auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
auth-krb5.o \
- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
- kexgsss.o \
+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
+ gss-serv-gsi.o \
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o
static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- return(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)));
+static int gssapi_with_mic = 1; /* flag to toggle "gssapi-with-mic" vs.
+ "gssapi" */
+
+static int
+userauth_external(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
++ return(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)));
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
*/
gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+ /* client may have used empty username to determine target
+ name from GSSAPI context */
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b2, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex");
+
+ gssbuf2.value = buffer_ptr(&b2);
+ gssbuf2.length = buffer_len(&b2);
+
/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
- &gssbuf, &mic))))
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
- authctxt->pw));
+ &gssbuf, &mic))) ||
+ !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
+ &gssbuf2, &mic)))) {
+ if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
+ }
+ }
buffer_free(&b);
+ buffer_free(&b2);
xfree(mic.value);
return (authenticated);
packet_check_eom();
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
- authctxt->pw));
+ /* user should be set if valid but we double-check here */
+ if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
+ } else {
+ authenticated = 0;
+ }
authctxt->postponed = 0;
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+ gssapi_set_username(authctxt);
+
if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
- authenticated =
- PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+ if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated =
++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+ } else {
- authenticated = 0;
++ authenticated = 0;
+ }
else
logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
/* now we can break out */
authctxt->success = 1;
} else {
-
+ /* Dont count server configuration issues against the client */
/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
- (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
+ (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
authctxt->failures++;
if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--- /dev/null
- &ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#ifdef GSI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+#include <globus_gss_assist.h>
+
+static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name);
+static int ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char **user);
+static void ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client);
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_gsi_mech = {
+ "dZuIebMjgUqaxvbF7hDbAw==",
+ "GSI",
+ {9, "\x2B\x06\x01\x04\x01\x9B\x50\x01\x01"},
+ NULL,
+ &ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok,
+ &ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname,
++ &ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds,
++ NULL
+};
+
+/*
+ * Check if this user is OK to login under GSI. User has been authenticated
+ * as identity in global 'client_name.value' and is trying to log in as passed
+ * username in 'name'.
+ *
+ * Returns non-zero if user is authorized, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+{
+ int authorized = 0;
+ globus_result_t res;
+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
+ char lname[256] = "";
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE
+ if (globus_module_activate(GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+/* use new globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() interface if available */
+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
+ debug("calling globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize()");
+ if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
+ (res = globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize(client->context, "ssh",
+ name, lname, 256))) {
+ debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
+ } else if (lname && lname[0] && strcmp(name, lname) != 0) {
+ debug("GSI user maps to %s, not %s", lname, name);
+ } else {
+ authorized = 1;
+ }
+#else
+ debug("calling globus_gss_assist_userok()");
+ if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
+ (res = (globus_gss_assist_userok(client->displayname.value,
+ name)))) {
+ debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
+ } else {
+ authorized = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ logit("GSI user %s is%s authorized as target user %s",
+ (char *) client->displayname.value, (authorized ? "" : " not"), name);
+
+ return authorized;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the local username associated with the GSI credentials.
+ */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char **user)
+{
+ globus_result_t res;
+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
+ char lname[256] = "";
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE
+ if (globus_module_activate(GLOBUS_GSI_GSS_ASSIST_MODULE) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+/* use new globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize() interface if available */
+#ifdef HAVE_GLOBUS_GSS_ASSIST_MAP_AND_AUTHORIZE
+ debug("calling globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize()");
+ if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
+ (res = globus_gss_assist_map_and_authorize(client->context, "ssh",
+ NULL, lname, 256))) {
+ debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
+ logit("failed to map GSI user %s", (char *)client->displayname.value);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *user = strdup(lname);
+#else
+ debug("calling globus_gss_assist_gridmap()");
+ if (GLOBUS_SUCCESS !=
+ (res = globus_gss_assist_gridmap(client->displayname.value, user))) {
+ debug("%s", globus_error_print_chain(globus_error_get(res)));
+ logit("failed to map GSI user %s", (char *)client->displayname.value);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ logit("GSI user %s mapped to target user %s",
+ (char *) client->displayname.value, *user);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export GSI credentials to disk.
+ */
+static void
+ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major_status;
+ OM_uint32 minor_status;
+ gss_buffer_desc export_cred = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ char * p;
+
+ if (!client || !client->creds) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ major_status = gss_export_cred(&minor_status,
+ client->creds,
+ GSS_C_NO_OID,
+ 1,
+ &export_cred);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major_status) && major_status != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) {
+ Gssctxt *ctx;
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctx);
+ ctx->major = major_status;
+ ctx->minor = minor_status;
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, &gssapi_gsi_mech.oid);
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ p = strchr((char *) export_cred.value, '=');
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ logit("Failed to parse exported credentials string '%.100s'",
+ (char *)export_cred.value);
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &export_cred);
+ return;
+ }
+ *p++ = '\0';
+ if (strcmp((char *)export_cred.value,"X509_USER_DELEG_PROXY") == 0) {
+ client->store.envvar = strdup("X509_USER_PROXY");
+ } else {
+ client->store.envvar = strdup((char *)export_cred.value);
+ }
+ if (access(p, R_OK) == 0) {
+ if (client->store.filename) {
+ if (rename(p, client->store.filename) < 0) {
+ logit("Failed to rename %s to %s: %s", p,
+ client->store.filename, strerror(errno));
+ xfree(client->store.filename);
+ client->store.filename = strdup(p);
+ } else {
+ p = client->store.filename;
+ }
+ } else {
+ client->store.filename = strdup(p);
+ }
+ }
+ client->store.envval = strdup(p);
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
+#endif
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor_status, &export_cred);
+}
+
+#endif /* GSI */
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
#endif
static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
+static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_init();
+static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name);
+static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_localname(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char **user);
+static void ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client);
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+ "Kerberos",
+ {9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"},
+ NULL,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_localname,
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+};
/* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
return;
}
-ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
- "Kerberos",
- {9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"},
- NULL,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
- NULL,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
-};
-
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
+ &principal))) {
+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+
+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+
+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
+ ccache))) {
+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
#endif /* KRB5 */
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#include "session.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
&gssapi_null_mech,
};
+#ifdef GSS_C_GLOBUS_LIMITED_PROXY_FLAG
+static int limited = 0;
+#endif
- /* Unprivileged */
- char *
- ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
- gss_OID_set supported;
-
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
- return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
- NULL));
- }
-
- /* Unprivileged */
- int
- ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data) {
- Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
- int res;
-
- res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-
- return (res);
- }
-
/*
* Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
* Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
gss_OID_set supported;
gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
- /* Ask priviledged process what mechanisms it supports. */
- PRIVSEP(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported));
+
- if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
++ /* Ask privileged process what mechanisms it supports. */
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))))
+ return;
while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
{
int i = 0;
- if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
- ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
+ int equal = 0;
+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
++ /* Call gss_inquire_cred rather than gss_inquire_cred_by_mech
++ because GSI doesn't support the latter. -jbasney */
++
++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, &new_name,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
- gss_buffer_desc ename;
+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
+ new_name, &equal);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ if (!equal) {
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
+
+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
+ client->name = new_name;
+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ client->updated = 1;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
client->mech = NULL;
if (client->mech == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
- ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ /* Call gss_inquire_cred rather than gss_inquire_cred_by_mech
++ because GSI doesn't support the latter. -jbasney */
++
+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
&client->displayname, NULL))) {
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
debug("No suitable client data");
return 0;
}
+#ifdef GSS_C_GLOBUS_LIMITED_PROXY_FLAG
+ if (limited && options.gsi_allow_limited_proxy != 1) {
+ debug("limited proxy not acceptable for remote login");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
return 1;
- else {
+ } else {
/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
return (0);
}
+/* ssh_gssapi_checkmic() moved to gss-genr.c so it can be called by
+ kexgss_client(). */
+
+/* Priviledged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_localname(char **user)
+{
+ *user = NULL;
+ if (gssapi_client.displayname.length==0 ||
+ gssapi_client.displayname.value==NULL) {
+ debug("No suitable client data");
+ return(0);;
+ }
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->localname) {
+ return((*gssapi_client.mech->localname)(&gssapi_client,user));
+ } else {
+ debug("Unknown client authentication type");
+ }
+ return(0);
+}
+
+ /* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
+ *
+ * In the child, we want to :
+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
+ */
+
+ /* Stuff for PAM */
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+ }
+ #endif
+
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
+ int ok;
+ int ret;
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
+ char *envstr;
+ #endif
+
+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return;
+
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
+
+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
+ */
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (!use_privsep) {
+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
+ &pamconv, &pamh);
+ if (ret)
+ return;
+
+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
+
+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
+ if (!ret)
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+ }
+
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
+ return 0;
+
+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
+ else
+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
+
+ restore_uid();
+
+ return ok;
+ }
+
#endif
#include "dh.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
+static void kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt);
+ extern ServerOptions options;
void
kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-- packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_put_string((char *)send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
packet_send();
gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
}
} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+ kex_gss_send_error(ctxt);
if (send_tok.length > 0) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-- packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_put_string((char *)send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
packet_send();
}
- fatal("accept_ctx died");
+ packet_disconnect("GSSAPI Key Exchange handshake failed");
}
if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
kex_finish(kex);
+
+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
+ * just exchanged. */
+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
}
+
+static void
+kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
+ char *errstr;
+ OM_uint32 maj,min;
+
+ errstr=PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt,&maj,&min));
+ if (errstr) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR);
+ packet_put_int(maj);
+ packet_put_int(min);
+ packet_put_cstring(errstr);
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ /* XXX - We should probably log the error locally here */
+ xfree(errstr);
+ }
+}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_error(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_localname(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, 0, mm_answer_gss_error},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 0, mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
return (authenticated);
}
- int
- mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
- {
- gss_buffer_desc data;
- gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 major, minor;
- u_int len;
-
- data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- data.length = len;
- if (data.length != 20)
- fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, (int)data.length);
-
- /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
- if (session_id2_len == 0) {
- session_id2_len = data.length;
- session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
- memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
- }
- major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
-
- xfree(data.value);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, major);
- buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
-
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
-
- gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
-
- /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-
- return (0);
- }
-
+int
+mm_answer_gss_error(int socket, Buffer *m) {
+ OM_uint32 major,minor;
+ char *msg;
+
+ msg=ssh_gssapi_last_error(gsscontext,&major,&minor);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m,major);
+ buffer_put_int(m,minor);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m,msg);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket,MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR,m);
+
+ xfree(msg);
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(int socket, Buffer *m) {
+ OM_uint32 major,minor;
+ gss_OID_set mech_set;
+ size_t i;
+
+ major=gss_indicate_mechs(&minor, &mech_set);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
+ buffer_put_int(m, mech_set->count);
+ for (i=0; i < mech_set->count; i++) {
+ buffer_put_string(m, mech_set->elements[i].elements,
+ mech_set->elements[i].length);
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MECHGLUE) /* mechglue memory management bug ??? */
+ gss_release_oid_set(&minor,&mech_set);
+#endif
+
+ mm_request_send(socket,MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS,m);
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_localname(int socket, Buffer *m) {
+ char *name;
+
+ ssh_gssapi_localname(&name);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ if (name) {
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
+ debug3("%s: sending result %s", __func__, name);
+ xfree(name);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, "");
+ debug3("%s: sending result \"\"", __func__);
+ }
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME, m);
+
+ return(0);
+}
++
+ int
+ mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+ {
+ gss_buffer_desc data;
+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ data.length = len;
+ if (data.length != 20)
+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
+ (int) data.length);
+
+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+ session_id2_len = data.length;
+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
+ }
+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
+
+ xfree(data.value);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
+
+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ int
+ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ int ok;
+
+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
+
+ xfree(store.filename);
+ xfree(store.envvar);
+ xfree(store.envval);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+
+ return(0);
+ }
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#ifdef JPAKE
MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSLOCALNAME, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
return (authenticated);
}
- OM_uint32
- mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
- {
- Buffer m;
- OM_uint32 major;
- u_int len;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
-
- major = buffer_get_int(&m);
- hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
- hash->length = len;
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return(major);
- }
-
+char *
+mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctx, OM_uint32 *major, OM_uint32 *minor) {
+ Buffer m;
+ OM_uint32 maj,min;
+ char *errstr;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR, &m);
+
+ maj = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ min = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ if (major) *major=maj;
+ if (minor) *minor=min;
+
+ errstr=buffer_get_string(&m,NULL);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return(errstr);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_OID_set *mech_set)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ OM_uint32 major,minor;
+ int count;
+ gss_OID_desc oid;
+ u_int length;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSMECHS,
+ &m);
+ major=buffer_get_int(&m);
+ count=buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&minor,mech_set);
+ while(count-->0) {
+ oid.elements=buffer_get_string(&m,&length);
+ oid.length=length;
+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&minor,&oid,mech_set);
+ }
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return(major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(char **lname)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSLOCALNAME, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME", __func__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSLOCALNAME,
+ &m);
+
+ *lname = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ if (lname[0] == '\0') {
+ debug3("%s: gssapi identity mapping failed", __func__);
+ } else {
+ debug3("%s: gssapi identity mapped to %s", __func__, *lname);
+ }
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+ OM_uint32
+ mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
+ {
+ Buffer m;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
+
+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+ hash->length = len;
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return(major);
+ }
+
+ int
+ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
+ {
+ Buffer m;
+ int ok;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
+
+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (ok);
+ }
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#ifdef JPAKE
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
- int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+ int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(char **user);
+OM_uint32 mm_gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
+ gss_OID_set *mech_set);
+char *mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *maj, OM_uint32 *min);
+ int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
#else
{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", oUnsupported },
#endif
-
+ { "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
+ { "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll },
+ { "tcprcvbuf", oTcpRcvBuf },
+ { "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
+ { "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled },
+ { "hpnbuffersize", oHPNBufferSize },
{ NULL, oBadOption }
};
options->tun_remote = -1;
options->local_command = NULL;
options->permit_local_command = -1;
+ options->none_switch = -1;
+ options->none_enabled = -1;
+ options->hpn_disabled = -1;
+ options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
+ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
+ options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
options->visual_host_key = -1;
+ options->none_switch = -1;
+ options->none_enabled = -1;
+ options->hpn_disabled = -1;
+ options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
+ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
+ options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
+ options->none_switch = -1;
+ options->none_enabled = -1;
+ options->hpn_disabled = -1;
+ options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
+ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
+ options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
}
/*
if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ options->gss_authentication = 1;
if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
- options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ options->gss_keyex = 1;
if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = 1;
if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
- options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ options->gss_trust_dns = 1;
+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->gss_keyex = -1;
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy = -1;
+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+ if (options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy == -1)
+ options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy = 0;
+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds,
+ sGssDelegateCreds,
- sGssStrictAcceptor,
- sGssKeyEx,
+ sGssCredsPath,
+ sGsiAllowLimitedProxy,
- sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sNoneEnabled, sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize,
sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+ sNoneEnabled, sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize,
sDeprecated, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef GSSAPI
{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", sGssDelegateCreds, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapicredentialspath", sGssCredsPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#ifdef GSI
+ { "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sGsiAllowLimitedProxy, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapicredentialspath", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#ifdef GSI
+ { "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
+#ifdef SESSION_HOOKS
+ { "allowsessionhooks", sAllowSessionHooks, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "sessionhookstartupcmd", sSessionHookStartupCmd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "sessionhookshutdowncmd", sSessionHookShutdownCmd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
goto parse_flag;
++ case sGssCredsPath:
++ charptr = &options->gss_creds_path;
++ goto parse_filename;
++
case sGssStrictAcceptor:
intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
goto parse_flag;
- case sGssCredsPath:
- charptr = &options->gss_creds_path;
- goto parse_filename;
+ case sGssStoreRekey:
+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
+ goto parse_flag;
++#ifdef GSI
+ case sGsiAllowLimitedProxy:
+ intptr = &options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy;
+ goto parse_flag;
++#endif
+
+#ifdef SESSION_HOOKS
+ case sAllowSessionHooks:
+ intptr = &options->session_hooks_allow;
+ goto parse_flag;
+ case sSessionHookStartupCmd:
+ case sSessionHookShutdownCmd:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: empty session hook command",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (opcode==sSessionHookStartupCmd)
+ options->session_hooks_startup_cmd = strdup(arg);
+ else
+ options->session_hooks_shutdown_cmd = strdup(arg);
+ break;
+#endif
+
case sPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
* /etc/passwd */
int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket
* file on logout. */
+#ifdef SESSION_HOOKS
+ int session_hooks_allow; /* If true, permit user hooks */
+ char* session_hooks_startup_cmd; /* cmd to be executed before */
+ char* session_hooks_shutdown_cmd; /* cmd to be executed after */
+#endif
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
++ int gsi_allow_limited_proxy; /* If true, accept limited proxies */
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
- int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ int gss_deleg_creds; /* If true, store delegated GSSAPI credentials*/
+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
- int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ char* gss_creds_path; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
- int gsi_allow_limited_proxy; /* If true, accept limited proxies */
+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ int gss_store_rekey;
int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
gss_buffer_desc displayname;
gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
gss_cred_id_t creds;
+ gss_name_t name;
struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ gss_ctx_id_t context;
+ int used;
+ int updated;
} ssh_gssapi_client;
typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
OM_uint32 minor; /* both */
gss_ctx_id_t context; /* both */
gss_name_t name; /* both */
- gss_OID oid; /* client */
+ gss_OID oid; /* both */
gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
gss_name_t client; /* server */
- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
} Gssctxt;
extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
- int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
+ int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+ int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+int ssh_gssapi_localname(char **name);
+
/* In the server */
- typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
- char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host);
- char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *);
+ typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
+ const char *);
+ char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
+ char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
+ const char *);
gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
- int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *);
+ int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
+ const char *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
- int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- char * ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
- int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
+#ifdef MECHGLUE
+gss_cred_id_t __gss_get_mechanism_cred
+ (gss_cred_id_t, /* union_cred */
+ gss_OID /* mech_type */
+ );
+#endif
+
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+ int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
+
+ int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
The default is
-.Dq no .
+.Dq yes .
Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
+ If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
+ connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
+ identity will be used.
.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
The default is
-.Dq no .
+.Dq yes .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+ If set to
+ .Dq yes
+ then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
+ ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
+ credentials to a session on the server.
+ The default is
-.Dq no .
++.Dq yes .
.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
Set to
- .Dq yes
- to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
+ .Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
the name of the host being connected to. If
- .Dq no ,
- the hostname entered on the
+ .Dq no, the hostname entered on the
command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
The default is
-.Dq no .
+.Dq yes .
This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
Indicates that
extern char *client_version_string;
extern char *server_version_string;
extern Options options;
+ extern Kex *xxx_kex;
+
+ /* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */
+ /* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */
+
+ extern int tty_flag;
+/* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */
+/* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */
+
+extern int tty_flag;
+
+/* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */
+/* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */
+
+extern int tty_flag;
+
/*
* SSH2 key exchange
*/
xfree(lang);
}
- static int attempt = 0;
+#ifdef GSI
+extern
+const gss_OID_desc * const gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl;
+#define is_gsi_oid(oid) \
+ (oid->length == gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl->length && \
+ (memcmp(oid->elements, gss_mech_globus_gssapi_openssl->elements, \
+ oid->length) == 0))
+#endif
+
+int
+userauth_external(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
- if (attempt++ >= 1)
- return 0;
++ static int attempt = 0;
+
- debug2("userauth_external");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
++ if (attempt++ >= 1)
++ return 0;
+
+ /* The client MUST NOT try this method if initial key exchange
+ was not performed using a GSSAPI-based key exchange
+ method. */
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
+ debug2("gsskex not performed, skipping external-keyx");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
- if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
- packet_put_cstring("");
++ debug2("userauth_external");
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+#ifdef GSI
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
++ if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
++ packet_put_cstring("");
+ } else {
+#endif
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- return 1;
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+#ifdef GSI
+ }
+#endif
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
++ packet_send();
++ packet_write_wait();
++ return 1;
+}
int
userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
return (0);
}
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
- "gssapi-keyex");
+#ifdef GSI
- if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex");
++ if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex");
+ } else {
+#endif
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
- "gssapi-keyex");
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
+#ifdef GSI
+ }
+#endif
gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
}
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
- packet_put_cstring("");
+#ifdef GSI
++ if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
++ packet_put_cstring("");
+ } else {
+#endif
packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+#ifdef GSI
+ }
+#endif
packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
The default is
.Dq yes .
Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPICredentialsPath
++If specified, the delegated GSSAPI credential is stored in the
++given path, overwriting any existing credentials.
++Paths can be specified with syntax similar to the AuthorizedKeysFile
++option (i.e., accepting %h and %u tokens).
++When using this option,
++setting 'GssapiCleanupCredentials no' is recommended,
++so logging out of one session
++doesn't remove the credentials in use by another session of
++the same user.
++Currently only implemented for the GSI mechanism.
++.It Cm GSIAllowLimitedProxy
++Specifies whether to accept limited proxy credentials for
++authentication.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
a client authenticates against. If
#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_5.2"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
- #define SSH_HPN "-hpn13v5"
+ #define SSH_HPN "-hpn13v6"
-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN
+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN \
+ NCSA_VERSION GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION MGLUE_VERSION
andersk / gssapi-openssh.git / commitdiff
