+20090615
+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
+ sshd.c ]
+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
+ Cast data.length before printing
+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
+
+20090201
+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
+
+20080404
+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
+ Stoichkov
+
20070317
- [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
- kexgssc.o \
- entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o
+ entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o \
+ kexgssc.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
auth-krb5.o \
- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
- kexgsss.o \
+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
gss-serv-gsi.o \
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
packet_check_eom();
if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
- return(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)));
+ return(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)));
}
return 0;
}
!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
&gssbuf2, &mic)))) {
if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->pw));
}
}
/* user should be set if valid but we double-check here */
if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->pw));
} else {
authenticated = 0;
}
if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
if (authctxt->valid && authctxt->user && authctxt->user[0]) {
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+ authenticated =
+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
} else {
- authenticated = 0;
+ authenticated = 0;
}
else
logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
/* Dont count server configuration issues against the client */
/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
- (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
+ (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
authctxt->failures++;
if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "port listener", 1);
- else
- c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
- hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 0, "port listener", 1);
+ else
+ c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+ hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "port listener", 1);
c->path = xstrdup(host);
c->host_port = port_to_connect;
c->listening_port = listen_port;
/* Processor cacheline length */
#define CACHELINE_LEN 64
+
+/* Collect thread stats and print at cancellation when in debug mode */
+/* #define CIPHER_THREAD_STATS */
+
+/* Use single-byte XOR instead of 8-byte XOR */
+/* #define CIPHER_BYTE_XOR */
/*-------------------- END TUNABLES --------------------*/
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_ctr_mt(void);
+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
+/*
+ * Struct to collect thread stats
+ */
+struct thread_stats {
+ u_int fills;
+ u_int skips;
+ u_int waits;
+ u_int drains;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Debug print the thread stats
+ * Use with pthread_cleanup_push for displaying at thread cancellation
+ */
+static void
+thread_loop_stats(void *x)
+{
+ struct thread_stats *s = x;
+
+ debug("tid %lu - %u fills, %u skips, %u waits", pthread_self(),
+ s->fills, s->skips, s->waits);
+}
+
+ #define STATS_STRUCT(s) struct thread_stats s
+ #define STATS_INIT(s) { memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); }
+ #define STATS_FILL(s) { s.fills++; }
+ #define STATS_SKIP(s) { s.skips++; }
+ #define STATS_WAIT(s) { s.waits++; }
+ #define STATS_DRAIN(s) { s.drains++; }
+#else
+ #define STATS_STRUCT(s)
+ #define STATS_INIT(s)
+ #define STATS_FILL(s)
+ #define STATS_SKIP(s)
+ #define STATS_WAIT(s)
+ #define STATS_DRAIN(s)
+#endif
+
/* Keystream Queue state */
enum {
KQINIT,
{
struct kq q[NUMKQ];
AES_KEY aes_ctx;
+ STATS_STRUCT(stats);
u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
pthread_t tid[CIPHER_THREADS];
int state;
thread_loop(void *x)
{
AES_KEY key;
+ STATS_STRUCT(stats);
struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c = x;
struct kq *q;
int i;
int qidx;
+ /* Threads stats on cancellation */
+ STATS_INIT(stats);
+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
+ pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_stats, &stats);
+#endif
+
/* Thread local copy of AES key */
memcpy(&key, &c->aes_ctx, sizeof(key));
}
ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * (NUMKQ - 1), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
+ STATS_FILL(stats);
pthread_cond_broadcast(&q->cond);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
}
+ else
+ STATS_SKIP(stats);
/*
* Normal case is to find empty queues and fill them, skipping over
pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
pthread_cleanup_push(thread_loop_cleanup, &q->lock);
while (q->qstate == KQDRAINING || q->qstate == KQINIT) {
+ STATS_WAIT(stats);
pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
}
pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
/* If filling or full, somebody else got it, skip */
if (q->qstate != KQEMPTY) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
+ STATS_SKIP(stats);
continue;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
ssh_ctr_add(q->ctr, KQLEN * (NUMKQ - 1), AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
q->qstate = KQFULL;
+ STATS_FILL(stats);
pthread_cond_signal(&q->cond);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&q->lock);
}
+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
+ /* Stats */
+ pthread_cleanup_pop(1);
+#endif
+
return NULL;
}
q = &c->q[c->qidx];
pthread_mutex_lock(&q->lock);
while (q->qstate != KQFULL) {
+ STATS_WAIT(c->stats);
pthread_cond_wait(&q->cond, &q->lock);
}
q->qstate = KQDRAINING;
/* Mark consumed queue empty and signal producers */
pthread_mutex_lock(&oldq->lock);
oldq->qstate = KQEMPTY;
+ STATS_DRAIN(c->stats);
pthread_cond_broadcast(&oldq->cond);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&oldq->lock);
}
pthread_cond_init(&c->q[i].cond, NULL);
}
+ STATS_INIT(c->stats);
+
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
}
int i;
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+#ifdef CIPHER_THREAD_STATS
+ debug("main thread: %u drains, %u waits", c->stats.drains,
+ c->stats.waits);
+#endif
/* Cancel pregen threads */
for (i = 0; i < CIPHER_THREADS; i++)
pthread_cancel(c->tid[i]);
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
/* import options */
extern Options options;
/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
if (!rekeying) {
channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+
+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
+ need_rekeying = 1;
+ }
+
if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
debug("need rekeying");
xxx_kex->done = 0;
#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000
#define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR 0x02000000
#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000
-#define SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW 0x08000000
+#define SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW 0x08000000
void enable_compat13(void);
void enable_compat20(void);
[Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
- m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv)
- AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [],
- AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
- [#include <bsm/audit.h>]
- AC_DEFINE(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE, 1,
- [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too])
- )
AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
[SessionCreate(0, 0);],
fi],
[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
)
+ m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv)
+ AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [],
+ AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+ [#include <bsm/audit.h>]
+ AC_DEFINE(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE, 1,
+ [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too])
+ )
;;
*-*-dragonfly*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.19 2007/06/12 11:56:15 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
*/
char *
-ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host) {
+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
gss_OID_set gss_supported;
OM_uint32 min_status;
- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
+ return NULL;
return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
- host));
+ host, client));
}
char *
ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
- const char *data) {
+ const char *host, const char *client) {
Buffer buf;
size_t i;
int oidpos, enclen;
oidpos = 0;
for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
- (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), data)) {
+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
switch (kex_type) {
case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
break;
case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
break;
case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
break;
default:
}
ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
return (ctx->major);
}
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+ gss_name_t gssname;
+ OM_uint32 status;
+ gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
+
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
+
+ if (!ctx->major)
+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
+
+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+
+ if (ctx->major)
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+ return(ctx->major);
+}
+
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
}
/* Priviledged when used by server */
-/* Moved here from gss-serv.c because called by kexgss_client(). */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
- if (ctx == NULL)
- return -1;
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
- return (ctx->major);
+ return (ctx->major);
}
void
}
int
-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
+ const char *client)
{
gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 major, minor;
ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
+
if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
NULL);
return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
}
+int
+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+ static gss_name_t name;
+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
+ int equal;
+ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
+
+ now = time(NULL);
+
+ if (ctxt) {
+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
+
+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
+
+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
+ saved_lifetime+= now;
+ } else {
+ /* Handle the error */
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (now - last_call < 10)
+ return 0;
+
+ last_call = now;
+
+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+ return 0;
+
+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
+ return 0;
+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return 0;
+
+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
NULL,
&ssh_gssapi_gsi_userok,
&ssh_gssapi_gsi_localname,
- &ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds
+ &ssh_gssapi_gsi_storecreds,
+ NULL
};
/*
/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
NULL,
&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
&ssh_gssapi_krb5_localname,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
};
/* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
return;
}
+int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
+ &principal))) {
+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+
+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
+
+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+
+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
+ ccache))) {
+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
#endif /* KRB5 */
#endif /* GSSAPI */
/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#include "session.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
{ GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}};
+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
#ifdef KRB5
extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
static int limited = 0;
#endif
-/* Unprivileged */
-char *
-ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
- gss_OID_set supported;
-
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
- return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
- NULL));
-}
-
-/* Unprivileged */
-int
-ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data) {
- Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
- int res;
-
- res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-
- return (res);
-}
-
/*
* Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
* Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
-
/* Privileged */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
}
+/* Unprivileged */
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
+ gss_OID_set supported;
+
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
+ NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
+ const char *dummy) {
+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
+ int res;
+
+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+
+ return (res);
+}
+
/* Unprivileged */
void
ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
gss_OID_set supported;
gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
- /* Ask priviledged process what mechanisms it supports. */
- PRIVSEP(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported));
+
+ /* Ask privileged process what mechanisms it supports. */
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))))
+ return;
while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
{
int i = 0;
+ int equal = 0;
+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ /* Call gss_inquire_cred rather than gss_inquire_cred_by_mech
+ because GSI doesn't support the latter. -jbasney */
+
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+ ctx->client_creds, &new_name,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
- gss_buffer_desc ename;
+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
+ new_name, &equal);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ if (!equal) {
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
+
+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
+ client->name = new_name;
+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ client->updated = 1;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
client->mech = NULL;
if (client->mech == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ /* Call gss_inquire_cred rather than gss_inquire_cred_by_mech
+ because GSI doesn't support the latter. -jbasney */
+
+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+ ctx->client_creds, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
&client->displayname, NULL))) {
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
return (ctx->major);
}
+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
+
/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
/* Privileged */
int
-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
{
OM_uint32 lmin;
}
#endif
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
return 1;
- else {
+ } else {
/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
return(0);
}
+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
+ *
+ * In the child, we want to :
+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
+ */
+
+/* Stuff for PAM */
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+#endif
+
+void
+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
+ int ok;
+ int ret;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
+ char *envstr;
+#endif
+
+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return;
+
+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
+
+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
+ */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (!use_privsep) {
+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
+ &pamconv, &pamh);
+ if (ret)
+ return;
+
+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
+
+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
+ if (!ret)
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
+ return 0;
+
+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
+ else
+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
+
+ restore_uid();
+
+ return ok;
+}
+
#endif
int gss_deleg_creds;
int gss_trust_dns;
char *gss_host;
+ char *gss_client;
#endif
char *client_version_string;
char *server_version_string;
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "includes.h"
+
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
BIGNUM *g = NULL;
u_char *kbuf, *hash;
u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
+ u_char *empty = "";
char *msg;
char *lang;
int type = 0;
if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
-
+
+ if (kex->gss_client &&
+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
+
switch (kex->kex_type) {
case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
dh = dh_new_group1();
klen = DH_size(dh);
kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
+ if (kout < 0)
+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
shared_secret = BN_new();
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf,kout, shared_secret);
+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
xfree(kbuf);
kex->server_version_string,
buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
- serverhostkey, slen, /* server host key */
+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
dh->pub_key, /* e */
dh_server_pub, /* f */
shared_secret, /* K */
kex->server_version_string,
buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
- serverhostkey, slen,
+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
min, nbits, max,
dh->p, dh->g,
dh->pub_key,
memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
}
+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
+
if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
gss_kex_context = ctxt;
else
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#include "dh.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
static void kex_gss_send_error(Gssctxt *ctxt);
+extern ServerOptions options;
void
kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
int type = 0;
gss_OID oid;
+ char *mechs;
/* Initialise GSSAPI */
* into life
*/
if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
- ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
+ xfree(mechs);
debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
- packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+ packet_put_string((char *)send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
packet_send();
gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
}
kex_gss_send_error(ctxt);
if (send_tok.length > 0) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
- packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+ packet_put_string((char *)send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
packet_send();
}
packet_disconnect("GSSAPI Key Exchange handshake failed");
klen = DH_size(dh);
kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
+ if (kout < 0)
+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
shared_secret = BN_new();
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
xfree(kbuf);
fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
}
- BN_free(dh_client_pub);
+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
kex_finish(kex);
+
+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
+ * just exchanged. */
+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
}
static void
int mm_answer_gss_error(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_gss_localname(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, 0, mm_answer_gss_error},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSMECHS, 0, mm_answer_gss_indicate_mechs},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
#ifdef GSSAPI
- kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ }
#endif
kex->server = 1;
kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
OM_uint32 major;
u_int len;
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
goid.length = len;
OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
u_int len;
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
in.length = len;
major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
OM_uint32 ret;
u_int len;
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
gssbuf.length = len;
mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
{
int authenticated;
- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
return (authenticated);
}
-int
-mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- gss_buffer_desc data;
- gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 major, minor;
- u_int len;
-
- data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- data.length = len;
- if (data.length != 20)
- fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, (int)data.length);
-
- /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
- if (session_id2_len == 0) {
- session_id2_len = data.length;
- session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
- memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
- }
- major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
-
- xfree(data.value);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, major);
- buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
-
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
-
- gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
-
- /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
int
mm_answer_gss_error(int socket, Buffer *m) {
OM_uint32 major,minor;
return(0);
}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc data;
+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ data.length = len;
+ if (data.length != 20)
+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
+ (int) data.length);
+
+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+ session_id2_len = data.length;
+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
+ }
+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
+
+ xfree(data.value);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
+
+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ int ok;
+
+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
+
+ xfree(store.filename);
+ xfree(store.envvar);
+ xfree(store.envval);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#ifdef JPAKE
MONITOR_REQ_GSSERR, MONITOR_ANS_GSSERR,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
}
int
-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
{
Buffer m;
int authenticated = 0;
return (authenticated);
}
-OM_uint32
-mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
-{
- Buffer m;
- OM_uint32 major;
- u_int len;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
-
- major = buffer_get_int(&m);
- hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
- hash->length = len;
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- return(major);
-}
-
char *
mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctx, OM_uint32 *major, OM_uint32 *minor) {
Buffer m;
return(0);
}
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
+
+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+ hash->length = len;
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return(major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int ok;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
+
+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (ok);
+}
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#ifdef JPAKE
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
int mm_ssh_gssapi_localname(char **user);
OM_uint32 mm_gss_indicate_mechs(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_OID_set *mech_set);
char *mm_ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *maj, OM_uint32 *min);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
- oGssKeyEx,
- oGssTrustDns,
+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
{ "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
#endif
{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
- { "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
- { "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll },
- { "tcprcvbuf", oTcpRcvBuf },
- { "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
- { "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled },
- { "hpnbuffersize", oHPNBufferSize },
{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
- { "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
- { "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll },
- { "tcprcvbuf", oTcpRcvBuf },
- { "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
- { "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled },
- { "hpnbuffersize", oHPNBufferSize },
#ifdef JPAKE
{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication",
oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication },
#else
{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication", oUnsupported },
#endif
+ { "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
+ { "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll },
+ { "tcprcvbuf", oTcpRcvBuf },
+ { "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
+ { "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled },
+ { "hpnbuffersize", oHPNBufferSize },
{ NULL, oBadOption }
};
goto parse_flag;
case oGssKeyEx:
- intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
goto parse_flag;
case oGssDelegateCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
goto parse_flag;
+ case oGssClientIdentity:
+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case oBatchMode:
intptr = &options->batch_mode;
goto parse_flag;
options->gss_keyex = -1;
options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
+ options->none_switch = -1;
+ options->none_enabled = -1;
+ options->hpn_disabled = -1;
+ options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
+ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
+ options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
}
/*
options->gss_deleg_creds = 1;
if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
options->gss_trust_dns = 1;
+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
int challenge_response_authentication;
/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
- int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
int password_authentication; /* Try password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy = -1;
+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
options->chroot_directory = NULL;
+ options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
options->none_enabled = -1;
options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
options->hpn_disabled = -1;
options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
- options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
}
void
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
if (options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy == -1)
options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy = 0;
+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds,
sGssDelegateCreds,
- sGssStrictAcceptor,
- sGssKeyEx,
sGssCredsPath,
sGsiAllowLimitedProxy,
- sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sNoneEnabled, sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize,
sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+ sNoneEnabled, sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize,
sDeprecated, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sGssDelegateCreds, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapicredentialspath", sGssCredsPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef GSI
{ "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sGsiAllowLimitedProxy, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapicredentialspath", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef GSI
{ "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
#ifdef SESSION_HOOKS
{ "allowsessionhooks", sAllowSessionHooks, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sGssCredsPath:
+ charptr = &options->gss_creds_path;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
case sGssStrictAcceptor:
intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
goto parse_flag;
- case sGssCredsPath:
- charptr = &options->gss_creds_path;
- goto parse_filename;
+ case sGssStoreRekey:
+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
+ goto parse_flag;
+#ifdef GSI
case sGsiAllowLimitedProxy:
intptr = &options->gsi_allow_limited_proxy;
goto parse_flag;
+#endif
#ifdef SESSION_HOOKS
case sAllowSessionHooks:
#endif
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ int gsi_allow_limited_proxy; /* If true, accept limited proxies */
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
int gss_deleg_creds; /* If true, store delegated GSSAPI credentials*/
- int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
- int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
char* gss_creds_path; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
- int gsi_allow_limited_proxy; /* If true, accept limited proxies */
+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ int gss_store_rekey;
int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
char *filename;
char *envvar;
char *envval;
+ struct passwd *owner;
void *data;
} ssh_gssapi_ccache;
gss_buffer_desc displayname;
gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
gss_cred_id_t creds;
+ gss_name_t name;
struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
gss_ctx_id_t context;
+ int used;
+ int updated;
} ssh_gssapi_client;
typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
} ssh_gssapi_mech;
typedef struct {
gss_OID oid; /* both */
gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
gss_name_t client; /* server */
- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
} Gssctxt;
extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
int ssh_gssapi_localname(char **name);
/* In the server */
-typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host);
-char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *);
+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
+ const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
+ const char *);
gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
-int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
+ const char *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-char * ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
#ifdef MECHGLUE
gss_cred_id_t __gss_get_mechanism_cred
);
#endif
+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
+
+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
The default is
.Dq yes .
Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
+identity will be used.
.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
The default is
.Dq yes .
-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+If set to
+.Dq yes
+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
+credentials to a session on the server.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
Set to
-.Dq yes
-to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
the name of the host being connected to. If
-.Dq no ,
-the hostname entered on the
+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
The default is
.Dq yes .
extern char *client_version_string;
extern char *server_version_string;
extern Options options;
+extern Kex *xxx_kex;
+
+/* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */
+/* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */
+
+extern int tty_flag;
/* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */
/* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */
else
gss_host = host;
- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host);
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
if (gss) {
debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
"%s,null", orig);
+ xfree(gss);
}
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
#ifdef GSSAPI
- kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+ }
#endif
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
#ifdef GSSAPI
- kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
- kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
- kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+ }
#endif
xxx_kex = kex;
* once. */
if (gss_supported == NULL)
- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
+ gss_supported = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
/* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
- &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host)) {
+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
} else {
mech++;
int
userauth_external(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- static int attempt = 0;
+ static int attempt = 0;
- if (attempt++ >= 1)
- return 0;
+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
+ return 0;
/* The client MUST NOT try this method if initial key exchange
was not performed using a GSSAPI-based key exchange
return 0;
}
- debug2("userauth_external");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ debug2("userauth_external");
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
#ifdef GSI
- if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
- packet_put_cstring("");
+ if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
+ packet_put_cstring("");
} else {
#endif
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
#ifdef GSI
}
#endif
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
- packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- return 1;
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ return 1;
}
int
userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
}
#ifdef GSI
- if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex");
+ if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, "", authctxt->service, "gssapi-keyex");
} else {
#endif
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
- "gssapi-keyex");
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
+ "gssapi-keyex");
#ifdef GSI
}
#endif
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
#ifdef GSI
- if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
- packet_put_cstring("");
+ if (options.implicit && is_gsi_oid(gss_kex_context->oid)) {
+ packet_put_cstring("");
} else {
#endif
packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
+ /* set the HPN options for the child */
+ channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
+
/*
* We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of
* get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked.
}
#endif
- /* set the HPN options for the child */
- channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
-
/*
* We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
* successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
}
#endif
- /* start key exchange */
/* start key exchange */
kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
#ifdef GSSAPI
- kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ }
#endif
kex->server = 1;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
The default is
.Dq yes .
Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPICredentialsPath
+If specified, the delegated GSSAPI credential is stored in the
+given path, overwriting any existing credentials.
+Paths can be specified with syntax similar to the AuthorizedKeysFile
+option (i.e., accepting %h and %u tokens).
+When using this option,
+setting 'GssapiCleanupCredentials no' is recommended,
+so logging out of one session
+doesn't remove the credentials in use by another session of
+the same user.
+Currently only implemented for the GSI mechanism.
+.It Cm GSIAllowLimitedProxy
+Specifies whether to accept limited proxy credentials for
+authentication.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
a client authenticates against. If
and setting it to
.Dq no
may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
-.It Cm GSSAPICredentialsPath
-If specified, the delegated GSSAPI credential is stored in the
-given path, overwriting any existing credentials.
-Paths can be specified with syntax similar to the AuthorizedKeysFile
-option (i.e., accepting %h and %u tokens).
-When using this option,
-setting 'GssapiCleanupCredentials no' is recommended,
-so logging out of one session
-doesn't remove the credentials in use by another session of
-the same user.
-Currently only implemented for the GSI mechanism.
-.It Cm GSIAllowLimitedProxy
-Specifies whether to accept limited proxy credentials for
-authentication.
-The default is
+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
.Dq no .
.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_5.2"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
-#define SSH_HPN "-hpn13v5"
+#define SSH_HPN "-hpn13v6"
#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN \
NCSA_VERSION GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION MGLUE_VERSION
andersk / gssapi-openssh.git / commitdiff
