+20000309
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3
+ [ssh.h atomicio.c]
+ - int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@
+ [auth-rsa.c]
+ - delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup.
+ [cipher.c]
+ - void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@
+ [hostfile.c]
+ - remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments.
+ - remove unused variable
+ [log-client.c log-server.c]
+ - rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision
+ [packet.c]
+ - missing xfree()
+ - getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com
+ - use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i;
+ from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
+ [pty.c pty.h]
+ - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
+ pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
+ [readconf.c]
+ - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
+ [rsa.c]
+ - PKCS#1 padding
+ [scp.c]
+ - allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org
+ [servconf.c]
+ - typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de
+ - sync with sshd_config
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ - enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@
+ [ssh.1]
+ - Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE'
+ [ssh.c]
+ - suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp
+ - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ - missing xfree()
+ - retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp.
+ - read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host"
+ [sshd.8]
+ - ie. -> i.e.,
+ - do not link to a commercial page..
+ - sync with sshd_config
+ [sshd.c]
+ - no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net
+ - log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly.
+ - don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@
+ - make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding
+ - delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root
+ - oops, fix comment, too.
+ - missing xfree()
+ - move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too.
+ (http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907)
+ - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
+ pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
+ - create x11 cookie file
+ - fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen()
+ - version 1.2.3
+ - Cleaned up
+
20000308
- Configure fix from Hiroshi Takekawa <takekawa@sr3.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
/*
* ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==write
*/
-int
+ssize_t
atomicio(f, fd, s, n)
- int (*f) ();
+ ssize_t (*f) ();
int fd;
void *s;
size_t n;
{
- int res, pos = 0;
+ ssize_t res, pos = 0;
while (n > pos) {
res = (f) (fd, (char*)s + pos, n - pos);
int
auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n)
{
- BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge, *aux;
+ BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
RSA *pk;
- BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char buf[32], mdbuf[16], response[16];
MD5_CTX md;
unsigned int i;
encrypted_challenge = BN_new();
challenge = BN_new();
- aux = BN_new();
/* Generate a random challenge. */
BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0);
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
BN_mod(challenge, challenge, n, ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
/* Create the public key data structure. */
pk = RSA_new();
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
packet_send();
+ BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
packet_write_wait();
+ /* Wait for a response. */
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 16, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ response[i] = packet_get_char();
+
/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
-
- /* We will no longer need these. */
- BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
BN_clear_free(challenge);
- BN_clear_free(aux);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
- /* Wait for a response. */
- packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- packet_integrity_check(plen, 16, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- response[i] = packet_get_char();
/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
SSH_3CBC_ENCRYPT(des_key_schedule ks1,
des_key_schedule ks2, des_cblock * iv2,
des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock * iv3,
- void *dest, void *src,
+ unsigned char *dest, unsigned char *src,
unsigned int len)
{
des_cblock iv1;
memcpy(&iv1, iv2, 8);
des_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, ks1, &iv1, DES_ENCRYPT);
- memcpy(&iv1, (char *)dest + len - 8, 8);
+ memcpy(&iv1, dest + len - 8, 8);
des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks2, iv2, DES_DECRYPT);
memcpy(iv2, &iv1, 8); /* Note how iv1 == iv2 on entry and exit. */
des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks3, iv3, DES_ENCRYPT);
- memcpy(iv3, (char *)dest + len - 8, 8);
+ memcpy(iv3, dest + len - 8, 8);
}
void
SSH_3CBC_DECRYPT(des_key_schedule ks1,
des_key_schedule ks2, des_cblock * iv2,
des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock * iv3,
- void *dest, void *src,
+ unsigned char *dest, unsigned char *src,
unsigned int len)
{
des_cblock iv1;
memcpy(&iv1, iv2, 8);
des_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, ks3, iv3, DES_DECRYPT);
- memcpy(iv3, (char *)src + len - 8, 8);
+ memcpy(iv3, src + len - 8, 8);
des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks2, iv2, DES_ENCRYPT);
- memcpy(iv2, (char *)dest + len - 8, 8);
+ memcpy(iv2, dest + len - 8, 8);
des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks1, &iv1, DES_DECRYPT);
/* memcpy(&iv1, iv2, 8); */
SSH_3CBC_ENCRYPT(context->u.des3.key1,
context->u.des3.key2, &context->u.des3.iv2,
context->u.des3.key3, &context->u.des3.iv3,
- dest, (void *) src, len);
+ dest, (unsigned char *) src, len);
break;
case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
SSH_3CBC_DECRYPT(context->u.des3.key1,
context->u.des3.key2, &context->u.des3.iv2,
context->u.des3.key3, &context->u.des3.iv3,
- dest, (void *) src, len);
+ dest, (unsigned char *) src, len);
break;
case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.11 2000/01/04 00:07:59 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.13 2000/02/18 10:20:20 markus Exp $");
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssh.h"
/*
- * Reads a multiple-precision integer in hex from the buffer, and advances
+ * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
* the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is
* permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the
* last processed (and maybe modified) character. Note that this may modify
auth_rsa_read_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM * value)
{
char *cp = *cpp;
- int len, old;
+ int old;
/* Skip any leading whitespace. */
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
- /* Check that it begins with a hex digit. */
+ /* Check that it begins with a decimal digit. */
if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9')
return 0;
/* Save starting position. */
*cpp = cp;
- /* Move forward until all hex digits skipped. */
+ /* Move forward until all decimal digits skipped. */
for (; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++)
;
- /* Compute the length of the hex number. */
- len = cp - *cpp;
-
/* Save the old terminating character, and replace it by \0. */
old = *cp;
*cp = 0;
FILE *f;
char line[8192];
int linenum = 0;
- unsigned int bits, kbits, hostlen;
+ unsigned int kbits, hostlen;
char *cp, *cp2;
HostStatus end_return;
*/
end_return = HOST_NEW;
- /* size of modulus 'n' */
- bits = BN_num_bits(n);
-
/* Go trough the file. */
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
cp = line;
}
}
-#define SSH_MSGBUFSIZE 1024
+#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
void
do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
- char msgbuf[SSH_MSGBUFSIZE];
+ char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
if (level > log_level)
return;
log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
}
-#define SSH_MSGBUFSIZE 1024
+#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
void
do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
- char msgbuf[SSH_MSGBUFSIZE];
- char fmtbuf[SSH_MSGBUFSIZE];
+ char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+ char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
char *txt = NULL;
int pri = LOG_INFO;
{
unsigned int len, padded_len;
unsigned char *ucp;
- char buf[8], *cp;
+ char buf[8], *cp, *msg;
unsigned int checksum, stored_checksum;
restart:
/* Handle disconnect message. */
if ((unsigned char) buf[0] == SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
- log("Received disconnect: %.900s", packet_get_string(NULL));
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ log("Received disconnect: %.900s", msg);
+ xfree(msg);
fatal_cleanup();
}
/* Send debug messages as debugging output. */
if ((unsigned char) buf[0] == SSH_MSG_DEBUG) {
- debug("Remote: %.900s", packet_get_string(NULL));
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ xfree(msg);
goto restart;
}
/* Return type. */
void pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyname);
+void pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyname);
+
#endif /* PTY_H */
if (options->forward_agent == -1)
options->forward_agent = 1;
if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
- options->forward_x11 = 1;
+ options->forward_x11 = 0;
if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
options->gateway_ports = 0;
if (options->use_privileged_port == -1)
BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() failed");
BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out);
BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
if ((len = RSA_private_decrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
- RSA_SSLV23_PADDING)) <= 0)
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
fatal("rsa_private_decrypt() failed");
BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out);
} while (*++cp);
return (1);
-bad: fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name", cp0);
+bad: fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
return (0);
}
if (options->permit_root_login == -1)
options->permit_root_login = 1; /* yes */
if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
- options->ignore_rhosts = 0;
+ options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->check_mail == -1)
if (options->print_motd == -1)
options->print_motd = 1;
if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
- options->x11_forwarding = 1;
+ options->x11_forwarding = 0;
if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
- options->x11_display_offset = 1;
+ options->x11_display_offset = 10;
if (options->strict_modes == -1)
options->strict_modes = 1;
if (options->keepalives == -1)
if (options->rhosts_authentication == -1)
options->rhosts_authentication = 0;
if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
- options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 1;
+ options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
options->rsa_authentication = 1;
#ifdef KRB4
options->skey_authentication = 1;
#endif
if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
- options->permit_empty_passwd = 1;
+ options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
if (options->use_login == -1)
options->use_login = 0;
}
case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
- goto parse_int;
+ goto parse_flag;
case sRhostsAuthentication:
intptr = &options->rhosts_authentication;
void
do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
{
- char *comment;
+ FILE *f;
+ BIGNUM *e, *n;
RSA *public_key;
+ char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024];
+ int i, skip = 0, num = 1, invalid = 1;
struct stat st;
if (!have_identity)
perror(identity_file);
exit(1);
}
+
public_key = RSA_new();
- if (!load_public_key(identity_file, public_key, &comment)) {
- char *cp, line[1024];
- BIGNUM *e, *n;
- int dummy, invalid = 0;
- FILE *f = fopen(identity_file, "r");
+ if (load_public_key(identity_file, public_key, &comment)) {
+ printf("%d %s %s\n", BN_num_bits(public_key->n),
+ fingerprint(public_key->e, public_key->n),
+ comment);
+ RSA_free(public_key);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ RSA_free(public_key);
+
+ f = fopen(identity_file, "r");
+ if (f != NULL) {
n = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
- if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
- cp = line;
- line[strlen(line) - 1] = '\0';
- if (auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &dummy, e, n)) {
- public_key->e = e;
- public_key->n = n;
- comment = xstrdup(cp ? cp : "no comment");
- } else {
- invalid = 1;
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ i = strlen(line) - 1;
+ if (line[i] != '\n') {
+ error("line %d too long: %.40s...", num, line);
+ skip = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ num++;
+ if (skip) {
+ skip = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ line[i] = '\0';
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+ continue ;
+ i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
+ if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
+ int quoted = 0;
+ comment = cp;
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ cp++; /* Skip both */
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ if (!*cp)
+ continue;
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ }
+ ep = cp;
+ if (auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &i, e, n)) {
+ invalid = 0;
+ comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
+ printf("%d %s %s\n", BN_num_bits(n),
+ fingerprint(e, n),
+ comment ? comment : "no comment");
}
- } else {
- invalid = 1;
- }
- if (invalid) {
- printf("%s is not a valid key file.\n", identity_file);
- BN_free(e);
- BN_free(n);
- exit(1);
}
+ BN_free(e);
+ BN_free(n);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ if (invalid) {
+ printf("%s is not a valid key file.\n", identity_file);
+ exit(1);
}
- printf("%d %s %s\n", BN_num_bits(public_key->n),
- fingerprint(public_key->e, public_key->n),
- comment);
- RSA_free(public_key);
exit(0);
}
usage(void)
{
printf("ssh-keygen version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
- printf("Usage: %s [-b bits] [-p] [-c] [-f file] [-P pass] [-N new-pass] [-C comment]\n", __progname);
+ printf("Usage: %s [-b bits] [-p] [-c] [-l] [-f file] [-P pass] [-N new-pass] [-C comment]\n", __progname);
exit(1);
}
.Dq yes
or
.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
.It Cm GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
forwarded ports.
.Dq VARNAME=value
to the environment.
.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
Records host keys for all hosts the user has logged into (that are not
in
A version of this library which includes support for the RSA algorithm
is required for proper operation.
.Sh AUTHOR
-Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-.Pp
-Issues can be found from the SSH WWW home page:
-.Pp
-.Dl http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh
-.Pp
OpenSSH
-is a derivative of the original (free) ssh 1.2.12 release, but with bugs
-removed and newer features re-added. Rapidly after the 1.2.12 release,
-newer versions bore successively more restrictive licenses. This version
-of OpenSSH
+is a derivative of the original (free) ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen,
+but with bugs removed and newer features re-added. Rapidly after the
+1.2.12 release, newer versions of the original ssh bore successively
+more restrictive licenses, and thus demand for a free version was born.
+This version of OpenSSH
.Bl -bullet
.It
has all components of a restrictive nature (i.e., patents, see
are chosen from
external libraries.
.It
-has been updated to support ssh protocol 1.5.
+has been updated to support ssh protocol 1.5, making it compatible with
+all other ssh protocol 1 clients and servers.
.It
contains added support for
.Xr kerberos 8
fprintf(stderr, " -k Disable Kerberos ticket and AFS token forwarding.\n");
#endif /* AFS */
fprintf(stderr, " -x Disable X11 connection forwarding.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -X Enable X11 connection forwarding.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -i file Identity for RSA authentication (default: ~/.ssh/identity).\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t Tty; allocate a tty even if command is given.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n");
struct addrinfo *ai = NULL;
int errgai;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
errgai = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai);
/*
* Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==write
*/
-int atomicio(int (*f)(), int fd, void *s, size_t n);
+ssize_t atomicio(ssize_t (*f)(), int fd, void *s, size_t n);
#ifdef KRB4
#include <krb.h>
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.53 2000/01/18 09:42:17 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.56 2000/02/18 08:50:33 markus Exp $");
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1;
sock = rresvport_af(&p, family);
if (sock < 0)
- fatal("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", family, strerror(errno));
- debug("Allocated local port %d.", p);
+ error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", family, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ debug("Allocated local port %d.", p);
} else {
/*
* Just create an ordinary socket on arbitrary port. We use
log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
"Reponse will be transmitted in clear text.");
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", challenge);
+ xfree(challenge);
fflush(stderr);
for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
if (i != 0)
/* Read other side\'s version identification. */
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
- if (read(connection_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1)
+ int len = read(connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
+ if (len < 0)
fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (len != 1)
+ fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host");
if (buf[i] == '\r') {
buf[i] = '\n';
buf[i + 1] = 0;
.Nm
does not start if this file is group/world-accessible.
.It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-Specifies that rhosts and shosts files will not be used in
-authentication.
+Specifies that
+.Pa .rhosts
+and
+.Pa .shosts
+files will not be used in authentication.
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
and
.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
are still used. The default is
-.Dq no .
+.Dq yes .
.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
Specifies whether
.Nm
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default
is
-.Dq yes .
+.Dq no .
.It Cm PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether the root can log in using
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The default is
-.Dq yes .
+.Dq no .
.It Cm RSAAuthentication
Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. The default is
.Dq yes .
X11 forwarding. This prevents
.Nm
from interfering with real X11 servers.
+The default is 10.
.It Cm X11Forwarding
Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The default is
-.Dq yes .
+.Dq no .
Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not improve security in any
way, as users can always install their own forwarders.
.El
machine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file
should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
.Sh AUTHOR
-Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-.Pp
-Information about new releases, mailing lists, and other related
-issues can be found from the SSH WWW home page:
-.Pp
-.Dl http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh.
-.Pp
OpenSSH
-is a derivative of the original (free) ssh 1.2.12 release, but with bugs
-removed and newer features re-added. Rapidly after the 1.2.12 release,
-newer versions bore successively more restrictive licenses. This version
-of OpenSSH
+is a derivative of the original (free) ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen,
+but with bugs removed and newer features re-added. Rapidly after the
+1.2.12 release, newer versions of the original ssh bore successively
+more restrictive licenses, and thus demand for a free version was born.
+This version of OpenSSH
.Bl -bullet
.It
has all components of a restrictive nature (i.e., patents, see
are chosen from
external libraries.
.It
-has been updated to support ssh protocol 1.5.
+has been updated to support ssh protocol 1.5, making it compatible with
+all other ssh protocol 1 clients and servers.
.It
contains added support for
.Xr kerberos 8
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.80 2000/01/20 15:19:22 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.90 2000/03/06 20:29:04 markus Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
const char *display, const char *auth_proto,
const char *auth_data, const char *ttyname);
+/*
+ * Remove local Xauthority file.
+ */
+void
+xauthfile_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
+{
+ debug("xauthfile_cleanup_proc called");
+
+ if (xauthfile != NULL) {
+ char *p;
+ unlink(xauthfile);
+ p = strrchr(xauthfile, '/');
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ *p = '\0';
+ rmdir(xauthfile);
+ }
+ xfree(xauthfile);
+ xauthfile = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Close all listening sockets
*/
char *
get_authname(int type)
{
+ static char buf[1024];
switch (type) {
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
return "password";
return "s/key";
#endif
}
- fatal("get_authname: unknown auth %d: internal error", type);
- return NULL;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
+ return buf;
}
/*
/* Cleanup user's local Xauthority file. */
if (xauthfile)
- unlink(xauthfile);
+ xauthfile_cleanup_proc(NULL);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
* DenyUsers or user's primary group is listed in DenyGroups, false will
* be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there, or
* if AllowGroups isn't empty and user isn't listed there, false will be
- * returned. Otherwise true is returned.
- * XXX This function should also check if user has a valid shell
+ * returned.
+ * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
+ * Otherwise true is returned.
*/
static int
allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
{
+ struct stat st;
struct group *grp;
int i;
#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
if (!pw)
return 0;
- /* XXX Should check for valid login shell */
+ /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
+ if (stat(pw->pw_shell, &st) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (!((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) && (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP))))
+ return 0;
/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
pw = getpwnam(user);
if (!pw || !allowed_user(pw))
do_fake_authloop(user);
+ xfree(user);
/* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
memset(&pwcopy, 0, sizeof(pwcopy));
if (getuid() != 0 && pw->pw_uid != getuid())
packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
- debug("Attempting authentication for %.100s.", user);
+ debug("Attempting authentication for %.100s.", pw->pw_name);
/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
if (options.password_authentication &&
get_remote_port(),
user);
- if (authenticated) {
#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (authenticated) {
if (!do_pam_account(pw->pw_name, client_user)) {
- if (client_user != NULL)
+ if (client_user != NULL) {
xfree(client_user);
-
+ client_user = NULL;
+ }
do_fake_authloop(pw->pw_name);
}
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
return;
}
+#else /* USE_PAM */
+ if (authenticated) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
if (client_user != NULL) {
xfree(client_user);
/* Try to send a fake s/key challenge. */
if (options.skey_authentication == 1 &&
(skeyinfo = skey_fake_keyinfo(user)) != NULL) {
+ password = NULL;
if (type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS) {
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
packet_put_string(skeyinfo, strlen(skeyinfo));
strncasecmp(password, "s/key", 5) == 0 ) {
packet_send_debug(skeyinfo);
}
+ if (password != NULL)
+ xfree(password);
}
#endif
if (attempt > AUTH_FAIL_MAX)
abort();
}
-
-/*
- * Remove local Xauthority file.
- */
-static void
-xauthfile_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
-{
- debug("xauthfile_cleanup_proc called");
-
- if (xauthfile != NULL) {
- unlink(xauthfile);
- xfree(xauthfile);
- xauthfile = NULL;
- }
-}
-
struct pty_cleanup_context {
const char *ttyname;
int pid;
{
int type;
int compression_level = 0, enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
- int have_pty = 0, ptyfd = -1, ttyfd = -1, xauthfd = -1;
+ int have_pty = 0, ptyfd = -1, ttyfd = -1;
int row, col, xpixel, ypixel, screen;
char ttyname[64];
char *command, *term = NULL, *display = NULL, *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
* by the client telling us, so we can equally well trust the client
* not to request anything bogus.)
*/
- channel_permit_all_opens();
+ if (!no_port_forwarding_flag)
+ channel_permit_all_opens();
/*
* We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
/* Setup to always have a local .Xauthority. */
xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "/tmp/XauthXXXXXX");
-
- if ((xauthfd = mkstemp(xauthfile)) != -1) {
- fchown(xauthfd, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
- close(xauthfd);
- fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, NULL);
- } else {
+ strlcpy(xauthfile, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
+ if (mkdtemp(xauthfile) == NULL) {
+ restore_uid();
+ error("private X11 dir: mkdtemp %s failed: %s",
+ xauthfile, strerror(errno));
xfree(xauthfile);
xauthfile = NULL;
+ goto fail;
}
+ strlcat(xauthfile, "/cookies", MAXPATHLEN);
+ open(xauthfile, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600);
+ restore_uid();
+ fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, NULL);
break;
#else /* XAUTH_PATH */
packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
const char *auth_data)
{
int pid, fdout;
+ int ptymaster;
const char *hostname;
time_t last_login_time;
char buf[100], *time_string;
*/
fdout = dup(ptyfd);
if (fdout < 0)
- packet_disconnect("dup failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ packet_disconnect("dup #1 failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* we keep a reference to the pty master */
+ ptymaster = dup(ptyfd);
+ if (ptymaster < 0)
+ packet_disconnect("dup #2 failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/* Enter interactive session. */
server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
- /* server_loop has not closed ptyfd and fdout. */
+ /* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */
/* Cancel the cleanup function. */
fatal_remove_cleanup(pty_cleanup_proc, (void *) &cleanup_context);
* the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
* while we're still cleaning up.
*/
- close(ptyfd);
- close(fdout);
+ if (close(ptymaster) < 0)
+ error("close(ptymaster): %s", strerror(errno));
}
/*
f = popen(XAUTH_PATH " -q -", "w");
if (f) {
fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", display, auth_proto, auth_data);
- fclose(f);
+ pclose(f);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s -q -\n", XAUTH_PATH);
}
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH-1.2.2"
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH-1.2.3"
andersk / openssh.git / commitdiff
