From: damien <damien>
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2000 10:27:49 +0000 (+0000)
Subject:  - OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3
X-Git-Tag: V_1_2_3_PRE1~5
X-Git-Url: http://andersk.mit.edu/gitweb/openssh.git/commitdiff_plain/c8d54615d40279fd33e21e6b10a67cca57656cbb

 - OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3
	[ssh.h atomicio.c]
	 - int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@
	[auth-rsa.c]
	 - delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup.
	[cipher.c]
	 - void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@
	[hostfile.c]
	 - remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments.
	 - remove unused variable
	[log-client.c log-server.c]
	 - rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision
	[packet.c]
	 - missing xfree()
	 - getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com
	 - use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i;
	from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
	[pty.c pty.h]
	 - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
   	pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
	[readconf.c]
	 - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
	[rsa.c]
	 - PKCS#1 padding
	[scp.c]
	 - allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org
	[servconf.c]
	 - typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de
	 - sync with sshd_config
	[ssh-keygen.c]
	 - enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@
	[ssh.1]
	 - Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE'
	[ssh.c]
	 - suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp
	 - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
	[sshconnect.c]
	 - missing xfree()
	 - retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp.
	 - read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host"
	[sshd.8]
	 - ie. -> i.e.,
	 - do not link to a commercial page..
	 - sync with sshd_config
	[sshd.c]
	 - no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net
	 - log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly.
	 - don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@
	 - make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding
	 - delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root
	 - oops, fix comment, too.
	 - missing xfree()
	 - move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too.
   	(http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907)
	 - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
      pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
	 - create x11 cookie file
	 - fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen()
	 - version 1.2.3
 - Cleaned up
---

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 4eb4ee6a..68c577f6 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,65 @@
+20000309
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3
+	[ssh.h atomicio.c]
+	 - int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@
+	[auth-rsa.c]
+	 - delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup.
+	[cipher.c]
+	 - void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@
+	[hostfile.c]
+	 - remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments.
+	 - remove unused variable
+	[log-client.c log-server.c]
+	 - rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision
+	[packet.c]
+	 - missing xfree()
+	 - getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com
+	 - use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i;
+	from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
+	[pty.c pty.h]
+	 - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to 
+   	pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
+	[readconf.c]
+	 - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
+	[rsa.c]
+	 - PKCS#1 padding
+	[scp.c]
+	 - allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org
+	[servconf.c]
+	 - typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de
+	 - sync with sshd_config
+	[ssh-keygen.c]
+	 - enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@
+	[ssh.1]
+	 - Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE'
+	[ssh.c]
+	 - suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp
+	 - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
+	[sshconnect.c]
+	 - missing xfree()
+	 - retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp.
+	 - read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host"
+	[sshd.8]
+	 - ie. -> i.e.,
+	 - do not link to a commercial page..
+	 - sync with sshd_config
+	[sshd.c]
+	 - no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net
+	 - log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly.
+	 - don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@
+	 - make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding
+	 - delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root
+	 - oops, fix comment, too.
+	 - missing xfree()
+	 - move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too.
+   	(http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907)
+	 - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to 
+      pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
+	 - create x11 cookie file
+	 - fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen()
+	 - version 1.2.3
+ - Cleaned up
+
 20000308
  - Configure fix from Hiroshi Takekawa <takekawa@sr3.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
 
diff --git a/atomicio.c b/atomicio.c
index 47f8190a..321af513 100644
--- a/atomicio.c
+++ b/atomicio.c
@@ -32,14 +32,14 @@ RCSID("$Id$");
 /*
  * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==write
  */
-int
+ssize_t
 atomicio(f, fd, s, n)
-	int (*f) ();
+	ssize_t (*f) ();
 	int fd;
 	void *s;
 	size_t n;
 {
-	int res, pos = 0;
+	ssize_t res, pos = 0;
 
 	while (n > pos) {
 		res = (f) (fd, (char*)s + pos, n - pos);
diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
index 2dcfd749..5fed5b6b 100644
--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rsa.c
@@ -68,9 +68,9 @@ extern unsigned char session_id[16];
 int
 auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n)
 {
-	BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge, *aux;
+	BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
 	RSA *pk;
-	BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+	BN_CTX *ctx;
 	unsigned char buf[32], mdbuf[16], response[16];
 	MD5_CTX md;
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -78,11 +78,12 @@ auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n)
 
 	encrypted_challenge = BN_new();
 	challenge = BN_new();
-	aux = BN_new();
 
 	/* Generate a random challenge. */
 	BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0);
+	ctx = BN_CTX_new();
 	BN_mod(challenge, challenge, n, ctx);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 
 	/* Create the public key data structure. */
 	pk = RSA_new();
@@ -99,8 +100,15 @@ auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n)
 	packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
 	packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
 	packet_send();
+	BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
 	packet_write_wait();
 
+	/* Wait for a response. */
+	packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+	packet_integrity_check(plen, 16, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		response[i] = packet_get_char();
+
 	/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
 	len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
 	if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
@@ -111,18 +119,7 @@ auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n)
 	MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
 	MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
 	MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
-
-	/* We will no longer need these. */
-	BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
 	BN_clear_free(challenge);
-	BN_clear_free(aux);
-	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-
-	/* Wait for a response. */
-	packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
-	packet_integrity_check(plen, 16, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
-	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		response[i] = packet_get_char();
 
 	/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
 	if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index c6ed6816..ddb2d0e3 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ void
 SSH_3CBC_ENCRYPT(des_key_schedule ks1,
 		 des_key_schedule ks2, des_cblock * iv2,
 		 des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock * iv3,
-		 void *dest, void *src,
+		 unsigned char *dest, unsigned char *src,
 		 unsigned int len)
 {
 	des_cblock iv1;
@@ -49,20 +49,20 @@ SSH_3CBC_ENCRYPT(des_key_schedule ks1,
 	memcpy(&iv1, iv2, 8);
 
 	des_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, ks1, &iv1, DES_ENCRYPT);
-	memcpy(&iv1, (char *)dest + len - 8, 8);
+	memcpy(&iv1, dest + len - 8, 8);
 
 	des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks2, iv2, DES_DECRYPT);
 	memcpy(iv2, &iv1, 8);	/* Note how iv1 == iv2 on entry and exit. */
 
 	des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks3, iv3, DES_ENCRYPT);
-	memcpy(iv3, (char *)dest + len - 8, 8);
+	memcpy(iv3, dest + len - 8, 8);
 }
 
 void
 SSH_3CBC_DECRYPT(des_key_schedule ks1,
 		 des_key_schedule ks2, des_cblock * iv2,
 		 des_key_schedule ks3, des_cblock * iv3,
-		 void *dest, void *src,
+		 unsigned char *dest, unsigned char *src,
 		 unsigned int len)
 {
 	des_cblock iv1;
@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ SSH_3CBC_DECRYPT(des_key_schedule ks1,
 	memcpy(&iv1, iv2, 8);
 
 	des_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, ks3, iv3, DES_DECRYPT);
-	memcpy(iv3, (char *)src + len - 8, 8);
+	memcpy(iv3, src + len - 8, 8);
 
 	des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks2, iv2, DES_ENCRYPT);
-	memcpy(iv2, (char *)dest + len - 8, 8);
+	memcpy(iv2, dest + len - 8, 8);
 
 	des_cbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, ks1, &iv1, DES_DECRYPT);
 	/* memcpy(&iv1, iv2, 8); */
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ cipher_encrypt(CipherContext *context, unsigned char *dest,
 		SSH_3CBC_ENCRYPT(context->u.des3.key1,
 				 context->u.des3.key2, &context->u.des3.iv2,
 				 context->u.des3.key3, &context->u.des3.iv3,
-				 dest, (void *) src, len);
+				 dest, (unsigned char *) src, len);
 		break;
 
 	case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ cipher_decrypt(CipherContext *context, unsigned char *dest,
 		SSH_3CBC_DECRYPT(context->u.des3.key1,
 				 context->u.des3.key2, &context->u.des3.iv2,
 				 context->u.des3.key3, &context->u.des3.iv3,
-				 dest, (void *) src, len);
+				 dest, (unsigned char *) src, len);
 		break;
 
 	case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
index 831ac592..ea92fa04 100644
--- a/hostfile.c
+++ b/hostfile.c
@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.11 2000/01/04 00:07:59 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.13 2000/02/18 10:20:20 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 
 /*
- * Reads a multiple-precision integer in hex from the buffer, and advances
+ * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
  * the pointer.  The integer must already be initialized.  This function is
  * permitted to modify the buffer.  This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the
  * last processed (and maybe modified) character.  Note that this may modify
@@ -31,26 +31,23 @@ int
 auth_rsa_read_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM * value)
 {
 	char *cp = *cpp;
-	int len, old;
+	int old;
 
 	/* Skip any leading whitespace. */
 	for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
 		;
 
-	/* Check that it begins with a hex digit. */
+	/* Check that it begins with a decimal digit. */
 	if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9')
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Save starting position. */
 	*cpp = cp;
 
-	/* Move forward until all hex digits skipped. */
+	/* Move forward until all decimal digits skipped. */
 	for (; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++)
 		;
 
-	/* Compute the length of the hex number. */
-	len = cp - *cpp;
-
 	/* Save the old terminating character, and replace it by \0. */
 	old = *cp;
 	*cp = 0;
@@ -179,7 +176,7 @@ check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
 	FILE *f;
 	char line[8192];
 	int linenum = 0;
-	unsigned int bits, kbits, hostlen;
+	unsigned int kbits, hostlen;
 	char *cp, *cp2;
 	HostStatus end_return;
 
@@ -198,9 +195,6 @@ check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
 	 */
 	end_return = HOST_NEW;
 
-	/* size of modulus 'n' */
-	bits = BN_num_bits(n);
-
 	/* Go trough the file. */
 	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
 		cp = line;
diff --git a/log-client.c b/log-client.c
index c1aeb32f..7726631b 100644
--- a/log-client.c
+++ b/log-client.c
@@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility ignored1, int ignored2)
 	}
 }
 
-#define SSH_MSGBUFSIZE 1024
+#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
 
 void
 do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
 {
-	char msgbuf[SSH_MSGBUFSIZE];
+	char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
 
 	if (level > log_level)
 		return;
diff --git a/log-server.c b/log-server.c
index 3776f109..38c53442 100644
--- a/log-server.c
+++ b/log-server.c
@@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
 }
 
-#define SSH_MSGBUFSIZE 1024
+#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
 
 void
 do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
 {
-	char msgbuf[SSH_MSGBUFSIZE];
-	char fmtbuf[SSH_MSGBUFSIZE];
+	char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+	char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
 	char *txt = NULL;
 	int pri = LOG_INFO;
 
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 9be0ad1b..ec4e5f97 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ packet_read_poll(int *payload_len_ptr)
 {
 	unsigned int len, padded_len;
 	unsigned char *ucp;
-	char buf[8], *cp;
+	char buf[8], *cp, *msg;
 	unsigned int checksum, stored_checksum;
 
 restart:
@@ -575,7 +575,9 @@ restart:
 
 	/* Handle disconnect message. */
 	if ((unsigned char) buf[0] == SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
-		log("Received disconnect: %.900s", packet_get_string(NULL));
+		msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+		log("Received disconnect: %.900s", msg);
+		xfree(msg);
 		fatal_cleanup();
 	}	
 
@@ -585,7 +587,9 @@ restart:
 
 	/* Send debug messages as debugging output. */
 	if ((unsigned char) buf[0] == SSH_MSG_DEBUG) {
-		debug("Remote: %.900s", packet_get_string(NULL));
+		msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+		debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+		xfree(msg);
 		goto restart;
 	}
 	/* Return type. */
diff --git a/pty.h b/pty.h
index c65f8c93..82da8620 100644
--- a/pty.h
+++ b/pty.h
@@ -45,4 +45,6 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, int row, int col,
 
 void	pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyname);
 
+void	pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyname);
+
 #endif				/* PTY_H */
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index eca13329..4dfeece7 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 	if (options->forward_agent == -1)
 		options->forward_agent = 1;
 	if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
-		options->forward_x11 = 1;
+		options->forward_x11 = 0;
 	if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
 		options->gateway_ports = 0;
 	if (options->use_privileged_port == -1)
diff --git a/rsa.c b/rsa.c
index 8db61a9b..90cae578 100644
--- a/rsa.c
+++ b/rsa.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
 	BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
 
 	if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
-				      RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
+	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
 		fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() failed");
 
 	BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out);
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
 	BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
 
 	if ((len = RSA_private_decrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
-				       RSA_SSLV23_PADDING)) <= 0)
+	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
 		fatal("rsa_private_decrypt() failed");
 
 	BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out);
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
index 300d10d0..18e23335 100644
--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ okname(cp0)
 	} while (*++cp);
 	return (1);
 
-bad:	fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name", cp0);
+bad:	fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
 	return (0);
 }
 
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 98146b18..31b53248 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	if (options->permit_root_login == -1)
 		options->permit_root_login = 1;			/* yes */
 	if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
-		options->ignore_rhosts = 0;
+		options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
 	if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
 		options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
 	if (options->check_mail == -1)
@@ -95,9 +95,9 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	if (options->print_motd == -1)
 		options->print_motd = 1;
 	if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
-		options->x11_forwarding = 1;
+		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
 	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
-		options->x11_display_offset = 1;
+		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
 	if (options->strict_modes == -1)
 		options->strict_modes = 1;
 	if (options->keepalives == -1)
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	if (options->rhosts_authentication == -1)
 		options->rhosts_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
-		options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 1;
+		options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
 		options->rsa_authentication = 1;
 #ifdef KRB4
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 		options->skey_authentication = 1;
 #endif
 	if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
-		options->permit_empty_passwd = 1;
+		options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
 	if (options->use_login == -1)
 		options->use_login = 0;
 }
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ parse_flag:
 
 		case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
 			intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
-			goto parse_int;
+			goto parse_flag;
 
 		case sRhostsAuthentication:
 			intptr = &options->rhosts_authentication;
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index e7f51708..c50bafa6 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -80,8 +80,11 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
 void
 do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
 {
-	char *comment;
+	FILE *f;
+	BIGNUM *e, *n;
 	RSA *public_key;
+	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024];
+	int i, skip = 0, num = 1, invalid = 1;
 	struct stat st;
 
 	if (!have_identity)
@@ -90,38 +93,71 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
 		perror(identity_file);
 		exit(1);
 	}
+	
 	public_key = RSA_new();
-	if (!load_public_key(identity_file, public_key, &comment)) {
-		char *cp, line[1024];
-		BIGNUM *e, *n;
-		int dummy, invalid = 0;
-		FILE *f = fopen(identity_file, "r");
+	if (load_public_key(identity_file, public_key, &comment)) {
+		printf("%d %s %s\n", BN_num_bits(public_key->n),
+		    fingerprint(public_key->e, public_key->n),
+		    comment);
+		RSA_free(public_key);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+	RSA_free(public_key);
+
+	f = fopen(identity_file, "r");
+	if (f != NULL) {
 		n = BN_new();
 		e = BN_new();
-		if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
-			cp = line;
-			line[strlen(line) - 1] = '\0';
-			if (auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &dummy, e, n)) {
-				public_key->e = e;
-				public_key->n = n;
-				comment = xstrdup(cp ? cp : "no comment");
-			} else {
-				invalid = 1;
+		while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+			i = strlen(line) - 1;
+			if (line[i] != '\n') {
+				error("line %d too long: %.40s...", num, line);
+				skip = 1;
+				continue;
+			}
+			num++;
+			if (skip) {
+				skip = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			line[i] = '\0';
+
+			/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+			for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+				;
+			if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+				continue ;
+			i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
+			if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
+				int quoted = 0;
+				comment = cp;
+				for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+					if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+						cp++;	/* Skip both */
+					else if (*cp == '"')
+						quoted = !quoted;
+				}
+				if (!*cp)
+					continue;
+				*cp++ = '\0';
+			}
+			ep = cp;
+			if (auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &i, e, n)) {
+				invalid = 0;
+				comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
+				printf("%d %s %s\n", BN_num_bits(n),
+				    fingerprint(e, n),
+				    comment ? comment : "no comment");
 			}
-		} else {
-			invalid = 1;
-		}
-		if (invalid) {
-			printf("%s is not a valid key file.\n", identity_file);
-			BN_free(e);
-			BN_free(n);
-			exit(1);
 		}
+		BN_free(e);
+		BN_free(n);
+		fclose(f);
+	}
+	if (invalid) {
+		printf("%s is not a valid key file.\n", identity_file);
+		exit(1);
 	}
-	printf("%d %s %s\n", BN_num_bits(public_key->n),
-	       fingerprint(public_key->e, public_key->n),
-	       comment);
-	RSA_free(public_key);
 	exit(0);
 }
 
@@ -314,7 +350,7 @@ void
 usage(void)
 {
 	printf("ssh-keygen version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
-	printf("Usage: %s [-b bits] [-p] [-c] [-f file] [-P pass] [-N new-pass] [-C comment]\n", __progname);
+	printf("Usage: %s [-b bits] [-p] [-c] [-l] [-f file] [-P pass] [-N new-pass] [-C comment]\n", __progname);
 	exit(1);
 }
 
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index 3b496edd..3b743be0 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -557,6 +557,8 @@ set.  The argument must be
 .Dq yes
 or
 .Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
 .It Cm GatewayPorts
 Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
 forwarded ports.
@@ -813,7 +815,7 @@ and adds lines of the format
 .Dq VARNAME=value
 to the environment.
 .Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
 .It Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
 Records host keys for all hosts the user has logged into (that are not
 in
@@ -958,17 +960,12 @@ above.
 A version of this library which includes support for the RSA algorithm
 is required for proper operation.
 .Sh AUTHOR
-Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-.Pp
-Issues can be found from the SSH WWW home page:
-.Pp
-.Dl http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh
-.Pp
 OpenSSH
-is a derivative of the original (free) ssh 1.2.12 release, but with bugs
-removed and newer features re-added.   Rapidly after the 1.2.12 release,
-newer versions bore successively more restrictive licenses.  This version
-of OpenSSH
+is a derivative of the original (free) ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen,
+but with bugs removed and newer features re-added.   Rapidly after the
+1.2.12 release, newer versions of the original ssh bore successively
+more restrictive licenses, and thus demand for a free version was born.
+This version of OpenSSH
 .Bl -bullet
 .It
 has all components of a restrictive nature (i.e., patents, see
@@ -977,7 +974,8 @@ directly removed from the source code; any licensed or patented components
 are chosen from
 external libraries.
 .It
-has been updated to support ssh protocol 1.5.
+has been updated to support ssh protocol 1.5, making it compatible with
+all other ssh protocol 1 clients and servers.
 .It
 contains added support for 
 .Xr kerberos 8
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index c3e66485..aac8866e 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ usage()
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -k          Disable Kerberos ticket and AFS token forwarding.\n");
 #endif				/* AFS */
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -x          Disable X11 connection forwarding.\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -X          Enable X11 connection forwarding.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -i file     Identity for RSA authentication (default: ~/.ssh/identity).\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -t          Tty; allocate a tty even if command is given.\n");
 	fprintf(stderr, "  -v          Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n");
@@ -497,7 +498,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		struct addrinfo *ai = NULL;
 		int errgai;
 		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-		hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+		hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
 		hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
 		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 		errgai = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai);
diff --git a/ssh.h b/ssh.h
index 4f352c24..9b6a1acf 100644
--- a/ssh.h
+++ b/ssh.h
@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ struct envstring {
 /*
  * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==write
  */
-int	atomicio(int (*f)(), int fd, void *s, size_t n);
+ssize_t	atomicio(ssize_t (*f)(), int fd, void *s, size_t n);
 
 #ifdef KRB4
 #include <krb.h>
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 5e2a3449..c4c9aee1 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.53 2000/01/18 09:42:17 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.56 2000/02/18 08:50:33 markus Exp $");
 
 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -156,8 +156,9 @@ ssh_create_socket(uid_t original_real_uid, int privileged, int family)
 		int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1;
 		sock = rresvport_af(&p, family);
 		if (sock < 0)
-			fatal("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", family, strerror(errno));
-		debug("Allocated local port %d.", p);
+			error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", family, strerror(errno));
+		else
+			debug("Allocated local port %d.", p);
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * Just create an ordinary socket on arbitrary port.  We use
@@ -891,6 +892,7 @@ try_skey_authentication()
 		log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
 		    "Reponse will be transmitted in clear text.");
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", challenge);
+	xfree(challenge);
 	fflush(stderr);
 	for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
 		if (i != 0)
@@ -960,8 +962,11 @@ ssh_exchange_identification()
 
 	/* Read other side\'s version identification. */
 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
-		if (read(connection_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1)
+		int len = read(connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
+		if (len < 0)
 			fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		if (len != 1)
+			fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host");
 		if (buf[i] == '\r') {
 			buf[i] = '\n';
 			buf[i + 1] = 0;
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index ec164f48..baa471cd 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -258,13 +258,16 @@ Note that
 .Nm
 does not start if this file is group/world-accessible.
 .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-Specifies that rhosts and shosts files will not be used in
-authentication.
+Specifies that
+.Pa .rhosts
+and 
+.Pa .shosts
+files will not be used in authentication.
 .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
 and
 .Pa /etc/shosts.equiv 
 are still used.  The default is 
-.Dq no .
+.Dq yes .
 .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
 Specifies whether
 .Nm
@@ -352,7 +355,7 @@ The default is
 When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
 server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.  The default
 is
-.Dq yes .
+.Dq no .
 .It Cm PermitRootLogin
 Specifies whether the root can log in using
 .Xr ssh 1 .
@@ -403,7 +406,7 @@ The default is
 .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
 Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
 with successful RSA host authentication is allowed.  The default is
-.Dq yes .
+.Dq no .
 .It Cm RSAAuthentication
 Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed.  The default is
 .Dq yes .
@@ -442,9 +445,10 @@ Specifies the first display number available for
 X11 forwarding.  This prevents
 .Nm
 from interfering with real X11 servers.
+The default is 10.
 .It Cm X11Forwarding
 Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.  The default is
-.Dq yes .
+.Dq no .
 Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not improve security in any
 way, as users can always install their own forwarders.
 .El
@@ -762,18 +766,12 @@ This can be used to specify
 machine-specific login-time initializations globally.  This file
 should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
 .Sh AUTHOR
-Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-.Pp
-Information about new releases, mailing lists, and other related
-issues can be found from the SSH WWW home page:
-.Pp
-.Dl http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh.
-.Pp
 OpenSSH
-is a derivative of the original (free) ssh 1.2.12 release, but with bugs
-removed and newer features re-added.   Rapidly after the 1.2.12 release,
-newer versions bore successively more restrictive licenses.  This version
-of OpenSSH
+is a derivative of the original (free) ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen,
+but with bugs removed and newer features re-added.   Rapidly after the
+1.2.12 release, newer versions of the original ssh bore successively
+more restrictive licenses, and thus demand for a free version was born.
+This version of OpenSSH
 .Bl -bullet
 .It
 has all components of a restrictive nature (i.e., patents, see
@@ -782,7 +780,8 @@ directly removed from the source code; any licensed or patented components
 are chosen from
 external libraries.
 .It
-has been updated to support ssh protocol 1.5.
+has been updated to support ssh protocol 1.5, making it compatible with
+all other ssh protocol 1 clients and servers.
 .It
 contains added support for 
 .Xr kerberos 8
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 0024440e..829c0a71 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.80 2000/01/20 15:19:22 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.90 2000/03/06 20:29:04 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
@@ -147,6 +147,27 @@ void do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
 	      const char *display, const char *auth_proto,
 	      const char *auth_data, const char *ttyname);
 
+/*
+ * Remove local Xauthority file.
+ */
+void
+xauthfile_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
+{
+	debug("xauthfile_cleanup_proc called");
+
+	if (xauthfile != NULL) {
+		char *p;
+		unlink(xauthfile);
+		p = strrchr(xauthfile, '/');
+		if (p != NULL) {
+			*p = '\0';
+			rmdir(xauthfile);
+		}
+		xfree(xauthfile);
+		xauthfile = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * Close all listening sockets
  */
@@ -234,6 +255,7 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
 char *
 get_authname(int type)
 {
+	static char buf[1024];
 	switch (type) {
 	case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
 		return "password";
@@ -252,8 +274,8 @@ get_authname(int type)
 		return "s/key";
 #endif
 	}
-	fatal("get_authname: unknown auth %d: internal error", type);
-	return NULL;
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
+	return buf;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -878,7 +900,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 
 	/* Cleanup user's local Xauthority file. */
 	if (xauthfile)
-		unlink(xauthfile);
+		xauthfile_cleanup_proc(NULL);
 
 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
 	verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
@@ -1089,12 +1111,14 @@ do_ssh_kex()
  * DenyUsers or user's primary group is listed in DenyGroups, false will
  * be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there, or
  * if AllowGroups isn't empty and user isn't listed there, false will be
- * returned. Otherwise true is returned.
- * XXX This function should also check if user has a valid shell
+ * returned. 
+ * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
+ * Otherwise true is returned. 
  */
 static int
 allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 {
+	struct stat st;
 	struct group *grp;
 	int i;
 #ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
@@ -1105,7 +1129,11 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
 	if (!pw)
 		return 0;
 
-	/* XXX Should check for valid login shell */
+	/* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
+	if (stat(pw->pw_shell, &st) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (!((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) && (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP))))
+		return 0;
 
 	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
 	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
@@ -1202,6 +1230,7 @@ do_authentication()
 	pw = getpwnam(user);
 	if (!pw || !allowed_user(pw))
 		do_fake_authloop(user);
+	xfree(user);
 
 	/* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
 	memset(&pwcopy, 0, sizeof(pwcopy));
@@ -1224,7 +1253,7 @@ do_authentication()
 	if (getuid() != 0 && pw->pw_uid != getuid())
 		packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
 
-	debug("Attempting authentication for %.100s.", user);
+	debug("Attempting authentication for %.100s.", pw->pw_name);
 
 	/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
 	if (options.password_authentication &&
@@ -1510,17 +1539,22 @@ do_authloop(struct passwd * pw)
 			get_remote_port(),
 			user);
 
-		if (authenticated) {
 #ifdef USE_PAM
+		if (authenticated) {
 			if (!do_pam_account(pw->pw_name, client_user)) {
-				if (client_user != NULL)
+				if (client_user != NULL) {
 					xfree(client_user);
-
+					client_user = NULL;
+				}
 				do_fake_authloop(pw->pw_name);
 			}
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
 			return;
 		}
+#else /* USE_PAM */
+		if (authenticated) {
+			return;
+		}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
 
 		if (client_user != NULL) {
 			xfree(client_user);
@@ -1572,6 +1606,7 @@ do_fake_authloop(char *user)
 		/* Try to send a fake s/key challenge. */
 		if (options.skey_authentication == 1 &&
 		    (skeyinfo = skey_fake_keyinfo(user)) != NULL) {
+			password = NULL;
 			if (type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS) {
 				packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
 				packet_put_string(skeyinfo, strlen(skeyinfo));
@@ -1585,6 +1620,8 @@ do_fake_authloop(char *user)
 			           strncasecmp(password, "s/key", 5) == 0 ) {
 				packet_send_debug(skeyinfo);
 			}
+			if (password != NULL)
+				xfree(password);
 		}
 #endif
 		if (attempt > AUTH_FAIL_MAX)
@@ -1607,22 +1644,6 @@ do_fake_authloop(char *user)
 	abort();
 }
 
-
-/*
- * Remove local Xauthority file.
- */
-static void
-xauthfile_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
-{
-	debug("xauthfile_cleanup_proc called");
-
-	if (xauthfile != NULL) {
-		unlink(xauthfile);
-		xfree(xauthfile);
-		xauthfile = NULL;
-	}
-}
-
 struct pty_cleanup_context {
 	const char *ttyname;
 	int pid;
@@ -1665,7 +1686,7 @@ do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw)
 {
 	int type;
 	int compression_level = 0, enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
-	int have_pty = 0, ptyfd = -1, ttyfd = -1, xauthfd = -1;
+	int have_pty = 0, ptyfd = -1, ttyfd = -1;
 	int row, col, xpixel, ypixel, screen;
 	char ttyname[64];
 	char *command, *term = NULL, *display = NULL, *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
@@ -1684,7 +1705,8 @@ do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw)
 	 * by the client telling us, so we can equally well trust the client
 	 * not to request anything bogus.)
 	 */
-	channel_permit_all_opens();
+	if (!no_port_forwarding_flag)
+		channel_permit_all_opens();
 
 	/*
 	 * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
@@ -1785,16 +1807,20 @@ do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw)
 
 			/* Setup to always have a local .Xauthority. */
 			xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-			snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "/tmp/XauthXXXXXX");
-
-			if ((xauthfd = mkstemp(xauthfile)) != -1) {
-				fchown(xauthfd, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
-				close(xauthfd);
-				fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, NULL);
-			} else {
+			strlcpy(xauthfile, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
+			temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
+			if (mkdtemp(xauthfile) == NULL) {
+				restore_uid();
+				error("private X11 dir: mkdtemp %s failed: %s",
+				    xauthfile, strerror(errno));
 				xfree(xauthfile);
 				xauthfile = NULL;
+				goto fail;
 			}
+			strlcat(xauthfile, "/cookies", MAXPATHLEN);
+			open(xauthfile, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600);
+			restore_uid();
+			fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, NULL);
 			break;
 #else /* XAUTH_PATH */
 			packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
@@ -2026,6 +2052,7 @@ do_exec_pty(const char *command, int ptyfd, int ttyfd,
 	    const char *auth_data)
 {
 	int pid, fdout;
+	int ptymaster;
 	const char *hostname;
 	time_t last_login_time;
 	char buf[100], *time_string;
@@ -2174,11 +2201,16 @@ do_exec_pty(const char *command, int ptyfd, int ttyfd,
 	 */
 	fdout = dup(ptyfd);
 	if (fdout < 0)
-		packet_disconnect("dup failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		packet_disconnect("dup #1 failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* we keep a reference to the pty master */
+	ptymaster = dup(ptyfd);
+	if (ptymaster < 0)
+		packet_disconnect("dup #2 failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 
 	/* Enter interactive session. */
 	server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
-	/* server_loop has not closed ptyfd and fdout. */
+	/* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */
 
 	/* Cancel the cleanup function. */
 	fatal_remove_cleanup(pty_cleanup_proc, (void *) &cleanup_context);
@@ -2194,8 +2226,8 @@ do_exec_pty(const char *command, int ptyfd, int ttyfd,
 	 * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
 	 * while we're still cleaning up.
 	 */
-	close(ptyfd);
-	close(fdout);
+	if (close(ptymaster) < 0)
+		error("close(ptymaster): %s", strerror(errno));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2563,7 +2595,7 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term,
 				f = popen(XAUTH_PATH " -q -", "w");
 				if (f) {
 					fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", display, auth_proto, auth_data);
-					fclose(f);
+					pclose(f);
 				} else
 					fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s -q -\n", XAUTH_PATH);
 			}
diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
index c2ef9ff4..fe2e876e 100644
--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
@@ -1 +1 @@
-#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH-1.2.2"
+#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH-1.2.3"