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3c0ef626 | 1 | /* |
2 | * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> | |
3 | * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland | |
4 | * All rights reserved | |
5 | * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, | |
6 | * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards | |
7 | * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted | |
8 | * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and | |
9 | * authentication agent connections. | |
10 | * | |
11 | * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software | |
12 | * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this | |
13 | * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is | |
14 | * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be | |
15 | * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". | |
16 | * | |
17 | * SSH2 implementation: | |
18 | * | |
19 | * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. | |
20 | * | |
21 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
22 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
23 | * are met: | |
24 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
25 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
26 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
28 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
29 | * | |
30 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR | |
31 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES | |
32 | * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. | |
33 | * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, | |
34 | * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
35 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, | |
36 | * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY | |
37 | * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT | |
38 | * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF | |
39 | * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
40 | */ | |
41 | ||
42 | #include "includes.h" | |
43 | RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.209 2001/11/10 13:19:45 markus Exp $"); | |
44 | ||
45 | #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
46 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
47 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> | |
48 | ||
49 | #include "ssh.h" | |
50 | #include "ssh1.h" | |
51 | #include "ssh2.h" | |
52 | #include "xmalloc.h" | |
53 | #include "rsa.h" | |
54 | #include "sshpty.h" | |
55 | #include "packet.h" | |
56 | #include "mpaux.h" | |
57 | #include "log.h" | |
58 | #include "servconf.h" | |
59 | #include "uidswap.h" | |
60 | #include "compat.h" | |
61 | #include "buffer.h" | |
62 | #include "cipher.h" | |
63 | #include "kex.h" | |
64 | #include "key.h" | |
65 | #include "dh.h" | |
66 | #include "myproposal.h" | |
67 | #include "authfile.h" | |
68 | #include "pathnames.h" | |
69 | #include "atomicio.h" | |
70 | #include "canohost.h" | |
71 | #include "auth.h" | |
72 | #include "misc.h" | |
73 | #include "dispatch.h" | |
74 | #include "channels.h" | |
75 | ||
76 | #ifdef LIBWRAP | |
77 | #include <tcpd.h> | |
78 | #include <syslog.h> | |
79 | int allow_severity = LOG_INFO; | |
80 | int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; | |
81 | #endif /* LIBWRAP */ | |
82 | ||
83 | #ifndef O_NOCTTY | |
84 | #define O_NOCTTY 0 | |
85 | #endif | |
86 | ||
87 | #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME | |
88 | extern char *__progname; | |
89 | #else | |
90 | char *__progname; | |
91 | #endif | |
92 | ||
93 | /* Server configuration options. */ | |
94 | ServerOptions options; | |
95 | ||
96 | /* Name of the server configuration file. */ | |
97 | char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; | |
98 | ||
99 | /* | |
100 | * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. | |
101 | * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. | |
102 | */ | |
103 | #ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT | |
104 | int IPv4or6 = AF_INET; | |
105 | #else | |
106 | int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; | |
107 | #endif | |
108 | ||
109 | /* | |
110 | * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug | |
111 | * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system | |
112 | * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing | |
113 | * the first connection. | |
114 | */ | |
115 | int debug_flag = 0; | |
116 | ||
117 | /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */ | |
118 | int test_flag = 0; | |
119 | ||
120 | /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ | |
121 | int inetd_flag = 0; | |
122 | ||
123 | /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ | |
124 | int no_daemon_flag = 0; | |
125 | ||
126 | /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ | |
127 | int log_stderr = 0; | |
128 | ||
129 | /* Saved arguments to main(). */ | |
130 | char **saved_argv; | |
131 | int saved_argc; | |
132 | ||
133 | /* | |
134 | * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP | |
135 | * signal handler. | |
136 | */ | |
137 | #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 | |
138 | int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; | |
139 | int num_listen_socks = 0; | |
140 | ||
141 | /* | |
142 | * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, | |
143 | * sshd will skip the version-number exchange | |
144 | */ | |
145 | char *client_version_string = NULL; | |
146 | char *server_version_string = NULL; | |
147 | ||
148 | /* for rekeying XXX fixme */ | |
149 | Kex *xxx_kex; | |
150 | ||
151 | /* | |
152 | * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this | |
153 | * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so | |
154 | * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some | |
155 | * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) | |
156 | * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is | |
157 | * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. | |
158 | */ | |
159 | struct { | |
160 | Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */ | |
161 | Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */ | |
162 | Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ | |
163 | int have_ssh1_key; | |
164 | int have_ssh2_key; | |
165 | u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; | |
166 | } sensitive_data; | |
167 | ||
168 | /* | |
169 | * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated. | |
170 | * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated. | |
171 | */ | |
172 | int key_do_regen = 0; | |
173 | ||
174 | /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ | |
175 | int received_sighup = 0; | |
176 | int received_sigterm = 0; | |
177 | ||
178 | /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ | |
179 | u_char session_id[16]; | |
180 | ||
181 | /* same for ssh2 */ | |
182 | u_char *session_id2 = NULL; | |
183 | int session_id2_len = 0; | |
184 | ||
185 | /* record remote hostname or ip */ | |
186 | u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN; | |
187 | ||
188 | /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ | |
189 | void destroy_sensitive_data(void); | |
190 | ||
191 | static void do_ssh1_kex(void); | |
192 | static void do_ssh2_kex(void); | |
193 | ||
194 | /* | |
195 | * Close all listening sockets | |
196 | */ | |
197 | static void | |
198 | close_listen_socks(void) | |
199 | { | |
200 | int i; | |
201 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) | |
202 | close(listen_socks[i]); | |
203 | num_listen_socks = -1; | |
204 | } | |
205 | ||
206 | /* | |
207 | * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; | |
208 | * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate | |
209 | * the server key). | |
210 | */ | |
211 | static void | |
212 | sighup_handler(int sig) | |
213 | { | |
214 | received_sighup = 1; | |
215 | signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); | |
216 | } | |
217 | ||
218 | /* | |
219 | * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. | |
220 | * Restarts the server. | |
221 | */ | |
222 | static void | |
223 | sighup_restart(void) | |
224 | { | |
225 | log("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); | |
226 | close_listen_socks(); | |
227 | execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); | |
228 | log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); | |
229 | exit(1); | |
230 | } | |
231 | ||
232 | /* | |
233 | * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. | |
234 | */ | |
235 | static void | |
236 | sigterm_handler(int sig) | |
237 | { | |
238 | received_sigterm = sig; | |
239 | } | |
240 | ||
241 | /* | |
242 | * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then | |
243 | * reap any zombies left by exited children. | |
244 | */ | |
245 | static void | |
246 | main_sigchld_handler(int sig) | |
247 | { | |
248 | int save_errno = errno; | |
249 | int status; | |
250 | ||
251 | while (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG) > 0) | |
252 | ; | |
253 | ||
254 | signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); | |
255 | errno = save_errno; | |
256 | } | |
257 | ||
258 | /* | |
259 | * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. | |
260 | */ | |
261 | static void | |
262 | grace_alarm_handler(int sig) | |
263 | { | |
264 | /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */ | |
265 | ||
266 | /* Close the connection. */ | |
267 | packet_close(); | |
268 | ||
269 | /* Log error and exit. */ | |
270 | fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s.", get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
271 | } | |
272 | ||
273 | /* | |
274 | * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this | |
275 | * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not | |
276 | * do anything with the private key or random state before forking. | |
277 | * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution | |
278 | * problems. | |
279 | */ | |
280 | static void | |
281 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) | |
282 | { | |
283 | u_int32_t rand = 0; | |
284 | int i; | |
285 | ||
286 | verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", | |
287 | sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); | |
288 | if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) | |
289 | key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); | |
290 | sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1, | |
291 | options.server_key_bits); | |
292 | verbose("RSA key generation complete."); | |
293 | ||
294 | for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { | |
295 | if (i % 4 == 0) | |
296 | rand = arc4random(); | |
297 | sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; | |
298 | rand >>= 8; | |
299 | } | |
300 | arc4random_stir(); | |
301 | } | |
302 | ||
303 | static void | |
304 | key_regeneration_alarm(int sig) | |
305 | { | |
306 | int save_errno = errno; | |
307 | signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); | |
308 | errno = save_errno; | |
309 | key_do_regen = 1; | |
310 | } | |
311 | ||
312 | static void | |
313 | sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) | |
314 | { | |
315 | int i, mismatch; | |
316 | int remote_major, remote_minor; | |
317 | int major, minor; | |
318 | char *s; | |
319 | char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ | |
320 | char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ | |
321 | ||
322 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && | |
323 | (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) { | |
324 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; | |
325 | minor = 99; | |
326 | } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { | |
327 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; | |
328 | minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; | |
329 | } else { | |
330 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; | |
331 | minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; | |
332 | } | |
333 | snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION); | |
334 | server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); | |
335 | ||
336 | if (client_version_string == NULL) { | |
337 | /* Send our protocol version identification. */ | |
338 | if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string)) | |
339 | != strlen(server_version_string)) { | |
340 | log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
341 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
342 | } | |
343 | ||
344 | /* Read other side's version identification. */ | |
345 | memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); | |
346 | for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { | |
347 | if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { | |
348 | log("Did not receive identification string from %s", | |
349 | get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
350 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
351 | } | |
352 | if (buf[i] == '\r') { | |
353 | buf[i] = 0; | |
354 | /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ | |
355 | if (i == 12 && | |
356 | strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) | |
357 | break; | |
358 | continue; | |
359 | } | |
360 | if (buf[i] == '\n') { | |
361 | buf[i] = 0; | |
362 | break; | |
363 | } | |
364 | } | |
365 | buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; | |
366 | client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); | |
367 | } | |
368 | ||
369 | /* | |
370 | * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept | |
371 | * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. | |
372 | */ | |
373 | if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", | |
374 | &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { | |
375 | s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; | |
376 | (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); | |
377 | close(sock_in); | |
378 | close(sock_out); | |
379 | log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s", | |
380 | client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
381 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
382 | } | |
383 | debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", | |
384 | remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); | |
385 | ||
386 | compat_datafellows(remote_version); | |
387 | ||
388 | if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) { | |
389 | log("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.", | |
390 | get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); | |
391 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
392 | } | |
393 | ||
394 | mismatch = 0; | |
395 | switch(remote_major) { | |
396 | case 1: | |
397 | if (remote_minor == 99) { | |
398 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) | |
399 | enable_compat20(); | |
400 | else | |
401 | mismatch = 1; | |
402 | break; | |
403 | } | |
404 | if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { | |
405 | mismatch = 1; | |
406 | break; | |
407 | } | |
408 | if (remote_minor < 3) { | |
409 | packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and " | |
410 | "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version."); | |
411 | } else if (remote_minor == 3) { | |
412 | /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */ | |
413 | enable_compat13(); | |
414 | } | |
415 | break; | |
416 | case 2: | |
417 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { | |
418 | enable_compat20(); | |
419 | break; | |
420 | } | |
421 | /* FALLTHROUGH */ | |
422 | default: | |
423 | mismatch = 1; | |
424 | break; | |
425 | } | |
426 | chop(server_version_string); | |
427 | debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); | |
428 | ||
429 | if (mismatch) { | |
430 | s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; | |
431 | (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); | |
432 | close(sock_in); | |
433 | close(sock_out); | |
434 | log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s", | |
435 | get_remote_ipaddr(), | |
436 | server_version_string, client_version_string); | |
437 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
438 | } | |
439 | } | |
440 | ||
441 | ||
442 | /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ | |
443 | void | |
444 | destroy_sensitive_data(void) | |
445 | { | |
446 | int i; | |
447 | ||
448 | if (sensitive_data.server_key) { | |
449 | key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); | |
450 | sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; | |
451 | } | |
452 | for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { | |
453 | if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { | |
454 | key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); | |
455 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; | |
456 | } | |
457 | } | |
458 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; | |
459 | memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); | |
460 | } | |
461 | ||
462 | static char * | |
463 | list_hostkey_types(void) | |
464 | { | |
465 | static char buf[1024]; | |
466 | int i; | |
467 | buf[0] = '\0'; | |
468 | for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { | |
469 | Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; | |
470 | if (key == NULL) | |
471 | continue; | |
472 | switch(key->type) { | |
473 | case KEY_RSA: | |
474 | case KEY_DSA: | |
475 | strlcat(buf, key_ssh_name(key), sizeof buf); | |
476 | strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf); | |
477 | break; | |
478 | } | |
479 | } | |
480 | i = strlen(buf); | |
481 | if (i > 0 && buf[i-1] == ',') | |
482 | buf[i-1] = '\0'; | |
483 | debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", buf); | |
484 | return buf; | |
485 | } | |
486 | ||
487 | static Key * | |
488 | get_hostkey_by_type(int type) | |
489 | { | |
490 | int i; | |
491 | for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { | |
492 | Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; | |
493 | if (key != NULL && key->type == type) | |
494 | return key; | |
495 | } | |
496 | return NULL; | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
499 | /* | |
500 | * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. | |
501 | * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability | |
502 | * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until | |
503 | * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups | |
504 | */ | |
505 | static int | |
506 | drop_connection(int startups) | |
507 | { | |
508 | double p, r; | |
509 | ||
510 | if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) | |
511 | return 0; | |
512 | if (startups >= options.max_startups) | |
513 | return 1; | |
514 | if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) | |
515 | return 1; | |
516 | ||
517 | p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; | |
518 | p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; | |
519 | p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin); | |
520 | p += options.max_startups_rate; | |
521 | p /= 100.0; | |
522 | r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX; | |
523 | ||
524 | debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r); | |
525 | return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; | |
526 | } | |
527 | ||
528 | int *startup_pipes = NULL; /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ | |
529 | int startup_pipe; /* in child */ | |
530 | ||
531 | /* | |
532 | * Main program for the daemon. | |
533 | */ | |
534 | int | |
535 | main(int ac, char **av) | |
536 | { | |
537 | extern char *optarg; | |
538 | extern int optind; | |
539 | int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1; | |
540 | pid_t pid; | |
541 | socklen_t fromlen; | |
542 | fd_set *fdset; | |
543 | struct sockaddr_storage from; | |
544 | const char *remote_ip; | |
545 | int remote_port; | |
546 | FILE *f; | |
547 | struct linger linger; | |
548 | struct addrinfo *ai; | |
549 | char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; | |
550 | int listen_sock, maxfd; | |
551 | int startup_p[2]; | |
552 | int startups = 0; | |
553 | Key *key; | |
554 | int ret, key_used = 0; | |
555 | ||
556 | __progname = get_progname(av[0]); | |
557 | init_rng(); | |
558 | ||
559 | /* Save argv. */ | |
560 | saved_argc = ac; | |
561 | saved_argv = av; | |
562 | ||
563 | /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ | |
564 | initialize_server_options(&options); | |
565 | ||
566 | /* Parse command-line arguments. */ | |
567 | while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) { | |
568 | switch (opt) { | |
569 | case '4': | |
570 | IPv4or6 = AF_INET; | |
571 | break; | |
572 | case '6': | |
573 | IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; | |
574 | break; | |
575 | case 'f': | |
576 | config_file_name = optarg; | |
577 | break; | |
578 | case 'd': | |
579 | if (0 == debug_flag) { | |
580 | debug_flag = 1; | |
581 | options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; | |
582 | } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { | |
583 | options.log_level++; | |
584 | } else { | |
585 | fprintf(stderr, "Too high debugging level.\n"); | |
586 | exit(1); | |
587 | } | |
588 | break; | |
589 | case 'D': | |
590 | no_daemon_flag = 1; | |
591 | break; | |
592 | case 'e': | |
593 | log_stderr = 1; | |
594 | break; | |
595 | case 'i': | |
596 | inetd_flag = 1; | |
597 | break; | |
598 | case 'Q': | |
599 | /* ignored */ | |
600 | break; | |
601 | case 'q': | |
602 | options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; | |
603 | break; | |
604 | case 'b': | |
605 | options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg); | |
606 | break; | |
607 | case 'p': | |
608 | options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; | |
609 | if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { | |
610 | fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); | |
611 | exit(1); | |
612 | } | |
613 | options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); | |
614 | if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) { | |
615 | fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); | |
616 | exit(1); | |
617 | } | |
618 | break; | |
619 | case 'g': | |
620 | if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { | |
621 | fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); | |
622 | exit(1); | |
623 | } | |
624 | break; | |
625 | case 'k': | |
626 | if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { | |
627 | fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n"); | |
628 | exit(1); | |
629 | } | |
630 | break; | |
631 | case 'h': | |
632 | if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) { | |
633 | fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n"); | |
634 | exit(1); | |
635 | } | |
636 | options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg; | |
637 | break; | |
638 | case 'V': | |
639 | client_version_string = optarg; | |
640 | /* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */ | |
641 | inetd_flag = 1; | |
642 | break; | |
643 | case 't': | |
644 | test_flag = 1; | |
645 | break; | |
646 | case 'u': | |
647 | utmp_len = atoi(optarg); | |
648 | break; | |
649 | case '?': | |
650 | default: | |
651 | fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION); | |
652 | fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname); | |
653 | fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); | |
654 | fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE); | |
655 | fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n"); | |
656 | fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n"); | |
657 | fprintf(stderr, " -D Do not fork into daemon mode\n"); | |
658 | fprintf(stderr, " -t Only test configuration file and keys\n"); | |
659 | fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n"); | |
660 | fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n"); | |
661 | fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n"); | |
662 | fprintf(stderr, " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 600)\n"); | |
663 | fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n"); | |
664 | fprintf(stderr, " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n", | |
665 | _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE); | |
666 | fprintf(stderr, " -u len Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n"); | |
667 | fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only\n"); | |
668 | fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only\n"); | |
669 | exit(1); | |
670 | } | |
671 | } | |
672 | SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); | |
673 | channel_set_af(IPv4or6); | |
674 | ||
675 | /* | |
676 | * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host | |
677 | * key (unless started from inetd) | |
678 | */ | |
679 | log_init(__progname, | |
680 | options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, | |
681 | options.log_facility == -1 ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, | |
682 | !inetd_flag); | |
683 | ||
684 | #ifdef _CRAY | |
685 | /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now! | |
686 | * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems! | |
687 | */ | |
688 | drop_cray_privs(); | |
689 | #endif | |
690 | ||
691 | seed_rng(); | |
692 | ||
693 | /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */ | |
694 | read_server_config(&options, config_file_name); | |
695 | ||
696 | /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ | |
697 | fill_default_server_options(&options); | |
698 | ||
699 | /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ | |
700 | if (optind < ac) { | |
701 | fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); | |
702 | exit(1); | |
703 | } | |
704 | ||
705 | debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION); | |
706 | ||
707 | /* load private host keys */ | |
708 | sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files*sizeof(Key*)); | |
709 | for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) | |
710 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; | |
711 | sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; | |
712 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; | |
713 | sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; | |
714 | sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; | |
715 | ||
716 | for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { | |
717 | key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL); | |
718 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; | |
719 | if (key == NULL) { | |
720 | error("Could not load host key: %s", | |
721 | options.host_key_files[i]); | |
722 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; | |
723 | continue; | |
724 | } | |
725 | switch(key->type){ | |
726 | case KEY_RSA1: | |
727 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key; | |
728 | sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1; | |
729 | break; | |
730 | case KEY_RSA: | |
731 | case KEY_DSA: | |
732 | sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; | |
733 | break; | |
734 | } | |
735 | debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type, | |
736 | key_type(key)); | |
737 | } | |
738 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { | |
739 | log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); | |
740 | options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; | |
741 | } | |
742 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { | |
743 | log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); | |
744 | options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; | |
745 | } | |
746 | if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { | |
747 | log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); | |
748 | exit(1); | |
749 | } | |
750 | ||
751 | /* Check certain values for sanity. */ | |
752 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { | |
753 | if (options.server_key_bits < 512 || | |
754 | options.server_key_bits > 32768) { | |
755 | fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n"); | |
756 | exit(1); | |
757 | } | |
758 | /* | |
759 | * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This | |
760 | * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I | |
761 | * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels | |
762 | */ | |
763 | if (options.server_key_bits > | |
764 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && | |
765 | options.server_key_bits < | |
766 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { | |
767 | options.server_key_bits = | |
768 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED; | |
769 | debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.", | |
770 | options.server_key_bits); | |
771 | } | |
772 | } | |
773 | ||
774 | /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ | |
775 | if (test_flag) | |
776 | exit(0); | |
777 | ||
778 | #ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW | |
779 | (void) set_auth_parameters(ac, av); | |
780 | #endif | |
781 | ||
782 | /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ | |
783 | if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag) | |
784 | log_stderr = 1; | |
785 | log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); | |
786 | ||
787 | /* | |
788 | * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect | |
789 | * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process | |
790 | * exits. | |
791 | */ | |
792 | if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) { | |
793 | #ifdef TIOCNOTTY | |
794 | int fd; | |
795 | #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ | |
796 | if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) | |
797 | fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); | |
798 | ||
799 | /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ | |
800 | #ifdef TIOCNOTTY | |
801 | fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); | |
802 | if (fd >= 0) { | |
803 | (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); | |
804 | close(fd); | |
805 | } | |
806 | #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ | |
807 | } | |
808 | /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ | |
809 | log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); | |
810 | ||
811 | /* Initialize the random number generator. */ | |
812 | arc4random_stir(); | |
813 | ||
814 | /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be | |
815 | unmounted if desired. */ | |
816 | chdir("/"); | |
817 | ||
818 | /* ignore SIGPIPE */ | |
819 | signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); | |
820 | ||
821 | /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */ | |
822 | if (inetd_flag) { | |
823 | int s1; | |
824 | s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */ | |
825 | dup(s1); | |
826 | sock_in = dup(0); | |
827 | sock_out = dup(1); | |
828 | startup_pipe = -1; | |
829 | /* | |
830 | * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 | |
831 | * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if | |
832 | * ttyfd happens to be one of those. | |
833 | */ | |
834 | debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out); | |
835 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) | |
836 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | |
837 | } else { | |
838 | for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { | |
839 | if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) | |
840 | continue; | |
841 | if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) | |
842 | fatal("Too many listen sockets. " | |
843 | "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); | |
844 | if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, | |
845 | ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), | |
846 | NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { | |
847 | error("getnameinfo failed"); | |
848 | continue; | |
849 | } | |
850 | /* Create socket for listening. */ | |
851 | listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); | |
852 | if (listen_sock < 0) { | |
853 | /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ | |
854 | verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
855 | continue; | |
856 | } | |
857 | if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) { | |
858 | error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); | |
859 | close(listen_sock); | |
860 | continue; | |
861 | } | |
862 | /* | |
863 | * Set socket options. We try to make the port | |
864 | * reusable and have it close as fast as possible | |
865 | * without waiting in unnecessary wait states on | |
866 | * close. | |
867 | */ | |
868 | setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, | |
869 | (void *) &on, sizeof(on)); | |
870 | linger.l_onoff = 1; | |
871 | linger.l_linger = 5; | |
872 | setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, | |
873 | (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger)); | |
874 | ||
875 | debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); | |
876 | ||
877 | /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ | |
878 | if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { | |
879 | if (!ai->ai_next) | |
880 | error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", | |
881 | strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); | |
882 | close(listen_sock); | |
883 | continue; | |
884 | } | |
885 | listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; | |
886 | num_listen_socks++; | |
887 | ||
888 | /* Start listening on the port. */ | |
889 | log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); | |
890 | if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0) | |
891 | fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
892 | ||
893 | } | |
894 | freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs); | |
895 | ||
896 | if (!num_listen_socks) | |
897 | fatal("Cannot bind any address."); | |
898 | ||
899 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) | |
900 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | |
901 | ||
902 | /* | |
903 | * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs | |
904 | * listen_sock. | |
905 | */ | |
906 | signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); | |
907 | ||
908 | signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); | |
909 | signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); | |
910 | ||
911 | /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */ | |
912 | signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); | |
913 | ||
914 | /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */ | |
915 | if (!debug_flag) { | |
916 | /* | |
917 | * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it | |
918 | * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to | |
919 | * do this before the bind above because the bind will | |
920 | * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will | |
921 | * overwrite any old pid in the file. | |
922 | */ | |
923 | f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb"); | |
924 | if (f) { | |
925 | fprintf(f, "%u\n", (u_int) getpid()); | |
926 | fclose(f); | |
927 | } | |
928 | } | |
929 | ||
930 | /* setup fd set for listen */ | |
931 | fdset = NULL; | |
932 | maxfd = 0; | |
933 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) | |
934 | if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) | |
935 | maxfd = listen_socks[i]; | |
936 | /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ | |
937 | startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int)); | |
938 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
939 | startup_pipes[i] = -1; | |
940 | ||
941 | /* | |
942 | * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or | |
943 | * the daemon is killed with a signal. | |
944 | */ | |
945 | for (;;) { | |
946 | if (received_sighup) | |
947 | sighup_restart(); | |
948 | if (fdset != NULL) | |
949 | xfree(fdset); | |
950 | fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); | |
951 | fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz); | |
952 | memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz); | |
953 | ||
954 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) | |
955 | FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); | |
956 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
957 | if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) | |
958 | FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); | |
959 | ||
960 | /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ | |
961 | ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
962 | if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) | |
963 | error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
964 | if (received_sigterm) { | |
965 | log("Received signal %d; terminating.", | |
966 | received_sigterm); | |
967 | close_listen_socks(); | |
968 | unlink(options.pid_file); | |
969 | exit(255); | |
970 | } | |
971 | if (key_used && key_do_regen) { | |
972 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | |
973 | key_used = 0; | |
974 | key_do_regen = 0; | |
975 | } | |
976 | if (ret < 0) | |
977 | continue; | |
978 | ||
979 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
980 | if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && | |
981 | FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { | |
982 | /* | |
983 | * the read end of the pipe is ready | |
984 | * if the child has closed the pipe | |
985 | * after successful authentication | |
986 | * or if the child has died | |
987 | */ | |
988 | close(startup_pipes[i]); | |
989 | startup_pipes[i] = -1; | |
990 | startups--; | |
991 | } | |
992 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { | |
993 | if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) | |
994 | continue; | |
995 | fromlen = sizeof(from); | |
996 | newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, | |
997 | &fromlen); | |
998 | if (newsock < 0) { | |
999 | if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) | |
1000 | error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1001 | continue; | |
1002 | } | |
1003 | if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) { | |
1004 | error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); | |
1005 | continue; | |
1006 | } | |
1007 | if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { | |
1008 | debug("drop connection #%d", startups); | |
1009 | close(newsock); | |
1010 | continue; | |
1011 | } | |
1012 | if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { | |
1013 | close(newsock); | |
1014 | continue; | |
1015 | } | |
1016 | ||
1017 | for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) | |
1018 | if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { | |
1019 | startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; | |
1020 | if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) | |
1021 | maxfd = startup_p[0]; | |
1022 | startups++; | |
1023 | break; | |
1024 | } | |
1025 | ||
1026 | /* | |
1027 | * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless | |
1028 | * we are in debugging mode. | |
1029 | */ | |
1030 | if (debug_flag) { | |
1031 | /* | |
1032 | * In debugging mode. Close the listening | |
1033 | * socket, and start processing the | |
1034 | * connection without forking. | |
1035 | */ | |
1036 | debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); | |
1037 | close_listen_socks(); | |
1038 | sock_in = newsock; | |
1039 | sock_out = newsock; | |
1040 | startup_pipe = -1; | |
1041 | pid = getpid(); | |
1042 | break; | |
1043 | } else { | |
1044 | /* | |
1045 | * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have | |
1046 | * the child process the connection. The | |
1047 | * parent continues listening. | |
1048 | */ | |
1049 | if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { | |
1050 | /* | |
1051 | * Child. Close the listening and max_startup | |
1052 | * sockets. Start using the accepted socket. | |
1053 | * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has | |
1054 | * changed). We break out of the loop to handle | |
1055 | * the connection. | |
1056 | */ | |
1057 | startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; | |
1058 | for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) | |
1059 | if (startup_pipes[j] != -1) | |
1060 | close(startup_pipes[j]); | |
1061 | close_listen_socks(); | |
1062 | sock_in = newsock; | |
1063 | sock_out = newsock; | |
1064 | log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); | |
1065 | break; | |
1066 | } | |
1067 | } | |
1068 | ||
1069 | /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ | |
1070 | if (pid < 0) | |
1071 | error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1072 | else | |
1073 | debug("Forked child %d.", pid); | |
1074 | ||
1075 | close(startup_p[1]); | |
1076 | ||
1077 | /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */ | |
1078 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && | |
1079 | key_used == 0) { | |
1080 | /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */ | |
1081 | signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); | |
1082 | alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); | |
1083 | key_used = 1; | |
1084 | } | |
1085 | ||
1086 | arc4random_stir(); | |
1087 | ||
1088 | /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */ | |
1089 | close(newsock); | |
1090 | } | |
1091 | /* child process check (or debug mode) */ | |
1092 | if (num_listen_socks < 0) | |
1093 | break; | |
1094 | } | |
1095 | } | |
1096 | ||
1097 | /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ | |
1098 | ||
1099 | /* | |
1100 | * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the | |
1101 | * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We | |
1102 | * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. | |
1103 | */ | |
1104 | alarm(0); | |
1105 | signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); | |
1106 | signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); | |
1107 | signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); | |
1108 | signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); | |
1109 | signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); | |
1110 | signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); | |
1111 | ||
1112 | /* | |
1113 | * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to | |
1114 | * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the | |
1115 | * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing. | |
1116 | */ | |
1117 | /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ | |
1118 | linger.l_onoff = 1; | |
1119 | linger.l_linger = 5; | |
1120 | setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger)); | |
1121 | ||
1122 | /* Set keepalives if requested. */ | |
1123 | if (options.keepalives && | |
1124 | setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, | |
1125 | sizeof(on)) < 0) | |
1126 | error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1127 | ||
1128 | /* | |
1129 | * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do | |
1130 | * not have a key. | |
1131 | */ | |
1132 | packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); | |
1133 | ||
1134 | remote_port = get_remote_port(); | |
1135 | remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); | |
1136 | ||
1137 | #ifdef LIBWRAP | |
1138 | /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ | |
1139 | { | |
1140 | struct request_info req; | |
1141 | ||
1142 | request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0); | |
1143 | fromhost(&req); | |
1144 | ||
1145 | if (!hosts_access(&req)) { | |
1146 | debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper"); | |
1147 | refuse(&req); | |
1148 | /* NOTREACHED */ | |
1149 | fatal("libwrap refuse returns"); | |
1150 | } | |
1151 | } | |
1152 | #endif /* LIBWRAP */ | |
1153 | ||
1154 | /* Log the connection. */ | |
1155 | verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); | |
1156 | ||
1157 | /* | |
1158 | * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side | |
1159 | * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is | |
1160 | * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero | |
1161 | * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging | |
1162 | * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you | |
1163 | * are about to discover the bug. | |
1164 | */ | |
1165 | signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); | |
1166 | if (!debug_flag) | |
1167 | alarm(options.login_grace_time); | |
1168 | ||
1169 | sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); | |
1170 | /* | |
1171 | * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port. | |
1172 | * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged | |
1173 | * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local | |
1174 | * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these | |
1175 | * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust. | |
1176 | */ | |
1177 | if (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED || | |
1178 | remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2) { | |
1179 | debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, " | |
1180 | "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port); | |
1181 | options.rhosts_authentication = 0; | |
1182 | } | |
1183 | #if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5) | |
1184 | if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() && | |
1185 | options.kerberos_authentication) { | |
1186 | debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4."); | |
1187 | options.kerberos_authentication = 0; | |
1188 | } | |
1189 | #endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */ | |
1190 | #ifdef AFS | |
1191 | /* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */ | |
1192 | if (k_hasafs()) { | |
1193 | k_setpag(); | |
1194 | k_unlog(); | |
1195 | } | |
1196 | #endif /* AFS */ | |
1197 | ||
1198 | packet_set_nonblocking(); | |
1199 | ||
1200 | /* perform the key exchange */ | |
1201 | /* authenticate user and start session */ | |
1202 | if (compat20) { | |
1203 | do_ssh2_kex(); | |
1204 | do_authentication2(); | |
1205 | } else { | |
1206 | do_ssh1_kex(); | |
1207 | do_authentication(); | |
1208 | } | |
1209 | /* The connection has been terminated. */ | |
1210 | verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip); | |
1211 | ||
1212 | #ifdef USE_PAM | |
1213 | finish_pam(); | |
1214 | #endif /* USE_PAM */ | |
1215 | ||
1216 | packet_close(); | |
1217 | exit(0); | |
1218 | } | |
1219 | ||
1220 | /* | |
1221 | * SSH1 key exchange | |
1222 | */ | |
1223 | static void | |
1224 | do_ssh1_kex(void) | |
1225 | { | |
1226 | int i, len; | |
1227 | int plen, slen; | |
1228 | int rsafail = 0; | |
1229 | BIGNUM *session_key_int; | |
1230 | u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; | |
1231 | u_char cookie[8]; | |
1232 | u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; | |
1233 | u_int32_t rand = 0; | |
1234 | ||
1235 | /* | |
1236 | * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user | |
1237 | * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip | |
1238 | * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody | |
1239 | * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local | |
1240 | * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random | |
1241 | * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one | |
1242 | * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. | |
1243 | */ | |
1244 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { | |
1245 | if (i % 4 == 0) | |
1246 | rand = arc4random(); | |
1247 | cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; | |
1248 | rand >>= 8; | |
1249 | } | |
1250 | ||
1251 | /* | |
1252 | * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random | |
1253 | * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP | |
1254 | * spoofing. | |
1255 | */ | |
1256 | packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1257 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) | |
1258 | packet_put_char(cookie[i]); | |
1259 | ||
1260 | /* Store our public server RSA key. */ | |
1261 | packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)); | |
1262 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); | |
1263 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); | |
1264 | ||
1265 | /* Store our public host RSA key. */ | |
1266 | packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); | |
1267 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e); | |
1268 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n); | |
1269 | ||
1270 | /* Put protocol flags. */ | |
1271 | packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); | |
1272 | ||
1273 | /* Declare which ciphers we support. */ | |
1274 | packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0)); | |
1275 | ||
1276 | /* Declare supported authentication types. */ | |
1277 | auth_mask = 0; | |
1278 | if (options.rhosts_authentication) | |
1279 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS; | |
1280 | if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) | |
1281 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA; | |
1282 | if (options.rsa_authentication) | |
1283 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA; | |
1284 | #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) | |
1285 | if (options.kerberos_authentication) | |
1286 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS; | |
1287 | #endif | |
1288 | #if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) | |
1289 | if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing) | |
1290 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT; | |
1291 | #endif | |
1292 | #ifdef AFS | |
1293 | if (options.afs_token_passing) | |
1294 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN; | |
1295 | #endif | |
1296 | if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) | |
1297 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS; | |
1298 | if (options.password_authentication) | |
1299 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD; | |
1300 | packet_put_int(auth_mask); | |
1301 | ||
1302 | /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */ | |
1303 | packet_send(); | |
1304 | packet_write_wait(); | |
1305 | ||
1306 | debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.", | |
1307 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), | |
1308 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); | |
1309 | ||
1310 | /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */ | |
1311 | packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); | |
1312 | ||
1313 | /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */ | |
1314 | cipher_type = packet_get_char(); | |
1315 | ||
1316 | if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type))) | |
1317 | packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher."); | |
1318 | ||
1319 | /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we | |
1320 | sent earlier with the public key packet. */ | |
1321 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) | |
1322 | if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) | |
1323 | packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); | |
1324 | ||
1325 | debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); | |
1326 | ||
1327 | /* Get the encrypted integer. */ | |
1328 | session_key_int = BN_new(); | |
1329 | packet_get_bignum(session_key_int, &slen); | |
1330 | ||
1331 | protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); | |
1332 | packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags); | |
1333 | ||
1334 | packet_integrity_check(plen, 1 + 8 + slen + 4, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); | |
1335 | ||
1336 | /* | |
1337 | * Decrypt it using our private server key and private host key (key | |
1338 | * with larger modulus first). | |
1339 | */ | |
1340 | if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) { | |
1341 | /* Server key has bigger modulus. */ | |
1342 | if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) < | |
1343 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { | |
1344 | fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", | |
1345 | get_remote_ipaddr(), | |
1346 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), | |
1347 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), | |
1348 | SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); | |
1349 | } | |
1350 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1351 | sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0) | |
1352 | rsafail++; | |
1353 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1354 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0) | |
1355 | rsafail++; | |
1356 | } else { | |
1357 | /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */ | |
1358 | if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) < | |
1359 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { | |
1360 | fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", | |
1361 | get_remote_ipaddr(), | |
1362 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), | |
1363 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), | |
1364 | SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); | |
1365 | } | |
1366 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1367 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0) | |
1368 | rsafail++; | |
1369 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1370 | sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0) | |
1371 | rsafail++; | |
1372 | } | |
1373 | /* | |
1374 | * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the | |
1375 | * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the | |
1376 | * key is in the highest bits. | |
1377 | */ | |
1378 | if (!rsafail) { | |
1379 | BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); | |
1380 | len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); | |
1381 | if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) { | |
1382 | error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: " | |
1383 | "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", | |
1384 | get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key)); | |
1385 | rsafail++; | |
1386 | } else { | |
1387 | memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); | |
1388 | BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, | |
1389 | session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len); | |
1390 | ||
1391 | compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, | |
1392 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n, | |
1393 | sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); | |
1394 | /* | |
1395 | * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the | |
1396 | * session id. | |
1397 | */ | |
1398 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) | |
1399 | session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; | |
1400 | } | |
1401 | } | |
1402 | if (rsafail) { | |
1403 | int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); | |
1404 | char *buf = xmalloc(bytes); | |
1405 | MD5_CTX md; | |
1406 | ||
1407 | log("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key"); | |
1408 | BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf); | |
1409 | MD5_Init(&md); | |
1410 | MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); | |
1411 | MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); | |
1412 | MD5_Final(session_key, &md); | |
1413 | MD5_Init(&md); | |
1414 | MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16); | |
1415 | MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); | |
1416 | MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); | |
1417 | MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md); | |
1418 | memset(buf, 0, bytes); | |
1419 | xfree(buf); | |
1420 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) | |
1421 | session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; | |
1422 | } | |
1423 | /* Destroy the private and public keys. They will no longer be needed. */ | |
1424 | destroy_sensitive_data(); | |
1425 | ||
1426 | /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */ | |
1427 | BN_clear_free(session_key_int); | |
1428 | ||
1429 | /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */ | |
1430 | packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type); | |
1431 | ||
1432 | /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */ | |
1433 | memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); | |
1434 | ||
1435 | debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); | |
1436 | ||
1437 | /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ | |
1438 | packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); | |
1439 | packet_send(); | |
1440 | packet_write_wait(); | |
1441 | } | |
1442 | ||
1443 | /* | |
1444 | * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 | |
1445 | */ | |
1446 | static void | |
1447 | do_ssh2_kex(void) | |
1448 | { | |
1449 | Kex *kex; | |
1450 | ||
1451 | if (options.ciphers != NULL) { | |
1452 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = | |
1453 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; | |
1454 | } | |
1455 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = | |
1456 | compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); | |
1457 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = | |
1458 | compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); | |
1459 | ||
1460 | if (options.macs != NULL) { | |
1461 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = | |
1462 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; | |
1463 | } | |
1464 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); | |
1465 | ||
1466 | /* start key exchange */ | |
1467 | kex = kex_setup(myproposal); | |
1468 | kex->server = 1; | |
1469 | kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; | |
1470 | kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; | |
1471 | kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type; | |
1472 | ||
1473 | xxx_kex = kex; | |
1474 | ||
1475 | dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); | |
1476 | ||
1477 | session_id2 = kex->session_id; | |
1478 | session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; | |
1479 | ||
1480 | #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH | |
1481 | /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ | |
1482 | packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); | |
1483 | packet_put_cstring("markus"); | |
1484 | packet_send(); | |
1485 | packet_write_wait(); | |
1486 | #endif | |
1487 | debug("KEX done"); | |
1488 | } |