--- /dev/null
+ssh
+scp
+sshd
+ssh-add
+ssh-keygen
+ssh-keyscan
+ssh-agent
+sftp-server
+sftp
+configure
+config.h.in
+config.h
+config.status
+config.cache
+config.log
+stamp-h.in
+Makefile
+ssh_prng_cmds
+*.out
+*.0
+buildit.sh
--- /dev/null
+Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> - Creator of SSH
+
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH
+
+Alain St-Denis <Alain.St-Denis@ec.gc.ca> - Irix fix
+Alexandre Oliva <oliva@lsd.ic.unicamp.br> - AIX fixes
+Andre Lucas <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com> - new login code, many fixes
+Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de> - Shadow password expiry support
+Andrew McGill <andrewm@datrix.co.za> - SCO fixes
+Andrew Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com> - PAM bugfixes
+Andrew Stribblehill <a.d.stribblehill@durham.ac.uk> - Bugfixes
+Andy Sloane <andy@guildsoftware.com> - bugfixes
+Aran Cox <acox@cv.telegroup.com> - SCO bugfixes
+Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl> - IPv6 compat fixes
+Ben Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org> - NeXT support
+Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net> - Solaris debugging and fixes
+Bratislav ILICH <bilic@zepter.ru> - Configure fix
+Charles Levert <charles@comm.polymtl.ca> - SunOS 4 & bug fixes
+Chip Salzenberg <chip@valinux.com> - Assorted patches
+Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net> - OSF SIA support
+Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com> - SuSE packaging
+Chris, the Young One <cky@pobox.com> - Password auth fixes
+Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com> - Autoconf fixes
+Chun-Chung Chen <cjj@u.washington.edu> - RPM fixes
+Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com> - Cygwin support
+Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com> - Autoconf support, build fixes
+Darren Hall <dhall@virage.org> - AIX patches
+David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com> - Build fixes
+David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au> - bug fixes
+David Hesprich <darkgrue@gue-tech.org> - Configure fixes
+David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us> - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes
+Ed Eden <ede370@stl.rural.usda.gov> - configure fixes
+Garrick James <garrick@james.net> - configure fixes
+Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com> - SCO support
+Ged Lodder <lodder@yacc.com.au> - HPUX fixes and enhancements
+Gert Doering <gd@hilb1.medat.de> - bug and portability fixes
+HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@klab.org> - Translations & doc fixes
+Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@ecei.tohoku.ac.jp> - IPv6 and bug fixes
+Hiroshi Takekawa <takekawa@sr3.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
+Holger Trapp <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE> - KRB4/AFS config patch
+IWAMURO Motonori <iwa@mmp.fujitsu.co.jp> - bugfixes
+Jani Hakala <jahakala@cc.jyu.fi> - Patches
+Jarno Huuskonen <jhuuskon@hytti.uku.fi> - Bugfixes
+Jim Knoble <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx> - Many patches
+Jonchen (email unknown) - the original author of PAM support of SSH
+Juergen Keil <jk@tools.de> - scp bugfixing
+KAMAHARA Junzo <kamahara@cc.kshosen.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
+Kees Cook <cook@cpoint.net> - scp fixes
+Kenji Miyake <kenji@miyake.org> - Configure fixes
+Kevin O'Connor <kevin_oconnor@standardandpoors.com> - RSAless operation
+Kevin Steves <stevesk@pobox.com> - HP support, bugfixes, improvements
+Kiyokazu SUTO <suto@ks-and-ks.ne.jp> - Bugfixes
+Larry Jones <larry.jones@sdrc.com> - Bugfixes
+Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> - Bugfixes
+Marc G. Fournier <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca> - Solaris patches
+Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> - bug fixes
+Martin Johansson <fatbob@acc.umu.se> - Linux fixes
+Mark D. Roth <roth+openssh@feep.net> - Features, bug fixes
+Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net> - Bugfixes
+Matt Richards <v2matt@btv.ibm.com> - AIX patches
+Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu> - Irix enhancements
+Nakaji Hiroyuki <nakaji@tutrp.tut.ac.jp> - Sony News-OS patch
+Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin.dahyabhai@pobox.com> - PAM environment patch
+Nate Itkin <nitkin@europa.com> - SunOS 4.1.x fixes
+Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk> - Assorted patches
+Pavel Kankovsky <peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz> - Security fixes
+Pavel Troller <patrol@omni.sinus.cz> - Bugfixes
+Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> - Bugfixes
+Peter Kocks <peter.kocks@baygate.com> - Makefile fixes
+Phil Hands <phil@hands.com> - Debian scripts, assorted patches
+Phil Karn <karn@ka9q.ampr.org> - Autoconf fixes
+Philippe WILLEM <Philippe.WILLEM@urssaf.fr> - Bugfixes
+Phill Camp <P.S.S.Camp@ukc.ac.uk> - login code fix
+Rip Loomis <loomisg@cist.saic.com> - Solaris package support, fixes
+SAKAI Kiyotaka <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp> - Multiple bugfixes
+Simon Wilkinson <sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk> - PAM fixes
+Svante Signell <svante.signell@telia.com> - Bugfixes
+Thomas Neumann <tom@smart.ruhr.de> - Shadow passwords
+Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> - Portability & SCO fixes
+Tobias Oetiker <oetiker@ee.ethz.ch> - Bugfixes
+Tom Bertelson's <tbert@abac.com> - AIX auth fixes
+Tor-Ake Fransson <torake@hotmail.com> - AIX support
+Tudor Bosman <tudorb@jm.nu> - MD5 password support
+Udo Schweigert <ust@cert.siemens.de> - ReliantUNIX support
+Zack Weinberg <zack@wolery.cumb.org> - GNOME askpass enhancement
+
+Apologies to anyone I have missed.
+
+Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+
+$Id$
+
--- /dev/null
+20011202
+ - (djm) Syn with OpenBSD OpenSSH-3.0.2
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [session.c sshd.8 version.h]
+ Don't allow authorized_keys specified environment variables when
+ UseLogin in active
+
+20011115
+ - (djm) Fix IPv4 default in ssh-keyscan. Spotted by Dan Astoorian
+ <djast@cs.toronto.edu> Fix from markus@
+ - (djm) Release 3.0.1p1
+
+20011113
+ - (djm) Fix early (and double) free of remote user when using Kerberos.
+ Patch from Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
+ - (djm) AIX login{success,failed} changes. Move loginsuccess call to
+ do_authenticated. Call loginfailed for protocol 2 failures > MAX like
+ we do for protocol 1. Reports from Ralf Wenk <wera0003@fh-karlsruhe.de>,
+ K.Wolkersdorfer@fz-juelich.de and others
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - dugsong@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/11 18:47:10
+ [auth-krb5.c]
+ fix krb5 authorization check. found by <jhawk@MIT.EDU>. from
+ art@, deraadt@ ok
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/12 11:17:07
+ [servconf.c]
+ enable authorized_keys2 again. tested by fries@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/13 02:03:57
+ [version.h]
+ enter 3.0.1
+ - (djm) Bump RPM package versions
+
+20011112
+ - (djm) Makefile correctness fix from Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net>
+ - (djm) Cygwin config patch from Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/24 08:41:41
+ [sshd.c]
+ mention remote port in debug message
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/24 08:41:20
+ [ssh.c]
+ remove unused
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/24 08:51:35
+ [clientloop.c ssh.c]
+ ignore SIGPIPE early, makes ssh work if agent dies, netbsd-pr via itojun@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/24 19:57:40
+ [clientloop.c]
+ make ~& (backgrounding) work again for proto v1; add support ~& for v2, too
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/25 21:14:32
+ [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+ better docu for fingerprinting, ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/29 19:27:15
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ hostbased: check for client hostkey before building chost
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/30 20:29:09
+ [ssh.1]
+ ssh.1
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 16:03:17
+ [packet.c packet.h sshconnect2.c]
+ pad using the padding field from the ssh2 packet instead of sending
+ extra ignore messages. tested against several other ssh servers.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 21:40:21
+ [ssh-rsa.c]
+ ssh_rsa_sign/verify: SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB not supported
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 22:10:28
+ [ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
+ missing free and sync dss/rsa code.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 22:12:01
+ [sshd.8]
+ s/Keepalive/KeepAlive/; from openbsd@davidkrause.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 22:41:51
+ [auth2.c auth-rh-rsa.c]
+ unused includes
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/07 22:53:21
+ [channels.h]
+ crank c->path to 256 so they can hold a full hostname; dwd@bell-labs.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/08 10:51:08
+ [readpass.c]
+ don't strdup too much data; from gotoh@taiyo.co.jp; ok millert.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/08 17:49:53
+ [ssh.1]
+ mention setuid root requirements; noted by cnorris@csc.UVic.ca; ok stevesk@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/08 20:02:24
+ [auth.c]
+ don't print ROOT in CAPS for the authentication messages, i.e.
+ Accepted publickey for ROOT from 127.0.0.1 port 42734 ssh2
+ becomes
+ Accepted publickey for root from 127.0.0.1 port 42734 ssh2
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/09 18:59:23
+ [clientloop.c serverloop.c]
+ don't memset too much memory, ok millert@
+ original patch from jlk@kamens.brookline.ma.us via nalin@redhat.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/10 13:19:45
+ [sshd.c]
+ cleanup libwrap support (remove bogus comment, bogus close(), add
+ debug, etc).
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/10 13:22:42
+ [ssh-rsa.c]
+ KNF (unexpand)
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/10 13:37:20
+ [packet.c]
+ remove extra debug()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/11 13:02:31
+ [servconf.c]
+ make AuthorizedKeysFile2 fallback to AuthorizedKeysFile if
+ AuthorizedKeysFile is specified.
+ - (djm) Reorder portable-specific server options so that they come first.
+ This should help reduce diff collisions for new server options (as they
+ will appear at the end)
+
+20011109
+ - (stevesk) auth-pam.c: use do_pam_authenticate(PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK)
+ if permit_empty_passwd == 0 so null password check cannot be bypassed.
+ jayaraj@amritapuri.com OpenBSD bug 2168
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/11/09 19:08:35
+ [sshd.c]
+ remove extra trailing dot from log message; pilot@naughty.monkey.org
+
+20011103
+ - (tim) [ contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/caldera/sshd.init] Updates
+ from Raymund Will <ray@caldera.de>
+ [acconfig.h configure.in] Clean up login checks.
+ Problem reported by Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
+
+20011101
+ - (djm) Compat define for OpenSSL < 0.9.6 (No OPENSSL_free)
+
+20011031
+ - (djm) Unsmoke drugs: config files should be noreplace.
+
+20011030
+ - (djm) Redhat RPM spec: remove noreplace from config files, allow IPv6
+ by default (can force IPv4 using --define "noipv6 1")
+
+20011029
+ - (tim) [TODO defines.h loginrec.c] Change the references to configure.in
+ to configure.ac
+
+20011028
+ - (djm) Avoid bug in Solaris PAM libs
+ - (djm) Disconnect if no tty and PAM reports password expired
+ - (djm) Fix for PAM password changes being echoed (from stevesk)
+ - (stevesk) Fix compile problem with PAM password change fix
+ - (stevesk) README: zlib location is http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
+
+20011027
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Fixes for ReliantUNIX (don't use libucb)
+ Patch by Robert Dahlem <Robert.Dahlem@siemens.com>
+
+20011026
+ - (bal) Set the correct current time in login_utmp_only(). Patch by
+ Wayne Davison <wayned@users.sourceforge.net>
+ - (tim) [scard/Makefile.in] Fix install: when building outside of source
+ tree and using --src=/full_path/to/openssh
+ Patch by Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net>
+
+20011025
+ - (bal) Use VDISABLE if _POSIX_VDISABLE is set in readpassphrase.c. Patch
+ by todd@
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Give path given in --with-xxx= for pcre,zlib, and
+ tcp-wrappers precedence over system libraries and includes.
+ Report from Dave Dykstra <dwd@bell-labs.com>
+
+20011024
+ - (bal) Should be 3.0p1 not 3.0p2. Corrected version.h already.
+ - (tim) configure.in -> configure.ac
+
+20011023
+ - (bal) Updated version to 3.0p1 in preparing for release.
+ - (bal) Added 'PAM_TTY_KLUDGE' to Solaris platform.
+ - (tim) [configure.in] Fix test for broken dirname. Based on patch from
+ Dave Dykstra <dwd@bell-labs.com>. Remove un-needed test for zlib.h.
+ [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec, contrib/redhat/openssh.spec,
+ contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update version to match version.h
+
+20011022
+ - (djm) Fix fd leak in loginrec.c (ro fd to lastlog was left open).
+ Report from Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>
+
+20011021
+ - (tim) [configure.in] Clean up library testing. Add optional PATH to
+ --with-pcre, --with-zlib, and --with-tcp-wrappers. Based on
+ patch by albert chin (china@thewrittenword.com)
+ Re-arange AC_CHECK_HEADERS and AC_CHECK_FUNCS for eaiser reading
+ of patches to configure.in. Replace obsolete AC_STRUCT_ST_BLKSIZE
+ with AC_CHECK_MEMBERS. Add test for broken dirname() on
+ Solaris 2.5.1 by Dan Astoorian <djast@cs.toronto.edu>
+ [acconfig.h aclocal.m4 defines.h configure.in] Better socklen_t test.
+ patch by albert chin (china@thewrittenword.com)
+ [scp.c] Replace obsolete HAVE_ST_BLKSIZE with
+ HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE.
+ [Makefile.in] When running make in top level, always do make
+ in openbsd-compat. patch by Dave Dykstra <dwd@bell-labs.com>
+
+20011019
+ - (bal) Fixed up init.d symlink issue and piddir stuff. Patches by
+ Zoran Milojevic <Zoran.Milojevic@SS8.com> and j.petersen@msh.de
+
+20011012
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/10 22:18:47
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c serverloop.c]
+ [session.c session.h]
+ try to keep channels open until an exit-status message is sent.
+ don't kill the login shells if the shells stdin/out/err is closed.
+ this should now work:
+ ssh -2n localhost 'exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 10; exit 5'; echo ?
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/11 13:45:21
+ [session.c]
+ delay detach of session if a channel gets closed but the child is
+ still alive. however, release pty, since the fd's to the child are
+ already closed.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/11 15:24:00
+ [clientloop.c]
+ clear select masks if we return before calling select().
+ - (djm) "make veryclean" fix from Tom Holroyd <tomh@po.crl.go.jp>
+ - (djm) Clean some autoconf-2.52 junk when doing "make distclean"
+ - (djm) Cleanup sshpty.c a little
+ - (bal) First wave of contrib/solaris/ package upgrades. Still more
+ work needs to be done, but it is a 190% better then the stuff we
+ had before!
+ - (bal) Minor bug fix in contrib/solaris/opensshd.in .. $etcdir was not
+ set right.
+
+20011010
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/04 14:34:16
+ [key.c]
+ call OPENSSL_free() for memory allocated by openssl; from chombier@mac.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/04 15:05:40
+ [channels.c serverloop.c]
+ comment out bogus conditions for selecting on connection_in
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/04 15:12:37
+ [serverloop.c]
+ client_alive_check cleanup
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/06 00:14:50
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ remove unused argument
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/06 00:36:42
+ [session.c]
+ fix typo in error message, sync with do_exec_nopty
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/06 11:18:19
+ [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshconnect.c]
+ unify hostkey check error messages, simplify prompt.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/07 10:29:52
+ [authfile.c]
+ grammer; Matthew_Clarke@mindlink.bc.ca
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/07 17:49:40
+ [channels.c channels.h]
+ avoid possible FD_ISSET overflow for channels established
+ during channnel_after_select() (used for dynamic channels).
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/08 11:48:57
+ [channels.c]
+ better debug
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/08 16:15:47
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ use correct family for -b option
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/08 19:05:05
+ [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h ssh-keyscan.c]
+ some more IPv4or6 cleanup
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/09 10:12:08
+ [session.c]
+ chdir $HOME after krb_afslog(); from bbense@networking.stanford.edu
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/09 19:32:49
+ [session.c]
+ stat subsystem command before calling do_exec, and return error to client.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/09 19:51:18
+ [serverloop.c]
+ close all channels if the connection to the remote host has been closed,
+ should fix sshd's hanging with WCHAN==wait
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/09 21:59:41
+ [channels.c channels.h serverloop.c session.c session.h]
+ simplify session close: no more delayed session_close, no more
+ blocking wait() calls.
+ - (bal) removed two unsed headers in openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
+ - (bal) seed_init() and seed_rng() required in ssh-keyscan.c
+
+20011007
+ - (bal) ssh-copy-id corrected permissions for .ssh/ and authorized_keys.
+ Prompted by Matthew Vernon <matthew@sel.cam.ac.uk>
+
+20011005
+ - (bal) AES works under Cray, no more hack.
+
+20011004
+ - (bal) nchan2.ms resync. BSD License applied.
+
+20011003
+ - (bal) CVS ID fix up in version.h
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/27 11:58:16
+ [compress.c]
+ mem leak; chombier@mac.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/27 11:59:37
+ [packet.c]
+ missing called=1; chombier@mac.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/27 15:31:17
+ [auth2.c auth2-chall.c sshconnect1.c]
+ typos; from solar
+ - camield@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/27 17:53:24
+ [sshd.8]
+ don't talk about compile-time options
+ ok markus@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/28 12:07:09
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ bzero private key after loading to smartcard; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/28 15:46:29
+ [ssh.c]
+ bug: read user config first; report kaukasoi@elektroni.ee.tut.fi
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/01 08:06:28
+ [scp.c]
+ skip filenames containing \n; report jdamery@chiark.greenend.org.uk
+ and matthew@debian.org
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/01 21:38:53
+ [channels.c channels.h ssh.c sshd.c]
+ remove ugliness; vp@drexel.edu via angelos
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/01 21:51:16
+ [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 sshconnect.c]
+ add NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost; note that the hostkey is
+ now check for localhost, too.
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/02 08:38:50
+ [ssh-add.c]
+ return non-zero exit code on error; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/02 22:56:09
+ [sshd.c]
+ #include "channels.h" for channel_set_af()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/10/03 10:01:20
+ [auth.c]
+ use realpath() for homedir, too. from jinmei@isl.rdc.toshiba.co.jp
+
+20011001
+ - (stevesk) loginrec.c: fix type conversion problems exposed when using
+ 64-bit off_t.
+
+20010929
+ - (bal) move reading 'config.h' up higher. Patch by albert chin
+ <china@thewrittenword.com)
+
+20010928
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS sync:
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/28 09:49:31
+ [scard.c]
+ Fix segv when smartcard communication error occurs during key load.
+ ok markus@
+ - (djm) Update spec files for new x11-askpass
+
+20010927
+ - (stevesk) session.c: declare do_pre_login() before use
+ wayned@users.sourceforge.net
+
+20010925
+ - (djm) Pull in auth-krb5.c from OpenBSD CVS. NB. it is not currently used.
+ - (djm) Sync $sysconfdir/moduli
+ - (djm) Add AC_SYS_LARGEFILE configure test
+ - (djm) Avoid bad and unportable sprintf usage in compat code
+
+20010923
+ - (bal) updated ssh.c to mirror minor getopts 'extern int' formating done
+ by stevesk@
+ - (bal) Removed 'extern int optopt;' since it is dead wood.
+ - (bal) Updated all *.specs for 2.9.9p1 and updated version.h
+
+20010923
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/23 11:09:13
+ [authfile.c]
+ relax permission check for private key files.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/23 09:58:13
+ [LICENCE]
+ new rijndael implementation
+
+20010920
+ - (tim) [scard/Makefile.in] Don't strip the Java binary
+ - (stevesk) sun_len, SUN_LEN() configure stuff no longer required
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/20 00:15:54
+ [sshd.8]
+ fix ClientAliveCountMax
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/20 13:46:48
+ [auth2.c]
+ key_read returns now -1 or 1
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/20 13:50:40
+ [compat.c compat.h ssh.c]
+ bug compat: request a dummy channel for -N (no shell) sessions +
+ cleanup; vinschen@redhat.com
+ - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/20 20:57:51
+ [sshd_config]
+ CheckMail removed. OKed stevesk@
+
+20010919
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/19 10:08:51
+ [sshd.8]
+ command=xxx applies to subsystem now, too
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/19 13:23:29
+ [key.c]
+ key_read() now returns -1 on type mismatch, too
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/19 19:24:19
+ [readconf.c readconf.h scp.c sftp.c ssh.1]
+ add ClearAllForwardings ssh option and set it in scp and sftp; ok
+ markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/19 19:35:30
+ [authfd.c]
+ use sizeof addr vs. SUN_LEN(addr) for sockaddr_un. Stevens
+ blesses this and we do it this way elsewhere. this helps in
+ portable because not all systems have SUN_LEN() and
+ sockaddr_un.sun_len. ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/19 21:04:53
+ [sshd.8]
+ missing -t in usage
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/19 21:41:57
+ [sshd.8]
+ don't advertise -V in usage; ok markus@
+ - (bal) openbsd-compat/vis.[ch] is dead wood. Removed.
+
+20010918
+ - (djm) Configure support for smartcards. Based on Ben's work.
+ - (djm) Revert setgroups call, it causes problems on OS-X
+ - (djm) Avoid warning on BSDgetopt
+ - (djm) More makefile infrastructre for smartcard support, also based
+ on Ben's work
+ - (djm) Specify --datadir in RPM spec files so smartcard applet gets
+ put somewhere sane. Add Ssh.bin to manifest.
+ - (djm) Make smartcard support conditional in Redhat RPM spec
+ - (bal) LICENCE update. Has not been done in a while.
+ - (stevesk) nchan.c: we use X/Open Sockets on HP-UX now so shutdown(2)
+ returns ENOTCONN vs. EINVAL for socket not connected; remove EINVAL
+ check. ok Lutz Jaenicke
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/17 17:57:57
+ [scp.1 scp.c sftp.1 sftp.c]
+ add -Fssh_config option; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/17 19:27:15
+ [kexdh.c kexgex.c key.c key.h ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
+ u_char*/char* cleanup; ok markus
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/17 20:22:14
+ [scard.c]
+ never keep a connection to the smartcard open.
+ allows ssh-keygen -D U while the agent is running; report from
+ jakob@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/17 20:38:09
+ [sftp.1 sftp.c]
+ cleanup and document -1, -s and -S; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/17 20:50:22
+ [key.c ssh-keygen.c]
+ better error handling if you try to export a bad key to ssh.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/17 20:52:47
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
+ try to fix agent-forwarding-backconnection-bug, as seen on HPUX,
+ for example; with Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE,
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/17 21:04:02
+ [channels.c serverloop.c]
+ don't send fake dummy packets on CR (\r)
+ bugreport from yyua@cs.sfu.ca via solar@@openwall.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/17 21:09:47
+ [compat.c]
+ more versions suffering the SSH_BUG_DEBUG bug;
+ 3.0.x reported by dbutts@maddog.storability.com
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/17 23:56:07
+ [scp.1]
+ missing -B in usage string
+
+20010917
+ - (djm) x11-ssh-askpass-1.2.4 in RPM spec, revert workarounds
+ - (tim) [includes.h openbsd-compat/getopt.c openbsd-compat/getopt.h]
+ rename getopt() to BSDgetopt() to keep form conflicting with
+ system getopt().
+ [Makefile.in configure.in] disable filepriv until I can add
+ missing procpriv calls.
+
+20010916
+ - (djm) Workaround XFree breakage in RPM spec file
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/16 14:46:54
+ [session.c]
+ calls krb_afslog() after setting $HOME; mattiasa@e.kth.se; fixes
+ pr 1943b
+
+20010915
+ - (djm) Make do_pre_login static to avoid prototype #ifdef hell
+ - (djm) Sync scard/ stuff
+ - (djm) Redhat spec file cleanups from Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> and
+ Redhat
+ - (djm) Redhat initscript config sanity checking from Pekka Savola
+ <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Clear supplemental groups at sshd start to prevent them from
+ being propogated to random PAM modules. Based on patch from Redhat via
+ Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Make sure rijndael.c picks config.h
+ - (djm) Ensure that u_char gets defined
+
+20010914
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/13
+ [rijndael.c rijndael.h]
+ missing $OpenBSD
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/14
+ [session.c]
+ command=xxx overwrites subsystems, too
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/14
+ [sshd.c]
+ typo
+
+20010913
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/23 11:31:59
+ [cipher.c cipher.h]
+ switch to the optimised AES reference code from
+ http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/rijndael-fst-3.0.zip
+
+20010912
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/16 19:18:34
+ [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8]
+ deprecate CheckMail. ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/16 20:14:57
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ document case sensitivity for ssh, sshd and key file
+ options and arguments; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/17 18:59:47
+ [servconf.h]
+ typo in comment
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/21 21:47:42
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ minor typos and cleanup
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/22 16:21:21
+ [ssh.1]
+ hostname not optional; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/22 16:30:02
+ [sshd.8]
+ no rexd; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/22 17:45:16
+ [ssh.1]
+ document cipher des for protocol 1; ok deraadt@
+ - camield@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/23 17:59:31
+ [sshd.c]
+ end request with 0, not NULL
+ ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/23 18:02:48
+ [ssh-agent.1]
+ fix usage; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/23 18:08:59
+ [ssh-add.1 ssh-keyscan.1]
+ minor cleanup
+ - danh@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/27 22:02:13
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ fix memory fault if non-existent filename is given to the -f option
+ ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/28 09:51:26
+ [readconf.c]
+ don't set DynamicForward unless Host matches
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/28 15:39:48
+ [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+ allow: ssh -F configfile host
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/29 20:44:03
+ [scp.c]
+ clear the malloc'd buffer, otherwise source() will leak malloc'd
+ memory; ok theo@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/29 23:02:21
+ [sshd.8]
+ add text about -u0 preventing DNS requests; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/29 23:13:10
+ [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+ document -D and DynamicForward; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/29 23:27:23
+ [ssh.c]
+ validate ports for -L/-R; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/29 23:39:40
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ additional documentation for GatewayPorts; ok markus@
+ - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/30 15:42:36
+ [ssh.1]
+ add -D to synopsis line; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/30 16:04:35
+ [readconf.c ssh.1]
+ validate ports for LocalForward/RemoteForward.
+ add host/port alternative syntax for IPv6 (like -L/-R).
+ ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/30 20:36:34
+ [auth-options.c sshd.8]
+ validate ports for permitopen key file option. add host/port
+ alternative syntax for IPv6. ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/30 22:22:32
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ do not pass pointers to longjmp; fix from wayne@blorf.net
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/31 11:46:39
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ disable kbd-interactive if we don't get SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST
+ messages
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/03 20:58:33
+ [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c]
+ fatal() for nonexistent -Fssh_config. ok markus@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/05 06:23:07
+ [scp.1 sftp.1 ssh.1 ssh-agent.1 sshd.8 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1]
+ avoid first person in manual pages
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/09/12 18:18:25
+ [scp.c]
+ don't forward agent for non third-party copies; ok markus@
+
+20010815
+ - (bal) Fixed stray code in readconf.c that went in by mistake.
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/07 10:37:46
+ [authfd.c authfd.h]
+ extended failure messages from galb@vandyke.com
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/08 07:16:58
+ [scp.1]
+ when describing the -o option, give -o Protocol=1 as the specific example
+ since we are SICK AND TIRED of clueless people who cannot have difficulty
+ thinking on their own.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/08 18:20:15
+ [uidswap.c]
+ permanently_set_uid is a noop if user is not privilegued;
+ fixes bug on solaris; from sbi@uchicago.edu
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/08 21:34:19
+ [uidswap.c]
+ undo last change; does not work for sshd
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/11 22:51:27
+ [ssh.c tildexpand.c]
+ fix more paths beginning with "//"; <bradshaw@staff.crosswalk.com>.
+ ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/13 23:38:54
+ [scp.c]
+ don't need main prototype (also sync with rcp); ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/14 09:23:02
+ [sftp.1 sftp-int.c]
+ "bye"; hk63a@netscape.net
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/14 17:54:29
+ [scp.1 sftp.1 ssh.1]
+ consistent documentation and example of ``-o ssh_option'' for sftp and
+ scp; document keyword=argument for ssh.
+ - (bal) QNX resync. OK tim@
+
+20010814
+ - (stevesk) sshpty.c, cray.[ch]: whitespace, formatting and cleanup
+ for some #ifdef _CRAY code; ok wendyp@cray.com
+ - (stevesk) sshpty.c: return 0 on error in cray pty code;
+ ok wendyp@cray.com
+ - (stevesk) bsd-cray.c: utmp strings are not C strings
+ - (stevesk) bsd-cray.c: more cleanup; ok wendyp@cray.com
+
+20010812
+ - (djm) Fix detection of long long int support. Based on patch from
+ Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu>. ok stevesk, tim
+
+20010808
+ - (bal) Minor correction to inet_ntop.h. _BSD_RRESVPORT_H should be
+ _BSD_INET_NTOP_H. Pointed out by Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net>
+
+20010807
+ - (tim) [configure.in sshconnect.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+ openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h ] Add inet_ntop.c inet_ntop.h back
+ in. Needed for sshconnect.c
+ [sshconnect.c] fix INET6_ADDRSTRLEN for non IPv6 machines
+ [configure.in] make tests with missing libraries fail
+ patch by Wendy Palm <wendyp@cray.com>
+ Added openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.h. Selective patches from
+ William L. Jones <jones@mail.utexas.edu>
+
+20010806
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/22 21:32:27
+ [sshpty.c]
+ update comment
+ - pvalchev@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/22 21:32:42
+ [ssh.1]
+ There is no option "Compress", point to "Compression" instead; ok
+ markus
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/22 22:04:19
+ [readconf.c ssh.1]
+ enable challenge-response auth by default; ok millert@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/22 22:24:16
+ [sshd.8]
+ Xr login.conf
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/23 09:06:28
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ reorder default sequence of userauth methods to match ssh behaviour:
+ hostbased,publickey,keyboard-interactive,password
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/23 12:47:05
+ [ssh.1]
+ sync PreferredAuthentications
+ - aaron@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/23 14:14:18
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ Fix typo.
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/23 18:14:58
+ [auth2.c auth-rsa.c]
+ use %lu; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/23 18:21:46
+ [xmalloc.c]
+ no zero size xstrdup() error; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/25 11:59:35
+ [scard.c]
+ typo in comment
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/25 14:35:18
+ [readconf.c ssh.1 ssh.c sshconnect.c]
+ cleanup connect(); connection_attempts 4 -> 1; from
+ eivind@freebsd.org
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/26 17:18:22
+ [sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ add -t option to test configuration file and keys; pekkas@netcore.fi
+ ok markus@
+ - rees@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/26 20:04:27
+ [scard.c ssh-keygen.c]
+ Inquire Cyberflex class for 0xf0 cards
+ change aid to conform to 7816-5
+ remove gratuitous fid selects
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/27 14:50:45
+ [ssh.c]
+ If smart card support is compiled in and a smart card is being used
+ for authentication, make it the first method used. markus@ OK
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/27 17:26:16
+ [scp.c]
+ shorten lines
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/28 09:21:15
+ [sshd.8]
+ cleanup some RSA vs DSA vs SSH1 vs SSH2 notes
+ - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/29 17:02:46
+ [scp.1]
+ Clarified -o option in scp.1 OKed by Markus@
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/30 16:06:07
+ [scard.c scard.h]
+ better errorcodes from sc_*; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/30 16:23:30
+ [rijndael.c rijndael.h]
+ new BSD-style license:
+ Brian Gladman <brg@gladman.plus.com>:
+ >I have updated my code at:
+ >http://fp.gladman.plus.com/cryptography_technology/rijndael/index.htm
+ >with a copyright notice as follows:
+ >[...]
+ >I am not sure which version of my old code you are using but I am
+ >happy for the notice above to be substituted for my existing copyright
+ >intent if this meets your purpose.
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/31 08:41:10
+ [scard.c]
+ do not complain about missing smartcards. ok markus@
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/31 09:28:44
+ [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c]
+ add 'SmartcardDevice' client option to specify which smartcard device
+ is used to access a smartcard used for storing the user's private RSA
+ key. ok markus@.
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/31 12:42:50
+ [sftp-int.c sftp-server.c]
+ avoid paths beginning with "//"; <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ ok markus@
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/31 12:53:34
+ [scard.c]
+ close smartcard connection if card is missing
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/01 22:03:33
+ [authfd.c authfd.h readconf.c readconf.h scard.c scard.h ssh-add.c
+ ssh-agent.c ssh.c]
+ use strings instead of ints for smartcard reader ids
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/01 22:16:45
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ refer to current ietf drafts for protocol v2
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/01 23:33:09
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ allow uploading RSA keys for non-default AUT0 (sha1 over passphrase
+ like sectok).
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/01 23:38:45
+ [scard.c ssh.c]
+ support finish rsa keys.
+ free public keys after login -> call finish -> close smartcard.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 00:10:17
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ add -D readerid option (download, i.e. print public RSA key to stdout).
+ check for card present when uploading keys.
+ use strings instead of ints for smartcard reader ids, too.
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 08:58:35
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ change -u (upload smartcard key) to -U. ok markus@
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 15:06:52
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ more verbose usage(). ok markus@
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 15:07:23
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ document smartcard upload/download. ok markus@
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 15:32:10
+ [ssh.c]
+ add smartcard to usage(). ok markus@
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 15:43:57
+ [ssh-agent.c ssh.c ssh-keygen.c]
+ add /* SMARTCARD */ to #else/#endif. ok markus@
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 16:14:05
+ [scard.c ssh-agent.c ssh.c ssh-keygen.c]
+ clean up some /* SMARTCARD */. ok markus@
+ - mpech@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/02 18:37:35
+ [ssh-keyscan.1]
+ o) .Sh AUTHOR -> .Sh AUTHORS;
+ o) .Sh EXAMPLE -> .Sh EXAMPLES;
+ o) Delete .Sh OPTIONS. Text moved to .Sh DESCRIPTION;
+
+ millert@ ok
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/03 10:31:19
+ [ssh-add.1]
+ document smartcard options. ok markus@
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/03 10:31:30
+ [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keyscan.c]
+ improve usage(). ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/05 23:18:20
+ [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c]
+ ssh 2 support; from wayned@users.sourceforge.net
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/05 23:29:58
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ make -t dsa work with commercial servers, too
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/08/06 19:47:05
+ [scp.c]
+ use alarm vs. setitimer for portable; ok markus@
+ - (bal) ssh-keyscan double -lssh hack due to seed_rng().
+ - (bal) Second around of UNICOS patches. A few other things left.
+ Patches by William L. Jones <jones@mail.utexas.edu>
+
+20010803
+ - (djm) Fix interrupted read in entropy gatherer. Spotted by markus@ on
+ a fast UltraSPARC.
+
+20010726
+ - (stevesk) use mysignal() in protocol 1 loop now that the SIGCHLD
+ handler has converged.
+
+20010725
+ - (bal) Added 'install-nokeys' to Makefile to assist package builders.
+
+20010724
+ - (bal) 4711 not 04711 for ssh binary.
+
+20010722
+ - (bal) Starting the Unicossmk merger. File merged TODO, configure.in,
+ myproposal.h, ssh_prng_cmds.in, and openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.
+ Added openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c. Rest will be merged after
+ approval. Selective patches from William L. Jones
+ <jones@mail.utexas.edu>
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/18 21:10:43
+ [sshpty.c]
+ pr #1946, allow sshd if /dev is readonly
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/18 21:40:40
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ chdir("/") from bbraun@synack.net; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/19 00:41:44
+ [ssh.1]
+ escape chars are below now
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/20 14:46:11
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ do not exit() from signal handlers; ok deraadt@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/20 18:41:51
+ [ssh.1]
+ "the" command line
+
+20010719
+ - (tim) [configure.in] put inet_aton back in AC_CHECK_FUNCS.
+ report from Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net>
+
+20010718
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/14 15:10:17
+ [readpass.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c]
+ delete spurious #includes; ok deraadt@ markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/15 16:17:08
+ [serverloop.c]
+ schedule client alive for ssh2 only, greg@cheers.bungi.com
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/15 16:57:21
+ [ssh-agent.1]
+ -d will not fork; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/15 16:58:29
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ typo in usage; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/17 20:48:42
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ update maxfd if maxfd is closed; report from jmcelroy@dtgnet.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/17 21:04:58
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c serverloop.c]
+ keep track of both maxfd and the size of the malloc'ed fdsets.
+ update maxfd if maxfd gets closed.
+ - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/18 16:45:52
+ [scp.c]
+ Missing -o in scp usage()
+ - (bal) Cleaned up trailing spaces in ChangeLog.
+ - (bal) Allow sshd to switch user context without password for Cygwin.
+ Patch by Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) Updated cygwin README and ssh-host-config. Patch by
+ Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+20010715
+ - (bal) Set "BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" for darwin platform. Reported by
+ Josh Larios <jdlarios@cac.washington.edu>
+ - (tim) put openssh/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.[ch] back in.
+ needed by openbsd-compat/fake-getaddrinfo.c
+
+20010714
+ - (stevesk) change getopt() declaration
+ - (stevesk) configure.in: use ll suffix for long long constant
+ in snprintf() test
+
+20010713
+ - (djm) Enable /etc/nologin check on PAM systems, as some lack the
+ pam_nologin module. Report from William Yodlowsky
+ <bsd@openbsd.rutgers.edu>
+ - (djm) Revert dirname fix, a better one is on its way.
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/04 22:47:19
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ ignore SIGPIPE when debugging, too
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/04 23:13:10
+ [scard.c scard.h ssh-agent.c]
+ handle card removal more gracefully, add sc_close() to scard.h
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/04 23:39:07
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ for smartcards remove both RSA1/2 keys
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/04 23:49:27
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ handle mutiple adds of the same smartcard key
+ - espie@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/05 11:43:33
+ [sftp-glob.c]
+ Directly cast to the right type. Ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/05 20:32:47
+ [sshconnect1.c]
+ statement after label; ok dugsong@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/08 15:23:38
+ [servconf.c]
+ fix ``MaxStartups max''; ok markus@
+ - fgsch@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/09 05:58:47
+ [ssh.c]
+ Use getopt(3); markus@ ok.
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/09 07:04:53
+ [session.c sftp-int.c]
+ correct type on last arg to execl(); nordin@cse.ogi.edu
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/10 21:49:12
+ [readpass.c]
+ don't panic if fork or pipe fail (just return an empty passwd).
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 00:24:53
+ [servconf.c]
+ make it compilable in all 4 combination of KRB4/KRB5 settings.
+ dugsong ok
+ XXX isn't it sensitive to the order of -I/usr/include/kerberosIV and
+ -I/usr/include/kerberosV?
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 16:29:59
+ [ssh.c]
+ sort options string, fix -p, add -k
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/11 18:26:15
+ [auth.c]
+ no need to call dirname(pw->pw_dir).
+ note that dirname(3) modifies its argument on some systems.
+ - (djm) Reorder Makefile.in so clean targets work a little better when
+ run directly from Makefile.in
+ - (djm) Pull in getopt(3) from OpenBSD libc for the optreset extension.
+
+20010711
+ - (djm) dirname(3) may modify its argument on glibc and other systems.
+ Patch from markus@, spotted by Tom Holroyd <tomh@po.crl.go.jp>
+
+20010704
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/25 08:25:41
+ [channels.c channels.h cipher.c clientloop.c compat.c compat.h
+ hostfile.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h nchan.c packet.c serverloop.c
+ session.c session.h sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c uuencode.h]
+ update copyright for 2001
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/25 17:18:27
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ sshd(8) will never read the private keys, but ssh(1) does;
+ hugh@mimosa.com
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/25 17:54:47
+ [auth.c auth.h auth-rsa.c]
+ terminate secure_filename checking after checking homedir. that way
+ it works on AFS. okay markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/25 20:26:37
+ [auth2.c sshconnect2.c]
+ prototype cleanup; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 02:47:07
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ allow loading a private RSA key to a cyberflex card.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 04:07:06
+ [ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c]
+ add debug flag
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 04:59:59
+ [authfd.c authfd.h ssh-add.c]
+ initial support for smartcards in the agent
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 05:07:43
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ update usage
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 05:33:34
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ more smartcard support.
+ - mpech@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 05:48:07
+ [sshd.8]
+ remove unnecessary .Pp between .It;
+ millert@ ok
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 05:50:11
+ [auth2.c]
+ new interface for secure_filename()
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 06:32:58
+ [atomicio.h authfd.h authfile.h auth.h auth-options.h bufaux.h
+ buffer.h canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h compat.h
+ compress.h crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.h
+ hostfile.h kex.h key.h log.h mac.h match.h misc.h mpaux.h packet.h
+ radix.h readconf.h readpass.h rsa.h]
+ prototype pedant. not very creative...
+ - () -> (void)
+ - no variable names
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 06:33:07
+ [servconf.h serverloop.h session.h sftp-client.h sftp-common.h
+ sftp-glob.h sftp-int.h sshconnect.h ssh-dss.h sshlogin.h sshpty.h
+ ssh-rsa.h tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h xmalloc.h]
+ prototype pedant. not very creative...
+ - () -> (void)
+ - no variable names
+ - dugsong@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 16:15:25
+ [auth1.c auth.h auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c readconf.c readconf.h
+ servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c]
+ Kerberos v5 support for SSH1, mostly from Assar Westerlund
+ <assar@freebsd.org> and Bjorn Gronvall <bg@sics.se>. markus@ ok
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 17:25:34
+ [ssh.1]
+ document SSH_ASKPASS; fubob@MIT.EDU
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 17:27:25
+ [authfd.h authfile.h auth.h auth-options.h bufaux.h buffer.h
+ canohost.h channels.h cipher.h clientloop.h compat.h compress.h
+ crc32.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h groupaccess.c groupaccess.h
+ hostfile.h kex.h key.h log.c log.h mac.h misc.c misc.h mpaux.h
+ packet.h radix.h readconf.h readpass.h rsa.h servconf.h serverloop.h
+ session.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-glob.h sftp-int.h
+ sshconnect.h ssh-dss.h sshlogin.h sshpty.h ssh-rsa.h sshtty.h
+ tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h xmalloc.h]
+ remove comments from .h, since they are cut&paste from the .c files
+ and out of sync
+ - dugsong@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 17:41:49
+ [servconf.c]
+ #include <kafs.h>
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/26 20:14:11
+ [key.c key.h ssh.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+ add smartcard support to the client, too (now you can use both
+ the agent and the client).
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 02:12:54
+ [serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c session.h]
+ quick hack to make ssh2 work again.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 04:48:53
+ [auth.c match.c sshd.8]
+ tridge@samba.org
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 05:35:42
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ use cyberflex_inq_class to inquire class.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 05:42:25
+ [rsa.c rsa.h ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c]
+ s/generate_additional_parameters/rsa_generate_additional_parameters/
+ http://www.humppa.com/
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 06:26:36
+ [ssh-add.c]
+ convert to getopt(3)
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/28 19:57:35
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ '\0' terminated data[] is ok; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/29 07:06:34
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ new error handling for cyberflex_*
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/29 07:11:01
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ initialize early
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/29 18:38:44
+ [clientloop.c]
+ sync function definition with declaration; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/29 18:40:28
+ [channels.c]
+ use socklen_t for getsockopt arg #5; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/30 18:08:40
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
+ adress -> address; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/02 13:59:15
+ [serverloop.c session.c session.h]
+ wait until !session_have_children(); bugreport from
+ Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/02 22:29:20
+ [readpass.c]
+ do not return NULL, use "" instead.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/02 22:40:18
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ update for sectok.h interface changes.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/07/02 22:52:57
+ [channels.c channels.h serverloop.c]
+ improve cleanup/exit logic in ssh2:
+ stop listening to channels, detach channel users (e.g. sessions).
+ wait for children (i.e. dying sessions), send exit messages,
+ cleanup all channels.
+ - (bal) forget a few new files in sync up.
+ - (bal) Makefile fix up requires scard.c
+ - (stevesk) sync misc.h
+ - (stevesk) more sync for session.c
+ - (stevesk) sync servconf.h (comments)
+ - (tim) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] sync with Caldera
+ - (tim) [openbsd-compat/dirname.h] Remove ^M causing some compilers to
+ issue warning (line 1: tokens ignored at end of directive line)
+ - (tim) [sshconnect1.c] give the compiler something to do for success:
+ if KRB5 and AFS are not defined
+ (ERROR: "sshconnect1.c", line 1274: Syntax error before or at: })
+
+20010629
+ - (bal) Removed net_aton() since we don't use it any more
+ - (bal) Fixed _DISABLE_VPOSIX in readpassphrase.c.
+ - (bal) Updated zlib's home. Thanks to David Howe <DaveHowe@gmx.co.uk>.
+ - (stevesk) remove _REENTRANT #define
+ - (stevesk) session.c: use u_int for envsize
+ - (stevesk) remove cli.[ch]
+
+20010628
+ - (djm) Sync openbsd-compat with -current libc
+ - (djm) Fix from Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> for my
+ broken makefile
+ - (bal) Removed strtok_r() and inet_ntop() since they are no longer used.
+ - (bal) Remove getusershell() since it's no longer used.
+
+20010627
+ - (djm) Reintroduce pam_session call for non-pty sessions.
+ - (djm) Remove redundant and incorrect test for max auth attempts in
+ PAM kbdint code. Based on fix from Matthew Melvin
+ <matthewm@webcentral.com.au>
+ - (djm) Rename sysconfdir/primes => sysconfdir/moduli
+ - (djm) Oops, forgot make logic for primes=>moduli. Also try to rename
+ existing primes->moduli if it exists.
+ - (djm) Sync with -current openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c:
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/27 13:23:30
+ typo, spotted by Tom Holroyd <tomh@po.crl.go.jp>; ok deraadt@
+ - (djm) Turn up warnings if gcc or egcs detected
+ - (stevesk) for HP-UX 11.X use X/Open socket interface;
+ pulls in modern socket prototypes and eliminates a number of compiler
+ warnings. see xopen_networking(7).
+ - (stevesk) fix x11 forwarding from _PATH_XAUTH change
+ - (stevesk) use X/Open socket interface for HP-UX 10.X also
+
+20010625
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/21 21:08:25
+ [session.c]
+ don't reset forced_command (we allow multiple login shells in
+ ssh2); dwd@bell-labs.com
+ - mpech@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 10:17:51
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8 ssh-keyscan.1]
+ o) .Sh AUTHOR -> .Sh AUTHORS;
+ o) remove unnecessary .Pp;
+ o) better -mdoc style;
+ o) typo;
+ o) sort SEE ALSO;
+ aaron@ ok
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 21:27:08
+ [dh.c pathnames.h]
+ use /etc/moduli instead of /etc/primes, okay markus@
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 21:28:53
+ [sshd.8]
+ document /etc/moduli
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 21:55:49
+ [auth2.c auth-rsa.c pathnames.h ssh.1 sshd.8 sshd_config
+ ssh-keygen.1]
+ merge authorized_keys2 into authorized_keys.
+ authorized_keys2 is used for backward compat.
+ (just append authorized_keys2 to authorized_keys).
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 21:57:59
+ [dh.c]
+ increase linebuffer to deal with larger moduli; use rewind instead of
+ close/open
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 22:21:20
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ allow long usernames/groups in readdir
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/22 23:35:21
+ [ssh.c]
+ don't overwrite argv (fixes ssh user@host in 'ps'), report by ericj@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 00:16:16
+ [scp.c]
+ slightly better care
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 00:20:57
+ [auth2.c auth.c auth.h auth-rh-rsa.c]
+ *known_hosts2 is obsolete for hostbased authentication and
+ only used for backward compat. merge ssh1/2 hostkey check
+ and move it to auth.c
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 02:33:05
+ [sftp.1 sftp-server.8 ssh-keygen.1]
+ join .%A entries; most by bk@rt.fm
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 02:34:33
+ [kexdh.c kexgex.c kex.h pathnames.h readconf.c servconf.h ssh.1
+ sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshd.8]
+ get rid of known_hosts2, use it for hostkey lookup, but do not
+ modify.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 03:03:59
+ [sshd.8]
+ draft-ietf-secsh-dh-group-exchange-01.txt
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 03:04:42
+ [auth2.c auth-rh-rsa.c]
+ restore correct ignore_user_known_hosts logic.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 05:26:02
+ [key.c]
+ handle sigature of size 0 (some broken clients send this).
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 05:57:09
+ [sftp.1 sftp-server.8 ssh-keygen.1]
+ ok, tmac is now fixed
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 06:41:10
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ try to decode ssh-3.0.0 private rsa keys
+ (allow migration to openssh, not vice versa), #910
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 15:12:20
+ [auth1.c auth2.c auth2-chall.c authfd.c authfile.c auth-rhosts.c
+ canohost.c channels.c cipher.c clientloop.c deattack.c dh.c
+ hostfile.c kex.c kexdh.c kexgex.c key.c nchan.c packet.c radix.c
+ readpass.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c sftp.c
+ sftp-client.c sftp-glob.c sftp-int.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c
+ ssh-agent.c ssh.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshconnect.c sshd.c
+ ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c]
+ more strict prototypes. raise warning level in Makefile.inc.
+ markus ok'ed
+ TODO; cleanup headers
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 17:05:22
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ fix import for (broken?) ssh.com/f-secure private keys
+ (i tested > 1000 RSA keys)
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 17:48:18
+ [sftp.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 ssh-keyscan.1]
+ kill whitespace at EOL.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 19:12:43
+ [sshd.c]
+ pidfile/sigterm race; bbraun@synack.net
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/23 22:37:46
+ [sshconnect1.c]
+ consistent with ssh2: skip key if empty passphrase is entered,
+ retry num_of_passwd_prompt times if passphrase is wrong. ok fgsch@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/24 05:25:10
+ [auth-options.c match.c match.h]
+ move ip+hostname check to match.c
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/24 05:35:33
+ [readpass.c readpass.h ssh-add.c sshconnect2.c ssh-keygen.c]
+ switch to readpassphrase(3)
+ 2.7/8-stable needs readpassphrase.[ch] from libc
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/24 05:47:13
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ oops, missing format string
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/24 17:18:31
+ [ttymodes.c]
+ passing modes works fine: debug2->3
+ - (djm) -Wall fix for session.c
+ - (djm) Bring in readpassphrase() from OpenBSD libc. Compiles OK on Linux and
+ Solaris
+
+20010622
+ - (stevesk) handle systems without pw_expire and pw_change.
+
+20010621
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/16 08:49:38
+ [misc.c]
+ typo; dunlap@apl.washington.edu
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/16 08:50:39
+ [channels.h]
+ bad //-style comment; thx to stevev@darkwing.uoregon.edu
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/16 08:57:35
+ [scp.c]
+ no stdio or exit() in signal handlers.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/16 08:58:34
+ [misc.c]
+ copy pw_expire and pw_change, too.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/19 12:34:09
+ [session.c]
+ cleanup forced command handling, from dwd@bell-labs.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/19 14:09:45
+ [session.c sshd.8]
+ disable x11-fwd if use_login is enabled; from lukem@wasabisystems.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/19 15:40:45
+ [session.c]
+ allocate and free at the same level.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/20 13:56:39
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c packet.c serverloop.c]
+ move from channel_stop_listening to channel_free_all,
+ call channel_free_all before calling waitpid() in serverloop.
+ fixes the utmp handling; report from Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE
+
+20010615
+ - (stevesk) don't set SA_RESTART and set SIGCHLD to SIG_DFL
+ around grantpt().
+ - (stevesk) update TODO: STREAMS pty systems don't call vhangup() now
+
+20010614
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/13 09:10:31
+ [session.c]
+ typo, use pid not s->pid, mstone@cs.loyola.edu
+
+20010613
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 10:58:29
+ [session.c]
+ merge session_free into session_close()
+ merge pty_cleanup_proc into session_pty_cleanup()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 16:10:38
+ [session.c]
+ merge ssh1/ssh2 tty msg parse and alloc code
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 16:11:26
+ [packet.c]
+ do not log() packet_set_maxsize
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 21:21:29
+ [session.c]
+ remove xauth-cookie-in-tmp handling. use default $XAUTHORITY, since
+ we do already trust $HOME/.ssh
+ you can use .ssh/sshrc and .ssh/environment if you want to customize
+ the location of the xauth cookies
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 21:30:57
+ [session.c]
+ unused
+
+20010612
+ - scp.c ID update (upstream synced vfsprintf() from us)
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/10 11:29:20
+ [dispatch.c]
+ we support rekeying
+ protocol errors are fatal.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/11 10:18:24
+ [session.c]
+ reset pointer to NULL after xfree(); report from solar@openwall.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/11 16:04:38
+ [sshd.8]
+ typo; bdubreuil@crrel.usace.army.mil
+
+20010611
+ - (bal) NeXT/MacOS X lack libgen.h and dirname(). Patch by Mark Miller
+ <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (bal) Handle broken krb4 issues on Solaris with multiple defined u_*_t
+ types. Patch by Jan IVEN <Jan.Iven@cern.ch>
+ - (bal) Fixed Makefile.in so that 'configure; make install' works.
+
+20010610
+ - (bal) Missed two files in major resync. auth-bsdauth.c and auth-skey.c
+
+20010609
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/30 12:55:13
+ [auth-options.c auth2.c channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c
+ packet.c serverloop.c session.c ssh.c ssh1.h]
+ channel layer cleanup: merge header files and split .c files
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/30 15:20:10
+ [ssh.c]
+ merge functions, simplify.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/31 10:30:17
+ [auth-options.c auth2.c channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c
+ packet.c serverloop.c session.c ssh.c]
+ undo the .c file split, just merge the header and keep the cvs
+ history
+ - (bal) Channels.c and Channels.h -- "Merge Functions, simplify" (draged
+ out of ssh Attic)
+ - (bal) Ooops.. nchan.c (and remove nchan.h) resync from OpenBSD ssh
+ Attic.
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/31 13:08:04
+ [sshd_config]
+ group options and add some more comments
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/03 14:55:39
+ [channels.c channels.h session.c]
+ use fatal_register_cleanup instead of atexit, sync with x11 authdir
+ handling
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/03 19:36:44
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ 1-2 bits of entrophy per character (not per word), ok stevesk@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/03 19:38:42
+ [scp.c]
+ pass -v to ssh; from slade@shore.net
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/03 20:06:11
+ [auth2-chall.c]
+ the challenge response device decides how to handle non-existing
+ users.
+ -> fake challenges for skey and cryptocard
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/04 21:59:43
+ [channels.c channels.h session.c]
+ switch uid when cleaning up tmp files and sockets; reported by
+ zen-parse@gmx.net on bugtraq
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/04 23:07:21
+ [clientloop.c serverloop.c sshd.c]
+ set flags in the signal handlers, do real work in the main loop,
+ ok provos@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/04 23:16:16
+ [session.c]
+ merge ssh1/2 x11-fwd setup, create listener after tmp-dir
+ - pvalchev@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/05 05:05:39
+ [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c]
+ License clarification from David Mazieres, ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/05 10:24:32
+ [channels.c]
+ don't delete the auth socket in channel_stop_listening()
+ auth_sock_cleanup_proc() will take care of this.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/05 16:46:19
+ [session.c]
+ let session_close() delete the pty. deny x11fwd if xauthfile is set.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/06 23:13:54
+ [ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
+ cleanup, remove old code
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/06 23:19:35
+ [ssh-add.c]
+ remove debug message; Darren.Moffat@eng.sun.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/07 19:57:53
+ [auth2.c]
+ style is used for bsdauth.
+ disconnect on user/service change (ietf-drafts)
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/07 20:23:05
+ [authfd.c authfile.c channels.c kexdh.c kexgex.c packet.c ssh.c
+ sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c]
+ use xxx_put_cstring()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/07 22:25:02
+ [session.c]
+ don't overwrite errno
+ delay deletion of the xauth cookie
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/08 15:25:40
+ [includes.h pathnames.h readconf.c servconf.c]
+ move the path for xauth to pathnames.h
+ - (bal) configure.in fix for Tru64 (forgeting to reset $LIB)
+ - (bal) ANSIify strmode()
+ - (bal) --with-catman should be --with-mantype patch by Dave
+ Dykstra <dwd@bell-labs.com>
+
+20010606
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/17 21:34:15
+ [ssh.1]
+ no spaces in PreferredAuthentications;
+ meixner@rbg.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/18 14:13:29
+ [auth-chall.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c readconf.c
+ readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ improved kbd-interactive support. work by per@appgate.com and me
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 00:36:40
+ [session.c]
+ Disable X11 forwarding if xauth binary is not found. Patch from Nalin
+ Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 16:05:41
+ [scp.c]
+ ftruncate() instead of open()+O_TRUNC like rcp.c does
+ allows scp /path/to/file localhost:/path/to/file
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 16:08:43
+ [sshd.8]
+ sort options; Matthew.Stier@fnc.fujitsu.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 16:32:16
+ [ssh.1 sshconnect2.c]
+ change preferredauthentication order to
+ publickey,hostbased,password,keyboard-interactive
+ document that hostbased defaults to no, document order
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 16:46:19
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ document MACs defaults with .Dq
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 19:43:57
+ [misc.c misc.h servconf.c sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ sshd command-line arguments and configuration file options that
+ specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
+ time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier
+ is one of the following:
+ <none>,s,m,h,d,w
+ Examples:
+ 600 600 seconds (10 minutes)
+ 10m 10 minutes
+ 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
+ ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/19 19:57:09
+ [channels.c]
+ typo in error message
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/20 17:20:36
+ [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8
+ sshd_config]
+ configurable authorized_keys{,2} location; originally from peter@;
+ ok djm@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/24 11:12:42
+ [auth.c]
+ fix comment; from jakob@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/24 18:57:53
+ [clientloop.c readconf.c ssh.c ssh.h]
+ don't perform escape processing when ``EscapeChar none''; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/25 14:37:32
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ use -P for -e and -y, too.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 08:04:39
+ [ssh.c]
+ fix usage()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 10:08:55
+ [authfile.c]
+ key_load_private: set comment to filename for PEM keys
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 22:51:11
+ [cipher.c cipher.h]
+ simpler 3des for ssh1
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 23:14:49
+ [channels.c channels.h nchan.c]
+ undo broken channel fix and try a different one. there
+ should be still some select errors...
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 23:25:24
+ [channels.c]
+ cleanup, typo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/28 23:58:35
+ [packet.c packet.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ remove some lines, simplify.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/29 12:31:27
+ [authfile.c]
+ typo
+
+20010528
+ - (tim) [conifgure.in] add setvbuf test needed for sftp-int.c
+ Patch by Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+20010517
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/12 19:53:13
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ readlink does not NULL-terminate; mhe@home.se
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/15 22:04:01
+ [ssh.1]
+ X11 forwarding details improved
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/16 20:51:57
+ [authfile.c]
+ return comments for private pem files, too; report from nolan@naic.edu
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/16 21:53:53
+ [clientloop.c]
+ check for open sessions before we call select(); fixes the x11 client
+ bug reported by bowman@math.ualberta.ca
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/16 22:09:21
+ [channels.c nchan.c]
+ more select() error fixes (don't set rfd/wfd to -1).
+ - (bal) Enabled USE_PIPES for Cygwin on Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) Corrected on_exit() emulation via atexit().
+
+20010512
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/11 14:59:56
+ [clientloop.c misc.c misc.h]
+ add unset_nonblock for stdout/err flushing in client_loop().
+ - (bal) Patch to partial sync up contrib/solaris/ packaging software.
+ Patch by pete <ninjaz@webexpress.com>
+
+20010511
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/09 22:51:57
+ [channels.c]
+ fix -R for protocol 2, noticed by greg@nest.cx.
+ bug was introduced with experimental dynamic forwarding.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/09 23:01:31
+ [rijndael.h]
+ fix prototype; J.S.Peatfield@damtp.cam.ac.uk
+
+20010509
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/06 21:23:31
+ [cli.c]
+ cli_read() fails to catch SIGINT + overflow; from obdb@zzlevo.net
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/08 19:17:31
+ [channels.c serverloop.c clientloop.c]
+ adds correct error reporting to async connect()s
+ fixes the server-discards-data-before-connected-bug found by
+ onoe@sm.sony.co.jp
+ - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/08 19:45:25
+ [misc.c misc.h scp.c sftp.c]
+ Use addargs() in sftp plus some clean up of addargs(). OK Markus
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/06 21:45:14
+ [clientloop.c]
+ use atomicio for flushing stdout/stderr bufs. thanks to
+ jbw@izanami.cee.hw.ac.uk
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/08 22:48:07
+ [atomicio.c]
+ no need for xmalloc.h, thanks to espie@
+ - (bal) UseLogin patch for Solaris/UNICOS. Patch by Wayne Davison
+ <wayne@blorf.net>
+ - (bal) ./configure support to disable SIA on OSF1. Patch by
+ Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net>
+ - (bal) Updates from the Sony NEWS-OS platform by NAKAJI Hiroyuki
+ <nakaji@tutrp.tut.ac.jp>
+
+20010508
+ - (bal) Fixed configure test for USE_SIA.
+
+20010506
+ - (djm) Update config.guess and config.sub with latest versions (from
+ ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/config/) to allow configure on ia64-hpux.
+ Suggested by Jason Mader <jason@ncac.gwu.edu>
+ - (bal) White Space and #ifdef sync with OpenBSD
+ - (bal) Add 'seed_rng()' to ssh-add.c
+ - (bal) CVS ID updates for readpass.c, readpass.h, cli.c, and cli.h
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/05 13:42:52
+ [sftp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-keygen.1]
+ typos, grammar
+
+20010505
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/04 14:21:56
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ typos
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/04 14:34:34
+ [channels.c]
+ channel_new() reallocs channels[], we cannot use Channel *c after
+ calling channel_new(), XXX fix this in the future...
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/04 23:47:34
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c nchan.h serverloop.c ssh.c]
+ move to Channel **channels (instead of Channel *channels), fixes realloc
+ problems. channel_new now returns a Channel *, favour Channel * over
+ channel id. remove old channel_allocate interface.
+
+20010504
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/03 15:07:39
+ [channels.c]
+ typo in debug() string
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/03 15:45:15
+ [session.c]
+ exec shell -c /bin/sh .ssh/sshrc, from abartlet@pcug.org.au
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/03 21:43:01
+ [servconf.c]
+ remove "\n" from fatal()
+ - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/03 23:09:53
+ [misc.c misc.h scp.c sftp.c]
+ Move colon() and cleanhost() to misc.c where I should I have put it in
+ the first place
+ - (bal) Updated Cygwin README by Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) Avoid socket file security issues in ssh-agent for Cygwin.
+ Patch by Egor Duda <deo@logos-m.ru>
+
+20010503
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/02 16:41:20
+ [ssh-add.c]
+ fix prompt for ssh-add.
+
+20010502
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/05/02 01:25:39
+ [readpass.c]
+ Put the 'const' back into ssh_askpass() function. Pointed out
+ by Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net>. OK Markus
+
+20010501
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/30 11:18:52
+ [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c sshconnect.c]
+ implement 'ssh -b bind_address' like 'telnet -b'
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/30 15:50:46
+ [compat.c compat.h kex.c]
+ allow interop with weaker key generation used by ssh-2.0.x, x < 10
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/30 16:02:49
+ [compat.c]
+ ssh-2.0.10 has the weak-key-bug, too.
+ - (tim) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] add Requires line for Caldera 3.1
+
+20010430
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/29 18:32:52
+ [serverloop.c]
+ fix whitespace
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/29 19:16:52
+ [channels.c clientloop.c compat.c compat.h serverloop.c]
+ more ssh.com-2.0.x bug-compat; from per@appgate.com
+ - (tim) New version of mdoc2man.pl from Mark D. Roth <roth+openssh@feep.net>
+ - (djm) Add .cvsignore files, suggested by Wayne Davison <wayne@blorf.net>
+
+20010429
+ - (bal) Updated INSTALL. PCRE moved to a new place.
+ - (djm) Release OpenSSH-2.9p1
+
+20010427
+ - (bal) Fixed uidswap.c so it should work on non-posix complient systems.
+ patch based on 2.5.2 version by djm.
+ - (bal) Build manpages and config files once unless changed. Patch by
+ Carson Gaspar <carson@taltos.org>
+ - (bal) arpa/nameser.h does not exist on Cygwin. Patch by Corinna
+ Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) Add /etc/sysconfig/sshd support to redhat's sshd.init. Patch by
+ Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (bal) Cygwin lacks setgroups() API. Patch by Corinna Vinschen
+ <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) version.h synced, RPM specs updated for 2.9
+ - (tim) update contrib/caldera files with what Caldera is using.
+ <sps@caldera.de>
+
+20010425
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/23 21:57:07
+ [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+ allow public key for -e, too
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/23 22:14:13
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ remove debug
+ - (bal) Whitespace resync w/ OpenBSD for uidswap.c
+ - (djm) Add new server configuration directive 'PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt'
+ (default: off), implies KbdInteractiveAuthentication. Suggestion from
+ markus@
+ - (djm) Include crypt.h if available in auth-passwd.c
+ - tim@mindrot.org 2001/04/25 21:38:01 [configure.in]
+ man page detection fixes for SCO
+
+20010424
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 23:58:36
+ [ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ document hostbased and other cleanup
+ - (stevesk) start_pam() doesn't use DNS now for sshd -u0.
+ - (stevesk) auth-pam.c: use PERMIT_NO_PASSWD
+ - (bal) sys/queue.h is bogus for NCR platform. Patch by Daniel Carroll
+ <dan@mesastate.edu>
+ - (bal) Fixed contrib/postinstall.in. Patch by wsanders@wsanders.net
+
+20010422
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/20 16:32:22
+ [uidswap.c]
+ set non-privileged gid before uid; tholo@ and deraadt@
+ - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/21 00:55:57
+ [sftp.1]
+ Spelling
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 08:13:30
+ [ssh.1]
+ typos spotted by stevesk@; ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 12:34:05
+ [scp.c]
+ scp > 2GB; niles@scyld.com; ok deraadt@, djm@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 13:25:37
+ [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+ rename arguments -x -> -e (export key), -X -> -i (import key)
+ xref draft-ietf-secsh-publickeyfile-01.txt
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 13:32:27
+ [sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ xref draft-ietf-secsh-*
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/22 13:41:02
+ [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+ style, noted by stevesk; sort flags in usage
+
+20010421
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/20 07:17:51
+ [clientloop.c ssh.1]
+ Split out and improve escape character documentation, mention ~R in
+ ~? help text; ok markus@
+ - Update RPM spec files for CVS version.h
+ - (stevesk) set the default PAM service name to __progname instead
+ of the hard-coded value "sshd"; from Mark D. Roth <roth@feep.net>
+ - (stevesk) document PAM service name change in INSTALL
+ - tim@mindrot.org 2001/04/21 14:25:57 [Makefile.in configure.in]
+ fix perl test, fix nroff test, fix Makefile to build outside source tree
+
+20010420
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - ian@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 16:21:05
+ [ssh-keyscan.1]
+ Fix typo reported in PR/1779
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 21:57:42
+ [readpass.c ssh-add.c]
+ call askpass from ssh, too, based on work by roth@feep.net, ok deraadt
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 22:03:45
+ [auth2.c sshconnect2.c]
+ use FDQN with trailing dot in the hostbased auth packets, ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 22:48:26
+ [auth2.c]
+ no longer const
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 23:43:26
+ [auth2.c compat.c sshconnect2.c]
+ more ssh v2 hostbased-auth interop: ssh.com >= 2.1.0 works now
+ (however the 2.1.0 server seems to work only if debug is enabled...)
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 23:44:51
+ [authfile.c]
+ error->debug; noted by fries@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/19 00:05:11
+ [auth2.c]
+ use local variable, no function call needed.
+ (btw, hostbased works now with ssh.com >= 2.0.13)
+ - (bal) Put scp-common.h back into scp.c (it exists in the upstream
+ tree) pointed out by Tom Holroyd <tomh@po.crl.go.jp>
+
+20010418
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/17 19:34:25
+ [session.c]
+ move auth_approval to do_authenticated().
+ do_child(): nuke hostkeys from memory
+ don't source .ssh/rc for subsystems.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/18 14:15:00
+ [canohost.c]
+ debug->debug3
+ - (bal) renabled 'catman-do:' and fixed it. So now catman pages should
+ be working again.
+ - (bal) Makfile day... Cleaned up multiple mantype support (Patch by
+ Mark D. Roth <roth+openssh@feep.net>), and fixed PIDDIR support.
+
+20010417
+ - (bal) Add perl5 check for HP/UX, Removed GNUness from Makefile.in
+ and temporary commented out 'catman-do:' since it is broken. Patches
+ for the first two by Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/16 08:26:04
+ [key.c]
+ better safe than sorry in later mods; yongari@kt-is.co.kr
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/17 08:14:01
+ [sshconnect1.c]
+ check for key!=NULL, thanks to costa
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/17 09:52:48
+ [clientloop.c]
+ handle EINTR/EAGAIN on read; ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/17 10:53:26
+ [key.c key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 sshconnect2.c]
+ add HostKeyAlgorithms; based on patch from res@shore.net; ok provos@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/17 12:55:04
+ [channels.c ssh.c]
+ undo socks5 and https support since they are not really used and
+ only bloat ssh. remove -D from usage(), since '-D' is experimental.
+
+20010416
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 01:35:22
+ [ttymodes.c]
+ fix comments
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 08:43:47
+ [dh.c sftp-glob.c sftp-glob.h sftp-int.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ some unused variable and typos; from tomh@po.crl.go.jp
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 16:58:03
+ [authfile.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c]
+ don't use errno for key_{load,save}_private; discussion w/ solar@openwall
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 17:16:00
+ [clientloop.c]
+ set stdin/out/err to nonblocking in SSH proto 1, too. suggested by ho@
+ should fix some of the blocking problems for rsync over SSH-1
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 19:41:21
+ [sshd.8]
+ some ClientAlive cleanup; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/15 21:28:35
+ [readconf.c servconf.c]
+ use fatal() or error() vs. fprintf(); ok markus@
+ - (djm) Convert mandoc manpages to man automatically. Patch from Mark D.
+ Roth <roth+openssh@feep.net>
+ - (bal) CVS ID fix up and slight manpage fix from OpenBSD tree.
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/16 02:31:44
+ [scp.c sftp.c]
+ IPv6 support for sftp (which I bungled in my last patch) which is
+ borrowed from scp.c. Thanks to Markus@ for pointing it out.
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/16 08:05:34
+ [xmalloc.c]
+ xrealloc dealing with ptr == nULL; mouring
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/16 08:19:31
+ [session.c]
+ Split motd and hushlogin checks into seperate functions, helps for
+ portable. From Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net>; ok markus@
+ - Fix OSF SIA support displaying too much information for quiet
+ logins and logins where access was denied by SIA. Patch from Chris Adams
+ <cmadams@hiwaay.net>
+
+20010415
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/14 04:31:01
+ [ssh-add.c]
+ do not double free
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/14 16:17:14
+ [channels.c]
+ remove some channels that are not appropriate for keepalive.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/14 16:27:57
+ [ssh-add.c]
+ use clear_pass instead of xfree()
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/14 16:33:20
+ [clientloop.c packet.h session.c ssh.c ttymodes.c ttymodes.h]
+ protocol 2 tty modes support; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/14 17:04:42
+ [scp.c]
+ 'T' handling rcp/scp sync; ok markus@
+ - Missed sshtty.[ch] in Sync.
+
+20010414
+ - Sync with OpenBSD glob.c, strlcat.c and vis.c changes
+ - Cygwin sftp/sftp-server binary mode patch from Corinna Vinschen
+ <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - beck@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/13 22:46:54
+ [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c sshd.8]
+ Add options ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax to sshd.
+ This gives the ability to do a "keepalive" via the encrypted channel
+ which can't be spoofed (unlike TCP keepalives). Useful for when you want
+ to use ssh connections to authenticate people for something, and know
+ relatively quickly when they are no longer authenticated. Disabled
+ by default (of course). ok markus@
+
+20010413
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/12 14:29:09
+ [ssh.c]
+ show debug output during option processing, report from
+ pekkas@netcore.fi
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/12 19:15:26
+ [auth-rhosts.c auth.h auth2.c buffer.c canohost.c canohost.h
+ compat.c compat.h hostfile.c pathnames.h readconf.c readconf.h
+ servconf.c servconf.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c
+ sshconnect2.c sshd_config]
+ implement HostbasedAuthentication (= RhostRSAAuthentication for ssh v2)
+ similar to RhostRSAAuthentication unless you enable (the experimental)
+ HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly option. please test. :)
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/12 19:39:27
+ [readconf.c]
+ typo
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/12 20:09:38
+ [misc.c misc.h readconf.c servconf.c ssh.c sshd.c]
+ robust port validation; ok markus@ jakob@
+ - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/12 23:17:54
+ [sftp-int.c sftp-int.h sftp.1 sftp.c]
+ Add support for:
+ sftp [user@]host[:file [file]] - Fetch remote file(s)
+ sftp [user@]host[:dir[/]] - Start in remote dir/
+ OK deraadt@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/13 01:26:17
+ [ssh.c]
+ missing \n in error message
+ - (bal) Added openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.[ch] since HP/UX (and others)
+ lack it.
+
+20010412
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/10 07:46:58
+ [channels.c]
+ cleanup socks4 handling
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/10 09:13:22
+ [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ document id_rsa{.pub,}. markus ok
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/10 12:15:23
+ [channels.c]
+ debug cleanup
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/11 07:06:22
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ 'mget' and 'mput' aliases; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/11 10:59:01
+ [ssh.c]
+ use strtol() for ports, thanks jakob@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/11 13:56:13
+ [channels.c ssh.c]
+ https-connect and socks5 support. i feel so bad.
+ - lebel@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/11 16:25:30
+ [sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ implement the -e option into sshd:
+ -e When this option is specified, sshd will send the output to the
+ standard error instead of the system log.
+ markus@ OK.
+
+20010410
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 20:52:55
+ [sftp.c]
+ do not modify an actual argv[] entry
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 23:28:27
+ [sshd.8]
+ spelling
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/09 00:42:05
+ [sftp.1]
+ spelling
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/09 15:12:23
+ [ssh-add.c]
+ passphrase caching: ssh-add tries last passphrase, clears passphrase if
+ not successful and after last try.
+ based on discussions with espie@, jakob@, ... and code from jakob@ and
+ wolfgang@wsrcc.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/09 15:19:49
+ [ssh-add.1]
+ ssh-add retries the last passphrase...
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/09 18:00:15
+ [sshd.8]
+ ListenAddress mandoc from aaron@
+
+20010409
+ - (stevesk) use setresgid() for setegid() if needed
+ - (stevesk) configure.in: typo
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 16:01:36
+ [sshd.8]
+ document ListenAddress addr:port
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 13:03:00
+ [ssh-add.c]
+ init pointers with NULL, thanks to danimal@danimal.org
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 11:27:33
+ [clientloop.c]
+ leave_raw_mode if ssh2 "session" is closed
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/06 21:00:17
+ [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth2.c channels.c session.c
+ ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h uidswap.c uidswap.h]
+ do gid/groups-swap in addition to uid-swap, should help if /home/group
+ is chmod 750 + chgrp grp /home/group/, work be deraadt and me, thanks
+ to olar@openwall.com is comments. we had many requests for this.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/07 08:55:18
+ [buffer.c channels.c channels.h readconf.c ssh.c]
+ allow the ssh client act as a SOCKS4 proxy (dynamic local
+ portforwarding). work by Dan Kaminsky <dankamin@cisco.com> and me.
+ thanks to Dan for this great patch: use 'ssh -D 1080 host' and make
+ netscape use localhost:1080 as a socks proxy.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/08 11:24:33
+ [uidswap.c]
+ KNF
+
+20010408
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/06 22:12:47
+ [hostfile.c]
+ unused; typo in comment
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/06 22:25:25
+ [servconf.c]
+ in addition to:
+ ListenAddress host|ipv4_addr|ipv6_addr
+ permit:
+ ListenAddress [host|ipv4_addr|ipv6_addr]:port
+ ListenAddress host|ipv4_addr:port
+ sshd.8 updates coming. ok markus@
+
+20010407
+ - (bal) CVS ID Resync of version.h
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 23:39:20
+ [serverloop.c]
+ keep the ssh session even if there is no active channel.
+ this is more in line with the protocol spec and makes
+ ssh -N -L 1234:server:110 host
+ more useful.
+ based on discussion with <mats@mindbright.se> long time ago
+ and recent mail from <res@shore.net>
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/06 16:46:59
+ [scp.c]
+ remove trailing / from source paths; fixes pr#1756
+
+20010406
+ - (stevesk) logintest.c: fix for systems without __progname
+ - (stevesk) Makefile.in: log.o is in libssh.a
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 10:00:06
+ [compat.c]
+ 2.3.x does old GEX, too; report jakob@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 10:39:03
+ [compress.c compress.h packet.c]
+ reset compress state per direction when rekeying.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 10:39:48
+ [version.h]
+ temporary version 2.5.4 (supports rekeying).
+ this is not an official release.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 10:42:57
+ [auth-chall.c authfd.c channels.c clientloop.c kex.c kexgex.c key.c
+ mac.c packet.c serverloop.c sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-glob.c
+ sftp-glob.h sftp-int.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect.c
+ sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ fix whitespace: unexpand + trailing spaces.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 11:09:17
+ [clientloop.c compat.c compat.h]
+ add SSH_BUG_NOREKEY and detect broken (=all old) openssh versions.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 15:45:43
+ [ssh.1]
+ ssh defaults to protocol v2; from quisar@quisar.ambre.net
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 15:48:18
+ [canohost.c canohost.h session.c]
+ move get_remote_name_or_ip() to canohost.[ch]; for portable. ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 20:01:10
+ [clientloop.c]
+ for ~R print message if server does not support rekeying. (and fix ~R).
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 21:02:46
+ [buffer.c]
+ better error message
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/05 21:05:24
+ [clientloop.c ssh.c]
+ don't request a session for 'ssh -N', pointed out slade@shore.net
+
+20010405
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 09:48:35
+ [kex.c kex.h kexdh.c kexgex.c packet.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ don't sent multiple kexinit-requests.
+ send newkeys, block while waiting for newkeys.
+ fix comments.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 14:34:58
+ [clientloop.c kex.c kex.h serverloop.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ enable server side rekeying + some rekey related clientup.
+ todo: we should not send any non-KEX messages after we send KEXINIT
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 15:50:55
+ [compat.c]
+ f-secure 1.3.2 does not handle IGNORE; from milliondl@ornl.gov
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 20:25:38
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c kex.c kex.h serverloop.c
+ sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ more robust rekeying
+ don't send channel data after rekeying is started.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 20:32:56
+ [auth2.c]
+ we don't care about missing bannerfiles; from tsoome@ut.ee, ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 22:04:35
+ [kex.c kexgex.c serverloop.c]
+ parse full kexinit packet.
+ make server-side more robust, too.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 23:09:18
+ [dh.c kex.c packet.c]
+ clear+free keys,iv for rekeying.
+ + fix DH mem leaks. ok niels@
+ - (stevesk) don't use vhangup() if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX); also removes
+ BROKEN_VHANGUP
+
+20010404
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/02 17:32:23
+ [ssh-agent.1]
+ grammar; slade@shore.net
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/03 13:56:11
+ [sftp-glob.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c]
+ free() -> xfree()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/03 19:53:29
+ [dh.c dh.h kex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ move kex to kex*.c, used dispatch_set() callbacks for kex. should
+ make rekeying easier.
+ - todd@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/03 21:19:38
+ [ssh_config]
+ id_rsa1/2 -> id_rsa; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/03 23:32:12
+ [kex.c kex.h packet.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ undo parts of recent my changes: main part of keyexchange does not
+ need dispatch-callbacks, since application data is delayed until
+ the keyexchange completes (if i understand the drafts correctly).
+ add some infrastructure for re-keying.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/04 00:06:54
+ [clientloop.c sshconnect2.c]
+ enable client rekeying
+ (1) force rekeying with ~R, or
+ (2) if the server requests rekeying.
+ works against ssh-2.0.12/2.0.13/2.1.0/2.2.0/2.3.0/2.3.1/2.4.0
+ - (bal) Oops.. Missed including kexdh.c and kexgex.c in OpenBSD sync.
+
+20010403
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/02 14:15:31
+ [sshd.8]
+ typo; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/04/02 14:20:23
+ [readconf.c servconf.c]
+ correct comment; ok markus@
+ - (stevesk) nchan.c: remove ostate checks and add EINVAL to
+ shutdown(SHUT_RD) error() bypass for HP-UX.
+
+20010402
+ - (stevesk) log.c openbsd sync; missing newlines
+ - (stevesk) sshpty.h openbsd sync; PTY_H -> SSHPTY_H
+
+20010330
+ - (djm) Another openbsd-compat/glob.c sync
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 21:59:41
+ [kex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ forgot to include min and max params in hash, okay markus@
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 22:04:57
+ [dh.c]
+ more sanity checking on primes file
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 22:43:31
+ [auth.h auth2.c auth2-chall.c]
+ check auth_root_allowed for kbd-int auth, too.
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/29 14:24:59
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ use recommended defaults
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/29 21:06:21
+ [sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ need to set both STOC and CTOS for SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/29 21:17:40
+ [dh.c dh.h kex.c kex.h]
+ prepare for rekeying: move DH code to dh.c
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/29 23:42:01
+ [sshd.c]
+ Protocol 1 key regeneration log => verbose, some KNF; ok markus@
+
+20010329
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/26 15:47:59
+ [ssh.1]
+ document more defaults; misc. cleanup. ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/26 23:12:42
+ [authfile.c]
+ KNF
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/26 23:23:24
+ [rsa.c rsa.h ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c]
+ try to read private f-secure ssh v2 rsa keys.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/27 10:34:08
+ [ssh-rsa.c sshd.c]
+ use EVP_get_digestbynid, reorder some calls and fix missing free.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/27 10:57:00
+ [compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c]
+ some older systems use NID_md5 instead of NID_sha1 for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
+ signatures in SSH protocol 2, ok djm@
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/27 17:46:50
+ [compat.c compat.h dh.c dh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h]
+ make dh group exchange more flexible, allow min and max group size,
+ okay markus@, deraadt@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 19:56:23
+ [scp.c]
+ start to sync scp closer to rcp; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 20:04:38
+ [scp.c]
+ usage more like rcp and add missing -B to usage; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/28 20:50:45
+ [sshd.c]
+ call refuse() before close(); from olemx@ans.pl
+
+20010328
+ - (djm) Reorder tests and library inclusion for Krb4/AFS to try to
+ resolve linking conflicts with libcrypto. Report and suggested fix
+ from Holger Trapp <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE>
+ - (djm) Work around Solaris' broken struct dirent. Diagnosis and suggested
+ fix from Philippe Levan <levan@epix.net>
+ - (djm) Rework krbIV tests to get us closer to building on Redhat. Still
+ doesn't work because of conflicts between krbIV's and OpenSSL's des.h
+ - (djm) Sync openbsd-compat/glob.c
+
+20010327
+ - Attempt sync with sshlogin.c w/ OpenBSD (mainly CVS ID)
+ - Fix pointer issues in waitpid() and wait() replaces. Patch by Lutz
+ Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/25 00:01:34
+ [session.c]
+ shorten; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/25 13:16:11
+ [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config]
+ PrintLastLog option; from chip@valinux.com with some minor
+ changes by me. ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/26 08:07:09
+ [authfile.c authfile.h ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect.c
+ sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ simpler key load/save interface, see authfile.h
+ - (djm) Reestablish PAM credentials (which can be supplemental group
+ memberships) after initgroups() blows them away. Report and suggested
+ fix from Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+
+20010324
+ - Fixed permissions ssh-keyscan. Thanks to Christopher Linn <celinn@mtu.edu>.
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/23 11:04:07
+ [compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ Compat for OpenSSH with broken Rijndael/AES. ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/23 12:02:49
+ [auth1.c]
+ authctxt is now passed to do_authenticated
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/23 13:10:57
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ fix put, upload to _absolute_ path, ok djm@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/23 14:28:32
+ [session.c sshd.c]
+ ignore SIGPIPE, restore in child, fixes x11-fwd crashes; with djm@
+ - (djm) Pull out our own SIGPIPE hacks
+
+20010323
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/22 20:22:55
+ [sshd.c]
+ do not place linefeeds in buffer
+
+20010322
+ - (djm) Better AIX no tty fix, spotted by Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
+ - (bal) version.c CVS ID resync
+ - (bal) auth-chall.c auth-passwd.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c session.c CVS ID
+ resync
+ - (bal) scp.c CVS ID resync
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/20 19:10:16
+ [readconf.c]
+ default to SSH protocol version 2
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/20 19:21:21
+ [session.c]
+ remove unused arg
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/20 19:21:21
+ [session.c]
+ remove unused arg
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/21 11:43:45
+ [auth1.c auth2.c session.c session.h]
+ merge common ssh v1/2 code
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/21 14:20:45
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ add -B flag to usage
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/21 21:06:30
+ [session.c]
+ missing init; from mib@unimelb.edu.au
+
+20010321
+ - (djm) Fix ttyname breakage for AIX and Tru64. Patch from Steve
+ VanDevender <stevev@darkwing.uoregon.edu>
+ - (djm) Make sure pam_retval is initialised on call to pam_end. Patch
+ from Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+ - (djm) Don't loop forever when changing password via PAM. Patch
+ from Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+ - (djm) Generate config files before build
+ - (djm) Correctly handle SIA and AIX when no tty present. Spotted and
+ suggested fix from Mike Battersby <mib@unimelb.edu.au>
+
+20010320
+ - (bal) glob.c update to added GLOB_LIMITS (OpenBSD CVS).
+ - (bal) glob.c update to set gl_pathv to NULL (OpenBSD CVS).
+ - (bal) Oops. Missed globc.h change (OpenBSD CVS).
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/19 17:07:23
+ [auth.c readconf.c]
+ undo /etc/shell and proto 2,1 change for openssh-2.5.2
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/19 17:12:10
+ [version.h]
+ version 2.5.2
+ - (djm) Update RPM spec version
+ - (djm) Release 2.5.2p1
+- tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/19 18:33:47 [defines.h]
+ change S_ISLNK macro to work for UnixWare 2.03
+- tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/19 20:45:11 [openbsd-compat/glob.c]
+ add get_arg_max(). Use sysconf() if ARG_MAX is not defined
+
+20010319
+ - (djm) Seed PRNG at startup, rather than waiting for arc4random calls to
+ do it implicitly.
+ - (djm) Add getusershell() functions from OpenBSD CVS
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/18 12:07:52
+ [auth-options.c]
+ ignore permitopen="host:port" if AllowTcpForwarding==no
+ - (djm) Make scp work on systems without 64-bit ints
+ - tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/18 18:28:39 [defines.h]
+ move HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT where it works
+ - (bal) Use 'NGROUPS' for NeXT Since 'MAX_NGROUPS' is wrapped up in -lposix
+ stuff. Change suggested by Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (bal) Small fix to scp. %lu vs %ld
+ - (bal) NeXTStep lacks S_ISLNK. Plus split up S_IS*
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/19 03:52:51
+ [sftp-client.c]
+ Report ssh connection closing correctly; ok deraadt@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/18 23:30:55
+ [compat.c compat.h sshd.c]
+ specifically version match on ssh scanners. do not log scan
+ information to the console
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/19 12:10:17
+ [sshd.8]
+ Document permitopen authorized_keys option; ok markus@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/19 05:49:52
+ [ssh.1]
+ document PreferredAuthentications option; ok markus@
+ - (bal) Minor NeXT fixed. Forgot to #undef NGROUPS_MAX
+
+20010318
+ - (bal) Fixed scp type casing issue which causes "scp: protocol error:
+ size not delimited" fatal errors when tranfering.
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/17 17:27:59
+ [auth.c]
+ check /etc/shells, too
+ - tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/17 18:45:25 [compat.c]
+ openbsd-compat/fake-regex.h
+
+20010317
+ - Support usrinfo() on AIX. Based on patch from Gert Doering
+ <gert@greenie.muc.de>
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/15 15:05:59
+ [scp.c]
+ use %lld in printf, ok millert@/deraadt@; report from ssh@client.fi
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/15 22:07:08
+ [session.c]
+ pass Session to do_child + KNF
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/16 08:16:18
+ [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-glob.c sftp-int.c]
+ Revise globbing for get/put to be more shell-like. In particular,
+ "get/put file* directory/" now works. ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/16 09:55:53
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ fix memset and whitespace
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/16 13:44:24
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ discourage strcat/strcpy
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/16 19:06:30
+ [auth-options.c channels.c channels.h serverloop.c session.c]
+ implement "permitopen" key option, restricts -L style forwarding to
+ to specified host:port pairs. based on work by harlan@genua.de
+ - Check for gl_matchc support in glob_t and fall back to the
+ openbsd-compat/glob.[ch] support if it does not exist.
+
+20010315
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/14 08:57:14
+ [sftp-client.c]
+ Wall
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/14 15:15:58
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ add version command
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/14 22:50:25
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ note no getopt()
+ - (stevesk) ssh-keyscan.c: specify "openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h"
+ - (bal) Cygwin README change by Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+20010314
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/13 17:34:42
+ [auth-options.c]
+ missing xfree, deny key on parse error; ok stevesk@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/13 22:42:54
+ [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-glob.c sftp-glob.h sftp-int.c]
+ sftp client filename globbing for get, put, ch{mod,grp,own}. ok markus@
+ - (bal) Fix strerror() in bsd-misc.c
+ - (djm) Add replacement glob() from OpenBSD libc if the system glob is
+ missing or lacks the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension
+ - (djm) Remove -I$(srcdir)/openbsd-compat from CFLAGS, refer to headers
+ relatively. Avoids conflict between glob.h and /usr/include/glob.h
+
+20010313
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/12 22:02:02
+ [key.c key.h ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c]
+ remove old key_fingerprint interface, s/_ex//
+
+20010312
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 13:25:36
+ [auth2.c key.c]
+ debug
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 15:03:16
+ [key.c key.h]
+ add improved fingerprint functions. based on work by Carsten
+ Raskgaard <cara@int.tele.dk> and modified by me. ok markus@.
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 15:04:16
+ [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+ print both md5, sha1 and bubblebabble fingerprints when using
+ ssh-keygen -l -v. ok markus@.
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 15:13:09
+ [key.c]
+ cleanup & shorten some var names key_fingerprint_bubblebabble.
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 16:39:03
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ KNF, and SHA1 binary output is just creeping featurism
+ - tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/11 17:29:32 [configure.in]
+ test if snprintf() supports %ll
+ add /dev to search path for PRNGD/EGD socket
+ fix my mistake in USER_PATH test program
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 18:29:51
+ [key.c]
+ style+cleanup
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/11 22:33:24
+ [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+ remove -v again. use -B instead for bubblebabble. make -B consistent
+ with -l and make -B work with /path/to/known_hosts. ok deraadt@
+ - (djm) Bump portable version number for generating test RPMs
+ - (djm) Add "static_openssl" RPM build option, remove rsh build dependency
+ - (bal) Reorder includes in Makefile.
+
+20010311
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/10 12:48:27
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ ignore nonexisting private keys; report rjmooney@mediaone.net
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/10 12:53:51
+ [readconf.c ssh_config]
+ default to SSH2, now that m68k runs fast
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/10 15:02:05
+ [ttymodes.c ttymodes.h]
+ remove unused sgtty macros; ok markus@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/10 15:31:00
+ [compat.c compat.h sshconnect.c]
+ all known netscreen ssh versions, and older versions of OSU ssh cannot
+ handle password padding (newer OSU is fixed)
+ - tim@mindrot.org 2001/03/10 16:33:42 [configure.in Makefile.in sshd_config]
+ make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/10 17:51:04
+ [kex.c match.c match.h readconf.c readconf.h sshconnect2.c]
+ add PreferredAuthentications
+
+20010310
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/09 03:14:39
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ create *.pub files with umask 0644, so that you can mv them to
+ authorized_keys
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/09 12:30:29
+ [sshd.c]
+ typo; slade@shore.net
+ - Removed log.o from sftp client. Not needed.
+
+20010309
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/08 18:47:12
+ [auth1.c]
+ unused; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/08 20:44:48
+ [sftp.1]
+ spelling, cleanup; ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/08 21:42:33
+ [compat.c compat.h readconf.h ssh.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+ implement client side of SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK (test public key ->
+ no need to do enter passphrase or do expensive sign operations if the
+ server does not accept key).
+
+20010308
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/07 10:11:23
+ [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-int.c sftp-server.c sftp.1 sftp.c sftp.h]
+ Support for new draft (draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-01). New symlink handling
+ functions and small protocol change.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/08 00:15:48
+ [readconf.c ssh.1]
+ turn off useprivilegedports by default. only rhost-auth needs
+ this. older sshd's may need this, too.
+ - (stevesk) Reliant Unix (SNI) needs HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H;
+ Dirk Markwardt <D.Markwardt@tu-bs.de>
+
+20010307
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 06:11:18
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ appease gcc
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 06:11:44
+ [sftp-int.c sftp.1 sftp.c]
+ sftp -b batchfile; mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 15:10:42
+ [sftp.1]
+ order things
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/07 01:19:06
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ the name "secure shell" is boring, noone ever uses it
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/07 04:05:58
+ [ssh.1]
+ removed dated comment
+ - Cygwin contrib improvements from Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+20010306
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 14:28:47
+ [sshd.8]
+ alpha order; jcs@rt.fm
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 15:44:51
+ [servconf.c]
+ sync error message; ok markus@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 15:56:16
+ [myproposal.h ssh.1]
+ switch to aes128-cbc/hmac-md5 by default in SSH2 -- faster;
+ provos & markus ok
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 16:07:15
+ [sshd.8]
+ detail default hmac setup too
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 17:17:21
+ [kex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ generate a 2*need size (~300 instead of 1024/2048) random private
+ exponent during the DH key agreement. according to Niels (the great
+ german advisor) this is safe since /etc/primes contains strong
+ primes only.
+
+ References:
+ P. C. van Oorschot and M. J. Wiener, On Diffie-Hellman key
+ agreement with short exponents, In Advances in Cryptology
+ - EUROCRYPT'96, LNCS 1070, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp.332-343.
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 17:40:48
+ [ssh.1]
+ more ssh_known_hosts2 documentation; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 17:58:22
+ [dh.c]
+ spelling
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 00:33:04
+ [authfd.c cli.c ssh-agent.c]
+ EINTR/EAGAIN handling is required in more cases
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 01:06:03
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ Don't assume we wil get the version string all in one read().
+ deraadt@ OK'd
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/06 01:08:27
+ [clientloop.c]
+ If read() fails with EINTR deal with it the same way we treat EAGAIN
+
+20010305
+ - (bal) CVS ID touch up on sshpty.[ch] and sshlogin.[ch]
+ - (bal) CVS ID touch up on sftp-int.c
+ - (bal) CVS ID touch up on uuencode.c
+ - (bal) CVS ID touch up on auth2.c, serverloop.c, session.c & sshd.c
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/17 23:48:48
+ [sshd.8]
+ it's the OpenSSH one
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/21 07:37:04
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ inline -> __inline__, and some indent
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/21 09:05:54
+ [authfile.c]
+ improve fd handling
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/21 09:12:56
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ careful with & and &&; markus ok
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/21 21:14:04
+ [ssh.c]
+ -i supports DSA identities now; ok markus@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 04:29:37
+ [servconf.c]
+ grammar; slade@shore.net
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 06:43:55
+ [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+ document -d, and -t defaults to rsa1
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 08:03:51
+ [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+ bye bye -d
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 18:09:06
+ [sshd_config]
+ activate RSA 2 key
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 21:57:27
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ typos/grammar from matt@anzen.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/22 21:59:44
+ [auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c misc.c misc.h ssh.c]
+ use pwcopy in ssh.c, too
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/23 15:34:53
+ [serverloop.c]
+ debug2->3
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/23 18:15:13
+ [sshd.c]
+ the random session key depends now on the session_key_int
+ sent by the 'attacker'
+ dig1 = md5(cookie|session_key_int);
+ dig2 = md5(dig1|cookie|session_key_int);
+ fake_session_key = dig1|dig2;
+ this change is caused by a mail from anakin@pobox.com
+ patch based on discussions with my german advisor niels@openbsd.org
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/24 10:37:55
+ [readconf.c]
+ look for id_rsa by default, before id_dsa
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/24 10:37:26
+ [sshd_config]
+ ssh2 rsa key before dsa key
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/27 10:35:27
+ [packet.c]
+ fix random padding
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/27 11:00:11
+ [compat.c]
+ support SSH-2.0-2.1 ; from Christophe_Moret@hp.com
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 05:34:28
+ [misc.c]
+ pull in protos
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 05:36:28
+ [sftp.c]
+ do not kill the subprocess on termination (we will see if this helps
+ things or hurts things)
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 08:45:39
+ [clientloop.c]
+ fix byte counts for ssh protocol v1
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 08:54:55
+ [channels.c nchan.c nchan.h]
+ make sure remote stderr does not get truncated.
+ remove closed fd's from the select mask.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 09:57:07
+ [packet.c packet.h sshconnect2.c]
+ in ssh protocol v2 use ignore messages for padding (instead of
+ trailing \0).
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 12:55:07
+ [channels.c]
+ unify debug messages
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 17:52:54
+ [misc.c]
+ for completeness, copy pw_gecos too
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 21:21:41
+ [sshd.c]
+ generate a fake session id, too
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 21:27:48
+ [channels.c packet.c packet.h serverloop.c]
+ use ignore message to simulate a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message
+ use random content in ignore messages.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/28 21:31:32
+ [channels.c]
+ typo
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/01 02:11:25
+ [authfd.c]
+ split line so that p will have an easier time next time around
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/01 02:29:04
+ [ssh.c]
+ shorten usage by a line
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/01 02:45:10
+ [auth-rsa.c auth2.c deattack.c packet.c]
+ KNF
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/01 03:38:33
+ [cli.c cli.h rijndael.h ssh-keyscan.1]
+ copyright notices on all source files
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/01 22:46:37
+ [ssh.c]
+ don't truncate remote ssh-2 commands; from mkubita@securities.cz
+ use min, not max for logging, fixes overflow.
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/02 06:21:01
+ [sshd.8]
+ explain SIGHUP better
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/02 09:42:49
+ [sshd.8]
+ doc the dsa/rsa key pair files
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/02 18:54:31
+ [atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-chall.c auth.c auth2-chall.c crc32.h
+ scp.c serverloop.c session.c sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c
+ ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ make copyright lines the same format
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 06:53:12
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ standard theo sweep
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 21:19:41
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ Dynamically allocate read_wait and its copies. Since maxfd is
+ based on resource limits it is often (usually?) larger than FD_SETSIZE.
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 21:40:30
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ Dynamically allocate fd_set; deraadt@ OK
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 21:41:07
+ [packet.c]
+ Dynamically allocate fd_set; deraadt@ OK
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 22:07:50
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ KNF
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 23:52:22
+ [sftp.c]
+ clean up arg processing. based on work by Christophe_Moret@hp.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/03 23:59:34
+ [log.c ssh.c]
+ log*.c -> log.c
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 00:03:59
+ [channels.c]
+ debug1->2
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 10:57:53
+ [ssh.c]
+ add -m to usage; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 11:04:41
+ [sshd.8]
+ small cleanup and clarify for PermitRootLogin; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 11:16:06
+ [servconf.c sshd.8]
+ kill obsolete RandomSeed; ok markus@ deraadt@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 12:54:04
+ [sshd.8]
+ spelling
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 17:42:28
+ [authfd.c channels.c dh.c log.c readconf.c servconf.c sftp-int.c
+ ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ log functions should not be passed strings that end in newline as they
+ get passed on to syslog() and when logging to stderr, do_log() appends
+ its own newline.
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/04 18:21:28
+ [sshd.8]
+ list SSH2 ciphers
+ - (bal) Put HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD back into pwcopy()
+ - (bal) Fix up logging since it changed. removed log-*.c
+ - (djm) Fix up LOG_AUTHPRIV for systems that have it
+ - (stevesk) OpenBSD sync:
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/03/05 08:37:27
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ skip inlining, why bother
+ - (stevesk) sftp.c: handle __progname
+
+20010304
+ - (bal) Remove make-ssh-known-hosts.1 since it's no longer valid.
+ - (bal) Updated contrib/README to remove 'make-ssh-known-hosts' and
+ give Mark Roth credit for mdoc2man.pl
+
+20010303
+ - (djm) Remove make-ssh-known-hosts.pl, ssh-keyscan is better.
+ - (djm) Document PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication in sshd.8
+ - (djm) Disable and comment ChallengeResponseAuthentication in sshd_config
+ - (djm) Allow PRNGd entropy collection from localhost TCP socket. Replace
+ "--with-egd-pool" configure option with "--with-prngd-socket" and
+ "--with-prngd-port" options. Debugged and improved by Lutz Jaenicke
+ <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+
+20010301
+ - (djm) Properly add -lcrypt if needed.
+ - (djm) Force standard PAM conversation function in a few more places.
+ Patch from Redhat 2.5.1p1-2 RPM, probably Nalin Dahyabhai
+ <nalin@redhat.com>
+ - (djm) Cygwin needs pw->pw_gecos copied too. Patch from Corinna Vinschen
+ <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (djm) Released 2.5.1p2
+
+20010228
+ - (djm) Detect endianness in configure and use it in rijndael.c. Fixes
+ "Bad packet length" bugs.
+ - (djm) Fully revert PAM session patch (again). All PAM session init is
+ now done before the final fork().
+ - (djm) EGD detection patch from Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (djm) Remove /tmp from EGD socket search list
+
+20010227
+ - (bal) Applied shutdown() patch for sftp.c by Corinna Vinschen
+ <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/23 15:37:45
+ [session.c]
+ handle SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER for buggy clients
+ - (bal) sshd.init support for all Redhat release. Patch by Jim Knoble
+ <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ - (djm) Fix up POSIX saved uid support. Report from Mark Miller
+ <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (djm) Search for -lcrypt on FreeBSD too
+ - (djm) fatal() on OpenSSL version mismatch
+ - (djm) Move PAM init to after fork for non-Solaris derived PAMs
+ - (djm) Warning fix on entropy.c saved uid stuff. Patch from Mark Miller
+ <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (djm) Fix PAM fix
+ - (djm) Remove 'noreplace' flag from sshd_config in RPM spec files. This
+ change is being made as 2.5.x configfiles are not back-compatible with
+ 2.3.x.
+ - (djm) Avoid warnings for missing broken IP_TOS. Patch from Mark Miller
+ <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (djm) Open Server 5 doesn't need BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS. Patch from Tim Rice
+ <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (djm) Avoid multiple definition of _PATH_LS. Patch from Tim Rice
+ <tim@multitalents.net>
+
+20010226
+ - (bal) Fixed bsd-snprinf.c so it now honors 'BROKEN_SNPRINTF' again.
+ - (djm) Some systems (SCO3, NeXT) have weird saved uid semantics.
+ Based on patch from Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+
+20010225
+ - (djm) Use %{_libexecdir} rather than hardcoded path in RPM specfile
+ Patch from Adrian Ho <lexfiend@usa.net>
+ - (bal) Replace 'unsigned long long' to 'u_int64_t' since not every
+ platform defines u_int64_t as being that.
+
+20010224
+ - (bal) Missed part of the UNIX sockets patch. Patch by Corinna
+ Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) Reorder where 'strftime' is detected to resolve linking
+ issues on SCO. Patch by Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+
+20010224
+ - (bal) pam_stack fix to correctly detect between RH7 and older RHs.
+ Patch by Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (bal) Renamed sigaction.[ch] to sigact.[ch]. Causes problems with
+ some platforms.
+ - (bal) Generalize lack of UNIX sockets since this also effects Cray
+ not just Cygwin. Based on patch by Wendy Palm <wendyp@cray.com>
+
+20010223
+ - (bal) Fix --define rh7 in openssh.spec file. Patch by Steve Tell
+ <tell@telltronics.org>
+ - (bal) Patch to force OpenSSH rpm to require the same version of OpenSSL
+ that it was compiled against. Patch by Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (bal) Double -I for OpenSSL on SCO. Patch by Tim Rice
+ <tim@multitalents.net>
+
+20010222
+ - (bal) Corrected SCO luid patch by svaughan <svaughan@asterion.com>
+ - (bal) Added mdoc2man.pl from Mark Roth <roth@feep.net>
+ - (bal) Removed reference to liblogin from contrib/README. It was
+ integrated into OpenSSH a long while ago.
+ - (stevesk) remove erroneous #ifdef sgi code.
+ Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu>
+
+20010221
+ - (bal) Removed -L/usr/ucblib -R/usr/ucblib for Solaris platform.
+ - (bal) Fixed OpenSSL rework to use $saved_*. Patch by Tim Rice
+ <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (bal) Reverted out of 2001/02/15 patch by djm below because it
+ breaks Solaris.
+ - (djm) Move PAM session setup back to before setuid to user.
+ fixes problems on Solaris-drived PAMs.
+ - (stevesk) session.c: back out to where we were before:
+ - (djm) Move PAM session initialisation until after fork in sshd. Patch
+ from Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+
+20010220
+ - (bal) Fix mixed up params to memmove() from Jan 5th in setenv.c and
+ getcwd.c.
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync:
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/19 23:09:05
+ [sshd.c]
+ clarify message to make it not mention "ident"
+
+20010219
+ - (bal) Markus' blessing to rename login.[ch] -> sshlogin.[ch] and
+ pty.[ch] -> sshpty.[ch]
+ - (djm) Rework search for OpenSSL location. Skip directories which don't
+ exist, don't add -L$ssldir/lib if it doesn't exist. Should help SCO
+ with its limit of 6 -L options.
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync:
+ - reinhard@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/17 08:24:40
+ [sftp.1]
+ typo
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/17 16:28:58
+ [ssh.c]
+ cleanup -V output; noted by millert
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/17 16:48:48
+ [sshd.8]
+ it's the OpenSSH one
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/18 11:33:54
+ [dispatch.c]
+ typo, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, from aspa@kronodoc.fi
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/19 02:53:32
+ [compat.c compat.h serverloop.c]
+ ssh-1.2.{18-22} has broken handling of ignore messages; report from
+ itojun@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/19 03:35:23
+ [version.h]
+ OpenSSH_2.5.1 adds bug compat with 1.2.{18-22}
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/19 03:36:25
+ [scp.c]
+ np is changed by recursion; vinschen@redhat.com
+ - Update versions in RPM spec files
+ - Release 2.5.1p1
+
+20010218
+ - (bal) Patch for fix FCHMOD reference in ftp-client.c by Tim Rice
+ <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (Bal) Patch for lack of RA_RESTART in misc.c for mysignal by
+ stevesk
+ - (djm) Fix my breaking of cygwin builds, Patch from Corinna Vinschen
+ <vinschen@redhat.com> and myself.
+ - (djm) Close listen_sock on bind() failures. Patch from Arkadiusz
+ Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.ORG.PL>
+ - (djm) Robustify EGD/PRNGd code in face of socket closures. Patch from
+ Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ - (djm) Use ttyname() to determine name of tty returned by openpty()
+ rather then risking overflow. Patch from Marek Michalkiewicz
+ <marekm@amelek.gda.pl>
+ - (djm) Swapped tests for no_libsocket and no_libnsl in configure.in.
+ Patch from Marek Michalkiewicz <marekm@amelek.gda.pl>
+ - (djm) Doc fixes from Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Use SA_INTERRUPT along SA_RESTART if present (equivalent for
+ SunOS)
+ - (djm) SCO needs librpc for libwrap. Patch from Tim Rice
+ <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (stevesk) misc.c: cpp rework of SA_(INTERRUPT|RESTART) handling.
+ - (stevesk) scp.c: use mysignal() for updateprogressmeter() handler.
+ - (djm) SA_INTERRUPT is the converse of SA_RESTART, apply it only for
+ SIGALRM.
+ - (djm) Move entropy.c over to mysignal()
+ - (djm) SunOS 4.x also needs to define HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H as it has
+ a <sys/queue.h> that lacks the TAILQ_* macros. Patch from Todd C.
+ Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ - (djm) Update RPM spec files for 2.5.0p1
+ - (djm) Merge BSD_AUTH support from Markus Friedl and David J. MacKenzie
+ enable with --with-bsd-auth.
+ - (stevesk) entropy.c: typo; should be SIGPIPE
+
+20010217
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/16 13:38:18
+ [channel.c]
+ remove debug
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/16 14:03:43
+ [session.c]
+ proper payload-length check for x11 w/o screen-number
+
+20010216
+ - (bal) added '--with-prce' to allow overriding of system regex when
+ required (tested by David Dulek <ddulek@fastenal.com>)
+ - (bal) Added DG/UX case and set that they have a broken IPTOS.
+ - (djm) Mini-configure reorder patch from Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+ Fixes linking on SCO.
+ - (djm) Make gnome-ssh-askpass handle multi-line prompts. Patch from
+ Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+ - (djm) BSD license for gnome-ssh-askpass (was X11)
+ - (djm) KNF on gnome-ssh-askpass
+ - (djm) USE_PIPES for a few more sysv platforms
+ - (djm) Cleanup configure.in a little
+ - (djm) Ask users to check config.log when we can't find necessary libs
+ - (djm) Set "login ID" on systems with setluid. Only enabled for SCO
+ OpenServer for now. Based on patch from svaughan <svaughan@asterion.com>
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/15 16:19:59
+ [channels.c channels.h serverloop.c sshconnect.c sshconnect.h]
+ [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+ genericize password padding function for SSH1 and SSH2.
+ add stylized echo to 2, too.
+ - (djm) Add roundup() macro to defines.h
+ - (stevesk) set SA_RESTART flag in mysignal() for SIGCHLD;
+ needed on Unixware 2.x.
+
+20010215
+ - (djm) Move PAM session setup back to before setuid to user. Fixes
+ problems on Solaris-derived PAMs.
+ - (djm) Clean up PAM namespace. Suggested by Darren Moffat
+ <Darren.Moffat@eng.sun.com>
+ - (bal) Sync w/ OpenSSH for new release
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/12 12:45:06
+ [sshconnect1.c]
+ fix xmalloc(0), ok dugsong@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/11 12:59:25
+ [Makefile.in sshd.8 sshconnect2.c readconf.h readconf.c packet.c
+ sshd.c ssh.c ssh.1 servconf.h servconf.c myproposal.h kex.h kex.c]
+ 1) clean up the MAC support for SSH-2
+ 2) allow you to specify the MAC with 'ssh -m'
+ 3) or the 'MACs' keyword in ssh(d)_config
+ 4) add hmac-{md5,sha1}-96
+ ok stevesk@, provos@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/12 16:16:23
+ [auth-passwd.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c servconf.c servconf.h
+ ssh-keygen.c sshd.8]
+ PermitRootLogin={yes,without-password,forced-commands-only,no}
+ (before this change, root could login even if PermitRootLogin==no)
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/12 22:56:09
+ [clientloop.c packet.c ssh-keyscan.c]
+ deal with EAGAIN/EINTR selects which were skipped
+ - markus@cvs.openssh.org 2001/02/13 22:49:40
+ [auth1.c auth2.c]
+ setproctitle(user) only if getpwnam succeeds
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/12 23:26:20
+ [sshd.c]
+ missing memset; from solar@openwall.com
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/12 20:53:33
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ lumask now works with 1 numeric arg; ok markus@, djm@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/14 9:46:03
+ [sftp-client.c sftp-int.c sftp.1]
+ Fix and document 'preserve modes & times' option ('-p' flag in sftp);
+ ok markus@
+ - (bal) replaced PATH_MAX in sftp-int.c w/ MAXPATHLEN.
+ - (djm) Move to Jim's 1.2.0 X11 askpass program
+ - (stevesk) OpenBSD sync:
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/15 01:38:04
+ [serverloop.c]
+ indent
+
+20010214
+ - (djm) Don't try to close PAM session or delete credentials if the
+ session has not been open or credentials not set. Based on patch from
+ Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@pcug.org.au>
+ - (djm) Move PAM session initialisation until after fork in sshd. Patch
+ from Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) Missing function prototype in bsd-snprintf.c patch by
+ Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (djm) Split out and improve OSF SIA auth code. Patch from Chris Adams
+ <cmadams@hiwaay.net> with a little modification and KNF.
+ - (stevesk) fix for SIA patch, misplaced session_setup_sia()
+
+20010213
+ - (djm) Only test -S potential EGD sockets if they exist and are readable.
+ - (bal) Cleaned out bsd-snprintf.c. VARARGS have been banished and
+ I did a base KNF over the whe whole file to make it more acceptable.
+ (backed out of original patch and removed it from ChangeLog)
+ - (bal) Use chown() if fchown() does not exist in ftp-server.c patch by
+ Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (stevesk) auth1.c: fix PAM passwordless check.
+
+20010212
+ - (djm) Update Redhat specfile to allow --define "skip_x11_askpass 1",
+ --define "skip_gnome_askpass 1", --define "rh7 1" and make the
+ implicit rpm-3.0.5 dependancy explicit. Patch and suggestions from
+ Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Clean up PCRE text in INSTALL
+ - (djm) Fix OSF SIA auth NULL pointer deref. Report from Mike Battersby
+ <mib@unimelb.edu.au>
+ - (bal) NCR SVR4 compatiblity provide by Don Bragg <thewizarddon@yahoo.com>
+ - (stevesk) session.c: remove debugging code.
+
+20010211
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 22:35:46
+ [auth1.c auth2.c sshd.c]
+ move k_setpag() to a central place; ok dugsong@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 12:52:02
+ [auth2.c]
+ offer passwd before s/key
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/8 22:37:10
+ [canohost.c]
+ remove last call to sprintf; ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 1:33:32
+ [canohost.c]
+ add debug message, since sshd blocks here if DNS is not available
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 12:44:02
+ [cli.c]
+ don't call vis() for \r
+ - danh@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 0:12:43
+ [scp.c]
+ revert a small change to allow -r option to work again; ok deraadt@
+ - danh@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 15:14:11
+ [scp.c]
+ fix memory leak; ok markus@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 0:45:52
+ [scp.1]
+ Mention that you can quote pathnames with spaces in them
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 1:46:28
+ [ssh.c]
+ remove mapping of argv[0] -> hostname
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:26:17
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ do not ask for passphrase in batch mode; report from ejb@ql.org
+ - itojun@cvs.opebsd.org 2001/02/08 10:47:05
+ [sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+ %.30s is too short for IPv6 numeric address. use %.128s for now.
+ markus ok
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 12:28:35
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ do not free twice, thanks to /etc/malloc.conf
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 17:10:53
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ partial success: debug->log; "Permission denied" if no more auth methods
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/10 12:09:21
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ remove some lines
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 13:38:07
+ [auth-options.c]
+ reset options if no option is given; from han.holl@prismant.nl
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 21:58:28
+ [channels.c]
+ nuke sprintf, ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 21:58:28
+ [channels.c]
+ nuke sprintf, ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:43:02
+ [clientloop.h]
+ remove confusing callback code
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 14:39:36
+ [readconf.c]
+ snprintf
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 19:30:52
+ sync with netbsd tree changes.
+ - more strict prototypes, include necessary headers
+ - use paths.h/pathnames.h decls
+ - size_t typecase to int -> u_long
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 18:04:50
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ fix size_t -> int cast (use u_long). markus ok
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 22:43:16
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ s/getline/Linebuf_getline/; from roumen.petrov@skalasoft.com
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 9:04:59
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ do not assume malloc() returns zero-filled region. found by
+ malloc.conf=AJ.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 22:35:30
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ don't connect if batch_mode is true and stricthostkeychecking set to
+ 'ask'
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 21:26:07
+ [sshd_config]
+ type: ok markus@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:07:50
+ [sshd_config]
+ enable sftp-server by default
+ - deraadt 2001/02/07 8:57:26
+ [xmalloc.c]
+ deal with new ANSI malloc stuff
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 16:46:08
+ [xmalloc.c]
+ typo in fatal()
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 18:04:50
+ [xmalloc.c]
+ fix size_t -> int cast (use u_long). markus ok
+ - 1.47 Thu Feb 8 23:11:42 GMT 2001 by dugsong
+ [serverloop.c sshconnect1.c]
+ mitigate SSH1 traffic analysis - from Solar Designer
+ <solar@openwall.com>, ok provos@
+ - (bal) fixed sftp-client.c. Return 'status' instead of '0'
+ (from the OpenBSD tree)
+ - (bal) Synced ssh.1, ssh-add.1 and sshd.8 w/ OpenBSD
+ - (bal) sftp-sever.c '%8lld' to '%8llu' (OpenBSD Sync)
+ - (bal) uuencode.c resync w/ OpenBSD tree, plus whitespace.
+ - (bal) A bit more whitespace cleanup
+ - (djm) Set PAM_RHOST earlier, patch from Andrew Bartlett
+ <abartlet@pcug.org.au>
+ - (stevesk) misc.c: ssh.h not needed.
+ - (stevesk) compat.c: more friendly cpp error
+ - (stevesk) OpenBSD sync:
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/11 06:15:57
+ [LICENSE]
+ typos and small cleanup; ok deraadt@
+
+20010210
+ - (djm) Sync sftp and scp stuff from OpenBSD:
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 03:55:13
+ [sftp-client.c]
+ Don't free handles before we are done with them. Based on work from
+ Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>. ok markus@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:32:53
+ [sftp.1]
+ Punctuation fix from Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 04:07:29
+ [sftp.1]
+ pretty up significantly
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 06:49:42
+ [sftp.1]
+ .Bl-.El mismatch. markus ok
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 06:12:30
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ Check that target is a directory before doing ls; ok markus@
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 11:01:18
+ [scp.c sftp-client.c sftp-server.c]
+ unsigned long long -> %llu, not %qu. markus ok
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 11:10:39
+ [sftp.1 sftp-int.c]
+ more man page cleanup and sync of help text with man page; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 14:58:34
+ [sftp-client.c]
+ older servers reply with SSH2_FXP_NAME + count==0 instead of EOF
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 15:27:19
+ [sftp.c]
+ Don't forward agent and X11 in sftp. Suggestion from Roumen Petrov
+ <roumen.petrov@skalasoft.com>
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 15:36:04
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ portable; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 15:55:47
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ lowercase cmds[].c also; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/07 17:04:52
+ [pathnames.h sftp.c]
+ allow sftp over ssh protocol 1; ok djm@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 07:38:55
+ [scp.c]
+ memory leak fix, and snprintf throughout
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 08:02:02
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ plug a memory leak
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 10:11:23
+ [session.c sftp-client.c]
+ %i -> %d
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 10:57:59
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ typo
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 15:28:07
+ [sftp-int.c pathnames.h]
+ _PATH_LS; ok markus@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/09 04:46:25
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ Check for NULL attribs for chown, chmod & chgrp operations, only send
+ relevant attribs back to server; ok markus@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 15:05:25
+ [sftp.c]
+ Use getopt to process commandline arguments
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 15:06:21
+ [sftp.c ]
+ Wait for ssh subprocess at exit
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 15:18:16
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ stat target for remote chdir before doing chdir
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 15:32:54
+ [sftp.1]
+ Punctuation fix from Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/05 22:22:02
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ cleanup get_pathname, fix pwd after failed cd. okay djm@
+ - (djm) Update makefile.in for _PATH_SFTP_SERVER
+ - (bal) sftp-client.c replace NULL w/ 0 in do_ls() (pending in OpenBSD tree)
+
+20010209
+ - (bal) patch to vis.c to deal with HAVE_VIS right by Robert Mooney
+ <rjmooney@mediaone.net>
+ - (bal) .c.o rule in openbsd-compat/Makefile.in did not make it to the
+ main tree while porting forward. Pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke
+ <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - (bal) double entry in configure.in. Pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke
+ <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - (stevesk) OpenBSD sync:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 11:20:01
+ [auth2.c]
+ strict checking
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 11:15:22
+ [version.h]
+ update to 2.3.2
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 11:12:30
+ [auth2.c]
+ fix typo
+ - (djm) Update spec files
+ - (bal) OpenBSD sync:
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 14:38:54
+ [scp.c]
+ memory leak fix, and snprintf throughout
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:43:02
+ [clientloop.c]
+ remove confusing callback code
+ - (djm) Add CVS Id's to files that we have missed
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync (more):
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/08 19:30:52
+ sync with netbsd tree changes.
+ - more strict prototypes, include necessary headers
+ - use paths.h/pathnames.h decls
+ - size_t typecase to int -> u_long
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:07:42
+ [ssh.c]
+ fatal() if subsystem fails
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 22:43:02
+ [ssh.c]
+ remove confusing callback code
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 23:03:24
+ [ssh.c]
+ add -1 option (force protocol version 1). ok markus@
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 23:06:21
+ [ssh.c]
+ reorder -{1,2,4,6} options. ok markus@
+ - (bal) Missing 'const' in readpass.h
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync (so at least the thing compiles for 2.3.2 =)
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/06 23:30:28
+ [sftp-client.c]
+ replace arc4random with counter for request ids; ok markus@
+ - (djm) Define _PATH_TTY for systems that don't. Report from Lutz
+ Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+
+20010208
+ - (djm) Don't delete external askpass program in make uninstall target.
+ Report and fix from Roumen Petrov <roumen.petrov@skalasoft.com>
+ - (djm) Fix linking of sftp, don't need arc4random any more.
+ - (djm) Try to use shell that supports "test -S" for EGD socket search.
+ Based on patch from Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+
+20010207
+ - (bal) Save the whole path to AR in configure. Some Solaris 2.7 installs
+ seem lose track of it while in openbsd-compat/ (two confirmed reports)
+ - (djm) Much KNF on PAM code
+ - (djm) Revise auth-pam.c conversation function to be a little more
+ readable.
+ - (djm) Revise kbd-int PAM conversation function to fold all text messages
+ to before first prompt. Fixes hangs if last pam_message did not require
+ a reply.
+ - (djm) Fix password changing when using PAM kbd-int authentication
+
+20010205
+ - (bal) Disable groupaccess by setting NGROUPS_MAX to 0 for platforms
+ that don't have NGROUPS_MAX.
+ - (bal) AIX patch for auth1.c by William L. Jones <jones@hpc.utexas.edu>
+ - (stevesk) OpenBSD sync:
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 08:32:27
+ [many files; did this manually to our top-level source dir]
+ unexpand and remove end-of-line whitespace; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 15:21:19
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID support; ok markus@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 17:02:32
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ ? == help
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 16:47:46
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ sort commands, so that abbreviations work as expected
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 15:17:52
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ debugging sftp: precedence and missing break. chmod, chown, chgrp
+ seem to be working now.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 14:41:21
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ use base 8 for umask/chmod
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 11:11:54
+ [sftp-int.c]
+ fix LCD
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 08:10:44
+ [ssh.1]
+ typo; dpo@club-internet.fr
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 06:30:12
+ [auth2.c authfd.c packet.c]
+ remove duplicate #include's; ok markus@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 16:56:23
+ [scp.c sshd.c]
+ alpha happiness
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 15:12:17
+ [sshd.c]
+ precedence; ok markus@
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 08:14:15
+ [ssh.c sshd.c]
+ make the alpha happy
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/31 13:37:24
+ [channels.c channels.h serverloop.c ssh.c]
+ do not disconnect if local port forwarding fails, e.g. if port is
+ already in use
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/01 14:58:09
+ [channels.c]
+ use ipaddr in channel messages, ietf-secsh wants this
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/31 12:26:20
+ [channels.c]
+ ssh.com-2.0.1x does not send additional info in CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
+ messages; bug report from edmundo@rano.org
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/31 13:48:09
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ unused
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 08:23:08
+ [sftp-client.c sftp-server.c]
+ make gcc on the alpha even happier
+
+20010204
+ - (bal) I think this is the last of the bsd-*.h that don't belong.
+ - (bal) Minor Makefile fix
+ - (bal) openbsd-compat/Makefile minor fix. Ensure dependancies are done
+ right.
+ - (bal) Changed order of LIB="" in -with-skey due to library resolving.
+ - (bal) next-posix.h changed to bsd-nextstep.h
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS sync:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/03 03:08:38
+ [auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth.c canohost.c]
+ [canohost.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshconnect1.c sshd.8]
+ [sshd_config]
+ make ReverseMappingCheck optional in sshd_config; ok djm@,dugsong@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/03 03:19:51
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8 sshd_config]
+ Skey is now called ChallengeResponse
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/03 03:43:09
+ [sshd.8]
+ use no-pty option in .ssh/authorized_keys* if you need a 8-bit clean
+ channel. note from Erik.Anggard@cygate.se (pr/1659)
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/03 10:03:06
+ [ssh.1]
+ typos; ok markus@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/02/04 04:11:56
+ [scp.1 sftp-server.c ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-client.c sftp-client.h]
+ [sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-int.c sftp-int.h sftp.1 sftp.c]
+ Basic interactive sftp client; ok theo@
+ - (djm) Update RPM specs for new sftp binary
+ - (djm) Update several bits for new optional reverse lookup stuff. I
+ think I got them all.
+ - (djm) Makefile.in fixes
+ - (stevesk) add mysignal() wrapper and use it for the protocol 2
+ SIGCHLD handler.
+ - (djm) Use setvbuf() instead of setlinebuf(). Suggest from stevesk@
+
+20010203
+ - (bal) Cygwin clean up by Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) renamed queue.h to fake-queue.h (even if it's an OpenBSD
+ based file) to ensure #include space does not get confused.
+ - (bal) Minor Makefile.in tweak. dirname may not exist on some
+ platforms so builds fail. (NeXT being a well known one)
+
+20010202
+ - (bal) Makefile fix where sourcedir != builddir by Corinna Vinschen
+ <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) Makefile fix to use $(MAKE) instead of 'make' for platforms
+ that use 'gmake'. Patch by Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+
+20010201
+ - (bal) Minor fix to Makefile to stop rebuilding executables if no
+ changes have occured to any of the supporting code. Patch by
+ Roumen Petrov <roumen.petrov@skalasoft.com>
+
+20010131
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync:
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/30 15:48:53
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ Make warning message a little more consistent. ok markus@
+ - (djm) Fix autoconf logic for --with-lastlog=no Report and diagnosis from
+ Philipp Buehler <lists@fips.de> and Kevin Steves <stevesk@sweden.hp.com>
+ respectively.
+ - (djm) Don't log SSH2 PAM KbdInt responses to debug, they may contain
+ passwords.
+ - (bal) Reorder. Move all bsd-*, fake-*, next-*, and cygwin* stuff to
+ openbsd-compat/. And resolve all ./configure and Makefile.in issues
+ assocated.
+
+20010130
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 09:55:37
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c]
+ fix select overflow; ok deraadt@ and stevesk@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 12:42:35
+ [canohost.c canohost.h channels.c clientloop.c]
+ add get_peer_ipaddr(socket), x11-fwd in ssh2 requires ipaddr, not DNS
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 12:47:32
+ [rsa.c rsa.h ssh-agent.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c]
+ handle rsa_private_decrypt failures; helps against the Bleichenbacher
+ pkcs#1 attack
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 05:36:11
+ [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+ Allow invocation of sybsystem by commandline (-s); ok markus@
+ - (stevesk) configure.in: remove duplicate PROG_LS
+
+20010129
+ - (stevesk) sftp-server.c: use %lld vs. %qd
+
+20010128
+ - (bal) Put USE_PIPES back into sco3.2v5
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 10:15:34
+ [dispatch.c]
+ re-keying is not supported; ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 10:24:04
+ [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ cleanup AUTHORS sections
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 10:37:26
+ [sshd.c sshd.8]
+ remove -Q, no longer needed
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 20:36:16
+ [readconf.c ssh.1]
+ ``StrictHostKeyChecking ask'' documentation and small cleanup.
+ ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 20:43:25
+ [sshd.8]
+ spelling. ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 20:53:21
+ [xmalloc.c]
+ use size_t for strlen() return. ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 22:27:05
+ [authfile.c]
+ spelling. use sizeof vs. strlen(). ok markus@
+ - niklas@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 1:59:14
+ [atomicio.h canohost.h clientloop.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h
+ groupaccess.c groupaccess.h hmac.h hostfile.h includes.h kex.h
+ key.h log.h login.h match.h misc.h myproposal.h nchan.ms pathnames.h
+ radix.h readpass.h rijndael.h serverloop.h session.h sftp.h ssh-add.1
+ ssh-dss.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-rsa.h ssh1.h ssh_config
+ sshconnect.h sshd_config tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h]
+ $OpenBSD$
+ - (bal) Minor auth2.c resync. Whitespace and moving of an #include.
+
+20010126
+ - (bal) SSH_PROGRAM vs _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM fix pointed out by Roumen
+ Petrov <roumen.petrov@skalasoft.com>
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/25 8:06:33
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ call _exit() in signal handler
+
+20010125
+ - (djm) Sync bsd-* support files:
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/01/26 03:43:20
+ [rresvport.c bindresvport.c]
+ new bindresvport() semantics that itojun, shin, jean-luc and i have
+ agreed on, which will be happy for the future. bindresvport_sa() for
+ sockaddr *, too. docs later..
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/01/24 02:24:21
+ [bindresvport.c]
+ in bindresvport(), if sin is non-NULL, example sin->sin_family for
+ the actual family being processed
+ - (djm) Mention PRNGd in documentation, it is nicer than EGD
+ - (djm) Automatically search for "well-known" EGD/PRNGd sockets in autoconf
+ - (bal) AC_FUNC_STRFTIME added to autoconf
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Resync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/24 21:03:50
+ [channels.c]
+ missing freeaddrinfo(); ok markus@
+
+20010124
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Resync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/23 10:45:10
+ [ssh.h]
+ nuke comment
+ - (bal) no 64bit support patch from Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (bal) #ifdef around S_IFSOCK if platform does not support it.
+ patch by Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (bal) fake-regex.h cleanup based on Tim Rice's patch.
+ - (stevesk) sftp-server.c: fix chmod() mode mask
+
+20010123
+ - (bal) regexp.h typo in configure.in. Should have been regex.h
+ - (bal) SSH_USER_DIR to _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR patch by stevesk@
+ - (bal) SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT to _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Resync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/22 8:15:00
+ [auth-krb4.c sshconnect1.c]
+ only AFS needs radix.[ch]
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/22 8:32:53
+ [auth2.c]
+ no need to include; from mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/22 16:55:21
+ [key.c]
+ free() -> xfree(); ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/22 17:22:28
+ [sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ fix memory leaks in SSH2 key exchange; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/22 23:06:39
+ [auth1.c auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h
+ sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ rename skey -> challenge response.
+ auto-enable kbd-interactive for ssh2 if challenge-reponse is enabled.
+
+
+20010122
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Resync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus
+ [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c]
+ only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus
+ [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c
+ auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c
+ packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c
+ session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h
+ ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c]
+ move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14
+ [sshd.8]
+ fix typo; from stevesk@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58
+ [ssh-dss.c]
+ clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from
+ stevesk@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus
+ [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c]
+ pass the filename to auth_parse_options()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001
+ [readconf.c]
+ fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42
+ [ssh-add.c]
+ do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from
+ andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56
+ [servconf.c]
+ Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07
+ [readconf.c]
+ KNF; ok markus
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ remove -R flag; ok markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40
+ [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c
+ auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c
+ auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c
+ bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c
+ cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c
+ deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c
+ key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h
+ match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c
+ readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h
+ session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c
+ ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h
+ sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h
+ ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c]
+ split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary
+ #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch]
+ - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree
+ - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve
+ conflict when compiling for non-kerb install
+ - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes
+ on 1/19.
+
+20010120
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Resync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26
+ [ssh-chall.c servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.c]
+ only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY
+ - (bal) Slight auth2-pam.c clean up.
+ - (bal) Includes a fake-regexp.h to be only used if regcomp() is found,
+ but no 'regexp.h' found (SCO OpenServer 3 lacks the header).
+
+20010119
+ - (djm) Update versions in RPM specfiles
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Resync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 16:20:21
+ [log-client.c log-server.c log.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.1 ssh.h
+ sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ log() is at pri=LOG_INFO, since LOG_NOTICE goes to /dev/console on many
+ systems
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 16:59:59
+ [auth-passwd.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c serverloop.c session.c
+ session.h sshconnect1.c]
+ 1) removes fake skey from sshd, since this will be much
+ harder with /usr/libexec/auth/login_XXX
+ 2) share/unify code used in ssh-1 and ssh-2 authentication (server side)
+ 3) make addition of BSD_AUTH and other challenge reponse methods
+ easier.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 17:12:43
+ [auth-chall.c auth2-chall.c]
+ rename *-skey.c *-chall.c since the files are not skey specific
+ - (djm) Merge patch from Tim Waugh (via Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>)
+ to fix NULL pointer deref and fake authloop breakage in PAM code.
+ - (bal) Updated contrib/cygwin/ by Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) Minor cygwin patch to auth1.c. Suggested by djm.
+
+20010118
+ - (bal) Super Sized OpenBSD Resync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/11 22:14:20 GMT 2001 by markus
+ [sshd.c]
+ maxfd+1
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 17:59:18
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ small ssh-keygen manpage cleanup; stevesk@pobox.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:03:07
+ [scp.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c]
+ getopt() returns -1 not EOF; stevesk@pobox.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:06:54
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ use SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; from stevesk@pobox.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:12:47
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ free() -> xfree(); fix memory leak; from stevesk@pobox.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:14:13
+ [ssh-add.c]
+ typo, from stevesk@sweden.hp.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:32:50
+ [packet.c session.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ split out keepalive from packet_interactive (from dale@accentre.com)
+ set IPTOS_LOWDELAY TCP_NODELAY IPTOS_THROUGHPUT for ssh2, too.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:36:45
+ [packet.c packet.h]
+ reorder, typo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:38:00
+ [auth-options.c]
+ fix comment
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:43:31
+ [session.c]
+ Wall
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 19:14:08
+ [clientloop.h clientloop.c ssh.c]
+ move callback to headerfile
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:40:10
+ [ssh.c]
+ use log() instead of stderr
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:43:51
+ [dh.c]
+ use error() not stderr!
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:45:29
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ rename must fail if newpath exists, debug off by default
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:46:38
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ readable long listing for sftp-server, ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 19:20:06
+ [key.c ssh-rsa.c]
+ make "ssh-rsa" key format for ssh2 confirm to the ietf-drafts; from
+ galb@vandyke.com. note that you have to delete older ssh2-rsa keys,
+ since they are in the wrong format, too. they must be removed from
+ .ssh/authorized_keys2 and .ssh/known_hosts2, etc.
+ (cd; grep -v ssh-rsa .ssh/authorized_keys2 > TMP && mv TMP
+ .ssh/authorized_keys2) additionally, we now check that
+ BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >= 768.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 20:54:27
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ remove some statics. simpler handles; idea from nisse@lysator.liu.se
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 23:58:08
+ [bufaux.c radix.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c]
+ indent
+ - (bal) Added bsd-strmode.[ch] since some non-OpenBSD platforms may
+ be missing such feature.
+
+
+20010117
+ - (djm) Only write random seed file at exit
+ - (djm) Make PAM support optional, enable with --with-pam
+ - (djm) Try to use libcrypt on Linux, but link it after OpenSSL (which
+ provides a crypt() of its own)
+ - (djm) Avoid a warning in bsd-bindresvport.c
+ - (djm) Try to avoid adding -I/usr/include to CPPFLAGS during SSL tests. This
+ can cause weird segfaults errors on Solaris
+ - (djm) Avoid warning in PAM code by making read_passphrase arguments const
+ - (djm) Add --with-pam to RPM spec files
+
+20010115
+ - (bal) sftp-server.c change to use chmod() if fchmod() does not exist.
+ - (bal) utimes() support via utime() interface on machine that lack utimes().
+
+20010114
+ - (stevesk) initial work for OpenBSD "support supplementary group in
+ {Allow,Deny}Groups" patch:
+ - import getgrouplist.c from OpenBSD (bsd-getgrouplist.c)
+ - add bsd-getgrouplist.h
+ - new files groupaccess.[ch]
+ - build but don't use yet (need to merge auth.c changes)
+ - (stevesk) complete:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 11:56:48
+ [auth.c sshd.8]
+ support supplementary group in {Allow,Deny}Groups
+ from stevesk@pobox.com
+
+20010112
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/10 22:56:22
+ [bufaux.h bufaux.c sftp-server.c sftp.h getput.h]
+ cleanup sftp-server implementation:
+ add buffer_get_int64, buffer_put_int64, GET_64BIT, PUT_64BIT
+ parse SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED
+ send SSH2_FX_EOF if readdir returns no more entries
+ reply to SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED message
+ use #defines from the draft
+ move #definations to sftp.h
+ more info:
+ http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/10 19:43:20
+ [sshd.c]
+ XXX - generate_empheral_server_key() is not safe against races,
+ because it calls log()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/09 21:19:50
+ [packet.c]
+ allow TCP_NDELAY for ipv6; from netbsd via itojun@
+
+20010110
+ - (djm) SNI/Reliant Unix needs USE_PIPES and $DISPLAY hack. Report from
+ Bladt Norbert <Norbert.Bladt@adi.ch>
+
+20010109
+ - (bal) Resync CVS ID of cli.c
+ - (stevesk) auth1.c: free should be after WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ code.
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/08 22:29:05
+ [auth2.c compat.c compat.h servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8
+ sshd_config version.h]
+ implement option 'Banner /etc/issue.net' for ssh2, move version to
+ 2.3.1 (needed for bugcompat detection, 2.3.0 would fail if Banner
+ is enabled).
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/08 22:03:23
+ [channels.c ssh-keyscan.c]
+ O_NDELAY -> O_NONBLOCK; thanks stevesk@pobox.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/08 21:55:41
+ [sshconnect1.c]
+ more cleanups and fixes from stevesk@pobox.com:
+ 1) try_agent_authentication() for loop will overwrite key just
+ allocated with key_new(); don't alloc
+ 2) call ssh_close_authentication_connection() before exit
+ try_agent_authentication()
+ 3) free mem on bad passphrase in try_rsa_authentication()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/08 21:48:17
+ [kex.c]
+ missing free; thanks stevesk@pobox.com
+ - (bal) Detect if clock_t structure exists, if not define it.
+ - (bal) Detect if O_NONBLOCK exists, if not define it.
+ - (bal) removed news4-posix.h (now empty)
+ - (bal) changed bsd-bindresvport.c and bsd-rresvport.c to use 'socklen_t'
+ instead of 'int'
+ - (stevesk) sshd_config: sync
+ - (stevesk) defines.h: remove spurious ``;''
+
+20010108
+ - (bal) Fixed another typo in cli.c
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/07 21:26:55
+ [cli.c]
+ typo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/07 21:26:55
+ [cli.c]
+ missing free, stevesk@pobox.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/07 19:06:25
+ [auth1.c]
+ missing free, stevesk@pobox.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/07 11:28:04
+ [log-client.c log-server.c log.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.1
+ ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ rename SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO->SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOTICE
+ syslog priority changes:
+ fatal() LOG_ERR -> LOG_CRIT
+ log() LOG_INFO -> LOG_NOTICE
+ - Updated TODO
+
+20010107
+ - (bal) OpenBSD Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/06 11:23:27
+ [ssh-rsa.c]
+ remove unused
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/05 08:23:29
+ [ssh-keyscan.1]
+ missing .El
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:41:03
+ [session.c sshconnect.c]
+ consistent use of _PATH_BSHELL; from stevesk@pobox.com
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:35:32
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ Mention AES as available SSH2 Cipher; ok markus
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:25:58
+ [sshd.c]
+ sync usage()/man with defaults; from stevesk@pobox.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/04 22:21:26
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ handle SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER; fixes bug when connecting to a server
+ that prints a banner (e.g. /etc/issue.net)
+
+20010105
+ - (bal) contrib/caldera/ provided by Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (bal) bsd-getcwd.c and bsd-setenv.c changed from bcopy() to memmove()
+
+20010104
+ - (djm) Fix memory leak on systems with BROKEN_GETADDRINFO. Based on
+ work by Chris Vaughan <vaughan99@yahoo.com>
+
+20010103
+ - (bal) fixed up sshconnect.c so it was closer inline with the OpenBSD
+ tree (mainly positioning)
+ - (bal) OpenSSH CVS Update
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/02 20:41:02
+ [packet.c]
+ log remote ip on disconnect; PR 1600 from jcs@rt.fm
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/02 20:50:56
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ strict_host_key_checking for host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
+ ip_status == HOST_CHANGED
+ - (bal) authfile.c: Synced CVS ID tag
+ - (bal) UnixWare 2.0 fixes by Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (bal) Disable sftp-server if no 64bit int support exists. Based on
+ patch by Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - (bal) Makefile.in changes to uninstall: target to remove sftp-server
+ and sftp-server.8 manpage.
+
+20010102
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Update
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/01 14:52:49
+ [scp.c]
+ use shared fatal(); from stevesk@pobox.com
+
+20001231
+ - (bal) Reverted out of MAXHOSTNAMELEN. This should be set per OS.
+ for multiple reasons.
+ - (bal) Reverted out of a partial NeXT patch.
+
+20001230
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Update
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 18:58:30
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ enable 'ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/{authorized_keys,known_hosts}{,2}
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/29 22:19:13
+ [channels.c]
+ missing xfree; from vaughan99@yahoo.com
+ - (bal) Resynced CVS ID with OpenBSD for channel.c and uidswap.c
+ - (bal) if no MAXHOSTNAMELEN is defined. Default to 64 character defination.
+ Suggested by Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>
+ - (bal) Add in '.c.o' section to Makefile.in to address make programs that
+ don't honor CPPFLAGS by default. Suggested by Lutz Jaenicke
+ <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+
+20001229
+ - (bal) Fixed spelling of 'authorized_keys' in ssh-copy-id.1 by Christian
+ Kurz <shorty@debian.org>
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Update
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 14:25:51
+ [auth.h auth2.c]
+ count authentication failures only
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 14:25:03
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ fingerprint for MITM attacks, too.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/28 12:03:57
+ [sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ document -D
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 14:19:21
+ [serverloop.c]
+ less chatty
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 12:34
+ [auth1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ typo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 12:30:19
+ [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 sshconnect.c]
+ new option: HostKeyAlias: allow the user to record the host key
+ under a different name. This is useful for ssh tunneling over
+ forwarded connections or if you run multiple sshd's on different
+ ports on the same machine.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 11:51:53
+ [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+ multiple -t force pty allocation, document ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/27 11:41:31
+ [sshd.8]
+ update for ssh-2
+ - (stevesk) compress.[ch] sync with openbsd; missed in prototype
+ fix merge.
+
+20001228
+ - (bal) Patch to add libutil.h to loginrec.c only if the platform has
+ libutil.h. Suggested by Pekka Savola <pekka@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Update to new x11-askpass in RPM spec
+ - (bal) SCO patch to not include <sys/queue.h> since it's unrelated
+ header. Patch by Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+ - Updated TODO w/ known HP/UX issue
+ - (bal) removed extra <netdb.h> noticed by Kevin Steves and removed the
+ bad reference to 'NeXT including it else were' on the #ifdef version.
+
+20001227
+ - (bal) Typo in configure.in: entut?ent should be endut?ent. Suggested by
+ Takumi Yamane <yamtak@b-session.com>
+ - (bal) Checks for getrlimit(), sysconf(), and setdtablesize(). Patch
+ by Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (djm) Fix catman-do target for non-bash
+ - (bal) Typo in configure.in: entut?ent should be endut?ent. Suggested by
+ Takumi Yamane <yamtak@b-session.com>
+ - (bal) Checks for getrlimit(), sysconf(), and setdtablesize(). Patch
+ by Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (djm) Fix catman-do target for non-bash
+ - (bal) Fixed NeXT's lack of CPPFLAGS honoring.
+ - (bal) ssh-keyscan.c: NeXT (and older BSDs) don't support getrlimit() w/
+ 'RLIMIT_NOFILE'
+ - (djm) Remove *.Ylonen files. They are no longer in the OpenBSD tree,
+ the info in COPYING.Ylonen has been moved to the start of each
+ SSH1-derived file and README.Ylonen is well out of date.
+
+20001223
+ - (bal) Fixed Makefile.in to support recompile of all ssh and sshd objects
+ if a change to config.h has occurred. Suggested by Gert Doering
+ <gert@greenie.muc.de>
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Update:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/22 16:49:40
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ fix ssh-keygen -x -t type > file; from Roumen.Petrov@skalasoft.com
+
+20001222
+ - Updated RCSID for pty.c
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/21 15:10:16
+ [auth-rh-rsa.c hostfile.c hostfile.h sshconnect.c]
+ print keyfile:line for changed hostkeys, for deraadt@, ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:26:56
+ [authfile.c]
+ allow ssh -i userkey for root
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:37:21
+ [authfd.c authfd.h kex.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uidswap.c uidswap.h]
+ fix prototypes; from stevesk@pobox.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/20 19:32:08
+ [sshd.c]
+ init pointer to NULL; report from Jan.Ivan@cern.ch
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/19 23:17:54
+ [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c
+ auth1.c auth2-skey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c
+ bufaux.h buffer.c canohost.c channels.c clientloop.c compress.c
+ crc32.c deattack.c getput.h hmac.c hmac.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h
+ key.c key.h log.c login.c match.c match.h mpaux.c mpaux.h packet.c
+ packet.h radix.c readconf.c rsa.c scp.c servconf.c servconf.h
+ serverloop.c session.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-dss.h
+ ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-rsa.h ssh.c ssh.h uuencode.c
+ uuencode.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c]
+ replace 'unsigned bla' with 'u_bla' everywhere. also replace 'char
+ unsigned' with u_char.
+
+20001221
+ - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/19 15:43:45
+ [authfile.c channels.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c]
+ remove() -> unlink() for consistency
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/19 15:48:09
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ replace <ssl/x.h> with <openssl/x.h>
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/17 02:33:40
+ [uidswap.c]
+ typo; from wsanchez@apple.com
+
+20001220
+ - (djm) Workaround PAM inconsistencies between Solaris derived PAM code
+ and Linux-PAM. Based on report and fix from Andrew Morgan
+ <morgan@transmeta.com>
+
+20001218
+ - (stevesk) rsa.c: entropy.h not needed.
+ - (bal) split CFLAGS into CFLAGS and CPPFLAGS in configure.in and Makefile.
+ Suggested by Wilfredo Sanchez <wsanchez@apple.com>
+
+20001216
+ - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/16 02:53:57
+ [scp.c]
+ allow + in usernames; request from Florian.Weimer@RUS.Uni-Stuttgart.DE
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/16 02:39:57
+ [scp.c]
+ unused; from stevesk@pobox.com
+
+20001215
+ - (stevesk) Old OpenBSD patch wasn't completely applied:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/01/24 22:11:20
+ [scp.c]
+ allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org
+ - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/13 16:26:53
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ fatal already adds \n; from stevesk@pobox.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/13 16:25:44
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ remove redundant spaces; from stevesk@pobox.com
+ - ho@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/12 15:50:21
+ [pty.c]
+ When failing to set tty owner and mode on a read-only filesystem, don't
+ abort if the tty already has correct owner and reasonably sane modes.
+ Example; permit 'root' to login to a firewall with read-only root fs.
+ (markus@ ok)
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/13 06:36:05
+ [pty.c]
+ KNF
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/12 14:45:21
+ [sshd.c]
+ source port < 1024 is no longer required for rhosts-rsa since it
+ adds no additional security.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/12 16:11:49
+ [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+ rhosts-rsa is no longer automagically disabled if ssh is not privileged.
+ UsePrivilegedPort=no disables rhosts-rsa _only_ for old servers.
+ these changes should not change the visible default behaviour of the ssh client.
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/11 10:27:33
+ [scp.c]
+ when copying 0-sized files, do not re-print ETA time at completion
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/15 10:30:15
+ [kex.c kex.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ compute diffie-hellman in parallel between server and client. okay markus@
+
+20001213
+ - (djm) Make sure we reset the SIGPIPE disposition after we fork. Report
+ from Andreas M. Kirchwitz <amk@krell.zikzak.de>
+ - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS update:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/12 15:30:02
+ [ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshd.c]
+ consistently use __progname; from stevesk@pobox.com
+
+20001211
+ - (bal) Applied patch to include ssh-keyscan into Redhat's package, and
+ patch to install ssh-keyscan manpage. Patch by Pekka Savola
+ <pekka@netcore.fi>
+ - (bal) OpenbSD CVS update
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/10 17:01:53
+ [sshconnect1.c]
+ always request new challenge for skey/tis-auth, fixes interop with
+ other implementations; report from roth@feep.net
+
+20001210
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/09 13:41:51
+ [cipher.c cipher.h rijndael.c rijndael.h rijndael_boxes.h]
+ undo rijndael changes
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/09 13:48:31
+ [rijndael.c]
+ fix byte order bug w/o introducing new implementation
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/09 14:08:27
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ "" -> "." for realpath; from vinschen@redhat.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/09 14:06:54
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ extern int optind; from stevesk@sweden.hp.com
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/09 23:51:11
+ [compat.c]
+ remove unnecessary '\n'
+
+20001209
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/07 4:24:59
+ [ssh.1]
+ Typo fix from Wilfredo Sanchez <wsanchez@apple.com>; ok theo
+
+20001207
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/06 22:58:14
+ [compat.c compat.h packet.c]
+ disable debug messages for ssh.com/f-secure 2.0.1x, 2.1.0
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/06 23:10:39
+ [rijndael.c]
+ unexpand(1)
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/06 23:05:43
+ [cipher.c cipher.h rijndael.c rijndael.h rijndael_boxes.h]
+ new rijndael implementation. fixes endian bugs
+
+20001206
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/05 20:34:09
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c]
+ async connects for -R/-L; ok deraadt@
+ - todd@cvs.openssh.org 2000/12/05 16:47:28
+ [sshd.c]
+ tweak comment to reflect real location of pid file; ok provos@
+ - (stevesk) Import <sys/queue.h> from OpenBSD for systems that don't
+ have it (used in ssh-keyscan).
+ - (stevesk) OpenBSD CVS update:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/06 19:57:48
+ [ssh-keyscan.c]
+ err(3) -> internal error(), from stevesk@sweden.hp.com
+
+20001205
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/04 19:24:02
+ [ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keyscan.1]
+ David Maziere's ssh-keyscan, ok niels@
+ - (bal) Updated Makefile.in to include ssh-keyscan that was just added
+ to the recent OpenBSD source tree.
+ - (stevesk) fix typos in contrib/hpux/README
+
+20001204
+ - (bal) More C functions defined in NeXT that are unaccessable without
+ defining -POSIX.
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/03 11:29:04
+ [compat.c]
+ remove fallback to SSH_BUG_HMAC now that the drafts are updated
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/03 11:27:55
+ [compat.c]
+ correctly match "2.1.0.pl2 SSH" etc; from
+ pekkas@netcore.fi/bugzilla.redhat
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/03 11:15:03
+ [auth2.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c]
+ support f-secure/ssh.com 2.0.12; ok niels@
+
+20001203
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/30 22:54:31
+ [channels.c]
+ debug->warn if tried to do -R style fwd w/o client requesting this;
+ ok neils@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/29 20:39:17
+ [cipher.c]
+ des_cbc_encrypt -> des_ncbc_encrypt since it already updates the IV
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/30 18:33:05
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ agents must not dump core, ok niels@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/30 07:04:02
+ [ssh.1]
+ T is for both protocols
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/12/01 00:00:51
+ [ssh.1]
+ typo; from green@FreeBSD.org
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/30 07:02:35
+ [ssh.c]
+ check -T before isatty()
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/29 13:51:27
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ show IP address and hostname when new key is encountered. okay markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/30 22:53:35
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ disable agent/x11/port fwding if hostkey has changed; ok niels@
+ - marksu@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/29 21:11:59
+ [sshd.c]
+ sshd -D, startup w/o deamon(), for monitoring scripts or inittab;
+ from handler@sub-rosa.com and eric@urbanrange.com; ok niels@
+ - (djm) Added patch from Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> to enable
+ PAM authentication using KbdInteractive.
+ - (djm) Added another TODO
+
+20001202
+ - (bal) Backed out of part of Alain St-Denis' loginrec.c patch.
+ - (bal) Irix need some sort of mansubdir, patch by Michael Stone
+ <mstone@cs.loyola.edu>
+
+20001129
+ - (djm) Back out all the serverloop.c hacks. sshd will now hang again
+ if there are background children with open fds.
+ - (djm) bsd-rresvport.c bzero -> memset
+ - (djm) Don't fail in defines.h on absence of 64 bit types (we will
+ still fail during compilation of sftp-server).
+ - (djm) Fail if ar is not found during configure
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/22 08:38:31
+ [sshd.8]
+ talk about /etc/primes, okay markus@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/23 14:03:48
+ [ssh.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+ complain about invalid ciphers for ssh1/ssh2, fall back to reasonable
+ defaults
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/25 09:42:53
+ [sshconnect1.c]
+ reorder check for illegal ciphers, bugreport from espie@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/25 10:19:34
+ [ssh-keygen.c ssh.h]
+ print keytype when generating a key.
+ reasonable defaults for RSA1/RSA/DSA keys.
+ - (djm) Patch from Pekka Savola <Pekka.Savola@netcore.fi> to include a few
+ more manpage paths in fixpaths calls
+ - (djm) Also add xauth path at Pekka's suggestion.
+ - (djm) Add Redhat RPM patch for AUTHPRIV SyslogFacility
+
+20001125
+ - (djm) Give up privs when reading seed file
+
+20001123
+ - (bal) Merge OpenBSD changes:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/15 22:31:36
+ [auth-options.c]
+ case insensitive key options; from stevesk@sweeden.hp.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/16 17:55:43
+ [dh.c]
+ do not use perror() in sshd, after child is forked()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/14 23:42:40
+ [auth-rsa.c]
+ parse option only if key matches; fix some confusing seen by the client
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/14 23:44:19
+ [session.c]
+ check no_agent_forward_flag for ssh-2, too
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/15
+ [ssh-agent.1]
+ reorder SYNOPSIS; typo, use .It
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/14 23:48:55
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ do not reorder keys if a key is removed
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/15 19:58:08
+ [ssh.c]
+ just ignore non existing user keys
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 200/11/15 20:24:43
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ Add missing \n at end of error message.
+
+20001122
+ - (bal) Minor patch to ensure platforms lacking IRIX job limit supports
+ are compilable.
+ - (bal) Updated TODO as of 11/18/2000 with known things to resolve.
+
+20001117
+ - (bal) Changed from 'primes' to 'primes.out' for consistancy sake. It
+ has no affect the output. Patch by Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (stevesk) Reworked progname support.
+ - (bal) Misplaced #include "includes.h" in bsd-setproctitle.c. Patch by
+ Shinichi Maruyama <marya@st.jip.co.jp>
+
+20001116
+ - (bal) Added in MAXSYMLINK test in bsd-realpath.c. Required for some SCO
+ releases.
+ - (bal) Make builds work outside of source tree. Patch by Mark D. Roth
+ <roth@feep.net>
+
+20001113
+ - (djm) Add pointer to http://www.imasy.or.jp/~gotoh/connect.c to
+ contrib/README
+ - (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:04:56
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c serverloop.c]
+ [session.c ssh.c]
+ agent forwarding and -R for ssh2, based on work from
+ jhuuskon@messi.uku.fi
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:13:27
+ [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ do not disabled rhosts(rsa) if server port > 1024; from
+ pekkas@netcore.fi
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:16:35
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ downgrade client to 1.3 if server is 1.4; help from mdb@juniper.net
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/09 18:04:40
+ [auth1.c]
+ typo; from mouring@pconline.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/12 12:03:28
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ off-by-one when removing a key from the agent
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/12 12:50:39
+ [auth-rh-rsa.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h]
+ [authfile.c hostfile.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h myproposal.h]
+ [readconf.c readconf.h rsa.c rsa.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c]
+ [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config]
+ [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config ssh-dss.c]
+ [ssh-dss.h ssh-rsa.c ssh-rsa.h dsa.c dsa.h]
+ add support for RSA to SSH2. please test.
+ there are now 3 types of keys: RSA1 is used by ssh-1 only,
+ RSA and DSA are used by SSH2.
+ you can use 'ssh-keygen -t rsa -f ssh2_rsa_file' to generate RSA
+ keys for SSH2 and use the RSA keys for hostkeys or for user keys.
+ SSH2 RSA or DSA keys are added to .ssh/authorised_keys2 as before.
+ - (djm) Fix up Makefile and Redhat init script to create RSA host keys
+ - (djm) Change to interim version
+ - (djm) Fix RPM spec file stupidity
+ - (djm) fixpaths to DSA and RSA keys too
+
+20001112
+ - (bal) SCO Patch to add needed libraries for configure.in. Patch by
+ Phillips Porch <root@theporch.com>
+ - (bal) IRIX patch to adding Job Limits. Patch by Denis Parker
+ <dcp@sgi.com>
+ - (stevesk) pty.c: HP-UX 10 and 11 don't define TIOCSCTTY. Add error() to
+ failed ioctl(TIOCSCTTY) call.
+
+20001111
+ - (djm) Added /etc/primes for kex DH group neg, fixup Makefile.in and
+ packaging files
+ - (djm) Fix new Makefile.in warnings
+ - (djm) Fix vsprintf("%h") in bsd-snprintf.c, short int va_args are
+ promoted to type int. Report and fix from Dan Astoorian
+ <djast@cs.toronto.edu>
+ - (djm) Hardwire sysconfdir in RPM spec files as some RPM versions get
+ it wrong. Report from Bennett Todd <bet@rahul.net>
+
+20001110
+ - (bal) Fixed dropped answer from skey_keyinfo() in auth1.c
+ - (bal) Changed from --with-skey to --with-skey=PATH in configure.in
+ - (bal) Added in check to verify S/Key library is being detected in
+ configure.in
+ - (bal) next-posix.h - added another prototype wrapped in POSIX ifdef/endif.
+ Patch by Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (bal) Added 'util.h' header to loginrec.c only if HAVE_UTIL_H is defined
+ to remove warnings under MacOS X. Patch by Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (bal) Fixed LDFLAG mispelling in configure.in for --with-afs
+
+20001107
+ - (bal) acconfig.in - removed the double "USE_PIPES" entry. Patch by
+ Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (bal) sshd.init files corrected to assign $? to RETVAL. Patch by
+ Jarno Huuskonen <jhuuskon@messi.uku.fi>
+ - (bal) fixpaths fixed to stop it from quitely failing. Patch by
+ Mark D. Roth <roth@feep.net>
+
+20001106
+ - (djm) Use Jim's new 1.0.3 askpass in Redhat RPMs
+ - (djm) Manually fix up missed diff hunks (mainly RCS idents)
+ - (djm) Remove UPGRADING document in favour of a link to the better
+ maintained FAQ on www.openssh.com
+ - (djm) Fix multiple dependancy on gnome-libs from Pekka Savola
+ <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Don't need X11-askpass in RPM spec file if building without it
+ from Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Release 2.3.0p1
+ - (bal) typo in configure.in in regards to --with-ldflags from Marko
+ Asplund <aspa@kronodoc.fi>
+ - (bal) fixed next-posix.h. Forgot prototype of getppid().
+
+20001105
+ - (bal) Sync with OpenBSD:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/31 9:31:58
+ [compat.c]
+ handle all old openssh versions
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/31 13:1853
+ [deattack.c]
+ so that large packets do not wrap "n"; from netbsd
+ - (bal) rijndel.c - fix up RCSID to match OpenBSD tree
+ - (bal) auth2-skey.c - Checked in. Missing from portable tree.
+ - (bal) Reworked NEWS-OS and NeXT ports to extract waitpid() and
+ setsid() into more common files
+ - (stevesk) pty.c: use __hpux to identify HP-UX.
+ - (bal) Missed auth-skey.o in Makefile.in and minor correction to
+ bsd-waitpid.c
+
+20001029
+ - (stevesk) Fix typo in auth.c: USE_PAM not PAM
+ - (stevesk) Create contrib/cygwin/ directory; patch from
+ Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ - (bal) Resolved more $xno and $xyes issues in configure.in
+ - (bal) next-posix.h - spelling and forgot a prototype
+
+20001028
+ - (djm) fix select hack in serverloop.c from Philippe WILLEM
+ <Philippe.WILLEM@urssaf.fr>
+ - (djm) Fix mangled AIXAUTHENTICATE code
+ - (djm) authctxt->pw may be NULL. Fix from Markus Friedl
+ <markus.friedl@informatik.uni-erlangen.de>
+ - (djm) Sync with OpenBSD:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/16 15:46:32
+ [ssh.1]
+ fixes from pekkas@netcore.fi
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/17 14:28:11
+ [atomicio.c]
+ return number of characters processed; ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/18 12:04:02
+ [atomicio.c]
+ undo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/18 12:23:02
+ [scp.c]
+ replace atomicio(read,...) with read(); ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/18 12:42:00
+ [session.c]
+ restore old record login behaviour
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/19 10:41:13
+ [auth-skey.c]
+ fmt string problem in unused code
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/19 10:45:16
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ don't reference freed memory. okay deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/21 11:04:23
+ [canohost.c]
+ typo, eramore@era-t.ericsson.se; ok niels@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/23 13:31:55
+ [cipher.c]
+ non-alignment dependent swap_bytes(); from
+ simonb@wasabisystems.com/netbsd
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/26 12:38:28
+ [compat.c]
+ add older vandyke products
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/27 01:32:19
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c session.c]
+ [ssh.c util.c]
+ enable non-blocking IO on channels, and tty's (except for the
+ client ttys).
+
+20001027
+ - (djm) Increase REKEY_BYTES to 2^24 for arc4random
+
+20001025
+ - (djm) Added WARNING.RNG file and modified configure to ask users of the
+ builtin entropy code to read it.
+ - (djm) Prefer builtin regex to PCRE.
+ - (bal) Added USE_PIPS defined to NeXT configure.in since scp hangs randomly.
+ - (bal) Apply fixes to configure.in pointed out by Pavel Roskin
+ <proski@gnu.org>
+
+20001020
+ - (djm) Don't define _REENTRANT for SNI/Reliant Unix
+ - (bal) Imported NEWS-OS waitpid() macros into NeXT. Since implementation
+ is more correct then current version.
+
+20001018
+ - (stevesk) Add initial support for setproctitle(). Current
+ support is for the HP-UX pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, ...) method.
+ - (stevesk) Add egd startup scripts to contrib/hpux/
+
+20001017
+ - (djm) Add -lregex to cywin libs from Corinna Vinschen
+ <vinschen@cygnus.com>
+ - (djm) Don't rely on atomicio's retval to determine length of askpass
+ supplied passphrase. Problem report from Lutz Jaenicke
+ <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - (bal) Changed from GNU rx to PCRE on suggestion from djm.
+ - (bal) Integrated Sony NEWS-OS patches from NAKAJI Hirouyuki
+ <nakaji@tutrp.tut.ac.jp>
+
+20001016
+ - (djm) Sync with OpenBSD:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 04:01:15
+ [cipher.c]
+ debug3
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 04:07:23
+ [scp.c]
+ remove spaces from arguments; from djm@mindrot.org
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:09:46
+ [ssh.1]
+ Cipher is for SSH-1 only
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:12:09
+ [servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c sshd.8]
+ AllowTcpForwarding; from naddy@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:16:56
+ [auth2.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c version.h]
+ OpenSSH_2.3; note that is is not complete, but the version number
+ needs to be changed for interoperability reasons
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/14 06:19:45
+ [auth-rsa.c]
+ do not send RSA challenge if key is not allowed by key-options; from
+ eivind@ThinkSec.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/15 08:14:01
+ [rijndael.c session.c]
+ typos; from stevesk@sweden.hp.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/15 08:18:31
+ [rijndael.c]
+ typo
+ - (djm) Copy manpages back over from OpenBSD - too tedious to wade
+ through diffs
+ - (djm) Added condrestart to Redhat init script. Patch from Pekka Savola
+ <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Update version in Redhat spec file
+ - (djm) Merge some of Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> changes from the
+ Redhat 7.0 spec file
+ - (djm) Make inability to read/write PRNG seedfile non-fatal
+
+
+20001015
+ - (djm) Fix ssh2 hang on background processes at logout.
+
+20001014
+ - (bal) Add support for realpath and getcwd for platforms with broken
+ or missing realpath implementations for sftp-server.
+ - (bal) Corrected mistake in INSTALL in regards to GNU rx library
+ - (bal) Add support for GNU rx library for those lacking regexp support
+ - (djm) Don't accept PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON messages during initial auth
+ - (djm) Revert SSH2 serverloop hack, will find a better way.
+ - (djm) Add workaround for Linux 2.4's gratuitious errno change. Patch
+ from Martin Johansson <fatbob@acc.umu.se>
+ - (djm) Big OpenBSD sync:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44
+ [log.c]
+ allow loglevel debug
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57
+ [packet.c]
+ hmac->mac
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03
+ [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c]
+ move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in
+ debug-msg
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48
+ ssh.c
+ do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44
+ ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c
+ -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34
+ auth-options.c
+ clear options on every call.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00
+ authfd.c authfd.h
+ interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net>
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45
+ compat.c
+ use rexexp for version string matching
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18
+ [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h]
+ First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The
+ client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman
+ in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer
+ keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52
+ [auth-rsa.c auth2.c]
+ clear auth options unless auth sucessfull
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27
+ [auth-options.h]
+ clear auth options unless auth sucessfull
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27
+ [scp.1 scp.c]
+ support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35
+ [dh.c]
+ Wall
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40
+ [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h]
+ [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h]
+ add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by
+ mkiernan@avantgo.com and me
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24
+ [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h]
+ [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c]
+ [sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ new cipher framework
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21
+ [cipher.c]
+ remove DES
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20
+ [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ enable DES in SSH-1 clients only
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13
+ [kex.h packet.c]
+ remove unused
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46
+ [sshd.c]
+ Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15
+ [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h]
+ rijndael/aes support
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54
+ [sshd.8]
+ more info about -V
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02
+ [myproposal.h]
+ prefer no compression
+ - (djm) Fix scp user@host handling
+ - (djm) Don't clobber ssh_prng_cmds on install
+ - (stevesk) Include config.h in rijndael.c so we define intXX_t and
+ u_intXX_t types on all platforms.
+ - (stevesk) rijndael.c: cleanup missing declaration warnings.
+ - (stevesk) ~/.hushlogin shouldn't cause required password change to
+ be bypassed.
+ - (stevesk) Display correct path to ssh-askpass in configure output.
+ Report from Lutz Jaenicke.
+
+20001007
+ - (stevesk) Print PAM return value in PAM log messages to aid
+ with debugging.
+ - (stevesk) Fix detection of pw_class struct member in configure;
+ patch from KAMAHARA Junzo <kamahara@cc.kshosen.ac.jp>
+
+20001002
+ - (djm) Fix USER_PATH, report from Kevin Steves <stevesk@sweden.hp.com>
+ - (djm) Add host system and CC to end-of-configure report. Suggested by
+ Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+
+20000931
+ - (djm) Cygwin fixes from Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>
+
+20000930
+ - (djm) Irix ssh_prng_cmds path fix from Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Support in bsd-snprintf.c for long long conversions from
+ Ben Lindstrom <mouring@pconline.com>
+ - (djm) Cleanup NeXT support from Ben Lindstrom <mouring@pconline.com>
+ - (djm) Ignore SIGPIPEs from serverloop to child. Fixes crashes with
+ very short lived X connections. Bug report from Tobias Oetiker
+ <oetiker@ee.ethz.ch>. Fix from Markus Friedl <markus@cvs.openbsd.org>
+ - (djm) Add recent InitScripts as a RPM dependancy for openssh-server
+ patch from Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Forgot to cvs add LICENSE file
+ - (djm) Add LICENSE to RPM spec files
+ - (djm) CVS OpenBSD sync:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/26 13:59:59
+ [clientloop.c]
+ use debug2
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/27 15:41:34
+ [auth2.c sshconnect2.c]
+ use key_type()
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/28 12:03:18
+ [channels.c]
+ debug -> debug2 cleanup
+ - (djm) Irix strips "/dev/tty" from [uw]tmp entries (other systems only
+ strip "/dev/"). Fix loginrec.c based on patch from Alain St-Denis
+ <Alain.St-Denis@ec.gc.ca>
+ - (djm) Fix 9 character passphrase failure with gnome-ssh-askpass.
+ Problem was caused by interrupted read in ssh-add. Report from Donald
+ J. Barry <don@astro.cornell.edu>
+
+20000929
+ - (djm) Fix SSH2 not terminating until all background tasks done problem.
+ - (djm) Another off-by-one fix from Pavel Kankovsky
+ <peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz>
+ - (djm) Clean up. Strip some unnecessary differences with OpenBSD's code,
+ tidy necessary differences. Use Markus' new debugN() in entropy.c
+ - (djm) Merged big SCO portability patch from Tim Rice
+ <tim@multitalents.net>
+
+20000926
+ - (djm) Update X11-askpass to 1.0.2 in RPM spec file
+ - (djm) Define _REENTRANT to pickup strtok_r() on HP/UX
+ - (djm) Security: fix off-by-one buffer overrun in fake-getnameinfo.c.
+ Report and fix from Pavel Kankovsky <peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz>
+
+20000924
+ - (djm) Merged cleanup patch from Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (djm) A bit more cleanup - created cygwin_util.h
+ - (djm) Include strtok_r() from OpenBSD libc. Fixes report from Mark Miller
+ <markm@swoon.net>
+
+20000923
+ - (djm) Fix address logging in utmp from Kevin Steves
+ <stevesk@sweden.hp.com>
+ - (djm) Redhat spec and manpage fixes from Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>
+ - (djm) Seperate tests for int64_t and u_int64_t types
+ - (djm) Tweak password expiry checking at suggestion of Kevin Steves
+ <stevesk@sweden.hp.com>
+ - (djm) NeXT patch from Ben Lindstrom <mouring@pconline.com>
+ - (djm) Use printf %lld instead of %qd in sftp-server.c. Fix from
+ Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu>
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS sync:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/17 09:38:59
+ [sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ fix DEBUG_KEXDH
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/17 09:52:51
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ yes no; ok niels@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 04:55:11
+ [sshd.8]
+ typo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 05:03:54
+ [serverloop.c]
+ typo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 05:11:42
+ scp.c
+ utime() to utimes(); mouring@pconline.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 05:25:08
+ sshconnect2.c
+ change login logic in ssh2, allows plugin of other auth methods
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 05:25:35
+ [auth2.c channels.c channels.h clientloop.c dispatch.c dispatch.h]
+ [serverloop.c]
+ add context to dispatch_run
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/21 05:07:52
+ authfd.c authfd.h ssh-agent.c
+ bug compat for old ssh.com software
+
+20000920
+ - (djm) Fix bad path substitution. Report from Andrew Miner
+ <asminer@cs.iastate.edu>
+
+20000916
+ - (djm) Fix SSL search order from Lutz Jaenicke
+ <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - (djm) New SuSE spec from Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
+ - (djm) Update CygWin support from Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>
+ - (djm) Use a real struct sockaddr inside the fake struct sockaddr_storage.
+ Patch from Larry Jones <larry.jones@sdrc.com>
+ - (djm) Add Steve VanDevender's <stevev@darkwing.uoregon.edu> PAM
+ password change patch.
+ - (djm) Bring licenses on my stuff in line with OpenBSD's
+ - (djm) Cleanup auth-passwd.c and unify HP/UX authentication. Patch from
+ Kevin Steves <stevesk@sweden.hp.com>
+ - (djm) Shadow expiry check fix from Pavel Troller <patrol@omni.sinus.cz>
+ - (djm) Re-enable int64_t types - we need them for sftp
+ - (djm) Use libexecdir from configure , rather than libexecdir/ssh
+ - (djm) Update Redhat SPEC file accordingly
+ - (djm) Add Kevin Steves <stevesk@sweden.hp.com> HP/UX contrib files
+ - (djm) Add Charles Levert <charles@comm.polymtl.ca> getpgrp patch
+ - (djm) Fix password auth on HP/UX 10.20. Patch from Dirk De Wachter
+ <Dirk.DeWachter@rug.ac.be>
+ - (djm) Fixprogs and entropy list fixes from Larry Jones
+ <larry.jones@sdrc.com>
+ - (djm) Fix for SuSE spec file from Takashi YOSHIDA
+ <tyoshida@gemini.rc.kyushu-u.ac.jp>
+ - (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57
+ [session.c]
+ print hostname (not hushlogin)
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48
+ [authfile.c ssh-add.c]
+ enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ cleanup
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41
+ [authfile.h]
+ prototype
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56
+ [ALL]
+ cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be
+ accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence
+ (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing
+ for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd
+ licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c]
+ cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00
+ [scp.c]
+ typo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37
+ [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c]
+ [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h]
+ [pty.c readconf.c]
+ some more Copyright fixes
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51
+ [README.openssh2]
+ bye bye
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33
+ [LICENCE cipher.c]
+ a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11
+ [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ multiple debug levels
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15
+ [clientloop.c]
+ typo
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
+
+20000913
+ - (djm) Fix server not exiting with jobs in background.
+
+20000905
+ - (djm) Import OpenBSD CVS changes
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/31 15:52:24
+ [Makefile sshd.8 sshd_config sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c]
+ implement a SFTP server. interops with sftp2, scp2 and the windows
+ client from ssh.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/31 15:56:03
+ [README.openssh2]
+ sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/31 16:05:42
+ [session.c]
+ Wall
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/31 16:09:34
+ [authfd.c ssh-agent.c]
+ add a flag to SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST for future extensions
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/01 09:25:13
+ [scp.1 scp.c]
+ cleanup and fix -S support; stevesk@sweden.hp.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/01 16:29:32
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ portability fixes
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/01 16:32:41
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ fix cast; mouring@pconline.com
+ - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/03 09:23:28
+ [ssh-add.1 ssh.1]
+ add missing .El against .Bl.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/04 13:03:41
+ [session.c]
+ missing close; ok theo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/04 13:07:21
+ [session.c]
+ fix get_last_login_time order; from andre@van-veen.de
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/04 13:10:09
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ more cast fixes; from mouring@pconline.com
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/04 13:06:04
+ [session.c]
+ set SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND; from Leakin@dfw.nostrum.com, bet@rahul.net
+ - (djm) Cleanup after import. Fix sftp-server compilation, Makefile
+ - (djm) Merge cygwin support from Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>
+
+20000903
+ - (djm) Fix Redhat init script
+
+20000901
+ - (djm) Pick up Jim's new X11-askpass
+ - (djm) Release 2.2.0p1
+
+20000831
+ - (djm) Workaround SIGPIPE problems on SCO. Fix from Aran Cox
+ <acox@cv.telegroup.com>
+ - (djm) Pick up new version (2.2.0) from OpenBSD CVS
+
+20000830
+ - (djm) Compile warning fixes from Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net>
+ - (djm) Periodically rekey arc4random
+ - (djm) Clean up diff against OpenBSD.
+ - (djm) HPUX 11 needs USE_PIPES as well: Kevin Steves
+ <stevesk@sweden.hp.com>
+ - (djm) Quieten the pam delete credentials error message
+ - (djm) Fix printing of $DISPLAY hack if set by system type. Report from
+ Kevin Steves <stevesk@sweden.hp.com>
+ - (djm) NeXT patch from Ben Lindstrom <mouring@pconline.com>
+ - (djm) Fix doh in bsd-arc4random.c
+
+20000829
+ - (djm) Fix ^C ignored issue on Solaris. Diagnosis from Gert
+ Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>, John Horne <J.Horne@plymouth.ac.uk> and
+ Garrick James <garrick@james.net>
+ - (djm) Check for SCO pty naming style (ptyp%d/ttyp%d). Based on fix from
+ Bastian Trompetter <btrompetter@firemail.de>
+ - (djm) NeXT tweaks from Ben Lindstrom <mouring@pconline.com>
+ - More OpenBSD updates:
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/24 15:46:59
+ [scp.c]
+ off_t in sink, to fix files > 2GB, i think, test is still running ;-)
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/25 10:10:06
+ [session.c]
+ Wall
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/26 04:33:43
+ [compat.c]
+ ssh.com-2.3.0
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/27 12:18:05
+ [compat.c]
+ compatibility with future ssh.com versions
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/27 21:50:55
+ [auth-krb4.c session.c ssh-add.c sshconnect.c uidswap.c]
+ print uid/gid as unsigned
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/28 13:51:00
+ [ssh.c]
+ enable -n and -f for ssh2
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/28 14:19:53
+ [ssh.c]
+ allow combination of -N and -f
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/28 14:20:56
+ [util.c]
+ util.c
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/28 14:22:02
+ [util.c]
+ undo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/28 14:23:38
+ [util.c]
+ don't complain if setting NONBLOCK fails with ENODEV
+
+20000823
+ - (djm) Define USE_PIPES to avoid socketpair problems on HPUX 10 and SunOS 4
+ Avoids "scp never exits" problem. Reports from Lutz Jaenicke
+ <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Tamito KAJIYAMA
+ <kajiyama@grad.sccs.chukyo-u.ac.jp>
+ - (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers
+ - (djm) Add local version to version.h
+ - (djm) Don't reseed arc4random everytime it is used
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23
+ [ssh.c]
+ accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13
+ [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c]
+ rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash. do not move to
+ libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it;
+ oneill@cs.sfu.ca
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08
+ [scp.1 scp.c]
+ -S prog support; tv@debian.org
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07
+ [scp.c]
+ knf
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33
+ [log-client.c]
+ shorten
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 12:48:11
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h]
+ support for ~. in ssh2
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40
+ [crc32.h]
+ proper prototype
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:34:44
+ [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1]
+ [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile]
+ [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h]
+ add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups.
+ (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents)
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:55:52
+ [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
+ more ~ support for ssh2
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 16:21:19
+ [clientloop.c]
+ oops
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53
+ [session.c]
+ We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we
+ close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process
+ will exit. Only a problem for "UseLogin yes".
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59
+ [session.c]
+ Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its
+ own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin
+ is present. Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define.
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43
+ [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c]
+ Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*(). We basically call
+ setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin().
+ Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class.
+ - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31
+ [session.c]
+ Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus.
+
+20000818
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/22 03:14:37
+ [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config]
+ random early drop; ok theo, niels
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/26 11:46:51
+ [ssh.1]
+ typo
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/01 11:46:11
+ [sshd.8]
+ many fixes from pepper@mail.reppep.com
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/01 13:01:42
+ [Makefile.in util.c aux.c]
+ rename aux.c to util.c to help with cygwin port
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/02 00:23:31
+ [authfd.c]
+ correct sun_len; Alexander@Leidinger.net
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/02 10:27:17
+ [readconf.c sshd.8]
+ disable kerberos authentication by default
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/02 11:27:05
+ [sshd.8 readconf.c auth-krb4.c]
+ disallow kerberos authentication if we can't verify the TGT; from
+ dugsong@
+ kerberos authentication is on by default only if you have a srvtab.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/04 14:30:07
+ [auth.c]
+ unused
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/04 14:30:35
+ [sshd_config]
+ MaxStartups
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/15 13:20:46
+ [authfd.c]
+ cleanup; ok niels@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/17 14:05:10
+ [session.c]
+ cleanup login(1)-like jobs, no duplicate utmp entries
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/17 14:06:34
+ [session.c sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ sshd -u len, similar to telnetd
+ - (djm) Lastlog was not getting closed after writing login entry
+ - (djm) Add Solaris package support from Rip Loomis <loomisg@cist.saic.com>
+
+20000816
+ - (djm) Replacement for inet_ntoa for Irix (which breaks on gcc)
+ - (djm) Fix strerror replacement for old SunOS. Based on patch from
+ Charles Levert <charles@comm.polymtl.ca>
+ - (djm) Seperate arc4random into seperate file and use OpenSSL's RC4
+ implementation.
+ - (djm) SUN_LEN macro for systems which lack it
+
+20000815
+ - (djm) More SunOS 4.1.x fixes from Nate Itkin <nitkin@europa.com>
+ - (djm) Avoid failures on Irix when ssh is not setuid. Fix from
+ Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu>
+ - (djm) Don't seek in directory based lastlogs
+ - (djm) Fix --with-ipaddr-display configure option test. Patch from
+ Jarno Huuskonen <jhuuskon@messi.uku.fi>
+ - (djm) Fix AIX limits from Alexandre Oliva <oliva@lsd.ic.unicamp.br>
+
+20000813
+ - (djm) Add $(srcdir) to includes when compiling (for VPATH). Report from
+ Fabrice bacchella <fabrice.bacchella@marchfirst.fr>
+
+20000809
+ - (djm) Define AIX hard limits if headers don't. Report from
+ Bill Painter <william.t.painter@lmco.com>
+ - (djm) utmp direct write & SunOS 4 patch from Charles Levert
+ <charles@comm.polymtl.ca>
+
+20000808
+ - (djm) Cleanup Redhat RPMs. Generate keys at runtime rather than install
+ time, spec file cleanup.
+
+20000807
+ - (djm) Set 0755 on binaries during install. Report from Lutz Jaenicke
+ - (djm) Suppress error messages on channel close shutdown() failurs
+ works around Linux bug. Patch from Zack Weinberg <zack@wolery.cumb.org>
+ - (djm) Add some more entropy collection commands from Lutz Jaenicke
+
+20000725
+ - (djm) Fix autoconf typo: HAVE_BINRESVPORT_AF -> HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_AF
+
+20000721
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/16 02:27:22
+ [authfd.c authfd.h channels.c clientloop.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh.c]
+ [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+ make ssh-add accept dsa keys (the agent does not)
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/17 19:25:02
+ [sshd.c]
+ Another closing of stdin; ok deraadt
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/19 18:33:12
+ [dsa.c]
+ missing free, reorder
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/20 16:23:14
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ document input and output files
+
+20000720
+ - (djm) Spec file fix from Petr Novotny <Petr.Novotny@antek.cz>
+
+20000716
+ - (djm) Release 2.1.1p4
+
+20000715
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/13 16:53:22
+ [aux.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.h]
+ allow multiple whitespace but only one '=' between tokens, bug report from
+ Ralf S. Engelschall <rse@engelschall.com> but different fix. okay deraadt@
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/13 17:14:09
+ [clientloop.c]
+ typo; todd@fries.net
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/13 17:19:31
+ [scp.c]
+ close can fail on AFS, report error; from Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/14 16:59:46
+ [readconf.c servconf.c]
+ allow leading whitespace. ok niels
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/14 22:01:38
+ [ssh-keygen.c ssh.c]
+ Always create ~/.ssh with mode 700; ok Markus
+ - Fixes for SunOS 4.1.4 from Gordon Atwood <gordon@cs.ualberta.ca>
+ - Include floatingpoint.h for entropy.c
+ - strerror replacement
+
+20000712
+ - (djm) Remove -lresolve for Reliant Unix
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Updates:
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/11 02:11:34
+ [session.c sshd.c ]
+ make MaxStartups code still work with -d; djm
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/11 13:17:45
+ [readconf.c ssh_config]
+ disable FallBackToRsh by default
+ - (djm) Replace in_addr_t with u_int32_t in bsd-inet_aton.c. Report from
+ Ben Lindstrom <mouring@pconline.com>
+ - (djm) Make building of X11-Askpass and GNOME-Askpass optional in RPM
+ spec file.
+ - (djm) Released 2.1.1p3
+
+20000711
+ - (djm) Fixup for AIX getuserattr() support from Tom Bertelson
+ <tbert@abac.com>
+ - (djm) ReliantUNIX support from Udo Schweigert <ust@cert.siemens.de>
+ - (djm) NeXT: dirent structures to get scp working from Ben Lindstrom
+ <mouring@pconline.com>
+ - (djm) Fix broken inet_ntoa check and ut_user/ut_name confusion, report
+ from Jim Watt <jimw@peisj.pebio.com>
+ - (djm) Replaced bsd-snprintf.c with one from Mutt source tree, it is known
+ to compile on more platforms (incl NeXT).
+ - (djm) Added bsd-inet_aton and configure support for NeXT
+ - (djm) Misc NeXT fixes from Ben Lindstrom <mouring@pconline.com>
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/26 03:22:29
+ [authfd.c]
+ cleanup, less cut&paste
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/26 15:59:19
+ [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ MaxStartups: limit number of unauthenticated connections, work by
+ theo and me
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/05 14:18:07
+ [session.c]
+ use no_x11_forwarding_flag correctly; provos ok
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/05 15:35:57
+ [sshd.c]
+ typo
+ - aaron@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/05 22:06:58
+ [scp.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 sshd.8]
+ Insert more missing .El directives. Our troff really should identify
+ these and spit out a warning.
+ - todd@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/06 21:55:04
+ [auth-rsa.c auth2.c ssh-keygen.c]
+ clean code is good code
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/07 02:14:29
+ [serverloop.c]
+ sense of port forwarding flag test was backwards
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/08 17:17:31
+ [compat.c readconf.c]
+ replace strtok with strsep; from David Young <dyoung@onthejob.net>
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/08 19:21:15
+ [auth.h]
+ KNF
+ - ho@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/08 19:27:33
+ [compat.c readconf.c]
+ Better conditions for strsep() ending.
+ - ho@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/10 10:27:05
+ [readconf.c]
+ Get the correct message on errors. (niels@ ok)
+ - ho@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/07/10 10:30:25
+ [cipher.c kex.c servconf.c]
+ strtok() --> strsep(). (niels@ ok)
+ - (djm) Fix problem with debug mode and MaxStartups
+ - (djm) Don't generate host keys when $(DESTDIR) is set (e.g. during RPM
+ builds)
+ - (djm) Add strsep function from OpenBSD libc for systems that lack it
+
+20000709
+ - (djm) Only enable PAM_TTY kludge for Linux. Problem report from
+ Kevin Steves <stevesk@sweden.hp.com>
+ - (djm) Match prototype and function declaration for rresvport_af.
+ Problem report from Niklas Edmundsson <nikke@ing.umu.se>
+ - (djm) Missing $(DESTDIR) on host-key target causing problems with RPM
+ builds. Problem report from Gregory Leblanc <GLeblanc@cu-portland.edu>
+ - (djm) Replace ut_name with ut_user. Patch from Jim Watt
+ <jimw@peisj.pebio.com>
+ - (djm) Fix pam sprintf fix
+ - (djm) Cleanup entropy collection code a little more. Split initialisation
+ from seeding, perform intialisation immediatly at start, be careful with
+ uids. Based on problem report from Jim Watt <jimw@peisj.pebio.com>
+ - (djm) More NeXT compatibility from Ben Lindstrom <mouring@pconline.com>
+ Including sigaction() et al. replacements
+ - (djm) AIX getuserattr() session initialisation from Tom Bertelson
+ <tbert@abac.com>
+
+20000708
+ - (djm) Fix bad fprintf format handling in auth-pam.c. Patch from
+ Aaron Hopkins <aaron@die.net>
+ - (djm) Fix incorrect configure handling of --with-rsh-path option. Fix from
+ Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - (djm) Fixed undefined variables for OSF SIA. Report from
+ Baars, Henk <Hendrik.Baars@nl.origin-it.com>
+ - (djm) Handle EWOULDBLOCK returns from read() and write() in atomicio.c
+ Fix from Marquess, Steve Mr JMLFDC <Steve.Marquess@DET.AMEDD.ARMY.MIL>
+ - (djm) Don't use inet_addr.
+
+20000702
+ - (djm) Fix brace mismatch from Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>
+ - (djm) Stop shadow expiry checking from preventing logins with NIS. Based
+ on fix from HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@nt.phys.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
+ - (djm) Use standard OpenSSL functions in auth-skey.c. Patch from
+ Chris, the Young One <cky@pobox.com>
+ - (djm) Fix scp progress meter on really wide terminals. Based on patch
+ from James H. Cloos Jr. <cloos@jhcloos.com>
+
+20000701
+ - (djm) Fix Tru64 SIA problems reported by John P Speno <speno@isc.upenn.edu>
+ - (djm) Login fixes from Tom Bertelson <tbert@abac.com>
+ - (djm) Replace "/bin/sh" with _PATH_BSHELL. Report from Corinna Vinschen
+ <vinschen@cygnus.com>
+ - (djm) Replace "/usr/bin/login" with LOGIN_PROGRAM
+ - (djm) Added check for broken snprintf() functions which do not correctly
+ terminate output string and attempt to use replacement.
+ - (djm) Released 2.1.1p2
+
+20000628
+ - (djm) Fixes to lastlog code for Irix
+ - (djm) Use atomicio in loginrec
+ - (djm) Patch from Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu> to add support for
+ Irix 6.x array sessions, project id's, and system audit trail id.
+ - (djm) Added 'distprep' make target to simplify packaging
+ - (djm) Added patch from Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net> to add OSF SIA
+ support. Enable using "USE_SIA=1 ./configure [options]"
+
+20000627
+ - (djm) Fixes to login code - not setting li->uid, cleanups
+ - (djm) Formatting
+
+20000626
+ - (djm) Better fix to aclocal tests from Garrick James <garrick@james.net>
+ - (djm) Account expiry support from Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de>
+ - (djm) Added password expiry checking (no password change support)
+ - (djm) Make EGD failures non-fatal if OpenSSL's entropy pool is still OK
+ based on patch from Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - (djm) Fix fixed EGD code.
+ - OpenBSD CVS update
+ - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/25 14:17:58
+ [channels.c]
+ correct check for bad channel ids; from Wei Dai <weidai@eskimo.com>
+
+20000623
+ - (djm) Use sa_family_t in prototype for rresvport_af. Patch from
+ Svante Signell <svante.signell@telia.com>
+ - (djm) Autoconf logic to define sa_family_t if it is missing
+ - OpenBSD CVS Updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/22 10:32:27
+ [sshd.c]
+ missing atomicio; report from Steve.Marquess@DET.AMEDD.ARMY.MIL
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/22 17:55:00
+ [auth-krb4.c key.c radix.c uuencode.c]
+ Missing CVS idents; ok markus
+
+20000622
+ - (djm) Automatically generate host key during "make install". Suggested
+ by Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com>
+ - (djm) Paranoia before kill() system call
+ - OpenBSD CVS Updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/18 18:50:11
+ [auth2.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c]
+ make userauth+pubkey interop with ssh.com-2.2.0
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/18 20:56:17
+ [dsa.c]
+ mem leak + be more paranoid in dsa_verify.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/18 21:29:50
+ [key.c]
+ cleanup fingerprinting, less hardcoded sizes
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/19 19:39:45
+ [atomicio.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c]
+ [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h]
+ [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher.c cipher.h]
+ [clientloop.c compat.c compat.h compress.c compress.h crc32.c crc32.h]
+ [deattack.c dispatch.c dsa.c fingerprint.c fingerprint.h getput.h hmac.c]
+ [kex.c log-client.c log-server.c login.c match.c mpaux.c mpaux.h nchan.c]
+ [nchan.h packet.c packet.h pty.c pty.h readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c]
+ [rsa.c rsa.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c]
+ [ssh.h tildexpand.c ttymodes.c ttymodes.h uidswap.c xmalloc.c xmalloc.h]
+ OpenBSD tag
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/21 10:46:10
+ sshconnect2.c missing free; nuke old comment
+
+20000620
+ - (djm) Replace use of '-o' and '-a' logical operators in configure tests
+ with '||' and '&&'. As suggested by Jim Knoble <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ to fix SCO Unixware problem reported by Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com>
+ - (djm) Typo in loginrec.c
+
+20000618
+ - (djm) Add summary of configure options to end of ./configure run
+ - (djm) Not all systems define RUSAGE_SELF & RUSAGE_CHILDREN. Report from
+ Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu>
+ - (djm) rusage is a privileged operation on some Unices (incl.
+ Solaris 2.5.1). Report from Paul D. Smith <pausmith@nortelnetworks.com>
+ - (djm) Avoid PAM failures when running without a TTY. Report from
+ Martin Petrak <petrak@spsknm.schools.sk>
+ - (djm) Include sys/types.h when including netinet/in.h in configure tests.
+ Patch from Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino <itojun@iijlab.net>
+ - (djm) Started merge of Ben Lindstrom's <mouring@pconline.com> NeXT support
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 09:58:46
+ [channels.c]
+ everyone says "nix it" (remove protocol 2 debugging message)
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 13:24:34
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ allow extended server banners
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 14:30:10
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ missing atomicio, typo
+ - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 16:52:34
+ [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config]
+ add support for ssh v2 subsystems. ok markus@.
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 18:57:48
+ [readconf.c servconf.c]
+ include = in WHITESPACE; markus ok
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 19:09:10
+ [auth2.c]
+ implement bug compatibility with ssh-2.0.13 pubkey, server side
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 21:00:28
+ [compat.c]
+ initial support for ssh.com's 2.2.0
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 21:16:09
+ [scp.c]
+ typo
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 22:05:02
+ [auth-rsa.c auth2.c serverloop.c session.c auth-options.c auth-options.h]
+ split auth-rsa option parsing into auth-options
+ add options support to authorized_keys2
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/06/17 22:42:54
+ [session.c]
+ typo
+
+20000613
+ - (djm) Fixes from Andrew McGill <andrewm@datrix.co.za>:
+ - Platform define for SCO 3.x which breaks on /dev/ptmx
+ - Detect and try to fix missing MAXPATHLEN
+ - (djm) Fix short copy in loginrec.c (based on patch from Phill Camp
+ <P.S.S.Camp@ukc.ac.uk>
+
+20000612
+ - (djm) Glob manpages in RPM spec files to catch compressed files
+ - (djm) Full license in auth-pam.c
+ - (djm) Configure fixes from SAKAI Kiyotaka <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp>
+ - (andre) AIX, lastlog, configure fixes from Tom Bertelson <tbert@abac.com>:
+ - Don't try to retrieve lastlog from wtmp/wtmpx if DISABLE_LASTLOG is
+ def'd
+ - Set AIX to use preformatted manpages
+
+20000610
+ - (djm) Minor doc tweaks
+ - (djm) Fix for configure on bash2 from Jim Knoble <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+
+20000609
+ - (djm) Patch from Kenji Miyake <kenji@miyake.org> to disable utmp usage
+ (in favour of utmpx) on Solaris 8
+
+20000606
+ - (djm) Cleanup of entropy.c. Reorganised code, removed second pass through
+ list of commands (by default). Removed verbose debugging (by default).
+ - (djm) Increased command entropy estimates and default entropy collection
+ timeout
+ - (djm) Remove duplicate headers from loginrec.c
+ - (djm) Don't add /usr/local/lib to library search path on Irix
+ - (djm) Fix rsh path in RPMs. Report from Jason L Tibbitts III
+ <tibbs@math.uh.edu>
+ - (djm) Warn user if grabs fail in GNOME askpass. Patch from Zack Weinberg
+ <zack@wolery.cumb.org>
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - todd@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ teach protocol v2 to count login failures properly and also enable an
+ explanation of why the password prompt comes up again like v1; this is NOT
+ crypto
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c ssh.1 ssh.c sshd.8]
+ xauth_location support; pr 1234
+ [readconf.c sshconnect2.c]
+ typo, unused
+ [session.c]
+ allow use_login only for login sessions, otherwise remote commands are
+ execed with uid==0
+ [sshd.8]
+ document UseLogin better
+ [version.h]
+ OpenSSH 2.1.1
+ [auth-rsa.c]
+ fix match_hostname() logic for auth-rsa: deny access if we have a
+ negative match or no match at all
+ [channels.c hostfile.c match.c]
+ don't panic if mkdtemp fails for authfwd; jkb@yahoo-inc.com via
+ kris@FreeBSD.org
+
+20000606
+ - (djm) Added --with-cflags, --with-ldflags and --with-libs options to
+ configure.
+
+20000604
+ - Configure tweaking for new login code on Irix 5.3
+ - (andre) login code changes based on djm feedback
+
+20000603
+ - (andre) New login code
+ - Remove bsd-login.[ch] and all the OpenBSD-derived code in login.c
+ - Add loginrec.[ch], logintest.c and autoconf code
+
+20000531
+ - Cleanup of auth.c, login.c and fake-*
+ - Cleanup of auth-pam.c, save and print "account expired" error messages
+ - Fix EGD read bug by IWAMURO Motonori <iwa@mmp.fujitsu.co.jp>
+ - Rewrote bsd-login to use proper utmp API if available. Major cleanup
+ of fallback DIY code.
+
+20000530
+ - Define atexit for old Solaris
+ - Fix buffer overrun in login.c for systems which use syslen in utmpx.
+ patch from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@cerberus.nemoto.ecei.tohoku.ac.jp>
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [session.c]
+ make x11-fwd work w/ localhost (xauth add host/unix:11)
+ [cipher.c compat.c readconf.c servconf.c]
+ check strtok() != NULL; ok niels@
+ [key.c]
+ fix key_read() for uuencoded keys w/o '='
+ [serverloop.c]
+ group ssh1 vs. ssh2 in serverloop
+ [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ split kexinit/kexdh, factor out common code
+ [readconf.c ssh.1 ssh.c]
+ forwardagent defaults to no, add ssh -A
+ - theo@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [session.c]
+ just some line shortening
+ - Released 2.1.0p3
+
+20000520
+ - Xauth fix from Markus Friedl <markus.friedl@informatik.uni-erlangen.de>
+ - Don't touch utmp if USE_UTMPX defined
+ - SunOS 4.x support from Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ - SIGCHLD fix for AIX and HPUX from Tom Bertelson <tbert@abac.com>
+ - HPUX and Configure fixes from Lutz Jaenicke
+ <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - Use mkinstalldirs script to make directories instead of non-portable
+ "install -d". Suggested by Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - Doc cleanup
+
+20000518
+ - Include Andre Lucas' fixprogs script. Forgot to "cvs add" it yesterday
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ copy only ai_addrlen bytes; misiek@pld.org.pl
+ [auth.c]
+ accept an empty shell in authentication; bug reported by
+ chris@tinker.ucr.edu
+ [serverloop.c]
+ we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions (fcntl errors)
+
+20000517
+ - Fix from Andre Lucas <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Fixes command line printing segfaults (spotter: Bladt Norbert)
+ - Fixes erroneous printing of debug messages to syslog
+ - Fixes utmp for MacOS X (spotter: Aristedes Maniatis)
+ - Gives useful error message if PRNG initialisation fails
+ - Reduced ssh startup delay
+ - Measures cumulative command time rather than the time between reads
+ after select()
+ - 'fixprogs' perl script to eliminate non-working entropy commands, and
+ optionally run 'ent' to measure command entropy
+ - Applied Tom Bertelson's <tbert@abac.com> AIX authentication fix
+ - Avoid WCOREDUMP complation errors for systems that lack it
+ - Avoid SIGCHLD warnings from entropy commands
+ - Fix HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST setting from Simon Wilkinson <sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk>
+ - OpenBSD CVS update:
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [ssh.c]
+ fix usage()
+ [ssh2.h]
+ draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt
+ [ssh.1]
+ document ssh -T -N (ssh2 only)
+ [channels.c serverloop.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c aux.c]
+ enable nonblocking IO for sshd w/ proto 1, too; split out common code
+ [aux.c]
+ missing include
+ - Several patches from SAKAI Kiyotaka <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp>
+ - INSTALL typo and URL fix
+ - Makefile fix
+ - Solaris fixes
+ - Checking for ssize_t and memmove. Based on patch from SAKAI Kiyotaka
+ <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp>
+ - RSAless operation patch from kevin_oconnor@standardandpoors.com
+ - Detect OpenSSL seperatly from RSA
+ - Better test for RSA (more compatible with RSAref). Based on work by
+ Ed Eden <ede370@stl.rural.usda.gov>
+
+20000513
+ - Fix for non-recognised DSA keys from Arkadiusz Miskiewicz
+ <misiek@pld.org.pl>
+
+20000511
+ - Fix for prng_seed permissions checking from Lutz Jaenicke
+ <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE>
+ - "make host-key" fix for Irix
+
+20000509
+ - OpenBSD CVS update
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [cipher.h myproposal.h readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c ssh.1 ssh.c]
+ [ssh.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8]
+ - complain about invalid ciphers in SSH1 (e.g. arcfour is SSH2 only)
+ - hugh@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [ssh.1]
+ - zap typo
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ - One last nit fix. (markus approved)
+ [sshd.8]
+ - some markus certified spelling adjustments
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c compat compat.h dsa.c kex.c]
+ [sshconnect2.c ]
+ - bug compat w/ ssh-2.0.13 x11, split out bugs
+ [nchan.c]
+ - no drain if ibuf_empty, fixes x11fwd problems; tests by fries@
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ - handle escapes in real and original key format, ok millert@
+ [version.h]
+ - OpenSSH-2.1
+ - Moved all the bsd-* and fake-* stuff into new libopenbsd-compat.a
+ - Doc updates
+ - Cleanup of bsd-base64 headers, bugfix definitions of __b64_*. Reported
+ by Andre Lucas <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+
+20000508
+ - Makefile and RPM spec fixes
+ - Generate DSA host keys during "make key" or RPM installs
+ - OpenBSD CVS update
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [clientloop.c sshconnect2.c]
+ - make x11-fwd interop w/ ssh-2.0.13
+ [README.openssh2]
+ - interop w/ SecureFX
+ - Release 2.0.0beta2
+
+ - Configure caching and cleanup patch from Andre Lucas'
+ <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+
+20000507
+ - Remove references to SSLeay.
+ - Big OpenBSD CVS update
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [clientloop.c]
+ - typo
+ [session.c]
+ - update proctitle on pty alloc/dealloc, e.g. w/ windows client
+ [session.c]
+ - update proctitle for proto 1, too
+ [channels.h nchan.c serverloop.c session.c sshd.c]
+ - use c-style comments
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [scp.c]
+ - more atomicio
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [channels.c]
+ - set O_NONBLOCK
+ [ssh.1]
+ - update AUTHOR
+ [readconf.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.h]
+ - default DSA key file ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+ [clientloop.c]
+ - typo, rm verbose debug
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ - document DSA use of ssh-keygen
+ [sshd.8]
+ - a start at describing what i understand of the DSA side
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ - document -X and -x
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ - simplify usage
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org
+ [sshd.8]
+ - there is no rhosts_dsa
+ [ssh-keygen.1]
+ - document -y, update -X,-x
+ [nchan.c]
+ - fix close for non-open ssh1 channels
+ [servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c ]
+ - s/DsaKey/HostDSAKey/, document option
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ - respect number_of_password_prompts
+ [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8]
+ - GatewayPorts for sshd, ok deraadt@
+ [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh.1]
+ - more doc on: DSA, id_dsa, known_hosts2, authorized_keys2
+ [ssh.1]
+ - more info on proto 2
+ [sshd.8]
+ - sync AUTHOR w/ ssh.1
+ [key.c key.h sshconnect.c]
+ - print key type when talking about host keys
+ [packet.c]
+ - clear padding in ssh2
+ [dsa.c key.c radix.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c uuencode.c uuencode.h]
+ - replace broken uuencode w/ libc b64_ntop
+ [auth2.c]
+ - log failure before sending the reply
+ [key.c radix.c uuencode.c]
+ - remote trailing comments before calling __b64_pton
+ [auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh.1]
+ [sshconnect2.c sshd.8]
+ - add DSAAuthetication option to ssh/sshd, document SSH2 in sshd.8
+ - Bring in b64_ntop and b64_pton from OpenBSD libc (bsd-base64.[ch])
+
+20000502
+ - OpenBSD CVS update
+ [channels.c]
+ - init all fds, close all fds.
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ - check whether file exists before asking for passphrase
+ [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ - PidFile, pr 1210
+ [channels.c]
+ - EINTR
+ [channels.c]
+ - unbreak, ok niels@
+ [sshd.c]
+ - unlink pid file, ok niels@
+ [auth2.c]
+ - Add missing #ifdefs; ok - markus
+ - Add Andre Lucas' <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com> patch to read entropy
+ gathering commands from a text file
+ - Release 2.0.0beta1
+
+20000501
+ - OpenBSD CVS update
+ [packet.c]
+ - send debug messages in SSH2 format
+ [scp.c]
+ - fix very rare EAGAIN/EINTR issues; based on work by djm
+ [packet.c]
+ - less debug, rm unused
+ [auth2.c]
+ - disable kerb,s/key in ssh2
+ [sshd.8]
+ - Minor tweaks and typo fixes.
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ - Put -d into usage and reorder. markus ok.
+ - Include missing headers for OpenSSL tests. Fix from Phil Karn
+ <karn@ka9q.ampr.org>
+ - Fixed __progname symbol collisions reported by Andre Lucas
+ <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Merged bsd-login ttyslot and AIX utmp patch from Gert Doering
+ <gd@hilb1.medat.de>
+ - Add some missing ifdefs to auth2.c
+ - Deprecate perl-tk askpass.
+ - Irix portability fixes - don't include netinet headers more than once
+ - Make sure we don't save PRNG seed more than once
+
+20000430
+ - Merge HP-UX fixes and TCB support from Ged Lodder <lodder@yacc.com.au>
+ - Integrate Andre Lucas' <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com> entropy collection
+ patch.
+ - Adds timeout to entropy collection
+ - Disables slow entropy sources
+ - Load and save seed file
+ - Changed entropy seed code to user per-user seeds only (server seed is
+ saved in root's .ssh directory)
+ - Use atexit() and fatal cleanups to save seed on exit
+ - More OpenBSD updates:
+ [session.c]
+ - don't call chan_write_failed() if we are not writing
+ [auth-rsa.c auth1.c authfd.c hostfile.c ssh-agent.c]
+ - keysize warnings error() -> log()
+
+20000429
+ - Merge big update to OpenSSH-2.0 from OpenBSD CVS
+ [README.openssh2]
+ - interop w/ F-secure windows client
+ - sync documentation
+ - ssh_host_dsa_key not ssh_dsa_key
+ [auth-rsa.c]
+ - missing fclose
+ [auth.c authfile.c compat.c dsa.c dsa.h hostfile.c key.c key.h radix.c]
+ [readconf.c readconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c]
+ [sshd.c uuencode.c uuencode.h authfile.h]
+ - add DSA pubkey auth and other SSH2 fixes. use ssh-keygen -[xX]
+ for trading keys with the real and the original SSH, directly from the
+ people who invented the SSH protocol.
+ [auth.c auth.h authfile.c sshconnect.c auth1.c auth2.c sshconnect.h]
+ [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
+ - split auth/sshconnect in one file per protocol version
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ - remove debug
+ [uuencode.c]
+ - add trailing =
+ [version.h]
+ - OpenSSH-2.0
+ [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+ - add -R flag: exit code indicates if RSA is alive
+ [sshd.c]
+ - remove unused
+ silent if -Q is specified
+ [ssh.h]
+ - host key becomes /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ [readconf.c servconf.c ]
+ - ssh/sshd default to proto 1 and 2
+ [uuencode.c]
+ - remove debug
+ [auth2.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ - xfree DSA blobs
+ [auth2.c serverloop.c session.c]
+ - cleanup logging for sshd/2, respect PasswordAuth no
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ - less debug, respect .ssh/config
+ [README.openssh2 channels.c channels.h]
+ - clientloop.c session.c ssh.c
+ - support for x11-fwding, client+server
+
+20000421
+ - Merge fix from OpenBSD CVS
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ - Fix memory leak per connection. Report from Andy Spiegl <Andy@Spiegl.de>
+ via Debian bug #59926
+ - Define __progname in session.c if libc doesn't
+ - Remove indentation on autoconf #include statements to avoid bug in
+ DEC Tru64 compiler. Report and fix from David Del Piero
+ <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au>
+
+20000420
+ - Make fixpaths work with perl4, patch from Andre Lucas
+ <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Sync with OpenBSD CVS:
+ [clientloop.c login.c serverloop.c ssh-agent.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ - pid_t
+ [session.c]
+ - remove bogus chan_read_failed. this could cause data
+ corruption (missing data) at end of a SSH2 session.
+ - Merge fixes from Debian patch from Phil Hands <phil@hands.com>
+ - Allow setting of PAM service name through CFLAGS (SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+ - Use vhangup to clean up Linux ttys
+ - Force posix getopt processing on GNU libc systems
+ - Debian bug #55910 - remove references to ssl(8) manpages
+ - Debian bug #58031 - ssh_config lies about default cipher
+
+20000419
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates
+ [channels.c]
+ - fix pr 1196, listen_port and port_to_connect interchanged
+ [scp.c]
+ - after completion, replace the progress bar ETA counter with a final
+ elapsed time; my idea, aaron wrote the patch
+ [ssh_config sshd_config]
+ - show 'Protocol' as an example, ok markus@
+ [sshd.c]
+ - missing xfree()
+ - Add missing header to bsd-misc.c
+
+20000416
+ - Reduce diff against OpenBSD source
+ - All OpenSSL includes are now unconditionally referenced as
+ openssl/foo.h
+ - Pick up formatting changes
+ - Other minor changed (typecasts, etc) that I missed
+
+20000415
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates.
+ [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+ - ssh -2
+ [auth.c channels.c clientloop.c packet.c packet.h serverloop.c]
+ [session.c sshconnect.c]
+ - check payload for (illegal) extra data
+ [ALL]
+ whitespace cleanup
+
+20000413
+ - INSTALL doc updates
+ - Merged OpenBSD updates to include paths.
+
+20000412
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - [channels.c]
+ repair x11-fwd
+ - [sshconnect.c]
+ fix passwd prompt for ssh2, less debugging output.
+ - [clientloop.c compat.c dsa.c kex.c sshd.c]
+ less debugging output
+ - [kex.c kex.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ check for reasonable public DH values
+ - [README.openssh2 cipher.c cipher.h compat.c compat.h readconf.c]
+ [readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ add Cipher and Protocol options to ssh/sshd, e.g.:
+ ssh -o 'Protocol 1,2' if you prefer proto 1, ssh -o 'Ciphers
+ arcfour,3des-cbc'
+ - [sshd.c]
+ print 1.99 only if server supports both
+
+20000408
+ - Avoid some compiler warnings in fake-get*.c
+ - Add IPTOS macros for systems which lack them
+ - Only set define entropy collection macros if they are found
+ - More large OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - [auth.c auth.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c]
+ [session.h ssh.h sshd.c README.openssh2]
+ ssh2 server side, see README.openssh2; enable with 'sshd -2'
+ - [channels.c]
+ no adjust after close
+ - [sshd.c compat.c ]
+ interop w/ latest ssh.com windows client.
+
+20000406
+ - OpenBSD CVS update:
+ - [channels.c]
+ close efd on eof
+ - [clientloop.c compat.c ssh.c sshconnect.c myproposal.h]
+ ssh2 client implementation, interops w/ ssh.com and lsh servers.
+ - [sshconnect.c]
+ missing free.
+ - [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h packet.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ remove unused argument, split cipher_mask()
+ - [clientloop.c]
+ re-order: group ssh1 vs. ssh2
+ - Make Redhat spec require openssl >= 0.9.5a
+
+20000404
+ - Add tests for RAND_add function when searching for OpenSSL
+ - OpenBSD CVS update:
+ - [packet.h packet.c]
+ ssh2 packet format
+ - [packet.h packet.c nchan2.ms nchan.h compat.h compat.c]
+ [channels.h channels.c]
+ channel layer support for ssh2
+ - [kex.h kex.c hmac.h hmac.c dsa.c dsa.h]
+ DSA, keyexchange, algorithm agreement for ssh2
+ - Generate manpages before make install not at the end of make all
+ - Don't seed the rng quite so often
+ - Always reseed rng when requested
+
+20000403
+ - Wrote entropy collection routines for systems that lack /dev/random
+ and EGD
+ - Disable tests and typedefs for 64 bit types. They are currently unused.
+
+20000401
+ - Big OpenBSD CVS update (mainly beginnings of SSH2 infrastructure)
+ - [auth.c session.c sshd.c auth.h]
+ split sshd.c -> auth.c session.c sshd.c plus cleanup and goto-removal
+ - [bufaux.c bufaux.h]
+ support ssh2 bignums
+ - [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c sshd.c nchan.c nchan.h packet.c]
+ [readconf.c ssh.c ssh.h serverloop.c]
+ replace big switch() with function tables (prepare for ssh2)
+ - [ssh2.h]
+ ssh2 message type codes
+ - [sshd.8]
+ reorder Xr to avoid cutting
+ - [serverloop.c]
+ close(fdin) if fdin != fdout, shutdown otherwise, ok theo@
+ - [channels.c]
+ missing close
+ allow bigger packets
+ - [cipher.c cipher.h]
+ support ssh2 ciphers
+ - [compress.c]
+ cleanup, less code
+ - [dispatch.c dispatch.h]
+ function tables for different message types
+ - [log-server.c]
+ do not log() if debuggin to stderr
+ rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision
+ - [mpaux.c]
+ KNF
+ - [nchan.c]
+ sync w/ channels.c
+
+20000326
+ - Better tests for OpenSSL w/ RSAref
+ - Added replacement setenv() function from OpenBSD libc. Suggested by
+ Ben Lindstrom <mouring@pconline.com>
+ - OpenBSD CVS update
+ - [auth-krb4.c]
+ -Wall
+ - [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c hostfile.c hostfile.h key.c key.h match.c]
+ [match.h ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ initial support for DSA keys. ok deraadt@, niels@
+ - [cipher.c cipher.h]
+ remove unused cipher_attack_detected code
+ - [scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ Fix some formatting problems I missed before.
+ - [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ fix spelling errors, From: FreeBSD
+ - [ssh.c]
+ switch to raw mode only if he _get_ a pty (not if we _want_ a pty).
+
+20000324
+ - Released 1.2.3
+
+20000317
+ - Clarified --with-default-path option.
+ - Added -blibpath handling for AIX to work around stupid runtime linking.
+ Problem elucidated by gshapiro@SENDMAIL.ORG by way of Jim Knoble
+ <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ - Checks for 64 bit int types. Problem report from Mats Fredholm
+ <matsf@init.se>
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - [atomicio.c auth-krb4.c bufaux.c channels.c compress.c fingerprint.c]
+ [packet.h radix.c rsa.c scp.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect.c]
+ [sshd.c]
+ pedantic: signed vs. unsigned, void*-arithm, etc
+ - [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ Various cleanups and standardizations.
+ - Runtime error fix for HPUX from Otmar Stahl
+ <O.Stahl@lsw.uni-heidelberg.de>
+
+20000316
+ - Fixed configure not passing LDFLAGS to Solaris. Report from David G.
+ Hesprich <dghespri@sprintparanet.com>
+ - Propogate LD through to Makefile
+ - Doc cleanups
+ - Added blurb about "scp: command not found" errors to UPGRADING
+
+20000315
+ - Fix broken CFLAGS handling during search for OpenSSL. Fixes va_list
+ problems with gcc/Solaris.
+ - Don't free argument to putenv() after use (in setenv() replacement).
+ Report from Seigo Tanimura <tanimura@r.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
+ - Created contrib/ subdirectory. Included helpers from Phil Hands'
+ Debian package, README file and chroot patch from Ricardo Cerqueira
+ <rmcc@clix.pt>
+ - Moved gnome-ssh-askpass.c to contrib directory and removed config
+ option.
+ - Slight cleanup to doc files
+ - Configure fix from Bratislav ILICH <bilic@zepter.ru>
+
+20000314
+ - Include macro for IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED. Report from
+ peter@frontierflying.com
+ - Include /usr/local/include and /usr/local/lib for systems that don't
+ do it themselves
+ - -R/usr/local/lib for Solaris
+ - Fix RSAref detection
+ - Fix IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED macro
+
+20000311
+ - Detect RSAref
+ - OpenBSD CVS change
+ [sshd.c]
+ - disallow guessing of root password
+ - More configure fixes
+ - IPv6 workarounds from Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@ecei.tohoku.ac.jp>
+
+20000309
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates to v1.2.3
+ [ssh.h atomicio.c]
+ - int atomicio -> ssize_t (for alpha). ok deraadt@
+ [auth-rsa.c]
+ - delay MD5 computation until client sends response, free() early, cleanup.
+ [cipher.c]
+ - void* -> unsigned char*, ok niels@
+ [hostfile.c]
+ - remove unused variable 'len'. fix comments.
+ - remove unused variable
+ [log-client.c log-server.c]
+ - rename a cpp symbol, to avoid param.h collision
+ [packet.c]
+ - missing xfree()
+ - getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com
+ - use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i;
+ from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
+ [pty.c pty.h]
+ - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
+ pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
+ [readconf.c]
+ - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
+ [rsa.c]
+ - PKCS#1 padding
+ [scp.c]
+ - allow '.' in usernames; from jedgar@fxp.org
+ [servconf.c]
+ - typo: ignore_user_known_hosts int->flag; naddy@mips.rhein-neckar.de
+ - sync with sshd_config
+ [ssh-keygen.c]
+ - enable ssh-keygen -l -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ok deraadt@
+ [ssh.1]
+ - Change invalid 'CHAT' loglevel to 'VERBOSE'
+ [ssh.c]
+ - suppress AAAA query host when '-4' is used; from shin@nd.net.fujitsu.co.jp
+ - turn off x11-fwd for the client, too.
+ [sshconnect.c]
+ - missing xfree()
+ - retry rresvport_af(), too. from sumikawa@ebina.hitachi.co.jp.
+ - read error vs. "Connection closed by remote host"
+ [sshd.8]
+ - ie. -> i.e.,
+ - do not link to a commercial page..
+ - sync with sshd_config
+ [sshd.c]
+ - no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net
+ - log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly.
+ - don't panic if client behaves strange. ok deraadt@
+ - make no-port-forwarding for RSA keys deny both -L and -R style fwding
+ - delay close() of pty until the pty has been chowned back to root
+ - oops, fix comment, too.
+ - missing xfree()
+ - move XAUTHORITY to subdir. ok dugsong@. fixes debian bug #57907, too.
+ (http://cgi.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?archive=no&bug=57907)
+ - register cleanup for pty earlier. move code for pty-owner handling to
+ pty.c ok provos@, dugsong@
+ - create x11 cookie file
+ - fix pr 1113, fclose() -> pclose(), todo: remote popen()
+ - version 1.2.3
+ - Cleaned up
+ - Removed warning workaround for Linux and devpts filesystems (no longer
+ required after OpenBSD updates)
+
+20000308
+ - Configure fix from Hiroshi Takekawa <takekawa@sr3.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
+
+20000307
+ - Released 1.2.2p1
+
+20000305
+ - Fix DEC compile fix
+ - Explicitly seed OpenSSL's PRNG before checking rsa_alive()
+ - Check for getpagesize in libucb.a if not found in libc. Fix for old
+ Solaris from Andre Lucas <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Check for libwrap if --with-tcp-wrappers option specified. Suggestion
+ Mate Wierdl <mw@moni.msci.memphis.edu>
+
+20000303
+ - Added "make host-key" target, Suggestion from Dominik Brettnacher
+ <domi@saargate.de>
+ - Don't permanently fail on bind() if getaddrinfo has more choices left for
+ us. Needed to work around messy IPv6 on Linux. Patch from Arkadiusz
+ Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl>
+ - DEC Unix compile fix from David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au>
+ - Manpage fix from David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au>
+
+20000302
+ - Big cleanup of autoconf code
+ - Rearranged to be a little more logical
+ - Added -R option for Solaris
+ - Rewrote OpenSSL detection code. Now uses AC_TRY_RUN with a test program
+ to detect library and header location _and_ ensure library has proper
+ RSA support built in (this is a problem with OpenSSL 0.9.5).
+ - Applied pty cleanup patch from markus.friedl@informatik.uni-erlangen.de
+ - Avoid warning message with Unix98 ptys
+ - Warning was valid - possible race condition on PTYs. Avoided using
+ platform-specific code.
+ - Document some common problems
+ - Allow root access to any key. Patch from
+ markus.friedl@informatik.uni-erlangen.de
+
+20000207
+ - Removed SOCKS code. Will support through a ProxyCommand.
+
+20000203
+ - Fixed SEGVs in authloop, fix from vbzoli@hbrt.hu
+ - Add --with-ssl-dir option
+
+20000202
+ - Fix lastlog code for directory based lastlogs. Fix from Josh Durham
+ <jmd@aoe.vt.edu>
+ - Documentation fixes from HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@nt.phys.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
+ - Added URLs to Japanese translations of documents by HARUYAMA Seigo
+ <haruyama@nt.phys.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
+
+20000201
+ - Use socket pairs by default (instead of pipes). Prevents race condition
+ on several (buggy) OSs. Report and fix from tridge@linuxcare.com
+
+20000127
+ - Seed OpenSSL's random number generator before generating RSA keypairs
+ - Split random collector into seperate file
+ - Compile fix from Andre Lucas <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+
+20000126
+ - Released 1.2.2 stable
+
+ - NeXT keeps it lastlog in /usr/adm. Report from
+ mouring@newton.pconline.com
+ - Added note in UPGRADING re interop with commercial SSH using idea.
+ Report from Jim Knoble <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ - Fix linking order for Kerberos/AFS. Fix from Holget Trapp
+ <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE>
+
+20000125
+ - Fix NULL pointer dereference in login.c. Fix from Andre Lucas
+ <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Reorder PAM initialisation so it does not mess up lastlog. Reported
+ by Andre Lucas <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Use preformatted manpages on SCO, report from Gary E. Miller
+ <gem@rellim.com>
+ - New URL for x11-ssh-askpass.
+ - Fixpaths was missing /etc/ssh_known_hosts. Report from Jim Knoble
+ <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ - Added 'DESTDIR' option to Makefile to ease package building. Patch from
+ Jim Knoble <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ - Updated RPM spec files to use DESTDIR
+
+20000124
+ - Pick up version 1.2.2 from OpenBSD CVS (no changes, just version number
+ increment)
+
+20000123
+ - OpenBSD CVS:
+ - [packet.c]
+ getsockname() requires initialized tolen; andy@guildsoftware.com
+ - AIX patch from Matt Richards <v2matt@btv.ibm.com> and David Rankin
+ <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us>
+ - Fix lastlog support, patch from Andre Lucas <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+
+20000122
+ - Fix compilation of bsd-snprintf.c on Solaris, fix from Ben Taylor
+ <bent@clark.net>
+ - Merge preformatted manpage patch from Andre Lucas
+ <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Make IPv4 use the default in RPM packages
+ - Irix uses preformatted manpages
+ - Missing htons() in bsd-bindresvport.c, fix from Holger Trapp
+ <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE>
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - [packet.c]
+ use getpeername() in packet_connection_is_on_socket(), fixes sshd -i;
+ from Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
+ - [sshd.c]
+ log with level log() not fatal() if peer behaves badly.
+ - [readpass.c]
+ instead of blocking SIGINT, catch it ourselves, so that we can clean
+ the tty modes up and kill ourselves -- instead of our process group
+ leader (scp, cvs, ...) going away and leaving us in noecho mode.
+ people with cbreak shells never even noticed..
+ - [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ ie. -> i.e.,
+
+20000120
+ - Don't use getaddrinfo on AIX
+ - Update to latest OpenBSD CVS:
+ - [auth-rsa.c]
+ - fix user/1056, sshd keeps restrictions; dbt@meat.net
+ - [sshconnect.c]
+ - disable agent fwding for proto 1.3, remove abuse of auth-rsa flags.
+ - destroy keys earlier
+ - split key exchange (kex) and user authentication (user-auth),
+ ok: provos@
+ - [sshd.c]
+ - no need for poll.h; from bright@wintelcom.net
+ - disable agent fwding for proto 1.3, remove abuse of auth-rsa flags.
+ - split key exchange (kex) and user authentication (user-auth),
+ ok: provos@
+ - Big manpage and config file cleanup from Andre Lucas
+ <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Re-added latest (unmodified) OpenBSD manpages
+ - Doc updates
+ - NetBSD patch from David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us> and
+ Christos Zoulas <christos@netbsd.org>
+
+20000119
+ - SCO compile fixes from Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com>
+ - Compile fix from Darren_Hall@progressive.com
+ - Linux/glibc-2.1.2 takes a *long* time to look up names for AF_UNSPEC
+ addresses using getaddrinfo(). Added a configure switch to make the
+ default lookup mode AF_INET
+
+20000118
+ - Fixed --with-pid-dir option
+ - Makefile fix from Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com>
+ - Compile fix for HPUX and Solaris from Andre Lucas
+ <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+
+20000117
+ - Clean up bsd-bindresvport.c. Use arc4random() for picking initial
+ port, ignore EINVAL errors (Linux) when searching for free port.
+ - Revert __snprintf -> snprintf aliasing. Apparently Solaris
+ __snprintf isn't. Report from Theo de Raadt <theo@cvs.openbsd.org>
+ - Document location of Redhat PAM file in INSTALL.
+ - Fixed X11 forwarding bug on Linux. libc advertises AF_INET6
+ INADDR_ANY_INIT addresses via getaddrinfo, but may not be able to
+ deliver (no IPv6 kernel support)
+ - Released 1.2.1pre27
+
+ - Fix rresvport_af failure errors (logic error in bsd-bindresvport.c)
+ - Fix --with-ipaddr-display option test. Fix from Jarno Huuskonen
+ <jhuuskon@hytti.uku.fi>
+ - Fix hang on logout if processes are still using the pty. Needs
+ further testing.
+ - Patch from Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com>
+ - Try $prefix first when looking for OpenSSL.
+ - Include sys/types.h when including sys/socket.h in test programs
+ - Substitute PID directory in sshd.8. Suggestion from Andrew
+ Stribblehill <a.d.stribblehill@durham.ac.uk>
+
+20000116
+ - Renamed --with-xauth-path to --with-xauth
+ - Added --with-pid-dir option
+ - Released 1.2.1pre26
+
+ - Compilation fix from Kiyokazu SUTO <suto@ks-and-ks.ne.jp>
+ - Fixed broken bugfix for /dev/ptmx on Linux systems which lack
+ openpty(). Report from Kiyokazu SUTO <suto@ks-and-ks.ne.jp>
+
+20000115
+ - Add --with-xauth-path configure directive and explicit test for
+ /usr/openwin/bin/xauth for Solaris systems. Report from Anders
+ Nordby <anders@fix.no>
+ - Fix incorrect detection of /dev/ptmx on Linux systems that lack
+ openpty. Report from John Seifarth <john@waw.be>
+ - Look for intXX_t and u_intXX_t in sys/bitypes.h if they are not in
+ sys/types.h. Fixes problems on SCO, report from Gary E. Miller
+ <gem@rellim.com>
+ - Use __snprintf and __vnsprintf if they are found where snprintf and
+ vnsprintf are lacking. Suggested by Ben Taylor <bent@shell.clark.net>
+ and others.
+
+20000114
+ - Merged OpenBSD IPv6 patch:
+ - [sshd.c sshd.8 sshconnect.c ssh.h ssh.c servconf.h servconf.c scp.1]
+ [scp.c packet.h packet.c login.c log.c canohost.c channels.c]
+ [hostfile.c sshd_config]
+ ipv6 support: mostly gethostbyname->getaddrinfo/getnameinfo, new
+ features: sshd allows multiple ListenAddress and Port options. note
+ that libwrap is not IPv6-ready. (based on patches from
+ fujiwara@rcac.tdi.co.jp)
+ - [ssh.c canohost.c]
+ more hints (hints.ai_socktype=SOCK_STREAM) for getaddrinfo,
+ from itojun@
+ - [channels.c]
+ listen on _all_ interfaces for X11-Fwd (hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE)
+ - [packet.h]
+ allow auth-kerberos for IPv4 only
+ - [scp.1 sshd.8 servconf.h scp.c]
+ document -4, -6, and 'ssh -L 2022/::1/22'
+ - [ssh.c]
+ 'ssh @host' is illegal (null user name), from
+ karsten@gedankenpolizei.de
+ - [sshconnect.c]
+ better error message
+ - [sshd.c]
+ allow auth-kerberos for IPv4 only
+ - Big IPv6 merge:
+ - Cleanup overrun in sockaddr copying on RHL 6.1
+ - Replacements for getaddrinfo, getnameinfo, etc based on versions
+ from patch from KIKUCHI Takahiro <kick@kyoto.wide.ad.jp>
+ - Replacement for missing structures on systems that lack IPv6
+ - record_login needed to know about AF_INET6 addresses
+ - Borrowed more code from OpenBSD: rresvport_af and requisites
+
+20000110
+ - Fixes to auth-skey to enable it to use the standard OpenSSL libraries
+
+20000107
+ - New config.sub and config.guess to fix problems on SCO. Supplied
+ by Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com>
+ - SCO build fix from Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com>
+ - Released 1.2.1pre25
+
+20000106
+ - Documentation update & cleanup
+ - Better KrbIV / AFS detection, based on patch from:
+ Holger Trapp <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE>
+
+20000105
+ - Fixed annoying DES corruption problem. libcrypt has been
+ overriding symbols in libcrypto. Removed libcrypt and crypt.h
+ altogether (libcrypto includes its own crypt(1) replacement)
+ - Added platform-specific rules for Irix 6.x. Included warning that
+ they are untested.
+
+20000103
+ - Add explicit make rules for files proccessed by fixpaths.
+ - Fix "make install" in RPM spec files. Report from Tenkou N. Hattori
+ <tnh@kondara.org>
+ - Removed "nullok" directive from default PAM configuration files.
+ Added information on enabling EmptyPasswords on openssh+PAM in
+ UPGRADING file.
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates
+ - [ssh-agent.c]
+ cleanup_exit() for SIGTERM/SIGHUP, too. from fgsch@ and
+ dgaudet@arctic.org
+ - [sshconnect.c]
+ compare correct version for 1.3 compat mode
+
+20000102
+ - Prevent multiple inclusion of config.h and defines.h. Suggested
+ by Andre Lucas <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Properly clean up on exit of ssh-agent. Patch from Dean Gaudet
+ <dgaudet@arctic.org>
+
+19991231
+ - Fix password support on systems with a mixture of shadowed and
+ non-shadowed passwords (e.g. NIS). Report and fix from
+ HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@nt.phys.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
+ - Fix broken autoconf typedef detection. Report from Marc G.
+ Fournier <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca>
+ - Fix occasional crash on LinuxPPC. Patch from Franz Sirl
+ <Franz.Sirl-kernel@lauterbach.com>
+ - Prevent typedefs from being compiled more than once. Report from
+ Marc G. Fournier <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca>
+ - Fill in ut_utaddr utmp field. Report from Benjamin Charron
+ <iretd@bigfoot.com>
+ - Really fix broken default path. Fix from Jim Knoble
+ <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ - Remove test for quad_t. No longer needed.
+ - Released 1.2.1pre24
+
+ - Added support for directory-based lastlogs
+ - Really fix typedefs, patch from Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net>
+
+19991230
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - [auth-passwd.c]
+ check for NULL 1st
+ - Removed most of the pam code into its own file auth-pam.[ch]. This
+ cleaned up sshd.c up significantly.
+ - PAM authentication was incorrectly interpreting
+ "PermitRootLogin without-password". Report from Matthias Andree
+ <ma@dt.e-technik.uni-dortmund.de
+ - Several other cleanups
+ - Merged Dante SOCKS support patch from David Rankin
+ <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us>
+ - Updated documentation with ./configure options
+ - Released 1.2.1pre23
+
+19991229
+ - Applied another NetBSD portability patch from David Rankin
+ <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us>
+ - Fix --with-default-path option.
+ - Autodetect perl, patch from David Rankin
+ <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us>
+ - Print whether OpenSSH was compiled with RSARef, patch from
+ Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@thermo.stat.ncsu.edu>
+ - Calls to pam_setcred, patch from Nalin Dahyabhai
+ <nalin@thermo.stat.ncsu.edu>
+ - Detect missing size_t and typedef it.
+ - Rename helper.[ch] to (more appropriate) bsd-misc.[ch]
+ - Minor Makefile cleaning
+
+19991228
+ - Replacement for getpagesize() for systems which lack it
+ - NetBSD login.c compile fix from David Rankin
+ <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us>
+ - Fully set ut_tv if present in utmp or utmpx
+ - Portability fixes for Irix 5.3 (now compiles OK!)
+ - autoconf and other misc cleanups
+ - Merged AIX patch from Darren Hall <dhall@virage.org>
+ - Cleaned up defines.h
+ - Released 1.2.1pre22
+
+19991227
+ - Automatically correct paths in manpages and configuration files. Patch
+ and script from Andre Lucas <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Removed credits from README to CREDITS file, updated.
+ - Added --with-default-path to specify custom path for server
+ - Removed #ifdef trickery from acconfig.h into defines.h
+ - PAM bugfix. PermitEmptyPassword was being ignored.
+ - Fixed PAM config files to allow empty passwords if server does.
+ - Explained spurious PAM auth warning workaround in UPGRADING
+ - Use last few chars of tty line as ut_id
+ - New SuSE RPM spec file from Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - [packet.h auth-rhosts.c]
+ check format string for packet_disconnect and packet_send_debug, too
+ - [channels.c]
+ use packet_get_maxsize for channels. consistence.
+
+19991226
+ - Enabled utmpx support by default for Solaris
+ - Cleanup sshd.c PAM a little more
+ - Revised RPM package to include Jim Knoble's <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ X11 ssh-askpass program.
+ - Disable logging of PAM success and failures, PAM is verbose enough.
+ Unfortunatly there is currently no way to disable auth failure
+ messages. Mention this in UPGRADING file and sent message to PAM
+ developers
+ - OpenBSD CVS update:
+ - [ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1]
+ remove ref to .ssh/random_seed, mention .ssh/environment in
+ .Sh FILES, too
+ - Released 1.2.1pre21
+ - Fixed implicit '.' in default path, report from Jim Knoble
+ <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ - Redhat RPM spec fixes from Jim Knoble <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+
+19991225
+ - More fixes from Andre Lucas <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Cleanup of auth-passwd.c for shadow and MD5 passwords
+ - Cleanup and bugfix of PAM authentication code
+ - Released 1.2.1pre20
+
+ - Merged fixes from Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net>
+ - Fixed configure support for PAM. Reported by Naz <96na@eng.cam.ac.uk>
+ - Disabled logging of PAM password authentication failures when password
+ is empty. (e.g start of authentication loop). Reported by Naz
+ <96na@eng.cam.ac.uk>)
+
+19991223
+ - Merged later HPUX patch from Andre Lucas
+ <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>
+ - Above patch included better utmpx support from Ben Taylor
+ <bent@clark.net>
+
+19991222
+ - Fix undefined fd_set type in ssh.h from Povl H. Pedersen
+ <pope@netguide.dk>
+ - Fix login.c breakage on systems which lack ut_host in struct
+ utmp. Reported by Willard Dawson <willard.dawson@sbs.siemens.com>
+
+19991221
+ - Integration of large HPUX patch from Andre Lucas
+ <andre.lucas@dial.pipex.com>. Integrating it had a few other
+ benefits:
+ - Ability to disable shadow passwords at configure time
+ - Ability to disable lastlog support at configure time
+ - Support for IP address in $DISPLAY
+ - OpenBSD CVS update:
+ - [sshconnect.c]
+ say "REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED"
+ - Fix DISABLE_SHADOW support
+ - Allow MD5 passwords even if shadow passwords are disabled
+ - Release 1.2.1pre19
+
+19991218
+ - Redhat init script patch from Chun-Chung Chen
+ <cjj@u.washington.edu>
+ - Avoid breakage on systems without IPv6 headers
+
+19991216
+ - Makefile changes for Solaris from Peter Kocks
+ <peter.kocks@baygate.com>
+ - Minor updates to docs
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [authfd.c ssh-agent.c]
+ keysize warnings talk about identity files
+ - [packet.c]
+ "Connection closed by x.x.x.x": fatal() -> log()
+ - Correctly handle empty passwords in shadow file. Patch from:
+ "Chris, the Young One" <cky@pobox.com>
+ - Released 1.2.1pre18
+
+19991215
+ - Integrated patchs from Juergen Keil <jk@tools.de>
+ - Avoid void* pointer arithmatic
+ - Use LDFLAGS correctly
+ - Fix SIGIO error in scp
+ - Simplify status line printing in scp
+ - Added better test for inline functions compiler support from
+ Darren_Hall@progressive.com
+
+19991214
+ - OpenBSD CVS Changes
+ - [canohost.c]
+ fix get_remote_port() and friends for sshd -i;
+ Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE
+ - [mpaux.c]
+ make code simpler. no need for memcpy. niels@ ok
+ - [pty.c]
+ namebuflen not sizeof namebuflen; bnd@ep-ag.com via djm@mindrot.org
+ fix proto; markus
+ - [ssh.1]
+ typo; mark.baushke@solipsa.com
+ - [channels.c ssh.c ssh.h sshd.c]
+ type conflict for 'extern Type *options' in channels.c; dot@dotat.at
+ - [sshconnect.c]
+ move checking of hostkey into own function.
+ - [version.h]
+ OpenSSH-1.2.1
+ - Clean up broken includes in pty.c
+ - Some older systems don't have poll.h, they use sys/poll.h instead
+ - Doc updates
+
+19991211
+ - Fix compilation on systems with AFS. Reported by
+ aloomis@glue.umd.edu
+ - Fix installation on Solaris. Reported by
+ Gordon Rowell <gordonr@gormand.com.au>
+ - Fix gccisms (__attribute__ and inline). Report by edgy@us.ibm.com,
+ patch from Markus Friedl <markus.friedl@informatik.uni-erlangen.de>
+ - Auto-locate xauth. Patch from David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com>
+ - Compile fix from David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com>
+ - Avoid compiler warning in bsd-snprintf.c
+ - Added pam_limits.so to default PAM config. Suggested by
+ Jim Knoble <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+
+19991209
+ - Import of patch from Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net>:
+ - Improved PAM support
+ - "uninstall" rule for Makefile
+ - utmpx support
+ - Should fix PAM problems on Solaris
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates:
+ - [readpass.c]
+ avoid stdio; based on work by markus, millert, and I
+ - [sshd.c]
+ make sure the client selects a supported cipher
+ - [sshd.c]
+ fix sighup handling. accept would just restart and daemon handled
+ sighup only after the next connection was accepted. use poll on
+ listen sock now.
+ - [sshd.c]
+ make that a fatal
+ - Applied patch from David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us>
+ to fix libwrap support on NetBSD
+ - Released 1.2pre17
+
+19991208
+ - Compile fix for Solaris with /dev/ptmx from
+ David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com>
+
+19991207
+ - sshd Redhat init script patch from Jim Knoble <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ fixes compatability with 4.x and 5.x
+ - Fixed default SSH_ASKPASS
+ - Fix PAM account and session being called multiple times. Problem
+ reported by Adrian Baugh <adrian@merlin.keble.ox.ac.uk>
+ - Merged more OpenBSD changes:
+ - [atomicio.c authfd.c scp.c serverloop.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ move atomicio into it's own file. wrap all socket write()s which
+ were doing write(sock, buf, len) != len, with atomicio() calls.
+ - [auth-skey.c]
+ fd leak
+ - [authfile.c]
+ properly name fd variable
+ - [channels.c]
+ display great hatred towards strcpy
+ - [pty.c pty.h sshd.c]
+ use openpty() if it exists (it does on BSD4_4)
+ - [tildexpand.c]
+ check for ~ expansion past MAXPATHLEN
+ - Modified helper.c to use new atomicio function.
+ - Reformat Makefile a little
+ - Moved RC4 routines from rc4.[ch] into helper.c
+ - Added autoconf code to detect /dev/ptmx (Solaris) and /dev/ptc (AIX)
+ - Updated SuSE spec from Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+ - Tweaked Redhat spec
+ - Clean up bad imports of a few files (forgot -kb)
+ - Released 1.2pre16
+
+19991204
+ - Small cleanup of PAM code in sshd.c
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-skey.c ssh.h]
+ move skey-auth from auth-passwd.c to auth-skey.c, same for krb4
+ - [auth-rsa.c]
+ warn only about mismatch if key is _used_
+ warn about keysize-mismatch with log() not error()
+ channels.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c
+ ports are u_short
+ - [hostfile.c]
+ indent, shorter warning
+ - [nchan.c]
+ use error() for internal errors
+ - [packet.c]
+ set loglevel for SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT to log(), not fatal()
+ serverloop.c
+ indent
+ - [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh.h]
+ document $SSH_ASKPASS, reasonable default
+ - [ssh.1]
+ CheckHostIP is not available for connects via proxy command
+ - [sshconnect.c]
+ typo
+ easier to read client code for passwd and skey auth
+ turn of checkhostip for proxy connects, since we don't know the remote ip
+
+19991126
+ - Add definition for __P()
+ - Added [v]snprintf() replacement for systems that lack it
+
+19991125
+ - More reformatting merged from OpenBSD CVS
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [channels.c]
+ fix packet_integrity_check() for !have_hostname_in_open.
+ report from mrwizard@psu.edu via djm@ibs.com.au
+ - [channels.c]
+ set SO_REUSEADDR and SO_LINGER for forwarded ports.
+ chip@valinux.com via damien@ibs.com.au
+ - [nchan.c]
+ it's not an error() if shutdown_write failes in nchan.
+ - [readconf.c]
+ remove dead #ifdef-0-code
+ - [readconf.c servconf.c]
+ strcasecmp instead of tolower
+ - [scp.c]
+ progress meter overflow fix from damien@ibs.com.au
+ - [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c]
+ SSH_ASKPASS support
+ - [ssh.1 ssh.c]
+ postpone fork_after_authentication until command execution,
+ request/patch from jahakala@cc.jyu.fi via damien@ibs.com.au
+ plus: use daemon() for backgrounding
+ - Added BSD compatible install program and autoconf test, thanks to
+ Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk>
+ - Solaris fixing, thanks to Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net>
+ - Merged beginnings of AIX support from Tor-Ake Fransson <torake@hotmail.com>
+ - Release 1.2pre15
+
+19991124
+ - Merged very large OpenBSD source code reformat
+ - OpenBSD CVS updates
+ - [channels.c cipher.c compat.c log-client.c scp.c serverloop.c]
+ [ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c]
+ syslog changes:
+ * Unified Logmessage for all auth-types, for success and for failed
+ * Standard connections get only ONE line in the LOG when level==LOG:
+ Auth-attempts are logged only, if authentication is:
+ a) successfull or
+ b) with passwd or
+ c) we had more than AUTH_FAIL_LOG failues
+ * many log() became verbose()
+ * old behaviour with level=VERBOSE
+ - [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ tranfer s/key challenge/response data in SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
+ messages. allows use of s/key in windows (ttssh, securecrt) and
+ ssh-1.2.27 clients without 'ssh -v', ok: niels@
+ - [sshd.8]
+ -V, for fallback to openssh in SSH2 compatibility mode
+ - [sshd.c]
+ fix sigchld race; cjc5@po.cwru.edu
+
+19991123
+ - Added SuSE package files from Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+ - Restructured package-related files under packages/*
+ - Added generic PAM config
+ - Numerous little Solaris fixes
+ - Add recommendation to use GNU make to INSTALL document
+
+19991122
+ - Make <enter> close gnome-ssh-askpass (Debian bug #50299)
+ - OpenBSD CVS Changes
+ - [ssh-keygen.c]
+ don't create ~/.ssh only if the user wants to store the private
+ key there. show fingerprint instead of public-key after
+ keygeneration. ok niels@
+ - Added OpenBSD bsd-strlcat.c, created bsd-strlcat.h
+ - Added timersub() macro
+ - Tidy RCSIDs of bsd-*.c
+ - Added autoconf test and macro to deal with old PAM libraries
+ pam_strerror definition (one arg vs two).
+ - Fix EGD problems (Thanks to Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net>)
+ - Retry /dev/urandom reads interrupted by signal (report from
+ Robert Hardy <rhardy@webcon.net>)
+ - Added a setenv replacement for systems which lack it
+ - Only display public key comment when presenting ssh-askpass dialog
+ - Released 1.2pre14
+
+ - Configure, Make and changelog corrections from Tudor Bosman
+ <tudorb@jm.nu> and Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk>
+
+19991121
+ - OpenBSD CVS Changes:
+ - [channels.c]
+ make this compile, bad markus
+ - [log.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.h]
+ bugfix: loglevels are per host in clientconfig,
+ factor out common log-level parsing code.
+ - [servconf.c]
+ remove unused index (-Wall)
+ - [ssh-agent.c]
+ only one 'extern char *__progname'
+ - [sshd.8]
+ document SIGHUP, -Q to synopsis
+ - [sshconnect.c serverloop.c sshd.c packet.c packet.h]
+ [channels.c clientloop.c]
+ SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, some clients use this, some need this, niels@
+ [hope this time my ISP stays alive during commit]
+ - [OVERVIEW README] typos; green@freebsd
+ - [ssh-keygen.c]
+ replace xstrdup+strcat with strlcat+fixed buffer, fixes OF (bad me)
+ exit if writing the key fails (no infinit loop)
+ print usage() everytime we get bad options
+ - [ssh-keygen.c] overflow, djm@mindrot.org
+ - [sshd.c] fix sigchld race; cjc5@po.cwru.edu
+
+19991120
+ - Merged more Solaris support from Marc G. Fournier
+ <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca>
+ - Wrote autoconf tests for integer bit-types
+ - Fixed enabling kerberos support
+ - Fix segfault in ssh-keygen caused by buffer overrun in filename
+ handling.
+
+19991119
+ - Merged PAM buffer overrun patch from Chip Salzenberg <chip@valinux.com>
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes
+ - [auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c ssh-agent.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ more %d vs. %s in fmt-strings
+ - [authfd.c]
+ Integers should not be printed with %s
+ - EGD uses a socket, not a named pipe. Duh.
+ - Fix includes in fingerprint.c
+ - Fix scp progress bar bug again.
+ - Move ssh-askpass from ${libdir}/ssh to ${libexecdir}/ssh at request of
+ David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us>
+ - Added autoconf option to enable Kerberos 4 support (untested)
+ - Added autoconf option to enable AFS support (untested)
+ - Added autoconf option to enable S/Key support (untested)
+ - Added autoconf option to enable TCP wrappers support (compiles OK)
+ - Renamed BSD helper function files to bsd-*
+ - Added tests for login and daemon and enable OpenBSD replacements for
+ when they are absent.
+ - Added non-PAM MD5 password support patch from Tudor Bosman <tudorb@jm.nu>
+
+19991118
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes
+ - [scp.c] foregroundproc() in scp
+ - [sshconnect.h] include fingerprint.h
+ - [sshd.c] bugfix: the log() for passwd-auth escaped during logging
+ changes.
+ - [ssh.1] Spell my name right.
+ - Added openssh.com info to README
+
+19991117
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes
+ - [ChangeLog.Ylonen] noone needs this anymore
+ - [authfd.c] close-on-exec for auth-socket, ok deraadt
+ - [hostfile.c]
+ in known_hosts key lookup the entry for the bits does not need
+ to match, all the information is contained in n and e. This
+ solves the problem with buggy servers announcing the wrong
+ modulus length. markus and me.
+ - [serverloop.c]
+ bugfix: check for space if child has terminated, from:
+ iedowse@maths.tcd.ie
+ - [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c sshconnect.c]
+ [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h]
+ rsa key fingerprints, idea from Bjoern Groenvall <bg@sics.se>
+ - [ssh-agent.1] typo
+ - [ssh.1] add OpenSSH information to AUTHOR section. okay markus@
+ - [sshd.c]
+ force logging to stderr while loading private key file
+ (lost while converting to new log-levels)
+
+19991116
+ - Fix some Linux libc5 problems reported by Miles Wilson <mw@mctitle.com>
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c authfd.c authfd.h hostfile.c mpaux.c]
+ [mpaux.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh.h ssh.c sshd.c]
+ the keysize of rsa-parameter 'n' is passed implizit,
+ a few more checks and warnings about 'pretended' keysizes.
+ - [cipher.c cipher.h packet.c packet.h sshd.c]
+ remove support for cipher RC4
+ - [ssh.c]
+ a note for legay systems about secuity issues with permanently_set_uid(),
+ the private hostkey and ptrace()
+ - [sshconnect.c]
+ more detailed messages about adding and checking hostkeys
+
+19991115
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [ssh-add.c] change passphrase loop logic and remove ref to
+ $DISPLAY, ok niels
+ - Changed to ssh-add.c broke askpass support. Revised it to be a little more
+ modular.
+ - Revised autoconf support for enabling/disabling askpass support.
+ - Merged more OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ [auth-krb4.c]
+ - disconnect if getpeername() fails
+ - missing xfree(*client)
+ [canohost.c]
+ - disconnect if getpeername() fails
+ - fix comment: we _do_ disconnect if ip-options are set
+ [sshd.c]
+ - disconnect if getpeername() fails
+ - move checking of remote port to central place
+ [auth-rhosts.c] move checking of remote port to central place
+ [log-server.c] avoid extra fd per sshd, from millert@
+ [readconf.c] print _all_ bad config-options in ssh(1), too
+ [readconf.h] print _all_ bad config-options in ssh(1), too
+ [ssh.c] print _all_ bad config-options in ssh(1), too
+ [sshconnect.c] disconnect if getpeername() fails
+ - OpenBSD's changes to sshd.c broke the PAM stuff, re-merged it.
+ - Various small cleanups to bring diff (against OpenBSD) size down.
+ - Merged more Solaris compability from Marc G. Fournier
+ <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca>
+ - Wrote autoconf tests for __progname symbol
+ - RPM spec file fixes from Jim Knoble <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx>
+ - Released 1.2pre12
+
+ - Another OpenBSD CVS update:
+ - [ssh-keygen.1] fix .Xr
+
+19991114
+ - Solaris compilation fixes (still imcomplete)
+
+19991113
+ - Build patch from Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk>
+ - Don't install config files if they already exist
+ - Fix inclusion of additional preprocessor directives from acconfig.h
+ - Removed redundant inclusions of config.h
+ - Added 'Obsoletes' lines to RPM spec file
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [bufaux.c] save a view malloc/memcpy/memset/free's, ok niels
+ - [scp.c] fix overflow reported by damien@ibs.com.au: off_t
+ totalsize, ok niels,aaron
+ - Delay fork (-f option) in ssh until after port forwarded connections
+ have been initialised. Patch from Jani Hakala <jahakala@cc.jyu.fi>
+ - Added shadow password patch from Thomas Neumann <tom@smart.ruhr.de>
+ - Added ifdefs to auth-passwd.c to exclude it when PAM is enabled
+ - Tidied default config file some more
+ - Revised Redhat initscript to fix bug: sshd (re)start would fail
+ if executed from inside a ssh login.
+
+19991112
+ - Merged changes from OpenBSD CVS
+ - [sshd.c] session_key_int may be zero
+ - [auth-rh-rsa.c servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config]
+ IgnoreUserKnownHosts(default=no), used for RhostRSAAuth, ok
+ deraadt,millert
+ - Brought default sshd_config more in line with OpenBSD's
+ - Grab server in gnome-ssh-askpass (Debian bug #49872)
+ - Released 1.2pre10
+
+ - Added INSTALL documentation
+ - Merged yet more changes from OpenBSD CVS
+ - [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c channels.c clientloop.c]
+ [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
+ make all access to options via 'extern Options options'
+ and 'extern ServerOptions options' respectively;
+ options are no longer passed as arguments:
+ * make options handling more consistent
+ * remove #include "readconf.h" from ssh.h
+ * readconf.h is only included if necessary
+ - [mpaux.c] clear temp buffer
+ - [servconf.c] print _all_ bad options found in configfile
+ - Make ssh-askpass support optional through autoconf
+ - Fix nasty division-by-zero error in scp.c
+ - Released 1.2pre11
+
+19991111
+ - Added (untested) Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) support
+ - Fixed /dev/urandom fd leak (Debian bug #49722)
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [auth-rh-rsa.c] user/958: check ~/.ssh/known_hosts for rhosts-rsa, too
+ - [ssh.1] user/958: check ~/.ssh/known_hosts for rhosts-rsa, too
+ - [sshd.8] user/958: check ~/.ssh/known_hosts for rhosts-rsa, too
+ - Fix integer overflow which was messing up scp's progress bar for large
+ file transfers. Fix submitted to OpenBSD developers. Report and fix
+ from Kees Cook <cook@cpoint.net>
+ - Merged more OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c] remove x11- and krb-cleanup from fatal()
+ + krb-cleanup cleanup
+ - [clientloop.c log-client.c log-server.c ]
+ [readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ]
+ [ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8]
+ add LogLevel {QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, CHAT, DEBUG} to ssh/sshd,
+ obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging in sshd.
+ - [sshd.c] fix fatal/assert() bug reported by damien@ibs.com.au:
+ allow session_key_int != sizeof(session_key)
+ [this should fix the pre-assert-removal-core-files]
+ - Updated default config file to use new LogLevel option and to improve
+ readability
+
+19991110
+ - Merged several minor fixes:
+ - ssh-agent commandline parsing
+ - RPM spec file now installs ssh setuid root
+ - Makefile creates libdir
+ - Merged beginnings of Solaris compability from Marc G. Fournier
+ <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca>
+
+19991109
+ - Autodetection of SSL/Crypto library location via autoconf
+ - Fixed location of ssh-askpass to follow autoconf
+ - Integrated Makefile patch from Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk>
+ - Autodetection of RSAref library for US users
+ - Minor doc updates
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [rsa.c] bugfix: use correct size for memset()
+ - [sshconnect.c] warn if announced size of modulus 'n' != real size
+ - Added GNOME passphrase requestor (use --with-gnome-askpass)
+ - RPM build now creates subpackages
+ - Released 1.2pre9
+
+19991108
+ - Removed debian/ directory. This is now being maintained separately.
+ - Added symlinks for slogin in RPM spec file
+ - Fixed permissions on manpages in RPM spec file
+ - Added references to required libraries in README file
+ - Removed config.h.in from CVS
+ - Removed pwdb support (better pluggable auth is provided by glibc)
+ - Made PAM and requisite libdl optional
+ - Removed lots of unnecessary checks from autoconf
+ - Added support and autoconf test for openpty() function (Unix98 pty support)
+ - Fix for scp not finding ssh if not installed as /usr/bin/ssh
+ - Added TODO file
+ - Merged parts of Debian patch From Phil Hands <phil@hands.com>:
+ - Added ssh-askpass program
+ - Added ssh-askpass support to ssh-add.c
+ - Create symlinks for slogin on install
+ - Fix "distclean" target in makefile
+ - Added example for ssh-agent to manpage
+ - Added support for PAM_TEXT_INFO messages
+ - Disable internal /etc/nologin support if PAM enabled
+ - Merged latest OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [all] replace assert() with error, fatal or packet_disconnect
+ - [sshd.c] don't send fail-msg but disconnect if too many authentication
+ failures
+ - [sshd.c] remove unused argument. ok dugsong
+ - [sshd.c] typo
+ - [rsa.c] clear buffers used for encryption. ok: niels
+ - [rsa.c] replace assert() with error, fatal or packet_disconnect
+ - [auth-krb4.c] remove unused argument. ok dugsong
+ - Fixed coredump after merge of OpenBSD rsa.c patch
+ - Released 1.2pre8
+
+19991102
+ - Merged change from OpenBSD CVS
+ - One-line cleanup in sshd.c
+
+19991030
+ - Integrated debian package support from Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com>
+ - Merged latest updates for OpenBSD CVS:
+ - channels.[ch] - remove broken x11 fix and document istate/ostate
+ - ssh-agent.c - call setsid() regardless of argv[]
+ - ssh.c - save a few lines when disabling rhosts-{rsa-}auth
+ - Documentation cleanups
+ - Renamed README -> README.Ylonen
+ - Renamed README.openssh ->README
+
+19991029
+ - Renamed openssh* back to ssh* at request of Theo de Raadt
+ - Incorporated latest changes from OpenBSD's CVS
+ - Integrated Makefile patch from Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk>
+ - Integrated PAM env patch from Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin.dahyabhai@pobox.com>
+ - Make distclean now removed configure script
+ - Improved PAM logging
+ - Added some debug() calls for PAM
+ - Removed redundant subdirectories
+ - Integrated part of a patch from Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com> for
+ building on Debian.
+ - Fixed off-by-one error in PAM env patch
+ - Released 1.2pre6
+
+19991028
+ - Further PAM enhancements.
+ - Much cleaner
+ - Now uses account and session modules for all logins.
+ - Integrated patch from Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com>
+ - Build fixes
+ - Autoconf
+ - Change binary names to open*
+ - Fixed autoconf script to detect PAM on RH6.1
+ - Added tests for libpwdb, and OpenBSD functions to autoconf
+ - Released 1.2pre4
+
+ - Imported latest OpenBSD CVS code
+ - Updated README.openssh
+ - Released 1.2pre5
+
+19991027
+ - Adapted PAM patch.
+ - Released 1.0pre2
+
+ - Excised my buggy replacements for strlcpy and mkdtemp
+ - Imported correct OpenBSD strlcpy and mkdtemp routines.
+ - Reduced arc4random_stir entropy read to 32 bytes (256 bits)
+ - Picked up correct version number from OpenBSD
+ - Added sshd.pam PAM configuration file
+ - Added sshd.init Redhat init script
+ - Added openssh.spec RPM spec file
+ - Released 1.2pre3
+
+19991026
+ - Fixed include paths of OpenSSL functions
+ - Use OpenSSL MD5 routines
+ - Imported RC4 code from nanocrypt
+ - Wrote replacements for OpenBSD arc4random* functions
+ - Wrote replacements for strlcpy and mkdtemp
+ - Released 1.0pre1
+
+$Id$
--- /dev/null
+1. Prerequisites
+----------------
+
+You will need working installations of Zlib and OpenSSL.
+
+Zlib:
+http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
+
+OpenSSL 0.9.5a or greater:
+http://www.openssl.org/
+
+RPMs of OpenSSL are available at http://violet.ibs.com.au/openssh/files/support.
+For Red Hat Linux 6.2, they have been released as errata. RHL7 includes
+these.
+
+OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your system
+supports it. PAM is standard on Redhat and Debian Linux, Solaris and
+HP-UX 11.
+
+PAM:
+http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
+
+If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
+libraries and headers.
+
+GNOME:
+http://www.gnome.org/
+
+Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble@jmknoble.cx> has written an excellent X11
+passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
+
+http://www.ntrnet.net/~jmknoble/software/x11-ssh-askpass/index.html
+
+PRNGD:
+
+If your system lacks Kernel based random collection, the use of Lutz
+Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
+
+http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html
+
+EGD:
+
+The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is supported if you have a system which
+lacks /dev/random and don't want to use OpenSSH's internal entropy collection.
+
+http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
+
+GNU Make:
+ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/make/
+
+OpenSSH has only been tested with GNU make. It may work with other
+'make' programs, but you are on your own.
+
+PCRE (PERL-compatible Regular Expression library):
+ftp://ftp.cus.cam.ac.uk/pub/software/programing/pcre/
+
+Most platforms do not require this. However older Unices may not have a
+posix regex library. PCRE provides a POSIX interface.
+
+S/Key Libraries:
+http://www.sparc.spb.su/solaris/skey/
+
+If you wish to use --with-skey then you will need the above library
+installed. No other current S/Key library is currently known to be
+supported.
+
+2. Building / Installation
+--------------------------
+
+To install OpenSSH with default options:
+
+./configure
+make
+make install
+
+This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
+in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
+installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
+
+./configure --prefix=/opt
+make
+make install
+
+Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
+specific paths, for example:
+
+./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
+make
+make install
+
+This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
+configuration files in /etc/ssh.
+
+If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
+file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
+them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
+which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
+for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd
+executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
+
+A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
+you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
+using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
+contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a
+valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
+authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
+configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
+name).
+
+There are a few other options to the configure script:
+
+--with-rsh=PATH allows you to specify the path to your rsh program.
+Normally ./configure will search the current $PATH for 'rsh'. You
+may need to specify this option if rsh is not in your path or has a
+different name.
+
+--with-pam enables PAM support.
+
+--enable-gnome-askpass will build the GNOME passphrase dialog. You
+need a working installation of GNOME, including the development
+headers, for this to work.
+
+--with-random=/some/file allows you to specify an alternate source of
+random numbers (the default is /dev/urandom). Unless you are absolutely
+sure of what you are doing, it is best to leave this alone.
+
+--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
+support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
+/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
+collection support.
+
+--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
+and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
+/dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy
+collection support.
+
+--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
+./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
+it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
+
+--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
+
+--with-sia, --without-sia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
+Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
+
+--with-kerberos4=PATH will enable Kerberos IV support. You will need
+to have the Kerberos libraries and header files installed for this
+to work. Use the optional PATH argument to specify the root of your
+Kerberos installation.
+
+--with-afs=PATH will enable AFS support. You will need to have the
+Kerberos IV and the AFS libraries and header files installed for this
+to work. Use the optional PATH argument to specify the root of your
+AFS installation. AFS requires Kerberos support to be enabled.
+
+--with-skey=PATH will enable S/Key one time password support. You will
+need the S/Key libraries and header files installed for this to work.
+
+--with-tcp-wrappers will enable TCP Wrappers (/etc/hosts.allow|deny)
+support. You will need libwrap.a and tcpd.h installed.
+
+--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
+if your operating system uses MD5 passwords without using PAM.
+
+--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
+some platforms.
+
+--without-shadow disables shadow password support.
+
+--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
+$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
+
+--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
+started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
+
+--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the ssh.pid file is
+created.
+
+--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
+
+--with-ipv4-default instructs OpenSSH to use IPv4 by default for new
+connections. Normally OpenSSH will try attempt to lookup both IPv6 and
+IPv4 addresses. On Linux/glibc-2.1.2 this causes long delays in name
+resolution. If this option is specified, you can still attempt to
+connect to IPv6 addresses using the command line option '-6'.
+
+--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your OpenSSL libraries
+are installed.
+
+--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
+real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
+
+If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
+can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
+For example:
+
+CFLAGS="-O -m486" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" LD="/usr/foo/ld" ./configure
+
+3. Configuration
+----------------
+
+The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
+whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
+
+The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
+review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
+
+To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
+manually using the following commands:
+
+ ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
+ ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
+ ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
+
+Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
+(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
+configuration)
+
+If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is
+running and has collected some Entropy.
+
+For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
+for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
+
+4. Problems?
+------------
+
+If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH.
+Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
+http://www.openssh.com/
+
+
+$Id$
--- /dev/null
+This file is part of the OpenSSH software.
+
+The licences which components of this software fall under are as
+follows. First, we will summarize and say that all components
+are under a BSD licence, or a licence more free than that.
+
+OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
+
+1)
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+
+ [Tatu continues]
+ * However, I am not implying to give any licenses to any patents or
+ * copyrights held by third parties, and the software includes parts that
+ * are not under my direct control. As far as I know, all included
+ * source code is used in accordance with the relevant license agreements
+ * and can be used freely for any purpose (the GNU license being the most
+ * restrictive); see below for details.
+
+ [However, none of that term is relevant at this point in time. All of
+ these restrictively licenced software components which he talks about
+ have been removed from OpenSSH, i.e.,
+
+ - RSA is no longer included, found in the OpenSSL library
+ - IDEA is no longer included, its use is deprecated
+ - DES is now external, in the OpenSSL library
+ - GMP is no longer used, and instead we call BN code from OpenSSL
+ - Zlib is now external, in a library
+ - The make-ssh-known-hosts script is no longer included
+ - TSS has been removed
+ - MD5 is now external, in the OpenSSL library
+ - RC4 support has been replaced with ARC4 support from OpenSSL
+ - Blowfish is now external, in the OpenSSL library
+
+ [The licence continues]
+
+ Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this
+ software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major
+ bookstore, scientific library, and patent office worldwide. More
+ information can be found e.g. at "http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto".
+
+ The legal status of this program is some combination of all these
+ permissions and restrictions. Use only at your own responsibility.
+ You will be responsible for any legal consequences yourself; I am not
+ making any claims whether possessing or using this is legal or not in
+ your country, and I am not taking any responsibility on your behalf.
+
+
+ NO WARRANTY
+
+ BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
+ FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN
+ OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
+ PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
+ OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS
+ TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE
+ PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
+ REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
+
+ IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
+ WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
+ REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
+ INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
+ OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
+ TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
+ YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
+ PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
+ POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+
+2)
+ The 32-bit CRC implementation in crc32.c is due to Gary S. Brown.
+ Comments in the file indicate it may be used for any purpose without
+ restrictions:
+
+ * COPYRIGHT (C) 1986 Gary S. Brown. You may use this program, or
+ * code or tables extracted from it, as desired without restriction.
+
+3)
+ The 32-bit CRC compensation attack detector in deattack.c was
+ contributed by CORE SDI S.A. under a BSD-style license.
+
+ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
+ * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
+ * this copyright notice is retained.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
+ * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
+
+4)
+ ssh-keygen was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style
+ license.
+
+ * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+ *
+ * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+ * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+ * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+
+5)
+ The Rijndael implementation by Vincent Rijmen, Antoon Bosselaers
+ and Paulo Barreto is in the public domain and distributed
+ with the following license:
+
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+6)
+ Remaining components of the software are provided under a standard
+ 2-term BSD licence with the following names as copyright holders:
+
+ Markus Friedl
+ Theo de Raadt
+ Niels Provos
+ Dug Song
+ Aaron Campbell
+ Damien Miller
+ Kevin Steves
+
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
--- /dev/null
+# $Id$
+
+prefix=@prefix@
+exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
+bindir=@bindir@
+sbindir=@sbindir@
+libexecdir=@libexecdir@
+datadir=@datadir@
+mandir=@mandir@
+mansubdir=@mansubdir@
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+DESTDIR=
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+
+PATHS= -DETCDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\"
+
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+AR=@AR@
+RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+PERL=@PERL@
+ENT=@ENT@
+XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+SSH_MODE= @SSHMODE@
+
+INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
+
+@NO_SFTP@SFTP_PROGS=sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(SFTP_PROGS)
+
+LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dh.o dispatch.o mac.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o log.o match.o misc.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o rijndael.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o scard.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o
+
+SSHOBJS= ssh.o sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o sshtty.o readconf.o clientloop.o
+
+SSHDOBJS= sshd.o auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o auth-rhosts.o auth-options.o auth-krb4.o auth-pam.o auth2-pam.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o auth-sia.o sshpty.o sshlogin.o loginrec.o servconf.o serverloop.o md5crypt.o session.o groupaccess.o auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o
+
+MANPAGES = scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out
+MANPAGES_IN = scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1
+MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
+
+CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
+CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
+
+PATHSUBS = \
+ -D/etc/ssh_config=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config \
+ -D/etc/ssh_known_hosts=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts \
+ -D/etc/sshd_config=$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config \
+ -D/usr/libexec=$(libexecdir) \
+ -D/etc/shosts.equiv=$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv \
+ -D/etc/ssh_host_key=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key \
+ -D/etc/ssh_host_dsa_key=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key \
+ -D/etc/ssh_host_rsa_key=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key \
+ -D/var/run/sshd.pid=$(piddir)/sshd.pid \
+ -D/etc/moduli=$(sysconfdir)/moduli \
+ -D/etc/sshrc=$(sysconfdir)/sshrc \
+ -D/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth=$(XAUTH_PATH) \
+ -D/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin=@user_path@
+
+FIXPATHSCMD = $(PERL) $(srcdir)/fixpaths $(PATHSUBS)
+
+all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+
+$(LIBSSH_OBJS): config.h
+$(SSHOBJS): config.h
+$(SSHDOBJS): config.h
+
+.c.o:
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+
+LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+$(LIBCOMPAT): always
+ (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
+always:
+
+libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+ $(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+ $(RANLIB) $@
+
+ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ scp.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-int.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-int.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
+ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
+ else \
+ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \
+ fi; \
+ if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \
+ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(PERL) $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.pl > $@; \
+ else \
+ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} > $@; \
+ fi
+
+$(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN)
+ conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \
+ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+ rm -f *.out core
+ (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean)
+
+distclean:
+ rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+ rm -f *.out core
+ rm -f Makefile config.h config.status ssh_prng_cmds *~
+ rm -rf autom4te.cache
+ (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
+ (cd scard && $(MAKE) distclean)
+
+veryclean:
+ rm -f configure config.h.in *.0
+ rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+ rm -f *.out core
+ rm -f Makefile config.h config.status ssh_prng_cmds *~
+ (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
+ (cd scard && $(MAKE) distclean)
+
+mrproper: distclean
+
+catman-do:
+ @for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \
+ base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \
+ echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \
+ nroff -mandoc $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \
+ >$$base.0 ; \
+ done
+
+distprep: catman-do
+ autoreconf
+ (cd scard && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.in distprep)
+
+install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files host-key
+install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files
+
+scard-install:
+ (cd scard && $(MAKE) DESTDIR=$(DESTDIR) install)
+
+install-files: scard-install
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(datadir)
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m $(SSH_MODE) -s ssh $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s scp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-add $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-agent $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-keygen $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-keyscan $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s sshd $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd
+ @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s sftp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp
+ @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s sftp-server $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+ @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+ @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+ ln -s ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+ ln -s ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
+ #@FILEPRIV@ -f dev,filesys,driver $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+ if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
+ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \
+ fi
+ if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
+ else \
+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
+ fi
+ if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \
+ else \
+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
+ fi
+ if [ -f ssh_prng_cmds -a ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS)" ]; then \
+ $(PERL) $(srcdir)/fixprogs ssh_prng_cmds $(ENT); \
+ if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds ] ; then \
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_prng_cmds.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds; \
+ else \
+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
+ fi ; \
+ fi
+ if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \
+ if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \
+ echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
+ mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
+ else \
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \
+ fi ; \
+ else \
+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
+ fi
+
+host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \
+ if [ -f "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key" ] ; then \
+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key already exists, skipping." ; \
+ else \
+ ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N "" ; \
+ fi ; \
+ if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key ] ; then \
+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \
+ else \
+ ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" ; \
+ fi ; \
+ if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key ] ; then \
+ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \
+ else \
+ ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" ; \
+ fi ; \
+ fi ;
+
+host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N ""
+ ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
+ ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
+
+uninstallall: uninstall
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
+ -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
+
+uninstall:
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
--- /dev/null
+[Note: This file has not been updated for OpenSSH versions after
+OpenSSH-1.2 and should be considered OBSOLETE. It has been left in
+the distribution because some of its information may still be useful
+to developers.]
+
+This document is intended for those who wish to read the ssh source
+code. This tries to give an overview of the structure of the code.
+
+Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+Updated 17 Nov 1995.
+Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2
+Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2
+
+The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and
+the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and
+make-ssh-known-hosts. The main program for each of these is in a .c
+file with the same name.
+
+There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of
+these programs.
+
+ Buffer manipulation routines
+
+ - These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended.
+ Data can be consumed from either end. The code is used heavily
+ throughout ssh. The basic buffer manipulation functions are in
+ buffer.c (header buffer.h), and additional code to manipulate specific
+ data types is in bufaux.c.
+
+ Compression Library
+
+ - Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB).
+
+ Encryption/Decryption
+
+ - Ssh contains several encryption algorithms. These are all
+ accessed through the cipher.h interface. The interface code is
+ in cipher.c, and the implementations are in libc.
+
+ Multiple Precision Integer Library
+
+ - Uses the SSLeay BIGNUM sublibrary.
+ - Some auxiliary functions for mp-int manipulation are in mpaux.c.
+
+ Random Numbers
+
+ - Uses arc4random() and such.
+
+ RSA key generation, encryption, decryption
+
+ - Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl.
+
+ RSA key files
+
+ - RSA keys are stored in files with a special format. The code to
+ read/write these files is in authfile.c. The files are normally
+ encrypted with a passphrase. The functions to read passphrases
+ are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords).
+
+ Binary packet protocol
+
+ - The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c. The
+ code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their
+ execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and
+ extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt
+ packets. CRC code comes from crc32.c.
+
+ - The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines
+ (buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (compress.c, zlib),
+ and the encryption routines.
+
+ X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding
+
+ - Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c.
+ The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication
+ channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to
+ implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication
+ agent forwarding.
+ The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c
+
+ Authentication agent
+
+ - Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c.
+
+ Authentication methods
+
+ - Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c
+ (auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c). This
+ code is linked into the server. The routines also manipulate
+ known hosts files using code in hostfile.c. Code in canohost.c
+ is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host.
+ Code in match.c is used to match host names.
+
+ - In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c. It
+ reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c. It reads
+ RSA key files with authfile.c. It communicates the
+ authentication agent using authfd.c.
+
+ The ssh client
+
+ - The client main program is in ssh.c. It first parses arguments
+ and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in
+ sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a
+ proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c).
+ It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests. It may call
+ code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes. Finally it
+ calls client_loop in clientloop.c. This does the real work for
+ the session.
+
+ - The client is suid root. It tries to temporarily give up this
+ rights while reading the configuration data. The root
+ privileges are only used to make the connection (from a
+ privileged socket). Any extra privileges are dropped before
+ calling ssh_login.
+
+ Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes
+
+ - Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c. Code to
+ encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c.
+
+ Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.)
+
+ - The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in
+ login.c. This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp,
+ and lastlog files. Some of the code is in sshd.c.
+
+ Writing to the system log and terminal
+
+ - The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error()
+ in many places to write messages to system log or user's
+ terminal. The implementation that logs to system log is in
+ log-server.c; it is used in the server program. The other
+ programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it
+ is in log-client.c. The definitions are in ssh.h.
+
+ The sshd server (daemon)
+
+ - The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the
+ configuration file (servconf.c). It then reads the host key,
+ starts listening for connections, and generates the server key.
+ The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm.
+
+ - When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the
+ regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client.
+ They first perform identification string exchange, then
+ negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory
+ operations, and finally the server enters the normal session
+ mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c. This does the real
+ work, calling functions in other modules.
+
+ - The code for the server is in sshd.c. It contains a lot of
+ stuff, including:
+ - server main program
+ - waiting for connections
+ - processing new connection
+ - authentication
+ - preparatory operations
+ - building up the execution environment for the user program
+ - starting the user program.
+
+ Auxiliary files
+
+ - There are several other files in the distribution that contain
+ various auxiliary routines:
+ ssh.h the main header file for ssh (various definitions)
+ getput.h byte-order independent storage of integers
+ includes.h includes most system headers. Lots of #ifdefs.
+ tildexpand.c expand tilde in file names
+ uidswap.c uid-swapping
+ xmalloc.c "safe" malloc routines
--- /dev/null
+- A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
+- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
+- Thanks to HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@klab.org>
+
+This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
+Unices.
+
+OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
+implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
+external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
+reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
+and Dug Song. It has a homepage at http://www.openssh.com/
+
+This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
+support (for Linux and Solaris), EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements
+for OpenBSD library functions that are (regrettably) absent from other
+unices. This port has been best tested on Linux, Solaris, HP-UX, NetBSD
+and Irix. Support for AIX, SCO, NeXT and other Unices is underway.
+This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
+
+The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
+commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
+all logins, not just when using password authentication.
+
+OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5].
+
+There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
+refer to http://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
+
+Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list
+openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by
+unsubscribed users.
+
+If you are a citizen of an USA-embargoed country to which export of
+cryptographic products is restricted, then please refrain from sending
+crypto-related code or patches to the list. We cannot accept them.
+Other code contribution are accepted, but please follow the OpenBSD
+style guidelines[6].
+
+Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install
+OpenSSH on your system. There are a number of differences between this
+port of OpenSSH and F-Secure SSH 1.x, please refer to the OpenSSH FAQ[7]
+for details and general tips.
+
+Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+
+Miscellania -
+
+This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD
+CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample
+implementation released by Tatu Ylonen.
+
+References -
+
+[0] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
+[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
+[2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html
+[3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
+[4] http://www.openssl.org/
+[5] http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ (PAM is standard on Solaris
+ and HP-UX 11)
+[6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
+[7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
+
+$Id$
--- /dev/null
+How to use smartcards with OpenSSH?
+
+OpenSSH contains experimental support for authentication using
+Cyberflex smartcards and TODOS card readers.
+
+WARNING: Smartcard support is still in development. Keyfile formats, etc
+are still subject to change.
+
+To enable this you need to:
+
+(1) install sectok
+
+ Sources are instructions are available from
+ http://www.citi.umich.edu/projects/smartcard/sectok.html
+
+(2) enable SMARTCARD support in OpenSSH:
+
+ $ ./configure --with-smartcard [options]
+
+ You can also specify a path to libsectok:
+
+ $ ./configure --with-smartcard=/path/to/libsectok [options]
+
+(3) load the Java Cardlet to the Cyberflex card:
+
+ $ sectok
+ sectok> login -d
+ sectok> jload /usr/libdata/ssh/Ssh.bin
+ sectok> quit
+
+(4) load a RSA key to the card:
+
+ please don't use your production RSA keys, since
+ with the current version of sectok/ssh-keygen
+ the private key file is still readable
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -f /path/to/rsakey -U 1
+ (where 1 is the reader number, you can also try 0)
+
+ In spite of the name, this does not generate a key.
+ It just loads an already existing key on to the card.
+
+(5) optional:
+
+ Change the card password so that only you can
+ read the private key:
+
+ $ sectok
+ sectok> login -d
+ sectok> setpass
+ sectok> quit
+
+ This prevents reading the key but not use of the
+ key by the card applet.
+
+ Do not forget the passphrase. There is no way to
+ recover if you do.
+
+ IMPORTANT WARNING: If you attempt to login with the
+ wrong passphrase three times in a row, you will
+ destroy your card.
+
+(6) tell the ssh client to use the card reader:
+
+ $ ssh -I 1 otherhost
+
+(7) or tell the agent (don't forget to restart) to use the smartcard:
+
+ $ ssh-add -s 1
+
+-markus,
+Tue Jul 17 23:54:51 CEST 2001
--- /dev/null
+.\" -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: RFC.nroff,v 1.2 2000/10/16 09:38:44 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.pl 10.0i
+.po 0
+.ll 7.2i
+.lt 7.2i
+.nr LL 7.2i
+.nr LT 7.2i
+.ds LF Ylonen
+.ds RF FORMFEED[Page %]
+.ds CF
+.ds LH Internet-Draft
+.ds RH 15 November 1995
+.ds CH SSH (Secure Shell) Remote Login Protocol
+.na
+.hy 0
+.in 0
+Network Working Group T. Ylonen
+Internet-Draft Helsinki University of Technology
+draft-ylonen-ssh-protocol-00.txt 15 November 1995
+Expires: 15 May 1996
+
+.in 3
+
+.ce
+The SSH (Secure Shell) Remote Login Protocol
+
+.ti 0
+Status of This Memo
+
+This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
+documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
+and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
+working documents as Internet-Drafts.
+
+Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
+months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other docu-
+ments at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
+reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in pro-
+gress.''
+
+To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
+``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet- Drafts Shadow
+Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe),
+munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or
+ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).
+
+The distribution of this memo is unlimited.
+
+.ti 0
+Introduction
+
+SSH (Secure Shell) is a program to log into another computer over a
+network, to execute commands in a remote machine, and to move files
+from one machine to another. It provides strong authentication and
+secure communications over insecure networks. Its features include
+the following:
+.IP o
+Closes several security holes (e.g., IP, routing, and DNS spoofing).
+New authentication methods: .rhosts together with RSA [RSA] based host
+authentication, and pure RSA authentication.
+.IP o
+All communications are automatically and transparently encrypted.
+Encryption is also used to protect integrity.
+.IP o
+X11 connection forwarding provides secure X11 sessions.
+.IP o
+Arbitrary TCP/IP ports can be redirected over the encrypted channel
+in both directions.
+.IP o
+Client RSA-authenticates the server machine in the beginning of every
+connection to prevent trojan horses (by routing or DNS spoofing) and
+man-in-the-middle attacks, and the server RSA-authenticates the client
+machine before accepting .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication
+(to prevent DNS, routing, or IP spoofing).
+.IP o
+An authentication agent, running in the user's local workstation or
+laptop, can be used to hold the user's RSA authentication keys.
+.RT
+
+The goal has been to make the software as easy to use as possible for
+ordinary users. The protocol has been designed to be as secure as
+possible while making it possible to create implementations that
+are easy to use and install. The sample implementation has a number
+of convenient features that are not described in this document as they
+are not relevant for the protocol.
+
+
+.ti 0
+Overview of the Protocol
+
+The software consists of a server program running on a server machine,
+and a client program running on a client machine (plus a few auxiliary
+programs). The machines are connected by an insecure IP [RFC0791]
+network (that can be monitored, tampered with, and spoofed by hostile
+parties).
+
+A connection is always initiated by the client side. The server
+listens on a specific port waiting for connections. Many clients may
+connect to the same server machine.
+
+The client and the server are connected via a TCP/IP [RFC0793] socket
+that is used for bidirectional communication. Other types of
+transport can be used but are currently not defined.
+
+When the client connects the server, the server accepts the connection
+and responds by sending back its version identification string. The
+client parses the server's identification, and sends its own
+identification. The purpose of the identification strings is to
+validate that the connection was to the correct port, declare the
+protocol version number used, and to declare the software version used
+on each side (for debugging purposes). The identification strings are
+human-readable. If either side fails to understand or support the
+other side's version, it closes the connection.
+
+After the protocol identification phase, both sides switch to a packet
+based binary protocol. The server starts by sending its host key
+(every host has an RSA key used to authenticate the host), server key
+(an RSA key regenerated every hour), and other information to the
+client. The client then generates a 256 bit session key, encrypts it
+using both RSA keys (see below for details), and sends the encrypted
+session key and selected cipher type to the server. Both sides then
+turn on encryption using the selected algorithm and key. The server
+sends an encrypted confirmation message to the client.
+
+The client then authenticates itself using any of a number of
+authentication methods. The currently supported authentication
+methods are .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication (disabled by
+default), the same with RSA-based host authentication, RSA
+authentication, and password authentication.
+
+After successful authentication, the client makes a number of requests
+to prepare for the session. Typical requests include allocating a
+pseudo tty, starting X11 [X11] or TCP/IP port forwarding, starting
+authentication agent forwarding, and executing the shell or a command.
+
+When a shell or command is executed, the connection enters interactive
+session mode. In this mode, data is passed in both directions,
+new forwarded connections may be opened, etc. The interactive session
+normally terminates when the server sends the exit status of the
+program to the client.
+
+
+The protocol makes several reservations for future extensibility.
+First of all, the initial protocol identification messages include the
+protocol version number. Second, the first packet by both sides
+includes a protocol flags field, which can be used to agree on
+extensions in a compatible manner. Third, the authentication and
+session preparation phases work so that the client sends requests to
+the server, and the server responds with success or failure. If the
+client sends a request that the server does not support, the server
+simply returns failure for it. This permits compatible addition of
+new authentication methods and preparation operations. The
+interactive session phase, on the other hand, works asynchronously and
+does not permit the use of any extensions (because there is no easy
+and reliable way to signal rejection to the other side and problems
+would be hard to debug). Any compatible extensions to this phase must
+be agreed upon during any of the earlier phases.
+
+.ti 0
+The Binary Packet Protocol
+
+After the protocol identification strings, both sides only send
+specially formatted packets. The packet layout is as follows:
+.IP o
+Packet length: 32 bit unsigned integer, coded as four 8-bit bytes, msb
+first. Gives the length of the packet, not including the length field
+and padding. The maximum length of a packet (not including the length
+field and padding) is 262144 bytes.
+.IP o
+Padding: 1-8 bytes of random data (or zeroes if not encrypting). The
+amount of padding is (8 - (length % 8)) bytes (where % stands for the
+modulo operator). The rationale for always having some random padding
+at the beginning of each packet is to make known plaintext attacks
+more difficult.
+.IP o
+Packet type: 8-bit unsigned byte. The value 255 is reserved for
+future extension.
+.IP o
+Data: binary data bytes, depending on the packet type. The number of
+data bytes is the "length" field minus 5.
+.IP o
+Check bytes: 32-bit crc, four 8-bit bytes, msb first. The crc is the
+Cyclic Redundancy Check, with the polynomial 0xedb88320, of the
+Padding, Packet type, and Data fields. The crc is computed before
+any encryption.
+.RT
+
+The packet, except for the length field, may be encrypted using any of
+a number of algorithms. The length of the encrypted part (Padding +
+Type + Data + Check) is always a multiple of 8 bytes. Typically the
+cipher is used in a chained mode, with all packets chained together as
+if it was a single data stream (the length field is never included in
+the encryption process). Details of encryption are described below.
+
+When the session starts, encryption is turned off. Encryption is
+enabled after the client has sent the session key. The encryption
+algorithm to use is selected by the client.
+
+
+.ti 0
+Packet Compression
+
+If compression is supported (it is an optional feature, see
+SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION below), the packet type and data fields
+of the packet are compressed using the gzip deflate algorithm [GZIP].
+If compression is in effect, the packet length field indicates the
+length of the compressed data, plus 4 for the crc. The amount of
+padding is computed from the compressed data, so that the amount of
+data to be encrypted becomes a multiple of 8 bytes.
+
+When compressing, the packets (type + data portions) in each direction
+are compressed as if they formed a continuous data stream, with only the
+current compression block flushed between packets. This corresponds
+to the GNU ZLIB library Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH option. The compression
+dictionary is not flushed between packets. The two directions are
+compressed independently of each other.
+
+
+.ti 0
+Packet Encryption
+
+The protocol supports several encryption methods. During session
+initialization, the server sends a bitmask of all encryption methods
+that it supports, and the client selects one of these methods. The
+client also generates a 256-bit random session key (32 8-bit bytes) and
+sends it to the server.
+
+The encryption methods supported by the current implementation, and
+their codes are:
+.TS
+center;
+l r l.
+SSH_CIPHER_NONE 0 No encryption
+SSH_CIPHER_IDEA 1 IDEA in CFB mode
+SSH_CIPHER_DES 2 DES in CBC mode
+SSH_CIPHER_3DES 3 Triple-DES in CBC mode
+SSH_CIPHER_TSS 4 An experimental stream cipher
+SSH_CIPHER_RC4 5 RC4
+.TE
+
+All implementations are required to support SSH_CIPHER_DES and
+SSH_CIPHER_3DES. Supporting SSH_CIPHER_IDEA, SSH_CIPHER_RC4, and
+SSH_CIPHER_NONE is recommended. Support for SSH_CIPHER_TSS is
+optional (and it is not described in this document). Other ciphers
+may be added at a later time; support for them is optional.
+
+For encryption, the encrypted portion of the packet is considered a
+linear byte stream. The length of the stream is always a multiple of
+8. The encrypted portions of consecutive packets (in the same
+direction) are encrypted as if they were a continuous buffer (that is,
+any initialization vectors are passed from the previous packet to the
+next packet). Data in each direction is encrypted independently.
+.IP SSH_CIPHER_DES
+The key is taken from the first 8 bytes of the session key. The least
+significant bit of each byte is ignored. This results in 56 bits of
+key data. DES [DES] is used in CBC mode. The iv (initialization vector) is
+initialized to all zeroes.
+.IP SSH_CIPHER_3DES
+The variant of triple-DES used here works as follows: there are three
+independent DES-CBC ciphers, with independent initialization vectors.
+The data (the whole encrypted data stream) is first encrypted with the
+first cipher, then decrypted with the second cipher, and finally
+encrypted with the third cipher. All these operations are performed
+in CBC mode.
+
+The key for the first cipher is taken from the first 8 bytes of the
+session key; the key for the next cipher from the next 8 bytes, and
+the key for the third cipher from the following 8 bytes. All three
+initialization vectors are initialized to zero.
+
+(Note: the variant of 3DES used here differs from some other
+descriptions.)
+.IP SSH_CIPHER_IDEA
+The key is taken from the first 16 bytes of the session key. IDEA
+[IDEA] is used in CFB mode. The initialization vector is initialized
+to all zeroes.
+.IP SSH_CIPHER_TSS
+All 32 bytes of the session key are used as the key.
+
+There is no reference available for the TSS algorithm; it is currently
+only documented in the sample implementation source code. The
+security of this cipher is unknown (but it is quite fast). The cipher
+is basically a stream cipher that uses MD5 as a random number
+generator and takes feedback from the data.
+.IP SSH_CIPHER_RC4
+The first 16 bytes of the session key are used as the key for the
+server to client direction. The remaining 16 bytes are used as the
+key for the client to server direction. This gives independent
+128-bit keys for each direction.
+
+This algorithm is the alleged RC4 cipher posted to the Usenet in 1995.
+It is widely believed to be equivalent with the original RSADSI RC4
+cipher. This is a very fast algorithm.
+.RT
+
+
+.ti 0
+Data Type Encodings
+
+The Data field of each packet contains data encoded as described in
+this section. There may be several data items; each item is coded as
+described here, and their representations are concatenated together
+(without any alignment or padding).
+
+Each data type is stored as follows:
+.IP "8-bit byte"
+The byte is stored directly as a single byte.
+.IP "32-bit unsigned integer"
+Stored in 4 bytes, msb first.
+.IP "Arbitrary length binary string"
+First 4 bytes are the length of the string, msb first (not including
+the length itself). The following "length" bytes are the string
+value. There are no terminating null characters.
+.IP "Multiple-precision integer"
+First 2 bytes are the number of bits in the integer, msb first (for
+example, the value 0x00012345 would have 17 bits). The value zero has
+zero bits. It is permissible that the number of bits be larger than the
+real number of bits.
+
+The number of bits is followed by (bits + 7) / 8 bytes of binary data,
+msb first, giving the value of the integer.
+.RT
+
+
+.ti 0
+TCP/IP Port Number and Other Options
+
+The server listens for connections on TCP/IP port 22.
+
+The client may connect the server from any port. However, if the
+client wishes to use any form of .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
+authentication, it must connect from a privileged port (less than
+1024).
+
+For the IP Type of Service field [RFC0791], it is recommended that
+interactive sessions (those having a user terminal or forwarding X11
+connections) use the IPTOS_LOWDELAY, and non-interactive connections
+use IPTOS_THROUGHPUT.
+
+It is recommended that keepalives are used, because otherwise programs
+on the server may never notice if the other end of the connection is
+rebooted.
+
+
+.ti 0
+Protocol Version Identification
+
+After the socket is opened, the server sends an identification string,
+which is of the form
+"SSH-<protocolmajor>.<protocolminor>-<version>\\n", where
+<protocolmajor> and <protocolminor> are integers and specify the
+protocol version number (not software distribution version).
+<version> is server side software version string (max 40 characters);
+it is not interpreted by the remote side but may be useful for
+debugging.
+
+The client parses the server's string, and sends a corresponding
+string with its own information in response. If the server has lower
+version number, and the client contains special code to emulate it,
+the client responds with the lower number; otherwise it responds with
+its own number. The server then compares the version number the
+client sent with its own, and determines whether they can work
+together. The server either disconnects, or sends the first packet
+using the binary packet protocol and both sides start working
+according to the lower of the protocol versions.
+
+By convention, changes which keep the protocol compatible with
+previous versions keep the same major protocol version; changes that
+are not compatible increment the major version (which will hopefully
+never happen). The version described in this document is 1.3.
+
+The client will
+
+.ti 0
+Key Exchange and Server Host Authentication
+
+The first message sent by the server using the packet protocol is
+SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY. It declares the server's host key, server public
+key, supported ciphers, supported authentication methods, and flags
+for protocol extensions. It also contains a 64-bit random number
+(cookie) that must be returned in the client's reply (to make IP
+spoofing more difficult). No encryption is used for this message.
+
+Both sides compute a session id as follows. The modulus of the server
+key is interpreted as a byte string (without explicit length field,
+with minimum length able to hold the whole value), most significant
+byte first. This string is concatenated with the server host key
+interpreted the same way. Additionally, the cookie is concatenated
+with this. Both sides compute MD5 of the resulting string. The
+resulting 16 bytes (128 bits) are stored by both parties and are
+called the session id.
+
+The client responds with a SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY message, which
+contains the selected cipher type, a copy of the 64-bit cookie sent by
+the server, client's protocol flags, and a session key encrypted
+with both the server's host key and server key. No encryption is used
+for this message.
+
+The session key is 32 8-bit bytes (a total of 256 random bits
+generated by the client). The client first xors the 16 bytes of the
+session id with the first 16 bytes of the session key. The resulting
+string is then encrypted using the smaller key (one with smaller
+modulus), and the result is then encrypted using the other key. The
+number of bits in the public modulus of the two keys must differ by at
+least 128 bits.
+
+At each encryption step, a multiple-precision integer is constructed
+from the data to be encrypted as follows (the integer is here
+interpreted as a sequence of bytes, msb first; the number of bytes is
+the number of bytes needed to represent the modulus).
+
+The most significant byte (which is only partial as the value must be
+less than the public modulus, which is never a power of two) is zero.
+
+The next byte contains the value 2 (which stands for public-key
+encrypted data in the PKCS standard [PKCS#1]). Then, there are
+non-zero random bytes to fill any unused space, a zero byte, and the
+data to be encrypted in the least significant bytes, the last byte of
+the data in the least significant byte.
+
+This algorithm is used twice. First, it is used to encrypt the 32
+random bytes generated by the client to be used as the session key
+(xored by the session id). This value is converted to an integer as
+described above, and encrypted with RSA using the key with the smaller
+modulus. The resulting integer is converted to a byte stream, msb
+first. This byte stream is padded and encrypted identically using the
+key with the larger modulus.
+
+After the client has sent the session key, it starts to use the
+selected algorithm and key for decrypting any received packets, and
+for encrypting any sent packets. Separate ciphers are used for
+different directions (that is, both directions have separate
+initialization vectors or other state for the ciphers).
+
+When the server has received the session key message, and has turned
+on encryption, it sends a SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS message to the client.
+
+The recommended size of the host key is 1024 bits, and 768 bits for
+the server key. The minimum size is 512 bits for the smaller key.
+
+
+.ti 0
+Declaring the User Name
+
+The client then sends a SSH_CMSG_USER message to the server. This
+message specifies the user name to log in as.
+
+The server validates that such a user exists, checks whether
+authentication is needed, and responds with either SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS or
+SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS indicates that no authentication
+is needed for this user (no password), and authentication phase has
+now been completed. SSH_SMSG_FAILURE indicates that authentication is
+needed (or the user does not exist).
+
+If the user does not exist, it is recommended that this returns
+failure, but the server keeps reading messages from the client, and
+responds to any messages (except SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT, SSH_MSG_IGNORE,
+and SSH_MSG_DEBUG) with SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. This way the client cannot
+be certain whether the user exists.
+
+
+.ti 0
+Authentication Phase
+
+Provided the server didn't immediately accept the login, an
+authentication exchange begins. The client sends messages to the
+server requesting different types of authentication in arbitrary order as
+many times as desired (however, the server may close the connection
+after a timeout). The server always responds with SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if
+it has accepted the authentication, and with SSH_SMSG_FAILURE if it has
+denied authentication with the requested method or it does not
+recognize the message. Some authentication methods cause an exchange
+of further messages before the final result is sent. The
+authentication phase ends when the server responds with success.
+
+The recommended value for the authentication timeout (timeout before
+disconnecting if no successful authentication has been made) is 5
+minutes.
+
+The following authentication methods are currently supported:
+.TS
+center;
+l r l.
+SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS 1 .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
+SSH_AUTH_RSA 2 pure RSA authentication
+SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD 3 password authentication
+SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4 .rhosts with RSA host authentication
+.TE
+.IP SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS
+
+This is the authentication method used by rlogin and rsh [RFC1282].
+
+The client sends SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS with the client-side user name
+as an argument.
+
+The server checks whether to permit authentication. On UNIX systems,
+this is usually done by checking /etc/hosts.equiv, and .rhosts in the
+user's home directory. The connection must come from a privileged
+port.
+
+It is recommended that the server checks that there are no IP options
+(such as source routing) specified for the socket before accepting
+this type of authentication. The client host name should be
+reverse-mapped and then forward mapped to ensure that it has the
+proper IP-address.
+
+This authentication method trusts the remote host (root on the remote
+host can pretend to be any other user on that host), the name
+services, and partially the network: anyone who can see packets coming
+out from the server machine can do IP-spoofing and pretend to be any
+machine; however, the protocol prevents blind IP-spoofing (which used
+to be possible with rlogin).
+
+Many sites probably want to disable this authentication method because
+of the fundamental insecurity of conventional .rhosts or
+/etc/hosts.equiv authentication when faced with spoofing. It is
+recommended that this method not be supported by the server by
+default.
+.IP SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA
+
+In addition to conventional .rhosts and hosts.equiv authentication,
+this method additionally requires that the client host be
+authenticated using RSA.
+
+The client sends SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA specifying the client-side
+user name, and the public host key of the client host.
+
+The server first checks if normal .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
+authentication would be accepted, and if not, responds with
+SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. Otherwise, it checks whether it knows the host key
+for the client machine (using the same name for the host that was used
+for checking the .rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv files). If it does not
+know the RSA key for the client, access is denied and SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
+is sent.
+
+If the server knows the host key of the client machine, it verifies
+that the given host key matches that known for the client. If not,
+access is denied and SSH_SMSG_FAILURE is sent.
+
+The server then sends a SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE message containing
+an encrypted challenge for the client. The challenge is 32 8-bit
+random bytes (256 bits). When encrypted, the highest (partial) byte
+is left as zero, the next byte contains the value 2, the following are
+non-zero random bytes, followed by a zero byte, and the challenge put
+in the remaining bytes. This is then encrypted using RSA with the
+client host's public key. (The padding and encryption algorithm is
+the same as that used for the session key.)
+
+The client decrypts the challenge using its private host key,
+concatenates this with the session id, and computes an MD5 checksum
+of the resulting 48 bytes. The MD5 output is returned as 16 bytes in
+a SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE message. (MD5 is used to deter chosen
+plaintext attacks against RSA; the session id binds it to a specific
+session).
+
+The server verifies that the MD5 of the decrypted challenge returned by
+the client matches that of the original value, and sends SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if
+so. Otherwise it sends SSH_SMSG_FAILURE and refuses the
+authentication attempt.
+
+This authentication method trusts the client side machine in that root
+on that machine can pretend to be any user on that machine.
+Additionally, it trusts the client host key. The name and/or IP
+address of the client host is only used to select the public host key.
+The same host name is used when scanning .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
+and when selecting the host key. It would in principle be possible to
+eliminate the host name entirely and substitute it directly by the
+host key. IP and/or DNS [RFC1034] spoofing can only be used
+to pretend to be a host for which the attacker has the private host
+key.
+.IP SSH_AUTH_RSA
+
+The idea behind RSA authentication is that the server recognizes the
+public key offered by the client, generates a random challenge, and
+encrypts the challenge with the public key. The client must then
+prove that it has the corresponding private key by decrypting the
+challenge.
+
+The client sends SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA with public key modulus (n) as an
+argument.
+
+The server may respond immediately with SSH_SMSG_FAILURE if it does
+not permit authentication with this key. Otherwise it generates a
+challenge, encrypts it using the user's public key (stored on the
+server and identified using the modulus), and sends
+SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE with the challenge (mp-int) as an
+argument.
+
+The challenge is 32 8-bit random bytes (256 bits). When encrypted,
+the highest (partial) byte is left as zero, the next byte contains the
+value 2, the following are non-zero random bytes, followed by a zero
+byte, and the challenge put in the remaining bytes. This is then
+encrypted with the public key. (The padding and encryption algorithm
+is the same as that used for the session key.)
+
+The client decrypts the challenge using its private key, concatenates
+it with the session id, and computes an MD5 checksum of the resulting
+48 bytes. The MD5 output is returned as 16 bytes in a
+SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE message. (Note that the MD5 is necessary
+to avoid chosen plaintext attacks against RSA; the session id binds it
+to a specific session.)
+
+The server verifies that the MD5 of the decrypted challenge returned
+by the client matches that of the original value, and sends
+SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if so. Otherwise it sends SSH_SMSG_FAILURE and
+refuses the authentication attempt.
+
+This authentication method does not trust the remote host, the
+network, name services, or anything else. Authentication is based
+solely on the possession of the private identification keys. Anyone
+in possession of the private keys can log in, but nobody else.
+
+The server may have additional requirements for a successful
+authentiation. For example, to limit damage due to a compromised RSA
+key, a server might restrict access to a limited set of hosts.
+.IP SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD
+
+The client sends a SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD message with the plain text
+password. (Note that even though the password is plain text inside
+the message, it is normally encrypted by the packet mechanism.)
+
+The server verifies the password, and sends SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if
+authentication was accepted and SSH_SMSG_FAILURE otherwise.
+
+Note that the password is read from the user by the client; the user
+never interacts with a login program.
+
+This authentication method does not trust the remote host, the
+network, name services or anything else. Authentication is based
+solely on the possession of the password. Anyone in possession of the
+password can log in, but nobody else.
+.RT
+
+.ti 0
+Preparatory Operations
+
+After successful authentication, the server waits for a request from
+the client, processes the request, and responds with SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
+whenever a request has been successfully processed. If it receives a
+message that it does not recognize or it fails to honor a request, it
+returns SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. It is expected that new message types might
+be added to this phase in future.
+
+The following messages are currently defined for this phase.
+.IP SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION
+Requests that compression be enabled for this session. A
+gzip-compatible compression level (1-9) is passed as an argument.
+.IP SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY
+Requests that a pseudo terminal device be allocated for this session.
+The user terminal type and terminal modes are supplied as arguments.
+.IP SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING
+Requests forwarding of X11 connections from the remote machine to the
+local machine over the secure channel. Causes an internet-domain
+socket to be allocated and the DISPLAY variable to be set on the server.
+X11 authentication data is automatically passed to the server, and the
+client may implement spoofing of authentication data for added
+security. The authentication data is passed as arguments.
+.IP SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST
+Requests forwarding of a TCP/IP port on the server host over the
+secure channel. What happens is that whenever a connection is made to
+the port on the server, a connection will be made from the client end
+to the specified host/port. Any user can forward unprivileged ports;
+only the root can forward privileged ports (as determined by
+authentication done earlier).
+.IP SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING
+Requests forwarding of the connection to the authentication agent.
+.IP SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL
+Starts a shell (command interpreter) for the user, and moves into
+interactive session mode.
+.IP SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD
+Executes the given command (actually "<shell> -c <command>" or
+equivalent) for the user, and moves into interactive session mode.
+.RT
+
+
+.ti 0
+Interactive Session and Exchange of Data
+
+During the interactive session, any data written by the shell or
+command running on the server machine is forwarded to stdin or
+stderr on the client machine, and any input available from stdin on
+the client machine is forwarded to the program on the server machine.
+
+All exchange is asynchronous; either side can send at any time, and
+there are no acknowledgements (TCP/IP already provides reliable
+transport, and the packet protocol protects against tampering or IP
+spoofing).
+
+When the client receives EOF from its standard input, it will send
+SSH_CMSG_EOF; however, this in no way terminates the exchange. The
+exchange terminates and interactive mode is left when the server sends
+SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS to indicate that the client program has
+terminated. Alternatively, either side may disconnect at any time by
+sending SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT or closing the connection.
+
+The server may send any of the following messages:
+.IP SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA
+Data written to stdout by the program running on the server. The data
+is passed as a string argument. The client writes this data to
+stdout.
+.IP SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA
+Data written to stderr by the program running on the server. The data
+is passed as a string argument. The client writes this data to
+stderr. (Note that if the program is running on a tty, it is not
+possible to separate stdout and stderr data, and all data will be sent
+as stdout data.)
+.IP SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS
+Indicates that the shell or command has exited. Exit status is passed
+as an integer argument. This message causes termination of the
+interactive session.
+.IP SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN
+Indicates that someone on the server side is requesting a connection
+to the authentication agent. The server-side channel number is passed
+as an argument. The client must respond with either
+SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE.
+.IP SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN
+Indicates that a connection has been made to the X11 socket on the
+server side and should be forwarded to the real X server. An integer
+argument indicates the channel number allocated for this connection on
+the server side. The client should send back either
+SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE with
+the same server side channel number.
+.IP SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN
+Indicates that a connection has been made to a port on the server side
+for which forwarding has been requested. Arguments are server side
+channel number, host name to connect to, and port to connect to. The
+client should send back either
+SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE with
+the same server side channel number.
+.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
+This is sent by the server to indicate that it has opened a connection
+as requested in a previous message. The first argument indicates the
+client side channel number, and the second argument is the channel number
+that the server has allocated for this connection.
+.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
+This is sent by the server to indicate that it failed to open a
+connection as requested in a previous message. The client-side
+channel number is passed as an argument. The client will close the
+descriptor associated with the channel and free the channel.
+.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
+This packet contains data for a channel from the server. The first
+argument is the client-side channel number, and the second argument (a
+string) is the data.
+.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
+This is sent by the server to indicate that whoever was in the other
+end of the channel has closed it. The argument is the client side channel
+number. The client will let all buffered data in the channel to
+drain, and when ready, will close the socket, free the channel, and
+send the server a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION message for the
+channel.
+.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
+This is send by the server to indicate that a channel previously
+closed by the client has now been closed on the server side as well.
+The argument indicates the client channel number. The client frees
+the channel.
+.RT
+
+The client may send any of the following messages:
+.IP SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA
+This is data to be sent as input to the program running on the server.
+The data is passed as a string.
+.IP SSH_CMSG_EOF
+Indicates that the client has encountered EOF while reading standard
+input. The server will allow any buffered input data to drain, and
+will then close the input to the program.
+.IP SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE
+Indicates that window size on the client has been changed. The server
+updates the window size of the tty and causes SIGWINCH to be sent to
+the program. The new window size is passed as four integer arguments:
+row, col, xpixel, ypixel.
+.IP SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN
+Indicates that a connection has been made to a port on the client side
+for which forwarding has been requested. Arguments are client side
+channel number, host name to connect to, and port to connect to. The
+server should send back either SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or
+SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE with the same client side channel number.
+.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
+This is sent by the client to indicate that it has opened a connection
+as requested in a previous message. The first argument indicates the
+server side channel number, and the second argument is the channel
+number that the client has allocated for this connection.
+.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
+This is sent by the client to indicate that it failed to open a
+connection as requested in a previous message. The server side
+channel number is passed as an argument. The server will close the
+descriptor associated with the channel and free the channel.
+.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
+This packet contains data for a channel from the client. The first
+argument is the server side channel number, and the second argument (a
+string) is the data.
+.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
+This is sent by the client to indicate that whoever was in the other
+end of the channel has closed it. The argument is the server channel
+number. The server will allow buffered data to drain, and when ready,
+will close the socket, free the channel, and send the client a
+SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION message for the channel.
+.IP SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
+This is send by the client to indicate that a channel previously
+closed by the server has now been closed on the client side as well.
+The argument indicates the server channel number. The server frees
+the channel.
+.RT
+
+Any unsupported messages during interactive mode cause the connection
+to be terminated with SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT and an error message.
+Compatible protocol upgrades should agree about any extensions during
+the preparation phase or earlier.
+
+
+.ti 0
+Termination of the Connection
+
+Normal termination of the connection is always initiated by the server
+by sending SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS after the program has exited. The
+client responds to this message by sending SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION
+and closes the socket; the server then closes the socket. There are
+two purposes for the confirmation: some systems may lose previously
+sent data when the socket is closed, and closing the client side first
+causes any TCP/IP TIME_WAIT [RFC0793] waits to occur on the client side, not
+consuming server resources.
+
+If the program terminates due to a signal, the server will send
+SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT with an appropriate message. If the connection is
+closed, all file descriptors to the program will be closed and the
+server will exit. If the program runs on a tty, the kernel sends it
+the SIGHUP signal when the pty master side is closed.
+
+.ti 0
+Protocol Flags
+
+Both the server and the client pass 32 bits of protocol flags to the
+other side. The flags are intended for compatible protocol extension;
+the server first announces which added capabilities it supports, and
+the client then sends the capabilities that it supports.
+
+The following flags are currently defined (the values are bit masks):
+.IP "1 SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER"
+This flag can only be sent by the client. It indicates that the X11
+forwarding requests it sends will include the screen number.
+.IP "2 SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN"
+If both sides specify this flag, SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN and
+SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN messages will contain an additional field containing
+a description of the host at the other end of the connection.
+.RT
+
+.ti 0
+Detailed Description of Packet Types and Formats
+
+The supported packet types and the corresponding message numbers are
+given in the following table. Messages with _MSG_ in their name may
+be sent by either side. Messages with _CMSG_ are only sent by the
+client, and messages with _SMSG_ only by the server.
+
+A packet may contain additional data after the arguments specified
+below. Any such data should be ignored by the receiver. However, it
+is recommended that no such data be stored without good reason. (This
+helps build compatible extensions.)
+.IP "0 SSH_MSG_NONE"
+This code is reserved. This message type is never sent.
+.IP "1 SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string Cause of disconnection
+.TE
+This message may be sent by either party at any time. It causes the
+immediate disconnection of the connection. The message is intended to
+be displayed to a human, and describes the reason for disconnection.
+.IP "2 SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+8 bytes anti_spoofing_cookie
+32-bit int server_key_bits
+mp-int server_key_public_exponent
+mp-int server_key_public_modulus
+32-bit int host_key_bits
+mp-int host_key_public_exponent
+mp-int host_key_public_modulus
+32-bit int protocol_flags
+32-bit int supported_ciphers_mask
+32-bit int supported_authentications_mask
+.TE
+Sent as the first message by the server. This message gives the
+server's host key, server key, protocol flags (intended for compatible
+protocol extension), supported_ciphers_mask (which is the
+bitwise or of (1 << cipher_number), where << is the left shift
+operator, for all supported ciphers), and
+supported_authentications_mask (which is the bitwise or of (1 <<
+authentication_type) for all supported authentication types). The
+anti_spoofing_cookie is 64 random bytes, and must be sent back
+verbatim by the client in its reply. It is used to make IP-spoofing
+more difficult (encryption and host keys are the real defense against
+spoofing).
+.IP "3 SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+1 byte cipher_type (must be one of the supported values)
+8 bytes anti_spoofing_cookie (must match data sent by the server)
+mp-int double-encrypted session key
+32-bit int protocol_flags
+.TE
+Sent by the client as the first message in the session. Selects the
+cipher to use, and sends the encrypted session key to the server. The
+anti_spoofing_cookie must be the same bytes that were sent by the
+server. Protocol_flags is intended for negotiating compatible
+protocol extensions.
+.IP "4 SSH_CMSG_USER"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string user login name on server
+.TE
+Sent by the client to begin authentication. Specifies the user name
+on the server to log in as. The server responds with SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
+if no authentication is needed for this user, or SSH_SMSG_FAILURE if
+authentication is needed (or the user does not exist). [Note to the
+implementator: the user name is of arbitrary size. The implementation
+must be careful not to overflow internal buffers.]
+.IP "5 SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string client-side user name
+.TE
+Requests authentication using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts (or
+equivalent mechanisms). This authentication method is normally
+disabled in the server because it is not secure (but this is the
+method used by rsh and rlogin). The server responds with
+SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if authentication was successful, and
+SSH_SMSG_FAILURE if access was not granted. The server should check
+that the client side port number is less than 1024 (a privileged
+port), and immediately reject authentication if it is not. Supporting
+this authentication method is optional. This method should normally
+not be enabled in the server because it is not safe. (However, not
+enabling this only helps if rlogind and rshd are disabled.)
+.IP "6 SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+mp-int identity_public_modulus
+.TE
+Requests authentication using pure RSA authentication. The server
+checks if the given key is permitted to log in, and if so, responds
+with SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE. Otherwise, it responds with
+SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. The client often tries several different keys in
+sequence until one supported by the server is found. Authentication
+is accepted if the client gives the correct response to the challenge.
+The server is free to add other criteria for authentication, such as a
+requirement that the connection must come from a certain host. Such
+additions are not visible at the protocol level. Supporting this
+authentication method is optional but recommended.
+.IP "7 SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+mp-int encrypted challenge
+.TE
+Presents an RSA authentication challenge to the client. The challenge
+is a 256-bit random value encrypted as described elsewhere in this
+document. The client must decrypt the challenge using the RSA private
+key, compute MD5 of the challenge plus session id, and send back the
+resulting 16 bytes using SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE.
+.IP "8 SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+16 bytes MD5 of decrypted challenge
+.TE
+This message is sent by the client in response to an RSA challenge.
+The MD5 checksum is returned instead of the decrypted challenge to
+deter known-plaintext attacks against the RSA key. The server
+responds to this message with either SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS or
+SSH_SMSG_FAILURE.
+.IP "9 SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string plain text password
+.TE
+Requests password authentication using the given password. Note that
+even though the password is plain text inside the packet, the whole
+packet is normally encrypted by the packet layer. It would not be
+possible for the client to perform password encryption/hashing,
+because it cannot know which kind of encryption/hashing, if any, the
+server uses. The server responds to this message with
+SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS or SSH_SMSG_FAILURE.
+.IP "10 SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string TERM environment variable value (e.g. vt100)
+32-bit int terminal height, rows (e.g., 24)
+32-bit int terminal width, columns (e.g., 80)
+32-bit int terminal width, pixels (0 if no graphics) (e.g., 480)
+32-bit int terminal height, pixels (0 if no graphics) (e.g., 640)
+n bytes tty modes encoded in binary
+.TE
+Requests a pseudo-terminal to be allocated for this command. This
+message can be used regardless of whether the session will later
+execute the shell or a command. If a pty has been requested with this
+message, the shell or command will run on a pty. Otherwise it will
+communicate with the server using pipes, sockets or some other similar
+mechanism.
+
+The terminal type gives the type of the user's terminal. In the UNIX
+environment it is passed to the shell or command in the TERM
+environment variable.
+
+The width and height values give the initial size of the user's
+terminal or window. All values can be zero if not supported by the
+operating system. The server will pass these values to the kernel if
+supported.
+
+Terminal modes are encoded into a byte stream in a portable format.
+The exact format is described later in this document.
+
+The server responds to the request with either SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS or
+SSH_SMSG_FAILURE. If the server does not have the concept of pseudo
+terminals, it should return success if it is possible to execute a
+shell or a command so that it looks to the client as if it was running
+on a pseudo terminal.
+.IP "11 SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int terminal height, rows
+32-bit int terminal width, columns
+32-bit int terminal width, pixels
+32-bit int terminal height, pixels
+.TE
+This message can only be sent by the client during the interactive
+session. This indicates that the size of the user's window has
+changed, and provides the new size. The server will update the
+kernel's notion of the window size, and a SIGWINCH signal or
+equivalent will be sent to the shell or command (if supported by the
+operating system).
+.IP "12 SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL"
+
+(no arguments)
+
+Starts a shell (command interpreter), and enters interactive session
+mode.
+.IP "13 SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string command to execute
+.TE
+Starts executing the given command, and enters interactive session
+mode. On UNIX, the command is run as "<shell> -c <command>", where
+<shell> is the user's login shell.
+.IP "14 SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS"
+
+(no arguments)
+
+This message is sent by the server in response to the session key, a
+successful authentication request, and a successfully completed
+preparatory operation.
+.IP "15 SSH_SMSG_FAILURE"
+
+(no arguments)
+
+This message is sent by the server in response to a failed
+authentication operation to indicate that the user has not yet been
+successfully authenticated, and in response to a failed preparatory
+operation. This is also sent in response to an authentication or
+preparatory operation request that is not recognized or supported.
+.IP "16 SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string data
+.TE
+Delivers data from the client to be supplied as input to the shell or
+program running on the server side. This message can only be used in
+the interactive session mode. No acknowledgement is sent for this
+message.
+.IP "17 SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string data
+.TE
+Delivers data from the server that was read from the standard output of
+the shell or program running on the server side. This message can
+only be used in the interactive session mode. No acknowledgement is
+sent for this message.
+.IP "18 SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string data
+.TE
+Delivers data from the server that was read from the standard error of
+the shell or program running on the server side. This message can
+only be used in the interactive session mode. No acknowledgement is
+sent for this message.
+.IP "19 SSH_CMSG_EOF"
+
+(no arguments)
+
+This message is sent by the client to indicate that EOF has been
+reached on the input. Upon receiving this message, and after all
+buffered input data has been sent to the shell or program, the server
+will close the input file descriptor to the program. This message can
+only be used in the interactive session mode. No acknowledgement is
+sent for this message.
+.IP "20 SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int exit status of the command
+.TE
+Returns the exit status of the shell or program after it has exited.
+The client should respond with SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION when it has
+received this message. This will be the last message sent by the
+server. If the program being executed dies with a signal instead of
+exiting normally, the server should terminate the session with
+SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT (which can be used to pass a human-readable string
+indicating that the program died due to a signal) instead of using
+this message.
+.IP "21 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int remote_channel
+32-bit int local_channel
+.TE
+This is sent in response to any channel open request if the channel
+has been successfully opened. Remote_channel is the channel number
+received in the initial open request; local_channel is the channel
+number the side sending this message has allocated for the channel.
+Data can be transmitted on the channel after this message.
+.IP "22 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int remote_channel
+.TE
+This message indicates that an earlier channel open request by the
+other side has failed or has been denied. Remote_channel is the
+channel number given in the original request.
+.IP "23 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int remote_channel
+string data
+.TE
+Data is transmitted in a channel in these messages. A channel is
+bidirectional, and both sides can send these messages. There is no
+acknowledgement for these messages. It is possible that either side
+receives these messages after it has sent SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE for
+the channel. These messages cannot be received after the party has
+sent or received SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION.
+.IP "24 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int remote_channel
+.TE
+When a channel is closed at one end of the connection, that side sends
+this message. Upon receiving this message, the channel should be
+closed. When this message is received, if the channel is already
+closed (the receiving side has sent this message for the same channel
+earlier), the channel is freed and no further action is taken;
+otherwise the channel is freed and SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
+is sent in response. (It is possible that the channel is closed
+simultaneously at both ends.)
+.IP "25 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int remote_channel
+.TE
+This message is sent in response to SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE unless the
+channel was already closed. When this message is sent or received,
+the channel is freed.
+.IP "26 (OBSOLETED; was unix-domain X11 forwarding)
+.IP "27 SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int local_channel
+string originator_string (see below)
+.TE
+This message can be sent by the server during the interactive session
+mode to indicate that a client has connected the fake X server.
+Local_channel is the channel number that the server has allocated for
+the connection. The client should try to open a connection to the
+real X server, and respond with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or
+SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE.
+
+The field originator_string is present if both sides
+specified SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN in the protocol flags. It
+contains a description of the host originating the connection.
+.IP "28 SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int server_port
+string host_to_connect
+32-bit int port_to_connect
+.TE
+Sent by the client in the preparatory phase, this message requests
+that server_port on the server machine be forwarded over the secure
+channel to the client machine, and from there to the specified host
+and port. The server should start listening on the port, and send
+SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN whenever a connection is made to it. Supporting
+this message is optional, and the server is free to reject any forward
+request. For example, it is highly recommended that unless the user
+has been authenticated as root, forwarding any privileged port numbers
+(below 1024) is denied.
+.IP "29 SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int local_channel
+string host_name
+32-bit int port
+string originator_string (see below)
+.TE
+Sent by either party in interactive session mode, this message
+indicates that a connection has been opened to a forwarded TCP/IP
+port. Local_channel is the channel number that the sending party has
+allocated for the connection. Host_name is the host the connection
+should be be forwarded to, and the port is the port on that host to
+connect. The receiving party should open the connection, and respond
+with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or
+SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE. It is recommended that the receiving
+side check the host_name and port for validity to avoid compromising
+local security by compromised remote side software. Particularly, it
+is recommended that the client permit connections only to those ports
+for which it has requested forwarding with SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST.
+
+The field originator_string is present if both sides
+specified SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN in the protocol flags. It
+contains a description of the host originating the connection.
+.IP "30 SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING"
+
+(no arguments)
+
+Requests that the connection to the authentication agent be forwarded
+over the secure channel. The method used by clients to contact the
+authentication agent within each machine is implementation and machine
+dependent. If the server accepts this request, it should arrange that
+any clients run from this session will actually contact the server
+program when they try to contact the authentication agent. The server
+should then send a SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN to open a channel to the agent,
+and the client should forward the connection to the real
+authentication agent. Supporting this message is optional.
+.IP "31 SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int local_channel
+.TE
+Sent by the server in interactive session mode, this message requests
+opening a channel to the authentication agent. The client should open
+a channel, and respond with either SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
+or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE.
+.IP "32 SSH_MSG_IGNORE"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string data
+.TE
+Either party may send this message at any time. This message, and the
+argument string, is silently ignored. This message might be used in
+some implementations to make traffic analysis more difficult. This
+message is not currently sent by the implementation, but all
+implementations are required to recognize and ignore it.
+.IP "33 SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION"
+
+(no arguments)
+
+Sent by the client in response to SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS. This is the
+last message sent by the client.
+.IP "34 SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string x11_authentication_protocol
+string x11_authentication_data
+32-bit int screen number (if SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER)
+.TE
+Sent by the client during the preparatory phase, this message requests
+that the server create a fake X11 display and set the DISPLAY
+environment variable accordingly. An internet-domain display is
+preferable. The given authentication protocol and the associated data
+should be recorded by the server so that it is used as authentication
+on connections (e.g., in .Xauthority). The authentication protocol
+must be one of the supported X11 authentication protocols, e.g.,
+"MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1". Authentication data must be a lowercase hex
+string of even length. Its interpretation is protocol dependent.
+The data is in a format that can be used with e.g. the xauth program.
+Supporting this message is optional.
+
+The client is permitted (and recommended) to generate fake
+authentication information and send fake information to the server.
+This way, a corrupt server will not have access to the user's terminal
+after the connection has terminated. The correct authorization codes
+will also not be left hanging around in files on the server (many
+users keep the same X session for months, thus protecting the
+authorization data becomes important).
+
+X11 authentication spoofing works by initially sending fake (random)
+authentication data to the server, and interpreting the first packet
+sent by the X11 client after the connection has been opened. The
+first packet contains the client's authentication. If the packet
+contains the correct fake data, it is replaced by the client by the
+correct authentication data, and then sent to the X server.
+.IP "35 SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string clint-side user name
+32-bit int client_host_key_bits
+mp-int client_host_key_public_exponent
+mp-int client_host_key_public_modulus
+.TE
+Requests authentication using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts (or
+equivalent) together with RSA host authentication. The server should
+check that the client side port number is less than 1024 (a privileged
+port), and immediately reject authentication if it is not. The server
+responds with SSH_SMSG_FAILURE or SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE. The
+client must respond to the challenge with the proper
+SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE. The server then responds with success if
+access was granted, or failure if the client gave a wrong response.
+Supporting this authentication method is optional but recommended in
+most environments.
+.IP "36 SSH_MSG_DEBUG"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+string debugging message sent to the other side
+.TE
+This message may be sent by either party at any time. It is used to
+send debugging messages that may be informative to the user in
+solving various problems. For example, if authentication fails
+because of some configuration error (e.g., incorrect permissions for
+some file), it can be very helpful for the user to make the cause of
+failure available. On the other hand, one should not make too much
+information available for security reasons. It is recommended that
+the client provides an option to display the debugging information
+sent by the sender (the user probably does not want to see it by default).
+The server can log debugging data sent by the client (if any). Either
+party is free to ignore any received debugging data. Every
+implementation must be able to receive this message, but no
+implementation is required to send these.
+.IP "37 SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int gzip compression level (1-9)
+.TE
+This message can be sent by the client in the preparatory operations
+phase. The server responds with SSH_SMSG_FAILURE if it does not
+support compression or does not want to compress; it responds with
+SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS if it accepted the compression request. In the
+latter case the response to this packet will still be uncompressed,
+but all further packets in either direction will be compressed by gzip.
+.RT
+
+
+.ti 0
+Encoding of Terminal Modes
+
+Terminal modes (as passed in SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY) are encoded into a
+byte stream. It is intended that the coding be portable across
+different environments.
+
+The tty mode description is a stream of bytes. The stream consists of
+opcode-argument pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0).
+Opcodes 1-127 have one-byte arguments. Opcodes 128-159 have 32-bit
+integer arguments (stored msb first). Opcodes 160-255 are not yet
+defined, and cause parsing to stop (they should only be used after any
+other data).
+
+The client puts in the stream any modes it knows about, and the server
+ignores any modes it does not know about. This allows some degree of
+machine-independence, at least between systems that use a POSIX-like
+[POSIX] tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as
+well, but the client may need to fill reasonable values for a number
+of parameters so the server pty gets set to a reasonable mode (the
+server leaves all unspecified mode bits in their default values, and
+only some combinations make sense).
+
+The following opcodes have been defined. The naming of opcodes mostly
+follows the POSIX terminal mode flags.
+.IP "0 TTY_OP_END"
+Indicates end of options.
+.IP "1 VINTR"
+Interrupt character; 255 if none. Similarly for the other characters.
+Not all of these characters are supported on all systems.
+.IP "2 VQUIT"
+The quit character (sends SIGQUIT signal on UNIX systems).
+.IP "3 VERASE"
+Erase the character to left of the cursor.
+.IP "4 VKILL"
+Kill the current input line.
+.IP "5 VEOF "
+End-of-file character (sends EOF from the terminal).
+.IP "6 VEOL "
+End-of-line character in addition to carriage return and/or linefeed.
+.IP "7 VEOL2"
+Additional end-of-line character.
+.IP "8 VSTART"
+Continues paused output (normally ^Q).
+.IP "9 VSTOP"
+Pauses output (^S).
+.IP "10 VSUSP"
+Suspends the current program.
+.IP "11 VDSUSP"
+Another suspend character.
+.IP "12 VREPRINT"
+Reprints the current input line.
+.IP "13 VWERASE"
+Erases a word left of cursor.
+.IP "14 VLNEXT"
+More special input characters; these are probably not supported on
+most systems.
+.IP "15 VFLUSH"
+.IP "16 VSWTCH"
+.IP "17 VSTATUS"
+.IP "18 VDISCARD"
+
+.IP "30 IGNPAR"
+The ignore parity flag. The next byte should be 0 if this flag is not
+set, and 1 if it is set.
+.IP "31 PARMRK"
+More flags. The exact definitions can be found in the POSIX standard.
+.IP "32 INPCK"
+.IP "33 ISTRIP"
+.IP "34 INLCR"
+.IP "35 IGNCR"
+.IP "36 ICRNL"
+.IP "37 IUCLC"
+.IP "38 IXON"
+.IP "39 IXANY"
+.IP "40 IXOFF"
+.IP "41 IMAXBEL"
+
+.IP "50 ISIG"
+.IP "51 ICANON"
+.IP "52 XCASE"
+.IP "53 ECHO"
+.IP "54 ECHOE"
+.IP "55 ECHOK"
+.IP "56 ECHONL"
+.IP "57 NOFLSH"
+.IP "58 TOSTOP"
+.IP "59 IEXTEN"
+.IP "60 ECHOCTL"
+.IP "61 ECHOKE"
+.IP "62 PENDIN"
+
+.IP "70 OPOST"
+.IP "71 OLCUC"
+.IP "72 ONLCR"
+.IP "73 OCRNL"
+.IP "74 ONOCR"
+.IP "75 ONLRET"
+
+.IP "90 CS7"
+.IP "91 CS8"
+.IP "92 PARENB"
+.IP "93 PARODD"
+
+.IP "192 TTY_OP_ISPEED"
+Specifies the input baud rate in bits per second.
+.IP "193 TTY_OP_OSPEED"
+Specifies the output baud rate in bits per second.
+.RT
+
+
+.ti 0
+The Authentication Agent Protocol
+
+The authentication agent is a program that can be used to hold RSA
+authentication keys for the user (in future, it might hold data for
+other authentication types as well). An authorized program can send
+requests to the agent to generate a proper response to an RSA
+challenge. How the connection is made to the agent (or its
+representative) inside a host and how access control is done inside a
+host is implementation-dependent; however, how it is forwarded and how
+one interacts with it is specified in this protocol. The connection
+to the agent is normally automatically forwarded over the secure
+channel.
+
+A program that wishes to use the agent first opens a connection to its
+local representative (typically, the agent itself or an SSH server).
+It then writes a request to the connection, and waits for response.
+It is recommended that at least five minutes of timeout are provided
+waiting for the agent to respond to an authentication challenge (this
+gives sufficient time for the user to cut-and-paste the challenge to a
+separate machine, perform the computation there, and cut-and-paste the
+result back if so desired).
+
+Messages sent to and by the agent are in the following format:
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+4 bytes Length, msb first. Does not include length itself.
+1 byte Packet type. The value 255 is reserved for future extensions.
+data Any data, depending on packet type. Encoding as in the ssh packet
+protocol.
+.TE
+
+The following message types are currently defined:
+.IP "1 SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES"
+
+(no arguments)
+
+Requests the agent to send a list of all RSA keys for which it can
+answer a challenge.
+.IP "2 SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int howmany
+howmany times:
+32-bit int bits
+mp-int public exponent
+mp-int public modulus
+string comment
+.TE
+The agent sends this message in response to the to
+SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES. The answer lists all RSA keys for
+which the agent can answer a challenge. The comment field is intended
+to help identify each key; it may be printed by an application to
+indicate which key is being used. If the agent is not holding any
+keys, howmany will be zero.
+.IP "3 SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int bits
+mp-int public exponent
+mp-int public modulus
+mp-int challenge
+16 bytes session_id
+32-bit int response_type
+.TE
+Requests RSA decryption of random challenge to authenticate the other
+side. The challenge will be decrypted with the RSA private key
+corresponding to the given public key.
+
+The decrypted challenge must contain a zero in the highest (partial)
+byte, 2 in the next byte, followed by non-zero random bytes, a zero
+byte, and then the real challenge value in the lowermost bytes. The
+real challenge must be 32 8-bit bytes (256 bits).
+
+Response_type indicates the format of the response to be returned.
+Currently the only supported value is 1, which means to compute MD5 of
+the real challenge plus session id, and return the resulting 16 bytes
+in a SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE message.
+.IP "4 SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+16 bytes MD5 of decrypted challenge
+.TE
+Answers an RSA authentication challenge. The response is 16 bytes:
+the MD5 checksum of the 32-byte challenge.
+.IP "5 SSH_AGENT_FAILURE"
+
+(no arguments)
+
+This message is sent whenever the agent fails to answer a request
+properly. For example, if the agent cannot answer a challenge (e.g.,
+no longer has the proper key), it can respond with this. The agent
+also responds with this message if it receives a message it does not
+recognize.
+.IP "6 SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS"
+
+(no arguments)
+
+This message is sent by the agent as a response to certain requests
+that do not otherwise cause a message be sent. Currently, this is
+only sent in response to SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY and
+SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY.
+.IP "7 SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int bits
+mp-int public modulus
+mp-int public exponent
+mp-int private exponent
+mp-int multiplicative inverse of p mod q
+mp-int p
+mp-int q
+string comment
+.TE
+Registers an RSA key with the agent. After this request, the agent can
+use this RSA key to answer requests. The agent responds with
+SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS or SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+.IP "8 SSH_AGENT_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY"
+.TS
+;
+l l.
+32-bit int bits
+mp-int public exponent
+mp-int public modulus
+.TE
+Removes an RSA key from the agent. The agent will no longer accept
+challenges for this key and will not list it as a supported identity.
+The agent responds with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS or SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.
+.RT
+
+If the agent receives a message that it does not understand, it
+responds with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. This permits compatible future
+extensions.
+
+It is possible that several clients have a connection open to the
+authentication agent simultaneously. Each client will use a separate
+connection (thus, any SSH connection can have multiple agent
+connections active simultaneously).
+
+
+.ti 0
+References
+
+.IP "[DES] "
+FIPS PUB 46-1: Data Encryption Standard. National Bureau of
+Standards, January 1988. FIPS PUB 81: DES Modes of Operation.
+National Bureau of Standards, December 1980. Bruce Schneier: Applied
+Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994. J. Seberry and J. Pieprzyk:
+Cryptography: An Introduction to Computer Security. Prentice-Hall,
+1989.
+.IP "[GZIP] "
+The GNU GZIP program; available for anonymous ftp at prep.ai.mit.edu.
+Please let me know if you know a paper describing the algorithm.
+.IP "[IDEA] "
+Xuejia Lai: On the Design and Security of Block Ciphers, ETH Series in
+Information Processing, vol. 1, Hartung-Gorre Verlag, Konstanz,
+Switzerland, 1992. Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography, John Wiley &
+Sons, 1994. See also the following patents: PCT/CH91/00117, EP 0 482
+154 B1, US Pat. 5,214,703.
+.IP [PKCS#1]
+PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard. Version 1.5, RSA Laboratories,
+November 1993. Available for anonymous ftp at ftp.rsa.com.
+.IP [POSIX]
+Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) - Part 1: Application
+Program Interface (API) [C language], ISO/IEC 9945-1, IEEE Std 1003.1,
+1990.
+.IP [RFC0791]
+J. Postel: Internet Protocol, RFC 791, USC/ISI, September 1981.
+.IP [RFC0793]
+J. Postel: Transmission Control Protocol, RFC 793, USC/ISI, September
+1981.
+.IP [RFC1034]
+P. Mockapetris: Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities, RFC 1034,
+USC/ISI, November 1987.
+.IP [RFC1282]
+B. Kantor: BSD Rlogin, RFC 1258, UCSD, December 1991.
+.IP "[RSA] "
+Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994. See
+also R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman: Cryptographic
+Communications System and Method. US Patent 4,405,829, 1983.
+.IP "[X11] "
+R. Scheifler: X Window System Protocol, X Consortium Standard, Version
+11, Release 6. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Laboratory of
+Computer Science, 1994.
+.RT
+
+
+.ti 0
+Security Considerations
+
+This protocol deals with the very issue of user authentication and
+security.
+
+First of all, as an implementation issue, the server program will have
+to run as root (or equivalent) on the server machine. This is because
+the server program will need be able to change to an arbitrary user
+id. The server must also be able to create a privileged TCP/IP port.
+
+The client program will need to run as root if any variant of .rhosts
+authentication is to be used. This is because the client program will
+need to create a privileged port. The client host key is also usually
+stored in a file which is readable by root only. The client needs the
+host key in .rhosts authentication only. Root privileges can be
+dropped as soon as the privileged port has been created and the host
+key has been read.
+
+The SSH protocol offers major security advantages over existing telnet
+and rlogin protocols.
+.IP o
+IP spoofing is restricted to closing a connection (by encryption, host
+keys, and the special random cookie). If encryption is not used, IP
+spoofing is possible for those who can hear packets going out from the
+server.
+.IP o
+DNS spoofing is made ineffective (by host keys).
+.IP o
+Routing spoofing is made ineffective (by host keys).
+.IP o
+All data is encrypted with strong algorithms to make eavesdropping as
+difficult as possible. This includes encrypting any authentication
+information such as passwords. The information for decrypting session
+keys is destroyed every hour.
+.IP o
+Strong authentication methods: .rhosts combined with RSA host
+authentication, and pure RSA authentication.
+.IP o
+X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can be forwarded securely.
+.IP o
+Man-in-the-middle attacks are deterred by using the server host key to
+encrypt the session key.
+.IP o
+Trojan horses to catch a password by routing manipulation are deterred
+by checking that the host key of the server machine matches that
+stored on the client host.
+.RT
+
+The security of SSH against man-in-the-middle attacks and the security
+of the new form of .rhosts authentication, as well as server host
+validation, depends on the integrity of the host key and the files
+containing known host keys.
+
+The host key is normally stored in a root-readable file. If the host
+key is compromised, it permits attackers to use IP, DNS and routing
+spoofing as with current rlogin and rsh. It should never be any worse
+than the current situation.
+
+The files containing known host keys are not sensitive. However, if an
+attacker gets to modify the known host key files, it has the same
+consequences as a compromised host key, because the attacker can then
+change the recorded host key.
+
+The security improvements obtained by this protocol for X11 are of
+particular significance. Previously, there has been no way to protect
+data communicated between an X server and a client running on a remote
+machine. By creating a fake display on the server, and forwarding all
+X11 requests over the secure channel, SSH can be used to run any X11
+applications securely without any cooperation with the vendors of the
+X server or the application.
+
+Finally, the security of this program relies on the strength of the
+underlying cryptographic algorithms. The RSA algorithm is used for
+authentication key exchange. It is widely believed to be secure. Of
+the algorithms used to encrypt the session, DES has a rather small key
+these days, probably permitting governments and organized criminals to
+break it in very short time with specialized hardware. 3DES is
+probably safe (but slower). IDEA is widely believed to be secure.
+People have varying degrees of confidence in the other algorithms.
+This program is not secure if used with no encryption at all.
+
+
+.ti 0
+Additional Information
+
+Additional information (especially on the implementation and mailing
+lists) is available via WWW at http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh.
+
+Comments should be sent to Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> or the SSH
+Mailing List <ssh@clinet.fi>.
+
+.ti 0
+Author's Address
+
+.TS
+;
+l.
+Tatu Ylonen
+Helsinki University of Technology
+Otakaari 1
+FIN-02150 Espoo, Finland
+
+Phone: +358-0-451-3374
+Fax: +358-0-451-3293
+EMail: ylo@cs.hut.fi
+.TE
--- /dev/null
+Programming:
+- Grep for 'XXX' comments and fix
+
+- Link order is incorrect for some systems using Kerberos 4 and AFS. Result
+ is multiple inclusion of DES symbols. Holger Trapp
+ <holger.trapp@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de> reports that changing the configure
+ generated link order from:
+ -lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl -lutil -lkafs -lkrb -ldes -lcrypto
+ to:
+ -lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl -lutil -lcrypto -lkafs -lkrb -ldes
+ fixing the problem.
+
+- Write a test program that calls stat() to search for EGD/PRNGd socket
+ rather than use the (non-portable) "test -S".
+
+- Replacement for setproctitle() - HP-UX support only currently
+
+- Handle changing passwords for the non-PAM expired password case
+
+- Improve PAM support (a pam_lastlog module will cause sshd to exit)
+ and maybe support alternate forms of authenications like OPIE via
+ pam?
+
+- Rework PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ - Use kbdint request packet with 0 prompts for informational messages
+ - Use different PAM service name for kbdint vs regular auth (suggest from
+ Solar Designer)
+ - Ability to select which ChallengeResponseAuthentications may be used
+ and order to try them in e.g. "ChallengeResponseAuthentication skey, pam"
+
+- Complete Tru64 SIA support
+ - It looks like we could merge it into the password auth code to cut down
+ on diff size. Maybe PAM password auth too?
+
+- Finish integrating kernel-level auditing code for IRIX and SOLARIS
+ (Gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
+
+- sftp-server: Rework to step down to 32bit ints if the platform
+ lacks 'long long' == 64bit (Notable SCO w/ SCO compiler)
+
+- Linux hangs for 20 seconds when you do "sleep 20&exit". All current
+ solutions break scp or leaves processes hanging around after the ssh
+ connection has ended. It seems to be linked to two things. One
+ select() under Linux is not as nice as others, and two the children
+ of the shell are not killed on exiting the shell. Redhat have an excellent
+ description of this in their RPM package.
+
+- Build an automated test suite
+
+- 64-bit builds on HP-UX 11.X (stevesk@pobox.com):
+ - utmp/wtmp get corrupted (something in loginrec?)
+ - can't build with PAM (no 64-bit libpam yet)
+
+Documentation:
+- More and better
+
+- Install FAQ?
+
+- General FAQ on S/Key, TIS, RSA, RSA2, DSA, etc and suggestions on when it
+ would be best to use them.
+
+- Create a Documentation/ directory?
+
+Clean up configure/makefiles:
+- Clean up configure.ac - There are a few double #defined variables
+ left to do. HAVE_LOGIN is one of them. Consider NOT looking for
+ information in wtmpx or utmpx or any of that stuff if it's not detected
+ from the start
+
+- Fails to compile when cross compile.
+ (vinschen@redhat.com)
+
+- Replace the whole u_intXX_t evilness in acconfig.h with something better???
+
+- Consider splitting the u_intXX_t test for sys/bitype.h into seperate test
+ to allow people to (right/wrongfully) link against Bind directly.
+
+Packaging:
+- Solaris: Update packaging scripts and build new sysv startup scripts
+ Ideally the package metadata should be generated by autoconf.
+ (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
+
+- HP-UX: Provide DEPOT package scripts.
+ (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
+
+$Id$
--- /dev/null
+This document contains a description of portable OpenSSH's random
+number collection code. An alternate reading of this text could
+well be titled "Why I should pressure my system vendor to supply
+/dev/random in their OS".
+
+Why is this important? OpenSSH depends on good, unpredictable numbers
+for generating keys, performing digital signatures and forming
+cryptographic challenges. If the random numbers that it uses are
+predictable, then the strength of the whole system is compromised.
+
+A particularly pernicious problem arises with DSA keys (used by the
+ssh2 protocol). Performing a DSA signature (which is required for
+authentication), entails the use of a 160 bit random number. If an
+attacker can predict this number, then they can deduce your *private*
+key and impersonate you or your hosts.
+
+If you are using the builtin random number support (configure will
+tell you if this is the case), then read this document in its entirety.
+Alternately, you can use Lutz Jaenicke's PRNGd - a small daemon which
+collects random numbers and makes them available by a socket.
+
+Please also request that your OS vendor provides a kernel-based random
+number collector (/dev/random) in future versions of your operating
+systems by default.
+
+On to the description...
+
+The portable OpenSSH contains random number collection support for
+systems which lack a kernel entropy pool (/dev/random).
+
+This collector operates by executing the programs listed in
+($etcdir)/ssh_prng_cmds, reading their output and adding it to the
+PRNG supplied by OpenSSL (which is hash-based). It also stirs in the
+output of several system calls and timings from the execution of the
+programs that it runs.
+
+The ssh_prng_cmds file also specifies a 'rate' for each program. This
+represents the number of bits of randomness per byte of output from
+the specified program.
+
+The random number code will also read and save a seed file to
+~/.ssh/prng_seed. This contents of this file are added to the random
+number generator at startup. The goal here is to maintain as much
+randomness between sessions as possible.
+
+The entropy collection code has two main problems:
+
+1. It is slow.
+
+Executing each program in the list can take a large amount of time,
+especially on slower machines. Additionally some program can take a
+disproportionate time to execute.
+
+This can be tuned by the administrator. To debug the entropy
+collection is great detail, turn on full debugging ("ssh -v -v -v" or
+"sshd -d -d -d"). This will list each program as it is executed, how
+long it took to execute, its exit status and whether and how much data
+it generated. You can the find the culprit programs which are causing
+the real slow-downs.
+
+The entropy collector will timeout programs which take too long
+to execute, the actual timeout used can be adjusted with the
+--with-entropy-timeout configure option. OpenSSH will not try to
+re-execute programs which have not been found, have had a non-zero
+exit status or have timed out more than a couple of times.
+
+2. Estimating the real 'rate' of program outputs is non-trivial
+
+The shear volume of the task is problematic: there are currently
+around 50 commands in the ssh_prng_cmds list, portable OpenSSH
+supports at least 12 different OSs. That is already 600 sets of data
+to be analysed, without taking into account the numerous differences
+between versions of each OS.
+
+On top of this, the different commands can produce varying amounts of
+usable data depending on how busy the machine is, how long it has been
+up and various other factors.
+
+To make matters even more complex, some of the commands are reporting
+largely the same data as other commands (eg. the various "ps" calls).
+
+$Id$
+
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _CONFIG_H
+#define _CONFIG_H
+
+/* Generated automatically from acconfig.h by autoheader. */
+/* Please make your changes there */
+
+@TOP@
+
+/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is */
+/* supported by bsd-setproctitle.c */
+#undef SPT_TYPE
+
+/* SCO workaround */
+#undef BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H
+#undef HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H
+
+/* Define if you have SCO protected password database */
+#undef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW
+
+/* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected) */
+/* from environment and PATH */
+#undef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+
+/* Define if your password has a pw_class field */
+#undef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+
+/* Define if your password has a pw_expire field */
+#undef HAVE_PW_EXPIRE_IN_PASSWD
+
+/* Define if your password has a pw_change field */
+#undef HAVE_PW_CHANGE_IN_PASSWD
+
+/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */
+#undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_NERR
+
+/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */
+#undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
+
+/* Define if you have the getuserattr function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUSERATTR
+
+/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */
+#undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
+
+/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
+#undef USE_PIPES
+
+/* Define if your snprintf is busted */
+#undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF
+
+/* Define if you are on Cygwin */
+#undef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+/* Define if you lack native POSIX regex and you are using PCRE */
+#undef HAVE_LIBPCRE
+
+/* Define if you have a broken realpath. */
+#undef BROKEN_REALPATH
+
+/* Define if you are on NeXT */
+#undef HAVE_NEXT
+
+/* Define if you are on NEWS-OS */
+#undef HAVE_NEWS4
+
+/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
+#undef USE_PAM
+
+/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
+#undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+
+/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C arrays) */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+
+/* Location of random number pool */
+#undef RANDOM_POOL
+
+/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+#undef PRNGD_SOCKET
+
+/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+#undef PRNGD_PORT
+
+/* Builtin PRNG command timeout */
+#undef ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC
+
+/* Define if you want to install preformatted manpages.*/
+#undef MANTYPE
+
+/* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include <openssl/header.h> */
+#undef HAVE_OPENSSL
+
+/* Define if you are linking against RSAref. Used only to print the right
+ * message at run-time. */
+#undef RSAREF
+
+/* struct timeval */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
+
+/* struct utmp and struct utmpx fields */
+#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX
+#undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
+#undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
+#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
+#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
+#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
+#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+#undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP
+#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */
+#undef DISABLE_LOGIN
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */
+#undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */
+#undef DISABLE_LASTLOG
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
+#undef DISABLE_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */
+#undef DISABLE_WTMP
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_WTMPX
+
+/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */
+#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+
+/* Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline */
+#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */
+#undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */
+#undef CONF_UTMP_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */
+#undef CONF_WTMP_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmpx file */
+#undef CONF_UTMPX_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */
+#undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want external askpass support */
+#undef USE_EXTERNAL_ASKPASS
+
+/* Define if libc defines __progname */
+#undef HAVE___PROGNAME
+
+/* Define if you want Kerberos 4 support */
+#undef KRB4
+
+/* Define if you want AFS support */
+#undef AFS
+
+/* Define if you want S/Key support */
+#undef SKEY
+
+/* Define if you want TCP Wrappers support */
+#undef LIBWRAP
+
+/* Define if your libraries define login() */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN
+
+/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
+#undef HAVE_DAEMON
+
+/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */
+#undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
+
+/* Define if xauth is found in your path */
+#undef XAUTH_PATH
+
+/* Define if rsh is found in your path */
+#undef RSH_PATH
+
+/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */
+#undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
+
+/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */
+#undef DISABLE_SHADOW
+
+/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */
+#undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+
+/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */
+#undef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+
+/* Define if you have getpwanam(3) [SunOS 4.x] */
+#undef HAVE_GETPWANAM
+
+/* Defined if in_systm.h needs to be included with netinet/ip.h (HPUX - <sigh/>) */
+#undef NEED_IN_SYSTM_H
+
+/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument */
+/* to pam_strerror */
+#undef HAVE_OLD_PAM
+
+/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages */
+/* to the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */
+#undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+
+/* Set this to your mail directory if you don't have maillock.h */
+#undef MAIL_DIRECTORY
+
+/* Data types */
+#undef HAVE_U_INT
+#undef HAVE_INTXX_T
+#undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
+#undef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+#undef HAVE_INT64_T
+#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+#undef HAVE_U_CHAR
+#undef HAVE_SIZE_T
+#undef HAVE_SSIZE_T
+#undef HAVE_CLOCK_T
+#undef HAVE_MODE_T
+#undef HAVE_PID_T
+#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+#undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
+#undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
+
+/* Define if you have a regcomp() function */
+#undef HAVE_REGCOMP
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */
+#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */
+#undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC
+
+/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */
+#undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
+
+/* Specify default $PATH */
+#undef USER_PATH
+
+/* Specify location of ssh.pid */
+#undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
+
+/* Use IPv4 for connection by default, IPv6 can still if explicity asked */
+#undef IPV4_DEFAULT
+
+/* If you have no atexit() but xatexit(), and want to use xatexit() */
+#undef HAVE_XATEXIT
+
+/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
+#undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO
+
+/* Workaround more Linux IPv6 quirks */
+#undef DONT_TRY_OTHER_AF
+
+/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */
+#undef IPV4_IN_IPV6
+
+/* Define if you have BSD auth support */
+#undef BSD_AUTH
+
+/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
+#undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS
+
+/* Needed for SCO and NeXT */
+#undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */
+#undef GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */
+#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC
+
+/* Define in your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name */
+#undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
+
+/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
+#undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
+
+/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */
+#undef MISSING_NFDBITS
+
+/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */
+#undef MISSING_HOWMANY
+
+/* Define on *nto-qnx systems */
+#undef MISSING_FD_MASK
+
+/* Define if you want smartcard support */
+#undef SMARTCARD
+
+@BOTTOM@
+
+/* ******************* Shouldn't need to edit below this line ************** */
+
+#include "defines.h"
+
+#endif /* _CONFIG_H */
--- /dev/null
+dnl $Id$
+dnl
+dnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros
+dnl
+
+
+dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol)
+dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field'
+dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result.
+dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there
+AC_DEFUN(OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD, [
+# look for field '$1' in header '$2'
+ dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename
+ ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+ dnl
+ ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2)
+ AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [
+ AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl
+ eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl
+ ], [ dnl
+ eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl
+ ]) dnl
+ ])
+ ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+ if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result)
+ if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+ AC_DEFINE($3)
+ fi
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ fi
+])
+
+dnl OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(variablename, command):
+dnl Tidiness function, sets 'undef' if not found, and does the AC_SUBST
+AC_DEFUN(OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG, [
+ AC_PATH_PROG($1, $2)
+ if test -z "[$]$1" ; then
+ $1="undef"
+ fi
+ AC_SUBST($1)
+])
+
+dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in
+dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different
+dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc. So we
+dnl have to test to find something that will work.
+AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T],
+[
+ AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent])
+ AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv],
+ [
+ # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
+ # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
+ curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
+ for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
+ for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+
+ int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
+ ],[
+ $t len;
+ getpeername(0,0,&len);
+ ],[
+ curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
+ break
+ ])
+ done
+ done
+
+ if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t])
+ fi
+ ])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv)
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv,
+ [type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])],
+ [#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>])
+])
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.10 2001/05/08 22:48:07 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==write
+ */
+ssize_t
+atomicio(f, fd, _s, n)
+ ssize_t (*f) ();
+ int fd;
+ void *_s;
+ size_t n;
+{
+ char *s = _s;
+ ssize_t res, pos = 0;
+
+ while (n > pos) {
+ res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
+ switch (res) {
+ case -1:
+#ifdef EWOULDBLOCK
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+#else
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+#endif
+ continue;
+ case 0:
+ return (res);
+ default:
+ pos += res;
+ }
+ }
+ return (pos);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 06:32:46 itojun Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==write
+ */
+ssize_t atomicio(ssize_t (*)(), int, void *, size_t);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.1 2001/05/18 14:13:28 markus Exp $");
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static void *
+bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ return authctxt;
+}
+
+static int
+bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+ u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+ char *challenge = NULL;
+
+ if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
+ debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
+ challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);
+ if (challenge == NULL) {
+ auth_close(authctxt->as);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (challenge == NULL) {
+ debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session");
+ debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s",
+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "<default>");
+ authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge);
+ if (authctxt->as == NULL)
+ challenge = NULL;
+ debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty");
+ }
+
+ if (challenge == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ *name = xstrdup("");
+ *infotxt = xstrdup("");
+ *numprompts = 1;
+ *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*));
+ *echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int));
+ (*echo_on)[0] = 0;
+ (*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+ int authok;
+
+ if (authctxt->as == 0)
+ error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");
+
+ if (numresponses != 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok);
+
+ return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+
+ if (authctxt && authctxt->as) {
+ auth_close(authctxt->as);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = {
+ "bsdauth",
+ bsdauth_init_ctx,
+ bsdauth_query,
+ bsdauth_respond,
+ bsdauth_free_ctx
+};
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.8 2001/05/18 14:13:28 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */
+
+extern KbdintDevice *devices[];
+static KbdintDevice *device;
+
+char *
+get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ char *challenge, *name, *info, **prompts;
+ u_int i, numprompts;
+ u_int *echo_on;
+
+ device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */
+ if (device == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((authctxt->kbdintctxt = device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info,
+ &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) {
+ device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (numprompts < 1)
+ fatal("get_challenge: numprompts < 1");
+ challenge = xstrdup(prompts[0]);
+ for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
+ xfree(prompts[i]);
+ xfree(prompts);
+ xfree(name);
+ xfree(echo_on);
+ xfree(info);
+
+ return (challenge);
+}
+int
+verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *response)
+{
+ char *resp[1];
+ int res;
+
+ if (device == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ resp[0] = (char *)response;
+ res = device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 1, resp);
+ device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+ return res ? 0 : 1;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.24 2001/06/26 16:15:22 dugsong Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef AFS
+#include "radix.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB4
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int
+krb4_init(void *context)
+{
+ static int cleanup_registered = 0;
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
+ const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
+ struct stat st;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (!authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
+ /* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
+ authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+#ifdef AFS
+ if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
+ tkt_root = "/ticket/";
+#endif /* AFS */
+ snprintf(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%d",
+ tkt_root, authctxt->pw->pw_uid, getpid());
+ krb_set_tkt_string(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+ }
+ /* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
+ if (!cleanup_registered) {
+ fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
+ cleanup_registered = 1;
+ }
+ /* Try to create our ticket file. */
+ if ((fd = mkstemp(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file)) != -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ return (1);
+ }
+ /* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */
+ if (lstat(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, &st) != -1) {
+ if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) &&
+ st.st_uid == authctxt->pw->pw_uid)
+ return (1);
+ }
+ /* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving ticket for inspection. */
+ log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+
+ fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
+ cleanup_registered = 0;
+
+ xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+ authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * try krb4 authentication,
+ * return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available
+ */
+int
+auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+ AUTH_DAT adata;
+ KTEXT_ST tkt;
+ struct hostent *hp;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN], phost[INST_SZ], realm[REALM_SZ];
+ u_int32_t faddr;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ /*
+ * Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
+ * users and only if Kerberos is installed.
+ */
+ if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) {
+ /* Set up our ticket file. */
+ if (!krb4_init(authctxt)) {
+ log("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!",
+ pw->pw_name);
+ goto failure;
+ }
+ /* Try to get TGT using our password. */
+ r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "", realm,
+ "krbtgt", realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *)password);
+ if (r != INTK_OK) {
+ debug("Kerberos v4 password authentication for %s "
+ "failed: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto failure;
+ }
+ /* Successful authentication. */
+ chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
+
+ /*
+ * Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
+ * "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
+ * to a bogus Kerberos server.
+ */
+ gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
+ strlcpy(phost, (char *)krb_get_phost(localhost),
+ sizeof(phost));
+ r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
+
+ if (r == KSUCCESS) {
+ if ((hp = gethostbyname(localhost)) == NULL) {
+ log("Couldn't get local host address!");
+ goto failure;
+ }
+ memmove((void *)&faddr, (void *)hp->h_addr,
+ sizeof(faddr));
+
+ /* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
+ r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
+ faddr, &adata, "");
+ if (r == RD_AP_UNDEC) {
+ /*
+ * Probably didn't have a srvtab on
+ * localhost. Disallow login.
+ */
+ log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
+ "no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s",
+ pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto failure;
+ } else if (r != KSUCCESS) {
+ log("Kerberos v4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
+ KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto failure;
+ }
+ } else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) {
+ /*
+ * Disallow login if no rcmd service exists, and
+ * log the error.
+ */
+ log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
+ "not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name,
+ krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
+ goto failure;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed!
+ */
+ debug("WARNING: Kerberos v4 TGT possibly spoofed "
+ "for %s: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto failure;
+ }
+ /* Authentication succeeded. */
+ return (1);
+ } else
+ /* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
+ debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
+
+ failure:
+ krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+
+ if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+void
+krb4_cleanup_proc(void *context)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
+ debug("krb4_cleanup_proc called");
+ if (authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
+ (void) dest_tkt();
+ xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+ authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client)
+{
+ AUTH_DAT adat = {0};
+ KTEXT_ST reply;
+ Key_schedule schedule;
+ struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
+ char instance[INST_SZ];
+ socklen_t slen;
+ u_int cksum;
+ int r, s;
+
+ s = packet_get_connection_in();
+
+ slen = sizeof(local);
+ memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
+ if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
+ debug("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ slen = sizeof(foreign);
+ memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
+ if (getpeername(s, (struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ instance[0] = '*';
+ instance[1] = 0;
+
+ /* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */
+ if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance,
+ 0, &adat, ""))) {
+ debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ des_key_sched((des_cblock *) adat.session, schedule);
+
+ *client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ);
+ (void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname,
+ *adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm);
+
+ /* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */
+ if (kuserok(&adat, authctxt->user) != KSUCCESS) {
+ log("Kerberos v4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to "
+ "account %s", *client, authctxt->user);
+ xfree(*client);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the
+ session key. */
+ cksum = adat.checksum + 1;
+ cksum = htonl(cksum);
+
+ /* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an
+ empty message, admitting our failure. */
+ if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply.dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
+ schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) {
+ debug("Kerberos v4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ reply.dat[0] = 0;
+ reply.length = 0;
+ } else
+ reply.length = r;
+
+ /* Clear session key. */
+ memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(&adat.session));
+
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
+ packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif /* KRB4 */
+
+#ifdef AFS
+int
+auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *string)
+{
+ CREDENTIALS creds;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
+ goto failure;
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) {
+ log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos v4 TGT");
+ goto failure;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
+ strlcpy(creds.service, "krbtgt", sizeof creds.service);
+
+ if (strcmp(creds.service, "krbtgt")) {
+ log("Kerberos v4 TGT (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s",
+ creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst,
+ creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
+ goto failure;
+ }
+ if (!krb4_init(authctxt))
+ goto failure;
+
+ if (in_tkt(creds.pname, creds.pinst) != KSUCCESS)
+ goto failure;
+
+ if (save_credentials(creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm,
+ creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno, &creds.ticket_st,
+ creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) {
+ debug("Kerberos v4 TGT refused: couldn't save credentials");
+ goto failure;
+ }
+ /* Successful authentication, passed all checks. */
+ chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
+
+ debug("Kerberos v4 TGT accepted (%s%s%s@%s)",
+ creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm);
+ memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+
+ restore_uid();
+
+ return (1);
+
+ failure:
+ krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+ memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+ restore_uid();
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+auth_afs_token(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *token_string)
+{
+ CREDENTIALS creds;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ uid_t uid;
+
+ if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (!radix_to_creds(token_string, &creds)) {
+ log("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
+ strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
+
+ if (strncmp(creds.pname, "AFS ID ", 7) == 0)
+ uid = atoi(creds.pname + 7);
+ else
+ uid = pw->pw_uid;
+
+ if (kafs_settoken(creds.realm, uid, &creds)) {
+ log("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s",
+ creds.pname, creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
+ memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s)", creds.pname, creds.realm);
+ memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif /* AFS */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar Exp $
+ * $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.2 2001/11/12 01:47:09 dugsong Exp $
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <krb5.h>
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int
+krb5_init(void *context)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ static int cleanup_registered = 0;
+
+ if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) {
+ problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx);
+ if (problem)
+ return (problem);
+ krb5_init_ets(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
+ }
+ if (!cleanup_registered) {
+ fatal_add_cleanup(krb5_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
+ cleanup_registered = 1;
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Try krb5 authentication. server_user is passed for logging purposes
+ * only, in auth is received ticket, in client is returned principal
+ * from the ticket
+ */
+int
+auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client)
+{
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ krb5_principal server;
+ krb5_data reply;
+ krb5_ticket *ticket;
+ int fd, ret;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ server = NULL;
+ ticket = NULL;
+ reply.length = 0;
+
+ problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
+ if (problem)
+ goto err;
+
+ problem = krb5_auth_con_init(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ &authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx);
+ if (problem)
+ goto err;
+
+ fd = packet_get_connection_in();
+ problem = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx, &fd);
+ if (problem)
+ goto err;
+
+ problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL ,
+ KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
+ if (problem)
+ goto err;
+
+ problem = krb5_rd_req(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx,
+ auth, server, NULL, NULL, &ticket);
+ if (problem)
+ goto err;
+
+ problem = krb5_copy_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket->client,
+ &authctxt->krb5_user);
+ if (problem)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* if client wants mutual auth */
+ problem = krb5_mk_rep(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx,
+ &reply);
+ if (problem)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Check .k5login authorization now. */
+ if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+ authctxt->pw->pw_name))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (client)
+ krb5_unparse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+ client);
+
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
+ packet_put_string((char *) reply.data, reply.length);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (server)
+ krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server);
+ if (ticket)
+ krb5_free_ticket(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ticket);
+ if (reply.length)
+ xfree(reply.data);
+
+ if (problem)
+ debug("Kerberos v5 authentication failed: %s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem));
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt)
+{
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ char *pname;
+
+ if (authctxt->pw == NULL || authctxt->krb5_user == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+
+ problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache);
+ if (problem)
+ goto fail;
+
+ problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
+ authctxt->krb5_user);
+ if (problem)
+ goto fail;
+
+ problem = krb5_rd_cred2(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx,
+ ccache, tgt);
+ if (problem)
+ goto fail;
+
+ authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = ccache;
+ ccache = NULL;
+
+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+
+ problem = krb5_unparse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+ &pname);
+ if (problem)
+ goto fail;
+
+ debug("Kerberos v5 TGT accepted (%s)", pname);
+
+ restore_uid();
+
+ return (1);
+
+ fail:
+ if (problem)
+ debug("Kerberos v5 TGT passing failed: %s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem));
+ if (ccache)
+ krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
+
+ restore_uid();
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+
+ if (authctxt->pw == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+
+ problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->pw->pw_name,
+ &authctxt->krb5_user);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops,
+ &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, authctxt->krb5_user);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+ authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, password, 1, NULL);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+
+ out:
+ restore_uid();
+
+ if (problem) {
+ debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem));
+
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+
+ if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
+ return (-1);
+ else
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+void
+krb5_cleanup_proc(void *context)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
+
+ debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
+ if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
+ krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
+ }
+ if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
+ krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
+ authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
+ }
+ if (authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx) {
+ krb5_auth_con_free(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx);
+ authctxt->krb5_auth_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) {
+ krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
+ authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* KRB5 */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.20 2001/08/30 20:36:34 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* Flags set authorized_keys flags */
+int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+int no_pty_flag = 0;
+
+/* "command=" option. */
+char *forced_command = NULL;
+
+/* "environment=" options. */
+struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL;
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+void
+auth_clear_options(void)
+{
+ no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ no_pty_flag = 0;
+ no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+ while (custom_environment) {
+ struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
+ custom_environment = ce->next;
+ xfree(ce->s);
+ xfree(ce);
+ }
+ if (forced_command) {
+ xfree(forced_command);
+ forced_command = NULL;
+ }
+ channel_clear_permitted_opens();
+}
+
+/*
+ * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not.
+ * side effect: sets key option flags
+ */
+int
+auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
+{
+ const char *cp;
+ int i;
+
+ /* reset options */
+ auth_clear_options();
+
+ if (!opts)
+ return 1;
+
+ while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
+ cp = "no-port-forwarding";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ packet_send_debug("Port forwarding disabled.");
+ no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "no-agent-forwarding";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled.");
+ no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "no-X11-forwarding";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled.");
+ no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "no-pty";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ packet_send_debug("Pty allocation disabled.");
+ no_pty_flag = 1;
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "command=\"";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+ i = 0;
+ while (*opts) {
+ if (*opts == '"')
+ break;
+ if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+ opts += 2;
+ forced_command[i++] = '"';
+ continue;
+ }
+ forced_command[i++] = *opts++;
+ }
+ if (!*opts) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ xfree(forced_command);
+ forced_command = NULL;
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ forced_command[i] = 0;
+ packet_send_debug("Forced command: %.900s", forced_command);
+ opts++;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "environment=\"";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ char *s;
+ struct envstring *new_envstring;
+
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ s = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+ i = 0;
+ while (*opts) {
+ if (*opts == '"')
+ break;
+ if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+ opts += 2;
+ s[i++] = '"';
+ continue;
+ }
+ s[i++] = *opts++;
+ }
+ if (!*opts) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ xfree(s);
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ s[i] = 0;
+ packet_send_debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
+ debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
+ opts++;
+ new_envstring = xmalloc(sizeof(struct envstring));
+ new_envstring->s = s;
+ new_envstring->next = custom_environment;
+ custom_environment = new_envstring;
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "from=\"";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ const char *remote_host = get_canonical_hostname(
+ options.reverse_mapping_check);
+ char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ i = 0;
+ while (*opts) {
+ if (*opts == '"')
+ break;
+ if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+ opts += 2;
+ patterns[i++] = '"';
+ continue;
+ }
+ patterns[i++] = *opts++;
+ }
+ if (!*opts) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ xfree(patterns);
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ patterns[i] = 0;
+ opts++;
+ if (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
+ patterns) != 1) {
+ xfree(patterns);
+ log("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
+ "correct key but not from a permitted "
+ "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
+ pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
+ packet_send_debug("Your host '%.200s' is not "
+ "permitted to use this key for login.",
+ remote_host);
+ /* deny access */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ xfree(patterns);
+ /* Host name matches. */
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+ cp = "permitopen=\"";
+ if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
+ char host[256], sport[6];
+ u_short port;
+ char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
+
+ opts += strlen(cp);
+ i = 0;
+ while (*opts) {
+ if (*opts == '"')
+ break;
+ if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
+ opts += 2;
+ patterns[i++] = '"';
+ continue;
+ }
+ patterns[i++] = *opts++;
+ }
+ if (!*opts) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
+ file, linenum);
+ xfree(patterns);
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ patterns[i] = 0;
+ opts++;
+ if (sscanf(patterns, "%255[^:]:%5[0-9]", host, sport) != 2 &&
+ sscanf(patterns, "%255[^/]/%5[0-9]", host, sport) != 2) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen specification "
+ "<%.100s>", file, linenum, patterns);
+ packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: "
+ "Bad permitopen specification", file, linenum);
+ xfree(patterns);
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ if ((port = a2port(sport)) == 0) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port <%.100s>",
+ file, linenum, sport);
+ packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: "
+ "Bad permitopen port", file, linenum);
+ xfree(patterns);
+ goto bad_option;
+ }
+ if (options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
+ channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port);
+ xfree(patterns);
+ goto next_option;
+ }
+next_option:
+ /*
+ * Skip the comma, and move to the next option
+ * (or break out if there are no more).
+ */
+ if (!*opts)
+ fatal("Bugs in auth-options.c option processing.");
+ if (*opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
+ break; /* End of options. */
+ if (*opts != ',')
+ goto bad_option;
+ opts++;
+ /* Process the next option. */
+ }
+ /* grant access */
+ return 1;
+
+bad_option:
+ log("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
+ file, linenum, opts);
+ packet_send_debug("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
+ file, linenum, opts);
+ /* deny access */
+ return 0;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.10 2001/06/26 17:27:22 markus Exp $ */
+
+#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
+#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H
+
+/* Linked list of custom environment strings */
+struct envstring {
+ struct envstring *next;
+ char *s;
+};
+
+/* Flags that may be set in authorized_keys options. */
+extern int no_port_forwarding_flag;
+extern int no_agent_forwarding_flag;
+extern int no_x11_forwarding_flag;
+extern int no_pty_flag;
+extern char *forced_command;
+extern struct envstring *custom_environment;
+
+int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
+void auth_clear_options(void);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "readpass.h"
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#define NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG \
+ "Warning: Your password has expired, please change it now"
+
+static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr);
+
+/* module-local variables */
+static struct pam_conv conv = {
+ do_pam_conversation,
+ NULL
+};
+static char *__pam_msg = NULL;
+static pam_handle_t *__pamh = NULL;
+static const char *__pampasswd = NULL;
+
+/* states for do_pam_conversation() */
+enum { INITIAL_LOGIN, OTHER } pamstate = INITIAL_LOGIN;
+/* remember whether pam_acct_mgmt() returned PAM_NEWAUTHTOK_REQD */
+static int password_change_required = 0;
+/* remember whether the last pam_authenticate() succeeded or not */
+static int was_authenticated = 0;
+
+/* Remember what has been initialised */
+static int session_opened = 0;
+static int creds_set = 0;
+
+/* accessor which allows us to switch conversation structs according to
+ * the authentication method being used */
+void do_pam_set_conv(struct pam_conv *conv)
+{
+ pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_CONV, conv);
+}
+
+/* start an authentication run */
+int do_pam_authenticate(int flags)
+{
+ int retval = pam_authenticate(__pamh, flags);
+ was_authenticated = (retval == PAM_SUCCESS);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PAM conversation function.
+ * There are two states this can run in.
+ *
+ * INITIAL_LOGIN mode simply feeds the password from the client into
+ * PAM in response to PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, and collects output
+ * messages with into __pam_msg. This is used during initial
+ * authentication to bypass the normal PAM password prompt.
+ *
+ * OTHER mode handles PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF with read_passphrase()
+ * and outputs messages to stderr. This mode is used if pam_chauthtok()
+ * is called to update expired passwords.
+ */
+static int do_pam_conversation(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr)
+{
+ struct pam_response *reply;
+ int count;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ /* PAM will free this later */
+ reply = malloc(num_msg * sizeof(*reply));
+ if (reply == NULL)
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+
+ for (count = 0; count < num_msg; count++) {
+ if (pamstate == INITIAL_LOGIN) {
+ /*
+ * We can't use stdio yet, queue messages for
+ * printing later
+ */
+ switch(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg_style)) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ free(reply);
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ if (__pampasswd == NULL) {
+ free(reply);
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+ }
+ reply[count].resp = xstrdup(__pampasswd);
+ reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ if ((*msg)[count].msg != NULL) {
+ message_cat(&__pam_msg,
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg));
+ }
+ reply[count].resp = xstrdup("");
+ reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ free(reply);
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * stdio is connected, so interact directly
+ */
+ switch(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg_style)) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ fputs(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg), stderr);
+ fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin);
+ reply[count].resp = xstrdup(buf);
+ reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ reply[count].resp =
+ read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count,
+ msg), RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ if ((*msg)[count].msg != NULL)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n",
+ PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, count, msg));
+ reply[count].resp = xstrdup("");
+ reply[count].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ free(reply);
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *resp = reply;
+
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* Called at exit to cleanly shutdown PAM */
+void do_pam_cleanup_proc(void *context)
+{
+ int pam_retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (__pamh && session_opened) {
+ pam_retval = pam_close_session(__pamh, 0);
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ log("Cannot close PAM session[%d]: %.200s",
+ pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+ }
+
+ if (__pamh && creds_set) {
+ pam_retval = pam_setcred(__pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ debug("Cannot delete credentials[%d]: %.200s",
+ pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+ }
+
+ if (__pamh) {
+ pam_retval = pam_end(__pamh, pam_retval);
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ log("Cannot release PAM authentication[%d]: %.200s",
+ pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+ }
+}
+
+/* Attempt password authentation using PAM */
+int auth_pam_password(struct passwd *pw, const char *password)
+{
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ int pam_retval;
+
+ do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
+
+ /* deny if no user. */
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_NO_PASSWD)
+ return 0;
+ if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ __pampasswd = password;
+
+ pamstate = INITIAL_LOGIN;
+ pam_retval = do_pam_authenticate(
+ options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
+ if (pam_retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ debug("PAM Password authentication accepted for "
+ "user \"%.100s\"", pw->pw_name);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ debug("PAM Password authentication for \"%.100s\" "
+ "failed[%d]: %s", pw->pw_name, pam_retval,
+ PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Do account management using PAM */
+int do_pam_account(char *username, char *remote_user)
+{
+ int pam_retval;
+
+ do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
+
+ if (remote_user) {
+ debug("PAM setting ruser to \"%.200s\"", remote_user);
+ pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_RUSER, remote_user);
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM set ruser failed[%d]: %.200s", pam_retval,
+ PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+ }
+
+ pam_retval = pam_acct_mgmt(__pamh, 0);
+ switch (pam_retval) {
+ case PAM_SUCCESS:
+ /* This is what we want */
+ break;
+ case PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD:
+ message_cat(&__pam_msg, NEW_AUTHTOK_MSG);
+ /* flag that password change is necessary */
+ password_change_required = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ log("PAM rejected by account configuration[%d]: "
+ "%.200s", pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh,
+ pam_retval));
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+}
+
+/* Do PAM-specific session initialisation */
+void do_pam_session(char *username, const char *ttyname)
+{
+ int pam_retval;
+
+ do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
+
+ if (ttyname != NULL) {
+ debug("PAM setting tty to \"%.200s\"", ttyname);
+ pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_TTY, ttyname);
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM set tty failed[%d]: %.200s",
+ pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+ }
+
+ pam_retval = pam_open_session(__pamh, 0);
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM session setup failed[%d]: %.200s",
+ pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+
+ session_opened = 1;
+}
+
+/* Set PAM credentials */
+void do_pam_setcred(int init)
+{
+ int pam_retval;
+
+ do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
+
+ debug("PAM establishing creds");
+ pam_retval = pam_setcred(__pamh,
+ init ? PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED : PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (was_authenticated)
+ fatal("PAM setcred failed[%d]: %.200s",
+ pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+ else
+ debug("PAM setcred failed[%d]: %.200s",
+ pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+ } else
+ creds_set = 1;
+}
+
+/* accessor function for file scope static variable */
+int is_pam_password_change_required(void)
+{
+ return password_change_required;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have user change authentication token if pam_acct_mgmt() indicated
+ * it was expired. This needs to be called after an interactive
+ * session is established and the user's pty is connected to
+ * stdin/stout/stderr.
+ */
+void do_pam_chauthtok(void)
+{
+ int pam_retval;
+
+ do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
+
+ if (password_change_required) {
+ pamstate = OTHER;
+ pam_retval = pam_chauthtok(__pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM pam_chauthtok failed[%d]: %.200s",
+ pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+ }
+}
+
+/* Cleanly shutdown PAM */
+void finish_pam(void)
+{
+ do_pam_cleanup_proc(NULL);
+ fatal_remove_cleanup(&do_pam_cleanup_proc, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Start PAM authentication for specified account */
+void start_pam(const char *user)
+{
+ int pam_retval;
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char *rhost;
+
+ debug("Starting up PAM with username \"%.200s\"", user);
+
+ pam_retval = pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &conv, &__pamh);
+
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM initialisation failed[%d]: %.200s",
+ pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+
+ rhost = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.reverse_mapping_check);
+ debug("PAM setting rhost to \"%.200s\"", rhost);
+
+ pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_RHOST, rhost);
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM set rhost failed[%d]: %.200s", pam_retval,
+ PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
+ /*
+ * Some PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate,
+ * and will fail in various stupid ways if they don't get one.
+ * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and may
+ * not even need one (for tty-less connections)
+ * Kludge: Set a fake PAM_TTY
+ */
+ pam_retval = pam_set_item(__pamh, PAM_TTY, "NODEVssh");
+ if (pam_retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fatal("PAM set tty failed[%d]: %.200s",
+ pam_retval, PAM_STRERROR(__pamh, pam_retval));
+#endif /* PAM_TTY_KLUDGE */
+
+ fatal_add_cleanup(&do_pam_cleanup_proc, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Return list of PAM enviornment strings */
+char **fetch_pam_environment(void)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+ return(pam_getenvlist(__pamh));
+#else /* HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST */
+ return(NULL);
+#endif /* HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST */
+}
+
+/* Print any messages that have been generated during authentication */
+/* or account checking to stderr */
+void print_pam_messages(void)
+{
+ if (__pam_msg != NULL)
+ fputs(__pam_msg, stderr);
+}
+
+/* Append a message to buffer */
+void message_cat(char **p, const char *a)
+{
+ char *cp;
+ size_t new_len;
+
+ new_len = strlen(a);
+
+ if (*p) {
+ size_t len = strlen(*p);
+
+ *p = xrealloc(*p, new_len + len + 2);
+ cp = *p + len;
+ } else
+ *p = cp = xmalloc(new_len + 2);
+
+ memcpy(cp, a, new_len);
+ cp[new_len] = '\n';
+ cp[new_len + 1] = '\0';
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+
+#include <pwd.h> /* For struct passwd */
+
+void start_pam(const char *user);
+void finish_pam(void);
+int auth_pam_password(struct passwd *pw, const char *password);
+char **fetch_pam_environment(void);
+int do_pam_authenticate(int flags);
+int do_pam_account(char *username, char *remote_user);
+void do_pam_session(char *username, const char *ttyname);
+void do_pam_setcred(int init);
+void print_pam_messages(void);
+int is_pam_password_change_required(void);
+void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+void do_pam_set_conv(struct pam_conv *);
+void message_cat(char **p, const char *a);
+
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Password authentication. This file contains the functions to check whether
+ * the password is valid for the user.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.23 2001/06/26 16:15:23 dugsong Exp $");
+
+#if !defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+# include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+# include <login.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef __hpux
+# include <hpsecurity.h>
+# include <prot.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW
+# include <sys/security.h>
+# include <sys/audit.h>
+# include <prot.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW */
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+# include <shadow.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+# include <sys/label.h>
+# include <sys/audit.h>
+# include <pwdadj.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
+# include "md5crypt.h"
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+#undef ERROR
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <sys/cygwin.h>
+#define is_winnt (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+#endif
+
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if
+ * authentication succeeds.
+ */
+int
+auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+ struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
+ char *encrypted_password;
+ char *pw_password;
+ char *salt;
+#ifdef __hpux
+ struct pr_passwd *spw;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW
+ struct pr_passwd *spw;
+#endif /* HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW */
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ struct spwd *spw;
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ struct passwd_adjunct *spw;
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ char *authmsg;
+ char *loginmsg;
+ int reenter = 1;
+#endif
+
+ /* deny if no user. */
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ return 0;
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
+ return 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * Empty password is only possible on NT if the user has _really_
+ * an empty password and authentication is done, though.
+ */
+ if (!is_winnt)
+#endif
+ if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
+ return 0;
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
+ int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password);
+ if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
+ return ret;
+ /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (is_winnt) {
+ HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password);
+
+ if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+ return 0;
+ cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken);
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ return (authenticate(pw->pw_name,password,&reenter,&authmsg) == 0);
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB4
+ if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
+ int ret = auth_krb4_password(authctxt, password);
+ if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
+ return ret;
+ /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ if (auth_userokay(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
+ (char *)password) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ pw_password = pw->pw_passwd;
+
+ /*
+ * Various interfaces to shadow or protected password data
+ */
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+ if (spw != NULL)
+ pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp;
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW
+ spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name);
+ if (spw != NULL)
+ pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
+#endif /* HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
+ pw_password = spw->pwa_passwd;
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
+
+#if defined(__hpux)
+ if (iscomsec() && (spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
+ pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
+#endif /* defined(__hpux) */
+
+ /* Check for users with no password. */
+ if ((password[0] == '\0') && (pw_password[0] == '\0'))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (pw_password[0] != '\0')
+ salt = pw_password;
+ else
+ salt = "xx";
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
+ if (is_md5_salt(salt))
+ encrypted_password = md5_crypt(password, salt);
+ else
+ encrypted_password = crypt(password, salt);
+#else /* HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */
+# ifdef __hpux
+ if (iscomsec())
+ encrypted_password = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+ else
+ encrypted_password = crypt(password, salt);
+# else
+ encrypted_password = crypt(password, salt);
+# endif /* __hpux */
+#endif /* HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS */
+
+ /* Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords are identical. */
+ return (strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0);
+}
+#endif /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host
+ * authentication.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.26 2001/11/07 22:41:51 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
+ * its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds.
+ */
+
+int
+auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, RSA *client_host_key)
+{
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ const char *canonical_hostname;
+ HostStatus host_status;
+ Key *client_key;
+
+ debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s", client_user);
+
+ if (pw == NULL || client_host_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */
+ if (!auth_rhosts(pw, client_user))
+ return 0;
+
+ canonical_hostname = get_canonical_hostname(
+ options.reverse_mapping_check);
+
+ debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", canonical_hostname);
+
+ /* wrap the RSA key into a 'generic' key */
+ client_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ BN_copy(client_key->rsa->e, client_host_key->e);
+ BN_copy(client_key->rsa->n, client_host_key->n);
+
+ host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, client_key, canonical_hostname,
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
+ options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
+
+ key_free(client_key);
+
+ if (host_status != HOST_OK) {
+ debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key");
+ packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* A matching host key was found and is known. */
+
+ /* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
+ if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) {
+ log("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
+ canonical_hostname);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv,
+ * and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication.
+ */
+
+ verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.",
+ pw->pw_name, client_user, canonical_hostname);
+ packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted.");
+ return 1;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit
+ * the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.24 2001/06/23 15:12:17 itojun Exp $");
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted
+ * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise.
+ */
+
+static int
+check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
+ const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user,
+ const char *server_user)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char buf[1024]; /* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
+
+ /* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */
+ f = fopen(filename, "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return 0;
+
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
+ /* All three must be at least as big as buf to avoid overflows. */
+ char hostbuf[1024], userbuf[1024], dummy[1024], *host, *user, *cp;
+ int negated;
+
+ for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we
+ * don't ever support the plus syntax).
+ */
+ if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the
+ * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten.
+ */
+ switch (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %s", hostbuf, userbuf, dummy)) {
+ case 0:
+ packet_send_debug("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename);
+ continue;
+ case 1:
+ /* Host name only. */
+ strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf));
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ /* Got both host and user name. */
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ packet_send_debug("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename);
+ continue;
+ default:
+ /* Weird... */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ host = hostbuf;
+ user = userbuf;
+ negated = 0;
+
+ /* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */
+ if (host[0] == '-') {
+ negated = 1;
+ host++;
+ } else if (host[0] == '+')
+ host++;
+
+ if (user[0] == '-') {
+ negated = 1;
+ user++;
+ } else if (user[0] == '+')
+ user++;
+
+ /* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
+ if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
+ /* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
+ packet_send_debug("Ignoring wild host/user names in %.100s.",
+ filename);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Verify that host name matches. */
+ if (host[0] == '@') {
+ if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
+ !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
+ continue;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
+ continue; /* Different hostname. */
+
+ /* Verify that user name matches. */
+ if (user[0] == '@') {
+ if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL))
+ continue;
+ } else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0)
+ continue; /* Different username. */
+
+ /* Found the user and host. */
+ fclose(f);
+
+ /* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
+ if (negated) {
+ packet_send_debug("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
+ filename);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Accept authentication. */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Authentication using this file denied. */
+ fclose(f);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns
+ * true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
+ */
+
+int
+auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user)
+{
+ const char *hostname, *ipaddr;
+ int ret;
+
+ hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check);
+ ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ ret = auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+ const char *ipaddr)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ struct stat st;
+ static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL};
+ u_int rhosts_file_index;
+
+ debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s",
+ client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
+
+ /* no user given */
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Switch to the user's uid. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ /*
+ * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files, return
+ * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
+ * servers.
+ */
+ for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
+ rhosts_file_index++) {
+ /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
+ pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Switch back to privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there are no system-wide files. */
+ if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
+ stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
+ stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */
+ if (pw->pw_uid != 0) {
+ if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user,
+ pw->pw_name)) {
+ packet_send_debug("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.",
+ hostname, ipaddr);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user,
+ pw->pw_name)) {
+ packet_send_debug("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.",
+ hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
+ * not group or world writable.
+ */
+ if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) {
+ log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: no home directory %.200s",
+ pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
+ packet_send_debug("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: no home directory %.200s",
+ pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options.strict_modes &&
+ ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+ log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad ownership or modes for home directory.",
+ pw->pw_name);
+ packet_send_debug("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad ownership or modes for home directory.",
+ pw->pw_name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ /* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
+ for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
+ rhosts_file_index++) {
+ /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
+ pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by
+ * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the
+ * owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally
+ * allowing access to their account by anyone.
+ */
+ if (options.strict_modes &&
+ ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+ log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
+ pw->pw_name, buf);
+ packet_send_debug("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts and .shosts files. */
+ if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
+ packet_send_debug("Server has been configured to ignore %.100s.",
+ rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
+ if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+ packet_send_debug("Accepted by %.100s.",
+ rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+ return 0;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login
+ * based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check
+ * validity of the host key.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.44 2001/07/23 18:14:58 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "mpaux.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
+ * responses to a particular session.
+ */
+extern u_char session_id[16];
+
+/*
+ * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
+ * following format:
+ * options bits e n comment
+ * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
+ * and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum
+ * length of a line is 8000 characters. See the documentation for a
+ * description of the options.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
+ * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
+ * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
+ */
+
+int
+auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *pk)
+{
+ BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], response[16];
+ MD5_CTX md;
+ u_int i;
+ int plen, len;
+
+ encrypted_challenge = BN_new();
+ challenge = BN_new();
+
+ /* Generate a random challenge. */
+ BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0);
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ BN_mod(challenge, challenge, pk->n, ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
+ rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, pk);
+
+ /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
+ packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
+ packet_send();
+ BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for a response. */
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 16, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ response[i] = packet_get_char();
+
+ /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
+ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
+ if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
+ fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: bad challenge length %d", len);
+ memset(buf, 0, 32);
+ BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
+ MD5_Init(&md);
+ MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
+ MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
+ MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+
+ /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
+ if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
+ /* Wrong answer. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Correct answer. */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns
+ * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
+ * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
+ */
+
+int
+auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
+{
+ char line[8192], *file;
+ int authenticated;
+ u_int bits;
+ FILE *f;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+ RSA *pk;
+
+ /* no user given */
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ /* The authorized keys. */
+ file = authorized_keys_file(pw);
+ debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
+
+ /* Fail quietly if file does not exist */
+ if (stat(file, &st) < 0) {
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+ xfree(file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */
+ f = fopen(file, "r");
+ if (!f) {
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+ packet_send_debug("Could not open %.900s for reading.", file);
+ packet_send_debug("If your home is on an NFS volume, it may need to be world-readable.");
+ xfree(file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options.strict_modes &&
+ secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
+ xfree(file);
+ fclose(f);
+ log("Authentication refused: %s", line);
+ packet_send_debug("Authentication refused: %s", line);
+ restore_uid();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Flag indicating whether authentication has succeeded. */
+ authenticated = 0;
+
+ pk = RSA_new();
+ pk->e = BN_new();
+ pk->n = BN_new();
+
+ /*
+ * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
+ * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
+ * user really has the corresponding private key.
+ */
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ char *cp;
+ char *options;
+
+ linenum++;
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
+ * save their starting address and skip the option part
+ * for now. If there are no options, set the starting
+ * address to NULL.
+ */
+ if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
+ int quoted = 0;
+ options = cp;
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ cp++; /* Skip both */
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ } else
+ options = NULL;
+
+ /* Parse the key from the line. */
+ if (!auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &bits, pk->e, pk->n)) {
+ debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
+ file, linenum);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* cp now points to the comment part. */
+
+ /* Check if the we have found the desired key (identified by its modulus). */
+ if (BN_cmp(pk->n, client_n) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* check the real bits */
+ if (bits != BN_num_bits(pk->n))
+ log("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
+ "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
+ file, linenum, BN_num_bits(pk->n), bits);
+
+ /* We have found the desired key. */
+ /*
+ * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
+ * do not send challenge.
+ */
+ if (!auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
+ if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(pk)) {
+ /* Wrong response. */
+ verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
+ packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Correct response. The client has been successfully
+ * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
+ * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
+ * authentication to be rejected.
+ * Break out of the loop if authentication was successful;
+ * otherwise continue searching.
+ */
+ authenticated = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /* Close the file. */
+ xfree(file);
+ fclose(f);
+
+ RSA_free(pk);
+
+ if (authenticated)
+ packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
+ else
+ auth_clear_options();
+
+ /* Return authentication result. */
+ return authenticated;
+}
--- /dev/null
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "auth-sia.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+
+#include <sia.h>
+#include <siad.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int saved_argc;
+extern char **saved_argv;
+
+extern int errno;
+
+int
+auth_sia_password(char *user, char *pass)
+{
+ int ret;
+ SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
+ const char *host;
+
+ host = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check);
+
+ if (!user || !pass)
+ return(0);
+
+ if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, user, NULL, 0,
+ NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
+ return(0);
+
+ if ((ret = sia_ses_authent(NULL, pass, ent)) != SIASUCCESS) {
+ error("couldn't authenticate %s from %s", user, host);
+ if (ret & SIASTOP)
+ sia_ses_release(&ent);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+ return(1);
+}
+
+void
+session_setup_sia(char *user, char *tty)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
+ const char *host;
+
+ host = get_canonical_hostname (options.reverse_mapping_check);
+
+ if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, user, tty, 0,
+ NULL) != SIASUCCESS) {
+ error("sia_ses_init failed");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
+ sia_ses_release(&ent);
+ error("getpwnam(%s) failed: %s", user, strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (sia_make_entity_pwd(pw, ent) != SIASUCCESS) {
+ sia_ses_release(&ent);
+ error("sia_make_entity_pwd failed");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ ent->authtype = SIA_A_NONE;
+ if (sia_ses_estab(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS) {
+ error("couldn't establish session for %s from %s", user,
+ host);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0) == -1) {
+ sia_ses_release(&ent);
+ error("setpriority failed: %s", strerror (errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (sia_ses_launch(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS) {
+ error("couldn't launch session for %s from %s", user, host);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+ if (setreuid(geteuid(), geteuid()) < 0) {
+ error("setreuid failed: %s", strerror (errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+
--- /dev/null
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+
+int auth_sia_password(char *user, char *pass);
+void session_setup_sia(char *user, char *tty);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.12 2001/05/18 14:13:28 markus Exp $");
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+
+#include <skey.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+static void *
+skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ return authctxt;
+}
+
+#define PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
+
+static int
+skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+ u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+ char challenge[1024], *p;
+ int len;
+ struct skey skey;
+
+ if (skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ *name = xstrdup("");
+ *infotxt = xstrdup("");
+ *numprompts = 1;
+ *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char*));
+ *echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int));
+ (*echo_on)[0] = 0;
+
+ len = strlen(challenge) + strlen(PROMPT) + 1;
+ p = xmalloc(len);
+ p[0] = '\0';
+ strlcat(p, challenge, len);
+ strlcat(p, PROMPT, len);
+ (*prompts)[0] = p;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+
+ if (authctxt->valid &&
+ numresponses == 1 &&
+ skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
+ skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, responses[0]) != -1)
+ return 0;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+skey_free_ctx(void *ctx)
+{
+ /* we don't have a special context */
+}
+
+KbdintDevice skey_device = {
+ "skey",
+ skey_init_ctx,
+ skey_query,
+ skey_respond,
+ skey_free_ctx
+};
+#endif /* SKEY */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.29 2001/11/08 20:02:24 markus Exp $");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+#include <login.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+#include <shadow.h>
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+#include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "tildexpand.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
+ * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
+ * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
+ * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
+ * listed there, false will be returned.
+ * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
+ * Otherwise true is returned.
+ */
+int
+allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
+ char *shell;
+ int i;
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ char *loginmsg;
+#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
+ !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+ struct spwd *spw;
+
+ /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
+ if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
+ return 0;
+
+ spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+ if (spw != NULL) {
+ int days = time(NULL) / 86400;
+
+ /* Check account expiry */
+ if ((spw->sp_expire >= 0) && (days > spw->sp_expire))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check password expiry */
+ if ((spw->sp_lstchg >= 0) && (spw->sp_max >= 0) &&
+ (days > (spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max)))
+ return 0;
+ }
+#else
+ /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
+ if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
+ return 0;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
+ * legal, and means /bin/sh.
+ */
+ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+
+ /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
+ if (stat(shell, &st) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (!((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) && (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP))))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) {
+ hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check);
+ ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ }
+
+ /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
+ if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
+ if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+ options.deny_users[i]))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
+ if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
+ if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+ options.allow_users[i]))
+ break;
+ /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
+ if (i >= options.num_allow_users)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+ /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
+ if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
+ if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
+ if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
+ options.num_deny_groups)) {
+ ga_free();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
+ * isn't listed there
+ */
+ if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
+ if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
+ options.num_allow_groups)) {
+ ga_free();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ga_free();
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ if (loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &loginmsg) != 0) {
+ if (loginmsg && *loginmsg) {
+ /* Remove embedded newlines (if any) */
+ char *p;
+ for (p = loginmsg; *p; p++) {
+ if (*p == '\n')
+ *p = ' ';
+ }
+ /* Remove trailing newline */
+ *--p = '\0';
+ log("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, loginmsg);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+
+ /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+Authctxt *
+authctxt_new(void)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
+ memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ return authctxt;
+}
+
+void
+auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
+{
+ void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
+ char *authmsg;
+
+ /* Raise logging level */
+ if (authenticated == 1 ||
+ !authctxt->valid ||
+ authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG ||
+ strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
+ authlog = log;
+
+ if (authctxt->postponed)
+ authmsg = "Postponed";
+ else
+ authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
+
+ authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
+ authmsg,
+ method,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
+ authctxt->user,
+ get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ get_remote_port(),
+ info);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
+ */
+int
+auth_root_allowed(char *method)
+{
+ switch (options.permit_root_login) {
+ case PERMIT_YES:
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
+ if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
+ if (forced_command) {
+ log("Root login accepted for forced command.");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
+ * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
+ * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
+ *
+ * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
+ */
+char *
+expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ Buffer buffer;
+ char *file;
+ const char *cp;
+
+ /*
+ * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate
+ * substitutions to the given file name.
+ */
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+ for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) {
+ if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
+ buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1);
+ cp++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
+ buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
+ cp++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
+ buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
+ strlen(pw->pw_name));
+ cp++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1);
+ }
+ buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
+ * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
+ */
+ file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer);
+ if (*cp != '/')
+ snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp);
+ else
+ strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN);
+
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return file;
+}
+
+char *
+authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
+}
+
+char *
+authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
+}
+
+/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
+HostStatus
+check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
+ const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
+{
+ Key *found;
+ char *user_hostfile;
+ struct stat st;
+ int host_status;
+
+ /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
+ found = key_new(key->type);
+ host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
+
+ if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
+ user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
+ if (options.strict_modes &&
+ (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
+ ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+ log("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
+ "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
+ pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
+ } else {
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
+ host, key, found, NULL);
+ restore_uid();
+ }
+ xfree(user_hostfile);
+ }
+ key_free(found);
+
+ debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
+ "ok" : "not found", host);
+ return host_status;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
+ * of the path to the file must either be owned by either the owner of
+ * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
+ *
+ * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
+ *
+ * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
+ * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+ */
+int
+secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+ char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+ uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char *cp;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) == NULL) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", pw->pw_dir,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* check the open file to avoid races */
+ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
+ (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
+ buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+
+ debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+ (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen,
+ "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
+ if (strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
+ debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
+ buf);
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
+ * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
+ */
+ if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.22 2001/06/26 17:27:22 markus Exp $
+ */
+#ifndef AUTH_H
+#define AUTH_H
+
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#include <login_cap.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+#include <bsd_auth.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <krb5.h>
+#endif
+
+typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
+typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
+
+struct Authctxt {
+ int success;
+ int postponed;
+ int valid;
+ int attempt;
+ int failures;
+ char *user;
+ char *service;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ char *style;
+ void *kbdintctxt;
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ auth_session_t *as;
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB4
+ char *krb4_ticket_file;
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+ krb5_context krb5_ctx;
+ krb5_auth_context krb5_auth_ctx;
+ krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache;
+ krb5_principal krb5_user;
+ char *krb5_ticket_file;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * Keyboard interactive device:
+ * init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success
+ * query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure
+ * respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction,
+ * otherwise - failure
+ */
+struct KbdintDevice
+{
+ const char *name;
+ void* (*init_ctx) __P((Authctxt*));
+ int (*query) __P((void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+ u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts,
+ u_int **echo_on));
+ int (*respond) __P((void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses));
+ void (*free_ctx) __P((void *ctx));
+};
+
+int auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *);
+int
+auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+int auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *, const char *, RSA *);
+int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int auth_rsa(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *);
+int auth_rsa_read_key(char **, u_int *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
+int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *);
+
+#ifdef KRB4
+#include <krb.h>
+int auth_krb4(Authctxt *, KTEXT, char **);
+int auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
+void krb4_cleanup_proc(void *);
+
+#ifdef AFS
+#include <kafs.h>
+int auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int auth_afs_token(Authctxt *, const char *);
+#endif /* AFS */
+
+#endif /* KRB4 */
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client);
+int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
+int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
+void krb5_cleanup_proc(void *authctxt);
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "auth2-pam.h"
+
+void do_authentication(void);
+void do_authentication2(void);
+
+Authctxt *authctxt_new(void);
+void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, char *, char *);
+void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, char *);
+int auth_root_allowed(char *);
+
+int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *);
+
+int allowed_user(struct passwd *);
+
+char *get_challenge(Authctxt *);
+int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
+
+struct passwd * auth_get_user(void);
+
+char *expand_filename(const char *, struct passwd *);
+char *authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *);
+char *authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *);
+
+int
+secure_filename(FILE *, const char *, struct passwd *, char *, size_t);
+
+HostStatus
+check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
+ const char *, const char *);
+
+#define AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6
+#define AUTH_FAIL_LOG (AUTH_FAIL_MAX/2)
+#define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s"
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.25 2001/06/26 16:15:23 dugsong Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "mpaux.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * convert ssh auth msg type into description
+ */
+static char *
+get_authname(int type)
+{
+ static char buf[1024];
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
+ return "password";
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA:
+ return "rsa";
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
+ return "rhosts-rsa";
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
+ return "rhosts";
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
+ return "challenge-response";
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
+ return "kerberos";
+#endif
+ }
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * read packets, try to authenticate the user and
+ * return only if authentication is successful
+ */
+static void
+do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ u_int bits;
+ RSA *client_host_key;
+ BIGNUM *n;
+ char *client_user, *password;
+ char info[1024];
+ u_int dlen;
+ int plen, nlen, elen;
+ u_int ulen;
+ int type = 0;
+ struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+
+ debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", authctxt->user);
+
+ /* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
+ if (options.password_authentication &&
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ auth_pam_password(pw, "")) {
+#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
+ 0) {
+#else
+ auth_password(authctxt, "")) {
+#endif
+ auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", "");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ client_user = NULL;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* default to fail */
+ authenticated = 0;
+
+ info[0] = '\0';
+
+ /* Get a packet from the client. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+
+ /* Process the packet. */
+ switch (type) {
+
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
+ if (!options.kerberos_authentication) {
+ verbose("Kerberos authentication disabled.");
+ } else {
+ char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+
+ if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* KRB_PROT_VERSION */
+#ifdef KRB4
+ KTEXT_ST tkt;
+
+ tkt.length = dlen;
+ if (tkt.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN)
+ memcpy(tkt.dat, kdata, tkt.length);
+
+ if (auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) {
+ authenticated = 1;
+ snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
+ " tktuser %.100s",
+ client_user);
+ }
+#endif /* KRB4 */
+ } else {
+#ifdef KRB5
+ krb5_data tkt;
+ tkt.length = dlen;
+ tkt.data = kdata;
+
+ if (auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user)) {
+ authenticated = 1;
+ snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
+ " tktuser %.100s",
+ client_user);
+ }
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+ }
+ xfree(kdata);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */
+
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ /* XXX - punt on backward compatibility here. */
+ case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
+ packet_send_debug("Kerberos TGT passing disabled before authentication.");
+ break;
+#ifdef AFS
+ case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
+ packet_send_debug("AFS token passing disabled before authentication.");
+ break;
+#endif /* AFS */
+#endif /* AFS || KRB5 */
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
+ if (!options.rhosts_authentication) {
+ verbose("Rhosts authentication disabled.");
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Get client user name. Note that we just have to
+ * trust the client; this is one reason why rhosts
+ * authentication is insecure. (Another is
+ * IP-spoofing on a local network.)
+ */
+ client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + ulen, type);
+
+ /* Try to authenticate using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts. */
+ authenticated = auth_rhosts(pw, client_user);
+
+ snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
+ if (!options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
+ verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled.");
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Get client user name. Note that we just have to
+ * trust the client; root on the client machine can
+ * claim to be any user.
+ */
+ client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
+
+ /* Get the client host key. */
+ client_host_key = RSA_new();
+ if (client_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("RSA_new failed");
+ client_host_key->e = BN_new();
+ client_host_key->n = BN_new();
+ if (client_host_key->e == NULL || client_host_key->n == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new failed");
+ bits = packet_get_int();
+ packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->e, &elen);
+ packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->n, &nlen);
+
+ if (bits != BN_num_bits(client_host_key->n))
+ verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
+ "actual %d, announced %d", BN_num_bits(client_host_key->n), bits);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen) + 4 + elen + nlen, type);
+
+ authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(pw, client_user, client_host_key);
+ RSA_free(client_host_key);
+
+ snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA:
+ if (!options.rsa_authentication) {
+ verbose("RSA authentication disabled.");
+ break;
+ }
+ /* RSA authentication requested. */
+ n = BN_new();
+ packet_get_bignum(n, &nlen);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, nlen, type);
+ authenticated = auth_rsa(pw, n);
+ BN_clear_free(n);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
+ if (!options.password_authentication) {
+ verbose("Password authentication disabled.");
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was
+ * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
+ * not visible to an outside observer.
+ */
+ password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ /* Do PAM auth with password */
+ authenticated = auth_pam_password(pw, password);
+#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
+ /* Do SIA auth with password */
+ authenticated = auth_sia_password(authctxt->user,
+ password);
+#else /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+ /* Try authentication with the password. */
+ authenticated = auth_password(authctxt, password);
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+ memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+ xfree(password);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
+ debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS");
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) {
+ char *challenge = get_challenge(authctxt);
+ if (challenge != NULL) {
+ debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
+ packet_put_cstring(challenge);
+ xfree(challenge);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
+ debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE");
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) {
+ char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ debug("got response '%s'", response);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+ authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
+ memset(response, 'r', dlen);
+ xfree(response);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure
+ * returned) during authentication.
+ */
+ log("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type);
+ break;
+ }
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ if (authctxt->as) {
+ auth_close(authctxt->as);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
+ fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
+ authctxt->user);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (authenticated &&
+ !check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD,pw->pw_uid)) {
+ packet_disconnect("Authentication rejected for uid %d.",
+ (int)pw->pw_uid);
+ authenticated = 0;
+ }
+#else
+ /* Special handling for root */
+ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type)))
+ authenticated = 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (authenticated && !do_pam_account(pw->pw_name, client_user))
+ authenticated = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /* Log before sending the reply */
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info);
+
+ if (client_user != NULL) {
+ xfree(client_user);
+ client_user = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (authenticated)
+ return;
+
+ if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) {
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ loginfailed(authctxt->user,
+ get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check),
+ "ssh");
+#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+ packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+ }
+
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already
+ * been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
+ */
+void
+do_authentication()
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int plen;
+ u_int ulen;
+ char *p, *user, *style = NULL;
+
+ /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_USER);
+
+ /* Get the user name. */
+ user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen), SSH_CMSG_USER);
+
+ if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ *style++ = '\0';
+
+ /* XXX - SSH.com Kerberos v5 braindeath. */
+ if ((p = strchr(user, '@')) != NULL)
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ authctxt = authctxt_new();
+ authctxt->user = user;
+ authctxt->style = style;
+
+ /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
+ pw = getpwnam(user);
+ if (pw && allowed_user(pw)) {
+ authctxt->valid = 1;
+ pw = pwcopy(pw);
+ } else {
+ debug("do_authentication: illegal user %s", user);
+ pw = NULL;
+ }
+ authctxt->pw = pw;
+
+ setproctitle("%s", pw ? user : "unknown");
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (pw)
+ start_pam(user);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
+ * the server. (Unless you are running Windows)
+ */
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (getuid() != 0 && pw && pw->pw_uid != getuid())
+ packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is
+ * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful
+ */
+ do_authloop(authctxt);
+
+ /* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Perform session preparation. */
+ do_authenticated(authctxt);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.8 2001/09/27 15:31:17 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *);
+static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *);
+static void input_userauth_info_response(int, int, void *);
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
+#else
+#ifdef SKEY
+extern KbdintDevice skey_device;
+#endif
+#endif
+
+KbdintDevice *devices[] = {
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ &bsdauth_device,
+#else
+#ifdef SKEY
+ &skey_device,
+#endif
+#endif
+ NULL
+};
+
+typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt;
+struct KbdintAuthctxt
+{
+ char *devices;
+ void *ctxt;
+ KbdintDevice *device;
+};
+
+static KbdintAuthctxt *
+kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
+{
+ KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+ int i;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ kbdintctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt));
+ if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) {
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
+ if (i != 0)
+ strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof(buf));
+ strlcat(buf, devices[i]->name, sizeof(buf));
+ }
+ debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", buf);
+ kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(buf);
+ } else {
+ kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs);
+ }
+ kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
+ kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
+
+ return kbdintctxt;
+}
+static void
+kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+ if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) {
+ kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt);
+ kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
+ }
+ kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
+}
+static void
+kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+ if (kbdintctxt->device)
+ kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
+ if (kbdintctxt->devices) {
+ xfree(kbdintctxt->devices);
+ kbdintctxt->devices = NULL;
+ }
+ xfree(kbdintctxt);
+}
+/* get next device */
+static int
+kbdint_next_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ char *t;
+ int i;
+
+ if (kbdintctxt->device)
+ kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
+ do {
+ len = kbdintctxt->devices ?
+ strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ break;
+ for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++)
+ if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name, len) == 0)
+ kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
+ t = kbdintctxt->devices;
+ kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
+ xfree(t);
+ debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ?
+ kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
+ } while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device);
+
+ return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to
+ * wait for the response.
+ */
+int
+auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs)
+{
+ debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s",
+ authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "<nouser>",
+ devs ? devs : "<no devs>");
+
+ if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs)
+ return 0;
+ if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs);
+ return auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
+}
+
+/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/
+static int
+auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+
+ debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s",
+ kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
+
+ if (kbdint_next_device(kbdintctxt) == 0) {
+ kbdint_free(kbdintctxt);
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'",
+ kbdintctxt->device->name);
+
+ if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) {
+ kbdint_free(kbdintctxt);
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) {
+ kbdint_free(kbdintctxt);
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
+ &input_userauth_info_response);
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+ char *name, *instr, **prompts;
+ int i;
+ u_int numprompts, *echo_on;
+
+ kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+ if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
+ &name, &instr, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on))
+ return 0;
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(name);
+ packet_put_cstring(instr);
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* language not used */
+ packet_put_int(numprompts);
+ for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++) {
+ packet_put_cstring(prompts[i]);
+ packet_put_char(echo_on[i]);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
+ xfree(prompts[i]);
+ xfree(prompts);
+ xfree(echo_on);
+ xfree(name);
+ xfree(instr);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+input_userauth_info_response(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+ int i, authenticated = 0, res, len;
+ u_int nresp;
+ char **response = NULL, *method;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
+ kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+ if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt");
+ if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device");
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */
+ nresp = packet_get_int();
+ if (nresp > 0) {
+ response = xmalloc(nresp * sizeof(char*));
+ for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
+ response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ }
+ packet_done();
+
+ if (authctxt->valid) {
+ res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
+ nresp, response);
+ } else {
+ res = -1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
+ memset(response[i], 'r', strlen(response[i]));
+ xfree(response[i]);
+ }
+ if (response)
+ xfree(response);
+
+ switch (res) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Success! */
+ authenticated = 1;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ /* Authentication needs further interaction */
+ authctxt->postponed = 1;
+ if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) {
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Failure! */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ len = strlen("keyboard-interactive") + 2 +
+ strlen(kbdintctxt->device->name);
+ method = xmalloc(len);
+ method[0] = '\0';
+ strlcat(method, "keyboard-interactive", len);
+ strlcat(method, "/", len);
+ strlcat(method, kbdintctxt->device->name, len);
+
+ if (!authctxt->postponed) {
+ /* unregister callback */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
+
+ if (authenticated) {
+ kbdint_free(kbdintctxt);
+ authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /* start next device */
+ /* may set authctxt->postponed */
+ auth2_challenge_start(authctxt);
+ }
+ }
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
+ xfree(method);
+}
--- /dev/null
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static int do_pam_conversation_kbd_int(int num_msg,
+ const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp,
+ void *appdata_ptr);
+void input_userauth_info_response_pam(int type, int plen, void *ctxt);
+
+struct {
+ int finished, num_received, num_expected;
+ int *prompts;
+ struct pam_response *responses;
+} context_pam2 = {0, 0, 0, NULL};
+
+static struct pam_conv conv2 = {
+ do_pam_conversation_kbd_int,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+int
+auth2_pam(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int retval = -1;
+
+ if (authctxt->user == NULL)
+ fatal("auth2_pam: internal error: no user");
+
+ conv2.appdata_ptr = authctxt;
+ do_pam_set_conv(&conv2);
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
+ &input_userauth_info_response_pam);
+ retval = (do_pam_authenticate(0) == PAM_SUCCESS);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int
+do_pam_conversation_kbd_int(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr)
+{
+ int i, j, done;
+ char *text;
+
+ context_pam2.finished = 0;
+ context_pam2.num_received = 0;
+ context_pam2.num_expected = 0;
+ context_pam2.prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(int) * num_msg);
+ context_pam2.responses = xmalloc(sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg);
+ memset(context_pam2.responses, 0, sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg);
+
+ text = NULL;
+ for (i = 0, context_pam2.num_expected = 0; i < num_msg; i++) {
+ int style = PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style);
+ switch (style) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ context_pam2.num_expected++;
+ break;
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ default:
+ /* Capture all these messages to be sent at once */
+ message_cat(&text, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context_pam2.num_expected == 0)
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* Name */
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* Instructions */
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* Language */
+ packet_put_int(context_pam2.num_expected);
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < num_msg; i++) {
+ int style = PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style);
+
+ /* Skip messages which don't need a reply */
+ if (style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON && style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF)
+ continue;
+
+ context_pam2.prompts[j++] = i;
+ if (text) {
+ message_cat(&text, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ packet_put_cstring(text);
+ text = NULL;
+ } else
+ packet_put_cstring(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+ packet_put_char(style == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /*
+ * Grabbing control of execution and spinning until we get what
+ * we want is probably rude, but it seems to work properly, and
+ * the client *should* be in lock-step with us, so the loop should
+ * only be traversed once.
+ */
+ while(context_pam2.finished == 0) {
+ done = 1;
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &done, appdata_ptr);
+ if(context_pam2.finished == 0)
+ debug("extra packet during conversation");
+ }
+
+ if(context_pam2.num_received == context_pam2.num_expected) {
+ *resp = context_pam2.responses;
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+}
+
+void
+input_userauth_info_response_pam(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ unsigned int nresp = 0, rlen = 0, i = 0;
+ char *resp;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_response_pam: no authentication context");
+
+ nresp = packet_get_int(); /* Number of responses. */
+ debug("got %d responses", nresp);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
+ int j = context_pam2.prompts[i];
+
+ resp = packet_get_string(&rlen);
+ context_pam2.responses[j].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ context_pam2.responses[j].resp = xstrdup(resp);
+ xfree(resp);
+ context_pam2.num_received++;
+ }
+
+ context_pam2.finished = 1;
+
+ packet_done();
+}
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+
+int auth2_pam(Authctxt *authctxt);
+
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.72 2001/11/07 22:41:51 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_char *session_id2;
+extern int session_id2_len;
+
+static Authctxt *x_authctxt = NULL;
+static int one = 1;
+
+typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
+struct Authmethod {
+ char *name;
+ int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ int *enabled;
+};
+
+/* protocol */
+
+static void input_service_request(int, int, void *);
+static void input_userauth_request(int, int, void *);
+static void protocol_error(int, int, void *);
+
+/* helper */
+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *);
+static char *authmethods_get(void);
+static int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+static int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
+
+/* auth */
+static void userauth_banner(void);
+static int userauth_none(Authctxt *);
+static int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *);
+static int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *);
+static int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *);
+static int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *);
+
+Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ {"none",
+ userauth_none,
+ &one},
+ {"publickey",
+ userauth_pubkey,
+ &options.pubkey_authentication},
+ {"password",
+ userauth_passwd,
+ &options.password_authentication},
+ {"keyboard-interactive",
+ userauth_kbdint,
+ &options.kbd_interactive_authentication},
+ {"hostbased",
+ userauth_hostbased,
+ &options.hostbased_authentication},
+ {NULL, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+/*
+ * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
+ */
+
+void
+do_authentication2()
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = authctxt_new();
+
+ x_authctxt = authctxt; /*XXX*/
+
+ /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+ if (options.pam_authentication_via_kbd_int)
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+
+ dispatch_init(&protocol_error);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt);
+ do_authenticated(authctxt);
+}
+
+static void
+protocol_error(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ log("auth: protocol error: type %d plen %d", type, plen);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED);
+ packet_put_int(0);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+static void
+input_service_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ u_int len;
+ int accept = 0;
+ char *service = packet_get_string(&len);
+ packet_done();
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt");
+
+ if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) {
+ if (!authctxt->success) {
+ accept = 1;
+ /* now we can handle user-auth requests */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request);
+ }
+ }
+ /* XXX all other service requests are denied */
+
+ if (accept) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT);
+ packet_put_cstring(service);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ } else {
+ debug("bad service request %s", service);
+ packet_disconnect("bad service request %s", service);
+ }
+ xfree(service);
+}
+
+static void
+input_userauth_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
+
+ user = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ service = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ method = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+
+ if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ *style++ = 0;
+
+ if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
+ /* setup auth context */
+ struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+ pw = getpwnam(user);
+ if (pw && allowed_user(pw) && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
+ authctxt->pw = pwcopy(pw);
+ authctxt->valid = 1;
+ debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ start_pam(pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ log("input_userauth_request: illegal user %s", user);
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ start_pam("NOUSER");
+#endif
+ }
+ setproctitle("%s", pw ? user : "unknown");
+ authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
+ authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+ } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
+ strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
+ packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
+ "(%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
+ authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
+ }
+ /* reset state */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, &protocol_error);
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ if (authctxt->as) {
+ auth_close(authctxt->as);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* try to authenticate user */
+ m = authmethod_lookup(method);
+ if (m != NULL) {
+ debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
+ authenticated = m->userauth(authctxt);
+ }
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method);
+
+ xfree(service);
+ xfree(user);
+ xfree(method);
+}
+
+void
+userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method)
+{
+ char *methods;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
+ fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
+ authctxt->user);
+
+ /* Special handling for root */
+ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ !auth_root_allowed(method))
+ authenticated = 0;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (authenticated && authctxt->user && !do_pam_account(authctxt->user,
+ NULL))
+ authenticated = 0;
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+ /* Log before sending the reply */
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method, " ssh2");
+
+ if (authctxt->postponed)
+ return;
+
+ /* XXX todo: check if multiple auth methods are needed */
+ if (authenticated == 1) {
+ /* turn off userauth */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &protocol_error);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ /* now we can break out */
+ authctxt->success = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX) {
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ loginfailed(authctxt->user,
+ get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check),
+ "ssh");
+#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+ packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
+ }
+ methods = authmethods_get();
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_cstring(methods);
+ packet_put_char(0); /* XXX partial success, unused */
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ xfree(methods);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+userauth_banner(void)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ char *banner = NULL;
+ off_t len, n;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (options.banner == NULL || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER))
+ return;
+ if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+ return;
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ goto done;
+ len = st.st_size;
+ banner = xmalloc(len + 1);
+ if ((n = read(fd, banner, len)) < 0)
+ goto done;
+ banner[n] = '\0';
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER);
+ packet_put_cstring(banner);
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* language, unused */
+ packet_send();
+ debug("userauth_banner: sent");
+done:
+ if (banner)
+ xfree(banner);
+ close(fd);
+ return;
+}
+
+static int
+userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ /* disable method "none", only allowed one time */
+ Authmethod *m = authmethod_lookup("none");
+ if (m != NULL)
+ m->enabled = NULL;
+ packet_done();
+ userauth_banner();
+
+ if (authctxt->valid == 0)
+ return(0);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw->pw_uid) == 0)
+ return(0);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ return auth_pam_password(authctxt->pw, "");
+#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
+ return 0;
+#else /* !HAVE_OSF_SIA && !USE_PAM */
+ return auth_password(authctxt, "");
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+}
+
+static int
+userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ char *password;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ int change;
+ u_int len;
+ change = packet_get_char();
+ if (change)
+ log("password change not supported");
+ password = packet_get_string(&len);
+ packet_done();
+ if (authctxt->valid &&
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw->pw_uid) &&
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ auth_pam_password(authctxt->pw, password) == 1)
+#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
+ auth_sia_password(authctxt->user, password) == 1)
+#else /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+ auth_password(authctxt, password) == 1)
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+ authenticated = 1;
+ memset(password, 0, len);
+ xfree(password);
+ return authenticated;
+}
+
+static int
+userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ char *lang, *devs;
+
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ devs = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ packet_done();
+
+ debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs);
+
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+ authenticated = auth2_challenge(authctxt, devs);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (authenticated == 0 && options.pam_authentication_via_kbd_int)
+ authenticated = auth2_pam(authctxt);
+#endif
+ xfree(devs);
+ xfree(lang);
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw->pw_uid) == 0)
+ return(0);
+#endif
+ return authenticated;
+}
+
+static int
+userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ Key *key;
+ char *pkalg, *pkblob, *sig;
+ u_int alen, blen, slen;
+ int have_sig, pktype;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid) {
+ debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ have_sig = packet_get_char();
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+ debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
+ /* no explicit pkalg given */
+ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
+ /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
+ pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ } else {
+ pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
+ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ }
+ pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
+ if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ /* this is perfectly legal */
+ log("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
+ xfree(pkalg);
+ xfree(pkblob);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ if (have_sig) {
+ sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
+ packet_done();
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+ buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ }
+ /* reconstruct packet */
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+ datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
+ "ssh-userauth" :
+ authctxt->service);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+ buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
+ buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+ }
+ buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+ /* test for correct signature */
+ if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key) &&
+ key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
+ authenticated = 1;
+ buffer_clear(&b);
+ xfree(sig);
+ } else {
+ debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
+ packet_done();
+
+ /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
+ /*
+ * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
+ * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
+ * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
+ * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
+ * issue? -markus
+ */
+ if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
+ packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
+ packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ authctxt->postponed = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (authenticated != 1)
+ auth_clear_options();
+ key_free(key);
+ }
+ debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
+ xfree(pkalg);
+ xfree(pkblob);
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw->pw_uid) == 0)
+ return(0);
+#endif
+ return authenticated;
+}
+
+static int
+userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ Key *key;
+ char *pkalg, *pkblob, *sig, *cuser, *chost, *service;
+ u_int alen, blen, slen;
+ int pktype;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid) {
+ debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
+ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ chost = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ cuser = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
+
+ debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d",
+ cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ debug("signature:");
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, sig, slen);
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+#endif
+ pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
+ if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ /* this is perfectly legal */
+ log("userauth_hostbased: unsupported "
+ "public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ debug("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
+ authctxt->service;
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ /* reconstruct packet */
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
+ buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
+ buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+ /* test for allowed key and correct signature */
+ if (hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key) &&
+ key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
+ authenticated = 1;
+
+ buffer_clear(&b);
+ key_free(key);
+
+done:
+ debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated);
+ xfree(pkalg);
+ xfree(pkblob);
+ xfree(cuser);
+ xfree(chost);
+ xfree(sig);
+ return authenticated;
+}
+
+/* get current user */
+
+struct passwd*
+auth_get_user(void)
+{
+ return (x_authctxt != NULL && x_authctxt->valid) ? x_authctxt->pw : NULL;
+}
+
+#define DELIM ","
+
+static char *
+authmethods_get(void)
+{
+ Authmethod *method = NULL;
+ u_int size = 0;
+ char *list;
+
+ for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
+ if (strcmp(method->name, "none") == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (method->enabled != NULL && *(method->enabled) != 0) {
+ if (size != 0)
+ size += strlen(DELIM);
+ size += strlen(method->name);
+ }
+ }
+ size++; /* trailing '\0' */
+ list = xmalloc(size);
+ list[0] = '\0';
+
+ for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
+ if (strcmp(method->name, "none") == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (method->enabled != NULL && *(method->enabled) != 0) {
+ if (list[0] != '\0')
+ strlcat(list, DELIM, size);
+ strlcat(list, method->name, size);
+ }
+ }
+ return list;
+}
+
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
+{
+ Authmethod *method = NULL;
+ if (name != NULL)
+ for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
+ if (method->enabled != NULL &&
+ *(method->enabled) != 0 &&
+ strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
+ return method;
+ debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* return 1 if user allows given key */
+static int
+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
+{
+ char line[8192];
+ int found_key = 0;
+ FILE *f;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+ Key *found;
+
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ debug("trying public key file %s", file);
+
+ /* Fail quietly if file does not exist */
+ if (stat(file, &st) < 0) {
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */
+ f = fopen(file, "r");
+ if (!f) {
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options.strict_modes &&
+ secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
+ fclose(f);
+ log("Authentication refused: %s", line);
+ restore_uid();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ found_key = 0;
+ found = key_new(key->type);
+
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ char *cp, *options = NULL;
+ linenum++;
+ /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+ continue;
+
+ if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+ /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
+ int quoted = 0;
+ debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
+ options = cp;
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ cp++; /* Skip both */
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
+ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+ debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
+ /* still no key? advance to next line*/
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key_equal(found, key) &&
+ auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum) == 1) {
+ found_key = 1;
+ debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu",
+ file, linenum);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ restore_uid();
+ fclose(f);
+ key_free(found);
+ if (!found_key)
+ debug2("key not found");
+ return found_key;
+}
+
+/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
+static int
+user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
+{
+ int success;
+ char *file;
+
+ file = authorized_keys_file(pw);
+ success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
+ xfree(file);
+ if (success)
+ return success;
+
+ /* try suffix "2" for backward compat, too */
+ file = authorized_keys_file2(pw);
+ success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
+ xfree(file);
+ return success;
+}
+
+/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
+static int
+hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
+ Key *key)
+{
+ const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup;
+ int host_status, len;
+
+ resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check);
+ ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+
+ debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s",
+ chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
+
+ if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
+ if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ lookup = chost;
+ } else {
+ if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
+ debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
+ chost[len - 1] = '\0';
+ }
+ if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
+ log("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
+ "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
+ chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
+ if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ lookup = resolvedname;
+ }
+ debug2("userauth_hostbased: access allowed by auth_rhosts2");
+
+ host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
+ options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
+
+ /* backward compat if no key has been found. */
+ if (host_status == HOST_NEW)
+ host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
+ options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
+ _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
+
+ return (host_status == HOST_OK);
+}
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.45 2001/09/19 19:35:30 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "getput.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/* helper */
+int decode_reply(int type);
+
+/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
+#define agent_failed(x) \
+ ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
+ (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
+
+/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
+
+int
+ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
+{
+ const char *authsocket;
+ int sock;
+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+
+ authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ if (!authsocket)
+ return -1;
+
+ sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+
+ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* close on exec */
+ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
+ close(sock);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
+ close(sock);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return sock;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
+{
+ int l, len;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
+ len = buffer_len(request);
+ PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
+
+ /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
+ if (atomicio(write, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+ atomicio(write, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
+ buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) {
+ error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
+ * response packet.
+ */
+ len = 4;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ l = read(auth->fd, buf + 4 - len, len);
+ if (l == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+ continue;
+ if (l <= 0) {
+ error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len -= l;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
+ len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+ if (len > 256 * 1024)
+ fatal("Authentication response too long: %d", len);
+
+ /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
+ buffer_clear(reply);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ l = len;
+ if (l > sizeof(buf))
+ l = sizeof(buf);
+ l = read(auth->fd, buf, l);
+ if (l == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+ continue;
+ if (l <= 0) {
+ error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buffer_append(reply, (char *) buf, l);
+ len -= l;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
+ * obtained). The argument must have been returned by
+ * ssh_get_authentication_socket().
+ */
+
+void
+ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
+{
+ if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
+ close(sock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Opens and connects a private socket for communication with the
+ * authentication agent. Returns the file descriptor (which must be
+ * shut down and closed by the caller when no longer needed).
+ * Returns NULL if an error occurred and the connection could not be
+ * opened.
+ */
+
+AuthenticationConnection *
+ssh_get_authentication_connection(void)
+{
+ AuthenticationConnection *auth;
+ int sock;
+
+ sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+
+ /*
+ * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection. This happens if we
+ * exited due to a timeout.
+ */
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
+ auth->fd = sock;
+ buffer_init(&auth->identities);
+ auth->howmany = 0;
+
+ return auth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the connection to the authentication agent and frees any associated
+ * memory.
+ */
+
+void
+ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
+{
+ buffer_free(&auth->identities);
+ close(auth->fd);
+ xfree(auth);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
+{
+ int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
+ Buffer request;
+
+ switch(version){
+ case 1:
+ code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+ code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
+ code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
+ * identities it can represent.
+ */
+ buffer_init(&request);
+ buffer_put_char(&request, code1);
+
+ buffer_clear(&auth->identities);
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&request);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buffer_free(&request);
+
+ /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
+ type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities);
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (type != code2) {
+ fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type);
+ }
+
+ /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
+ auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+ if (auth->howmany > 1024)
+ fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
+ auth->howmany);
+
+ return auth->howmany;
+}
+
+Key *
+ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
+{
+ /* get number of identities and return the first entry (if any). */
+ if (ssh_get_num_identities(auth, version) > 0)
+ return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Key *
+ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
+{
+ u_int bits;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+
+ /* Return failure if no more entries. */
+ if (auth->howmany <= 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal
+ * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
+ */
+ switch(version){
+ case 1:
+ key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
+ *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+ if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
+ log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+ BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
+ *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
+ auth->howmany--;
+ return key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates a random challenge, sends it to the agent, and waits for
+ * response from the agent. Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the
+ * correct answer, zero otherwise. Response type selects the style of
+ * response desired, with 0 corresponding to protocol version 1.0 (no longer
+ * supported) and 1 corresponding to protocol version 1.1.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+ Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
+ u_char session_id[16],
+ u_int response_type,
+ u_char response[16])
+{
+ Buffer buffer;
+ int success = 0;
+ int i;
+ int type;
+
+ if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
+ return 0;
+ if (response_type == 0) {
+ log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+ buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
+ buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
+ buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16);
+ buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
+
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ log("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
+ } else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
+ fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
+ } else {
+ success = 1;
+ /*
+ * Get the response from the packet. This will abort with a
+ * fatal error if the packet is corrupt.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ response[i] = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return success;
+}
+
+/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+ Key *key,
+ u_char **sigp, int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ extern int datafellows;
+ Buffer msg;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ int type, flags = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)
+ flags = SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, flags);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+ } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+ fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
+ } else {
+ ret = 0;
+ *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
+
+static void
+ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
+{
+ buffer_clear(b);
+ buffer_put_char(b, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY);
+ buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->d);
+ /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp); /* ssh key->u */
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q); /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
+{
+ buffer_clear(b);
+ buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY);
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ switch(key->type){
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adds an identity to the authentication server. This call is not meant to
+ * be used by normal applications.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ int type;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment);
+ break;
+ default:
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes an identity from the authentication server. This call is not
+ * meant to be used by normal applications.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ int type;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
+ } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA || key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ } else {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, const char *reader_id)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ int type;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, add ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY :
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes all identities from the agent. This call is not meant to be used
+ * by normal applications.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ int type;
+ int code = (version==1) ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
+ SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
+
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
+int
+decode_reply(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
+ case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
+ case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
+ log("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
+ return 0;
+ case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ fatal("Bad response from authentication agent: %d", type);
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return 0;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.21 2001/08/07 10:37:46 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef AUTHFD_H
+#define AUTHFD_H
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
+#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
+#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3
+#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4
+#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5
+#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9
+
+/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
+#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13
+#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
+
+/* smartcard */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21
+
+/* extended failure messages */
+#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30
+
+/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */
+#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE 102
+
+#define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01
+
+typedef struct {
+ int fd;
+ Buffer identities;
+ int howmany;
+} AuthenticationConnection;
+
+int ssh_get_authentication_socket(void);
+void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int);
+
+AuthenticationConnection *ssh_get_authentication_connection(void);
+void ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *);
+int ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
+Key *ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
+Key *ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, char **, int);
+int ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, const char *);
+int ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *);
+int ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *, int);
+int ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *);
+
+int
+ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[16],
+ u_int, u_char[16]);
+
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, u_char **, int *, u_char *,
+ int);
+
+#endif /* AUTHFD_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file contains functions for reading and writing identity files, and
+ * for reading the passphrase from the user.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.39 2001/10/07 10:29:52 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+
+/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
+static const char authfile_id_string[] =
+ "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n";
+
+/*
+ * Saves the authentication (private) key in a file, encrypting it with
+ * passphrase. The identification of the file (lowest 64 bits of n) will
+ * precede the key to provide identification of the key without needing a
+ * passphrase.
+ */
+
+static int
+key_save_private_rsa1(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ const char *comment)
+{
+ Buffer buffer, encrypted;
+ char buf[100], *cp;
+ int fd, i;
+ CipherContext ciphercontext;
+ Cipher *cipher;
+ u_int32_t rand;
+
+ /*
+ * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting
+ * to another cipher; otherwise use SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(passphrase, "") == 0)
+ cipher = cipher_by_number(SSH_CIPHER_NONE);
+ else
+ cipher = cipher_by_number(SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ fatal("save_private_key_rsa: bad cipher");
+
+ /* This buffer is used to built the secret part of the private key. */
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+
+ /* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */
+ rand = arc4random();
+ buf[0] = rand & 0xff;
+ buf[1] = (rand >> 8) & 0xff;
+ buf[2] = buf[0];
+ buf[3] = buf[1];
+ buffer_append(&buffer, buf, 4);
+
+ /*
+ * Store the private key (n and e will not be stored because they
+ * will be stored in plain text, and storing them also in encrypted
+ * format would just give known plaintext).
+ */
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->d);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->iqmp);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->q); /* reverse from SSL p */
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->p); /* reverse from SSL q */
+
+ /* Pad the part to be encrypted until its size is a multiple of 8. */
+ while (buffer_len(&buffer) % 8 != 0)
+ buffer_put_char(&buffer, 0);
+
+ /* This buffer will be used to contain the data in the file. */
+ buffer_init(&encrypted);
+
+ /* First store keyfile id string. */
+ for (i = 0; authfile_id_string[i]; i++)
+ buffer_put_char(&encrypted, authfile_id_string[i]);
+ buffer_put_char(&encrypted, 0);
+
+ /* Store cipher type. */
+ buffer_put_char(&encrypted, cipher->number);
+ buffer_put_int(&encrypted, 0); /* For future extension */
+
+ /* Store public key. This will be in plain text. */
+ buffer_put_int(&encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ buffer_put_bignum(&encrypted, key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&encrypted, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&encrypted, comment);
+
+ /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */
+ buffer_append_space(&encrypted, &cp, buffer_len(&buffer));
+
+ cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase);
+ cipher_encrypt(&ciphercontext, (u_char *) cp,
+ (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer));
+ memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+
+ /* Destroy temporary data. */
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+
+ fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ error("open %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (write(fd, buffer_ptr(&encrypted), buffer_len(&encrypted)) !=
+ buffer_len(&encrypted)) {
+ error("write to key file %s failed: %s", filename,
+ strerror(errno));
+ buffer_free(&encrypted);
+ close(fd);
+ unlink(filename);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ buffer_free(&encrypted);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* save SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */
+static int
+key_save_private_pem(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *_passphrase,
+ const char *comment)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ int fd;
+ int success = 0;
+ int len = strlen(_passphrase);
+ char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (char *)_passphrase : NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_des_ede3_cbc() : NULL;
+
+ if (len > 0 && len <= 4) {
+ error("passphrase too short: have %d bytes, need > 4", len);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ error("open %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fp = fdopen(fd, "w");
+ if (fp == NULL ) {
+ error("fdopen %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ success = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(fp, key->dsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ success = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(fp, key->rsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ return success;
+}
+
+int
+key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ const char *comment)
+{
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ return key_save_private_rsa1(key, filename, passphrase,
+ comment);
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return key_save_private_pem(key, filename, passphrase,
+ comment);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ error("key_save_private: cannot save key type %d", key->type);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Loads the public part of the ssh v1 key file. Returns NULL if an error was
+ * encountered (the file does not exist or is not readable), and the key
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+
+static Key *
+key_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+ Buffer buffer;
+ Key *pub;
+ char *cp;
+ int i;
+ off_t len;
+
+ len = lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_END);
+ lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_SET);
+
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+ buffer_append_space(&buffer, &cp, len);
+
+ if (read(fd, cp, (size_t) len) != (size_t) len) {
+ debug("Read from key file %.200s failed: %.100s", filename,
+ strerror(errno));
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */
+ if (len < sizeof(authfile_id_string)) {
+ debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename);
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string
+ * from the buffer.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(authfile_id_string); i++)
+ if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != authfile_id_string[i]) {
+ debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename);
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Skip cipher type and reserved data. */
+ (void) buffer_get_char(&buffer); /* cipher type */
+ (void) buffer_get_int(&buffer); /* reserved */
+
+ /* Read the public key from the buffer. */
+ buffer_get_int(&buffer);
+ pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, pub->rsa->n);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, pub->rsa->e);
+ if (commentp)
+ *commentp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+ /* The encrypted private part is not parsed by this function. */
+
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return pub;
+}
+
+/* load public key from private-key file, works only for SSH v1 */
+Key *
+key_load_public_type(int type, const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+ Key *pub;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ pub = key_load_public_rsa1(fd, filename, commentp);
+ close(fd);
+ return pub;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Loads the private key from the file. Returns 0 if an error is encountered
+ * (file does not exist or is not readable, or passphrase is bad). This
+ * initializes the private key.
+ * Assumes we are called under uid of the owner of the file.
+ */
+
+static Key *
+key_load_private_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ char **commentp)
+{
+ int i, check1, check2, cipher_type;
+ off_t len;
+ Buffer buffer, decrypted;
+ char *cp;
+ CipherContext ciphercontext;
+ Cipher *cipher;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ BIGNUM *aux;
+ Key *prv = NULL;
+
+ len = lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_END);
+ lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_SET);
+
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+ buffer_append_space(&buffer, &cp, len);
+
+ if (read(fd, cp, (size_t) len) != (size_t) len) {
+ debug("Read from key file %.200s failed: %.100s", filename,
+ strerror(errno));
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */
+ if (len < sizeof(authfile_id_string)) {
+ debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename);
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string
+ * from the buffer.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(authfile_id_string); i++)
+ if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != authfile_id_string[i]) {
+ debug3("Not a RSA1 key file %.200s.", filename);
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Read cipher type. */
+ cipher_type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+ (void) buffer_get_int(&buffer); /* Reserved data. */
+
+ /* Read the public key from the buffer. */
+ buffer_get_int(&buffer);
+ prv = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
+
+ buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, prv->rsa->n);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, prv->rsa->e);
+ if (commentp)
+ *commentp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL);
+ else
+ xfree(buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL));
+
+ /* Check that it is a supported cipher. */
+ cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ debug("Unsupported cipher %d used in key file %.200s.",
+ cipher_type, filename);
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* Initialize space for decrypted data. */
+ buffer_init(&decrypted);
+ buffer_append_space(&decrypted, &cp, buffer_len(&buffer));
+
+ /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */
+ cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase);
+ cipher_decrypt(&ciphercontext, (u_char *) cp,
+ (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer));
+ memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+
+ check1 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted);
+ check2 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted);
+ if (check1 != buffer_get_char(&decrypted) ||
+ check2 != buffer_get_char(&decrypted)) {
+ if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0)
+ debug("Bad passphrase supplied for key file %.200s.",
+ filename);
+ /* Bad passphrase. */
+ buffer_free(&decrypted);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* Read the rest of the private key. */
+ buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->d);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp); /* u */
+ /* in SSL and SSH v1 p and q are exchanged */
+ buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->q); /* p */
+ buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->p); /* q */
+
+ /* calculate p-1 and q-1 */
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ aux = BN_new();
+
+ BN_sub(aux, prv->rsa->q, BN_value_one());
+ BN_mod(prv->rsa->dmq1, prv->rsa->d, aux, ctx);
+
+ BN_sub(aux, prv->rsa->p, BN_value_one());
+ BN_mod(prv->rsa->dmp1, prv->rsa->d, aux, ctx);
+
+ BN_clear_free(aux);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ buffer_free(&decrypted);
+ close(fd);
+ return prv;
+
+fail:
+ if (commentp)
+ xfree(*commentp);
+ close(fd);
+ key_free(prv);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static Key *
+key_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
+ char **commentp)
+{
+ FILE *fp;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ Key *prv = NULL;
+ char *name = "<no key>";
+
+ fp = fdopen(fd, "r");
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ error("fdopen failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ pk = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, (char *)passphrase);
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ debug("PEM_read_PrivateKey failed");
+ (void)ERR_get_error();
+ } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
+ (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_RSA)) {
+ prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
+ prv->type = KEY_RSA;
+ name = "rsa w/o comment";
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+ } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
+ (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_DSA)) {
+ prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk);
+ prv->type = KEY_DSA;
+ name = "dsa w/o comment";
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ error("PEM_read_PrivateKey: mismatch or "
+ "unknown EVP_PKEY save_type %d", pk->save_type);
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ if (pk != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ if (prv != NULL && commentp)
+ *commentp = xstrdup(name);
+ debug("read PEM private key done: type %s",
+ prv ? key_type(prv) : "<unknown>");
+ return prv;
+}
+
+static int
+key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
+ * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
+ * then we don't care.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (check_ntsec(filename))
+#endif
+ if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @");
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
+ st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
+ error("It is recommended that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
+ error("This private key will be ignored.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ char **commentp)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) {
+ error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename);
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ return key_load_private_rsa1(fd, filename, passphrase,
+ commentp);
+ /* closes fd */
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ return key_load_private_pem(fd, type, passphrase, commentp);
+ /* closes fd */
+ break;
+ default:
+ close(fd);
+ break;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+ char **commentp)
+{
+ Key *pub, *prv;
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) {
+ error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename);
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ pub = key_load_public_rsa1(fd, filename, commentp);
+ lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_SET); /* rewind */
+ if (pub == NULL) {
+ /* closes fd */
+ prv = key_load_private_pem(fd, KEY_UNSPEC, passphrase, NULL);
+ /* use the filename as a comment for PEM */
+ if (commentp && prv)
+ *commentp = xstrdup(filename);
+ } else {
+ /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */
+ key_free(pub);
+ /* closes fd */
+ prv = key_load_private_rsa1(fd, filename, passphrase, NULL);
+ }
+ return prv;
+}
+
+static int
+key_try_load_public(Key *k, const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[4096];
+ char *cp;
+
+ f = fopen(filename, "r");
+ if (f != NULL) {
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ line[sizeof(line)-1] = '\0';
+ cp = line;
+ switch(*cp){
+ case '#':
+ case '\n':
+ case '\0':
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Skip leading whitespace. */
+ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
+ ;
+ if (*cp) {
+ if (key_read(k, &cp) == 1) {
+ if (commentp)
+ *commentp=xstrdup(filename);
+ fclose(f);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* load public key from ssh v1 private or any pubkey file */
+Key *
+key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+ Key *pub;
+ char file[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ pub = key_load_public_type(KEY_RSA1, filename, commentp);
+ if (pub != NULL)
+ return pub;
+ pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ if (key_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp) == 1)
+ return pub;
+ if ((strlcpy(file, filename, sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) &&
+ (strlcat(file, ".pub", sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) &&
+ (key_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp) == 1))
+ return pub;
+ key_free(pub);
+ return NULL;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.8 2001/06/26 17:27:22 markus Exp $ */
+
+#ifndef AUTHFILE_H
+#define AUTHFILE_H
+
+int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **);
+Key *key_load_public_type(int, const char *, char **);
+Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **);
+Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from
+ * Buffers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.17 2001/01/21 19:05:45 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "getput.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/*
+ * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer with a 2-byte msb first bit count, followed
+ * by (bits+7)/8 bytes of binary data, msb first.
+ */
+void
+buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ int bits = BN_num_bits(value);
+ int bin_size = (bits + 7) / 8;
+ u_char *buf = xmalloc(bin_size);
+ int oi;
+ char msg[2];
+
+ /* Get the value of in binary */
+ oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf);
+ if (oi != bin_size)
+ fatal("buffer_put_bignum: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
+ oi, bin_size);
+
+ /* Store the number of bits in the buffer in two bytes, msb first. */
+ PUT_16BIT(msg, bits);
+ buffer_append(buffer, msg, 2);
+ /* Store the binary data. */
+ buffer_append(buffer, (char *)buf, oi);
+
+ memset(buf, 0, bin_size);
+ xfree(buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieves an BIGNUM from the buffer.
+ */
+int
+buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ int bits, bytes;
+ u_char buf[2], *bin;
+
+ /* Get the number for bits. */
+ buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 2);
+ bits = GET_16BIT(buf);
+ /* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */
+ bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+ if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes)
+ fatal("buffer_get_bignum: input buffer too small");
+ bin = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(buffer);
+ BN_bin2bn(bin, bytes, value);
+ buffer_consume(buffer, bytes);
+
+ return 2 + bytes;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer in SSH2 format.
+ */
+void
+buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ int bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1;
+ u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
+ int oi;
+ int hasnohigh = 0;
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ /* Get the value of in binary */
+ oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1);
+ if (oi != bytes-1)
+ fatal("buffer_put_bignum: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
+ oi, bytes);
+ hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
+ if (value->neg) {
+ /**XXX should be two's-complement */
+ int i, carry;
+ u_char *uc = buf;
+ log("negativ!");
+ for(i = bytes-1, carry = 1; i>=0; i--) {
+ uc[i] ^= 0xff;
+ if(carry)
+ carry = !++uc[i];
+ }
+ }
+ buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh);
+ memset(buf, 0, bytes);
+ xfree(buf);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ /**XXX should be two's-complement */
+ int len;
+ u_char *bin = (u_char *)buffer_get_string(buffer, (u_int *)&len);
+ BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value);
+ xfree(bin);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns an integer from the buffer (4 bytes, msb first).
+ */
+u_int
+buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ u_char buf[4];
+ buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 4);
+ return GET_32BIT(buf);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+u_int64_t
+buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ u_char buf[8];
+ buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 8);
+ return GET_64BIT(buf);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Stores an integer in the buffer in 4 bytes, msb first.
+ */
+void
+buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value)
+{
+ char buf[4];
+ PUT_32BIT(buf, value);
+ buffer_append(buffer, buf, 4);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+void
+buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
+{
+ char buf[8];
+ PUT_64BIT(buf, value);
+ buffer_append(buffer, buf, 8);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Returns an arbitrary binary string from the buffer. The string cannot
+ * be longer than 256k. The returned value points to memory allocated
+ * with xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling function to free
+ * the data. If length_ptr is non-NULL, the length of the returned data
+ * will be stored there. A null character will be automatically appended
+ * to the returned string, and is not counted in length.
+ */
+char *
+buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ u_int len;
+ char *value;
+ /* Get the length. */
+ len = buffer_get_int(buffer);
+ if (len > 256 * 1024)
+ fatal("Received packet with bad string length %d", len);
+ /* Allocate space for the string. Add one byte for a null character. */
+ value = xmalloc(len + 1);
+ /* Get the string. */
+ buffer_get(buffer, value, len);
+ /* Append a null character to make processing easier. */
+ value[len] = 0;
+ /* Optionally return the length of the string. */
+ if (length_ptr)
+ *length_ptr = len;
+ return value;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stores and arbitrary binary string in the buffer.
+ */
+void
+buffer_put_string(Buffer *buffer, const void *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ buffer_put_int(buffer, len);
+ buffer_append(buffer, buf, len);
+}
+void
+buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *buffer, const char *s)
+{
+ buffer_put_string(buffer, s, strlen(s));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a character from the buffer (0 - 255).
+ */
+int
+buffer_get_char(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ char ch;
+ buffer_get(buffer, &ch, 1);
+ return (u_char) ch;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stores a character in the buffer.
+ */
+void
+buffer_put_char(Buffer *buffer, int value)
+{
+ char ch = value;
+ buffer_append(buffer, &ch, 1);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.h,v 1.13 2001/06/26 17:27:22 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef BUFAUX_H
+#define BUFAUX_H
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+void buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+void buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+
+int buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+int buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+
+u_int buffer_get_int(Buffer *);
+void buffer_put_int(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+u_int64_t buffer_get_int64(Buffer *);
+void buffer_put_int64(Buffer *, u_int64_t);
+#endif
+
+int buffer_get_char(Buffer *);
+
+void buffer_put_char(Buffer *, int);
+
+char *buffer_get_string(Buffer *, u_int *);
+
+void buffer_put_string(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
+void buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *, const char *);
+
+#endif /* BUFAUX_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for manipulating fifo buffers (that can grow if needed).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.13 2001/04/12 19:15:24 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* Initializes the buffer structure. */
+
+void
+buffer_init(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ buffer->alloc = 4096;
+ buffer->buf = xmalloc(buffer->alloc);
+ buffer->offset = 0;
+ buffer->end = 0;
+}
+
+/* Frees any memory used for the buffer. */
+
+void
+buffer_free(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ memset(buffer->buf, 0, buffer->alloc);
+ xfree(buffer->buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clears any data from the buffer, making it empty. This does not actually
+ * zero the memory.
+ */
+
+void
+buffer_clear(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ buffer->offset = 0;
+ buffer->end = 0;
+}
+
+/* Appends data to the buffer, expanding it if necessary. */
+
+void
+buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const char *data, u_int len)
+{
+ char *cp;
+ buffer_append_space(buffer, &cp, len);
+ memcpy(cp, data, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Appends space to the buffer, expanding the buffer if necessary. This does
+ * not actually copy the data into the buffer, but instead returns a pointer
+ * to the allocated region.
+ */
+
+void
+buffer_append_space(Buffer *buffer, char **datap, u_int len)
+{
+ /* If the buffer is empty, start using it from the beginning. */
+ if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) {
+ buffer->offset = 0;
+ buffer->end = 0;
+ }
+restart:
+ /* If there is enough space to store all data, store it now. */
+ if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc) {
+ *datap = buffer->buf + buffer->end;
+ buffer->end += len;
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If the buffer is quite empty, but all data is at the end, move the
+ * data to the beginning and retry.
+ */
+ if (buffer->offset > buffer->alloc / 2) {
+ memmove(buffer->buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset,
+ buffer->end - buffer->offset);
+ buffer->end -= buffer->offset;
+ buffer->offset = 0;
+ goto restart;
+ }
+ /* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */
+ buffer->alloc += len + 32768;
+ buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, buffer->alloc);
+ goto restart;
+}
+
+/* Returns the number of bytes of data in the buffer. */
+
+u_int
+buffer_len(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ return buffer->end - buffer->offset;
+}
+
+/* Gets data from the beginning of the buffer. */
+
+void
+buffer_get(Buffer *buffer, char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ if (len > buffer->end - buffer->offset)
+ fatal("buffer_get: trying to get more bytes %d than in buffer %d",
+ len, buffer->end - buffer->offset);
+ memcpy(buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset, len);
+ buffer->offset += len;
+}
+
+/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the beginning of the buffer. */
+
+void
+buffer_consume(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
+{
+ if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset)
+ fatal("buffer_consume: trying to get more bytes than in buffer");
+ buffer->offset += bytes;
+}
+
+/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the end of the buffer. */
+
+void
+buffer_consume_end(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes)
+{
+ if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset)
+ fatal("buffer_consume_end: trying to get more bytes than in buffer");
+ buffer->end -= bytes;
+}
+
+/* Returns a pointer to the first used byte in the buffer. */
+
+char *
+buffer_ptr(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ return buffer->buf + buffer->offset;
+}
+
+/* Dumps the contents of the buffer to stderr. */
+
+void
+buffer_dump(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ int i;
+ u_char *ucp = (u_char *) buffer->buf;
+
+ for (i = buffer->offset; i < buffer->end; i++) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x", ucp[i]);
+ if ((i-buffer->offset)%16==15)
+ fprintf(stderr, "\r\n");
+ else if ((i-buffer->offset)%2==1)
+ fprintf(stderr, " ");
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "\r\n");
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Code for manipulating FIFO buffers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.9 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef BUFFER_H
+#define BUFFER_H
+
+typedef struct {
+ char *buf; /* Buffer for data. */
+ u_int alloc; /* Number of bytes allocated for data. */
+ u_int offset; /* Offset of first byte containing data. */
+ u_int end; /* Offset of last byte containing data. */
+} Buffer;
+
+void buffer_init(Buffer *);
+void buffer_clear(Buffer *);
+void buffer_free(Buffer *);
+
+u_int buffer_len(Buffer *);
+char *buffer_ptr(Buffer *);
+
+void buffer_append(Buffer *, const char *, u_int);
+void buffer_append_space(Buffer *, char **, u_int);
+
+void buffer_get(Buffer *, char *, u_int);
+
+void buffer_consume(Buffer *, u_int);
+void buffer_consume_end(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+void buffer_dump(Buffer *);
+
+#endif /* BUFFER_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.27 2001/06/23 15:12:17 itojun Exp $");
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+
+static void check_ip_options(int, char *);
+
+/*
+ * Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket. The
+ * caller should free the returned string with xfree.
+ */
+
+static char *
+get_remote_hostname(int socket, int reverse_mapping_check)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ int i;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *) &from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *from6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from;
+
+ /* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped address and convert it to */
+ /* plain (AF_INET) IPv4 address */
+ if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&from6->sin6_addr)) {
+ struct sockaddr_in *from4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from;
+ struct in_addr addr;
+ u_int16_t port;
+
+ memcpy(&addr, ((char *)&from6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(addr));
+ port = from6->sin6_port;
+
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+
+ from4->sin_family = AF_INET;
+ memcpy(&from4->sin_addr, &addr, sizeof(addr));
+ from4->sin_port = port;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
+ check_ip_options(socket, ntop);
+
+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+ NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
+ fatal("get_remote_hostname: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed");
+
+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
+ log("Could not reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /* Got host name. */
+ name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
+ /*
+ * Convert it to all lowercase (which is expected by the rest
+ * of this software).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; name[i]; i++)
+ if (isupper(name[i]))
+ name[i] = tolower(name[i]);
+
+ if (!reverse_mapping_check)
+ return xstrdup(name);
+ /*
+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+ * the domain).
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+ log("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+ "failed - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!", name);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+ if (!ai) {
+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
+ log("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+ "map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!",
+ ntop, name);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+ }
+ return xstrdup(name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
+ * disconnect them if any are found). Basically we are worried about
+ * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
+ * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
+ * under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless
+ * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
+ * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
+ * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
+ * exit here if we detect any IP options.
+ */
+/* IPv4 only */
+static void
+check_ip_options(int socket, char *ipaddr)
+{
+ u_char options[200];
+ char text[sizeof(options) * 3 + 1];
+ socklen_t option_size;
+ int i, ipproto;
+ struct protoent *ip;
+
+ if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL)
+ ipproto = ip->p_proto;
+ else
+ ipproto = IPPROTO_IP;
+ option_size = sizeof(options);
+ if (getsockopt(socket, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, (void *)options,
+ &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+ text[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+ " %2.2x", options[i]);
+ log("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
+ ipaddr, text);
+ packet_disconnect("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
+ ipaddr, text);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+ * several times.
+ */
+
+const char *
+get_canonical_hostname(int reverse_mapping_check)
+{
+ static char *canonical_host_name = NULL;
+ static int reverse_mapping_checked = 0;
+
+ /* Check if we have previously retrieved name with same option. */
+ if (canonical_host_name != NULL) {
+ if (reverse_mapping_checked != reverse_mapping_check)
+ xfree(canonical_host_name);
+ else
+ return canonical_host_name;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the real hostname if socket; otherwise return UNKNOWN. */
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+ canonical_host_name = get_remote_hostname(
+ packet_get_connection_in(), reverse_mapping_check);
+ else
+ canonical_host_name = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+
+ reverse_mapping_checked = reverse_mapping_check;
+ return canonical_host_name;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the remote IP-address of socket as a string. The returned
+ * string must be freed.
+ */
+static char *
+get_socket_address(int socket, int remote, int flags)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+
+ if (remote) {
+ if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
+ < 0) {
+ debug("get_socket_ipaddr: getpeername failed: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (getsockname(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
+ < 0) {
+ debug("get_socket_ipaddr: getsockname failed: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Get the address in ascii. */
+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+ NULL, 0, flags) != 0) {
+ error("get_socket_ipaddr: getnameinfo %d failed", flags);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
+}
+
+char *
+get_peer_ipaddr(int socket)
+{
+ return get_socket_address(socket, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+}
+
+char *
+get_local_ipaddr(int socket)
+{
+ return get_socket_address(socket, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+}
+
+char *
+get_local_name(int socket)
+{
+ return get_socket_address(socket, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
+ * string must not be freed.
+ */
+
+const char *
+get_remote_ipaddr()
+{
+ static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL;
+
+ /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
+ if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) {
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ canonical_host_ip =
+ get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
+ if (canonical_host_ip == NULL)
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ } else {
+ /* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */
+ canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+ }
+ }
+ return canonical_host_ip;
+}
+
+const char *
+get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int utmp_len, int reverse_mapping_check)
+{
+ static const char *remote = "";
+ if (utmp_len > 0)
+ remote = get_canonical_hostname(reverse_mapping_check);
+ if (utmp_len == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_len)
+ remote = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ return remote;
+}
+
+/* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */
+
+static int
+get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (local) {
+ if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ }
+ /* Return port number. */
+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
+ strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0)
+ fatal("get_sock_port: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed");
+ return atoi(strport);
+}
+
+/* Returns remote/local port number for the current connection. */
+
+static int
+get_port(int local)
+{
+ /*
+ * If the connection is not a socket, return 65535. This is
+ * intentionally chosen to be an unprivileged port number.
+ */
+ if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+ return 65535;
+
+ /* Get socket and return the port number. */
+ return get_sock_port(packet_get_connection_in(), local);
+}
+
+int
+get_peer_port(int sock)
+{
+ return get_sock_port(sock, 0);
+}
+
+int
+get_remote_port()
+{
+ return get_port(0);
+}
+
+int
+get_local_port()
+{
+ return get_port(1);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.8 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+const char *get_canonical_hostname(int);
+const char *get_remote_ipaddr(void);
+const char *get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int, int);
+
+char *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
+int get_peer_port(int);
+char *get_local_ipaddr(int);
+char *get_local_name(int);
+
+int get_remote_port(void);
+int get_local_port(void);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding.
+ * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections,
+ * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.140 2001/10/10 22:18:47 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+
+
+/* -- channel core */
+
+/*
+ * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array is
+ * dynamically extended as needed.
+ */
+static Channel **channels = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be
+ * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL
+ */
+static int channels_alloc = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is
+ * updated in channel_new.
+ */
+static int channel_max_fd = 0;
+
+
+/* -- tcp forwarding */
+
+/*
+ * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests.
+ * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent
+ * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local
+ * network (which might be behind a firewall).
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */
+ u_short port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */
+ u_short listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port number. */
+} ForwardPermission;
+
+/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect. */
+static ForwardPermission permitted_opens[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
+
+/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array. */
+static int num_permitted_opens = 0;
+/*
+ * If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on the server
+ * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do
+ * anything after logging in anyway.
+ */
+static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
+
+
+/* -- X11 forwarding */
+
+/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000
+
+/* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */
+static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL;
+
+/* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */
+static char *x11_saved_data = NULL;
+static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us;
+ * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data.
+ */
+static char *x11_fake_data = NULL;
+static u_int x11_fake_data_len;
+
+
+/* -- agent forwarding */
+
+#define NUM_SOCKS 10
+
+/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
+static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
+static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+
+/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
+static int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
+
+/* helper */
+static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype);
+
+/* -- channel core */
+
+Channel *
+channel_lookup(int id)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if (id < 0 || id > channels_alloc) {
+ log("channel_lookup: %d: bad id", id);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ c = channels[id];
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ log("channel_lookup: %d: bad id: channel free", id);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or
+ * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd
+ */
+
+static void
+channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+ int extusage, int nonblock)
+{
+ /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */
+ channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, rfd);
+ channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd);
+ channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd);
+
+ /* XXX set close-on-exec -markus */
+
+ c->rfd = rfd;
+ c->wfd = wfd;
+ c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1;
+ c->efd = efd;
+ c->extended_usage = extusage;
+
+ /* XXX ugly hack: nonblock is only set by the server */
+ if (nonblock && isatty(c->rfd)) {
+ debug("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd);
+ c->isatty = 1;
+ if (!isatty(c->wfd)) {
+ error("channel %d: wfd %d is not a tty?",
+ c->self, c->wfd);
+ }
+ } else {
+ c->isatty = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* enable nonblocking mode */
+ if (nonblock) {
+ if (rfd != -1)
+ set_nonblock(rfd);
+ if (wfd != -1)
+ set_nonblock(wfd);
+ if (efd != -1)
+ set_nonblock(efd);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause
+ * remote_name to be freed.
+ */
+
+Channel *
+channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+ int window, int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
+{
+ int i, found;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ /* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */
+ if (channels_alloc == 0) {
+ chan_init();
+ channels_alloc = 10;
+ channels = xmalloc(channels_alloc * sizeof(Channel *));
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ channels[i] = NULL;
+ fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) channel_free_all, NULL);
+ }
+ /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
+ for (found = -1, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ if (channels[i] == NULL) {
+ /* Found a free slot. */
+ found = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (found == -1) {
+ /* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand the array. */
+ found = channels_alloc;
+ channels_alloc += 10;
+ debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc);
+ channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc * sizeof(Channel *));
+ for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ channels[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ /* Initialize and return new channel. */
+ c = channels[found] = xmalloc(sizeof(Channel));
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(Channel));
+ buffer_init(&c->input);
+ buffer_init(&c->output);
+ buffer_init(&c->extended);
+ chan_init_iostates(c);
+ channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock);
+ c->self = found;
+ c->type = type;
+ c->ctype = ctype;
+ c->local_window = window;
+ c->local_window_max = window;
+ c->local_consumed = 0;
+ c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
+ c->remote_id = -1;
+ c->remote_name = remote_name;
+ c->remote_window = 0;
+ c->remote_maxpacket = 0;
+ c->cb_fn = NULL;
+ c->cb_arg = NULL;
+ c->cb_event = 0;
+ c->force_drain = 0;
+ c->detach_user = NULL;
+ c->input_filter = NULL;
+ debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name);
+ return c;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_find_maxfd(void)
+{
+ int i, max = 0;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ max = MAX(max, c->rfd);
+ max = MAX(max, c->wfd);
+ max = MAX(max, c->efd);
+ }
+ }
+ return max;
+}
+
+int
+channel_close_fd(int *fdp)
+{
+ int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
+
+ if (fd != -1) {
+ ret = close(fd);
+ *fdp = -1;
+ if (fd == channel_max_fd)
+ channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd();
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Close all channel fd/socket. */
+
+static void
+channel_close_fds(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug3("channel_close_fds: channel %d: r %d w %d e %d",
+ c->self, c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd);
+
+ channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->rfd);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->wfd);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
+}
+
+/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */
+
+void
+channel_free(Channel *c)
+{
+ char *s;
+ int i, n;
+
+ for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ if (channels[i])
+ n++;
+ debug("channel_free: channel %d: %s, nchannels %d", c->self,
+ c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
+
+ s = channel_open_message();
+ debug3("channel_free: status: %s", s);
+ xfree(s);
+
+ if (c->sock != -1)
+ shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+ channel_close_fds(c);
+ buffer_free(&c->input);
+ buffer_free(&c->output);
+ buffer_free(&c->extended);
+ if (c->remote_name) {
+ xfree(c->remote_name);
+ c->remote_name = NULL;
+ }
+ channels[c->self] = NULL;
+ xfree(c);
+}
+
+void
+channel_free_all(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ if (channels[i] != NULL)
+ channel_free(channels[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file
+ * descriptors after a fork.
+ */
+
+void
+channel_close_all()
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
+ if (channels[i] != NULL)
+ channel_close_fds(channels[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stop listening to channels.
+ */
+
+void
+channel_stop_listening(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+ channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+ channel_free(c);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or
+ * more channel is overfull.
+ */
+
+int
+channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()
+{
+ u_int i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+#if 0
+ if (!compat20 &&
+ buffer_len(&c->input) > packet_get_maxsize()) {
+ debug("channel %d: big input buffer %d",
+ c->self, buffer_len(&c->input));
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output) > packet_get_maxsize()) {
+ debug("channel %d: big output buffer %d > %d",
+ c->self, buffer_len(&c->output),
+ packet_get_maxsize());
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */
+
+int
+channel_still_open()
+{
+ int i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+ continue;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+ if (!compat20)
+ fatal("cannot happen: SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL");
+ continue;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+ return 1;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+ if (!compat13)
+ fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN");
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ fatal("channel_still_open: bad channel type %d", c->type);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */
+
+int
+channel_find_open()
+{
+ int i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+ continue;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+ return i;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+ if (!compat13)
+ fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN");
+ return i;
+ default:
+ fatal("channel_find_open: bad channel type %d", c->type);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections,
+ * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for
+ * newlines.
+ */
+
+char *
+channel_open_message()
+{
+ Buffer buffer;
+ Channel *c;
+ char buf[1024], *cp;
+ int i;
+
+ buffer_init(&buffer);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n");
+ buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch (c->type) {
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+ continue;
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
+ case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, " #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%d/%d o%d/%d fd %d/%d)\r\n",
+ c->self, c->remote_name,
+ c->type, c->remote_id,
+ c->istate, buffer_len(&c->input),
+ c->ostate, buffer_len(&c->output),
+ c->rfd, c->wfd);
+ buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ continue;
+ default:
+ fatal("channel_open_message: bad channel type %d", c->type);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ }
+ buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
+ cp = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&buffer));
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return cp;
+}
+
+void
+channel_send_open(int id)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ log("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ debug("send channel open %d", id);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ packet_put_cstring(c->ctype);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ packet_send();
+}
+
+void
+channel_request(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm)
+{
+ channel_request_start(id, service, wantconfirm);
+ packet_send();
+ debug("channel request %d: %s", id, service) ;
+}
+void
+channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ log("channel_request: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_cstring(service);
+ packet_put_char(wantconfirm);
+}
+void
+channel_register_callback(int id, int mtype, channel_callback_fn *fn, void *arg)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ log("channel_register_callback: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->cb_event = mtype;
+ c->cb_fn = fn;
+ c->cb_arg = arg;
+}
+void
+channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ log("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->detach_user = fn;
+}
+void
+channel_cancel_cleanup(int id)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ log("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->detach_user = NULL;
+}
+void
+channel_register_filter(int id, channel_filter_fn *fn)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ log("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->input_filter = fn;
+}
+
+void
+channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+ int extusage, int nonblock)
+{
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
+ fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id);
+ channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock);
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+ /* XXX window size? */
+ c->local_window = c->local_window_max = c->local_maxpacket * 2;
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+ packet_send();
+}
+
+/*
+ * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits relevant to
+ * channels in the select bitmasks.
+ */
+/*
+ * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which
+ * have events pending.
+ */
+typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset);
+chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
+chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
+
+static void
+channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self);
+ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize())
+ FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0)
+ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_open_15(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ /* test whether sockets are 'alive' for read/write */
+ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN)
+ if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize())
+ FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+ if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
+ c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+ } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+ chan_obuf_empty(c);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_open_20(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
+ c->remote_window > 0 &&
+ buffer_len(&c->input) < c->remote_window)
+ FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
+ if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
+ c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+ FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
+ } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+ chan_obuf_empty(c);
+ }
+ }
+ /** XXX check close conditions, too */
+ if (c->efd != -1) {
+ if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
+ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)
+ FD_SET(c->efd, writeset);
+ else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ &&
+ buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window)
+ FD_SET(c->efd, readset);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED;
+ debug("channel %d: closing after input drain.", c->self);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0)
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ else
+ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11
+ * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this
+ * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication
+ * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the
+ * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode.
+ * XXX All this happens at the client side.
+ * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok
+ */
+static int
+x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
+{
+ u_char *ucp;
+ u_int proto_len, data_len;
+
+ /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
+ if (buffer_len(b) < 12)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */
+ ucp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(b);
+ if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */
+ proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7];
+ data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9];
+ } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */
+ proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7];
+ data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9];
+ } else {
+ debug("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
+ ucp[0]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */
+ if (buffer_len(b) <
+ 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */
+ if (proto_len != strlen(x11_saved_proto) ||
+ memcmp(ucp + 12, x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) {
+ debug("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
+ if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len ||
+ memcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
+ x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
+ debug("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Check fake data length */
+ if (x11_fake_data_len != x11_saved_data_len) {
+ error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d",
+ x11_fake_data_len, x11_saved_data_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Received authentication protocol and data match
+ * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real
+ * data.
+ */
+ memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
+ x11_saved_data, x11_saved_data_len);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ /* Start normal processing for the channel. */
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+ channel_pre_open_13(c, readset, writeset);
+ } else if (ret == -1) {
+ /*
+ * We have received an X11 connection that has bad
+ * authentication information.
+ */
+ log("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication.");
+ buffer_clear(&c->input);
+ buffer_clear(&c->output);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->sock);
+ c->sock = -1;
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED;
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
+
+ /* c->force_drain = 1; */
+
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+ if (compat20)
+ channel_pre_open_20(c, readset, writeset);
+ else
+ channel_pre_open_15(c, readset, writeset);
+ } else if (ret == -1) {
+ debug("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
+ chan_read_failed(c); /** force close? */
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+ debug("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
+ }
+}
+
+/* try to decode a socks4 header */
+static int
+channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ u_char *p, *host;
+ int len, have, i, found;
+ char username[256];
+ struct {
+ u_int8_t version;
+ u_int8_t command;
+ u_int16_t dest_port;
+ struct in_addr dest_addr;
+ } s4_req, s4_rsp;
+
+ debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self);
+
+ have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+ len = sizeof(s4_req);
+ if (have < len)
+ return 0;
+ p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+ for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) {
+ if (p[i] == '\0') {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i > 1024) {
+ /* the peer is probably sending garbage */
+ debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long",
+ c->self);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found)
+ return 0;
+ buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.version, 1);
+ buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.command, 1);
+ buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_port, 2);
+ buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4);
+ have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+ p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+ len = strlen(p);
+ debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len);
+ if (len > have)
+ fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: len %d > have %d",
+ c->self, len, have);
+ strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username));
+ buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
+ buffer_consume(&c->input, 1); /* trailing '\0' */
+
+ host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr);
+ strlcpy(c->path, host, sizeof(c->path));
+ c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port);
+
+ debug("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u",
+ c->self, host, c->host_port, s4_req.command);
+
+ if (s4_req.command != 1) {
+ debug("channel %d: cannot handle: socks4 cn %d",
+ c->self, s4_req.command);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */
+ s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */
+ s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
+ s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */
+ buffer_append(&c->output, (char *)&s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* dynamic port forwarding */
+static void
+channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ u_char *p;
+ int have, ret;
+
+ have = buffer_len(&c->input);
+ c->delayed = 0;
+ debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
+ /* buffer_dump(&c->input); */
+ /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
+ if (have < 4) {
+ /* need more */
+ FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* try to guess the protocol */
+ p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
+ switch (p[0]) {
+ case 0x04:
+ ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, readset, writeset);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self);
+ /* need more */
+ FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
+ } else {
+ /* switch to the next state */
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+ port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip");
+ }
+}
+
+/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */
+static void
+channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ struct sockaddr addr;
+ int newsock;
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+ char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr;
+ int remote_port;
+
+ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
+ debug("X11 connection requested.");
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+ newsock = accept(c->sock, &addr, &addrlen);
+ if (newsock < 0) {
+ error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock);
+ remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d",
+ remote_ipaddr, remote_port);
+
+ nc = channel_new("accepted x11 socket",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
+ c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket,
+ 0, xstrdup(buf), 1);
+ if (nc == NULL) {
+ close(newsock);
+ xfree(remote_ipaddr);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ packet_put_cstring("x11");
+ packet_put_int(nc->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ /* originator ipaddr and port */
+ packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) {
+ debug("ssh2 x11 bug compat mode");
+ } else {
+ packet_put_int(remote_port);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN);
+ packet_put_int(nc->self);
+ if (packet_get_protocol_flags() &
+ SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN)
+ packet_put_cstring(buf);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ xfree(remote_ipaddr);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype)
+{
+ int direct;
+ char buf[1024];
+ char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
+ u_short remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
+
+ direct = (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0);
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf,
+ "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, "
+ "connect from %.200s port %d",
+ rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port,
+ remote_ipaddr, remote_port);
+
+ xfree(c->remote_name);
+ c->remote_name = xstrdup(buf);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ packet_put_cstring(rtype);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ if (direct) {
+ /* target host, port */
+ packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+ packet_put_int(c->host_port);
+ } else {
+ /* listen address, port */
+ packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+ packet_put_int(c->listening_port);
+ }
+ /* originator host and port */
+ packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr);
+ packet_put_int(remote_port);
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_cstring(c->path);
+ packet_put_int(c->host_port);
+ if (packet_get_protocol_flags() &
+ SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN)
+ packet_put_cstring(c->remote_name);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ xfree(remote_ipaddr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
+ */
+static void
+channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ struct sockaddr addr;
+ int newsock, nextstate;
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+ char *rtype;
+
+ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
+ debug("Connection to port %d forwarding "
+ "to %.100s port %d requested.",
+ c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port);
+
+ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) {
+ nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+ rtype = "forwarded-tcpip";
+ } else {
+ if (c->host_port == 0) {
+ nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC;
+ rtype = "dynamic-tcpip";
+ } else {
+ nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+ rtype = "direct-tcpip";
+ }
+ }
+
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+ newsock = accept(c->sock, &addr, &addrlen);
+ if (newsock < 0) {
+ error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ nc = channel_new(rtype,
+ nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1,
+ c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket,
+ 0, xstrdup(rtype), 1);
+ if (nc == NULL) {
+ error("channel_post_port_listener: no new channel:");
+ close(newsock);
+ return;
+ }
+ nc->listening_port = c->listening_port;
+ nc->host_port = c->host_port;
+ strlcpy(nc->path, c->path, sizeof(nc->path));
+
+ if (nextstate == SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) {
+ /*
+ * do not call the channel_post handler until
+ * this flag has been reset by a pre-handler.
+ * otherwise the FD_ISSET calls might overflow
+ */
+ nc->delayed = 1;
+ } else {
+ port_open_helper(nc, rtype);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from
+ * clients.
+ */
+static void
+channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ char *name;
+ int newsock;
+ struct sockaddr addr;
+ socklen_t addrlen;
+
+ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) {
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+ newsock = accept(c->sock, &addr, &addrlen);
+ if (newsock < 0) {
+ error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ name = xstrdup("accepted auth socket");
+ nc = channel_new("accepted auth socket",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
+ c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket,
+ 0, name, 1);
+ if (nc == NULL) {
+ error("channel_post_auth_listener: channel_new failed");
+ xfree(name);
+ close(newsock);
+ }
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ packet_put_cstring("auth-agent@openssh.com");
+ packet_put_int(nc->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN);
+ packet_put_int(nc->self);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ socklen_t sz = sizeof(err);
+
+ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) {
+ if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (char *)&err,
+ &sz) < 0) {
+ err = errno;
+ error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed");
+ }
+ if (err == 0) {
+ debug("channel %d: connected", c->self);
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug("channel %d: not connected: %s",
+ c->self, strerror(err));
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+ packet_put_cstring(strerror(err));
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ }
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ }
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ char buf[16*1024];
+ int len;
+
+ if (c->rfd != -1 &&
+ FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)) {
+ len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
+ return 1;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ debug("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d",
+ c->self, c->rfd, len);
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+ debug("channel %d: not open", c->self);
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (compat13) {
+ buffer_consume(&c->output, buffer_len(&c->output));
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING;
+ debug("channel %d: input draining.", c->self);
+ } else {
+ chan_read_failed(c);
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if(c->input_filter != NULL) {
+ if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) {
+ debug("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
+ chan_read_failed(c);
+ }
+ } else {
+ buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+static int
+channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ struct termios tio;
+ u_char *data;
+ u_int dlen;
+ int len;
+
+ /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
+ if (c->wfd != -1 &&
+ FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&
+ buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+ data = buffer_ptr(&c->output);
+ dlen = buffer_len(&c->output);
+ len = write(c->wfd, data, dlen);
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
+ return 1;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+ debug("channel %d: not open", c->self);
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (compat13) {
+ buffer_consume(&c->output, buffer_len(&c->output));
+ debug("channel %d: input draining.", c->self);
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING;
+ } else {
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r') {
+ if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 &&
+ !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
+ /*
+ * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
+ * traffic analysis. We need to match the
+ * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message
+ * (4 byte channel id + data)
+ */
+ packet_send_ignore(4 + len);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ }
+ buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
+ if (compat20 && len > 0) {
+ c->local_consumed += len;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+static int
+channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ char buf[16*1024];
+ int len;
+
+/** XXX handle drain efd, too */
+ if (c->efd != -1) {
+ if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
+ FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) &&
+ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) {
+ len = write(c->efd, buffer_ptr(&c->extended),
+ buffer_len(&c->extended));
+ debug2("channel %d: written %d to efd %d",
+ c->self, len, c->efd);
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
+ return 1;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d",
+ c->self, c->efd);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
+ } else {
+ buffer_consume(&c->extended, len);
+ c->local_consumed += len;
+ }
+ } else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ &&
+ FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset)) {
+ len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ debug2("channel %d: read %d from efd %d",
+ c->self, len, c->efd);
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
+ return 1;
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
+ c->self, c->efd);
+ channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
+ } else {
+ buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+static int
+channel_check_window(Channel *c)
+{
+ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+ !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
+ c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2 &&
+ c->local_consumed > 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_consumed);
+ packet_send();
+ debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d",
+ c->self, c->local_window,
+ c->local_consumed);
+ c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
+ c->local_consumed = 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_open_1(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ if (c->delayed)
+ return;
+ channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset);
+ channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_open_2(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ if (c->delayed)
+ return;
+ channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset);
+ channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset);
+ channel_handle_efd(c, readset, writeset);
+
+ channel_check_window(c);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ int len;
+ /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
+ len = write(c->sock, buffer_ptr(&c->output),
+ buffer_len(&c->output));
+ if (len <= 0)
+ buffer_consume(&c->output, buffer_len(&c->output));
+ else
+ buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init_20(void)
+{
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_20;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
+
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open_2;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open_2;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init_13(void)
+{
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_13;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open_13;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_input_draining;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_output_draining;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
+
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open_1;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_post_output_drain_13;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open_1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init_15(void)
+{
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_15;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
+ channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
+
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open_1;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
+ channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open_1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ for(i = 0; i < SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE; i++) {
+ channel_pre[i] = NULL;
+ channel_post[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ if (compat20)
+ channel_handler_init_20();
+ else if (compat13)
+ channel_handler_init_13();
+ else
+ channel_handler_init_15();
+}
+
+/* gc dead channels */
+static void
+channel_garbage_collect(Channel *c)
+{
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (c->detach_user != NULL) {
+ if (!chan_is_dead(c, 0))
+ return;
+ debug("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self);
+ c->detach_user(c->self, NULL);
+ /* if we still have a callback */
+ if (c->detach_user != NULL)
+ return;
+ debug("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self);
+ }
+ if (!chan_is_dead(c, 1))
+ return;
+ debug("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self);
+ channel_free(c);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ static int did_init = 0;
+ int i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if (!did_init) {
+ channel_handler_init();
+ did_init = 1;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (ftab[c->type] != NULL)
+ (*ftab[c->type])(c, readset, writeset);
+ channel_garbage_collect(c);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in
+ * select bitmasks.
+ */
+void
+channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
+ int *nallocp, int rekeying)
+{
+ int n;
+ u_int sz;
+
+ n = MAX(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd);
+
+ sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */
+ if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
+ *readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, sz);
+ *writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, sz);
+ *nallocp = sz;
+ }
+ *maxfdp = n;
+ memset(*readsetp, 0, sz);
+ memset(*writesetp, 0, sz);
+
+ if (!rekeying)
+ channel_handler(channel_pre, *readsetp, *writesetp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have
+ * events pending.
+ */
+void
+channel_after_select(fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset);
+}
+
+
+/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */
+
+void
+channel_output_poll()
+{
+ int len, i;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
+ c = channels[i];
+ if (c == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered
+ * incoming data.
+ */
+ if (compat13) {
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+ c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING)
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (compat20 &&
+ (c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) {
+ /* XXX is this true? */
+ debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */
+ if ((c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
+ c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) &&
+ (len = buffer_len(&c->input)) > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Send some data for the other side over the secure
+ * connection.
+ */
+ if (compat20) {
+ if (len > c->remote_window)
+ len = c->remote_window;
+ if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
+ len = c->remote_maxpacket;
+ } else {
+ if (packet_is_interactive()) {
+ if (len > 1024)
+ len = 512;
+ } else {
+ /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()/2)
+ len = packet_get_maxsize()/2;
+ }
+ }
+ if (len > 0) {
+ packet_start(compat20 ?
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA : SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->input), len);
+ packet_send();
+ buffer_consume(&c->input, len);
+ c->remote_window -= len;
+ }
+ } else if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+ if (compat13)
+ fatal("cannot happen: istate == INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN for proto 1.3");
+ /*
+ * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown:
+ * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF
+ */
+ chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+ }
+ /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */
+ if (compat20 &&
+ c->remote_window > 0 &&
+ (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 &&
+ c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) {
+ debug2("channel %d: rwin %d elen %d euse %d",
+ c->self, c->remote_window, buffer_len(&c->extended),
+ c->extended_usage);
+ if (len > c->remote_window)
+ len = c->remote_window;
+ if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
+ len = c->remote_maxpacket;
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->extended), len);
+ packet_send();
+ buffer_consume(&c->extended, len);
+ c->remote_window -= len;
+ debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %d", c->self, len);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* -- protocol input */
+
+void
+channel_input_data(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id;
+ char *data;
+ u_int data_len;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ /* Get the channel number and verify it. */
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received data for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+
+ /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+ c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN)
+ return;
+
+ /* same for protocol 1.5 if output end is no longer open */
+ if (!compat13 && c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
+ return;
+
+ /* Get the data. */
+ data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+ packet_done();
+
+ if (compat20){
+ if (data_len > c->local_maxpacket) {
+ log("channel %d: rcvd big packet %d, maxpack %d",
+ c->self, data_len, c->local_maxpacket);
+ }
+ if (data_len > c->local_window) {
+ log("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d",
+ c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
+ xfree(data);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->local_window -= data_len;
+ }else{
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + 4 + data_len, type);
+ }
+ buffer_append(&c->output, data, data_len);
+ xfree(data);
+}
+
+void
+channel_input_extended_data(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id;
+ int tcode;
+ char *data;
+ u_int data_len;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ /* Get the channel number and verify it. */
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received extended_data for bad channel %d.", id);
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+ log("channel %d: ext data for non open", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ tcode = packet_get_int();
+ if (c->efd == -1 ||
+ c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE ||
+ tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) {
+ log("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self);
+ return;
+ }
+ data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+ packet_done();
+ if (data_len > c->local_window) {
+ log("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %d, win %d",
+ c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
+ xfree(data);
+ return;
+ }
+ debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %d", c->self, data_len);
+ c->local_window -= data_len;
+ buffer_append(&c->extended, data, data_len);
+ xfree(data);
+}
+
+void
+channel_input_ieof(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type);
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received ieof for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+ chan_rcvd_ieof(c);
+
+ /* XXX force input close */
+ if (c->force_drain) {
+ debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self);
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
+ }
+
+}
+
+void
+channel_input_close(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type);
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received close for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+
+ /*
+ * Send a confirmation that we have closed the channel and no more
+ * data is coming for it.
+ */
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+
+ /*
+ * If the channel is in closed state, we have sent a close request,
+ * and the other side will eventually respond with a confirmation.
+ * Thus, we cannot free the channel here, because then there would be
+ * no-one to receive the confirmation. The channel gets freed when
+ * the confirmation arrives.
+ */
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED) {
+ /*
+ * Not a closed channel - mark it as draining, which will
+ * cause it to be freed later.
+ */
+ buffer_consume(&c->input, buffer_len(&c->input));
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING;
+ }
+}
+
+/* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */
+void
+channel_input_oclose(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id = packet_get_int();
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received oclose for nonexistent channel %d.", id);
+ chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
+}
+
+void
+channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id = packet_get_int();
+ Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ packet_done();
+ if (c == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for "
+ "out-of-range channel %d.", id);
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED)
+ packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for "
+ "non-closed channel %d (type %d).", id, c->type);
+ channel_free(c);
+}
+
+void
+channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id, remote_id;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if (!compat20)
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + 4, type);
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
+ packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for "
+ "non-opening channel %d.", id);
+ remote_id = packet_get_int();
+ /* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel is now open. */
+ c->remote_id = remote_id;
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ c->remote_window = packet_get_int();
+ c->remote_maxpacket = packet_get_int();
+ packet_done();
+ if (c->cb_fn != NULL && c->cb_event == type) {
+ debug2("callback start");
+ c->cb_fn(c->self, c->cb_arg);
+ debug2("callback done");
+ }
+ debug("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %d rmax %d", c->self,
+ c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket);
+ }
+}
+
+static char *
+reason2txt(int reason)
+{
+ switch(reason) {
+ case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED:
+ return "administratively prohibited";
+ case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED:
+ return "connect failed";
+ case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE:
+ return "unknown channel type";
+ case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE:
+ return "resource shortage";
+ }
+ return "unknown reason";
+}
+
+void
+channel_input_open_failure(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id, reason;
+ char *msg = NULL, *lang = NULL;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if (!compat20)
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type);
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
+ packet_disconnect("Received open failure for "
+ "non-opening channel %d.", id);
+ if (compat20) {
+ reason = packet_get_int();
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ }
+ packet_done();
+ log("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", id,
+ reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : "");
+ if (msg != NULL)
+ xfree(msg);
+ if (lang != NULL)
+ xfree(lang);
+ }
+ /* Free the channel. This will also close the socket. */
+ channel_free(c);
+}
+
+void
+channel_input_channel_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL ||
+ (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL))
+ packet_disconnect("Received request for "
+ "non-open channel %d.", id);
+ if (c->cb_fn != NULL && c->cb_event == type) {
+ debug2("callback start");
+ c->cb_fn(c->self, c->cb_arg);
+ debug2("callback done");
+ } else {
+ char *service = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ debug("channel %d: rcvd request for %s", c->self, service);
+ debug("cb_fn %p cb_event %d", c->cb_fn , c->cb_event);
+ xfree(service);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+channel_input_window_adjust(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int id, adjust;
+
+ if (!compat20)
+ return;
+
+ /* Get the channel number and verify it. */
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+
+ if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+ log("Received window adjust for "
+ "non-open channel %d.", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ adjust = packet_get_int();
+ packet_done();
+ debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %d", id, adjust);
+ c->remote_window += adjust;
+}
+
+void
+channel_input_port_open(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ u_short host_port;
+ char *host, *originator_string;
+ int remote_id, sock = -1;
+
+ remote_id = packet_get_int();
+ host = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ host_port = packet_get_int();
+
+ if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) {
+ originator_string = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ } else {
+ originator_string = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)");
+ }
+ packet_done();
+ sock = channel_connect_to(host, host_port);
+ if (sock != -1) {
+ c = channel_new("connected socket",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0,
+ originator_string, 1);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ error("channel_input_port_open: channel_new failed");
+ close(sock);
+ } else {
+ c->remote_id = remote_id;
+ }
+ }
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ xfree(host);
+}
+
+
+/* -- tcp forwarding */
+
+void
+channel_set_af(int af)
+{
+ IPv4or6 = af;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initiate forwarding of connections to local port "port" through the secure
+ * channel to host:port from remote side.
+ */
+int
+channel_request_local_forwarding(u_short listen_port, const char *host_to_connect,
+ u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports)
+{
+ return channel_request_forwarding(
+ NULL, listen_port,
+ host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
+ gateway_ports, /*remote_fwd*/ 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If 'remote_fwd' is true we have a '-R style' listener for protocol 2
+ * (SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER).
+ */
+int
+channel_request_forwarding(
+ const char *listen_address, u_short listen_port,
+ const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect,
+ int gateway_ports, int remote_fwd)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int success, sock, on = 1, type;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ const char *host;
+ struct linger linger;
+
+ success = 0;
+
+ if (remote_fwd) {
+ host = listen_address;
+ type = SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER;
+ } else {
+ host = host_to_connect;
+ type = SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER;
+ }
+
+ if (strlen(host) > SSH_CHANNEL_PATH_LEN - 1) {
+ error("Forward host name too long.");
+ return success;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX listen_address is currently ignored */
+ /*
+ * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is
+ * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_flags = gateway_ports ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", listen_port);
+ if (getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop) != 0)
+ packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error");
+
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+ strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+ error("channel_request_forwarding: getnameinfo failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Create a port to listen for the host. */
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */
+ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear
+ * as soon as it has been closed for whatever reason.
+ */
+ setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on));
+ linger.l_onoff = 1;
+ linger.l_linger = 5;
+ setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *)&linger, sizeof(linger));
+ debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
+
+ /* Bind the socket to the address. */
+ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ /* address can be in use ipv6 address is already bound */
+ if (!ai->ai_next)
+ error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ else
+ verbose("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ close(sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
+ if (listen(sock, 5) < 0) {
+ error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
+ c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, xstrdup("port listener"), 1);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ error("channel_request_forwarding: channel_new failed");
+ close(sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ strlcpy(c->path, host, sizeof(c->path));
+ c->host_port = port_to_connect;
+ c->listening_port = listen_port;
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ if (success == 0)
+ error("channel_request_forwarding: cannot listen to port: %d",
+ listen_port);
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through
+ * the secure channel to host:port from local side.
+ */
+
+void
+channel_request_remote_forwarding(u_short listen_port,
+ const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect)
+{
+ int payload_len, type, success = 0;
+
+ /* Record locally that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
+ if (num_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+ fatal("channel_request_remote_forwarding: too many forwards");
+
+ /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
+ if (compat20) {
+ const char *address_to_bind = "0.0.0.0";
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward");
+ packet_put_char(0); /* boolean: want reply */
+ packet_put_cstring(address_to_bind);
+ packet_put_int(listen_port);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ /* Assume that server accepts the request */
+ success = 1;
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_int(listen_port);
+ packet_put_cstring(host_to_connect);
+ packet_put_int(port_to_connect);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for response from the remote side. */
+ type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS:
+ success = 1;
+ break;
+ case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
+ log("Warning: Server denied remote port forwarding.");
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Unknown packet */
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error for port forward request:"
+ "received packet type %d.", type);
+ }
+ }
+ if (success) {
+ permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
+ permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port_to_connect;
+ permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = listen_port;
+ num_permitted_opens++;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called after receiving CHANNEL_FORWARDING_REQUEST. This initates
+ * listening for the port, and sends back a success reply (or disconnect
+ * message if there was an error). This never returns if there was an error.
+ */
+
+void
+channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, int gateway_ports)
+{
+ u_short port, host_port;
+ char *hostname;
+
+ /* Get arguments from the packet. */
+ port = packet_get_int();
+ hostname = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ host_port = packet_get_int();
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * Check that an unprivileged user is not trying to forward a
+ * privileged port.
+ */
+ if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && !is_root)
+ packet_disconnect("Requested forwarding of port %d but user is not root.",
+ port);
+#endif
+ /* Initiate forwarding */
+ channel_request_local_forwarding(port, hostname, host_port, gateway_ports);
+
+ /* Free the argument string. */
+ xfree(hostname);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_opens[] is empty. This is
+ * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port
+ * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway.
+ */
+void
+channel_permit_all_opens()
+{
+ if (num_permitted_opens == 0)
+ all_opens_permitted = 1;
+}
+
+void
+channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
+{
+ if (num_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+ fatal("channel_request_remote_forwarding: too many forwards");
+ debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
+
+ permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host);
+ permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
+ num_permitted_opens++;
+
+ all_opens_permitted = 0;
+}
+
+void
+channel_clear_permitted_opens(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
+ xfree(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
+ num_permitted_opens = 0;
+
+}
+
+
+/* return socket to remote host, port */
+static int
+connect_to(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int gaierr;
+ int sock = -1;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", host,
+ gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+ strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+ error("connect_to: getnameinfo failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
+ fatal("connect_to: F_SETFL: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 &&
+ errno != EINPROGRESS) {
+ error("connect_to %.100s port %s: %.100s", ntop, strport,
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ continue; /* fail -- try next */
+ }
+ break; /* success */
+
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ if (!ai) {
+ error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", host, port);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ return sock;
+}
+
+int
+channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short listen_port)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
+ if (permitted_opens[i].listen_port == listen_port)
+ return connect_to(
+ permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect,
+ permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect);
+ error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d",
+ listen_port);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
+int
+channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+ int i, permit;
+
+ permit = all_opens_permitted;
+ if (!permit) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
+ if (permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect == port &&
+ strcmp(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, host) == 0)
+ permit = 1;
+
+ }
+ if (!permit) {
+ log("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, "
+ "but the request was denied.", host, port);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return connect_to(host, port);
+}
+
+/* -- X11 forwarding */
+
+/*
+ * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections.
+ * Returns a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable, or NULL if an error
+ * occurs.
+ */
+char *
+x11_create_display_inet(int screen_number, int x11_display_offset)
+{
+ int display_number, sock;
+ u_short port;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS];
+ char display[512];
+ char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+
+ for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
+ display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
+ display_number++) {
+ port = 6000 + display_number;
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; /* XXX loopback only ? */
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)) {
+ error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ } else {
+ debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported",
+ ai->ai_family);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ debug("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno));
+ shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(sock);
+
+ if (ai->ai_next)
+ continue;
+
+ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+ shutdown(socks[n], SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(socks[n]);
+ }
+ num_socks = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+#ifndef DONT_TRY_OTHER_AF
+ if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
+ break;
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ if (num_socks > 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
+ error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
+ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+ sock = socks[n];
+ if (listen(sock, 5) < 0) {
+ error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(sock);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
+ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
+ fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
+ /*
+ * HPUX detects the local hostname in the DISPLAY variable and tries
+ * to set up a shared memory connection to the server, which it
+ * incorrectly supposes to be local.
+ *
+ * The workaround - as used in later $$H and other programs - is
+ * is to set display to the host's IP address.
+ */
+ {
+ struct hostent *he;
+ struct in_addr my_addr;
+
+ he = gethostbyname(hostname);
+ if (he == NULL) {
+ error("[X11-broken-fwd-hostname-workaround] Could not get "
+ "IP address for hostname %s.", hostname);
+
+ packet_send_debug("[X11-broken-fwd-hostname-workaround]"
+ "Could not get IP address for hostname %s.", hostname);
+
+ shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(sock);
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
+
+ /* Set DISPLAY to <ip address>:screen.display */
+ snprintf(display, sizeof(display), "%.50s:%d.%d", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
+ display_number, screen_number);
+ }
+#else /* IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY */
+ /* Just set DISPLAY to hostname:screen.display */
+ snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%d.%d", hostname,
+ display_number, screen_number);
+#endif /* IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY */
+
+ /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
+ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+ sock = socks[n];
+ (void) channel_new("x11 listener",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, xstrdup("X11 inet listener"), 1);
+ }
+
+ /* Return a suitable value for the DISPLAY environment variable. */
+ return xstrdup(display);
+}
+
+#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH
+#define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X"
+#endif
+
+static int
+connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
+{
+ static const char *const x_sockets[] = {
+ X_UNIX_PATH "%u",
+ "/var/X/.X11-unix/X" "%u",
+ "/usr/spool/sockets/X11/" "%u",
+ NULL
+ };
+ int sock;
+ struct sockaddr_un addr;
+ const char *const * path;
+
+ for (path = x_sockets; *path; ++path) {
+ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+ addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ snprintf(addr.sun_path, sizeof addr.sun_path, *path, dnr);
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
+ return sock;
+ close(sock);
+ }
+ error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+x11_connect_display(void)
+{
+ int display_number, sock = 0;
+ const char *display;
+ char buf[1024], *cp;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int gaierr;
+
+ /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */
+ display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+ if (!display) {
+ error("DISPLAY not set.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a
+ * connection to the real X server.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in
+ * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
+ */
+ if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
+ display[0] == ':') {
+ /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
+ if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%d", &display_number) != 1) {
+ error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+ display);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Create a socket. */
+ sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+ return sock;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly
+ * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
+ */
+ strncpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+ cp = strchr(buf, ':');
+ if (!cp) {
+ error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *cp = 0;
+ /* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the display number. */
+ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%d", &display_number) != 1) {
+ error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+ display);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Look up the host address */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", 6000 + display_number);
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+ error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ /* Create a socket. */
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ debug("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Connect it to the display. */
+ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ debug("connect %.100s port %d: %.100s", buf,
+ 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ break;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ if (!ai) {
+ error("connect %.100s port %d: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return sock;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN is received. The packet contains
+ * the remote channel number. We should do whatever we want, and respond
+ * with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE.
+ */
+
+void
+x11_input_open(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ int remote_id, sock = 0;
+ char *remote_host;
+
+ debug("Received X11 open request.");
+
+ remote_id = packet_get_int();
+
+ if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) {
+ remote_host = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ } else {
+ remote_host = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)");
+ }
+ packet_done();
+
+ /* Obtain a connection to the real X display. */
+ sock = x11_connect_display();
+ if (sock != -1) {
+ /* Allocate a channel for this connection. */
+ c = channel_new("connected x11 socket",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0,
+ remote_host, 1);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ error("x11_input_open: channel_new failed");
+ close(sock);
+ } else {
+ c->remote_id = remote_id;
+ c->force_drain = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ /* Send refusal to the remote host. */
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(remote_id);
+ } else {
+ /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+}
+
+/* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */
+void
+deny_input_open(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int rchan = packet_get_int();
+ switch(type){
+ case SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN:
+ error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
+ break;
+ case SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN:
+ error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("deny_input_open: type %d plen %d", type, plen);
+ break;
+ }
+ error("Warning: this is probably a break in attempt by a malicious server.");
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(rchan);
+ packet_send();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication
+ * data, and enables authentication spoofing.
+ * This should be called in the client only.
+ */
+void
+x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id,
+ const char *proto, const char *data)
+{
+ u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2;
+ u_int i, value, len;
+ char *new_data;
+ int screen_number;
+ const char *cp;
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+
+ cp = getenv("DISPLAY");
+ if (cp)
+ cp = strchr(cp, ':');
+ if (cp)
+ cp = strchr(cp, '.');
+ if (cp)
+ screen_number = atoi(cp + 1);
+ else
+ screen_number = 0;
+
+ /* Save protocol name. */
+ x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
+
+ /*
+ * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data of the
+ * same length.
+ */
+ x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+ x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+ for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
+ if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
+ fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad authentication data: %.100s", data);
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ x11_saved_data[i] = value;
+ x11_fake_data[i] = rand & 0xff;
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+ x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
+ x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
+
+ /* Convert the fake data into hex. */
+ len = 2 * data_len + 1;
+ new_data = xmalloc(len);
+ for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++)
+ snprintf(new_data + 2 * i, len - 2 * i,
+ "%02x", (u_char) x11_fake_data[i]);
+
+ /* Send the request packet. */
+ if (compat20) {
+ channel_request_start(client_session_id, "x11-req", 0);
+ packet_put_char(0); /* XXX bool single connection */
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
+ }
+ packet_put_cstring(proto);
+ packet_put_cstring(new_data);
+ packet_put_int(screen_number);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ xfree(new_data);
+}
+
+
+/* -- agent forwarding */
+
+/* Sends a message to the server to request authentication fd forwarding. */
+
+void
+auth_request_forwarding()
+{
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the name of the forwarded authentication socket. Returns NULL if
+ * there is no forwarded authentication socket. The returned value points to
+ * a static buffer.
+ */
+
+char *
+auth_get_socket_name()
+{
+ return auth_sock_name;
+}
+
+/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
+
+void
+auth_sock_cleanup_proc(void *_pw)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw = _pw;
+
+ if (auth_sock_name) {
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ unlink(auth_sock_name);
+ rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+ auth_sock_name = NULL;
+ restore_uid();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to process SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING on the server.
+ * This starts forwarding authentication requests.
+ */
+
+int
+auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ int sock;
+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+
+ if (auth_get_socket_name() != NULL) {
+ error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
+ auth_sock_name = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+ auth_sock_dir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+ strlcpy(auth_sock_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
+
+ /* Create private directory for socket */
+ if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
+ packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: "
+ "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ restore_uid();
+ xfree(auth_sock_name);
+ xfree(auth_sock_dir);
+ auth_sock_name = NULL;
+ auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ snprintf(auth_sock_name, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/agent.%d",
+ auth_sock_dir, (int) getpid());
+
+ /* delete agent socket on fatal() */
+ fatal_add_cleanup(auth_sock_cleanup_proc, pw);
+
+ /* Create the socket. */
+ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ packet_disconnect("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Bind it to the name. */
+ memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
+ sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strncpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name,
+ sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+
+ if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0)
+ packet_disconnect("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /* Start listening on the socket. */
+ if (listen(sock, 5) < 0)
+ packet_disconnect("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
+ nc = channel_new("auth socket",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, xstrdup("auth socket"), 1);
+ if (nc == NULL) {
+ error("auth_input_request_forwarding: channel_new failed");
+ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(pw);
+ fatal_remove_cleanup(auth_sock_cleanup_proc, pw);
+ close(sock);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ strlcpy(nc->path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(nc->path));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* This is called to process an SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN message. */
+
+void
+auth_input_open_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ int remote_id, sock;
+ char *name;
+
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type);
+
+ /* Read the remote channel number from the message. */
+ remote_id = packet_get_int();
+
+ /*
+ * Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again
+ * get forwarded).
+ */
+ sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+
+ /*
+ * If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to
+ * the server. This should never happen unless the agent dies,
+ * because authentication forwarding is only enabled if we have an
+ * agent.
+ */
+ if (sock >= 0) {
+ name = xstrdup("authentication agent connection");
+ c = channel_new("", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock,
+ -1, 0, 0, 0, name, 1);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ error("auth_input_open_request: channel_new failed");
+ xfree(name);
+ close(sock);
+ } else {
+ c->remote_id = remote_id;
+ c->force_drain = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(remote_id);
+ } else {
+ /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */
+ debug("Forwarding authentication connection.");
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.51 2001/11/07 22:53:21 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef CHANNEL_H
+#define CHANNEL_H
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+/* Definitions for channel types. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING 8 /* sending remaining data to conn */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING 9 /* sending remaining data to app */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 15
+
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_PATH_LEN 256
+
+struct Channel;
+typedef struct Channel Channel;
+
+typedef void channel_callback_fn(int, void *);
+typedef int channel_filter_fn(struct Channel *, char *, int);
+
+struct Channel {
+ int type; /* channel type/state */
+ int self; /* my own channel identifier */
+ int remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */
+ int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */
+ int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */
+ int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */
+ int rfd; /* read fd */
+ int wfd; /* write fd */
+ int efd; /* extended fd */
+ int sock; /* sock fd */
+ int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */
+ int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */
+ int delayed; /* fdset hack */
+ Buffer input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over
+ * encrypted connection */
+ Buffer output; /* data received over encrypted connection for
+ * send on socket */
+ Buffer extended;
+ char path[SSH_CHANNEL_PATH_LEN];
+ /* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */
+ int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */
+ int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */
+ char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */
+
+ int remote_window;
+ int remote_maxpacket;
+ int local_window;
+ int local_window_max;
+ int local_consumed;
+ int local_maxpacket;
+ int extended_usage;
+
+ char *ctype; /* type */
+
+ /* callback */
+ channel_callback_fn *cb_fn;
+ void *cb_arg;
+ int cb_event;
+ channel_callback_fn *detach_user;
+
+ /* filter */
+ channel_filter_fn *input_filter;
+};
+
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2
+
+/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */
+#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (32*1024)
+#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT/2)
+#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (32*1024)
+#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT/2)
+#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*1024)
+#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT/2)
+
+/* possible input states */
+#define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0x01
+#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 0x02
+#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 0x04
+#define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 0x08
+
+/* possible output states */
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0x10
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 0x20
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 0x40
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 0x80
+
+#define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01
+#define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02
+
+/* channel management */
+
+Channel *channel_lookup(int);
+Channel *channel_new(char *, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, char *, int);
+void channel_set_fds(int, int, int, int, int, int);
+void channel_free(Channel *);
+void channel_free_all(void);
+void channel_stop_listening(void);
+
+void channel_send_open(int);
+void channel_request(int, char *, int);
+void channel_request_start(int, char *, int);
+void channel_register_callback(int, int mtype, channel_callback_fn *, void *);
+void channel_register_cleanup(int, channel_callback_fn *);
+void channel_register_filter(int, channel_filter_fn *);
+void channel_cancel_cleanup(int);
+int channel_close_fd(int *);
+
+/* protocol handler */
+
+void channel_input_channel_request(int, int, void *);
+void channel_input_close(int, int, void *);
+void channel_input_close_confirmation(int, int, void *);
+void channel_input_data(int, int, void *);
+void channel_input_extended_data(int, int, void *);
+void channel_input_ieof(int, int, void *);
+void channel_input_oclose(int, int, void *);
+void channel_input_open_confirmation(int, int, void *);
+void channel_input_open_failure(int, int, void *);
+void channel_input_port_open(int, int, void *);
+void channel_input_window_adjust(int, int, void *);
+
+/* file descriptor handling (read/write) */
+
+void channel_prepare_select(fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, int*, int);
+void channel_after_select(fd_set *, fd_set *);
+void channel_output_poll(void);
+
+int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void);
+void channel_close_all(void);
+int channel_still_open(void);
+char *channel_open_message(void);
+int channel_find_open(void);
+
+/* tcp forwarding */
+void channel_set_af(int af);
+void channel_permit_all_opens(void);
+void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int);
+void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
+void channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int);
+int channel_connect_to(const char *, u_short);
+int channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short);
+void channel_request_remote_forwarding(u_short, const char *, u_short);
+int channel_request_local_forwarding(u_short, const char *, u_short, int);
+int
+channel_request_forwarding(const char *, u_short, const char *, u_short, int,
+ int);
+
+/* x11 forwarding */
+
+int x11_connect_display(void);
+char *x11_create_display(int);
+char *x11_create_display_inet(int, int);
+void x11_input_open(int, int, void *);
+void x11_request_forwarding(void);
+void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *);
+void deny_input_open(int, int, void *);
+
+/* agent forwarding */
+
+void auth_request_forwarding(void);
+char *auth_get_socket_name(void);
+void auth_sock_cleanup_proc(void *);
+int auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd *);
+void auth_input_open_request(int, int, void *);
+
+/* channel close */
+
+int chan_is_dead(Channel *, int);
+void chan_mark_dead(Channel *);
+void chan_init_iostates(Channel *);
+void chan_init(void);
+
+typedef void chan_event_fn(Channel *);
+
+/* for the input state */
+extern chan_event_fn *chan_rcvd_oclose;
+extern chan_event_fn *chan_read_failed;
+extern chan_event_fn *chan_ibuf_empty;
+
+/* for the output state */
+extern chan_event_fn *chan_rcvd_ieof;
+extern chan_event_fn *chan_write_failed;
+extern chan_event_fn *chan_obuf_empty;
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.47 2001/08/23 11:31:59 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+/* no encryption */
+static void
+none_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+}
+static void
+none_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen)
+{
+}
+static void
+none_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+ memcpy(dest, src, len);
+}
+
+/* DES */
+static void
+des_ssh1_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+ static int dowarn = 1;
+ if (dowarn) {
+ error("Warning: use of DES is strongly discouraged "
+ "due to cryptographic weaknesses");
+ dowarn = 0;
+ }
+ des_set_key((void *)key, cc->u.des.key);
+}
+static void
+des_ssh1_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen)
+{
+ memset(cc->u.des.iv, 0, sizeof(cc->u.des.iv));
+}
+static void
+des_ssh1_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+ des_ncbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, cc->u.des.key, &cc->u.des.iv,
+ DES_ENCRYPT);
+}
+static void
+des_ssh1_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+ des_ncbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, cc->u.des.key, &cc->u.des.iv,
+ DES_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+/* 3DES */
+static void
+des3_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+ des_set_key((void *) key, cc->u.des3.key1);
+ des_set_key((void *) (key+8), cc->u.des3.key2);
+ des_set_key((void *) (key+16), cc->u.des3.key3);
+}
+static void
+des3_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen)
+{
+ memset(cc->u.des3.iv1, 0, sizeof(cc->u.des3.iv1));
+ memset(cc->u.des3.iv2, 0, sizeof(cc->u.des3.iv2));
+ memset(cc->u.des3.iv3, 0, sizeof(cc->u.des3.iv3));
+ if (iv == NULL)
+ return;
+ memcpy(cc->u.des3.iv3, (char *)iv, 8);
+}
+static void
+des3_cbc_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+ des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len,
+ cc->u.des3.key1, cc->u.des3.key2, cc->u.des3.key3,
+ &cc->u.des3.iv3, DES_ENCRYPT);
+}
+static void
+des3_cbc_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+ des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len,
+ cc->u.des3.key1, cc->u.des3.key2, cc->u.des3.key3,
+ &cc->u.des3.iv3, DES_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is used by SSH1:
+ *
+ * What kind of triple DES are these 2 routines?
+ *
+ * Why is there a redundant initialization vector?
+ *
+ * If only iv3 was used, then, this would till effect have been
+ * outer-cbc. However, there is also a private iv1 == iv2 which
+ * perhaps makes differential analysis easier. On the other hand, the
+ * private iv1 probably makes the CRC-32 attack ineffective. This is a
+ * result of that there is no longer any known iv1 to use when
+ * choosing the X block.
+ */
+static void
+des3_ssh1_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+ des_set_key((void *) key, cc->u.des3.key1);
+ des_set_key((void *) (key+8), cc->u.des3.key2);
+ if (keylen <= 16)
+ des_set_key((void *) key, cc->u.des3.key3);
+ else
+ des_set_key((void *) (key+16), cc->u.des3.key3);
+}
+static void
+des3_ssh1_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+ u_int len)
+{
+ des_ncbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key1, &cc->u.des3.iv1,
+ DES_ENCRYPT);
+ des_ncbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key2, &cc->u.des3.iv2,
+ DES_DECRYPT);
+ des_ncbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key3, &cc->u.des3.iv3,
+ DES_ENCRYPT);
+}
+static void
+des3_ssh1_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+ u_int len)
+{
+ des_ncbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key3, &cc->u.des3.iv3,
+ DES_DECRYPT);
+ des_ncbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key2, &cc->u.des3.iv2,
+ DES_ENCRYPT);
+ des_ncbc_encrypt(dest, dest, len, cc->u.des3.key1, &cc->u.des3.iv1,
+ DES_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+/* Blowfish */
+static void
+blowfish_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+ BF_set_key(&cc->u.bf.key, keylen, (u_char *)key);
+}
+static void
+blowfish_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen)
+{
+ if (iv == NULL)
+ memset(cc->u.bf.iv, 0, 8);
+ else
+ memcpy(cc->u.bf.iv, (char *)iv, 8);
+}
+static void
+blowfish_cbc_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+ u_int len)
+{
+ BF_cbc_encrypt((void *)src, dest, len, &cc->u.bf.key, cc->u.bf.iv,
+ BF_ENCRYPT);
+}
+static void
+blowfish_cbc_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+ u_int len)
+{
+ BF_cbc_encrypt((void *)src, dest, len, &cc->u.bf.key, cc->u.bf.iv,
+ BF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSH1 uses a variation on Blowfish, all bytes must be swapped before
+ * and after encryption/decryption. Thus the swap_bytes stuff (yuk).
+ */
+static void
+swap_bytes(const u_char *src, u_char *dst, int n)
+{
+ char c[4];
+
+ /* Process 4 bytes every lap. */
+ for (n = n / 4; n > 0; n--) {
+ c[3] = *src++;
+ c[2] = *src++;
+ c[1] = *src++;
+ c[0] = *src++;
+
+ *dst++ = c[0];
+ *dst++ = c[1];
+ *dst++ = c[2];
+ *dst++ = c[3];
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+blowfish_ssh1_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+ u_int len)
+{
+ swap_bytes(src, dest, len);
+ BF_cbc_encrypt((void *)dest, dest, len, &cc->u.bf.key, cc->u.bf.iv,
+ BF_ENCRYPT);
+ swap_bytes(dest, dest, len);
+}
+static void
+blowfish_ssh1_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+ u_int len)
+{
+ swap_bytes(src, dest, len);
+ BF_cbc_encrypt((void *)dest, dest, len, &cc->u.bf.key, cc->u.bf.iv,
+ BF_DECRYPT);
+ swap_bytes(dest, dest, len);
+}
+
+/* alleged rc4 */
+static void
+arcfour_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+ RC4_set_key(&cc->u.rc4, keylen, (u_char *)key);
+}
+static void
+arcfour_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+ RC4(&cc->u.rc4, len, (u_char *)src, dest);
+}
+
+/* CAST */
+static void
+cast_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+ CAST_set_key(&cc->u.cast.key, keylen, (u_char *) key);
+}
+static void
+cast_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen)
+{
+ if (iv == NULL)
+ fatal("no IV for %s.", cc->cipher->name);
+ memcpy(cc->u.cast.iv, (char *)iv, 8);
+}
+static void
+cast_cbc_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+ CAST_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, &cc->u.cast.key, cc->u.cast.iv,
+ CAST_ENCRYPT);
+}
+static void
+cast_cbc_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+ CAST_cbc_encrypt(src, dest, len, &cc->u.cast.key, cc->u.cast.iv,
+ CAST_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+/* RIJNDAEL */
+
+#define RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE 16
+static void
+rijndael_setkey(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+ rijndael_set_key(&cc->u.rijndael.enc, (char *)key, 8*keylen, 1);
+ rijndael_set_key(&cc->u.rijndael.dec, (char *)key, 8*keylen, 0);
+}
+static void
+rijndael_setiv(CipherContext *cc, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen)
+{
+ if (iv == NULL || ivlen != RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE)
+ fatal("bad/no IV for %s.", cc->cipher->name);
+ memcpy(cc->u.rijndael.iv, iv, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+}
+static void
+rijndael_cbc_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+ u_int len)
+{
+ rijndael_ctx *ctx = &cc->u.rijndael.enc;
+ u_char *iv = cc->u.rijndael.iv;
+ u_char in[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
+ u_char *cprev, *cnow, *plain;
+ int i, j, blocks = len / RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return;
+ if (len % RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE)
+ fatal("rijndael_cbc_encrypt: bad len %d", len);
+ cnow = dest;
+ plain = (u_char *) src;
+ cprev = iv;
+ for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++, plain+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE,
+ cnow+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++)
+ in[j] = plain[j] ^ cprev[j];
+ rijndael_encrypt(ctx, in, cnow);
+ cprev = cnow;
+ }
+ memcpy(iv, cprev, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+}
+static void
+rijndael_cbc_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+ u_int len)
+{
+ rijndael_ctx *ctx = &cc->u.rijndael.dec;
+ u_char *iv = cc->u.rijndael.iv;
+ u_char ivsaved[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
+ u_char *cnow = (u_char *) (src+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+ u_char *plain = dest+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+ u_char *ivp;
+ int i, j, blocks = len / RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return;
+ if (len % RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE)
+ fatal("rijndael_cbc_decrypt: bad len %d", len);
+ memcpy(ivsaved, cnow, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+ for (i = blocks; i > 0; i--, cnow-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE,
+ plain-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ rijndael_decrypt(ctx, cnow, plain);
+ ivp = (i == 1) ? iv : cnow-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+ for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++)
+ plain[j] ^= ivp[j];
+ }
+ memcpy(iv, ivsaved, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+}
+
+Cipher ciphers[] = {
+ { "none",
+ SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0,
+ none_setkey, none_setiv,
+ none_crypt, none_crypt },
+ { "des",
+ SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8,
+ des_ssh1_setkey, des_ssh1_setiv,
+ des_ssh1_encrypt, des_ssh1_decrypt },
+ { "3des",
+ SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16,
+ des3_ssh1_setkey, des3_setiv,
+ des3_ssh1_encrypt, des3_ssh1_decrypt },
+ { "blowfish",
+ SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 16,
+ blowfish_setkey, blowfish_setiv,
+ blowfish_ssh1_encrypt, blowfish_ssh1_decrypt },
+
+ { "3des-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24,
+ des3_setkey, des3_setiv,
+ des3_cbc_encrypt, des3_cbc_decrypt },
+ { "blowfish-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16,
+ blowfish_setkey, blowfish_setiv,
+ blowfish_cbc_encrypt, blowfish_cbc_decrypt },
+ { "cast128-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16,
+ cast_setkey, cast_setiv,
+ cast_cbc_encrypt, cast_cbc_decrypt },
+ { "arcfour",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16,
+ arcfour_setkey, none_setiv,
+ arcfour_crypt, arcfour_crypt },
+ { "aes128-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16,
+ rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv,
+ rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt },
+ { "aes192-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24,
+ rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv,
+ rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt },
+ { "aes256-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32,
+ rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv,
+ rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt },
+ { "rijndael128-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16,
+ rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv,
+ rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt },
+ { "rijndael192-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24,
+ rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv,
+ rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt },
+ { "rijndael256-cbc",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32,
+ rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv,
+ rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt },
+ { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32,
+ rijndael_setkey, rijndael_setiv,
+ rijndael_cbc_encrypt, rijndael_cbc_decrypt },
+ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/*--*/
+
+u_int
+cipher_mask_ssh1(int client)
+{
+ u_int mask = 0;
+ mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES; /* Mandatory */
+ mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
+ if (client) {
+ mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_DES;
+ }
+ return mask;
+}
+
+Cipher *
+cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ Cipher *c;
+ for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ return c;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+Cipher *
+cipher_by_number(int id)
+{
+ Cipher *c;
+ for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ if (c->number == id)
+ return c;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#define CIPHER_SEP ","
+int
+ciphers_valid(const char *names)
+{
+ Cipher *c;
+ char *ciphers, *cp;
+ char *p;
+
+ if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+ return 0;
+ ciphers = cp = xstrdup(names);
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
+ c = cipher_by_name(p);
+ if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) {
+ debug("bad cipher %s [%s]", p, names);
+ xfree(ciphers);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ debug3("cipher ok: %s [%s]", p, names);
+ }
+ }
+ debug3("ciphers ok: [%s]", names);
+ xfree(ciphers);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parses the name of the cipher. Returns the number of the corresponding
+ * cipher, or -1 on error.
+ */
+
+int
+cipher_number(const char *name)
+{
+ Cipher *c;
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ c = cipher_by_name(name);
+ return (c==NULL) ? -1 : c->number;
+}
+
+char *
+cipher_name(int id)
+{
+ Cipher *c = cipher_by_number(id);
+ return (c==NULL) ? "<unknown>" : c->name;
+}
+
+void
+cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
+ const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen)
+{
+ if (keylen < cipher->key_len)
+ fatal("cipher_init: key length %d is insufficient for %s.",
+ keylen, cipher->name);
+ if (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher->block_size)
+ fatal("cipher_init: iv length %d is insufficient for %s.",
+ ivlen, cipher->name);
+ cc->cipher = cipher;
+ cipher->setkey(cc, key, keylen);
+ cipher->setiv(cc, iv, ivlen);
+}
+
+void
+cipher_encrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+ if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
+ fatal("cipher_encrypt: bad plaintext length %d", len);
+ cc->cipher->encrypt(cc, dest, src, len);
+}
+
+void
+cipher_decrypt(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
+{
+ if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
+ fatal("cipher_decrypt: bad ciphertext length %d", len);
+ cc->cipher->decrypt(cc, dest, src, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the
+ * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key.
+ */
+
+void
+cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher,
+ const char *passphrase)
+{
+ MD5_CTX md;
+ u_char digest[16];
+
+ MD5_Init(&md);
+ MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ MD5_Final(digest, &md);
+
+ cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0);
+
+ memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
+ memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.29 2001/08/23 11:31:59 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef CIPHER_H
+#define CIPHER_H
+
+#include <openssl/des.h>
+#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
+#include <openssl/rc4.h>
+#include <openssl/cast.h>
+#include "rijndael.h"
+/*
+ * Cipher types for SSH-1. New types can be added, but old types should not
+ * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31.
+ */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_SSH2 -3
+#define SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL -2 /* No valid cipher selected. */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET -1 /* None selected (invalid number). */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_NONE 0 /* no encryption */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_IDEA 1 /* IDEA CFB */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_DES 2 /* DES CBC */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_3DES 3 /* 3DES CBC */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_TSS 4 /* TRI's Simple Stream encryption CBC */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_RC4 5 /* Alleged RC4 */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 6
+#define SSH_CIPHER_RESERVED 7
+#define SSH_CIPHER_MAX 31
+
+typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
+typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
+
+struct CipherContext {
+ union {
+ struct {
+ des_key_schedule key;
+ des_cblock iv;
+ } des;
+ struct {
+ des_key_schedule key1;
+ des_key_schedule key2;
+ des_key_schedule key3;
+ des_cblock iv1;
+ des_cblock iv2;
+ des_cblock iv3;
+ } des3;
+ struct {
+ struct bf_key_st key;
+ u_char iv[8];
+ } bf;
+ struct {
+ CAST_KEY key;
+ u_char iv[8];
+ } cast;
+ struct {
+ u_char iv[16];
+ rijndael_ctx enc;
+ rijndael_ctx dec;
+ } rijndael;
+ RC4_KEY rc4;
+ } u;
+ Cipher *cipher;
+};
+struct Cipher {
+ char *name;
+ int number; /* for ssh1 only */
+ u_int block_size;
+ u_int key_len;
+ void (*setkey)(CipherContext *, const u_char *, u_int);
+ void (*setiv)(CipherContext *, const u_char *, u_int);
+ void (*encrypt)(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int);
+ void (*decrypt)(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int);
+};
+
+u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int);
+Cipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
+Cipher *cipher_by_number(int);
+int cipher_number(const char *);
+char *cipher_name(int);
+int ciphers_valid(const char *);
+void cipher_init(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const u_char *, u_int,
+ const u_char *, u_int);
+void cipher_encrypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int);
+void cipher_decrypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int);
+void cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *);
+
+#endif /* CIPHER_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * The main loop for the interactive session (client side).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.87 2001/11/09 18:59:23 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "sshtty.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* import options */
+extern Options options;
+
+/* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */
+extern int stdin_null_flag;
+
+/*
+ * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
+ * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * configuration file.
+ */
+extern char *host;
+
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
+ * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new
+ * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile
+ * because this is updated in a signal handler.
+ */
+static volatile int received_window_change_signal = 0;
+static volatile int received_signal = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether the user\'s terminal is in non-blocking mode. */
+static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
+
+/* Common data for the client loop code. */
+static int quit_pending; /* Set to non-zero to quit the client loop. */
+static int escape_char; /* Escape character. */
+static int escape_pending; /* Last character was the escape character */
+static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */
+static int exit_status; /* Used to store the exit status of the command. */
+static int stdin_eof; /* EOF has been encountered on standard error. */
+static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */
+static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */
+static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */
+static u_long stdin_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes;
+static u_int buffer_high;/* Soft max buffer size. */
+static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */
+static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */
+static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
+static int session_closed = 0; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */
+
+static void client_init_dispatch(void);
+int session_ident = -1;
+
+/*XXX*/
+extern Kex *xxx_kex;
+
+/* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */
+
+static void
+leave_non_blocking(void)
+{
+ if (in_non_blocking_mode) {
+ (void) fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, 0);
+ in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
+ fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) leave_non_blocking, NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Puts stdin terminal in non-blocking mode. */
+
+static void
+enter_non_blocking(void)
+{
+ in_non_blocking_mode = 1;
+ (void) fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
+ fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) leave_non_blocking, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a
+ * flag indicating that the window has changed.
+ */
+
+static void
+window_change_handler(int sig)
+{
+ received_window_change_signal = 1;
+ signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These
+ * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
+ */
+
+static void
+signal_handler(int sig)
+{
+ received_signal = sig;
+ quit_pending = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns current time in seconds from Jan 1, 1970 with the maximum
+ * available resolution.
+ */
+
+static double
+get_current_time(void)
+{
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+ return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when the interactive is entered. This checks if there is
+ * an EOF coming on stdin. We must check this explicitly, as select() does
+ * not appear to wake up when redirecting from /dev/null.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(void)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[1];
+
+ /*
+ * If standard input is to be "redirected from /dev/null", we simply
+ * mark that we have seen an EOF and send an EOF message to the
+ * server. Otherwise, we try to read a single character; it appears
+ * that for some files, such /dev/null, select() never wakes up for
+ * read for this descriptor, which means that we never get EOF. This
+ * way we will get the EOF if stdin comes from /dev/null or similar.
+ */
+ if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ /* Fake EOF on stdin. */
+ debug("Sending eof.");
+ stdin_eof = 1;
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ enter_non_blocking();
+
+ /* Check for immediate EOF on stdin. */
+ len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, 1);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ /* EOF. Record that we have seen it and send EOF to server. */
+ debug("Sending eof.");
+ stdin_eof = 1;
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+ packet_send();
+ } else if (len > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Got data. We must store the data in the buffer,
+ * and also process it as an escape character if
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+ if ((u_char) buf[0] == escape_char)
+ escape_pending = 1;
+ else
+ buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 1);
+ }
+ leave_non_blocking();
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Make packets from buffered stdin data, and buffer them for sending to the
+ * connection.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(void)
+{
+ u_int len;
+
+ /* Send buffered stdin data to the server. */
+ while (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0 &&
+ packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+ len = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
+ /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+ if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
+ len = packet_get_maxsize();
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer), len);
+ packet_send();
+ buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len);
+ stdin_bytes += len;
+ /* If we have a pending EOF, send it now. */
+ if (stdin_eof && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to
+ * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software
+ * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_check_window_change(void)
+{
+ struct winsize ws;
+
+ if (! received_window_change_signal)
+ return;
+ /** XXX race */
+ received_window_change_signal = 0;
+
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ return;
+
+ debug2("client_check_window_change: changed");
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ channel_request_start(session_ident, "window-change", 0);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on
+ * one of the file descriptors).
+ */
+
+static void
+client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
+ int *maxfdp, int *nallocp, int rekeying)
+{
+ /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */
+ channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, rekeying);
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ /* Read from the connection, unless our buffers are full. */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) < buffer_high &&
+ buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) < buffer_high &&
+ channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+ FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+ /*
+ * Read from stdin, unless we have seen EOF or have very much
+ * buffered data to send to the server.
+ */
+ if (!stdin_eof && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ FD_SET(fileno(stdin), *readsetp);
+
+ /* Select stdout/stderr if have data in buffer. */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0)
+ FD_SET(fileno(stdout), *writesetp);
+ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0)
+ FD_SET(fileno(stderr), *writesetp);
+ } else {
+ /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */
+ if (session_closed && !channel_still_open() &&
+ !packet_have_data_to_write()) {
+ /* clear mask since we did not call select() */
+ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
+ memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
+ return;
+ } else {
+ FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */
+ if (packet_have_data_to_write())
+ FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until
+ * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other
+ * event pending. Note: if you want to implement SSH_MSG_IGNORE
+ * messages to fool traffic analysis, this might be the place to do
+ * it: just have a random timeout for the select, and send a random
+ * SSH_MSG_IGNORE packet when the timeout expires.
+ */
+
+ if (select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+ char buf[100];
+
+ /*
+ * We have to clear the select masks, because we return.
+ * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags
+ * set by the signal handlers.
+ */
+ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
+ memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
+
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ return;
+ /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno));
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr)
+{
+ struct winsize oldws, newws;
+
+ /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */
+ if (buffer_len(bout) > 0)
+ atomicio(write, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(bout), buffer_len(bout));
+ if (buffer_len(berr) > 0)
+ atomicio(write, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(berr), buffer_len(berr));
+
+ leave_raw_mode();
+
+ /*
+ * Free (and clear) the buffer to reduce the amount of data that gets
+ * written to swap.
+ */
+ buffer_free(bin);
+ buffer_free(bout);
+ buffer_free(berr);
+
+ /* Save old window size. */
+ ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &oldws);
+
+ /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */
+ kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP);
+
+ /* Check if the window size has changed. */
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &newws) >= 0 &&
+ (oldws.ws_row != newws.ws_row ||
+ oldws.ws_col != newws.ws_col ||
+ oldws.ws_xpixel != newws.ws_xpixel ||
+ oldws.ws_ypixel != newws.ws_ypixel))
+ received_window_change_signal = 1;
+
+ /* OK, we have been continued by the user. Reinitialize buffers. */
+ buffer_init(bin);
+ buffer_init(bout);
+ buffer_init(berr);
+
+ enter_raw_mode();
+}
+
+static void
+client_process_net_input(fd_set * readset)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[8192];
+
+ /*
+ * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
+ * the packet subsystem.
+ */
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
+ /* Read as much as possible. */
+ len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len == 0) {
+ /* Received EOF. The remote host has closed the connection. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n",
+ host);
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to
+ * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available.
+ */
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+ len = 0;
+
+ if (len < 0) {
+ /* An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a network problem. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n",
+ host, strerror(errno));
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
+ }
+}
+
+/* process the characters one by one */
+static int
+process_escapes(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ char string[1024];
+ pid_t pid;
+ int bytes = 0;
+ u_int i;
+ u_char ch;
+ char *s;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ /* Get one character at a time. */
+ ch = buf[i];
+
+ if (escape_pending) {
+ /* We have previously seen an escape character. */
+ /* Clear the flag now. */
+ escape_pending = 0;
+
+ /* Process the escaped character. */
+ switch (ch) {
+ case '.':
+ /* Terminate the connection. */
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c.\r\n", escape_char);
+ buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return -1;
+
+ case 'Z' - 64:
+ /* Suspend the program. */
+ /* Print a message to that effect to the user. */
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", escape_char);
+ buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+
+ /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */
+ client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr);
+
+ /* We have been continued. */
+ continue;
+
+ case 'R':
+ if (compat20) {
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
+ log("Server does not support re-keying");
+ else
+ need_rekeying = 1;
+ }
+ continue;
+
+ case '&':
+ /*
+ * Detach the program (continue to serve connections,
+ * but put in background and no more new connections).
+ */
+ /* Restore tty modes. */
+ leave_raw_mode();
+
+ /* Stop listening for new connections. */
+ channel_stop_listening();
+
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+ "%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char);
+ buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+
+ /* Fork into background. */
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid < 0) {
+ error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */
+ /* The parent just exits. */
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ /* The child continues serving connections. */
+ if (compat20) {
+ buffer_append(bin, "\004", 1);
+ /* fake EOF on stdin */
+ return -1;
+ } else if (!stdin_eof) {
+ /*
+ * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not always appear
+ * to be enough. So we try to send an EOF character
+ * first.
+ */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA);
+ packet_put_string("\004", 1);
+ packet_send();
+ /* Close stdin. */
+ stdin_eof = 1;
+ if (buffer_len(bin) == 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ }
+ continue;
+
+ case '?':
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string,
+"%c?\r\n\
+Supported escape sequences:\r\n\
+~. - terminate connection\r\n\
+~R - Request rekey (SSH protocol 2 only)\r\n\
+~^Z - suspend ssh\r\n\
+~# - list forwarded connections\r\n\
+~& - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)\r\n\
+~? - this message\r\n\
+~~ - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n\
+(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after newline.)\r\n",
+ escape_char);
+ buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+ continue;
+
+ case '#':
+ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c#\r\n", escape_char);
+ buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string));
+ s = channel_open_message();
+ buffer_append(berr, s, strlen(s));
+ xfree(s);
+ continue;
+
+ default:
+ if (ch != escape_char) {
+ buffer_put_char(bin, escape_char);
+ bytes++;
+ }
+ /* Escaped characters fall through here */
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The previous character was not an escape char. Check if this
+ * is an escape.
+ */
+ if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) {
+ /* It is. Set the flag and continue to next character. */
+ escape_pending = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline,
+ * and append it to the buffer.
+ */
+ last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n');
+ buffer_put_char(bin, ch);
+ bytes++;
+ }
+ return bytes;
+}
+
+static void
+client_process_input(fd_set * readset)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[8192];
+
+ /* Read input from stdin. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) {
+ /* Read as much as possible. */
+ len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+ return; /* we'll try again later */
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * Received EOF or error. They are treated
+ * similarly, except that an error message is printed
+ * if it was an error condition.
+ */
+ if (len < 0) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "read: %.100s\r\n", strerror(errno));
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ }
+ /* Mark that we have seen EOF. */
+ stdin_eof = 1;
+ /*
+ * Send an EOF message to the server unless there is
+ * data in the buffer. If there is data in the
+ * buffer, no message will be sent now. Code
+ * elsewhere will send the EOF when the buffer
+ * becomes empty if stdin_eof is set.
+ */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ } else if (escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
+ /*
+ * Normal successful read, and no escape character.
+ * Just append the data to buffer.
+ */
+ buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, len);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Normal, successful read. But we have an escape character
+ * and have to process the characters one by one.
+ */
+ if (process_escapes(&stdin_buffer, &stdout_buffer,
+ &stderr_buffer, buf, len) == -1)
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+client_process_output(fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[100];
+
+ /* Write buffered output to stdout. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), writeset)) {
+ /* Write as much data as possible. */
+ len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+ len = 0;
+ else {
+ /*
+ * An error or EOF was encountered. Put an
+ * error message to stderr buffer.
+ */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "write stdout: %.50s\r\n", strerror(errno));
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Consume printed data from the buffer. */
+ buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
+ stdout_bytes += len;
+ }
+ /* Write buffered output to stderr. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stderr), writeset)) {
+ /* Write as much data as possible. */
+ len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+ len = 0;
+ else {
+ /* EOF or error, but can't even print error message. */
+ quit_pending = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Consume printed characters from the buffer. */
+ buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
+ stderr_bytes += len;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as
+ * there are packets available.
+ *
+ * Any unknown packets received during the actual
+ * session cause the session to terminate. This is
+ * intended to make debugging easier since no
+ * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol
+ * extensions must be negotiated during the
+ * preparatory phase.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_process_buffered_input_packets(void)
+{
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending, compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL);
+}
+
+/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */
+
+static int
+simple_escape_filter(Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ /* XXX we assume c->extended is writeable */
+ return process_escapes(&c->input, &c->output, &c->extended, buf, len);
+}
+
+static void
+client_channel_closed(int id, void *arg)
+{
+ if (id != session_ident)
+ error("client_channel_closed: id %d != session_ident %d",
+ id, session_ident);
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+ session_closed = 1;
+ if (in_raw_mode())
+ leave_raw_mode();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after
+ * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the
+ * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character
+ * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session.
+ */
+
+int
+client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
+{
+ fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
+ double start_time, total_time;
+ int max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len, rekeying = 0, nalloc = 0;
+ char buf[100];
+
+ debug("Entering interactive session.");
+
+ start_time = get_current_time();
+
+ /* Initialize variables. */
+ escape_pending = 0;
+ last_was_cr = 1;
+ exit_status = -1;
+ stdin_eof = 0;
+ buffer_high = 64 * 1024;
+ connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+ connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+ max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
+ set_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
+ set_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
+ set_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdin));
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdout));
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stderr));
+ }
+ stdin_bytes = 0;
+ stdout_bytes = 0;
+ stderr_bytes = 0;
+ quit_pending = 0;
+ escape_char = escape_char_arg;
+
+ /* Initialize buffers. */
+ buffer_init(&stdin_buffer);
+ buffer_init(&stdout_buffer);
+ buffer_init(&stderr_buffer);
+
+ client_init_dispatch();
+
+ /* Set signal handlers to restore non-blocking mode. */
+ signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
+ signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
+ if (have_pty)
+ signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
+
+ if (have_pty)
+ enter_raw_mode();
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
+ if (escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
+ channel_register_filter(session_ident,
+ simple_escape_filter);
+ if (session_ident != -1)
+ channel_register_cleanup(session_ident,
+ client_channel_closed);
+ } else {
+ /* Check if we should immediately send eof on stdin. */
+ client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin();
+ }
+
+ /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */
+ while (!quit_pending) {
+
+ /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */
+ client_process_buffered_input_packets();
+
+ if (compat20 && session_closed && !channel_still_open())
+ break;
+
+ rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done);
+
+ if (rekeying) {
+ debug("rekeying in progress");
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Make packets of buffered stdin data, and buffer
+ * them for sending to the server.
+ */
+ if (!compat20)
+ client_make_packets_from_stdin_data();
+
+ /*
+ * Make packets from buffered channel data, and
+ * enqueue them for sending to the server.
+ */
+ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ channel_output_poll();
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a
+ * message about it to the server if so.
+ */
+ client_check_window_change();
+
+ if (quit_pending)
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes
+ * available on one of the descriptors).
+ */
+ max_fd2 = max_fd;
+ client_wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset,
+ &max_fd2, &nalloc, rekeying);
+
+ if (quit_pending)
+ break;
+
+ /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+ if (!rekeying) {
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+
+ if (need_rekeying) {
+ debug("user requests rekeying");
+ xxx_kex->done = 0;
+ kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex);
+ need_rekeying = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Buffer input from the connection. */
+ client_process_net_input(readset);
+
+ if (quit_pending)
+ break;
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ /* Buffer data from stdin */
+ client_process_input(readset);
+ /*
+ * Process output to stdout and stderr. Output to
+ * the connection is processed elsewhere (above).
+ */
+ client_process_output(writeset);
+ }
+
+ /* Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the sender. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
+ packet_write_poll();
+ }
+ if (readset)
+ xfree(readset);
+ if (writeset)
+ xfree(writeset);
+
+ /* Terminate the session. */
+
+ /* Stop watching for window change. */
+ if (have_pty)
+ signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
+
+ channel_free_all();
+
+ if (have_pty)
+ leave_raw_mode();
+
+ /* restore blocking io */
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
+ unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
+ unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
+ unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
+
+ if (received_signal) {
+ if (in_non_blocking_mode) /* XXX */
+ leave_non_blocking();
+ fatal("Killed by signal %d.", received_signal);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
+ * that the connection has been closed.
+ */
+ if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host);
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf));
+ }
+
+ /* Output any buffered data for stdout. */
+ while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) {
+ len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ error("Write failed flushing stdout buffer.");
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
+ stdout_bytes += len;
+ }
+
+ /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */
+ while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) {
+ len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer.");
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
+ stderr_bytes += len;
+ }
+
+ /* Clear and free any buffers. */
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ buffer_free(&stdin_buffer);
+ buffer_free(&stdout_buffer);
+ buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
+
+ /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */
+ total_time = get_current_time() - start_time;
+ debug("Transferred: stdin %lu, stdout %lu, stderr %lu bytes in %.1f seconds",
+ stdin_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes, total_time);
+ if (total_time > 0)
+ debug("Bytes per second: stdin %.1f, stdout %.1f, stderr %.1f",
+ stdin_bytes / total_time, stdout_bytes / total_time,
+ stderr_bytes / total_time);
+
+ /* Return the exit status of the program. */
+ debug("Exit status %d", exit_status);
+ return exit_status;
+}
+
+/*********/
+
+static void
+client_input_stdout_data(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ u_int data_len;
+ char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + data_len, type);
+ buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len);
+ memset(data, 0, data_len);
+ xfree(data);
+}
+static void
+client_input_stderr_data(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ u_int data_len;
+ char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + data_len, type);
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len);
+ memset(data, 0, data_len);
+ xfree(data);
+}
+static void
+client_input_exit_status(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type);
+ exit_status = packet_get_int();
+ /* Acknowledge the exit. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_send();
+ /*
+ * Must wait for packet to be sent since we are
+ * exiting the loop.
+ */
+ packet_write_wait();
+ /* Flag that we want to exit. */
+ quit_pending = 1;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+ Channel* c = NULL;
+ char *listen_address, *originator_address;
+ int listen_port, originator_port;
+ int sock;
+
+ /* Get rest of the packet */
+ listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ listen_port = packet_get_int();
+ originator_address = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ originator_port = packet_get_int();
+ packet_done();
+
+ debug("client_request_forwarded_tcpip: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d",
+ listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port);
+
+ sock = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_port);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ xfree(originator_address);
+ xfree(listen_address);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ c = channel_new("forwarded-tcpip",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, 0,
+ xstrdup(originator_address), 1);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ error("client_request_forwarded_tcpip: channel_new failed");
+ close(sock);
+ }
+ xfree(originator_address);
+ xfree(listen_address);
+ return c;
+}
+
+static Channel*
+client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ char *originator;
+ int originator_port;
+ int sock;
+
+ if (!options.forward_x11) {
+ error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
+ error("Warning: this is probably a break in attempt by a malicious server.");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) {
+ debug2("buggy server: x11 request w/o originator_port");
+ originator_port = 0;
+ } else {
+ originator_port = packet_get_int();
+ }
+ packet_done();
+ /* XXX check permission */
+ debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator,
+ originator_port);
+ xfree(originator);
+ sock = x11_connect_display();
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ c = channel_new("x11",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
+ xstrdup("x11"), 1);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ error("client_request_x11: channel_new failed");
+ close(sock);
+ }
+ c->force_drain = 1;
+ return c;
+}
+
+static Channel*
+client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ int sock;
+
+ if (!options.forward_agent) {
+ error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
+ error("Warning: this is probably a break in attempt by a malicious server.");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ c = channel_new("authentication agent connection",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, 0,
+ xstrdup("authentication agent connection"), 1);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ error("client_request_agent: channel_new failed");
+ close(sock);
+ }
+ c->force_drain = 1;
+ return c;
+}
+
+/* XXXX move to generic input handler */
+static void
+client_input_channel_open(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ char *ctype;
+ u_int len;
+ int rchan;
+ int rmaxpack;
+ int rwindow;
+
+ ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
+ rchan = packet_get_int();
+ rwindow = packet_get_int();
+ rmaxpack = packet_get_int();
+
+ debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
+ ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
+
+ if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) {
+ c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ctype, rchan);
+ } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) {
+ c = client_request_x11(ctype, rchan);
+ } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ c = client_request_agent(ctype, rchan);
+ }
+/* XXX duplicate : */
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ debug("confirm %s", ctype);
+ c->remote_id = rchan;
+ c->remote_window = rwindow;
+ c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug("failure %s", ctype);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(rchan);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+ packet_put_cstring("open failed");
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ xfree(ctype);
+}
+static void
+client_input_channel_req(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ int id, reply, success = 0;
+ char *rtype;
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ reply = packet_get_char();
+
+ debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %d rtype %s reply %d",
+ id, rtype, reply);
+
+ if (session_ident == -1) {
+ error("client_input_channel_req: no channel %d", session_ident);
+ } else if (id != session_ident) {
+ error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: wrong channel: %d",
+ session_ident, id);
+ }
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: unknown channel", id);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) {
+ success = 1;
+ exit_status = packet_get_int();
+ packet_done();
+ }
+ if (reply) {
+ packet_start(success ?
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ xfree(rtype);
+}
+
+static void
+client_init_dispatch_20(void)
+{
+ dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
+
+ /* rekeying */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+}
+static void
+client_init_dispatch_13(void)
+{
+ dispatch_init(NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS, &client_input_exit_status);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA, &client_input_stderr_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA, &client_input_stdout_data);
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN, options.forward_agent ?
+ &auth_input_open_request : &deny_input_open);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN, options.forward_x11 ?
+ &x11_input_open : &deny_input_open);
+}
+static void
+client_init_dispatch_15(void)
+{
+ client_init_dispatch_13();
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, & channel_input_oclose);
+}
+static void
+client_init_dispatch(void)
+{
+ if (compat20)
+ client_init_dispatch_20();
+ else if (compat13)
+ client_init_dispatch_13();
+ else
+ client_init_dispatch_15();
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.6 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
+int client_loop(int, int, int);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.53 2001/09/20 13:50:40 markus Exp $");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBPCRE
+# include <pcreposix.h>
+#else /* Use native regex libraries */
+# ifdef HAVE_REGEX_H
+# include <regex.h>
+# else
+# include "openbsd-compat/fake-regex.h"
+# endif
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBPCRE */
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+int compat13 = 0;
+int compat20 = 0;
+int datafellows = 0;
+
+void
+enable_compat20(void)
+{
+ verbose("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0");
+ compat20 = 1;
+}
+void
+enable_compat13(void)
+{
+ verbose("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 1.3");
+ compat13 = 1;
+}
+/* datafellows bug compatibility */
+void
+compat_datafellows(const char *version)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+ char ebuf[1024];
+ regex_t reg;
+ static struct {
+ char *pat;
+ int bugs;
+ } check[] = {
+ { "^OpenSSH[-_]2\\.[012]",
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_BANNER|
+ SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY },
+ { "^OpenSSH_2\\.3\\.0", SSH_BUG_BANNER|SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|
+ SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY},
+ { "^OpenSSH_2\\.3\\.", SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
+ SSH_BUG_NOREKEY},
+ { "^OpenSSH_2\\.5\\.[01]p1",
+ SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX|
+ SSH_BUG_NOREKEY },
+ { "^OpenSSH_2\\.5\\.[012]",
+ SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY },
+ { "^OpenSSH_2\\.5\\.3",
+ SSH_BUG_NOREKEY },
+ { "^OpenSSH", 0 },
+ { "MindTerm", 0 },
+ { "^2\\.1\\.0", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE },
+ { "^2\\.1 ", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE },
+ { "^2\\.0\\.1[3-9]", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
+ SSH_BUG_PKOK|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|
+ SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
+ SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN },
+ { "^2\\.0\\.1[1-2]", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
+ SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK|
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
+ SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN },
+ { "^2\\.0\\.", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
+ SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
+ SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK|
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
+ SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY|SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN },
+ { "^2\\.[23]\\.0", SSH_BUG_HMAC|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 },
+ { "^2\\.3\\.", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 },
+ { "^2\\.[2-9]\\.", SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
+ { "^3\\.0\\.", SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
+ { "^2\\.4$", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, /* Van Dyke */
+ { "^3\\.0 SecureCRT", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
+ { "^1\\.7 SecureFX", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
+ { "^1\\.2\\.1[89]", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
+ { "^1\\.2\\.2[012]", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
+ { "^1\\.3\\.2", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, /* f-secure */
+ { "^SSH Compatible Server", /* Netscreen */
+ SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
+ { "^OSU_0", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
+ { "^OSU_1\\.[0-4]", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
+ { "^OSU_1\\.5alpha[1-3]",
+ SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
+ { "^SSH_Version_Mapper",
+ SSH_BUG_SCANNER },
+ { NULL, 0 }
+ };
+ /* process table, return first match */
+ for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+ ret = regcomp(®, check[i].pat, REG_EXTENDED|REG_NOSUB);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ regerror(ret, ®, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf));
+ ebuf[sizeof(ebuf)-1] = '\0';
+ error("regerror: %s", ebuf);
+ continue;
+ }
+ ret = regexec(®, version, 0, NULL, 0);
+ regfree(®);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ debug("match: %s pat %s", version, check[i].pat);
+ datafellows = check[i].bugs;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ debug("no match: %s", version);
+}
+
+#define SEP ","
+int
+proto_spec(const char *spec)
+{
+ char *s, *p, *q;
+ int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+
+ if (spec == NULL)
+ return ret;
+ q = s = xstrdup(spec);
+ for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) {
+ switch(atoi(p)) {
+ case 1:
+ if (ret == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ ret |= SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED;
+ ret |= SSH_PROTO_1;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ ret |= SSH_PROTO_2;
+ break;
+ default:
+ log("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ xfree(s);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+char *
+compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
+{
+ char *orig_prop, *fix_ciphers;
+ char *cp, *tmp;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
+ return(cipher_prop);
+
+ len = strlen(cipher_prop) + 1;
+ fix_ciphers = xmalloc(len);
+ *fix_ciphers = '\0';
+ tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(cipher_prop);
+ while((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
+ if (strncmp(cp, "aes", 3) && strncmp(cp, "rijndael", 8)) {
+ if (*fix_ciphers)
+ strlcat(fix_ciphers, ",", len);
+ strlcat(fix_ciphers, cp, len);
+ }
+ }
+ xfree(orig_prop);
+ debug2("Original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
+ debug2("Compat cipher proposal: %s", fix_ciphers);
+ if (!*fix_ciphers)
+ fatal("No available ciphers found.");
+
+ return(fix_ciphers);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.29 2001/09/20 13:50:40 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef COMPAT_H
+#define COMPAT_H
+
+#define SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN 0x00
+#define SSH_PROTO_1 0x01
+#define SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED 0x02
+#define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04
+
+#define SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB 0x00000001
+#define SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE 0x00000002
+#define SSH_BUG_HMAC 0x00000004
+#define SSH_BUG_X11FWD 0x00000008
+#define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010
+#define SSH_BUG_PKAUTH 0x00000020
+#define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040
+#define SSH_BUG_BANNER 0x00000080
+#define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100
+#define SSH_BUG_PKOK 0x00000200
+#define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400
+#define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800
+#define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000
+#define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000
+#define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000
+#define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000
+#define SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE 0x00010000
+#define SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE 0x00020000
+#define SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY 0x00040000
+#define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN 0x00100000
+
+void enable_compat13(void);
+void enable_compat20(void);
+void compat_datafellows(const char *);
+int proto_spec(const char *);
+char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
+
+extern int compat13;
+extern int compat20;
+extern int datafellows;
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Interface to packet compression for ssh.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: compress.c,v 1.15 2001/09/27 11:58:16 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "zlib.h"
+#include "compress.h"
+
+static z_stream incoming_stream;
+static z_stream outgoing_stream;
+static int compress_init_send_called = 0;
+static int compress_init_recv_called = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Initializes compression; level is compression level from 1 to 9
+ * (as in gzip).
+ */
+
+void
+buffer_compress_init_send(int level)
+{
+ if (compress_init_send_called == 1)
+ deflateEnd(&outgoing_stream);
+ compress_init_send_called = 1;
+ debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
+ if (level < 1 || level > 9)
+ fatal("Bad compression level %d.", level);
+ deflateInit(&outgoing_stream, level);
+}
+void
+buffer_compress_init_recv(void)
+{
+ if (compress_init_recv_called == 1)
+ inflateEnd(&incoming_stream);
+ compress_init_recv_called = 1;
+ inflateInit(&incoming_stream);
+}
+
+/* Frees any data structures allocated for compression. */
+
+void
+buffer_compress_uninit(void)
+{
+ debug("compress outgoing: raw data %lu, compressed %lu, factor %.2f",
+ outgoing_stream.total_in, outgoing_stream.total_out,
+ outgoing_stream.total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
+ (double) outgoing_stream.total_out / outgoing_stream.total_in);
+ debug("compress incoming: raw data %lu, compressed %lu, factor %.2f",
+ incoming_stream.total_out, incoming_stream.total_in,
+ incoming_stream.total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
+ (double) incoming_stream.total_in / incoming_stream.total_out);
+ if (compress_init_recv_called == 1)
+ inflateEnd(&incoming_stream);
+ if (compress_init_send_called == 1)
+ deflateEnd(&outgoing_stream);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compresses the contents of input_buffer into output_buffer. All packets
+ * compressed using this function will form a single compressed data stream;
+ * however, data will be flushed at the end of every call so that each
+ * output_buffer can be decompressed independently (but in the appropriate
+ * order since they together form a single compression stream) by the
+ * receiver. This appends the compressed data to the output buffer.
+ */
+
+void
+buffer_compress(Buffer * input_buffer, Buffer * output_buffer)
+{
+ char buf[4096];
+ int status;
+
+ /* This case is not handled below. */
+ if (buffer_len(input_buffer) == 0)
+ return;
+
+ /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
+ outgoing_stream.next_in = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(input_buffer);
+ outgoing_stream.avail_in = buffer_len(input_buffer);
+
+ /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
+ do {
+ /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
+ outgoing_stream.next_out = (u_char *)buf;
+ outgoing_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
+
+ /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
+ status = deflate(&outgoing_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
+ switch (status) {
+ case Z_OK:
+ /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
+ buffer_append(output_buffer, buf,
+ sizeof(buf) - outgoing_stream.avail_out);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("buffer_compress: deflate returned %d", status);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ } while (outgoing_stream.avail_out == 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Uncompresses the contents of input_buffer into output_buffer. All packets
+ * uncompressed using this function will form a single compressed data
+ * stream; however, data will be flushed at the end of every call so that
+ * each output_buffer. This must be called for the same size units that the
+ * buffer_compress was called, and in the same order that buffers compressed
+ * with that. This appends the uncompressed data to the output buffer.
+ */
+
+void
+buffer_uncompress(Buffer * input_buffer, Buffer * output_buffer)
+{
+ char buf[4096];
+ int status;
+
+ incoming_stream.next_in = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(input_buffer);
+ incoming_stream.avail_in = buffer_len(input_buffer);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
+ incoming_stream.next_out = (u_char *) buf;
+ incoming_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
+
+ status = inflate(&incoming_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
+ switch (status) {
+ case Z_OK:
+ buffer_append(output_buffer, buf,
+ sizeof(buf) - incoming_stream.avail_out);
+ break;
+ case Z_BUF_ERROR:
+ /*
+ * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
+ * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to
+ * be the error that we get.
+ */
+ return;
+ default:
+ fatal("buffer_uncompress: inflate returned %d", status);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Interface to packet compression for ssh.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: compress.h,v 1.10 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef COMPRESS_H
+#define COMPRESS_H
+
+void buffer_compress_init_send(int);
+void buffer_compress_init_recv(void);
+void buffer_compress_uninit(void);
+void buffer_compress(Buffer *, Buffer *);
+void buffer_uncompress(Buffer *, Buffer *);
+
+#endif /* COMPRESS_H */
--- /dev/null
+#! /bin/sh
+# Attempt to guess a canonical system name.
+# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001
+# Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+timestamp='2001-04-20'
+
+# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+# General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+#
+# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you
+# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a
+# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under
+# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program.
+
+# Written by Per Bothner <bothner@cygnus.com>.
+# Please send patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>.
+#
+# This script attempts to guess a canonical system name similar to
+# config.sub. If it succeeds, it prints the system name on stdout, and
+# exits with 0. Otherwise, it exits with 1.
+#
+# The plan is that this can be called by configure scripts if you
+# don't specify an explicit build system type.
+
+me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'`
+
+usage="\
+Usage: $0 [OPTION]
+
+Output the configuration name of the system \`$me' is run on.
+
+Operation modes:
+ -h, --help print this help, then exit
+ -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit
+ -v, --version print version number, then exit
+
+Report bugs and patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>."
+
+version="\
+GNU config.guess ($timestamp)
+
+Originally written by Per Bothner.
+Copyright (C) 1992, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 2000
+Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
+warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
+
+help="
+Try \`$me --help' for more information."
+
+# Parse command line
+while test $# -gt 0 ; do
+ case $1 in
+ --time-stamp | --time* | -t )
+ echo "$timestamp" ; exit 0 ;;
+ --version | -v )
+ echo "$version" ; exit 0 ;;
+ --help | --h* | -h )
+ echo "$usage"; exit 0 ;;
+ -- ) # Stop option processing
+ shift; break ;;
+ - ) # Use stdin as input.
+ break ;;
+ -* )
+ echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2
+ exit 1 ;;
+ * )
+ break ;;
+ esac
+done
+
+if test $# != 0; then
+ echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+
+dummy=dummy-$$
+trap 'rm -f $dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy; exit 1' 1 2 15
+
+# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script.
+# Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still
+# use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated.
+
+case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in
+ ,,) echo "int dummy(){}" > $dummy.c
+ for c in cc gcc c89 ; do
+ ($c $dummy.c -c -o $dummy.o) >/dev/null 2>&1
+ if test $? = 0 ; then
+ CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break
+ fi
+ done
+ rm -f $dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel
+ if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then
+ CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found
+ fi
+ ;;
+ ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;;
+ ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;;
+esac
+
+# This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe.
+# (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 8/24/94.)
+if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH
+fi
+
+UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown
+UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown
+UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown
+UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown
+
+# Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive.
+
+case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in
+ *:NetBSD:*:*)
+ # Netbsd (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or
+ # more of the tupples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*,
+ # *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*. For targets that recently
+ # switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old
+ # object file format. This provides both forward
+ # compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the
+ # object file format.
+ # Determine the machine/vendor (is the vendor relevant).
+ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
+ amiga) machine=m68k-unknown ;;
+ arm32) machine=arm-unknown ;;
+ atari*) machine=m68k-atari ;;
+ sun3*) machine=m68k-sun ;;
+ mac68k) machine=m68k-apple ;;
+ macppc) machine=powerpc-apple ;;
+ hp3[0-9][05]) machine=m68k-hp ;;
+ ibmrt|romp-ibm) machine=romp-ibm ;;
+ *) machine=${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown ;;
+ esac
+ # The Operating System including object format, if it has switched
+ # to ELF recently, or will in the future.
+ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
+ i386|sparc|amiga|arm*|hp300|mvme68k|vax|atari|luna68k|mac68k|news68k|next68k|pc532|sun3*|x68k)
+ if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+ | grep __ELF__ >/dev/null
+ then
+ # Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout).
+ # Return netbsd for either. FIX?
+ os=netbsd
+ else
+ os=netbsdelf
+ fi
+ ;;
+ *)
+ os=netbsd
+ ;;
+ esac
+ # The OS release
+ release=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'`
+ # Since CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM:
+ # contains redundant information, the shorter form:
+ # CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used.
+ echo "${machine}-${os}${release}"
+ exit 0 ;;
+ alpha:OSF1:*:*)
+ if test $UNAME_RELEASE = "V4.0"; then
+ UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'`
+ fi
+ # A Vn.n version is a released version.
+ # A Tn.n version is a released field test version.
+ # A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel.
+ # 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r.
+ cat <<EOF >$dummy.s
+ .data
+\$Lformat:
+ .byte 37,100,45,37,120,10,0 # "%d-%x\n"
+
+ .text
+ .globl main
+ .align 4
+ .ent main
+main:
+ .frame \$30,16,\$26,0
+ ldgp \$29,0(\$27)
+ .prologue 1
+ .long 0x47e03d80 # implver \$0
+ lda \$2,-1
+ .long 0x47e20c21 # amask \$2,\$1
+ lda \$16,\$Lformat
+ mov \$0,\$17
+ not \$1,\$18
+ jsr \$26,printf
+ ldgp \$29,0(\$26)
+ mov 0,\$16
+ jsr \$26,exit
+ .end main
+EOF
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.s -o $dummy 2>/dev/null
+ if test "$?" = 0 ; then
+ case `./$dummy` in
+ 0-0)
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alpha"
+ ;;
+ 1-0)
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5"
+ ;;
+ 1-1)
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56"
+ ;;
+ 1-101)
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56"
+ ;;
+ 2-303)
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6"
+ ;;
+ 2-307)
+ UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev67"
+ ;;
+ esac
+ fi
+ rm -f $dummy.s $dummy
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[VTX]//' | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*)
+ # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
+ # Should we change UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead
+ # of the specific Alpha model?
+ echo alpha-pc-interix
+ exit 0 ;;
+ 21064:Windows_NT:50:3)
+ echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5
+ exit 0 ;;
+ Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-sysv4
+ exit 0;;
+ amiga:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos
+ exit 0 ;;
+ arc64:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo mips64el-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ arc:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ hkmips:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo mips-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ pmax:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sgi:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo mips-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ wgrisc:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:OS/390:*:*)
+ echo i370-ibm-openedition
+ exit 0 ;;
+ arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*)
+ echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0;;
+ SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*)
+ echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp
+ exit 0;;
+ Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*)
+ # akee@wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE.
+ if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then
+ echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3
+ else
+ echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ NILE*:*:*:dcosx)
+ echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*)
+ echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*)
+ echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i86pc:SunOS:5.*:*)
+ echo i386-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sun4*:SunOS:6*:*)
+ # According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize
+ # SunOS6. Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but
+ # it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4.
+ echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sun4*:SunOS:*:*)
+ case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in
+ Series*|S4*)
+ UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v`
+ ;;
+ esac
+ # Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'.
+ echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sun3*:SunOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sun*:*:4.2BSD:*)
+ UNAME_RELEASE=`(head -1 /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null`
+ test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = "x" && UNAME_RELEASE=3
+ case "`/bin/arch`" in
+ sun3)
+ echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ ;;
+ sun4)
+ echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ ;;
+ esac
+ exit 0 ;;
+ aushp:SunOS:*:*)
+ echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ atari*:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ # The situation for MiNT is a little confusing. The machine name
+ # can be virtually everything (everything which is not
+ # "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor
+ # > m68000). The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT"
+ # to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint"). Finally
+ # the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not
+ # MiNT. But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should
+ # be no problem.
+ atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-milan-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-hades-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-mint${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sun3*:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ mac68k:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ mvme68k:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ mvme88k:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo m88k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ powerpc:machten:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ RISC*:Mach:*:*)
+ echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3
+ exit 0 ;;
+ RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*)
+ echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*)
+ echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ 2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*)
+ echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos)
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+#include <stdio.h> /* for printf() prototype */
+ int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
+#else
+ int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; {
+#endif
+ #if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB)
+ #if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV)
+ printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+ #endif
+ #if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4)
+ printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+ #endif
+ #if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD)
+ printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ exit (-1);
+ }
+EOF
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy \
+ && ./$dummy `echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` \
+ && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0
+ rm -f $dummy.c $dummy
+ echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-motorola-powermax
+ exit 0 ;;
+ Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-harris-powerunix
+ exit 0 ;;
+ m88k:CX/UX:7*:*)
+ echo m88k-harris-cxux7
+ exit 0 ;;
+ m88k:*:4*:R4*)
+ echo m88k-motorola-sysv4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ m88k:*:3*:R3*)
+ echo m88k-motorola-sysv3
+ exit 0 ;;
+ AViiON:dgux:*:*)
+ # DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures
+ UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p`
+ if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 ] || [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ]
+ then
+ if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \
+ [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ]
+ then
+ echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ else
+ echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ else
+ echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ M88*:DolphinOS:*:*) # DolphinOS (SVR3)
+ echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3
+ exit 0 ;;
+ M88*:*:R3*:*)
+ # Delta 88k system running SVR3
+ echo m88k-motorola-sysv3
+ exit 0 ;;
+ XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3)
+ echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3
+ exit 0 ;;
+ Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD)
+ echo m68k-tektronix-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:IRIX*:*:*)
+ echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2) # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX.
+ echo romp-ibm-aix # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id
+ exit 0 ;; # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX '
+ i*86:AIX:*:*)
+ echo i386-ibm-aix
+ exit 0 ;;
+ ia64:AIX:*:*)
+ if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then
+ IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel`
+ else
+ IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:AIX:2:3)
+ if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ #include <sys/systemcfg.h>
+
+ main()
+ {
+ if (!__power_pc())
+ exit(1);
+ puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5");
+ exit(0);
+ }
+EOF
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy && ./$dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0
+ rm -f $dummy.c $dummy
+ echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5
+ elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4
+ else
+ echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:AIX:*:[45])
+ IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | head -1 | awk '{ print $1 }'`
+ if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ IBM_ARCH=rs6000
+ else
+ IBM_ARCH=powerpc
+ fi
+ if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then
+ IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel`
+ else
+ IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:AIX:*:*)
+ echo rs6000-ibm-aix
+ exit 0 ;;
+ ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*)
+ echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) # covers RT/PC BSD and
+ echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE} # 4.3 with uname added to
+ exit 0 ;; # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3
+ *:BOSX:*:*)
+ echo rs6000-bull-bosx
+ exit 0 ;;
+ DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*)
+ echo m68k-bull-sysv3
+ exit 0 ;;
+ 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*)
+ echo m68k-hp-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*)
+ echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ 9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*)
+ HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
+ 9000/31? ) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;;
+ 9000/[34]?? ) HP_ARCH=m68k ;;
+ 9000/[678][0-9][0-9])
+ case "${HPUX_REV}" in
+ 11.[0-9][0-9])
+ if [ -x /usr/bin/getconf ]; then
+ sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null`
+ sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null`
+ case "${sc_cpu_version}" in
+ 523) HP_ARCH="hppa1.0" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0
+ 528) HP_ARCH="hppa1.1" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1
+ 532) # CPU_PA_RISC2_0
+ case "${sc_kernel_bits}" in
+ 32) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0n" ;;
+ 64) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w" ;;
+ esac ;;
+ esac
+ fi ;;
+ esac
+ if [ "${HP_ARCH}" = "" ]; then
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+
+ #define _HPUX_SOURCE
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+
+ int main ()
+ {
+ #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
+ long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS);
+ #endif
+ long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
+
+ switch (cpu)
+ {
+ case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
+ case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break;
+ case CPU_PA_RISC2_0:
+ #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
+ switch (bits)
+ {
+ case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break;
+ case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break;
+ default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
+ } break;
+ #else /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */
+ puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
+ #endif
+ default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
+ }
+ exit (0);
+ }
+EOF
+ (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null ) && HP_ARCH=`./$dummy`
+ if test -z "$HP_ARCH"; then HP_ARCH=hppa; fi
+ rm -f $dummy.c $dummy
+ fi ;;
+ esac
+ echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ ia64:HP-UX:*:*)
+ HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+ echo ia64-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ 3050*:HI-UX:*:*)
+ sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ int
+ main ()
+ {
+ long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
+ /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns
+ true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0. CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct
+ results, however. */
+ if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu))
+ {
+ switch (cpu)
+ {
+ case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+ case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+ case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+ default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu))
+ puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
+ else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
+ exit (0);
+ }
+EOF
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy && ./$dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0
+ rm -f $dummy.c $dummy
+ echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2
+ exit 0 ;;
+ 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* )
+ echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ 9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*)
+ echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *9??*:MPE/iX:*:*)
+ echo hppa1.0-hp-mpeix
+ exit 0 ;;
+ hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* )
+ echo hppa1.1-hp-osf
+ exit 0 ;;
+ hp8??:OSF1:*:*)
+ echo hppa1.0-hp-osf
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:OSF1:*:*)
+ if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk
+ else
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ parisc*:Lites*:*:*)
+ echo hppa1.1-hp-lites
+ exit 0 ;;
+ hppa*:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo hppa-unknown-openbsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*)
+ echo c1-convex-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*)
+ if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc
+ then echo c32-convex-bsd
+ else echo c2-convex-bsd
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*)
+ echo c34-convex-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*)
+ echo c38-convex-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*)
+ echo c4-convex-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ CRAY*X-MP:*:*:*)
+ echo xmp-cray-unicos
+ exit 0 ;;
+ CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*)
+ echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \
+ | sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \
+ -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/
+ exit 0 ;;
+ CRAY*TS:*:*:*)
+ echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ exit 0 ;;
+ CRAY*T3D:*:*:*)
+ echo alpha-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ exit 0 ;;
+ CRAY*T3E:*:*:*)
+ echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ exit 0 ;;
+ CRAY*SV1:*:*:*)
+ echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+ exit 0 ;;
+ CRAY-2:*:*:*)
+ echo cray2-cray-unicos
+ exit 0 ;;
+ F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
+ FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'`
+ FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'`
+ FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
+ echo "${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}"
+ exit 0 ;;
+ hp300:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*)
+ echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:BSD/OS:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:FreeBSD:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:OpenBSD:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-openbsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*:CYGWIN*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*:MINGW*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*:PW*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*)
+ # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem?
+ # It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we
+ # UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead of i386?
+ echo i386-pc-interix
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*:UWIN*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin
+ exit 0 ;;
+ p*:CYGWIN*:*)
+ echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin
+ exit 0 ;;
+ prep*:SunOS:5.*:*)
+ echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:GNU:*:*)
+ echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-gnu`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'`
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:Minix:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix
+ exit 0 ;;
+ arm*:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit 0 ;;
+ ia64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux
+ exit 0 ;;
+ m68*:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit 0 ;;
+ mips:Linux:*:*)
+ cat >$dummy.c <<EOF
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+#include <stdio.h> /* for printf() prototype */
+int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
+#else
+int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; {
+#endif
+#ifdef __MIPSEB__
+ printf ("%s-unknown-linux-gnu\n", argv[1]);
+#endif
+#ifdef __MIPSEL__
+ printf ("%sel-unknown-linux-gnu\n", argv[1]);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+EOF
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null && ./$dummy "${UNAME_MACHINE}" && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0
+ rm -f $dummy.c $dummy
+ ;;
+ ppc:Linux:*:*)
+ # Determine Lib Version
+ cat >$dummy.c <<EOF
+#include <features.h>
+#if defined(__GLIBC__)
+extern char __libc_version[];
+extern char __libc_release[];
+#endif
+main(argc, argv)
+ int argc;
+ char *argv[];
+{
+#if defined(__GLIBC__)
+ printf("%s %s\n", __libc_version, __libc_release);
+#else
+ printf("unknown\n");
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+EOF
+ LIBC=""
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null
+ if test "$?" = 0 ; then
+ ./$dummy | grep 1\.99 > /dev/null
+ if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC="libc1" ; fi
+ fi
+ rm -f $dummy.c $dummy
+ echo powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ alpha:Linux:*:*)
+ cat <<EOF >$dummy.s
+ .data
+ \$Lformat:
+ .byte 37,100,45,37,120,10,0 # "%d-%x\n"
+ .text
+ .globl main
+ .align 4
+ .ent main
+ main:
+ .frame \$30,16,\$26,0
+ ldgp \$29,0(\$27)
+ .prologue 1
+ .long 0x47e03d80 # implver \$0
+ lda \$2,-1
+ .long 0x47e20c21 # amask \$2,\$1
+ lda \$16,\$Lformat
+ mov \$0,\$17
+ not \$1,\$18
+ jsr \$26,printf
+ ldgp \$29,0(\$26)
+ mov 0,\$16
+ jsr \$26,exit
+ .end main
+EOF
+ LIBC=""
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.s -o $dummy 2>/dev/null
+ if test "$?" = 0 ; then
+ case `./$dummy` in
+ 0-0) UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;;
+ 1-0) UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5" ;;
+ 1-1) UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56" ;;
+ 1-101) UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56" ;;
+ 2-303) UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6" ;;
+ 2-307) UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev67" ;;
+ esac
+ objdump --private-headers $dummy | \
+ grep ld.so.1 > /dev/null
+ if test "$?" = 0 ; then
+ LIBC="libc1"
+ fi
+ fi
+ rm -f $dummy.s $dummy
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ parisc:Linux:*:* | hppa:Linux:*:*)
+ # Look for CPU level
+ case `grep '^cpu[^a-z]*:' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f2` in
+ PA7*) echo hppa1.1-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
+ PA8*) echo hppa2.0-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
+ *) echo hppa-unknown-linux-gnu ;;
+ esac
+ exit 0 ;;
+ parisc64:Linux:*:* | hppa64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo hppa64-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit 0 ;;
+ s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-linux
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sh*:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit 0 ;;
+ sparc:Linux:*:* | sparc64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit 0 ;;
+ x86_64:Linux:*:*)
+ echo x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:Linux:*:*)
+ # The BFD linker knows what the default object file format is, so
+ # first see if it will tell us. cd to the root directory to prevent
+ # problems with other programs or directories called `ld' in the path.
+ ld_supported_emulations=`cd /; ld --help 2>&1 \
+ | sed -ne '/supported emulations:/!d
+ s/[ ][ ]*/ /g
+ s/.*supported emulations: *//
+ s/ .*//
+ p'`
+ case "$ld_supported_emulations" in
+ i*86linux)
+ echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuaout"
+ exit 0
+ ;;
+ elf_i*86)
+ TENTATIVE="${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnu"
+ ;;
+ i*86coff)
+ echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnucoff"
+ exit 0
+ ;;
+ esac
+ # Either a pre-BFD a.out linker (linux-gnuoldld)
+ # or one that does not give us useful --help.
+ # GCC wants to distinguish between linux-gnuoldld and linux-gnuaout.
+ # If ld does not provide *any* "supported emulations:"
+ # that means it is gnuoldld.
+ test -z "$ld_supported_emulations" && echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuoldld" && exit 0
+ case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in
+ i*86)
+ VENDOR=pc;
+ ;;
+ *)
+ VENDOR=unknown;
+ ;;
+ esac
+ # Determine whether the default compiler is a.out or elf
+ cat >$dummy.c <<EOF
+#include <features.h>
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+#include <stdio.h> /* for printf() prototype */
+ int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
+#else
+ int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; {
+#endif
+#ifdef __ELF__
+# ifdef __GLIBC__
+# if __GLIBC__ >= 2
+ printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnu\n", argv[1]);
+# else
+ printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnulibc1\n", argv[1]);
+# endif
+# else
+ printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnulibc1\n", argv[1]);
+# endif
+#else
+ printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnuaout\n", argv[1]);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+EOF
+ $CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null && ./$dummy "${UNAME_MACHINE}" && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0
+ rm -f $dummy.c $dummy
+ test x"${TENTATIVE}" != x && echo "${TENTATIVE}" && exit 0
+ ;;
+# ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there. earlier versions
+# are messed up and put the nodename in both sysname and nodename.
+ i*86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*)
+ echo i386-sequent-sysv4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*)
+ # Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version
+ # number series starting with 2...
+ # I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this,
+ # I just have to hope. -- rms.
+ # Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it.
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv4.2uw${UNAME_VERSION}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:*:4.*:* | i*86:SYSTEM_V:4.*:*)
+ UNAME_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed 's/\/MP$//'`
+ if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-univel-sysv${UNAME_REL}
+ else
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_REL}
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:*:5:7*)
+ # Fixed at (any) Pentium or better
+ UNAME_MACHINE=i586
+ if [ ${UNAME_SYSTEM} = "UnixWare" ] ; then
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sco-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}uw${UNAME_VERSION}
+ else
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:*:3.2:*)
+ if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then
+ UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' </usr/options/cb.name`
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-isc$UNAME_REL
+ elif /bin/uname -X 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
+ UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|egrep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')`
+ (/bin/uname -X|egrep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486
+ (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \
+ && UNAME_MACHINE=i586
+ (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pent ?II' >/dev/null) \
+ && UNAME_MACHINE=i686
+ (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \
+ && UNAME_MACHINE=i686
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL
+ else
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv32
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:*DOS:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msdosdjgpp
+ exit 0 ;;
+ pc:*:*:*)
+ # Left here for compatibility:
+ # uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about
+ # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i386.
+ echo i386-pc-msdosdjgpp
+ exit 0 ;;
+ Intel:Mach:3*:*)
+ echo i386-pc-mach3
+ exit 0 ;;
+ paragon:*:*:*)
+ echo i860-intel-osf1
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4
+ if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ echo i860-stardent-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4
+ else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered.
+ echo i860-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Unknown i860-SVR4
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*)
+ # "miniframe"
+ echo m68010-convergent-sysv
+ exit 0 ;;
+ M68*:*:R3V[567]*:*)
+ test -r /sysV68 && echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv' && exit 0 ;;
+ 3[34]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0)
+ OS_REL=''
+ test -r /etc/.relid \
+ && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
+ /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+ && echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL} && exit 0
+ /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
+ && echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL} && exit 0 ;;
+ 3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*)
+ /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+ && echo i486-ncr-sysv4 && exit 0 ;;
+ m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*)
+ echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
+ echo m68k-atari-sysv4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.0*:*)
+ echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*)
+ echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*)
+ echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.0*:*)
+ echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*)
+ echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*)
+ echo mips-sni-sysv4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ RM*:SINIX-*:*:*)
+ echo mips-sni-sysv4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:SINIX-*:*:*)
+ if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
+ UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4
+ else
+ echo ns32k-sni-sysv
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ PENTIUM:CPunix:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort
+ # says <Richard.M.Bartel@ccMail.Census.GOV>
+ echo i586-unisys-sysv4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*)
+ # From Gerald Hewes <hewes@openmarket.com>.
+ # How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm
+ echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:*:*:FTX*)
+ # From seanf@swdc.stratus.com.
+ echo i860-stratus-sysv4
+ exit 0 ;;
+ mc68*:A/UX:*:*)
+ echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*)
+ echo mips-sony-newsos6
+ exit 0 ;;
+ R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*)
+ if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then
+ echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ else
+ echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ BeBox:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only.
+ echo powerpc-be-beos
+ exit 0 ;;
+ BeMac:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only.
+ echo powerpc-apple-beos
+ exit 0 ;;
+ BePC:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Intel PC compatible.
+ echo i586-pc-beos
+ exit 0 ;;
+ SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+ echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+ echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ Power*:Rhapsody:*:*)
+ echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:Rhapsody:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:Darwin:*:*)
+ echo `uname -p`-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*)
+ if test "${UNAME_MACHINE}" = "x86pc"; then
+ UNAME_MACHINE=pc
+ fi
+ echo `uname -p`-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:QNX:*:4*)
+ echo i386-pc-qnx
+ exit 0 ;;
+ NSR-[KW]:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+ echo nsr-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:NonStop-UX:*:*)
+ echo mips-compaq-nonstopux
+ exit 0 ;;
+ BS2000:POSIX*:*:*)
+ echo bs2000-siemens-sysv
+ exit 0 ;;
+ DS/*:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-${UNAME_SYSTEM}-${UNAME_RELEASE}
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:Plan9:*:*)
+ # "uname -m" is not consistent, so use $cputype instead. 386
+ # is converted to i386 for consistency with other x86
+ # operating systems.
+ if test "$cputype" = "386"; then
+ UNAME_MACHINE=i386
+ else
+ UNAME_MACHINE="$cputype"
+ fi
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-plan9
+ exit 0 ;;
+ i*86:OS/2:*:*)
+ # If we were able to find `uname', then EMX Unix compatibility
+ # is probably installed.
+ echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-os2-emx
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:TOPS-10:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-unknown-tops10
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:TENEX:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-unknown-tenex
+ exit 0 ;;
+ KS10:TOPS-20:*:* | KL10:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE4:TOPS-20:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-dec-tops20
+ exit 0 ;;
+ XKL-1:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE5:TOPS-20:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-xkl-tops20
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:TOPS-20:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-unknown-tops20
+ exit 0 ;;
+ *:ITS:*:*)
+ echo pdp10-unknown-its
+ exit 0 ;;
+esac
+
+#echo '(No uname command or uname output not recognized.)' 1>&2
+#echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" 1>&2
+
+cat >$dummy.c <<EOF
+#ifdef _SEQUENT_
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/utsname.h>
+#endif
+main ()
+{
+#if defined (sony)
+#if defined (MIPSEB)
+ /* BFD wants "bsd" instead of "newsos". Perhaps BFD should be changed,
+ I don't know.... */
+ printf ("mips-sony-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#include <sys/param.h>
+ printf ("m68k-sony-newsos%s\n",
+#ifdef NEWSOS4
+ "4"
+#else
+ ""
+#endif
+ ); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (__arm) && defined (__acorn) && defined (__unix)
+ printf ("arm-acorn-riscix"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (hp300) && !defined (hpux)
+ printf ("m68k-hp-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (NeXT)
+#if !defined (__ARCHITECTURE__)
+#define __ARCHITECTURE__ "m68k"
+#endif
+ int version;
+ version=`(hostinfo | sed -n 's/.*NeXT Mach \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') 2>/dev/null`;
+ if (version < 4)
+ printf ("%s-next-nextstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
+ else
+ printf ("%s-next-openstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
+ exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (MULTIMAX) || defined (n16)
+#if defined (UMAXV)
+ printf ("ns32k-encore-sysv\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#if defined (CMU)
+ printf ("ns32k-encore-mach\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+ printf ("ns32k-encore-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (__386BSD__)
+ printf ("i386-pc-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (sequent)
+#if defined (i386)
+ printf ("i386-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#if defined (ns32000)
+ printf ("ns32k-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (_SEQUENT_)
+ struct utsname un;
+
+ uname(&un);
+
+ if (strncmp(un.version, "V2", 2) == 0) {
+ printf ("i386-sequent-ptx2\n"); exit (0);
+ }
+ if (strncmp(un.version, "V1", 2) == 0) { /* XXX is V1 correct? */
+ printf ("i386-sequent-ptx1\n"); exit (0);
+ }
+ printf ("i386-sequent-ptx\n"); exit (0);
+
+#endif
+
+#if defined (vax)
+# if !defined (ultrix)
+# include <sys/param.h>
+# if defined (BSD)
+# if BSD == 43
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3\n"); exit (0);
+# else
+# if BSD == 199006
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3reno\n"); exit (0);
+# else
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+# endif
+# endif
+# else
+ printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+# endif
+# else
+ printf ("vax-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (alliant) && defined (i860)
+ printf ("i860-alliant-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+ exit (1);
+}
+EOF
+
+$CC_FOR_BUILD $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null && ./$dummy && rm -f $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0
+rm -f $dummy.c $dummy
+
+# Apollos put the system type in the environment.
+
+test -d /usr/apollo && { echo ${ISP}-apollo-${SYSTYPE}; exit 0; }
+
+# Convex versions that predate uname can use getsysinfo(1)
+
+if [ -x /usr/convex/getsysinfo ]
+then
+ case `getsysinfo -f cpu_type` in
+ c1*)
+ echo c1-convex-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ c2*)
+ if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc
+ then echo c32-convex-bsd
+ else echo c2-convex-bsd
+ fi
+ exit 0 ;;
+ c34*)
+ echo c34-convex-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ c38*)
+ echo c38-convex-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ c4*)
+ echo c4-convex-bsd
+ exit 0 ;;
+ esac
+fi
+
+cat >&2 <<EOF
+$0: unable to guess system type
+
+This script, last modified $timestamp, has failed to recognize
+the operating system you are using. It is advised that you
+download the most up to date version of the config scripts from
+
+ ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/config/
+
+If the version you run ($0) is already up to date, please
+send the following data and any information you think might be
+pertinent to <config-patches@gnu.org> in order to provide the needed
+information to handle your system.
+
+config.guess timestamp = $timestamp
+
+uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+
+/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null`
+
+hostinfo = `(hostinfo) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null`
+
+UNAME_MACHINE = ${UNAME_MACHINE}
+UNAME_RELEASE = ${UNAME_RELEASE}
+UNAME_SYSTEM = ${UNAME_SYSTEM}
+UNAME_VERSION = ${UNAME_VERSION}
+EOF
+
+exit 1
+
+# Local variables:
+# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp)
+# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='"
+# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d"
+# time-stamp-end: "'"
+# End:
--- /dev/null
+#! /bin/sh
+# Configuration validation subroutine script.
+# Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001
+# Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+timestamp='2001-04-20'
+
+# This file is (in principle) common to ALL GNU software.
+# The presence of a machine in this file suggests that SOME GNU software
+# can handle that machine. It does not imply ALL GNU software can.
+#
+# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330,
+# Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
+
+# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you
+# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a
+# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under
+# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program.
+
+# Please send patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>.
+#
+# Configuration subroutine to validate and canonicalize a configuration type.
+# Supply the specified configuration type as an argument.
+# If it is invalid, we print an error message on stderr and exit with code 1.
+# Otherwise, we print the canonical config type on stdout and succeed.
+
+# This file is supposed to be the same for all GNU packages
+# and recognize all the CPU types, system types and aliases
+# that are meaningful with *any* GNU software.
+# Each package is responsible for reporting which valid configurations
+# it does not support. The user should be able to distinguish
+# a failure to support a valid configuration from a meaningless
+# configuration.
+
+# The goal of this file is to map all the various variations of a given
+# machine specification into a single specification in the form:
+# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM
+# or in some cases, the newer four-part form:
+# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM
+# It is wrong to echo any other type of specification.
+
+me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'`
+
+usage="\
+Usage: $0 [OPTION] CPU-MFR-OPSYS
+ $0 [OPTION] ALIAS
+
+Canonicalize a configuration name.
+
+Operation modes:
+ -h, --help print this help, then exit
+ -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit
+ -v, --version print version number, then exit
+
+Report bugs and patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>."
+
+version="\
+GNU config.sub ($timestamp)
+
+Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001
+Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
+warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
+
+help="
+Try \`$me --help' for more information."
+
+# Parse command line
+while test $# -gt 0 ; do
+ case $1 in
+ --time-stamp | --time* | -t )
+ echo "$timestamp" ; exit 0 ;;
+ --version | -v )
+ echo "$version" ; exit 0 ;;
+ --help | --h* | -h )
+ echo "$usage"; exit 0 ;;
+ -- ) # Stop option processing
+ shift; break ;;
+ - ) # Use stdin as input.
+ break ;;
+ -* )
+ echo "$me: invalid option $1$help"
+ exit 1 ;;
+
+ *local*)
+ # First pass through any local machine types.
+ echo $1
+ exit 0;;
+
+ * )
+ break ;;
+ esac
+done
+
+case $# in
+ 0) echo "$me: missing argument$help" >&2
+ exit 1;;
+ 1) ;;
+ *) echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2
+ exit 1;;
+esac
+
+# Separate what the user gave into CPU-COMPANY and OS or KERNEL-OS (if any).
+# Here we must recognize all the valid KERNEL-OS combinations.
+maybe_os=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\2/'`
+case $maybe_os in
+ nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | storm-chaos* | os2-emx*)
+ os=-$maybe_os
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'`
+ ;;
+ *)
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/-[^-]*$//'`
+ if [ $basic_machine != $1 ]
+ then os=`echo $1 | sed 's/.*-/-/'`
+ else os=; fi
+ ;;
+esac
+
+### Let's recognize common machines as not being operating systems so
+### that things like config.sub decstation-3100 work. We also
+### recognize some manufacturers as not being operating systems, so we
+### can provide default operating systems below.
+case $os in
+ -sun*os*)
+ # Prevent following clause from handling this invalid input.
+ ;;
+ -dec* | -mips* | -sequent* | -encore* | -pc532* | -sgi* | -sony* | \
+ -att* | -7300* | -3300* | -delta* | -motorola* | -sun[234]* | \
+ -unicom* | -ibm* | -next | -hp | -isi* | -apollo | -altos* | \
+ -convergent* | -ncr* | -news | -32* | -3600* | -3100* | -hitachi* |\
+ -c[123]* | -convex* | -sun | -crds | -omron* | -dg | -ultra | -tti* | \
+ -harris | -dolphin | -highlevel | -gould | -cbm | -ns | -masscomp | \
+ -apple | -axis)
+ os=
+ basic_machine=$1
+ ;;
+ -sim | -cisco | -oki | -wec | -winbond)
+ os=
+ basic_machine=$1
+ ;;
+ -scout)
+ ;;
+ -wrs)
+ os=-vxworks
+ basic_machine=$1
+ ;;
+ -hiux*)
+ os=-hiuxwe2
+ ;;
+ -sco5)
+ os=-sco3.2v5
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
+ ;;
+ -sco4)
+ os=-sco3.2v4
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
+ ;;
+ -sco3.2.[4-9]*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/sco3.2./sco3.2v/'`
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
+ ;;
+ -sco3.2v[4-9]*)
+ # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer.
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
+ ;;
+ -sco*)
+ os=-sco3.2v2
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
+ ;;
+ -udk*)
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
+ ;;
+ -isc)
+ os=-isc2.2
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
+ ;;
+ -clix*)
+ basic_machine=clipper-intergraph
+ ;;
+ -isc*)
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'`
+ ;;
+ -lynx*)
+ os=-lynxos
+ ;;
+ -ptx*)
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-sequent/'`
+ ;;
+ -windowsnt*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/windowsnt/winnt/'`
+ ;;
+ -psos*)
+ os=-psos
+ ;;
+ -mint | -mint[0-9]*)
+ basic_machine=m68k-atari
+ os=-mint
+ ;;
+esac
+
+# Decode aliases for certain CPU-COMPANY combinations.
+case $basic_machine in
+ # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name.
+ # Some are omitted here because they have special meanings below.
+ tahoe | i860 | ia64 | m32r | m68k | m68000 | m88k | ns32k | arc \
+ | arm | arme[lb] | arm[bl]e | armv[2345] | armv[345][lb] | strongarm | xscale \
+ | pyramid | mn10200 | mn10300 | tron | a29k \
+ | 580 | i960 | h8300 \
+ | x86 | ppcbe | mipsbe | mipsle | shbe | shle \
+ | hppa | hppa1.0 | hppa1.1 | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0w | hppa2.0n \
+ | hppa64 \
+ | alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphapca5[67] \
+ | alphaev6[78] \
+ | we32k | ns16k | clipper | i370 | sh | sh[34] \
+ | powerpc | powerpcle \
+ | 1750a | dsp16xx | pdp10 | pdp11 \
+ | mips16 | mips64 | mipsel | mips64el \
+ | mips64orion | mips64orionel | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \
+ | mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el | mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \
+ | mips64vr5000 | miprs64vr5000el | mcore | s390 | s390x \
+ | sparc | sparclet | sparclite | sparc64 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b \
+ | v850 | c4x \
+ | thumb | d10v | d30v | fr30 | avr | openrisc | tic80 \
+ | pj | pjl | h8500)
+ basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown
+ ;;
+ m6811 | m68hc11 | m6812 | m68hc12)
+ # Motorola 68HC11/12.
+ basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown
+ os=-none
+ ;;
+ m88110 | m680[12346]0 | m683?2 | m68360 | m5200 | z8k | v70 | w65)
+ ;;
+
+ # We use `pc' rather than `unknown'
+ # because (1) that's what they normally are, and
+ # (2) the word "unknown" tends to confuse beginning users.
+ i*86 | x86_64)
+ basic_machine=$basic_machine-pc
+ ;;
+ # Object if more than one company name word.
+ *-*-*)
+ echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+ # Recognize the basic CPU types with company name.
+ # FIXME: clean up the formatting here.
+ vax-* | tahoe-* | i*86-* | i860-* | ia64-* | m32r-* | m68k-* | m68000-* \
+ | m88k-* | sparc-* | ns32k-* | fx80-* | arc-* | c[123]* \
+ | arm-* | armbe-* | armle-* | armv*-* | strongarm-* | xscale-* \
+ | mips-* | pyramid-* | tron-* | a29k-* | romp-* | rs6000-* \
+ | power-* | none-* | 580-* | cray2-* | h8300-* | h8500-* | i960-* \
+ | xmp-* | ymp-* \
+ | x86-* | ppcbe-* | mipsbe-* | mipsle-* | shbe-* | shle-* \
+ | hppa-* | hppa1.0-* | hppa1.1-* | hppa2.0-* | hppa2.0w-* \
+ | hppa2.0n-* | hppa64-* \
+ | alpha-* | alphaev[4-8]-* | alphaev56-* | alphapca5[67]-* \
+ | alphaev6[78]-* \
+ | we32k-* | cydra-* | ns16k-* | pn-* | np1-* | xps100-* \
+ | clipper-* | orion-* \
+ | sparclite-* | pdp10-* | pdp11-* | sh-* | powerpc-* | powerpcle-* \
+ | sparc64-* | sparcv9-* | sparcv9b-* | sparc86x-* \
+ | mips16-* | mips64-* | mipsel-* \
+ | mips64el-* | mips64orion-* | mips64orionel-* \
+ | mips64vr4100-* | mips64vr4100el-* | mips64vr4300-* | mips64vr4300el-* \
+ | mipstx39-* | mipstx39el-* | mcore-* \
+ | f30[01]-* | f700-* | s390-* | s390x-* | sv1-* | t3e-* \
+ | [cjt]90-* \
+ | m88110-* | m680[01234]0-* | m683?2-* | m68360-* | z8k-* | d10v-* \
+ | thumb-* | v850-* | d30v-* | tic30-* | tic80-* | c30-* | fr30-* \
+ | bs2000-* | tic54x-* | c54x-* | x86_64-* | pj-* | pjl-*)
+ ;;
+ # Recognize the various machine names and aliases which stand
+ # for a CPU type and a company and sometimes even an OS.
+ 386bsd)
+ basic_machine=i386-unknown
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ 3b1 | 7300 | 7300-att | att-7300 | pc7300 | safari | unixpc)
+ basic_machine=m68000-att
+ ;;
+ 3b*)
+ basic_machine=we32k-att
+ ;;
+ a29khif)
+ basic_machine=a29k-amd
+ os=-udi
+ ;;
+ adobe68k)
+ basic_machine=m68010-adobe
+ os=-scout
+ ;;
+ alliant | fx80)
+ basic_machine=fx80-alliant
+ ;;
+ altos | altos3068)
+ basic_machine=m68k-altos
+ ;;
+ am29k)
+ basic_machine=a29k-none
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ amdahl)
+ basic_machine=580-amdahl
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ amiga | amiga-*)
+ basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+ ;;
+ amigaos | amigados)
+ basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+ os=-amigaos
+ ;;
+ amigaunix | amix)
+ basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+ os=-sysv4
+ ;;
+ apollo68)
+ basic_machine=m68k-apollo
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ apollo68bsd)
+ basic_machine=m68k-apollo
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ aux)
+ basic_machine=m68k-apple
+ os=-aux
+ ;;
+ balance)
+ basic_machine=ns32k-sequent
+ os=-dynix
+ ;;
+ convex-c1)
+ basic_machine=c1-convex
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ convex-c2)
+ basic_machine=c2-convex
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ convex-c32)
+ basic_machine=c32-convex
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ convex-c34)
+ basic_machine=c34-convex
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ convex-c38)
+ basic_machine=c38-convex
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ cray | ymp)
+ basic_machine=ymp-cray
+ os=-unicos
+ ;;
+ cray2)
+ basic_machine=cray2-cray
+ os=-unicos
+ ;;
+ [cjt]90)
+ basic_machine=${basic_machine}-cray
+ os=-unicos
+ ;;
+ crds | unos)
+ basic_machine=m68k-crds
+ ;;
+ cris | cris-* | etrax*)
+ basic_machine=cris-axis
+ ;;
+ da30 | da30-*)
+ basic_machine=m68k-da30
+ ;;
+ decstation | decstation-3100 | pmax | pmax-* | pmin | dec3100 | decstatn)
+ basic_machine=mips-dec
+ ;;
+ delta | 3300 | motorola-3300 | motorola-delta \
+ | 3300-motorola | delta-motorola)
+ basic_machine=m68k-motorola
+ ;;
+ delta88)
+ basic_machine=m88k-motorola
+ os=-sysv3
+ ;;
+ dpx20 | dpx20-*)
+ basic_machine=rs6000-bull
+ os=-bosx
+ ;;
+ dpx2* | dpx2*-bull)
+ basic_machine=m68k-bull
+ os=-sysv3
+ ;;
+ ebmon29k)
+ basic_machine=a29k-amd
+ os=-ebmon
+ ;;
+ elxsi)
+ basic_machine=elxsi-elxsi
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ encore | umax | mmax)
+ basic_machine=ns32k-encore
+ ;;
+ es1800 | OSE68k | ose68k | ose | OSE)
+ basic_machine=m68k-ericsson
+ os=-ose
+ ;;
+ fx2800)
+ basic_machine=i860-alliant
+ ;;
+ genix)
+ basic_machine=ns32k-ns
+ ;;
+ gmicro)
+ basic_machine=tron-gmicro
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ go32)
+ basic_machine=i386-pc
+ os=-go32
+ ;;
+ h3050r* | hiux*)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi
+ os=-hiuxwe2
+ ;;
+ h8300hms)
+ basic_machine=h8300-hitachi
+ os=-hms
+ ;;
+ h8300xray)
+ basic_machine=h8300-hitachi
+ os=-xray
+ ;;
+ h8500hms)
+ basic_machine=h8500-hitachi
+ os=-hms
+ ;;
+ harris)
+ basic_machine=m88k-harris
+ os=-sysv3
+ ;;
+ hp300-*)
+ basic_machine=m68k-hp
+ ;;
+ hp300bsd)
+ basic_machine=m68k-hp
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ hp300hpux)
+ basic_machine=m68k-hp
+ os=-hpux
+ ;;
+ hp3k9[0-9][0-9] | hp9[0-9][0-9])
+ basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp
+ ;;
+ hp9k2[0-9][0-9] | hp9k31[0-9])
+ basic_machine=m68000-hp
+ ;;
+ hp9k3[2-9][0-9])
+ basic_machine=m68k-hp
+ ;;
+ hp9k6[0-9][0-9] | hp6[0-9][0-9])
+ basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp
+ ;;
+ hp9k7[0-79][0-9] | hp7[0-79][0-9])
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ ;;
+ hp9k78[0-9] | hp78[0-9])
+ # FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ ;;
+ hp9k8[67]1 | hp8[67]1 | hp9k80[24] | hp80[24] | hp9k8[78]9 | hp8[78]9 | hp9k893 | hp893)
+ # FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ ;;
+ hp9k8[0-9][13679] | hp8[0-9][13679])
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ ;;
+ hp9k8[0-9][0-9] | hp8[0-9][0-9])
+ basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp
+ ;;
+ hppa-next)
+ os=-nextstep3
+ ;;
+ hppaosf)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ os=-osf
+ ;;
+ hppro)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+ os=-proelf
+ ;;
+ i370-ibm* | ibm*)
+ basic_machine=i370-ibm
+ ;;
+# I'm not sure what "Sysv32" means. Should this be sysv3.2?
+ i*86v32)
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'`
+ os=-sysv32
+ ;;
+ i*86v4*)
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'`
+ os=-sysv4
+ ;;
+ i*86v)
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'`
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ i*86sol2)
+ basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'`
+ os=-solaris2
+ ;;
+ i386mach)
+ basic_machine=i386-mach
+ os=-mach
+ ;;
+ i386-vsta | vsta)
+ basic_machine=i386-unknown
+ os=-vsta
+ ;;
+ iris | iris4d)
+ basic_machine=mips-sgi
+ case $os in
+ -irix*)
+ ;;
+ *)
+ os=-irix4
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+ isi68 | isi)
+ basic_machine=m68k-isi
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ m88k-omron*)
+ basic_machine=m88k-omron
+ ;;
+ magnum | m3230)
+ basic_machine=mips-mips
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ merlin)
+ basic_machine=ns32k-utek
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ mingw32)
+ basic_machine=i386-pc
+ os=-mingw32
+ ;;
+ miniframe)
+ basic_machine=m68000-convergent
+ ;;
+ *mint | -mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | *MiNT[0-9]*)
+ basic_machine=m68k-atari
+ os=-mint
+ ;;
+ mipsel*-linux*)
+ basic_machine=mipsel-unknown
+ os=-linux-gnu
+ ;;
+ mips*-linux*)
+ basic_machine=mips-unknown
+ os=-linux-gnu
+ ;;
+ mips3*-*)
+ basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'`
+ ;;
+ mips3*)
+ basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'`-unknown
+ ;;
+ mmix*)
+ basic_machine=mmix-knuth
+ os=-mmixware
+ ;;
+ monitor)
+ basic_machine=m68k-rom68k
+ os=-coff
+ ;;
+ msdos)
+ basic_machine=i386-pc
+ os=-msdos
+ ;;
+ mvs)
+ basic_machine=i370-ibm
+ os=-mvs
+ ;;
+ ncr3000)
+ basic_machine=i486-ncr
+ os=-sysv4
+ ;;
+ netbsd386)
+ basic_machine=i386-unknown
+ os=-netbsd
+ ;;
+ netwinder)
+ basic_machine=armv4l-rebel
+ os=-linux
+ ;;
+ news | news700 | news800 | news900)
+ basic_machine=m68k-sony
+ os=-newsos
+ ;;
+ news1000)
+ basic_machine=m68030-sony
+ os=-newsos
+ ;;
+ news-3600 | risc-news)
+ basic_machine=mips-sony
+ os=-newsos
+ ;;
+ necv70)
+ basic_machine=v70-nec
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ next | m*-next )
+ basic_machine=m68k-next
+ case $os in
+ -nextstep* )
+ ;;
+ -ns2*)
+ os=-nextstep2
+ ;;
+ *)
+ os=-nextstep3
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+ nh3000)
+ basic_machine=m68k-harris
+ os=-cxux
+ ;;
+ nh[45]000)
+ basic_machine=m88k-harris
+ os=-cxux
+ ;;
+ nindy960)
+ basic_machine=i960-intel
+ os=-nindy
+ ;;
+ mon960)
+ basic_machine=i960-intel
+ os=-mon960
+ ;;
+ nonstopux)
+ basic_machine=mips-compaq
+ os=-nonstopux
+ ;;
+ np1)
+ basic_machine=np1-gould
+ ;;
+ nsr-tandem)
+ basic_machine=nsr-tandem
+ ;;
+ op50n-* | op60c-*)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki
+ os=-proelf
+ ;;
+ OSE68000 | ose68000)
+ basic_machine=m68000-ericsson
+ os=-ose
+ ;;
+ os68k)
+ basic_machine=m68k-none
+ os=-os68k
+ ;;
+ pa-hitachi)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi
+ os=-hiuxwe2
+ ;;
+ paragon)
+ basic_machine=i860-intel
+ os=-osf
+ ;;
+ pbd)
+ basic_machine=sparc-tti
+ ;;
+ pbb)
+ basic_machine=m68k-tti
+ ;;
+ pc532 | pc532-*)
+ basic_machine=ns32k-pc532
+ ;;
+ pentium | p5 | k5 | k6 | nexgen)
+ basic_machine=i586-pc
+ ;;
+ pentiumpro | p6 | 6x86 | athlon)
+ basic_machine=i686-pc
+ ;;
+ pentiumii | pentium2)
+ basic_machine=i686-pc
+ ;;
+ pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | k6-* | nexgen-*)
+ basic_machine=i586-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+ ;;
+ pentiumpro-* | p6-* | 6x86-* | athlon-*)
+ basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+ ;;
+ pentiumii-* | pentium2-*)
+ basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+ ;;
+ pn)
+ basic_machine=pn-gould
+ ;;
+ power) basic_machine=power-ibm
+ ;;
+ ppc) basic_machine=powerpc-unknown
+ ;;
+ ppc-*) basic_machine=powerpc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+ ;;
+ ppcle | powerpclittle | ppc-le | powerpc-little)
+ basic_machine=powerpcle-unknown
+ ;;
+ ppcle-* | powerpclittle-*)
+ basic_machine=powerpcle-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'`
+ ;;
+ ps2)
+ basic_machine=i386-ibm
+ ;;
+ pw32)
+ basic_machine=i586-unknown
+ os=-pw32
+ ;;
+ rom68k)
+ basic_machine=m68k-rom68k
+ os=-coff
+ ;;
+ rm[46]00)
+ basic_machine=mips-siemens
+ ;;
+ rtpc | rtpc-*)
+ basic_machine=romp-ibm
+ ;;
+ sa29200)
+ basic_machine=a29k-amd
+ os=-udi
+ ;;
+ sequent)
+ basic_machine=i386-sequent
+ ;;
+ sh)
+ basic_machine=sh-hitachi
+ os=-hms
+ ;;
+ sparclite-wrs)
+ basic_machine=sparclite-wrs
+ os=-vxworks
+ ;;
+ sps7)
+ basic_machine=m68k-bull
+ os=-sysv2
+ ;;
+ spur)
+ basic_machine=spur-unknown
+ ;;
+ st2000)
+ basic_machine=m68k-tandem
+ ;;
+ stratus)
+ basic_machine=i860-stratus
+ os=-sysv4
+ ;;
+ sun2)
+ basic_machine=m68000-sun
+ ;;
+ sun2os3)
+ basic_machine=m68000-sun
+ os=-sunos3
+ ;;
+ sun2os4)
+ basic_machine=m68000-sun
+ os=-sunos4
+ ;;
+ sun3os3)
+ basic_machine=m68k-sun
+ os=-sunos3
+ ;;
+ sun3os4)
+ basic_machine=m68k-sun
+ os=-sunos4
+ ;;
+ sun4os3)
+ basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ os=-sunos3
+ ;;
+ sun4os4)
+ basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ os=-sunos4
+ ;;
+ sun4sol2)
+ basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ os=-solaris2
+ ;;
+ sun3 | sun3-*)
+ basic_machine=m68k-sun
+ ;;
+ sun4)
+ basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ ;;
+ sun386 | sun386i | roadrunner)
+ basic_machine=i386-sun
+ ;;
+ sv1)
+ basic_machine=sv1-cray
+ os=-unicos
+ ;;
+ symmetry)
+ basic_machine=i386-sequent
+ os=-dynix
+ ;;
+ t3e)
+ basic_machine=t3e-cray
+ os=-unicos
+ ;;
+ tic54x | c54x*)
+ basic_machine=tic54x-unknown
+ os=-coff
+ ;;
+ tx39)
+ basic_machine=mipstx39-unknown
+ ;;
+ tx39el)
+ basic_machine=mipstx39el-unknown
+ ;;
+ tower | tower-32)
+ basic_machine=m68k-ncr
+ ;;
+ udi29k)
+ basic_machine=a29k-amd
+ os=-udi
+ ;;
+ ultra3)
+ basic_machine=a29k-nyu
+ os=-sym1
+ ;;
+ v810 | necv810)
+ basic_machine=v810-nec
+ os=-none
+ ;;
+ vaxv)
+ basic_machine=vax-dec
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ vms)
+ basic_machine=vax-dec
+ os=-vms
+ ;;
+ vpp*|vx|vx-*)
+ basic_machine=f301-fujitsu
+ ;;
+ vxworks960)
+ basic_machine=i960-wrs
+ os=-vxworks
+ ;;
+ vxworks68)
+ basic_machine=m68k-wrs
+ os=-vxworks
+ ;;
+ vxworks29k)
+ basic_machine=a29k-wrs
+ os=-vxworks
+ ;;
+ w65*)
+ basic_machine=w65-wdc
+ os=-none
+ ;;
+ w89k-*)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond
+ os=-proelf
+ ;;
+ xmp)
+ basic_machine=xmp-cray
+ os=-unicos
+ ;;
+ xps | xps100)
+ basic_machine=xps100-honeywell
+ ;;
+ z8k-*-coff)
+ basic_machine=z8k-unknown
+ os=-sim
+ ;;
+ none)
+ basic_machine=none-none
+ os=-none
+ ;;
+
+# Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types. It is in
+# some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular.
+ w89k)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond
+ ;;
+ op50n)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki
+ ;;
+ op60c)
+ basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki
+ ;;
+ mips)
+ if [ x$os = x-linux-gnu ]; then
+ basic_machine=mips-unknown
+ else
+ basic_machine=mips-mips
+ fi
+ ;;
+ romp)
+ basic_machine=romp-ibm
+ ;;
+ rs6000)
+ basic_machine=rs6000-ibm
+ ;;
+ vax)
+ basic_machine=vax-dec
+ ;;
+ pdp10)
+ # there are many clones, so DEC is not a safe bet
+ basic_machine=pdp10-unknown
+ ;;
+ pdp11)
+ basic_machine=pdp11-dec
+ ;;
+ we32k)
+ basic_machine=we32k-att
+ ;;
+ sh3 | sh4)
+ basic_machine=sh-unknown
+ ;;
+ sparc | sparcv9 | sparcv9b)
+ basic_machine=sparc-sun
+ ;;
+ cydra)
+ basic_machine=cydra-cydrome
+ ;;
+ orion)
+ basic_machine=orion-highlevel
+ ;;
+ orion105)
+ basic_machine=clipper-highlevel
+ ;;
+ mac | mpw | mac-mpw)
+ basic_machine=m68k-apple
+ ;;
+ pmac | pmac-mpw)
+ basic_machine=powerpc-apple
+ ;;
+ c4x*)
+ basic_machine=c4x-none
+ os=-coff
+ ;;
+ *-unknown)
+ # Make sure to match an already-canonicalized machine name.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+esac
+
+# Here we canonicalize certain aliases for manufacturers.
+case $basic_machine in
+ *-digital*)
+ basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/digital.*/dec/'`
+ ;;
+ *-commodore*)
+ basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/commodore.*/cbm/'`
+ ;;
+ *)
+ ;;
+esac
+
+# Decode manufacturer-specific aliases for certain operating systems.
+
+if [ x"$os" != x"" ]
+then
+case $os in
+ # First match some system type aliases
+ # that might get confused with valid system types.
+ # -solaris* is a basic system type, with this one exception.
+ -solaris1 | -solaris1.*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|solaris1|sunos4|'`
+ ;;
+ -solaris)
+ os=-solaris2
+ ;;
+ -svr4*)
+ os=-sysv4
+ ;;
+ -unixware*)
+ os=-sysv4.2uw
+ ;;
+ -gnu/linux*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|gnu/linux|linux-gnu|'`
+ ;;
+ # First accept the basic system types.
+ # The portable systems comes first.
+ # Each alternative MUST END IN A *, to match a version number.
+ # -sysv* is not here because it comes later, after sysvr4.
+ -gnu* | -bsd* | -mach* | -minix* | -genix* | -ultrix* | -irix* \
+ | -*vms* | -sco* | -esix* | -isc* | -aix* | -sunos | -sunos[34]*\
+ | -hpux* | -unos* | -osf* | -luna* | -dgux* | -solaris* | -sym* \
+ | -amigaos* | -amigados* | -msdos* | -newsos* | -unicos* | -aof* \
+ | -aos* \
+ | -nindy* | -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -ebmon* | -hms* | -mvs* \
+ | -clix* | -riscos* | -uniplus* | -iris* | -rtu* | -xenix* \
+ | -hiux* | -386bsd* | -netbsd* | -openbsd* | -freebsd* | -riscix* \
+ | -lynxos* | -bosx* | -nextstep* | -cxux* | -aout* | -elf* | -oabi* \
+ | -ptx* | -coff* | -ecoff* | -winnt* | -domain* | -vsta* \
+ | -udi* | -eabi* | -lites* | -ieee* | -go32* | -aux* \
+ | -cygwin* | -pe* | -psos* | -moss* | -proelf* | -rtems* \
+ | -mingw32* | -linux-gnu* | -uxpv* | -beos* | -mpeix* | -udk* \
+ | -interix* | -uwin* | -rhapsody* | -darwin* | -opened* \
+ | -openstep* | -oskit* | -conix* | -pw32* | -nonstopux* \
+ | -storm-chaos* | -tops10* | -tenex* | -tops20* | -its* | -os2*)
+ # Remember, each alternative MUST END IN *, to match a version number.
+ ;;
+ -qnx*)
+ case $basic_machine in
+ x86-* | i*86-*)
+ ;;
+ *)
+ os=-nto$os
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ;;
+ -nto*)
+ os=-nto-qnx
+ ;;
+ -sim | -es1800* | -hms* | -xray | -os68k* | -none* | -v88r* \
+ | -windows* | -osx | -abug | -netware* | -os9* | -beos* \
+ | -macos* | -mpw* | -magic* | -mmixware* | -mon960* | -lnews*)
+ ;;
+ -mac*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|mac|macos|'`
+ ;;
+ -linux*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|linux|linux-gnu|'`
+ ;;
+ -sunos5*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos5|solaris2|'`
+ ;;
+ -sunos6*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos6|solaris3|'`
+ ;;
+ -opened*)
+ os=-openedition
+ ;;
+ -wince*)
+ os=-wince
+ ;;
+ -osfrose*)
+ os=-osfrose
+ ;;
+ -osf*)
+ os=-osf
+ ;;
+ -utek*)
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ -dynix*)
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ -acis*)
+ os=-aos
+ ;;
+ -386bsd)
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ -ctix* | -uts*)
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ -ns2 )
+ os=-nextstep2
+ ;;
+ -nsk*)
+ os=-nsk
+ ;;
+ # Preserve the version number of sinix5.
+ -sinix5.*)
+ os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sinix|sysv|'`
+ ;;
+ -sinix*)
+ os=-sysv4
+ ;;
+ -triton*)
+ os=-sysv3
+ ;;
+ -oss*)
+ os=-sysv3
+ ;;
+ -svr4)
+ os=-sysv4
+ ;;
+ -svr3)
+ os=-sysv3
+ ;;
+ -sysvr4)
+ os=-sysv4
+ ;;
+ # This must come after -sysvr4.
+ -sysv*)
+ ;;
+ -ose*)
+ os=-ose
+ ;;
+ -es1800*)
+ os=-ose
+ ;;
+ -xenix)
+ os=-xenix
+ ;;
+ -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*)
+ os=-mint
+ ;;
+ -none)
+ ;;
+ *)
+ # Get rid of the `-' at the beginning of $os.
+ os=`echo $os | sed 's/[^-]*-//'`
+ echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': system \`$os\' not recognized 1>&2
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+esac
+else
+
+# Here we handle the default operating systems that come with various machines.
+# The value should be what the vendor currently ships out the door with their
+# machine or put another way, the most popular os provided with the machine.
+
+# Note that if you're going to try to match "-MANUFACTURER" here (say,
+# "-sun"), then you have to tell the case statement up towards the top
+# that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating system. Otherwise, code above
+# will signal an error saying that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating
+# system, and we'll never get to this point.
+
+case $basic_machine in
+ *-acorn)
+ os=-riscix1.2
+ ;;
+ arm*-rebel)
+ os=-linux
+ ;;
+ arm*-semi)
+ os=-aout
+ ;;
+ pdp10-*)
+ os=-tops20
+ ;;
+ pdp11-*)
+ os=-none
+ ;;
+ *-dec | vax-*)
+ os=-ultrix4.2
+ ;;
+ m68*-apollo)
+ os=-domain
+ ;;
+ i386-sun)
+ os=-sunos4.0.2
+ ;;
+ m68000-sun)
+ os=-sunos3
+ # This also exists in the configure program, but was not the
+ # default.
+ # os=-sunos4
+ ;;
+ m68*-cisco)
+ os=-aout
+ ;;
+ mips*-cisco)
+ os=-elf
+ ;;
+ mips*-*)
+ os=-elf
+ ;;
+ *-tti) # must be before sparc entry or we get the wrong os.
+ os=-sysv3
+ ;;
+ sparc-* | *-sun)
+ os=-sunos4.1.1
+ ;;
+ *-be)
+ os=-beos
+ ;;
+ *-ibm)
+ os=-aix
+ ;;
+ *-wec)
+ os=-proelf
+ ;;
+ *-winbond)
+ os=-proelf
+ ;;
+ *-oki)
+ os=-proelf
+ ;;
+ *-hp)
+ os=-hpux
+ ;;
+ *-hitachi)
+ os=-hiux
+ ;;
+ i860-* | *-att | *-ncr | *-altos | *-motorola | *-convergent)
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ *-cbm)
+ os=-amigaos
+ ;;
+ *-dg)
+ os=-dgux
+ ;;
+ *-dolphin)
+ os=-sysv3
+ ;;
+ m68k-ccur)
+ os=-rtu
+ ;;
+ m88k-omron*)
+ os=-luna
+ ;;
+ *-next )
+ os=-nextstep
+ ;;
+ *-sequent)
+ os=-ptx
+ ;;
+ *-crds)
+ os=-unos
+ ;;
+ *-ns)
+ os=-genix
+ ;;
+ i370-*)
+ os=-mvs
+ ;;
+ *-next)
+ os=-nextstep3
+ ;;
+ *-gould)
+ os=-sysv
+ ;;
+ *-highlevel)
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ *-encore)
+ os=-bsd
+ ;;
+ *-sgi)
+ os=-irix
+ ;;
+ *-siemens)
+ os=-sysv4
+ ;;
+ *-masscomp)
+ os=-rtu
+ ;;
+ f30[01]-fujitsu | f700-fujitsu)
+ os=-uxpv
+ ;;
+ *-rom68k)
+ os=-coff
+ ;;
+ *-*bug)
+ os=-coff
+ ;;
+ *-apple)
+ os=-macos
+ ;;
+ *-atari*)
+ os=-mint
+ ;;
+ *)
+ os=-none
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+
+# Here we handle the case where we know the os, and the CPU type, but not the
+# manufacturer. We pick the logical manufacturer.
+vendor=unknown
+case $basic_machine in
+ *-unknown)
+ case $os in
+ -riscix*)
+ vendor=acorn
+ ;;
+ -sunos*)
+ vendor=sun
+ ;;
+ -aix*)
+ vendor=ibm
+ ;;
+ -beos*)
+ vendor=be
+ ;;
+ -hpux*)
+ vendor=hp
+ ;;
+ -mpeix*)
+ vendor=hp
+ ;;
+ -hiux*)
+ vendor=hitachi
+ ;;
+ -unos*)
+ vendor=crds
+ ;;
+ -dgux*)
+ vendor=dg
+ ;;
+ -luna*)
+ vendor=omron
+ ;;
+ -genix*)
+ vendor=ns
+ ;;
+ -mvs* | -opened*)
+ vendor=ibm
+ ;;
+ -ptx*)
+ vendor=sequent
+ ;;
+ -vxsim* | -vxworks*)
+ vendor=wrs
+ ;;
+ -aux*)
+ vendor=apple
+ ;;
+ -hms*)
+ vendor=hitachi
+ ;;
+ -mpw* | -macos*)
+ vendor=apple
+ ;;
+ -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*)
+ vendor=atari
+ ;;
+ esac
+ basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed "s/unknown/$vendor/"`
+ ;;
+esac
+
+echo $basic_machine$os
+exit 0
+
+# Local variables:
+# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp)
+# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='"
+# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d"
+# time-stamp-end: "'"
+# End:
--- /dev/null
+# $Id$
+
+AC_INIT
+AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
+
+AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h)
+AC_PROG_CC
+AC_CANONICAL_HOST
+AC_C_BIGENDIAN
+
+# Checks for programs.
+AC_PROG_CPP
+AC_PROG_RANLIB
+AC_PROG_INSTALL
+AC_PATH_PROG(AR, ar)
+AC_PATH_PROGS(PERL, perl5 perl)
+AC_SUBST(PERL)
+AC_PATH_PROG(ENT, ent)
+AC_SUBST(ENT)
+AC_PATH_PROGS(FILEPRIV, filepriv, true, /sbin:/usr/sbin)
+AC_PATH_PROG(TEST_MINUS_S_SH, bash)
+AC_PATH_PROG(TEST_MINUS_S_SH, ksh)
+AC_PATH_PROG(TEST_MINUS_S_SH, sh)
+
+# System features
+AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
+
+if test -z "$AR" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***])
+fi
+
+# Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible
+if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK, "$LOGIN_PROGRAM")
+else
+ # Search for login
+ AC_PATH_PROG(LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK, login)
+ if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK, "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK")
+ fi
+fi
+
+if test -z "$LD" ; then
+ LD=$CC
+fi
+AC_SUBST(LD)
+
+AC_C_INLINE
+if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wno-uninitialized"
+fi
+
+# Check for some target-specific stuff
+case "$host" in
+*-*-aix*)
+ AFS_LIBS="-lld"
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
+ if (test "$LD" != "gcc" && test -z "$blibpath"); then
+ blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib:/usr/local/lib"
+ fi
+ AC_CHECK_FUNC(authenticate, [AC_DEFINE(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE)])
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
+ dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+ ;;
+*-*-cygwin*)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lregex /usr/lib/textmode.o"
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CYGWIN)
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ AC_DEFINE(IPV4_DEFAULT)
+ AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
+ AC_DEFINE(NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS)
+ ;;
+*-*-dgux*)
+ AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
+ ;;
+*-*-darwin*)
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
+ ;;
+*-*-hpux10*)
+ if test -z "$GCC"; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
+ fi
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
+ IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
+ AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lxnet -lsec"
+ ;;
+*-*-hpux11*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
+ IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+ AC_DEFINE(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE)
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
+ AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lxnet -lsec"
+ ;;
+*-*-irix5*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_INET_NTOA)
+ ;;
+*-*-irix6*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
+ AC_DEFINE(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+ AC_DEFINE(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT)
+ AC_DEFINE(WITH_IRIX_AUDIT)
+ AC_CHECK_FUNC(jlimit_startjob, [AC_DEFINE(WITH_IRIX_JOBS)])
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_INET_NTOA)
+ ;;
+*-*-linux*)
+ no_dev_ptmx=1
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ AC_DEFINE(DONT_TRY_OTHER_AF)
+ AC_DEFINE(PAM_TTY_KLUDGE)
+ inet6_default_4in6=yes
+ ;;
+mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NEWS4)
+ SONY=1
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(iberty, xatexit, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_XATEXIT),
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libiberty missing - please install first or check config.log ***])
+ )
+ ;;
+*-*-netbsd*)
+ need_dash_r=1
+ ;;
+*-*-freebsd*)
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ ;;
+*-next-*)
+ conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
+ conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
+ conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
+ MAIL=/usr/spool/mail
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NEXT)
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_REALPATH)
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ ;;
+*-*-solaris*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib"
+ need_dash_r=1
+ AC_DEFINE(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE)
+ AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
+ AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM)
+ AC_DEFINE(PAM_TTY_KLUDGE)
+ # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
+ conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x)
+ sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'`
+ if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMP)
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ fi
+ ;;
+*-*-sunos4*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getpwanam)
+ AC_DEFINE(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H)
+ conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
+ conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
+ conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ ;;
+*-ncr-sysv*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H)
+ ;;
+*-sni-sysv*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
+ IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H)
+ # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
+ # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
+ # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
+ ;;
+*-*-sysv4.2*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
+# enable_suid_ssh=no
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ ;;
+*-*-sysv5*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
+# enable_suid_ssh=no
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ ;;
+*-*-sysv*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
+ ;;
+*-*-sco3.2v4*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dftruncate=chsize -I/usr/local/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -los -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
+ rsh_path="/usr/bin/rcmd"
+ RANLIB=true
+ no_dev_ptmx=1
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H)
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H)
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getluid setluid)
+ MANTYPE=man
+ do_sco3_extra_lib_check=yes
+ ;;
+*-*-sco3.2v5*)
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
+ no_dev_ptmx=1
+ rsh_path="/usr/bin/rcmd"
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H)
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getluid setluid)
+ MANTYPE=man
+ ;;
+*-*-unicos*)
+ no_libsocket=1
+ no_libnsl=1
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal,-L/usr/local/lib"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc"
+ ;;
+*-dec-osf*)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for Digital Unix SIA)
+ no_osfsia=""
+ AC_ARG_WITH(osfsia,
+ [ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(disabled)
+ no_osfsia=1
+ fi
+ ],
+ )
+ if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
+ if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LOGIN)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ fi
+ fi
+ ;;
+
+*-*-nto-qnx)
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+ AC_DEFINE(NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS)
+ AC_DEFINE(MISSING_NFDBITS)
+ AC_DEFINE(MISSING_HOWMANY)
+ AC_DEFINE(MISSING_FD_MASK)
+ ;;
+esac
+
+# Allow user to specify flags
+AC_ARG_WITH(cflags,
+ [ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH(cppflags,
+ [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] ,
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH(ldflags,
+ [ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH(libs,
+ [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH(pcre,
+ [ --with-pcre[[=PATH]] Override built in regex library with pcre
+ (optionally in PATH)],
+ [
+ case "$withval" in
+ no) ;;
+ *)
+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
+ if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ else
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test -d "$withval/include"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(pcreposix.h,
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(pcre, pcre_info,[
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBPCRE)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lpcreposix -lpcre"
+ no_comp_check=yes],
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** unable to locate pcre library ***])),
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** unable to locate pcreposix.h include file ***]))
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ]
+)
+
+# Checks for libraries.
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(yp_match, , AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, yp_match))
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(setsockopt, , AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, setsockopt))
+
+dnl SCO OS3 needs this for libwrap
+if test "x$with_tcp_wrappers" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$do_sco3_extra_lib_check" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(rpc, innetgr, LIBS="-lrpc -lyp -lrpc $LIBS" , , -lyp -lrpc)
+ fi
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(getspnam, ,
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(gen, getspnam, LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"))
+
+dnl zlib is required
+AC_ARG_WITH(zlib,
+ [ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH],
+ [
+ if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ else
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test -d "$withval/include"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_CHECK_LIB(z, deflate, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***]))
+
+# We don't want to check if we did an pcre override.
+if test -z "$no_comp_check" ; then
+ AC_CHECK_FUNC(regcomp,
+ [ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_REGCOMP)],
+ [
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(pcre, pcre_info,
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBPCRE)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lpcreposix -lpcre"
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** No regex library found.])
+ ])
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+dnl UnixWare 2.x
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(strcasecmp,
+ [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB(resolv, strcasecmp, LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv") ]
+)
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(utimes,
+ [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB(c89, utimes, LIBS="$LIBS -lc89") ]
+)
+
+dnl Checks for libutil functions
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libutil.h)
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(login, util bsd, [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LOGIN)])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(logout updwtmp logwtmp)
+
+AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
+
+# Checks for header files.
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bstring.h crypt.h endian.h floatingpoint.h \
+ getopt.h glob.h lastlog.h limits.h login.h \
+ login_cap.h maillock.h netdb.h netgroup.h \
+ netinet/in_systm.h paths.h poll.h pty.h regex.h \
+ security/pam_appl.h shadow.h stddef.h stdint.h \
+ strings.h sys/bitypes.h sys/bsdtty.h sys/cdefs.h \
+ sys/poll.h sys/queue.h sys/select.h sys/stat.h \
+ sys/stropts.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/time.h \
+ sys/ttcompat.h sys/un.h time.h ttyent.h usersec.h \
+ util.h utime.h utmp.h utmpx.h)
+
+# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
+AC_MSG_CHECKING(for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support)
+AC_EGREP_CPP(FOUNDIT,
+ [
+ #include <glob.h>
+ #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
+ FOUNDIT
+ #endif
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
+AC_MSG_CHECKING(for gl_matchc field in glob_t)
+AC_EGREP_CPP(FOUNDIT,
+ [
+ #include <glob.h>
+ int main(void){glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;}
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name])
+AC_TRY_RUN(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+int main(void){struct dirent d;return(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));}
+ ],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME)
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check whether user wants S/Key support
+SKEY_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(skey,
+ [ --with-skey[[=PATH]] Enable S/Key support
+ (optionally in PATH)],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+
+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+ fi
+
+ AC_DEFINE(SKEY)
+ LIBS="-lskey $LIBS"
+ SKEY_MSG="yes"
+
+ AC_CHECK_FUNC(skey_keyinfo,
+ [],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing s/key libraries.])
+ ])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
+TCPW_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(tcp-wrappers,
+ [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support
+ (optionally in PATH)],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+ if test -n "${withval}" -a "${withval}" != "yes"; then
+ if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ else
+ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for libwrap)
+ AC_TRY_LINK(
+ [
+#include <tcpd.h>
+ int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
+ ],
+ [hosts_access(0);],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_DEFINE(LIBWRAP)
+ TCPW_MSG="yes"
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
+ ]
+ )
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+dnl Checks for library functions.
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random atexit b64_ntop bcopy bindresvport_sa \
+ clock fchmod fchown freeaddrinfo futimes gai_strerror \
+ getaddrinfo getcwd getgrouplist getnameinfo getopt \
+ getrlimit getrusage getttyent glob inet_aton inet_ntoa \
+ inet_ntop innetgr login_getcapbool md5_crypt memmove \
+ mkdtemp on_exit openpty readpassphrase realpath \
+ rresvport_af setdtablesize setegid setenv seteuid \
+ setlogin setproctitle setresgid setreuid setrlimit \
+ setsid setvbuf sigaction sigvec snprintf strerror \
+ strlcat strlcpy strmode strsep sysconf tcgetpgrp utimes \
+ vhangup vsnprintf waitpid __b64_ntop _getpty)
+
+dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(dirname, [AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h)] ,[
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(gen, dirname,[
+ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname],
+ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [
+ save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+ AC_TRY_RUN(
+ [
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ char *s, buf[32];
+
+ strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
+ s = dirname(buf);
+ if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
+ exit(1);
+ } else {
+ exit(0);
+ }
+}
+ ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ]
+ )
+ LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+ ])
+ if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DIRNAME)
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h)
+ fi
+ ])
+])
+
+dnl Checks for time functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(gettimeofday time)
+dnl Checks for utmp functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent)
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(utmpname)
+dnl Checks for utmpx functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline pututxline )
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setutxent utmpxname)
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(getuserattr,
+ [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETUSERATTR)],
+ [AC_CHECK_LIB(s, getuserattr, [LIBS="$LIBS -ls"; AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETUSERATTR)])]
+)
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(daemon,
+ [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DAEMON)],
+ [AC_CHECK_LIB(bsd, daemon, [LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DAEMON)])]
+)
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(getpagesize,
+ [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETPAGESIZE)],
+ [AC_CHECK_LIB(ucb, getpagesize, [LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETPAGESIZE)])]
+)
+
+# Check for broken snprintf
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings])
+ AC_TRY_RUN(
+ [
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(void){char b[5];snprintf(b,5,"123456789");return(b[4]!='\0');}
+ ],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SNPRINTF)
+ AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+AC_FUNC_GETPGRP
+
+# Check for PAM libs
+PAM_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(pam,
+ [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
+ fi
+
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(dl, dlopen, , )
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_set_item, , AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing]))
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_getenvlist)
+
+ disable_shadow=yes
+ PAM_MSG="yes"
+
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM)
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check for older PAM
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+ # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+ ],
+ [(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OLD_PAM)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+# The big search for OpenSSL
+AC_ARG_WITH(ssl-dir,
+ [ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ tryssldir=$withval
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+if test "x$prefix" != "xNONE" ; then
+ tryssldir="$tryssldir $prefix"
+fi
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for OpenSSL directory], ac_cv_openssldir, [
+ for ssldir in $tryssldir "" /usr/local/openssl /usr/lib/openssl /usr/local/ssl /usr/lib/ssl /usr/local /usr/pkg /opt /opt/openssl ; do
+ CPPFLAGS="$saved_CPPFLAGS"
+ LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS -lcrypto"
+
+ # Skip directories if they don't exist
+ if test ! -z "$ssldir" -a ! -d "$ssldir" ; then
+ continue;
+ fi
+ if test ! -z "$ssldir" -a "x$ssldir" != "x/usr"; then
+ # Try to use $ssldir/lib if it exists, otherwise
+ # $ssldir
+ if test -d "$ssldir/lib" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L$ssldir/lib $saved_LDFLAGS"
+ if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="-R$ssldir/lib $LDFLAGS"
+ fi
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L$ssldir $saved_LDFLAGS"
+ if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="-R$ssldir $LDFLAGS"
+ fi
+ fi
+ # Try to use $ssldir/include if it exists, otherwise
+ # $ssldir
+ if test -d "$ssldir/include" ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="-I$ssldir/include $saved_CPPFLAGS"
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="-I$ssldir $saved_CPPFLAGS"
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ # Basic test to check for compatible version and correct linking
+ # *does not* test for RSA - that comes later.
+ AC_TRY_RUN(
+ [
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+int main(void)
+{
+ char a[2048];
+ memset(a, 0, sizeof(a));
+ RAND_add(a, sizeof(a), sizeof(a));
+ return(RAND_status() <= 0);
+}
+ ],
+ [
+ found_crypto=1
+ break;
+ ], []
+ )
+
+ if test ! -z "$found_crypto" ; then
+ break;
+ fi
+ done
+
+ if test -z "$found_crypto" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([Could not find working OpenSSL library, please install or check config.log])
+ fi
+ if test -z "$ssldir" ; then
+ ssldir="(system)"
+ fi
+
+ ac_cv_openssldir=$ssldir
+])
+
+if (test ! -z "$ac_cv_openssldir" && test "x$ac_cv_openssldir" != "x(system)") ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL)
+ dnl Need to recover ssldir - test above runs in subshell
+ ssldir=$ac_cv_openssldir
+ if test ! -z "$ssldir" -a "x$ssldir" != "x/usr"; then
+ # Try to use $ssldir/lib if it exists, otherwise
+ # $ssldir
+ if test -d "$ssldir/lib" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="-L$ssldir/lib $saved_LDFLAGS"
+ if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="-R$ssldir/lib $LDFLAGS"
+ fi
+ else
+ LDFLAGS="-L$ssldir $saved_LDFLAGS"
+ if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="-R$ssldir $LDFLAGS"
+ fi
+ fi
+ # Try to use $ssldir/include if it exists, otherwise
+ # $ssldir
+ if test -d "$ssldir/include" ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="-I$ssldir/include $saved_CPPFLAGS"
+ else
+ CPPFLAGS="-I$ssldir $saved_CPPFLAGS"
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+LIBS="$saved_LIBS -lcrypto"
+
+# Now test RSA support
+saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for RSA support])
+for WANTS_RSAREF in "" 1 ; do
+ if test -z "$WANTS_RSAREF" ; then
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+ else
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS -lRSAglue -lrsaref"
+ fi
+ AC_TRY_RUN([
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+int main(void)
+{
+ int num; RSA *key; static unsigned char p_in[] = "blahblah";
+ unsigned char c[256], p[256];
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(c)); RAND_add(c, sizeof(c), sizeof(c));
+ if ((key=RSA_generate_key(512, 3, NULL, NULL))==NULL) return(1);
+ num = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(p_in) - 1, p_in, c, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ return(-1 == RSA_private_decrypt(num, c, p, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING));
+}
+ ],
+ [
+ rsa_works=1
+ break;
+ ], [])
+done
+LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+if test ! -z "$no_rsa" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(disabled)
+ RSA_MSG="disabled"
+else
+ if test -z "$rsa_works" ; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([*** No RSA support found *** ])
+ RSA_MSG="no"
+ else
+ if test -z "$WANTS_RSAREF" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ RSA_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ RSA_MSG="yes (using RSAref)"
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(using RSAref)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypto -lRSAglue -lrsaref"
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the
+# version in OpenSSL. Skip this for PAM
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xno" -a "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt")
+fi
+
+# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
+if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
+fi
+
+# Checks for data types
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(char, 1)
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(short int, 2)
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(int, 4)
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(long int, 4)
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF(long long int, 8)
+
+# More checks for data types
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <sys/types.h> ],
+ [ u_int a; a = 1;],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_INT)
+ have_u_int=1
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <sys/types.h> ],
+ [ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;],
+ [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INTXX_T)
+ have_intxx_t=1
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <stdint.h> ],
+ [ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INTXX_T)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ]
+ )
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <sys/types.h> ],
+ [ int64_t a; a = 1;],
+ [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INT64_T)
+ have_int64_t=1
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_int64_t" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for int64_t type in sys/socket.h])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <sys/socket.h> ],
+ [ int64_t a; a = 1],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INT64_T)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ]
+ )
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <sys/types.h> ],
+ [ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_INTXX_T)
+ have_u_intxx_t=1
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <sys/socket.h> ],
+ [ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_INTXX_T)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ]
+ )
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <sys/types.h> ],
+ [ u_int64_t a; a = 1;],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_INT64_T)
+ have_u_int64_t=1
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
+ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ ],
+ [ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no" ]
+ )
+ ])
+ if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_UINTXX_T)
+ fi
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_uintxx_t" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <stdint.h> ],
+ [ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_UINTXX_T)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ]
+ )
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+ ],
+ [
+ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
+ u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
+ a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_INTXX_T)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_INTXX_T)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ ],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
+ )
+fi
+
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ ],
+ [ u_char foo; foo = 125; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_U_CHAR)
+fi
+
+TYPE_SOCKLEN_T
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ ],
+ [ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SIZE_T)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ ],
+ [ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SSIZE_T)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <time.h>
+ ],
+ [ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CLOCK_T)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+ ],
+ [ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
+ [ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+ ],
+ [ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
+
+ [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ]
+ )]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ ],
+ [ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PID_T)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ ],
+ [ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_MODE_T)
+fi
+
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+ ],
+ [ struct sockaddr_storage s; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+ ],
+ [ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+ ],
+ [ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+ ],
+ [ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <sys/time.h> ],
+ [ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL)
+ have_struct_timeval=1
+fi
+
+# If we don't have int64_t then we can't compile sftp-server. So don't
+# even attempt to do it.
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" -a \
+ "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" -a \
+ "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
+ NO_SFTP='#'
+else
+dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
+ AC_TRY_RUN(
+ [
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+main()
+{
+ char buf[50];
+ char expected_out[50];
+ int mazsize = 50 ;
+#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+ long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
+#else
+ long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
+#endif
+ strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
+ snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
+ if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
+ exit(1);
+ exit(0);
+}
+#else
+main() { exit(0); }
+#endif
+ ], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) ]
+ )
+fi
+AC_SUBST(NO_SFTP)
+
+dnl Checks for structure members
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_host, utmp.h, HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_host, utmpx.h, HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(syslen, utmpx.h, HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_pid, utmp.h, HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_type, utmp.h, HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_type, utmpx.h, HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_tv, utmp.h, HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_id, utmp.h, HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_id, utmpx.h, HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_addr, utmp.h, HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_addr, utmpx.h, HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_addr_v6, utmp.h, HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_addr_v6, utmpx.h, HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_exit, utmp.h, HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_time, utmp.h, HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_time, utmpx.h, HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_tv, utmpx.h, HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize])
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
+ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+ ],
+ [ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ],
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
+ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+ ],
+ [ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pw_class field in struct passwd],
+ ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <pwd.h>
+ ],
+ [ struct passwd p; p.pw_class = 0; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pw_expire field in struct passwd],
+ ac_cv_have_pw_expire_in_struct_passwd, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <pwd.h>
+ ],
+ [ struct passwd p; p.pw_expire = 0; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_pw_expire_in_struct_passwd="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_pw_expire_in_struct_passwd="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_pw_expire_in_struct_passwd" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PW_EXPIRE_IN_PASSWD)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pw_change field in struct passwd],
+ ac_cv_have_pw_change_in_struct_passwd, [
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <pwd.h>
+ ],
+ [ struct passwd p; p.pw_change = 0; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_pw_change_in_struct_passwd="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_pw_change_in_struct_passwd="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_pw_change_in_struct_passwd" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PW_CHANGE_IN_PASSWD)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [
+ AC_TRY_LINK([],
+ [ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE___PROGNAME)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support],
+ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [
+ AC_TRY_LINK(
+ [
+#include <getopt.h>
+ ],
+ [ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [
+ AC_TRY_LINK([],
+ [ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST)
+fi
+
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [
+ AC_TRY_LINK([],
+ [ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" ]
+ )
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether user wants Kerberos support
+SCARD_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(smartcard,
+ [ --with-smartcard Enable smartcard support],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}"
+ if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${withval}"
+ fi
+ if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+ blibpath="$blibpath:${withval}"
+ fi
+ fi
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sectok.h)
+ if test "$ac_cv_header_sectok_h" != yes; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR(Can't find sectok.h)
+ fi
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(sectok, sectok_open)
+ if test "$ac_cv_lib_sectok_sectok_open" != yes; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR(Can't find libsectok)
+ fi
+ AC_DEFINE(SMARTCARD)
+ SCARD_MSG="yes"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check whether user wants Kerberos support
+KRB4_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos4,
+ [ --with-kerberos4=PATH Enable Kerberos 4 support],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+ if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${withval}/lib"
+ fi
+ if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+ blibpath="$blibpath:${withval}/lib"
+ fi
+ else
+ if test -d /usr/include/kerberosIV ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/include/kerberosIV"
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(krb.h)
+ if test "$ac_cv_header_krb_h" != yes; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find krb.h, build may fail])
+ fi
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(krb, main)
+ if test "$ac_cv_lib_krb_main" != yes; then
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(krb4, main)
+ if test "$ac_cv_lib_krb4_main" != yes; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find libkrb nor libkrb4, build may fail])
+ else
+ KLIBS="-lkrb4"
+ fi
+ else
+ KLIBS="-lkrb"
+ fi
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(des, des_cbc_encrypt)
+ if test "$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" != yes; then
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(des425, des_cbc_encrypt)
+ if test "$ac_cv_lib_des425_des_cbc_encrypt" != yes; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find libdes nor libdes425, build may fail])
+ else
+ KLIBS="-ldes425"
+ fi
+ else
+ KLIBS="-ldes"
+ fi
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(resolv, dn_expand, , )
+ KRB4=yes
+ KRB4_MSG="yes"
+ AC_DEFINE(KRB4)
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check whether user wants AFS support
+AFS_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(afs,
+ [ --with-afs=PATH Enable AFS support],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+
+ if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+ fi
+
+ if test -z "$KRB4" ; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([AFS requires Kerberos IV support, build may fail])
+ fi
+
+ LIBS="-lkafs $LIBS"
+ if test ! -z "$AFS_LIBS" ; then
+ LIBS="$LIBS $AFS_LIBS"
+ fi
+ AC_DEFINE(AFS)
+ AFS_MSG="yes"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+LIBS="$LIBS $KLIBS"
+
+# Looking for programs, paths and files
+AC_ARG_WITH(rsh,
+ [ --with-rsh=PATH Specify path to remote shell program ],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "$no" ; then
+ rsh_path=$withval
+ fi
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_PATH_PROG(rsh_path, rsh)
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH(xauth,
+ [ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ xauth_path=$withval
+ fi
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_PATH_PROG(xauth_path, xauth,,$PATH:/usr/X/bin:/usr/bin/X11:/usr/X11R6/bin:/usr/openwin/bin)
+ if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
+ xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
+ XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
+ AC_SUBST(XAUTH_PATH)
+else
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(XAUTH_PATH, "$xauth_path")
+ XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
+ AC_SUBST(XAUTH_PATH)
+fi
+if test ! -z "$rsh_path" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(RSH_PATH, "$rsh_path")
+fi
+
+# Check for mail directory (last resort if we cannot get it from headers)
+if test ! -z "$MAIL" ; then
+ maildir=`dirname $MAIL`
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_DIRECTORY, "$maildir")
+fi
+
+if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
+ AC_CHECK_FILE("/dev/ptmx",
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
+ have_dev_ptmx=1
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+AC_CHECK_FILE("/dev/ptc",
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC)
+ have_dev_ptc=1
+ ]
+)
+
+# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
+
+# Check for user-specified random device, otherwise check /dev/urandom
+AC_ARG_WITH(random,
+ [ --with-random=FILE read entropy from FILE (default=/dev/urandom)],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ RANDOM_POOL="$withval";
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(RANDOM_POOL, "$RANDOM_POOL")
+ fi
+ ],
+ [
+ # Check for random device
+ AC_CHECK_FILE("/dev/urandom",
+ [
+ RANDOM_POOL="/dev/urandom";
+ AC_SUBST(RANDOM_POOL)
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(RANDOM_POOL, "$RANDOM_POOL")
+ ]
+ )
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check for PRNGD/EGD pool file
+AC_ARG_WITH(prngd-port,
+ [ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD localhost:PORT],
+ [
+ if test ! -z "$withval" -a "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PRNGD_PORT, $PRNGD_PORT)
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check for PRNGD/EGD pool file
+AC_ARG_WITH(prngd-socket,
+ [ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PRNGD_SOCKET, "$PRNGD_SOCKET")
+ fi
+ ],
+ [
+ # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
+ if test -z "$RANDOM_POOL" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for PRNGD/EGD socket)
+ # Insert other locations here
+ for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
+ if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
+ PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PRNGD_SOCKET, "$PRNGD_SOCKET")
+ break;
+ fi
+ done
+ if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT($PRNGD_SOCKET)
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(not found)
+ fi
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+
+# detect pathnames for entropy gathering commands, if we need them
+INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=""
+rm -f prng_commands
+if (test -z "$RANDOM_POOL" && test -z "$PRNGD") ; then
+ # Use these commands to collect entropy
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_LS, ls)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_NETSTAT, netstat)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_ARP, arp)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_IFCONFIG, ifconfig)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_JSTAT, jstat)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_PS, ps)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_SAR, sar)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_W, w)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_WHO, who)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_LAST, last)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_LASTLOG, lastlog)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_DF, df)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_VMSTAT, vmstat)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_UPTIME, uptime)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_IPCS, ipcs)
+ OSSH_PATH_ENTROPY_PROG(PROG_TAIL, tail)
+
+ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS="yes"
+fi
+AC_SUBST(INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS)
+
+
+AC_ARG_WITH(mantype,
+ [ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type],
+ [
+ case "$withval" in
+ man|cat|doc)
+ MANTYPE=$withval
+ ;;
+ *)
+ AC_MSG_ERROR(invalid man type: $withval)
+ ;;
+ esac
+ ]
+)
+if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
+ AC_PATH_PROGS(NROFF, nroff awf, /bin/false, /usr/bin:/usr/ucb)
+ if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ MANTYPE=doc
+ elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ MANTYPE=man
+ else
+ MANTYPE=cat
+ fi
+fi
+AC_SUBST(MANTYPE)
+if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
+ mansubdir=man;
+else
+ mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
+fi
+AC_SUBST(mansubdir)
+
+# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords
+MD5_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(md5-passwords,
+ [ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS)
+ MD5_MSG="yes"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Whether to disable shadow password support
+AC_ARG_WITH(shadow,
+ [ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+ disable_shadow=yes
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+ struct spwd sp;
+ ],[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ],
+ [ sp_expire_available=yes ], []
+ )
+
+ if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
+if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
+ DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ AC_DEFINE(IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY)
+else
+ DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH(ipaddr-display,
+ [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in \$DISPLAY],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY)
+ DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ fi
+ ]
+ )
+fi
+
+# Whether to mess with the default path
+SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
+AC_ARG_WITH(default-path,
+ [ --with-default-path=PATH Specify default \$PATH environment for server],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ user_path="$withval"
+ SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
+ fi
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_TRY_RUN(
+ [
+/* find out what STDPATH is */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
+# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
+
+main()
+{
+ FILE *fd;
+ int rc;
+
+ fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ if(fd == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+ if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+
+ exit(0);
+}
+ ], [ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ],
+ [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ],
+ [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ]
+ )
+# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
+ t_bindir=`eval echo ${bindir}`
+ case $t_bindir in
+ NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
+ esac
+ case $t_bindir in
+ NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+ esac
+ echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
+ if test $? -ne 0 ; then
+ echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
+ if test $? -ne 0 ; then
+ user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work)
+ fi
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(USER_PATH, "$user_path")
+AC_SUBST(user_path)
+
+# Whether to force IPv4 by default (needed on broken glibc Linux)
+IPV4_HACK_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(ipv4-default,
+ [ --with-ipv4-default Use IPv4 by connections unless '-6' specified],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(IPV4_DEFAULT)
+ IPV4_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses])
+IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(4in6,
+ [ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_DEFINE(IPV4_IN_IPV6)
+ IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ fi
+ ],[
+ if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)])
+ AC_DEFINE(IPV4_IN_IPV6)
+ IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)])
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Whether to enable BSD auth support
+AC_ARG_WITH(bsd-auth,
+ [ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(BSD_AUTH)
+ bsd_auth=yes
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether to install ssh as suid root)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(suid-ssh,
+[ --enable-suid-ssh Install ssh as suid root (default)
+ --disable-suid-ssh Install ssh without suid bit],
+[ case "$enableval" in
+ no)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ SSHMODE=0711
+ ;;
+ *) AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ SSHMODE=4711
+ ;;
+ esac ],
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ SSHMODE=4711
+)
+AC_SUBST(SSHMODE)
+
+
+# Where to place sshd.pid
+piddir=/var/run
+AC_ARG_WITH(pid-dir,
+ [ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of ssh.pid file],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ piddir=$withval
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# make sure the directory exists
+if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+ piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
+ case $piddir in
+ NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+ esac
+fi
+
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR, "$piddir")
+AC_SUBST(piddir)
+
+dnl allow user to disable some login recording features
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(lastlog,
+ [ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]],
+ [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG) ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmp,
+ [ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]],
+ [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP) ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmpx,
+ [ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]],
+ [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMPX) ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(wtmp,
+ [ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]],
+ [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMP) ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(wtmpx,
+ [ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]],
+ [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMPX) ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(libutil,
+ [ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]],
+ [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LOGIN) ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pututline,
+ [ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]],
+ [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) ]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pututxline,
+ [ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]],
+ [ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) ]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH(lastlog,
+ [ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+ else
+ conf_lastlog_location=$withval
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
+dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
+dnl need for command-line parameters
+dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails
+
+dnl lastlog detection
+dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE])
+AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+# include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+# include <login.h>
+#endif
+ ],
+ [ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+# include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+ ],
+ [ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ system_lastlog_path=no
+ ])
+ ]
+)
+
+if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
+ for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
+ if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
+ conf_lastlog_location=$f
+ fi
+ done
+ if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **])
+ dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(CONF_LASTLOG_FILE, "$conf_lastlog_location")
+fi
+
+dnl utmp detection
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE])
+AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+ ],
+ [ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ system_utmp_path=no ]
+)
+if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
+ for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
+ if test -f $f ; then
+ conf_utmp_location=$f
+ fi
+ done
+ if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(CONF_UTMP_FILE, "$conf_utmp_location")
+fi
+
+dnl wtmp detection
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE])
+AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+ ],
+ [ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ system_wtmp_path=no ]
+)
+if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
+ for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
+ if test -f $f ; then
+ conf_wtmp_location=$f
+ fi
+ done
+ if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMP)
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(CONF_WTMP_FILE, "$conf_wtmp_location")
+fi
+
+
+dnl utmpx detection - I don't know any system so perverse as to require
+dnl utmpx, but not define UTMPX_FILE (ditto wtmpx.) No doubt it's out
+dnl there, though.
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMPX_FILE])
+AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+ ],
+ [ char *utmpx = UTMPX_FILE; ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ system_utmpx_path=no ]
+)
+if test -z "$conf_utmpx_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_utmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMPX)
+ fi
+else
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(CONF_UTMPX_FILE, "$conf_utmpx_location")
+fi
+
+dnl wtmpx detection
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE])
+AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+ ],
+ [ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ system_wtmpx_path=no ]
+)
+if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
+ if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_WTMPX)
+ fi
+else
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(CONF_WTMPX_FILE, "$conf_wtmpx_location")
+fi
+
+
+# Change default command timeout for builtin PRNG
+entropy_timeout=200
+AC_ARG_WITH(entropy-timeout,
+ [ --with-entropy-timeout Specify entropy gathering command timeout (msec)],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ entropy_timeout=$withval
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC, $entropy_timeout)
+
+
+if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+ LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -blibpath:$blibpath"
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit -blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
+fi
+
+AC_EXEEXT
+
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile openbsd-compat/Makefile scard/Makefile ssh_prng_cmds])
+AC_OUTPUT
+
+# Print summary of options
+
+if test ! -z "$RANDOM_POOL" ; then
+ RAND_MSG="Device ($RANDOM_POOL)"
+else
+ if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
+ RAND_MSG="PRNGD/EGD (port localhost:$PRNGD_PORT)"
+ elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
+ RAND_MSG="PRNGD/EGD (socket $PRNGD_SOCKET)"
+ else
+ RAND_MSG="Builtin (timeout $entropy_timeout)"
+ BUILTIN_RNG=1
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Someone please show me a better way :)
+A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
+B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
+C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
+D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
+E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
+F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
+G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
+H=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
+
+echo ""
+echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
+echo " User binaries: $B"
+echo " System binaries: $C"
+echo " Configuration files: $D"
+echo " Askpass program: $E"
+echo " Manual pages: $F"
+echo " PID file: $G"
+echo " sshd default user PATH: $H"
+echo " Random number collection: $RAND_MSG"
+echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
+echo " PAM support: ${PAM_MSG}"
+echo " KerberosIV support: $KRB4_MSG"
+echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+echo " AFS support: $AFS_MSG"
+echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
+echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
+echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
+echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+echo " Use IPv4 by default hack: $IPV4_HACK_MSG"
+echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+
+if test ! -z "$bsd_auth"; then
+ echo " BSD Auth support: yes"
+fi
+
+echo ""
+
+echo " Host: ${host}"
+echo " Compiler: ${CC}"
+echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
+echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
+echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
+echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
+
+echo ""
+
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+ echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file for sshd,"
+ echo "otherwise password authentication may fail. Example PAM control files"
+ echo "can be found in the contrib/ subdirectory"
+ echo ""
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$BUILTIN_RNG" ; then
+ echo "WARNING: you are using the builtin random number collection service."
+ echo "Please read WARNING.RNG and request that your OS vendor includes"
+ echo "/dev/random in future versions of their OS."
+ echo ""
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$NO_SFTP"; then
+ echo "sftp-server will be disabled. Your compiler does not support"
+ echo "64bit integers."
+ echo ""
+fi
+
--- /dev/null
+Other patches and addons for OpenSSH. Please send submissions to
+djm@ibs.com.au
+
+Elsewhere
+---------
+
+http://www.imasy.or.jp/~gotoh/connect.c is a Unix and Windows
+ProxyCommand which allows OpenSSH to make connections through a SOCKS5
+or http proxy which supports the CONNECT method (eg. Squid).
+
+In this directory
+-----------------
+
+chroot.diff:
+
+Ricardo Cerqueira's <rmcc@clix.pt> patch to enable chrooting using the
+wu-ftpd style magic home directories (containing '/./'). More details in
+the head of the patch itself.
+
+ssh-copy-id:
+
+Phil Hands' <phil@hands.com> shell script to automate the process of adding
+your public key to a remote machine's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file.
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass:
+
+A GNOME passphrase requester of my own creation. Compilation instructions
+are in the top of the file.
+
+sshd.pam.generic:
+
+A generic PAM config file which may be useful on your system. YMMV
+
+sshd.pam.freebsd:
+
+A PAM config file which works with FreeBSD's PAM port. Contributed by
+Dominik Brettnacher <domi@saargate.de>
+
+mdoc2man.pl:
+
+Converts mdoc formated manpages into normal manpages. This can be used
+on Solaris machines to provide manpages that are not preformated.
+Contributed by Mark D. Roth <roth@feep.net>
+
+redhat:
+
+RPM spec file an scripts for building Redhat packages
+
+suse:
+
+RPM spec file an scripts for building SuSE packages
+
+
+Externally maintained
+---------------------
+
+X11 SSH Askpass:
+
+Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
+passphrase requester. This is highly recommended:
+
+http://www.ntrnet.net/~jmknoble/software/x11-ssh-askpass/index.html
--- /dev/null
+%define use-stable 1
+%if %{use-stable}
+ %define version 3.0.2p1
+ %define cvs %{nil}
+ %define release 1
+%else
+ %define version 3.0p1
+ %define cvs cvs20011102
+ %define release 0r1
+%endif
+%define xsa x11-ssh-askpass
+%define askpass %{xsa}-1.2.4.1
+
+Name : openssh
+Version : %{version}%{cvs}
+Release : %{release}
+Group : System/Network
+
+Summary : OpenSSH free Secure Shell (SSH) implementation.
+
+Copyright : BSD
+Packager : Raymund Will <ray@caldera.de>
+URL : http://www.openssh.com/
+
+Obsoletes : ssh, ssh-clients, openssh-clients
+
+BuildRoot : /tmp/%{Name}-%{Version}
+
+# %{use-stable}==1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable
+# %{use-stable}==0: :pserver:cvs@bass.directhit.com:/cvs/openssh_cvs
+Source0: see-above:/.../openssh-%{Version}.tar.gz
+%if %{use-stable}
+Source1: see-above:/.../openssh-%{Version}.tar.gz.sig
+%endif
+Source2: http://www.ntrnet.net/~jmknoble/software/%{xsa}/%{askpass}.tar.gz
+Source3: http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
+
+
+%Package server
+Group : System/Network
+Requires : openssh = %{Version}
+Obsoletes : ssh-server
+
+Summary : OpenSSH Secure Shell protocol server (sshd).
+
+
+%Package askpass
+Group : System/Network
+Requires : openssh = %{Version}
+URL : http://www.ntrnet.net/~jmknoble/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
+Obsoletes : ssh-extras
+
+Summary : OpenSSH X11 pass-phrase dialog.
+
+
+%Prep
+%setup %([ -z "%{cvs}" ] || echo "-n %{Name}_cvs") -a2
+
+%if ! %{use-stable}
+ autoreconf
+%endif
+
+
+%Build
+CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
+./configure \
+ --prefix=/usr \
+ --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh \
+ --libexecdir=/usr/lib/ssh \
+ --with-pam \
+ --with-tcp-wrappers \
+ --with-ipv4-default \
+
+make
+
+cd %{askpass}
+./configure
+xmkmf
+make includes
+make
+
+
+%Install
+%{mkDESTDIR}
+
+make DESTDIR="$DESTDIR" install
+
+make -C %{askpass} BINDIR="/usr/lib/ssh" install
+
+# OpenLinux specific configuration
+mkdir -p $DESTDIR/{etc/pam.d,%{SVIcdir},%{SVIdir}}
+
+# enabling X11 forwarding on the server is convenient and okay,
+# on the client side we consider it a potential security risk!
+%{fixUP} -vT $DESTDIR/etc/ssh/sshd_config -e '
+ s/X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/i'
+
+install -m644 contrib/caldera/sshd.pam $DESTDIR/etc/pam.d/sshd
+# FIXME: disabled, find out why this doesn't work with NIS
+%{fixUP} -vT $DESTDIR/etc/pam.d/sshd -e 's/^(.*pam_limits.*)$/#$1/'
+
+install -m 0755 contrib/caldera/sshd.init $DESTDIR%{SVIdir}/sshd
+%{fixUP} -vT $DESTDIR/%{SVIdir} -e 's:\@SVIdir\@:%{SVIdir}: +
+ s:\@sysconfdir\@:/etc/ssh:'
+
+cat <<-EoD > $DESTDIR%{SVIcdir}/sshd
+ IDENT=sshd
+ DESCRIPTIVE="OpenSSH secure shell daemon"
+ # This service will be marked as 'skipped' on boot if there
+ # is no host key. Use ssh-host-keygen to generate one.
+ ONBOOT="yes"
+ OPTIONS=""
+EoD
+
+SKG=$DESTDIR/usr/sbin/ssh-host-keygen
+install -m 0755 contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen $SKG
+%{fixUP} -T $SKG -e 's:\@sysconfdir\@:/etc/ssh: +
+ s:\@sshkeygen\@:/usr/bin/ssh-keygen:'
+
+
+# install remaining docs
+DocD="$DESTDIR%{_defaultdocdir}/%{Name}-%{Version}"; mkdir -p $DocD/00-LEGAL
+cp -a LICENCE $DocD/00-LEGAL
+cp -a CREDITS ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* TODO $DocD
+install -p -m 0444 -o 0 -g 0 %{SOURCE3} $DocD/faq.html
+mkdir -p $DocD/%{askpass}
+cp -a %{askpass}/{README,ChangeLog,TODO,SshAskpass*.ad} $DocD/%{askpass}
+
+cp -p %{askpass}/%{xsa}.man $DESTDIR/usr/man/man1/%{xsa}.1
+ln -s %{xsa}.1 $DESTDIR/usr/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1
+
+%{fixManPages}
+
+
+# generate file lists
+%{mkLists} -c %{Name}
+%{mkLists} -d %{Name} << 'EOF'
+/etc/ssh base
+^/etc/ IGNORED
+%{_defaultdocdir}/$ IGNORED
+askpass askpass
+* default
+EOF
+%{mkLists} -a -f %{Name} << 'EOF'
+^/etc * prefix(%%config)
+/usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults IGNORED
+Ssh.bin IGNORED # for now
+[Aa]skpass askpass
+%{_defaultdocdir}/%{Name}-%{Version}/ base
+ssh-keygen base
+moduli server
+sshd server
+sftp-server server
+.* base
+EOF
+
+
+%Clean
+%{rmDESTDIR}
+
+
+%Post
+# Generate host key when none is present to get up and running,
+# both client and server require this for host-based auth!
+# ssh-host-keygen checks for existing keys.
+/usr/sbin/ssh-host-keygen
+: # to protect the rpm database
+
+
+%Post server
+if [ -x %{LSBinit}-install ]; then
+ %{LSBinit}-install sshd
+else
+ lisa --SysV-init install sshd S55 3:4:5 K45 0:1:2:6
+fi
+
+! %{SVIdir}/sshd status || %{SVIdir}/sshd restart
+: # to protect the rpm database
+
+
+%PreUn server
+[ "$1" = 0 ] || exit 0
+
+! %{SVIdir}/sshd status || %{SVIdir}/sshd stop
+: # to protect the rpm database
+
+
+%PostUn server
+if [ -x %{LSBinit}-remove ]; then
+ %{LSBinit}-remove sshd
+else
+ lisa --SysV-init remove sshd $1
+fi
+: # to protect the rpm database
+
+
+%Files -f files-%{Name}-base
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+
+
+%Files server -f files-%{Name}-server
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+
+
+%Files askpass -f files-%{Name}-askpass
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+
+
+%Description
+OpenSSH (Secure Shell) provides access to a remote system. It replaces
+telnet, rlogin, rexec, and rsh, and provides secure encrypted
+communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
+X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over
+the secure channel.
+
+%Description server
+This package installs the sshd, the server portion of OpenSSH.
+
+%Description askpass
+This package contains an X11-based pass-phrase dialog used per
+default by ssh-add(1). It is based on %{askpass}
+by Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>.
+
+%ChangeLog
+* Mon Jan 01 1998 ...
+
+$Id$
--- /dev/null
+#! /bin/sh
+#
+# $Id$
+#
+# This script is normally run only *once* for a given host
+# (in a given period of time) -- on updates/upgrades/recovery
+# the ssh_host_key* files _should_ be retained! Otherwise false
+# "man-in-the-middle-attack" alerts will frighten unsuspecting
+# clients...
+
+keydir=@sysconfdir@
+keygen=@sshkeygen@
+
+if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_key -o \
+ -f $keydir/ssh_host_key.pub ]; then
+ echo "You already have an SSH1 RSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_key."
+else
+ echo "Generating 1024 bit SSH1 RSA host key."
+ $keygen -b 1024 -t rsa1 -f $keydir/ssh_host_key -C '' -N ''
+fi
+
+if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key -o \
+ -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub ]; then
+ echo "You already have an SSH2 RSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key."
+else
+ echo "Generating 1024 bit SSH2 RSA host key."
+ $keygen -b 1024 -t rsa -f $keydir/ssh_host_rsa_key -C '' -N ''
+fi
+
+if [ -f $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key -o \
+ -f $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub ]; then
+ echo "You already have an SSH2 DSA host key in $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key."
+else
+ echo "Generating SSH2 DSA host key."
+ $keygen -t dsa -f $keydir/ssh_host_dsa_key -C '' -N ''
+fi
--- /dev/null
+#! /bin/bash
+#
+# $Id$
+#
+### BEGIN INIT INFO
+# Provides:
+# Required-Start: $network
+# Required-Stop:
+# Default-Start: 3 4 5
+# Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6
+# Description: sshd
+# Bring up/down the OpenSSH secure shell daemon.
+### END INIT INFO
+#
+# Written by Miquel van Smoorenburg <miquels@drinkel.ow.org>.
+# Modified for Debian GNU/Linux by Ian Murdock <imurdock@gnu.ai.mit.edu>.
+# Modified for OpenLinux by Raymund Will <ray@caldera.de>
+
+NAME=sshd
+DAEMON=/usr/sbin/$NAME
+# Hack-Alert(TM)! This is necessary to get around the 'reload'-problem
+# created by recent OpenSSH daemon/ssd combinations. See Caldera internal
+# PR [linux/8278] for details...
+PIDF=/var/run/$NAME.pid
+NAME=$DAEMON
+
+_status() {
+ [ -z "$1" ] || local pidf="$1"
+ local ret=-1
+ local pid
+ if [ -n "$pidf" ] && [ -r "$pidf" ]; then
+ pid=$(head -1 $pidf)
+ else
+ pid=$(pidof $NAME)
+ fi
+
+ if [ ! -e $SVIlock ]; then
+ # no lock-file => not started == stopped?
+ ret=3
+ elif [ -n "$pidf" -a ! -f "$pidf" ] || [ -z "$pid" ]; then
+ # pid-file given but not present or no pid => died, but was not stopped
+ ret=2
+ elif [ -r /proc/$pid/cmdline ] &&
+ echo -ne $NAME'\000' | cmp -s - /proc/$pid/cmdline; then
+ # pid-file given and present or pid found => check process...
+ # but don't compare exe, as this will fail after an update!
+ # compares OK => all's well, that ends well...
+ ret=0
+ else
+ # no such process or exe does not match => stale pid-file or process died
+ # just recently...
+ ret=1
+ fi
+ return $ret
+}
+
+# Source function library (and set vital variables).
+. @SVIdir@/functions
+
+case "$1" in
+ start)
+ [ ! -e $SVIlock ] || exit 0
+ [ -x $DAEMON ] || exit 5
+ SVIemptyConfig @sysconfdir@/sshd_config && exit 6
+
+ if [ ! \( -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_key -a \
+ -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_key.pub \) -a \
+ ! \( -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_rsa_key -a \
+ -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub \) -a \
+ ! \( -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_dsa_key -a \
+ -f @sysconfdir@/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub \) ]; then
+
+ echo "$SVIsubsys: host key not initialized: skipped!"
+ echo "$SVIsubsys: use ssh-host-keygen to generate one!"
+ exit 6
+ fi
+
+ echo -n "Starting $SVIsubsys services: "
+ ssd -S -x $DAEMON -n $NAME -- $OPTIONS
+ ret=$?
+
+ echo "."
+ touch $SVIlock
+ ;;
+
+ stop)
+ [ -e $SVIlock ] || exit 0
+
+ echo -n "Stopping $SVIsubsys services: "
+ ssd -K -p $PIDF -n $NAME
+ ret=$?
+
+ echo "."
+ rm -f $SVIlock
+ ;;
+
+ force-reload|reload)
+ [ -e $SVIlock ] || exit 0
+
+ echo "Reloading $SVIsubsys configuration files: "
+ ssd -K --signal 1 -q -p $PIDF -n $NAME
+ ret=$?
+ echo "done."
+ ;;
+
+ restart)
+ $0 stop
+ $0 start
+ ret=$?
+ ;;
+
+ status)
+ _status $PIDF
+ ret=$?
+ ;;
+
+ *)
+ echo "Usage: $SVIscript {[re]start|stop|[force-]reload|status}"
+ ret=2
+ ;;
+
+esac
+
+exit $ret
+
--- /dev/null
+#%PAM-1.0
+auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nodelay
+auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
+account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so
+password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so
+password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok
+session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so
+session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so
--- /dev/null
+From: Ricardo Cerqueira <rmcc@clix.pt>
+
+A patch to cause sshd to chroot when it encounters the magic token
+'/./' in a users home directory. The directory portion before the
+token is the directory to chroot() to, the portion after the
+token is the user's home directory relative to the new root.
+
+Index: session.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /var/cvs/openssh/session.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.4
+diff -u -r1.4 session.c
+--- session.c 2000/04/16 02:31:51 1.4
++++ session.c 2000/04/16 02:47:55
+@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
+
++#define CHROOT
++
+ /* types */
+
+ #define TTYSZ 64
+@@ -783,6 +785,10 @@
+ extern char **environ;
+ struct stat st;
+ char *argv[10];
++#ifdef CHROOT
++ char *user_dir;
++ char *new_root;
++#endif /* CHROOT */
+
+ #ifndef USE_PAM /* pam_nologin handles this */
+ f = fopen("/etc/nologin", "r");
+@@ -799,6 +805,26 @@
+ /* Set login name in the kernel. */
+ if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
+ error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++
++#ifdef CHROOT
++ user_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
++ new_root = user_dir + 1;
++
++ while((new_root = strchr(new_root, '.')) != NULL) {
++ new_root--;
++ if(strncmp(new_root, "/./", 3) == 0) {
++ *new_root = '\0';
++ new_root += 2;
++
++ if(chroot(user_dir) != 0)
++ fatal("Couldn't chroot to user directory %s", user_dir);
++
++ pw->pw_dir = new_root;
++ break;
++ }
++ new_root += 2;
++ }
++#endif /* CHROOT */
+
+ /* Set uid, gid, and groups. */
+ /* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
--- /dev/null
+This package is the actual port of OpenSSH to Cygwin 1.3.
+
+===========================================================================
+Important change since 2.9p2:
+
+Since Cygwin is able to switch user context without password beginning
+with version 1.3.2, OpenSSH now allows to do so when it's running under
+a version >= 1.3.2. Keep in mind that `ntsec' has to be activated to
+allow that feature.
+===========================================================================
+
+===========================================================================
+Important change since 2.3.0p1:
+
+When using `ntea' or `ntsec' you now have to care for the ownership
+and permission bits of your host key files and your private key files.
+The host key files have to be owned by the NT account which starts
+sshd. The user key files have to be owned by the user. The permission
+bits of the private key files (host and user) have to be at least
+rw------- (0600)!
+
+Note that this is forced under `ntsec' only if the files are on a NTFS
+filesystem (which is recommended) due to the lack of any basic security
+features of the FAT/FAT32 filesystems.
+===========================================================================
+
+If you are installing OpenSSH the first time, you can generate global config
+files and server keys by running
+
+ /usr/bin/ssh-host-config
+
+Note that this binary archive doesn't contain default config files in /etc.
+That files are only created if ssh-host-config is started.
+
+If you are updating your installation you may run the above ssh-host-config
+as well to move your configuration files to the new location and to
+erase the files at the old location.
+
+To support testing and unattended installation ssh-host-config got
+some options:
+
+usage: ssh-host-config [OPTION]...
+Options:
+ --debug -d Enable shell's debug output.
+ --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
+ --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
+ --port -p <n> sshd listens on port n.
+
+Additionally ssh-host-config now asks if it should install sshd as a
+service when running under NT/W2K. This requires cygrunsrv installed.
+
+You can create the private and public keys for a user now by running
+
+ /usr/bin/ssh-user-config
+
+under the users account.
+
+To support testing and unattended installation ssh-user-config got
+some options as well:
+
+usage: ssh-user-config [OPTION]...
+Options:
+ --debug -d Enable shell's debug output.
+ --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
+ --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
+ --passphrase -p word Use "word" as passphrase automatically.
+
+Install sshd as daemon via cygrunsrv.exe (recommended on NT/W2K), via inetd
+(results in very slow deamon startup!) or from the command line (recommended
+on 9X/ME).
+
+If you start sshd as deamon via cygrunsrv.exe you MUST give the
+"-D" option to sshd. Otherwise the service can't get started at all.
+
+If starting via inetd, copy sshd to eg. /usr/sbin/in.sshd and add the
+following line to your inetd.conf file:
+
+sshd stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/in.sshd sshd -i
+
+Moreover you'll have to add the following line to your
+${SYSTEMROOT}/system32/drivers/etc/services file:
+
+ sshd 22/tcp #SSH daemon
+
+===========================================================================
+The following restrictions only apply to Cygwin versions up to 1.3.1
+===========================================================================
+
+Authentication to sshd is possible in one of two ways.
+You'll have to decide before starting sshd!
+
+- If you want to authenticate via RSA and you want to login to that
+ machine to exactly one user account you can do so by running sshd
+ under that user account. You must change /etc/sshd_config
+ to contain the following:
+
+ RSAAuthentication yes
+
+ Moreover it's possible to use rhosts and/or rhosts with
+ RSA authentication by setting the following in sshd_config:
+
+ RhostsAuthentication yes
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
+
+- If you want to be able to login to different user accounts you'll
+ have to start sshd under system account or any other account that
+ is able to switch user context. Note that administrators are _not_
+ able to do that by default! You'll have to give the following
+ special user rights to the user:
+ "Act as part of the operating system"
+ "Replace process level token"
+ "Increase quotas"
+ and if used via service manager
+ "Logon as a service".
+
+ The system account does of course own that user rights by default.
+
+ Unfortunately, if you choose that way, you can only logon with
+ NT password authentification and you should change
+ /etc/sshd_config to contain the following:
+
+ PasswordAuthentication yes
+ RhostsAuthentication no
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+ RSAAuthentication no
+
+ However you can login to the user which has started sshd with
+ RSA authentication anyway. If you want that, change the RSA
+ authentication setting back to "yes":
+
+ RSAAuthentication yes
+
+Please note that OpenSSH does never use the value of $HOME to
+search for the users configuration files! It always uses the
+value of the pw_dir field in /etc/passwd as the home directory.
+If no home diretory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory
+is used instead!
+
+You may use all features of the CYGWIN=ntsec setting the same
+way as they are used by the `login' port on sources.redhat.com:
+
+ The pw_gecos field may contain an additional field, that begins
+ with (upper case!) "U-", followed by the domain and the username
+ separated by a backslash.
+ CAUTION: The SID _must_ remain the _last_ field in pw_gecos!
+ BTW: The field separator in pw_gecos is the comma.
+ The username in pw_name itself may be any nice name:
+
+ domuser::1104:513:John Doe,U-domain\user,S-1-5-21-...
+
+ Now you may use `domuser' as your login name with telnet!
+ This is possible additionally for local users, if you don't like
+ your NT login name ;-) You only have to leave out the domain:
+
+ locuser::1104:513:John Doe,U-user,S-1-5-21-...
+
+SSH2 server and user keys are generated by the `ssh-*-config' scripts
+as well.
+
+If you want to build from source, the following options to
+configure are used for the Cygwin binary distribution:
+
+ --prefix=/usr \
+ --sysconfdir=/etc \
+ --libexecdir='${exec_prefix}/sbin \
+ --with-pcre
+
+You must have installed the zlib, openssl and regex packages to
+be able to build OpenSSH! The `--with-pcre' option requires
+the installation of the pcre package.
+
+Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin@cygwin.com.
+
+Have fun,
+
+Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Cygwin Developer
+Red Hat Inc.
--- /dev/null
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000, Red Hat Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
+
+# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed
+PREFIX=/usr
+
+# Directory where the config files are stored
+SYSCONFDIR=/etc
+
+# Subdirectory where an old package might be installed
+OLDPREFIX=/usr/local
+OLDSYSCONFDIR=${OLDPREFIX}/etc
+
+progname=$0
+auto_answer=""
+port_number=22
+
+request()
+{
+ if [ "${auto_answer}" = "yes" ]
+ then
+ return 0
+ elif [ "${auto_answer}" = "no" ]
+ then
+ return 1
+ fi
+
+ answer=""
+ while [ "X${answer}" != "Xyes" -a "X${answer}" != "Xno" ]
+ do
+ echo -n "$1 (yes/no) "
+ read answer
+ done
+ if [ "X${answer}" = "Xyes" ]
+ then
+ return 0
+ else
+ return 1
+ fi
+}
+
+# Check options
+
+while :
+do
+ case $# in
+ 0)
+ break
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ option=$1
+ shift
+
+ case "$option" in
+ -d | --debug )
+ set -x
+ ;;
+
+ -y | --yes )
+ auto_answer=yes
+ ;;
+
+ -n | --no )
+ auto_answer=no
+ ;;
+
+ -p | --port )
+ port_number=$1
+ shift
+ ;;
+
+ *)
+ echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..."
+ echo
+ echo "This script creates an OpenSSH host configuration."
+ echo
+ echo "Options:"
+ echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output."
+ echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
+ echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
+ echo " --port -p <n> sshd listens on port n."
+ echo
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+
+ esac
+done
+
+# Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while
+# some ssh processes are still running
+
+if ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep -q ssh
+then
+ echo
+ echo "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first."
+ echo
+ #exit 1
+fi
+
+# Check for ${SYSCONFDIR} directory
+
+if [ -e "${SYSCONFDIR}" -a ! -d "${SYSCONFDIR}" ]
+then
+ echo
+ echo "${SYSCONFDIR} is existant but not a directory."
+ echo "Cannot create global configuration files."
+ echo
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+# Create it if necessary
+
+if [ ! -e "${SYSCONFDIR}" ]
+then
+ mkdir "${SYSCONFDIR}"
+ if [ ! -e "${SYSCONFDIR}" ]
+ then
+ echo
+ echo "Creating ${SYSCONFDIR} directory failed"
+ echo
+ exit 1
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Check for an old installation in ${OLDPREFIX} unless ${OLDPREFIX} isn't
+# the same as ${PREFIX}
+
+old_install=0
+if [ "${OLDPREFIX}" != "${PREFIX}" ]
+then
+ if [ -f "${OLDPREFIX}/sbin/sshd" ]
+ then
+ echo
+ echo "You seem to have an older installation in ${OLDPREFIX}."
+ echo
+ # Check if old global configuration files exist
+ if [ -f "${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key" ]
+ then
+ if request "Do you want to copy your config files to your new installation?"
+ then
+ cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key ${SYSCONFDIR}
+ cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key.pub ${SYSCONFDIR}
+ cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key ${SYSCONFDIR}
+ cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub ${SYSCONFDIR}
+ cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config ${SYSCONFDIR}
+ cp -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config ${SYSCONFDIR}
+ fi
+ fi
+ if request "Do you want to erase your old installation?"
+ then
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/ssh.exe
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/ssh-config
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/scp.exe
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/ssh-add.exe
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/ssh-agent.exe
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/ssh-keygen.exe
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/bin/slogin
+ rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key
+ rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key.pub
+ rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key
+ rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+ rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
+ rm -f ${OLDSYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/ssh.1
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/scp.1
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/ssh-add.1
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/ssh-agent.1
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/ssh-keygen.1
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man1/slogin.1
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/man/man8/sshd.8
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/sbin/sshd.exe
+ rm -f ${OLDPREFIX}/sbin/sftp-server.exe
+ fi
+ old_install=1
+ fi
+fi
+
+# First generate host keys if not already existing
+
+if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key" ]
+then
+ echo "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key"
+ ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_key -N '' > /dev/null
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key" ]
+then
+ echo "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key"
+ ssh-keygen -t rsa -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key -N '' > /dev/null
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key" ]
+then
+ echo "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key"
+ ssh-keygen -t dsa -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key -N '' > /dev/null
+fi
+
+# Check if ssh_config exists. If yes, ask for overwriting
+
+if [ -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" ]
+then
+ if request "Overwrite existing ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file?"
+ then
+ rm -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config"
+ if [ -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" ]
+ then
+ echo "Can't overwrite. ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config is write protected."
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Create default ssh_config from here script
+
+if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" ]
+then
+ echo "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file"
+ cat > ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config << EOF
+# This is ssh client systemwide configuration file. This file provides
+# defaults for users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration
+# files or on the command line.
+
+# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
+# 1. command line options
+# 2. user-specific file
+# 3. system-wide file
+# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
+# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
+
+# Site-wide defaults for various options
+
+# Host *
+# ForwardAgent no
+# ForwardX11 no
+# RhostsAuthentication no
+# RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
+# RSAAuthentication yes
+# PasswordAuthentication yes
+# FallBackToRsh no
+# UseRsh no
+# BatchMode no
+# CheckHostIP yes
+# StrictHostKeyChecking yes
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+# Port 22
+# Protocol 2,1
+# Cipher blowfish
+# EscapeChar ~
+EOF
+ if [ "$port_number" != "22" ]
+ then
+ echo "Host localhost" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
+ echo " Port $port_number" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Check if sshd_config exists. If yes, ask for overwriting
+
+if [ -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" ]
+then
+ if request "Overwrite existing ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file?"
+ then
+ rm -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config"
+ if [ -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" ]
+ then
+ echo "Can't overwrite. ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config is write protected."
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Create default sshd_config from here script
+
+if [ ! -f "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" ]
+then
+ echo "Generating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file"
+ cat > ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config << EOF
+# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See sshd(8)
+# for more information.
+
+Port $port_number
+#Protocol 2,1
+#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+#ListenAddress ::
+
+# HostKey for protocol version 1
+HostKey /etc/ssh_host_key
+# HostKeys for protocol version 2
+HostKey /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key
+HostKey /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key
+
+# Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server ke
+KeyRegenerationInterval 3600
+ServerKeyBits 768
+
+# Logging
+SyslogFacility AUTH
+LogLevel INFO
+#obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
+
+# Authentication:
+
+LoginGraceTime 600
+PermitRootLogin yes
+# The following setting overrides permission checks on host key files
+# and directories. For security reasons set this to "yes" when running
+# NT/W2K, NTFS and CYGWIN=ntsec.
+StrictModes no
+
+RSAAuthentication yes
+PubkeyAuthentication yes
+#AuthorizedKeysFile %h/.ssh/authorized_keys
+
+# rhosts authentication should not be used
+RhostsAuthentication no
+# Don't read ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
+IgnoreRhosts yes
+# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh_known_hosts
+RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+# similar for protocol version 2
+HostbasedAuthentication no
+# Uncomment if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for RhostsRSAAuthentication
+#IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes
+
+# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+PasswordAuthentication yes
+PermitEmptyPasswords no
+
+X11Forwarding no
+X11DisplayOffset 10
+PrintMotd yes
+#PrintLastLog no
+KeepAlive yes
+#UseLogin no
+
+#MaxStartups 10:30:60
+#Banner /etc/issue.net
+#ReverseMappingCheck yes
+
+Subsystem sftp /usr/sbin/sftp-server
+EOF
+fi
+
+# Care for services file
+_sys="`uname -a`"
+_nt=`expr "$_sys" : "CYGWIN_NT"`
+if [ $_nt -gt 0 ]
+then
+ _wservices="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\services"
+ _wserv_tmp="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\srv.out.$$"
+else
+ _wservices="${WINDIR}\\SERVICES"
+ _wserv_tmp="${WINDIR}\\SERV.$$"
+fi
+_services=`cygpath -u "${_wservices}"`
+_serv_tmp=`cygpath -u "${_wserv_tmp}"`
+
+mount -t -f "${_wservices}" "${_services}"
+mount -t -f "${_wserv_tmp}" "${_serv_tmp}"
+
+# Remove sshd 22/port from services
+if [ `grep -q 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
+then
+ grep -v 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}"
+ if [ -f "${_serv_tmp}" ]
+ then
+ if mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
+ then
+ echo "Removing sshd from ${_services}"
+ else
+ echo "Removing sshd from ${_services} failed\!"
+ fi
+ rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
+ else
+ echo "Removing sshd from ${_services} failed\!"
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Add ssh 22/tcp and ssh 22/udp to services
+if [ `grep -q 'ssh[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
+then
+ awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh 22/tcp #SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh 22/udp #SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}"
+ if [ -f "${_serv_tmp}" ]
+ then
+ if mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
+ then
+ echo "Added ssh to ${_services}"
+ else
+ echo "Adding ssh to ${_services} failed\!"
+ fi
+ rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
+ else
+ echo "Adding ssh to ${_services} failed\!"
+ fi
+fi
+
+umount "${_services}"
+umount "${_serv_tmp}"
+
+# Care for inetd.conf file
+_inetcnf="/etc/inetd.conf"
+_inetcnf_tmp="/etc/inetd.conf.$$"
+
+if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
+then
+ # Check if ssh service is already in use as sshd
+ with_comment=1
+ grep -q '^[ \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && with_comment=0
+ # Remove sshd line from inetd.conf
+ if [ `grep -q '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
+ then
+ grep -v '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+ if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
+ then
+ if mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
+ then
+ echo "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}"
+ else
+ echo "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed\!"
+ fi
+ rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+ else
+ echo "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed\!"
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ # Add ssh line to inetd.conf
+ if [ `grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
+ then
+ if [ "${with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
+ then
+ echo 'ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
+ else
+ echo '# ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
+ fi
+ echo "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}"
+ fi
+fi
+
+# Create /var/log and /var/log/lastlog if not already existing
+
+if [ -f /var/log ]
+then
+ echo "Creating /var/log failed\!"
+else
+ if [ ! -d /var/log ]
+ then
+ mkdir /var/log
+ fi
+ if [ -d /var/log/lastlog ]
+ then
+ echo "Creating /var/log/lastlog failed\!"
+ elif [ ! -f /var/log/lastlog ]
+ then
+ cat /dev/null > /var/log/lastlog
+ fi
+fi
+
+# On NT ask if sshd should be installed as service
+if [ $_nt -gt 0 ]
+then
+ echo
+ echo "Do you want to install sshd as service?"
+ if request "(Say \"no\" if it's already installed as service)"
+ then
+ echo
+ echo "Which value should the environment variable CYGWIN have when"
+ echo "sshd starts? It's recommended to set at least \"ntsec\" to be"
+ echo "able to change user context without password."
+ echo -n "Default is \"binmode ntsec tty\". CYGWIN="
+ read _cygwin
+ [ -z "${_cygwin}" ] && _cygwin="binmode ntsec tty"
+ if cygrunsrv -I sshd -d "CYGWIN sshd" -p /usr/sbin/sshd -a -D -e "CYGWIN=${_cygwin}"
+ then
+ chown system /etc/ssh*
+ echo
+ echo "The service has been installed under LocalSystem account."
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+if [ "${old_install}" = "1" ]
+then
+ echo
+ echo "Note: If you have used sshd as service or from inetd, don't forget to"
+ echo " change the path to sshd.exe in the service entry or in inetd.conf."
+fi
+
+echo
+echo "Host configuration finished. Have fun!"
--- /dev/null
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# ssh-user-config, Copyright 2000, Red Hat Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
+
+progname=$0
+auto_answer=""
+auto_passphrase="no"
+passphrase=""
+
+request()
+{
+ if [ "${auto_answer}" = "yes" ]
+ then
+ return 0
+ elif [ "${auto_answer}" = "no" ]
+ then
+ return 1
+ fi
+
+ answer=""
+ while [ "X${answer}" != "Xyes" -a "X${answer}" != "Xno" ]
+ do
+ echo -n "$1 (yes/no) "
+ read answer
+ done
+ if [ "X${answer}" = "Xyes" ]
+ then
+ return 0
+ else
+ return 1
+ fi
+}
+
+# Check options
+
+while :
+do
+ case $# in
+ 0)
+ break
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ option=$1
+ shift
+
+ case "$option" in
+ -d | --debug )
+ set -x
+ ;;
+
+ -y | --yes )
+ auto_answer=yes
+ ;;
+
+ -n | --no )
+ auto_answer=no
+ ;;
+
+ -p | --passphrase )
+ with_passphrase="yes"
+ passphrase=$1
+ shift
+ ;;
+
+ *)
+ echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..."
+ echo
+ echo "This script creates an OpenSSH user configuration."
+ echo
+ echo "Options:"
+ echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output."
+ echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
+ echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
+ echo " --passphrase -p word Use \"word\" as passphrase automatically."
+ echo
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+
+ esac
+done
+
+# Ask user if user identity should be generated
+
+if [ ! -f /etc/passwd ]
+then
+ echo '/etc/passwd is nonexistant. Please generate an /etc/passwd file'
+ echo 'first using mkpasswd. Check if it contains an entry for you and'
+ echo 'please care for the home directory in your entry as well.'
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+uid=`id -u`
+pwdhome=`awk -F: '{ if ( $3 == '${uid}' ) print $6; }' < /etc/passwd`
+
+if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X" ]
+then
+ echo 'There is no home directory set for you in /etc/passwd.'
+ echo 'Setting $HOME is not sufficient!'
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ ! -d "${pwdhome}" ]
+then
+ echo "${pwdhome} is set in /etc/passwd as your home directory"
+ echo 'but it is not a valid directory. Cannot create user identity files.'
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+# If home is the root dir, set home to empty string to avoid error messages
+# in subsequent parts of that script.
+if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X/" ]
+then
+ # But first raise a warning!
+ echo 'Your home directory in /etc/passwd is set to root (/). This is not recommended!'
+ if request "Would you like to proceed anyway?"
+ then
+ pwdhome=''
+ else
+ exit 1
+ fi
+fi
+
+if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" -a ! -d "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+then
+ echo "${pwdhome}/.ssh is existant but not a directory. Cannot create user identity files."
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+then
+ mkdir "${pwdhome}/.ssh"
+ if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+ then
+ echo "Creating users ${pwdhome}/.ssh directory failed"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/identity" ]
+then
+ if request "Shall I create an SSH1 RSA identity file for you?"
+ then
+ echo "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/identity"
+ if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ]
+ then
+ ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/identity" > /dev/null
+ else
+ ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/identity" > /dev/null
+ fi
+ if request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?"
+ then
+ echo "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+ cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/identity.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_rsa" ]
+then
+ if request "Shall I create an SSH2 RSA identity file for you? (yes/no) "
+ then
+ echo "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_rsa"
+ if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ]
+ then
+ ssh-keygen -t rsa -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_rsa" > /dev/null
+ else
+ ssh-keygen -t rsa -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_rsa" > /dev/null
+ fi
+ if request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?"
+ then
+ echo "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys2"
+ cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_rsa.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys2"
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_dsa" ]
+then
+ if request "Shall I create an SSH2 DSA identity file for you? (yes/no) "
+ then
+ echo "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_dsa"
+ if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ]
+ then
+ ssh-keygen -t dsa -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_dsa" > /dev/null
+ else
+ ssh-keygen -t dsa -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_dsa" > /dev/null
+ fi
+ if request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?"
+ then
+ echo "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys2"
+ cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/id_dsa.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys2"
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+echo
+echo "Configuration finished. Have fun!"
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Compile with:
+ *
+ * cc `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+ * gnome-ssh-askpass.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
+ * `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <gnome.h>
+#include <X11/Xlib.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+
+void
+report_failed_grab (void)
+{
+ GtkWidget *err;
+
+ err = gnome_message_box_new("Could not grab keyboard or mouse.\n"
+ "A malicious client may be eavesdropping on your session.",
+ GNOME_MESSAGE_BOX_ERROR, "EXIT", NULL);
+ gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(err), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL);
+
+ gnome_dialog_run_and_close(GNOME_DIALOG(err));
+}
+
+void
+passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+{
+ char *passphrase;
+ char **messages;
+ int result, i;
+
+ GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *label;
+
+ dialog = gnome_dialog_new("OpenSSH", GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_OK,
+ GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_CANCEL, NULL);
+
+ messages = g_strsplit(message, "\\n", 0);
+ if (messages)
+ for(i = 0; messages[i]; i++) {
+ label = gtk_label_new(messages[i]);
+ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
+ label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+ }
+
+ entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
+ FALSE, 0);
+ gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+
+ /* Center window and prepare for grab */
+ gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(dialog), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL);
+ gnome_dialog_set_default(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), 0);
+ gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ gtk_window_set_policy(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), FALSE, FALSE, TRUE);
+ gnome_dialog_close_hides(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), TRUE);
+ gtk_container_set_border_width(GTK_CONTAINER(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
+ GNOME_PAD);
+ gtk_widget_show_all(dialog);
+
+ /* Grab focus */
+ XGrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+ if (gdk_pointer_grab(dialog->window, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL,
+ GDK_CURRENT_TIME))
+ goto nograb;
+ if (gdk_keyboard_grab(dialog->window, FALSE, GDK_CURRENT_TIME))
+ goto nograbkb;
+
+ /* Make <enter> close dialog */
+ gnome_dialog_editable_enters(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_EDITABLE(entry));
+
+ /* Run dialog */
+ result = gnome_dialog_run(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
+
+ /* Ungrab */
+ XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+ gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+ gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+ gdk_flush();
+
+ /* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
+ passphrase = gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry));
+ if (result == 0)
+ puts(passphrase);
+
+ /* Zero passphrase in memory */
+ memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
+ gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
+
+ gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
+ return;
+
+ /* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report
+ the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot
+ fail. */
+ nograbkb:
+ gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+ nograb:
+ XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+ gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
+
+ report_failed_grab();
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char *message;
+
+ gnome_init("GNOME ssh-askpass", "0.1", argc, argv);
+
+ if (argc == 2)
+ message = argv[1];
+ else
+ message = "Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:";
+
+ setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
+ passphrase_dialog(message);
+ return 0;
+}
--- /dev/null
+README for OpenSSH HP-UX contrib files
+Kevin Steves <stevesk@pobox.com>
+
+sshd: configuration file for sshd.rc
+sshd.rc: SSH startup script
+egd: configuration file for egd.rc
+egd.rc: EGD (entropy gathering daemon) startup script
+
+To install:
+
+sshd.rc:
+
+o Verify paths in sshd.rc match your local installation
+ (WHAT_PATH and WHAT_PID)
+o Customize sshd if needed (SSHD_ARGS)
+o Install:
+
+ # cp sshd /etc/rc.config.d
+ # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/sshd
+ # cp sshd.rc /sbin/init.d
+ # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc
+ # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K100sshd
+ # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S900sshd
+
+egd.rc:
+
+o Verify egd.pl path in egd.rc matches your local installation
+ (WHAT_PATH)
+o Customize egd if needed (EGD_ARGS and EGD_LOG)
+o Add pseudo account:
+
+ # groupadd egd
+ # useradd -g egd egd
+ # mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd
+ # chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd
+ # chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd
+
+o Install:
+
+ # cp egd /etc/rc.config.d
+ # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/egd
+ # cp egd.rc /sbin/init.d
+ # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/egd.rc
+ # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K600egd
+ # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S400egd
--- /dev/null
+# EGD_START: Set to 1 to start entropy gathering daemon
+# EGD_ARGS: Command line arguments to pass to egd
+# EGD_LOG: EGD stdout and stderr log file (default /etc/opt/egd/egd.log)
+#
+# To configure the egd environment:
+
+# groupadd egd
+# useradd -g egd egd
+# mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd
+# chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd
+# chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd
+
+EGD_START=1
+EGD_ARGS='/etc/opt/egd/entropy'
+EGD_LOG=
--- /dev/null
+#!/sbin/sh
+
+#
+# egd.rc: EGD start-up and shutdown script
+#
+
+# Allowed exit values:
+# 0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist.
+# 1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist.
+# 2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist.
+# Use this value if execution of this script is overridden
+# by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not
+# appropriate to execute for some other reason.
+# 3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution.
+
+# Input and output:
+# stdin is redirected from /dev/null
+#
+# stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file
+# during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode.
+
+umask 022
+
+PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin
+export PATH
+
+WHAT='EGD (entropy gathering daemon)'
+WHAT_PATH=/opt/perl/bin/egd.pl
+WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/egd
+WHAT_LOG=/etc/opt/egd/egd.log
+
+# NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might
+# not be available. Do not attempt to access commands or files in
+# /usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater. Other
+# file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var
+# and /opt.
+
+rval=0
+
+# Check the exit value of a command run by this script. If non-zero, the
+# exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script
+# is set to indicate failure.
+
+set_return() {
+ x=$?
+ if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then
+ echo "EXIT CODE: $x"
+ rval=1 # script FAILed
+ fi
+}
+
+case $1 in
+'start_msg')
+ echo "Starting $WHAT"
+ ;;
+
+'stop_msg')
+ echo "Stopping $WHAT"
+ ;;
+
+'start')
+ if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then
+ . $WHAT_CONFIG
+ else
+ echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING"
+ fi
+
+
+ if [ "$EGD_START" -eq 1 -a -x $WHAT_PATH ]; then
+ EGD_LOG=${EGD_LOG:-$WHAT_LOG}
+ su egd -c "nohup $WHAT_PATH $EGD_ARGS >$EGD_LOG 2>&1" &&
+ echo $WHAT started
+ set_return
+ else
+ rval=2
+ fi
+ ;;
+
+'stop')
+ pid=`ps -fuegd | awk '$1 == "egd" { print $2 }'`
+ if [ "X$pid" != "X" ]; then
+ if kill "$pid"; then
+ echo "$WHAT stopped"
+ else
+ rval=1
+ echo "Unable to stop $WHAT"
+ fi
+ fi
+ set_return
+ ;;
+
+*)
+ echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}"
+ rval=1
+ ;;
+esac
+
+exit $rval
--- /dev/null
+# SSHD_START: Set to 1 to start SSH daemon
+# SSHD_ARGS: Command line arguments to pass to sshd
+#
+SSHD_START=1
+SSHD_ARGS=
--- /dev/null
+#!/sbin/sh
+
+#
+# sshd.rc: SSH daemon start-up and shutdown script
+#
+
+# Allowed exit values:
+# 0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist.
+# 1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist.
+# 2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist.
+# Use this value if execution of this script is overridden
+# by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not
+# appropriate to execute for some other reason.
+# 3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution.
+
+# Input and output:
+# stdin is redirected from /dev/null
+#
+# stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file
+# during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode.
+
+PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin
+export PATH
+
+WHAT='OpenSSH'
+WHAT_PATH=/opt/openssh/sbin/sshd
+WHAT_PID=/var/run/sshd.pid
+WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/sshd
+
+# NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might
+# not be available. Do not attempt to access commands or files in
+# /usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater. Other
+# file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var
+# and /opt.
+
+rval=0
+
+# Check the exit value of a command run by this script. If non-zero, the
+# exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script
+# is set to indicate failure.
+
+set_return() {
+ x=$?
+ if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then
+ echo "EXIT CODE: $x"
+ rval=1 # script FAILed
+ fi
+}
+
+case $1 in
+'start_msg')
+ echo "Starting $WHAT"
+ ;;
+
+'stop_msg')
+ echo "Stopping $WHAT"
+ ;;
+
+'start')
+ if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then
+ . $WHAT_CONFIG
+ else
+ echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING"
+ fi
+
+ if [ "$SSHD_START" -eq 1 -a -x "$WHAT_PATH" ]; then
+ $WHAT_PATH $SSHD_ARGS && echo "$WHAT started"
+ set_return
+ else
+ rval=2
+ fi
+ ;;
+
+'stop')
+ if kill `cat $WHAT_PID`; then
+ echo "$WHAT stopped"
+ else
+ rval=1
+ echo "Unable to stop $WHAT"
+ fi
+ set_return
+ ;;
+
+*)
+ echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}"
+ rval=1
+ ;;
+esac
+
+exit $rval
--- /dev/null
+# Version of OpenSSH
+%define oversion 3.0.2p1
+
+# Version of ssh-askpass
+%define aversion 1.2.4.1
+
+# Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define no_x11_askpass 0
+
+# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define no_gnome_askpass 0
+
+# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no)
+%define static_libcrypto 0
+
+# Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no)
+%define scard 0
+
+# Use Redhat 7.0 pam control file
+%define redhat7 0
+
+# Disable IPv6 (avoids DNS hangs on some glibc versions)
+%define noip6 0
+
+# Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
+%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1}
+%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1}
+
+# Options for Redhat version:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "rh7 1"
+%{?rh7:%define redhat7 1}
+
+# Options for static OpenSSL link:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
+%{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1}
+
+# Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine)
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1"
+%{?smartcard:%define scard 1}
+
+# Option to disable ipv6
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "noipv6 1"
+%{?noipv6:%define noip6 1}
+
+%define exact_openssl_version %(rpm -q openssl | cut -d - -f 2)
+
+Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2
+Name: openssh
+Version: %{oversion}
+Release: 1
+Packager: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
+Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{oversion}.tar.gz
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+Source1: http://www.pobox.com/~jmknoble/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz
+%endif
+License: BSD
+Group: Applications/Internet
+BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot
+Obsoletes: ssh
+BuildPreReq: perl, openssl-devel, tcp_wrappers
+BuildPreReq: /bin/login, /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h
+BuildPreReq: rpm >= 3.0.5
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+BuildPreReq: XFree86-devel
+%endif
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+BuildPreReq: gnome-libs-devel
+%endif
+%if ! %{static_libcrypto}
+PreReq: openssl >= 0.9.5a
+PreReq: openssl = %{exact_openssl_version}
+Requires: openssl >= 0.9.5a
+%endif
+Requires: rpm >= 3.0.5
+
+%package clients
+Summary: OpenSSH clients.
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Obsoletes: ssh-clients
+
+%package server
+Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon.
+Group: System Environment/Daemons
+Obsoletes: ssh-server
+PreReq: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9
+%if %{redhat7}
+Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
+%endif
+
+%package askpass
+Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X.
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Obsoletes: ssh-extras
+
+%package askpass-gnome
+Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME.
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Obsoletes: ssh-extras
+
+%description
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's SSH (Secure SHell) protocol implementation. SSH
+replaces rlogin and rsh, to provide secure encrypted communications
+between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections
+and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure
+channel. Public key authentication may be used for "passwordless"
+access to servers.
+
+This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH
+client and server. To make this package useful, you should also
+install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both.
+
+%description clients
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's SSH (Secure SHell) protocol implementation.
+
+This package includes the clients necessary to make encrypted
+connections to SSH protocol servers. You'll also need to install the
+openssh package on OpenSSH clients.
+
+%description server
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's SSH (Secure SHell) protocol implementation.
+
+This package contains the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon
+allows SSH clients to securely connect to your SSH server. You also
+need to have the openssh package installed.
+
+%description askpass
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's SSH (Secure SHell) protocol implementation.
+
+This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
+
+%description askpass-gnome
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's SSH (Secure SHell) protocol implementation.
+
+This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the
+GNOME GUI desktop environment.
+
+%prep
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+%setup -q -a 1
+%else
+%setup -q
+%endif
+
+%build
+
+%define _sysconfdir /etc/ssh
+
+EXTRA_OPTS=""
+
+%if %{scard}
+ EXTRA_OPTS="$EXTRA_OPTS --with-smartcard"
+%endif
+
+%if %{noip6}
+ EXTRA_OPTS="$EXTRA_OPTS --with-ipv4-default "
+%endif
+
+%configure \
+ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
+ --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
+ --with-pam \
+ --with-tcp-wrappers \
+ --with-rsh=/usr/bin/rsh \
+ --with-default-path=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/X11R6/bin \
+ $EXTRA_OPTS
+
+%if %{static_libcrypto}
+perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|/usr/lib/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile
+%endif
+
+make
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}
+%configure \
+ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+xmkmf -a
+make
+popd
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+pushd contrib
+gcc -O -g `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+ gnome-ssh-askpass.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
+ `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+popd
+%endif
+
+%install
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+%{makeinstall} \
+ libexecdir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
+ datadir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/openssh \
+ DESTDIR=/ # Hack to disable key generation
+
+
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+%if %{redhat7}
+install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam-7.x $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+%else
+install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+%endif
+install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+install -s x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+ln -s /usr/libexec/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+install -s contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
+
+%clean
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+%post server
+/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
+if test -r /var/run/sshd.pid ; then
+ /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd restart >&2
+fi
+
+%preun server
+if [ "$1" = 0 ] ; then
+ /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd stop >&2
+ /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd
+fi
+
+%files
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* RFC* TODO WARNING*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/moduli
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
+%if %{scard}
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin
+%endif
+
+%files clients
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh_config
+%attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin
+%attr(-,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1*
+
+%files server
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
+#%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+%files askpass
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+%files askpass-gnome
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%changelog
+* Mon Oct 18 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Merge some of Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> changes from the
+ Redhat 7.0 spec file
+* Tue Sep 05 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Use RPM configure macro
+* Tue Aug 08 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Some surgery to sshd.init (generate keys at runtime)
+- Cleanup of groups and removal of keygen calls
+* Wed Jul 12 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Make building of X11-askpass and gnome-askpass optional
+* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Glob manpages to catch compressed files
+* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Updated for new location
+- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
+* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Added Jim Knoble's <jmknoble@pobox.com> askpass
+* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
+* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
+* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use make install
+- Subpackages
+* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Added links for slogin
+- Fixed perms on manpages
+* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Renamed init script
+* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Back to old binary names
+* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use autoconf
+- New binary names
+* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
+
--- /dev/null
+#!/bin/bash
+
+# Init file for OpenSSH server daemon
+#
+# chkconfig: 2345 55 25
+# description: OpenSSH server daemon
+#
+# processname: sshd
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed
+# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid
+
+# source function library
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
+
+[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd
+
+RETVAL=0
+
+# Some functions to make the below more readable
+KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen
+RSA1_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid
+my_success() {
+ local msg
+ if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then
+ msg="$2"
+ else
+ msg="done"
+ fi
+ case "`type -type success`" in
+ function)
+ success "$1"
+ ;;
+ *)
+ echo -n "${msg}"
+ ;;
+ esac
+}
+my_failure() {
+ local msg
+ if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then
+ msg="$2"
+ else
+ msg="FAILED"
+ fi
+ case "`type -type failure`" in
+ function)
+ failure "$1"
+ ;;
+ *)
+ echo -n "${msg}"
+ ;;
+ esac
+}
+do_rsa1_keygen() {
+ if ! test -f $RSA1_KEY ; then
+ echo -n "Generating SSH1 RSA host key: "
+ if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa1 -f $RSA1_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+ my_success "RSA1 key generation"
+ echo
+ else
+ my_failure "RSA1 key generation"
+ echo
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ fi
+}
+do_rsa_keygen() {
+ if ! test -f $RSA_KEY ; then
+ echo -n "Generating SSH2 RSA host key: "
+ if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+ my_success "RSA key generation"
+ echo
+ else
+ my_failure "RSA key generation"
+ echo
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ fi
+}
+do_dsa_keygen() {
+ if ! test -f $DSA_KEY ; then
+ echo -n "Generating SSH2 DSA host key: "
+ if $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then
+ my_success "DSA key generation"
+ echo
+ else
+ my_failure "DSA key generation"
+ echo
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ fi
+}
+do_restart_sanity_check() {
+ sshd -t
+ RETVAL=$?
+ if [ ! "$RETVAL" = 0 ]; then
+ my_failure "Configuration file or keys"
+ echo
+ exit $RETVAL
+ fi
+}
+
+
+case "$1" in
+ start)
+ # Create keys if necessary
+ do_rsa1_keygen;
+ do_rsa_keygen;
+ do_dsa_keygen;
+
+ echo -n "Starting sshd: "
+ if [ ! -f $PID_FILE ] ; then
+ sshd $OPTIONS
+ RETVAL=$?
+ if [ "$RETVAL" = "0" ] ; then
+ my_success "sshd startup" "sshd"
+ touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd
+ else
+ my_failure "sshd startup" ""
+ fi
+ fi
+ echo
+ ;;
+ stop)
+ echo -n "Shutting down sshd: "
+ if [ -f $PID_FILE ] ; then
+ killproc sshd
+ RETVAL=$?
+ [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd
+ fi
+ echo
+ ;;
+ restart)
+ do_restart_sanity_check
+ $0 stop
+ $0 start
+ RETVAL=$?
+ ;;
+ condrestart)
+ if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then
+ do_restart_sanity_check
+ $0 stop
+ $0 start
+ RETVAL=$?
+ fi
+ ;;
+ status)
+ status sshd
+ RETVAL=$?
+ ;;
+ *)
+ echo "Usage: sshd {start|stop|restart|status|condrestart}"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+esac
+
+exit $RETVAL
--- /dev/null
+#%PAM-1.0
+auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nodelay
+auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
+account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so
+password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so
+password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok
+session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so
+session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so
--- /dev/null
+#%PAM-1.0
+auth required /lib/security/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
+account required /lib/security/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+password required /lib/security/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+session required /lib/security/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so
+session optional /lib/security/pam_console.so
--- /dev/null
+The following is a new package build script for Solaris. This is being
+introduced into OpenSSH 3.0 and above in hopes of simplifying the build
+process.
+
+The build process is called a 'dummy install'.. Which means the software does
+a "make install-nokeys DESTDIR=[fakeroot]". This way all manpages should
+be handled correctly and key are defered until the first time the sshd
+is started.
+
+Directions:
+
+1. make -F Makefile.in distprep (Only if you are getting from the CVS tree)
+2. ./configure --with-pam [..any other options you want..]
+3. cd contrib/solaris; ./buildpkg.sh
+
+If all goes well you should have a solaris package ready to be installed.
+
+If you have any problems with this script please post them to
+openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org and I will try to assist you as best as I can.
+
+- Ben Lindstrom
+
+TODO:
+- Expand to cover all sysvr4 family of OSes
+- Clean things up a bit more.
+- Detect if sshd is running and refuse to start.
+- SHOULD check for existing sshd_config nor ssh_config (does not currently).
+ [Post install script? Ugh.. Nasty]
--- /dev/null
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# Fake Root Solaris Build System - Prototype
+#
+# The following code has been provide under Public Domain License. I really
+# don't care what you use it for. Just as long as you don't complain to me
+# nor my employer if you break it. - Ben Lindstrom (mouring@eviladmin.org)
+#
+umask 022
+PKGNAME=OpenSSH
+
+## Extract common info requires for the 'info' part of the package.
+VERSION=`tail -1 ../../version.h | sed -e 's/.*_\([0-9]\)/\1/g' | sed 's/\"$//'`
+ARCH=`uname -p`
+
+## Start by faking root install
+echo "Faking root install..."
+START=`pwd`
+FAKE_ROOT=$START/package
+mkdir $FAKE_ROOT
+cd ../..
+make install-nokeys DESTDIR=$FAKE_ROOT
+
+## Fill in some details, like prefix and sysconfdir
+ETCDIR=`grep "^sysconfdir=" Makefile | sed 's/sysconfdir=//'`
+PREFIX=`grep "^prefix=" Makefile | cut -d = -f 2`
+PIDDIR=`grep "^piddir=" Makefile | cut -d = -f 2`
+cd $FAKE_ROOT
+
+## Setup our run level stuff while we are at it.
+mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT/etc/init.d
+mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rcS.d
+mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc0.d
+mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc1.d
+mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc2.d
+
+
+## setup our initscript correctly
+sed -e "s#%%configDir%%#$ETCDIR#g" \
+ -e "s#%%openSSHDir%%#$PREFIX#g" \
+ -e "s#%%pidDir%%#$PIDDIR#g" \
+ ../opensshd.in > $FAKE_ROOT/etc/init.d/opensshd
+chmod 711 $FAKE_ROOT/etc/init.d/opensshd
+
+ln -s ../init.d/opensshd $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rcS.d/K30opensshd
+ln -s ../init.d/opensshd $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc0.d/K30opensshd
+ln -s ../init.d/opensshd $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc1.d/K30opensshd
+ln -s ../init.d/opensshd $FAKE_ROOT/etc/rc2.d/S98opensshd
+
+
+## Ok, this is outright wrong, but it will work. I'm tired of pkgmk
+## whining.
+for i in *; do
+ PROTO_ARGS="$PROTO_ARGS $i=/$i";
+done
+
+## Build info file
+echo "Building pkginfo file..."
+cat > pkginfo << _EOF
+PKG=$PKGNAME
+NAME=OpenSSH Portable for Solaris
+DESC="Secure Shell remote access utility; replaces telnet and rlogin/rsh."
+VENDOR="OpenSSH Portable Team - http://www.openssh.com/portable.html"
+BASEDIR=$FAKE_ROOT
+ARCH=$ARCH
+VERSION=$VERSION
+CATEGORY=Security
+BASEDIR=/
+_EOF
+
+## Next Build our prototype
+echo "Building prototype file..."
+find . | egrep -v "prototype|pkginfo" | sort | pkgproto $PROTO_ARGS | \
+ awk '
+ BEGIN { print "i pkginfo" }
+ { $5="root"; $6="sys"; }
+ { print; }' > prototype
+
+## Step back a directory and now build the package.
+echo "Building package.."
+cd ..
+pkgmk -d . -f $FAKE_ROOT/prototype -o
+rm -rf $FAKE_ROOT
+echo | pkgtrans -os . $PKGNAME-$ARCH-$VERSION.pkg
+rm -rf $PKGNAME
--- /dev/null
+#!/sbin/sh
+# Donated code that was put under PD license.
+#
+# Stripped PRNGd out of it for the time being.
+
+AWK=/usr/bin/awk
+CAT=/usr/bin/cat
+KILL=/usr/bin/kill
+PS=/usr/bin/ps
+XARGS=/usr/bin/xargs
+
+prefix=%%openSSHDir%%
+etcdir=%%configDir%%
+piddir=%%pidDir%%
+
+SSHD=$prefix/sbin/sshd
+PIDFILE=$piddir/sshd.pid
+SSH_KEYGEN=$prefix/bin/ssh-keygen
+HOST_KEY_RSA1=$etcdir/ssh_host_key
+HOST_KEY_DSA=$etcdir/ssh_host_dsa_key
+HOST_KEY_RSA=$etcdir/ssh_host_rsa_key
+
+killproc() {
+ _procname=$1
+ _signal=$2
+ ${PS} -u root | ${AWK} '/'"$_procname"'$/ {print $1}' | ${XARGS} ${KILL}
+}
+
+
+checkkeys() {
+ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA1 ]; then
+ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa1 -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA1} -N ""
+ fi
+ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_DSA ]; then
+ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t dsa -f ${HOST_KEY_DSA} -N ""
+ fi
+ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA ]; then
+ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA} -N ""
+ fi
+}
+
+stop_service() {
+ if [ -r $PIDFILE -a ! -z ${PIDFILE} ]; then
+ PID=`${CAT} ${PIDFILE}`
+ fi
+ if [ ${PID:=0} -gt 1 -a ! "X$PID" = "X " ]; then
+ ${KILL} ${PID}
+ else
+ echo "Unable to read PID file, killing using alternate method"
+ killproc sshd TERM
+ fi
+}
+
+start_service() {
+ # XXX We really should check if the service is already going, but
+ # XXX we will opt out at this time. - Bal
+
+ # Check to see if we have keys that need to be made
+ checkkeys
+
+ # Start SSHD
+ echo "starting $SSHD... \c" ; $SSHD
+
+ sshd_rc=$?
+ if [ $sshd_rc -ne 0 ]; then
+ echo "$0: Error ${sshd_rc} starting ${SSHD}... bailing."
+ exit $sshd_rc
+ fi
+ echo done.
+}
+
+case $1 in
+
+'start')
+ start_service
+ ;;
+
+'stop')
+ stop_service
+ ;;
+
+'restart')
+ stop_service
+ start_service
+ ;;
+
+*)
+ echo "$0: usage: $0 {start|stop|restart}"
+ ;;
+esac
--- /dev/null
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Shell script to install your identity.pub on a remote machine
+# Takes the remote machine name as an argument.
+# Obviously, the remote machine must accept password authentication,
+# or one of the other keys in your ssh-agent, for this to work.
+
+ID_FILE="${HOME}/.ssh/identity.pub"
+
+if [ "-i" = "$1" ]; then
+ shift
+ # check if we have 2 parameters left, if so the first is the new ID file
+ if [ -n "$2" ]; then
+ if expr "$1" : ".*\.pub" ; then
+ ID_FILE="$1"
+ else
+ ID_FILE="$1.pub"
+ fi
+ shift # and this should leave $1 as the target name
+ fi
+else
+ if [ x$SSH_AUTH_SOCK != x ] ; then
+ GET_ID="$GET_ID ssh-add -L"
+ fi
+fi
+
+if [ -z "`eval $GET_ID`" -a -r "${ID_FILE}" ] ; then
+ GET_ID="cat ${ID_FILE}"
+fi
+
+if [ -z "`eval $GET_ID`" ]; then
+ echo "$0: ERROR: No identities found"
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $1 "umask 077; test -d .ssh || mkdir .ssh ; cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys"
+
+cat <<EOF
+Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '$1'", and check in:
+
+ .ssh/authorized_keys
+
+to make sure we haven't added extra keys that you weren't expecting.
+
+EOF
--- /dev/null
+.ig \" -*- nroff -*-
+Copyright (c) 1999 Philip Hands Computing <http://www.hands.com/>
+
+Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of
+this manual provided the copyright notice and this permission notice
+are preserved on all copies.
+
+Permission is granted to copy and distribute modified versions of this
+manual under the conditions for verbatim copying, provided that the
+entire resulting derived work is distributed under the terms of a
+permission notice identical to this one.
+
+Permission is granted to copy and distribute translations of this
+manual into another language, under the above conditions for modified
+versions, except that this permission notice may be included in
+translations approved by the Free Software Foundation instead of in
+the original English.
+..
+.TH SSH-COPY-ID 1 "14 November 1999" "OpenSSH"
+.SH NAME
+ssh-copy-id \- install your identity.pub in a remote machine's authorized_keys
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B ssh-copy-id [-i [identity_file]]
+.I "[user@]machine"
+.br
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.BR ssh-copy-id
+is a script that uses ssh to log into a remote machine (presumably
+using a login password, so password authentication should be enabled,
+unless you've done some clever use of multiple identities)
+.PP
+It also changes the permissions of the remote user's home,
+.BR ~/.ssh ,
+and
+.B ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+to remove group writability (which would otherwise prevent you from logging in, if the remote
+.B sshd
+has
+.B StrictModes
+set in its configuration).
+.PP
+If the
+.B -i
+option is given then the identity file (defaults to
+.BR ~/.ssh/identity.pub )
+is used, regardless of whether there are any keys in your
+.BR ssh-agent .
+Otherwise, if this:
+.PP
+.B " ssh-add -L"
+.PP
+provides any output, it uses that in preference to the identity file.
+.PP
+If the
+.B -i
+option is used, or the
+.B ssh-add
+produced no output, then it uses the contents of the identity
+file. Once it has one or more fingerprints (by whatever means) it
+uses ssh to append them to
+.B ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on the remote machine (creating the file, and directory, if necessary)
+
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.BR ssh (1),
+.BR ssh-agent (1),
+.BR sshd (8)
--- /dev/null
+sshd auth required pam_unix.so try_first_pass
+sshd account required pam_unix.so
+sshd password required pam_permit.so
+sshd session required pam_permit.so
+
--- /dev/null
+#%PAM-1.0
+auth required /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nodelay
+auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
+account required /lib/security/pam_unix.so
+password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so
+password required /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nullok use_authtok
+session required /lib/security/pam_unix.so
+session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so
--- /dev/null
+Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
+Name: openssh
+Version: 3.0.2p1
+URL: http://www.openssh.com/
+Release: 1
+Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+Copyright: BSD
+Group: Applications/Internet
+BuildRoot: /tmp/openssh-%{version}-buildroot
+PreReq: openssl
+Obsoletes: ssh
+#
+# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.)
+# building prerequisites -- stuff for
+# OpenSSL (openssl-devel),
+# TCP Wrappers (nkitb),
+# and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd)
+#
+BuildPrereq: openssl
+BuildPrereq: nkitb
+BuildPrereq: glibdev
+BuildPrereq: gtkdev
+BuildPrereq: gnlibsd
+
+%description
+Ssh (Secure Shell) a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
+rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
+up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
+patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL).
+
+This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH
+client and server. Additionally, this package contains the GNOME
+passphrase dialog.
+
+%changelog
+* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Glob manpages to catch compressed files
+* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Updated for new location
+- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
+* Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass
+* Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and
+ /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into
+ his released tarfile
+- Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600
+ even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs
+- Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host
+ key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing
+ message if an SSH host key is already in place
+- Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation)
+* Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support
+- Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer)
+* Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Made this package correct for SuSE.
+- Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly
+ with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default.
+* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
+* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
+* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use make install
+- Subpackages
+* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Added links for slogin
+- Fixed perms on manpages
+* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Renamed init script
+* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Back to old binary names
+* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use autoconf
+- New binary names
+* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
+
+%prep
+
+%setup -q
+
+%build
+CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
+./configure --prefix=/usr \
+ --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh \
+ --datadir=/usr/share/openssh \
+ --with-pam \
+ --with-gnome-askpass \
+ --with-tcp-wrappers \
+ --with-ipv4-default \
+ --libexecdir=/usr/lib/ssh
+make
+
+cd contrib
+gcc -O -g `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+ gnome-ssh-askpass.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
+ `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+cd ..
+
+%install
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/ssh/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/sbin/init.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/ssh
+install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/sbin/init.d/sshd
+ln -s ../../sbin/init.d/sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/sbin/rcsshd
+install -s contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+ln -s gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass
+install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd \
+ $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
+
+%clean
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+%post
+if [ "$1" = 1 ]; then
+ echo "Creating SSH stop/start scripts in the rc directories..."
+ ln -s ../sshd /sbin/init.d/rc2.d/K20sshd
+ ln -s ../sshd /sbin/init.d/rc2.d/S20sshd
+ ln -s ../sshd /sbin/init.d/rc3.d/K20sshd
+ ln -s ../sshd /sbin/init.d/rc3.d/S20sshd
+fi
+echo "Updating /etc/rc.config..."
+if [ -x /bin/fillup ] ; then
+ /bin/fillup -q -d = etc/rc.config var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd
+else
+ echo "ERROR: fillup not found. This should NOT happen in SuSE Linux."
+ echo "Update /etc/rc.config by hand from the following template file:"
+ echo " /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd"
+fi
+if [ ! -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -o ! -s /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key ]; then
+ echo "Generating SSH host key..."
+ /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -b 1024 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N '' >&2
+fi
+if [ ! -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -o ! -s /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ]; then
+ echo "Generating SSH DSA host key..."
+ /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -d -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N '' >&2
+fi
+if test -r /var/run/sshd.pid
+then
+ echo "Restarting the running SSH daemon..."
+ /usr/sbin/rcsshd restart >&2
+fi
+
+%preun
+if [ "$1" = 0 ]
+then
+ echo "Stopping the SSH daemon..."
+ /usr/sbin/rcsshd stop >&2
+ echo "Removing SSH stop/start scripts from the rc directories..."
+ rm /sbin/init.d/rc2.d/K20sshd
+ rm /sbin/init.d/rc2.d/S20sshd
+ rm /sbin/init.d/rc3.d/K20sshd
+ rm /sbin/init.d/rc3.d/S20sshd
+fi
+
+%files
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README*
+%doc RFC.nroff TODO CREDITS LICENSE
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir /etc/ssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config /etc/ssh/moduli
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config /etc/pam.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config /sbin/init.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/ssh-keygen
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/scp
+%attr(4755,root,root) /usr/bin/ssh
+%attr(-,root,root) /usr/bin/slogin
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/ssh-agent
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/ssh-add
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/ssh-keyscan
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/sftp
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/sbin/sshd
+%attr(-,root,root) /usr/sbin/rcsshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir /usr/lib/ssh
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass
+%attr(0755,root,root) /usr/lib/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/scp.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/ssh.1*
+%attr(-,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/slogin.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/ssh-agent.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/ssh-add.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/man/man8/sshd.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd
+
--- /dev/null
+#
+# Start the Secure Shell (SSH) Daemon?
+#
+START_SSHD="yes"
+
--- /dev/null
+#! /bin/sh
+# Copyright (c) 1995-1998 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany.
+#
+# Author: Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+#
+# /sbin/init.d/sshd
+#
+# and symbolic its link
+#
+# /sbin/rcsshd
+#
+
+. /etc/rc.config
+
+# Determine the base and follow a runlevel link name.
+base=${0##*/}
+link=${base#*[SK][0-9][0-9]}
+
+# Force execution if not called by a runlevel directory.
+test $link = $base && START_SSHD=yes
+test "$START_SSHD" = yes || exit 0
+
+# The echo return value for success (defined in /etc/rc.config).
+return=$rc_done
+case "$1" in
+ start)
+ echo -n "Starting service sshd"
+ ## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails
+ ## the echo return value is set appropriate.
+
+ startproc /usr/sbin/sshd || return=$rc_failed
+
+ echo -e "$return"
+ ;;
+ stop)
+ echo -n "Stopping service sshd"
+ ## Stop daemon with killproc(8) and if this fails
+ ## set echo the echo return value.
+
+ killproc -TERM /usr/sbin/sshd || return=$rc_failed
+
+ echo -e "$return"
+ ;;
+ restart)
+ ## If first returns OK call the second, if first or
+ ## second command fails, set echo return value.
+ $0 stop && $0 start || return=$rc_failed
+ ;;
+ reload)
+ ## Choose ONE of the following two cases:
+
+ ## First possibility: A few services accepts a signal
+ ## to reread the (changed) configuration.
+
+ echo -n "Reload service sshd"
+ killproc -HUP /usr/sbin/sshd || return=$rc_failed
+ echo -e "$return"
+ ;;
+ status)
+ echo -n "Checking for service sshd"
+ ## Check status with checkproc(8), if process is running
+ ## checkproc will return with exit status 0.
+
+ checkproc /usr/sbin/sshd && echo OK || echo No process
+ ;;
+ probe)
+ ## Optional: Probe for the necessity of a reload,
+ ## give out the argument which is required for a reload.
+
+ test /etc/ssh/sshd_config -nt /var/run/sshd.pid && echo reload
+ ;;
+ *)
+ echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|status|restart|reload[|probe]}"
+ exit 1
+ ;;
+esac
+
+# Inform the caller not only verbosely and set an exit status.
+test "$return" = "$rc_done" || exit 1
+exit 0
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * COPYRIGHT (C) 1986 Gary S. Brown. You may use this program, or
+ * code or tables extracted from it, as desired without restriction.
+ *
+ * First, the polynomial itself and its table of feedback terms. The
+ * polynomial is
+ * X^32+X^26+X^23+X^22+X^16+X^12+X^11+X^10+X^8+X^7+X^5+X^4+X^2+X^1+X^0
+ *
+ * Note that we take it "backwards" and put the highest-order term in
+ * the lowest-order bit. The X^32 term is "implied"; the LSB is the
+ * X^31 term, etc. The X^0 term (usually shown as "+1") results in
+ * the MSB being 1
+ *
+ * Note that the usual hardware shift register implementation, which
+ * is what we're using (we're merely optimizing it by doing eight-bit
+ * chunks at a time) shifts bits into the lowest-order term. In our
+ * implementation, that means shifting towards the right. Why do we
+ * do it this way? Because the calculated CRC must be transmitted in
+ * order from highest-order term to lowest-order term. UARTs transmit
+ * characters in order from LSB to MSB. By storing the CRC this way
+ * we hand it to the UART in the order low-byte to high-byte; the UART
+ * sends each low-bit to hight-bit; and the result is transmission bit
+ * by bit from highest- to lowest-order term without requiring any bit
+ * shuffling on our part. Reception works similarly
+ *
+ * The feedback terms table consists of 256, 32-bit entries. Notes
+ *
+ * The table can be generated at runtime if desired; code to do so
+ * is shown later. It might not be obvious, but the feedback
+ * terms simply represent the results of eight shift/xor opera
+ * tions for all combinations of data and CRC register values
+ *
+ * The values must be right-shifted by eight bits by the "updcrc
+ * logic; the shift must be u_(bring in zeroes). On some
+ * hardware you could probably optimize the shift in assembler by
+ * using byte-swap instructions
+ * polynomial $edb88320
+ */
+
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: crc32.c,v 1.8 2000/12/19 23:17:56 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "crc32.h"
+
+static u_int crc32_tab[] = {
+ 0x00000000L, 0x77073096L, 0xee0e612cL, 0x990951baL, 0x076dc419L,
+ 0x706af48fL, 0xe963a535L, 0x9e6495a3L, 0x0edb8832L, 0x79dcb8a4L,
+ 0xe0d5e91eL, 0x97d2d988L, 0x09b64c2bL, 0x7eb17cbdL, 0xe7b82d07L,
+ 0x90bf1d91L, 0x1db71064L, 0x6ab020f2L, 0xf3b97148L, 0x84be41deL,
+ 0x1adad47dL, 0x6ddde4ebL, 0xf4d4b551L, 0x83d385c7L, 0x136c9856L,
+ 0x646ba8c0L, 0xfd62f97aL, 0x8a65c9ecL, 0x14015c4fL, 0x63066cd9L,
+ 0xfa0f3d63L, 0x8d080df5L, 0x3b6e20c8L, 0x4c69105eL, 0xd56041e4L,
+ 0xa2677172L, 0x3c03e4d1L, 0x4b04d447L, 0xd20d85fdL, 0xa50ab56bL,
+ 0x35b5a8faL, 0x42b2986cL, 0xdbbbc9d6L, 0xacbcf940L, 0x32d86ce3L,
+ 0x45df5c75L, 0xdcd60dcfL, 0xabd13d59L, 0x26d930acL, 0x51de003aL,
+ 0xc8d75180L, 0xbfd06116L, 0x21b4f4b5L, 0x56b3c423L, 0xcfba9599L,
+ 0xb8bda50fL, 0x2802b89eL, 0x5f058808L, 0xc60cd9b2L, 0xb10be924L,
+ 0x2f6f7c87L, 0x58684c11L, 0xc1611dabL, 0xb6662d3dL, 0x76dc4190L,
+ 0x01db7106L, 0x98d220bcL, 0xefd5102aL, 0x71b18589L, 0x06b6b51fL,
+ 0x9fbfe4a5L, 0xe8b8d433L, 0x7807c9a2L, 0x0f00f934L, 0x9609a88eL,
+ 0xe10e9818L, 0x7f6a0dbbL, 0x086d3d2dL, 0x91646c97L, 0xe6635c01L,
+ 0x6b6b51f4L, 0x1c6c6162L, 0x856530d8L, 0xf262004eL, 0x6c0695edL,
+ 0x1b01a57bL, 0x8208f4c1L, 0xf50fc457L, 0x65b0d9c6L, 0x12b7e950L,
+ 0x8bbeb8eaL, 0xfcb9887cL, 0x62dd1ddfL, 0x15da2d49L, 0x8cd37cf3L,
+ 0xfbd44c65L, 0x4db26158L, 0x3ab551ceL, 0xa3bc0074L, 0xd4bb30e2L,
+ 0x4adfa541L, 0x3dd895d7L, 0xa4d1c46dL, 0xd3d6f4fbL, 0x4369e96aL,
+ 0x346ed9fcL, 0xad678846L, 0xda60b8d0L, 0x44042d73L, 0x33031de5L,
+ 0xaa0a4c5fL, 0xdd0d7cc9L, 0x5005713cL, 0x270241aaL, 0xbe0b1010L,
+ 0xc90c2086L, 0x5768b525L, 0x206f85b3L, 0xb966d409L, 0xce61e49fL,
+ 0x5edef90eL, 0x29d9c998L, 0xb0d09822L, 0xc7d7a8b4L, 0x59b33d17L,
+ 0x2eb40d81L, 0xb7bd5c3bL, 0xc0ba6cadL, 0xedb88320L, 0x9abfb3b6L,
+ 0x03b6e20cL, 0x74b1d29aL, 0xead54739L, 0x9dd277afL, 0x04db2615L,
+ 0x73dc1683L, 0xe3630b12L, 0x94643b84L, 0x0d6d6a3eL, 0x7a6a5aa8L,
+ 0xe40ecf0bL, 0x9309ff9dL, 0x0a00ae27L, 0x7d079eb1L, 0xf00f9344L,
+ 0x8708a3d2L, 0x1e01f268L, 0x6906c2feL, 0xf762575dL, 0x806567cbL,
+ 0x196c3671L, 0x6e6b06e7L, 0xfed41b76L, 0x89d32be0L, 0x10da7a5aL,
+ 0x67dd4accL, 0xf9b9df6fL, 0x8ebeeff9L, 0x17b7be43L, 0x60b08ed5L,
+ 0xd6d6a3e8L, 0xa1d1937eL, 0x38d8c2c4L, 0x4fdff252L, 0xd1bb67f1L,
+ 0xa6bc5767L, 0x3fb506ddL, 0x48b2364bL, 0xd80d2bdaL, 0xaf0a1b4cL,
+ 0x36034af6L, 0x41047a60L, 0xdf60efc3L, 0xa867df55L, 0x316e8eefL,
+ 0x4669be79L, 0xcb61b38cL, 0xbc66831aL, 0x256fd2a0L, 0x5268e236L,
+ 0xcc0c7795L, 0xbb0b4703L, 0x220216b9L, 0x5505262fL, 0xc5ba3bbeL,
+ 0xb2bd0b28L, 0x2bb45a92L, 0x5cb36a04L, 0xc2d7ffa7L, 0xb5d0cf31L,
+ 0x2cd99e8bL, 0x5bdeae1dL, 0x9b64c2b0L, 0xec63f226L, 0x756aa39cL,
+ 0x026d930aL, 0x9c0906a9L, 0xeb0e363fL, 0x72076785L, 0x05005713L,
+ 0x95bf4a82L, 0xe2b87a14L, 0x7bb12baeL, 0x0cb61b38L, 0x92d28e9bL,
+ 0xe5d5be0dL, 0x7cdcefb7L, 0x0bdbdf21L, 0x86d3d2d4L, 0xf1d4e242L,
+ 0x68ddb3f8L, 0x1fda836eL, 0x81be16cdL, 0xf6b9265bL, 0x6fb077e1L,
+ 0x18b74777L, 0x88085ae6L, 0xff0f6a70L, 0x66063bcaL, 0x11010b5cL,
+ 0x8f659effL, 0xf862ae69L, 0x616bffd3L, 0x166ccf45L, 0xa00ae278L,
+ 0xd70dd2eeL, 0x4e048354L, 0x3903b3c2L, 0xa7672661L, 0xd06016f7L,
+ 0x4969474dL, 0x3e6e77dbL, 0xaed16a4aL, 0xd9d65adcL, 0x40df0b66L,
+ 0x37d83bf0L, 0xa9bcae53L, 0xdebb9ec5L, 0x47b2cf7fL, 0x30b5ffe9L,
+ 0xbdbdf21cL, 0xcabac28aL, 0x53b39330L, 0x24b4a3a6L, 0xbad03605L,
+ 0xcdd70693L, 0x54de5729L, 0x23d967bfL, 0xb3667a2eL, 0xc4614ab8L,
+ 0x5d681b02L, 0x2a6f2b94L, 0xb40bbe37L, 0xc30c8ea1L, 0x5a05df1bL,
+ 0x2d02ef8dL
+};
+
+/* Return a 32-bit CRC of the contents of the buffer. */
+
+u_int
+ssh_crc32(const u_char *s, u_int len)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ u_int crc32val;
+
+ crc32val = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i ++) {
+ crc32val = crc32_tab[(crc32val ^ s[i]) & 0xff] ^ (crc32val >> 8);
+ }
+ return crc32val;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1992 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for computing 32-bit CRC.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: crc32.h,v 1.12 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef CRC32_H
+#define CRC32_H
+
+u_int ssh_crc32(const u_char *, u_int);
+
+#endif /* CRC32_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.14 2001/06/23 15:12:18 itojun Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
+ * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
+ * this copyright notice is retained.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
+ * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "deattack.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "crc32.h"
+#include "getput.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* SSH Constants */
+#define SSH_MAXBLOCKS (32 * 1024)
+#define SSH_BLOCKSIZE (8)
+
+/* Hashing constants */
+#define HASH_MINSIZE (8 * 1024)
+#define HASH_ENTRYSIZE (2)
+#define HASH_FACTOR(x) ((x)*3/2)
+#define HASH_UNUSEDCHAR (0xff)
+#define HASH_UNUSED (0xffff)
+#define HASH_IV (0xfffe)
+
+#define HASH_MINBLOCKS (7*SSH_BLOCKSIZE)
+
+
+/* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */
+#define HASH(x) GET_32BIT(x)
+
+#define CMP(a, b) (memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE))
+
+static void
+crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b)
+{
+ b ^= *a;
+ *a = ssh_crc32((u_char *) &b, sizeof(b));
+}
+
+/* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */
+static int
+check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len,
+ u_char *IV)
+{
+ u_int32_t crc;
+ u_char *c;
+
+ crc = 0;
+ if (IV && !CMP(S, IV)) {
+ crc_update(&crc, 1);
+ crc_update(&crc, 0);
+ }
+ for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ if (!CMP(S, c)) {
+ crc_update(&crc, 1);
+ crc_update(&crc, 0);
+ } else {
+ crc_update(&crc, 0);
+ crc_update(&crc, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ return (crc == 0);
+}
+
+
+/* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */
+int
+detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len, u_char *IV)
+{
+ static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL;
+ static u_int32_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
+ register u_int32_t i, j;
+ u_int32_t l;
+ register u_char *c;
+ u_char *d;
+
+ if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) ||
+ len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0) {
+ fatal("detect_attack: bad length %d", len);
+ }
+ for (l = n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2)
+ ;
+
+ if (h == NULL) {
+ debug("Installing crc compensation attack detector.");
+ n = l;
+ h = (u_int16_t *) xmalloc(n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+ } else {
+ if (l > n) {
+ n = l;
+ h = (u_int16_t *) xrealloc(h, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) {
+ for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ if (IV && (!CMP(c, IV))) {
+ if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)))
+ return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ if (!CMP(c, d)) {
+ if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)))
+ return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return (DEATTACK_OK);
+ }
+ memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
+
+ if (IV)
+ h[HASH(IV) & (n - 1)] = HASH_IV;
+
+ for (c = buf, j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
+ for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
+ i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) {
+ if (h[i] == HASH_IV) {
+ if (!CMP(c, IV)) {
+ if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
+ return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
+ if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
+ return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ h[i] = j;
+ }
+ return (DEATTACK_OK);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: deattack.h,v 1.7 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - Header file
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
+ *
+ * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
+ * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
+ * this copyright notice is retained.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
+ * <http://www.core-sdi.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DEATTACK_H
+#define _DEATTACK_H
+
+/* Return codes */
+#define DEATTACK_OK 0
+#define DEATTACK_DETECTED 1
+
+int detect_attack(u_char *, u_int32_t, u_char[8]);
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+#ifndef _DEFINES_H
+#define _DEFINES_H
+
+/* $Id$ */
+
+/* Necessary headers */
+
+#include <sys/types.h> /* For [u]intxx_t */
+#include <sys/socket.h> /* For SHUT_XXXX */
+#include <sys/param.h> /* For MAXPATHLEN and roundup() */
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h> /* For typedefs */
+#include <netinet/in.h> /* For IPv6 macros */
+#include <netinet/ip.h> /* For IPTOS macros */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h> /* For sockaddr_un */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+# include <sys/bitypes.h> /* For u_intXX_t */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h> /* For _PATH_XXX */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h> /* For PATH_MAX */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h> /* For timersub */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+# include <maillock.h> /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
+# include <sys/cdefs.h> /* For __P() */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h> /* For MIN, MAX, etc */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h> /* For S_* constants and macros */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+# include <libc.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <unistd.h> /* For STDIN_FILENO, etc */
+#include <termios.h> /* Struct winsize */
+#include <fcntl.h> /* For O_NONBLOCK */
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+/* *-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively */
+#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+# include <strings.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+# include <login.h>
+#endif
+
+
+/* Constants */
+
+#ifndef SHUT_RDWR
+enum
+{
+ SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */
+ SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */
+ SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */
+};
+# define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD
+# define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR
+# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR
+#endif
+
+#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY
+# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10
+# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08
+# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04
+# define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02
+# define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST
+#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */
+
+#ifndef MAXPATHLEN
+# ifdef PATH_MAX
+# define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
+# else /* PATH_MAX */
+# define MAXPATHLEN 64 /* Should be safe */
+# endif /* PATH_MAX */
+#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
+
+#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
+# define STDIN_FILENO 0
+#endif
+#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO
+# define STDOUT_FILENO 1
+#endif
+#ifndef STDERR_FILENO
+# define STDERR_FILENO 2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */
+#ifdef NGROUPS
+#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
+#else
+#define NGROUPS_MAX 0
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef O_NONBLOCK /* Non Blocking Open */
+# define O_NONBLOCK 00004
+#endif
+
+#ifndef S_ISDIR
+# define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR))
+#endif /* S_ISDIR */
+
+#ifndef S_ISREG
+# define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG))
+#endif /* S_ISREG */
+
+#ifndef S_ISLNK
+# define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
+#endif /* S_ISLNK */
+
+#ifndef S_IXUSR
+# define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */
+# define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */
+# define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */
+# define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */
+# define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */
+# define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */
+# define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */
+# define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */
+# define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */
+# define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */
+# define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */
+# define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */
+# define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */
+#endif /* S_IXUSR */
+
+/* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this constant in the system headers */
+#ifdef MISSING_NFDBITS
+# define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long))
+#endif
+
+/* Types */
+
+/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
+/* (or die trying) */
+
+
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INT
+typedef unsigned int u_int;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T
+# if (SIZEOF_CHAR == 1)
+typedef char int8_t;
+# else
+# error "8 bit int type not found."
+# endif
+# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
+typedef short int int16_t;
+# else
+# ifdef _CRAY
+typedef long int16_t;
+# else
+# error "16 bit int type not found."
+# endif /* _CRAY */
+# endif
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+typedef int int32_t;
+# else
+# ifdef _CRAY
+typedef long int32_t;
+# else
+# error "32 bit int type not found."
+# endif /* _CRAY */
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
+# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+typedef uint8_t u_int8_t;
+typedef uint16_t u_int16_t;
+typedef uint32_t u_int32_t;
+# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
+# else
+# if (SIZEOF_CHAR == 1)
+typedef unsigned char u_int8_t;
+# else
+# error "8 bit int type not found."
+# endif
+# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
+typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t;
+# else
+# ifdef _CRAY
+typedef unsigned long u_int16_t;
+# else
+# error "16 bit int type not found."
+# endif
+# endif
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+typedef unsigned int u_int32_t;
+# else
+# ifdef _CRAY
+typedef unsigned long u_int32_t;
+# else
+# error "32 bit int type not found."
+# endif
+# endif
+# endif
+#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__
+#endif
+
+/* 64-bit types */
+#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef long int int64_t;
+# define HAVE_INT64_T 1
+# else
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef long long int int64_t;
+# define HAVE_INT64_T 1
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t;
+# define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1
+# else
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t;
+# define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+#if !defined(HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT) && (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+# define HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR
+typedef unsigned char u_char;
+# define HAVE_U_CHAR
+#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T
+typedef unsigned int size_t;
+# define HAVE_SIZE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T
+typedef int ssize_t;
+# define HAVE_SSIZE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T
+typedef long clock_t;
+# define HAVE_CLOCK_T
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+typedef int sa_family_t;
+# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PID_T
+typedef int pid_t;
+# define HAVE_PID_T
+#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T
+typedef int mode_t;
+# define HAVE_MODE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
+# define ss_family __ss_family
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+struct sockaddr_un {
+ short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */
+ char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */
+};
+#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
+#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
+struct winsize {
+ unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */
+ unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */
+ unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */
+ unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */
+};
+#endif
+
+/* *-*-nto-qnx does not define this type in the system headers */
+#ifdef MISSING_FD_MASK
+ typedef unsigned long int fd_mask;
+#endif
+
+/* Paths */
+
+#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL
+# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh"
+#endif
+#ifndef _PATH_CSHELL
+# define _PATH_CSHELL "/bin/csh"
+#endif
+#ifndef _PATH_SHELLS
+# define _PATH_SHELLS "/etc/shells"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USER_PATH
+# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH
+# undef _PATH_STDPATH
+# endif
+# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
+# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL
+# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAIL_DIRECTORY
+# define MAIL_DIRECTORY "/var/spool/mail"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAILDIR
+# define MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAILDIR)
+# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAILDIR
+#endif /* !defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAILDIR) */
+
+#ifndef _PATH_RSH
+# ifdef RSH_PATH
+# define _PATH_RSH RSH_PATH
+# else /* RSH_PATH */
+# define _PATH_RSH "/usr/bin/rsh"
+# endif /* RSH_PATH */
+#endif /* _PATH_RSH */
+
+#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
+# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
+#endif
+
+/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */
+#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
+#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH
+#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
+
+#ifndef _PATH_TTY
+# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty"
+#endif
+
+/* Macros */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H)
+# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAX
+# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
+# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef roundup
+# define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef timersub
+#define timersub(a, b, result) \
+ do { \
+ (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \
+ (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \
+ if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \
+ --(result)->tv_sec; \
+ (result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __P
+# define __P(x) x
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \
+ ((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \
+ (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff)))
+#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */
+
+#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2)
+# define __attribute__(x)
+#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */
+
+/* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this macro in the system headers */
+#ifdef MISSING_HOWMANY
+# define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
+#endif
+
+/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
+
+/* In older versions of libpam, pam_strerror takes a single argument */
+#ifdef HAVE_OLD_PAM
+# define PAM_STRERROR(a,b) pam_strerror((b))
+#else
+# define PAM_STRERROR(a,b) pam_strerror((a),(b))
+#endif
+
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
+#else
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
+# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#endif
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO)
+# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+#endif
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR)
+# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
+# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATEXIT) && defined(HAVE_ON_EXIT)
+# define atexit(a, NULL) on_exit(a, NULL)
+#else
+# if defined(HAVE_XATEXIT)
+# define atexit(a) xatexit(a)
+# endif /* defined(HAVE_XATEXIT) */
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ATEXIT) && defined(HAVE_ON_EXIT) */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
+# define USE_VHANGUP
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) */
+
+#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
+# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
+#endif
+
+/* OPENSSL_free() is Free() in versions before OpenSSL 0.9.6 */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090600f)
+# define OPENSSL_free(x) Free(x)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
+ * client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems.
+ *
+ * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems
+ * but you may need to set it yourself
+ */
+/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */
+
+/**
+ ** login recorder definitions
+ **/
+
+/* preprocess */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+# include <time.h>
+# endif
+# include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+# ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
+# include <sys/time.h>
+# endif
+# include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+# include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+/* FIXME: put default paths back in */
+#ifndef UTMP_FILE
+# ifdef _PATH_UTMP
+# define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP
+# else
+# ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE
+# define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef WTMP_FILE
+# ifdef _PATH_WTMP
+# define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP
+# else
+# ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE
+# define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */
+#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE
+# ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG
+# define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG
+# else
+# ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+# define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+
+/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN)
+# define USE_LOGIN
+
+#else
+/* Simply select your favourite login types. */
+/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... <sigh> */
+# if defined(UTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX)
+# define USE_UTMPX
+# endif
+# if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP)
+# define USE_UTMP
+# endif
+# if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX)
+# define USE_WTMPX
+# endif
+# if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP)
+# define USE_WTMP
+# endif
+
+#endif
+
+/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */
+#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+# define USE_LASTLOG
+#endif
+
+/* which type of time to use? (api.c) */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# define USE_TIMEVAL
+#endif
+
+/** end of login recorder definitions */
+
+#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.17 2001/06/23 15:12:18 itojun Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+static int
+parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
+{
+ char *cp, *arg;
+ char *strsize, *gen, *prime;
+
+ cp = line;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ /* Ignore leading whitespace */
+ if (*arg == '\0')
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!*arg || *arg == '#')
+ return 0;
+
+ /* time */
+ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+ goto fail;
+ arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* type */
+ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+ goto fail;
+ arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tests */
+ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+ goto fail;
+ arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tries */
+ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+ goto fail;
+ strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */
+ if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' ||
+ (dhg->size = atoi(strsize)) == 0)
+ goto fail;
+ /* The whole group is one bit larger */
+ dhg->size++;
+ gen = strsep(&cp, " "); /* gen */
+ if (cp == NULL || *gen == '\0')
+ goto fail;
+ prime = strsep(&cp, " "); /* prime */
+ if (cp != NULL || *prime == '\0')
+ goto fail;
+
+ dhg->g = BN_new();
+ dhg->p = BN_new();
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0)
+ goto failclean;
+
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->p, prime) == 0)
+ goto failclean;
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(dhg->p) != dhg->size)
+ goto failclean;
+
+ return (1);
+
+ failclean:
+ BN_free(dhg->g);
+ BN_free(dhg->p);
+ fail:
+ error("Bad prime description in line %d", linenum);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+DH *
+choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[2048];
+ int best, bestcount, which;
+ int linenum;
+ struct dhgroup dhg;
+
+ if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL &&
+ (f = fopen(_PATH_DH_PRIMES, "r")) == NULL) {
+ log("WARNING: %s does not exist, using old modulus", _PATH_DH_MODULI);
+ return (dh_new_group1());
+ }
+
+ linenum = 0;
+ best = bestcount = 0;
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ linenum++;
+ if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
+ continue;
+ BN_free(dhg.g);
+ BN_free(dhg.p);
+
+ if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min)
+ continue;
+
+ if ((dhg.size > wantbits && dhg.size < best) ||
+ (dhg.size > best && best < wantbits)) {
+ best = dhg.size;
+ bestcount = 0;
+ }
+ if (dhg.size == best)
+ bestcount++;
+ }
+ rewind(f);
+
+ if (bestcount == 0) {
+ fclose(f);
+ log("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_PRIMES);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
+ linenum = 0;
+ which = arc4random() % bestcount;
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
+ continue;
+ if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) ||
+ dhg.size != best ||
+ linenum++ != which) {
+ BN_free(dhg.g);
+ BN_free(dhg.p);
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ if (linenum != which+1)
+ fatal("WARNING: line %d disappeared in %s, giving up",
+ which, _PATH_DH_PRIMES);
+
+ return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p));
+}
+
+/* diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 */
+
+int
+dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+{
+ int i;
+ int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub);
+ int bits_set = 0;
+
+ if (dh_pub->neg) {
+ log("invalid public DH value: negativ");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i))
+ bits_set++;
+ debug("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+
+ /* if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial */
+ if (bits_set > 1 && (BN_cmp(dh_pub, dh->p) == -1))
+ return 1;
+ log("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+{
+ int i, bits_set = 0, tries = 0;
+
+ if (dh->p == NULL)
+ fatal("dh_gen_key: dh->p == NULL");
+ if (2*need >= BN_num_bits(dh->p))
+ fatal("dh_gen_key: group too small: %d (2*need %d)",
+ BN_num_bits(dh->p), 2*need);
+ do {
+ if (dh->priv_key != NULL)
+ BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+ dh->priv_key = BN_new();
+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+ fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_new failed");
+ /* generate a 2*need bits random private exponent */
+ if (!BN_rand(dh->priv_key, 2*need, 0, 0))
+ fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_rand failed");
+ if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+ fatal("DH_generate_key");
+ for (i = 0; i <= BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key); i++)
+ if (BN_is_bit_set(dh->priv_key, i))
+ bits_set++;
+ debug("dh_gen_key: priv key bits set: %d/%d",
+ bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key));
+ if (tries++ > 10)
+ fatal("dh_gen_key: too many bad keys: giving up");
+ } while (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key));
+}
+
+DH *
+dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+
+ dh = DH_new();
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ fatal("DH_new");
+
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_hex2bn p");
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0)
+ fatal("BN_hex2bn g");
+
+ return (dh);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange
+ * value.
+ */
+
+DH *
+dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+
+ dh = DH_new();
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ fatal("DH_new");
+ dh->p = modulus;
+ dh->g = gen;
+
+ return (dh);
+}
+
+DH *
+dh_new_group1(void)
+{
+ static char *gen = "2", *group1 =
+ "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+ "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+ "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+ "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+ "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE65381"
+ "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+ return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group1));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an
+ * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits). Estimate
+ * with: O(exp(1.9223 * (ln q)^(1/3) (ln ln q)^(2/3)))
+ */
+
+int
+dh_estimate(int bits)
+{
+
+ if (bits < 64)
+ return (512); /* O(2**63) */
+ if (bits < 128)
+ return (1024); /* O(2**86) */
+ if (bits < 192)
+ return (2048); /* O(2**116) */
+ return (4096); /* O(2**156) */
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.7 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef DH_H
+#define DH_H
+
+struct dhgroup {
+ int size;
+ BIGNUM *g;
+ BIGNUM *p;
+};
+
+DH *choose_dh(int, int, int);
+DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *);
+DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
+DH *dh_new_group1(void);
+
+void dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *);
+
+int dh_estimate(int);
+
+#define DH_GRP_MIN 1024
+#define DH_GRP_MAX 8192
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.11 2001/06/10 11:29:20 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+
+#define DISPATCH_MIN 0
+#define DISPATCH_MAX 255
+
+dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
+
+void
+dispatch_protocol_error(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ fatal("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d plen %d", type, plen);
+}
+void
+dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *dflt)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++)
+ dispatch[i] = dflt;
+}
+void
+dispatch_set(int type, dispatch_fn *fn)
+{
+ dispatch[type] = fn;
+}
+void
+dispatch_run(int mode, int *done, void *ctxt)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ int plen;
+ int type;
+
+ if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) {
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ } else {
+ type = packet_read_poll(&plen);
+ if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE)
+ return;
+ }
+ if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && dispatch[type] != NULL)
+ (*dispatch[type])(type, plen, ctxt);
+ else
+ packet_disconnect("protocol error: rcvd type %d", type);
+ if (done != NULL && *done)
+ return;
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.6 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+enum {
+ DISPATCH_BLOCK,
+ DISPATCH_NONBLOCK
+};
+
+typedef void dispatch_fn(int, int, void *);
+
+void dispatch_init(dispatch_fn *);
+void dispatch_set(int, dispatch_fn *);
+void dispatch_run(int, int *, void *);
+void dispatch_protocol_error(int, int, void *);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+/* SunOS 4.4.4 needs this */
+#ifdef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H
+# include <floatingpoint.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H */
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#ifndef offsetof
+# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
+#endif
+
+/* Number of times to pass through command list gathering entropy */
+#define NUM_ENTROPY_RUNS 1
+
+/* Scale entropy estimates back by this amount on subsequent runs */
+#define SCALE_PER_RUN 10.0
+
+/* Minimum number of commands to be considered valid */
+#define MIN_ENTROPY_SOURCES 16
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\n"
+
+#ifndef RUSAGE_SELF
+# define RUSAGE_SELF 0
+#endif
+#ifndef RUSAGE_CHILDREN
+# define RUSAGE_CHILDREN 0
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
+# define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+#endif
+
+static void
+check_openssl_version(void)
+{
+ if (SSLeay() != OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+ "have %lx", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+}
+
+#if defined(PRNGD_SOCKET) || defined(PRNGD_PORT)
+# define USE_PRNGD
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_PRNGD) || defined(RANDOM_POOL)
+
+#ifdef USE_PRNGD
+/* Collect entropy from PRNGD/EGD */
+int
+get_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int fd;
+ char msg[2];
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+ struct sockaddr_in addr;
+#else
+ struct sockaddr_un addr;
+#endif
+ int addr_len, rval, errors;
+ mysig_t old_sigpipe;
+
+ memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
+
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+ addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
+ addr.sin_port = htons(PRNGD_PORT);
+ addr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+#else /* use IP socket PRNGD_SOCKET instead */
+ /* Sanity checks */
+ if (sizeof(PRNGD_SOCKET) > sizeof(addr.sun_path))
+ fatal("Random pool path is too long");
+ if (len > 255)
+ fatal("Too many bytes to read from PRNGD");
+
+ addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strlcpy(addr.sun_path, PRNGD_SOCKET, sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+ addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
+ sizeof(PRNGD_SOCKET);
+#endif
+
+ old_sigpipe = mysignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+ errors = rval = 0;
+reopen:
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+ fd = socket(addr.sin_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't create AF_INET socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ goto done;
+ }
+#else
+ fd = socket(addr.sun_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't create AF_UNIX socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ goto done;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+ error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s",
+ PRNGD_PORT, strerror(errno));
+#else
+ error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s",
+ addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */
+ msg[0] = 0x02;
+ msg[1] = len;
+
+ if (atomicio(write, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+ close(fd);
+ errors++;
+ goto reopen;
+ }
+ error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != len) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+ close(fd);
+ errors++;
+ goto reopen;
+ }
+ error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rval = 1;
+done:
+ mysignal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
+ if (fd != -1)
+ close(fd);
+ return(rval);
+}
+#else /* !USE_PRNGD */
+#ifdef RANDOM_POOL
+/* Collect entropy from /dev/urandom or pipe */
+static int
+get_random_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int random_pool;
+
+ random_pool = open(RANDOM_POOL, O_RDONLY);
+ if (random_pool == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't open random pool \"%s\": %s",
+ RANDOM_POOL, strerror(errno));
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (atomicio(read, random_pool, buf, len) != len) {
+ error("Couldn't read from random pool \"%s\": %s",
+ RANDOM_POOL, strerror(errno));
+ close(random_pool);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ close(random_pool);
+
+ return(1);
+}
+#endif /* RANDOM_POOL */
+#endif /* USE_PRNGD */
+
+/*
+ * Seed OpenSSL's random number pool from Kernel random number generator
+ * or PRNGD/EGD
+ */
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[32];
+
+ debug("Seeding random number generator");
+
+ if (!get_random_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf))) {
+ if (!RAND_status())
+ fatal("Entropy collection failed and entropy exhausted");
+ } else {
+ RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+ }
+
+ memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+void
+init_rng(void)
+{
+ check_openssl_version();
+}
+
+#else /* defined(USE_PRNGD) || defined(RANDOM_POOL) */
+
+/*
+ * FIXME: proper entropy estimations. All current values are guesses
+ * FIXME: (ATL) do estimates at compile time?
+ * FIXME: More entropy sources
+ */
+
+/* slow command timeouts (all in milliseconds) */
+/* static int entropy_timeout_default = ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC; */
+static int entropy_timeout_current = ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC;
+
+static int prng_seed_saved = 0;
+static int prng_initialised = 0;
+uid_t original_uid;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ /* Proportion of data that is entropy */
+ double rate;
+ /* Counter goes positive if this command times out */
+ unsigned int badness;
+ /* Increases by factor of two each timeout */
+ unsigned int sticky_badness;
+ /* Path to executable */
+ char *path;
+ /* argv to pass to executable */
+ char *args[5];
+ /* full command string (debug) */
+ char *cmdstring;
+} entropy_source_t;
+
+double stir_from_system(void);
+double stir_from_programs(void);
+double stir_gettimeofday(double entropy_estimate);
+double stir_clock(double entropy_estimate);
+double stir_rusage(int who, double entropy_estimate);
+double hash_output_from_command(entropy_source_t *src, char *hash);
+
+/* this is initialised from a file, by prng_read_commands() */
+entropy_source_t *entropy_sources = NULL;
+
+double
+stir_from_system(void)
+{
+ double total_entropy_estimate;
+ long int i;
+
+ total_entropy_estimate = 0;
+
+ i = getpid();
+ RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.5);
+ total_entropy_estimate += 0.1;
+
+ i = getppid();
+ RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.5);
+ total_entropy_estimate += 0.1;
+
+ i = getuid();
+ RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.0);
+ i = getgid();
+ RAND_add(&i, sizeof(i), 0.0);
+
+ total_entropy_estimate += stir_gettimeofday(1.0);
+ total_entropy_estimate += stir_clock(0.5);
+ total_entropy_estimate += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_SELF, 2.0);
+
+ return(total_entropy_estimate);
+}
+
+double
+stir_from_programs(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ int c;
+ double entropy_estimate;
+ double total_entropy_estimate;
+ char hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ total_entropy_estimate = 0;
+ for(i = 0; i < NUM_ENTROPY_RUNS; i++) {
+ c = 0;
+ while (entropy_sources[c].path != NULL) {
+
+ if (!entropy_sources[c].badness) {
+ /* Hash output from command */
+ entropy_estimate = hash_output_from_command(&entropy_sources[c], hash);
+
+ /* Scale back entropy estimate according to command's rate */
+ entropy_estimate *= entropy_sources[c].rate;
+
+ /* Upper bound of entropy estimate is SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+ if (entropy_estimate > SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ entropy_estimate = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+ /* Scale back estimates for subsequent passes through list */
+ entropy_estimate /= SCALE_PER_RUN * (i + 1.0);
+
+ /* Stir it in */
+ RAND_add(hash, sizeof(hash), entropy_estimate);
+
+ debug3("Got %0.2f bytes of entropy from '%s'", entropy_estimate,
+ entropy_sources[c].cmdstring);
+
+ total_entropy_estimate += entropy_estimate;
+
+ /* Execution times should be a little unpredictable */
+ total_entropy_estimate += stir_gettimeofday(0.05);
+ total_entropy_estimate += stir_clock(0.05);
+ total_entropy_estimate += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_SELF, 0.1);
+ total_entropy_estimate += stir_rusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, 0.1);
+ } else {
+ debug2("Command '%s' disabled (badness %d)",
+ entropy_sources[c].cmdstring, entropy_sources[c].badness);
+
+ if (entropy_sources[c].badness > 0)
+ entropy_sources[c].badness--;
+ }
+
+ c++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return(total_entropy_estimate);
+}
+
+double
+stir_gettimeofday(double entropy_estimate)
+{
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't gettimeofday: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ RAND_add(&tv, sizeof(tv), entropy_estimate);
+
+ return(entropy_estimate);
+}
+
+double
+stir_clock(double entropy_estimate)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_CLOCK
+ clock_t c;
+
+ c = clock();
+ RAND_add(&c, sizeof(c), entropy_estimate);
+
+ return(entropy_estimate);
+#else /* _HAVE_CLOCK */
+ return(0);
+#endif /* _HAVE_CLOCK */
+}
+
+double
+stir_rusage(int who, double entropy_estimate)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_GETRUSAGE
+ struct rusage ru;
+
+ if (getrusage(who, &ru) == -1)
+ return(0);
+
+ RAND_add(&ru, sizeof(ru), entropy_estimate);
+
+ return(entropy_estimate);
+#else /* _HAVE_GETRUSAGE */
+ return(0);
+#endif /* _HAVE_GETRUSAGE */
+}
+
+
+static int
+_get_timeval_msec_difference(struct timeval *t1, struct timeval *t2) {
+ int secdiff, usecdiff;
+
+ secdiff = t2->tv_sec - t1->tv_sec;
+ usecdiff = (secdiff*1000000) + (t2->tv_usec - t1->tv_usec);
+ return (int)(usecdiff / 1000);
+}
+
+double
+hash_output_from_command(entropy_source_t *src, char *hash)
+{
+ static int devnull = -1;
+ int p[2];
+ fd_set rdset;
+ int cmd_eof = 0, error_abort = 0;
+ struct timeval tv_start, tv_current;
+ int msec_elapsed = 0;
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status;
+ char buf[16384];
+ int bytes_read;
+ int total_bytes_read;
+ SHA_CTX sha;
+
+ debug3("Reading output from \'%s\'", src->cmdstring);
+
+ if (devnull == -1) {
+ devnull = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
+ if (devnull == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't open /dev/null: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ if (pipe(p) == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't open pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ (void)gettimeofday(&tv_start, NULL); /* record start time */
+
+ switch (pid = fork()) {
+ case -1: /* Error */
+ close(p[0]);
+ close(p[1]);
+ fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ case 0: /* Child */
+ dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO);
+ dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
+ dup2(p[1], STDERR_FILENO);
+ close(p[0]);
+ close(p[1]);
+ close(devnull);
+
+ setuid(original_uid);
+ execv(src->path, (char**)(src->args));
+ debug("(child) Couldn't exec '%s': %s", src->cmdstring,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(-1);
+ default: /* Parent */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ RAND_add(&pid, sizeof(&pid), 0.0);
+
+ close(p[1]);
+
+ /* Hash output from child */
+ SHA1_Init(&sha);
+ total_bytes_read = 0;
+
+ while (!error_abort && !cmd_eof) {
+ int ret;
+ struct timeval tv;
+ int msec_remaining;
+
+ (void) gettimeofday(&tv_current, 0);
+ msec_elapsed = _get_timeval_msec_difference(&tv_start, &tv_current);
+ if (msec_elapsed >= entropy_timeout_current) {
+ error_abort=1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ msec_remaining = entropy_timeout_current - msec_elapsed;
+
+ FD_ZERO(&rdset);
+ FD_SET(p[0], &rdset);
+ tv.tv_sec = msec_remaining / 1000;
+ tv.tv_usec = (msec_remaining % 1000) * 1000;
+
+ ret = select(p[0]+1, &rdset, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+
+ RAND_add(&tv, sizeof(tv), 0.0);
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 0:
+ /* timer expired */
+ error_abort = 1;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ /* command input */
+ do {
+ bytes_read = read(p[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
+ } while (bytes_read == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+ RAND_add(&bytes_read, sizeof(&bytes_read), 0.0);
+ if (bytes_read == -1) {
+ error_abort = 1;
+ break;
+ } else if (bytes_read) {
+ SHA1_Update(&sha, buf, bytes_read);
+ total_bytes_read += bytes_read;
+ } else {
+ cmd_eof = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ default:
+ /* error */
+ debug("Command '%s': select() failed: %s", src->cmdstring,
+ strerror(errno));
+ error_abort = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SHA1_Final(hash, &sha);
+
+ close(p[0]);
+
+ debug3("Time elapsed: %d msec", msec_elapsed);
+
+ if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't wait for child '%s' completion: %s", src->cmdstring,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return(0.0);
+ }
+
+ RAND_add(&status, sizeof(&status), 0.0);
+
+ if (error_abort) {
+ /* closing p[0] on timeout causes the entropy command to
+ * SIGPIPE. Take whatever output we got, and mark this command
+ * as slow */
+ debug2("Command '%s' timed out", src->cmdstring);
+ src->sticky_badness *= 2;
+ src->badness = src->sticky_badness;
+ return(total_bytes_read);
+ }
+
+ if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(status)==0) {
+ return(total_bytes_read);
+ } else {
+ debug2("Command '%s' exit status was %d", src->cmdstring,
+ WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ src->badness = src->sticky_badness = 128;
+ return (0.0);
+ }
+ } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+ debug2("Command '%s' returned on uncaught signal %d !", src->cmdstring,
+ status);
+ src->badness = src->sticky_badness = 128;
+ return(0.0);
+ } else
+ return(0.0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * prng seedfile functions
+ */
+int
+prng_check_seedfile(char *filename) {
+
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* FIXME raceable: eg replace seed between this stat and subsequent open */
+ /* Not such a problem because we don't trust the seed file anyway */
+ if (lstat(filename, &st) == -1) {
+ /* Give up on hard errors */
+ if (errno != ENOENT)
+ debug("WARNING: Couldn't stat random seed file \"%s\": %s",
+ filename, strerror(errno));
+
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ /* regular file? */
+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
+ fatal("PRNG seedfile %.100s is not a regular file", filename);
+
+ /* mode 0600, owned by root or the current user? */
+ if (((st.st_mode & 0177) != 0) || !(st.st_uid == original_uid)) {
+ debug("WARNING: PRNG seedfile %.100s must be mode 0600, owned by uid %d",
+ filename, getuid());
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+}
+
+void
+prng_write_seedfile(void) {
+ int fd;
+ char seed[1024];
+ char filename[1024];
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ /* Don't bother if we have already saved a seed */
+ if (prng_seed_saved)
+ return;
+
+ setuid(original_uid);
+
+ prng_seed_saved = 1;
+
+ pw = getpwuid(original_uid);
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ fatal("Couldn't get password entry for current user (%i): %s",
+ original_uid, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Try to ensure that the parent directory is there */
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+ _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+ mkdir(filename, 0700);
+
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+ SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE);
+
+ debug("writing PRNG seed to file %.100s", filename);
+
+ RAND_bytes(seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+ /* Don't care if the seed doesn't exist */
+ prng_check_seedfile(filename);
+
+ if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC|O_CREAT, 0600)) == -1) {
+ debug("WARNING: couldn't access PRNG seedfile %.100s (%.100s)",
+ filename, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ if (atomicio(write, fd, &seed, sizeof(seed)) != sizeof(seed))
+ fatal("problem writing PRNG seedfile %.100s (%.100s)", filename,
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ close(fd);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+prng_read_seedfile(void) {
+ int fd;
+ char seed[1024];
+ char filename[1024];
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ pw = getpwuid(original_uid);
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ fatal("Couldn't get password entry for current user (%i): %s",
+ original_uid, strerror(errno));
+
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+ SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE);
+
+ debug("loading PRNG seed from file %.100s", filename);
+
+ if (!prng_check_seedfile(filename)) {
+ verbose("Random seed file not found or not valid, ignoring.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* open the file and read in the seed */
+ fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd == -1)
+ fatal("could not open PRNG seedfile %.100s (%.100s)", filename,
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, &seed, sizeof(seed)) != sizeof(seed)) {
+ verbose("invalid or short read from PRNG seedfile %.100s - ignoring",
+ filename);
+ memset(seed, '\0', sizeof(seed));
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+ /* stir in the seed, with estimated entropy zero */
+ RAND_add(&seed, sizeof(seed), 0.0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * entropy command initialisation functions
+ */
+int
+prng_read_commands(char *cmdfilename)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char *cp;
+ char line[1024];
+ char cmd[1024];
+ char path[256];
+ int linenum;
+ int num_cmds = 64;
+ int cur_cmd = 0;
+ double est;
+ entropy_source_t *entcmd;
+
+ f = fopen(cmdfilename, "r");
+ if (!f) {
+ fatal("couldn't read entropy commands file %.100s: %.100s",
+ cmdfilename, strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ entcmd = (entropy_source_t *)xmalloc(num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_source_t));
+ memset(entcmd, '\0', num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_source_t));
+
+ /* Read in file */
+ linenum = 0;
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ int arg;
+ char *argv;
+
+ linenum++;
+
+ /* skip leading whitespace, test for blank line or comment */
+ cp = line + strspn(line, WHITESPACE);
+ if ((*cp == 0) || (*cp == '#'))
+ continue; /* done with this line */
+
+ /* First non-whitespace char should be double quote delimiting */
+ /* commandline */
+ if (*cp != '"') {
+ error("bad entropy command, %.100s line %d", cmdfilename,
+ linenum);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* first token, command args (incl. argv[0]) in double quotes */
+ cp = strtok(cp, "\"");
+ if (cp == NULL) {
+ error("missing or bad command string, %.100s line %d -- ignored",
+ cmdfilename, linenum);
+ continue;
+ }
+ strlcpy(cmd, cp, sizeof(cmd));
+
+ /* second token, full command path */
+ if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) == NULL) {
+ error("missing command path, %.100s line %d -- ignored",
+ cmdfilename, linenum);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* did configure mark this as dead? */
+ if (strncmp("undef", cp, 5) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ strlcpy(path, cp, sizeof(path));
+
+ /* third token, entropy rate estimate for this command */
+ if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) == NULL) {
+ error("missing entropy estimate, %.100s line %d -- ignored",
+ cmdfilename, linenum);
+ continue;
+ }
+ est = strtod(cp, &argv);
+
+ /* end of line */
+ if ((cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)) != NULL) {
+ error("garbage at end of line %d in %.100s -- ignored", linenum,
+ cmdfilename);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* save the command for debug messages */
+ entcmd[cur_cmd].cmdstring = xstrdup(cmd);
+
+ /* split the command args */
+ cp = strtok(cmd, WHITESPACE);
+ arg = 0;
+ argv = NULL;
+ do {
+ char *s = (char*)xmalloc(strlen(cp) + 1);
+ strncpy(s, cp, strlen(cp) + 1);
+ entcmd[cur_cmd].args[arg] = s;
+ arg++;
+ } while ((arg < 5) && (cp = strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE)));
+
+ if (strtok(NULL, WHITESPACE))
+ error("ignored extra command elements (max 5), %.100s line %d",
+ cmdfilename, linenum);
+
+ /* Copy the command path and rate estimate */
+ entcmd[cur_cmd].path = xstrdup(path);
+ entcmd[cur_cmd].rate = est;
+
+ /* Initialise other values */
+ entcmd[cur_cmd].sticky_badness = 1;
+
+ cur_cmd++;
+
+ /* If we've filled the array, reallocate it twice the size */
+ /* Do this now because even if this we're on the last command,
+ we need another slot to mark the last entry */
+ if (cur_cmd == num_cmds) {
+ num_cmds *= 2;
+ entcmd = xrealloc(entcmd, num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_source_t));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* zero the last entry */
+ memset(&entcmd[cur_cmd], '\0', sizeof(entropy_source_t));
+
+ /* trim to size */
+ entropy_sources = xrealloc(entcmd, (cur_cmd+1) * sizeof(entropy_source_t));
+
+ debug("Loaded %d entropy commands from %.100s", cur_cmd, cmdfilename);
+
+ return (cur_cmd >= MIN_ENTROPY_SOURCES);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a keyfile at exit
+ */
+void
+prng_seed_cleanup(void *junk)
+{
+ prng_write_seedfile();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally Seed OpenSSL's random number pool from
+ * syscalls and program output
+ */
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+ mysig_t old_sigchld_handler;
+
+ if (!prng_initialised)
+ fatal("RNG not initialised");
+
+ /* Make sure some other sigchld handler doesn't reap our entropy */
+ /* commands */
+ old_sigchld_handler = mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+ debug("Seeded RNG with %i bytes from programs",
+ (int)stir_from_programs());
+ debug("Seeded RNG with %i bytes from system calls",
+ (int)stir_from_system());
+
+ if (!RAND_status())
+ fatal("Not enough entropy in RNG");
+
+ mysignal(SIGCHLD, old_sigchld_handler);
+
+ if (!RAND_status())
+ fatal("Couldn't initialise builtin random number generator -- exiting.");
+}
+
+void
+init_rng(void)
+{
+ int original_euid;
+
+ check_openssl_version();
+
+ original_uid = getuid();
+ original_euid = geteuid();
+
+ /* Read in collection commands */
+ if (!prng_read_commands(SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE))
+ fatal("PRNG initialisation failed -- exiting.");
+
+ /* Set ourselves up to save a seed upon exit */
+ prng_seed_saved = 0;
+
+ /* Give up privs while reading seed file */
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+ if ((original_uid != original_euid) && (seteuid(original_uid) == -1))
+ fatal("Couldn't give up privileges");
+#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+ /*
+ * Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids.
+ * Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid.
+ */
+ if (original_uid != original_euid && (setuid(original_euid) == -1 ||
+ seteuid(original_uid) == -1))
+ fatal("Couldn't give up privileges");
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+ prng_read_seedfile();
+
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+ if ((original_uid != original_euid) && (seteuid(original_euid) == -1))
+ fatal("Couldn't restore privileges");
+#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+ /*
+ * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value.
+ * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid
+ * as well.
+ */
+ if (original_uid != original_euid && (seteuid(original_euid) == -1 ||
+ setuid(original_uid) == -1))
+ fatal("Couldn't restore privileges");
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+ fatal_add_cleanup(prng_seed_cleanup, NULL);
+ atexit(prng_write_seedfile);
+
+ prng_initialised = 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(USE_PRNGD) || defined(RANDOM_POOL) */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _RANDOMS_H
+#define _RANDOMS_H
+
+void seed_rng(void);
+void init_rng(void);
+
+#endif /* _RANDOMS_H */
--- /dev/null
+#!/usr/bin/perl -w
+#
+# fixpaths - substitute makefile variables into text files
+
+
+$usage = "Usage: $0 [-Dstring=replacement] [[infile] ...]\n";
+
+if (!defined(@ARGV)) { die ("$usage"); }
+
+# read in the command line and get some definitions
+while ($_=$ARGV[0], /^-/) {
+ if (/^-D/) {
+ # definition
+ shift(@ARGV);
+ if ( /-D(.*)=(.*)/ ) {
+ $def{"$1"}=$2;
+ } else {
+ die ("$usage$0: error in command line arguments.\n");
+ }
+ } else {
+ @cmd = split(//, $ARGV[0]); $opt = $cmd[1];
+ die ("$usage$0: unknown option '-$opt'\n");
+ }
+} # while parsing arguments
+
+if (!defined(%def)) {
+ die ("$0: nothing to do - no substitutions listed!\n");
+}
+
+for $f (@ARGV) {
+
+ $f =~ /(.*\/)*(.*)$/;
+
+ open(IN, "<$f") || die ("$0: input file $f missing!\n");
+ while (<IN>) {
+ for $s (keys(%def)) {
+ s#$s#$def{$s}#;
+ } # for $s
+ print;
+ } # while <IN>
+} # for $f
+
+exit 0;
--- /dev/null
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+#
+# fixprogs - run through the list of entropy commands and
+# score out the losers
+#
+
+$entscale = 50; # divisor for optional entropy measurement
+
+sub usage {
+ return("Usage: $0 <command file>\n");
+}
+
+if (($#ARGV == -1) || ($#ARGV>1)) {
+ die(&usage);
+}
+
+# 'undocumented' option - run ent (in second param) on the output
+if ($#ARGV==1) {
+ $entcmd=$ARGV[1]
+} else {
+ $entcmd = ""
+};
+
+$infilename = $ARGV[0];
+
+if (!open(IN, "<".$infilename)) {
+ die("Couldn't open input file");
+}
+$outfilename=$infilename.".out";
+if (!open(OUT, ">$outfilename")) {
+ die("Couldn't open output file $outfilename");
+}
+@infile=<IN>;
+
+select(OUT); $|=1; select(STDOUT);
+
+foreach (@infile) {
+ if (/^\s*\#/ || /^\s*$/) {
+ print OUT;
+ next;
+ }
+ ($cmd, $path, $est) = /^\"([^\"]+)\"\s+([\w\/_-]+)\s+([\d\.\-]+)/o;
+ @args = split(/ /, $cmd);
+ if (! ($pid = fork())) {
+ # child
+ close STDIN; close STDOUT; close STDERR;
+ open (STDIN, "</dev/null");
+ open (STDOUT, ">/dev/null");
+ open (STDERR, ">/dev/null");
+ exec $path @args;
+ exit 1; # shouldn't be here
+ }
+ # parent
+ waitpid ($pid, 0); $ret=$? >> 8;
+
+ if ($ret != 0) {
+ $path = "undef";
+ } else {
+ if ($entcmd ne "") {
+ # now try to run ent on the command
+ $mostargs=join(" ", splice(@args,1));
+ print "Evaluating '$path $mostargs'\n";
+ @ent = qx{$path $mostargs | $entcmd -b -t};
+ @ent = grep(/^1,/, @ent);
+ ($null, $null, $rate) = split(/,/, $ent[0]);
+ $est = $rate / $entscale; # scale the estimate back
+ }
+ }
+ print OUT "\"$cmd\" $path $est\n";
+}
+
+close(IN);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Macros for storing and retrieving data in msb first and lsb first order.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: getput.h,v 1.7 2001/01/10 22:56:22 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef GETPUT_H
+#define GETPUT_H
+
+/*------------ macros for storing/extracting msb first words -------------*/
+
+#define GET_64BIT(cp) (((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[0] << 56) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[1] << 48) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[2] << 40) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[3] << 32) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[4] << 24) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[5] << 16) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[6] << 8) | \
+ ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[7]))
+
+#define GET_32BIT(cp) (((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[0] << 24) | \
+ ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[1] << 16) | \
+ ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
+ ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[3]))
+
+#define GET_16BIT(cp) (((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[0] << 8) | \
+ ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[1]))
+
+#define PUT_64BIT(cp, value) do { \
+ (cp)[0] = (value) >> 56; \
+ (cp)[1] = (value) >> 48; \
+ (cp)[2] = (value) >> 40; \
+ (cp)[3] = (value) >> 32; \
+ (cp)[4] = (value) >> 24; \
+ (cp)[5] = (value) >> 16; \
+ (cp)[6] = (value) >> 8; \
+ (cp)[7] = (value); } while (0)
+
+#define PUT_32BIT(cp, value) do { \
+ (cp)[0] = (value) >> 24; \
+ (cp)[1] = (value) >> 16; \
+ (cp)[2] = (value) >> 8; \
+ (cp)[3] = (value); } while (0)
+
+#define PUT_16BIT(cp, value) do { \
+ (cp)[0] = (value) >> 8; \
+ (cp)[1] = (value); } while (0)
+
+#endif /* GETPUT_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static int ngroups;
+static char *groups_byname[NGROUPS_MAX + 1]; /* +1 for base/primary group */
+
+/*
+ * Initialize group access list for user with primary (base) and
+ * supplementary groups. Return the number of groups in the list.
+ */
+int
+ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base)
+{
+ gid_t groups_bygid[NGROUPS_MAX + 1];
+ int i, j;
+ struct group *gr;
+
+ if (ngroups > 0)
+ ga_free();
+
+ ngroups = sizeof(groups_bygid) / sizeof(gid_t);
+ if (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1)
+ log("getgrouplist: groups list too small");
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+ if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL)
+ groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name);
+ return (ngroups = j);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups.
+ * Return 0 otherwise. Use match_pattern() for string comparison.
+ */
+int
+ga_match(char * const *groups, int n)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+ if (match_pattern(groups_byname[i], groups[j]))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free memory allocated for group access list.
+ */
+void
+ga_free(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (ngroups > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+ xfree(groups_byname[i]);
+ ngroups = 0;
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GROUPACCESS_H
+#define GROUPACCESS_H
+
+#include <grp.h>
+
+int ga_init(const char *, gid_t);
+int ga_match(char * const *, int);
+void ga_free(void);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.28 2001/06/25 08:25:37 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the
+ * pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end.
+ */
+
+static int
+hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, Key *ret)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace. */
+ for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+
+ if (key_read(ret, &cp) != 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Skip trailing whitespace. */
+ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+
+ /* Return results. */
+ *cpp = cp;
+ *bitsp = key_size(ret);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+auth_rsa_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n)
+{
+ Key *k = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ int ret = hostfile_read_key(cpp, bitsp, k);
+ BN_copy(e, k->rsa->e);
+ BN_copy(n, k->rsa->n);
+ key_free(k);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+hostfile_check_key(int bits, Key *key, const char *host, const char *filename, int linenum)
+{
+ if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA1 || key->rsa == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) {
+ log("Warning: %s, line %d: keysize mismatch for host %s: "
+ "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
+ filename, linenum, host, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+ log("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %d.",
+ bits, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), filename, linenum);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether the given host (which must be in all lowercase) is already
+ * in the list of our known hosts. Returns HOST_OK if the host is known and
+ * has the specified key, HOST_NEW if the host is not known, and HOST_CHANGED
+ * if the host is known but used to have a different host key.
+ */
+
+HostStatus
+check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, Key *key,
+ Key *found, int *numret)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[8192];
+ int linenum = 0;
+ u_int kbits;
+ char *cp, *cp2;
+ HostStatus end_return;
+
+ debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: filename %s", filename);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ fatal("no key to look up");
+ /* Open the file containing the list of known hosts. */
+ f = fopen(filename, "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return HOST_NEW;
+
+ /*
+ * Return value when the loop terminates. This is set to
+ * HOST_CHANGED if we have seen a different key for the host and have
+ * not found the proper one.
+ */
+ end_return = HOST_NEW;
+
+ /* Go through the file. */
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ cp = line;
+ linenum++;
+
+ /* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
+ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
+ continue;
+
+ /* Find the end of the host name portion. */
+ for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
+ ;
+
+ /* Check if the host name matches. */
+ if (match_hostname(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 1)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Got a match. Skip host name. */
+ cp = cp2;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract the key from the line. This will skip any leading
+ * whitespace. Ignore badly formatted lines.
+ */
+ if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, found))
+ continue;
+ if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, found, host, filename, linenum))
+ continue;
+
+ if (numret != NULL)
+ *numret = linenum;
+
+ /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key. */
+ if (key_equal(key, found)) {
+ /* Ok, they match. */
+ debug3("check_host_in_hostfile: match line %d", linenum);
+ fclose(f);
+ return HOST_OK;
+ }
+ /*
+ * They do not match. We will continue to go through the
+ * file; however, we note that we will not return that it is
+ * new.
+ */
+ end_return = HOST_CHANGED;
+ }
+ /* Clear variables and close the file. */
+ fclose(f);
+
+ /*
+ * Return either HOST_NEW or HOST_CHANGED, depending on whether we
+ * saw a different key for the host.
+ */
+ return end_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not
+ * be appended.
+ */
+
+int
+add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, Key *key)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ int success = 0;
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return 1; /* XXX ? */
+ f = fopen(filename, "a");
+ if (!f)
+ return 0;
+ fprintf(f, "%s ", host);
+ if (key_write(key, f)) {
+ success = 1;
+ } else {
+ error("add_host_to_hostfile: saving key in %s failed", filename);
+ }
+ fprintf(f, "\n");
+ fclose(f);
+ return success;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.9 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+#ifndef HOSTFILE_H
+#define HOSTFILE_H
+
+typedef enum {
+ HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED
+} HostStatus;
+
+HostStatus
+check_host_in_hostfile(const char *, const char *, Key *, Key *, int *);
+int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, Key *);
+int auth_rsa_read_key(char **, u_int *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.15 2001/06/08 15:25:40 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file includes most of the needed system headers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef INCLUDES_H
+#define INCLUDES_H
+
+#define RCSID(msg) \
+static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_H
+# include <getopt.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
+#define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H
+# include <bstring.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
+ defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC)
+# include <glob.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
+# include <netgroup.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
+# include <endian.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
+# include <sys/bsdtty.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_TTYENT_H
+# include <ttyent.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+# include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+# include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H
+# include <utime.h>
+#endif
+#include "version.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h"
+#include "entropy.h"
+
+#endif /* INCLUDES_H */
--- /dev/null
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# install - install a program, script, or datafile
+# This comes from X11R5 (mit/util/scripts/install.sh).
+#
+# Copyright 1991 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its
+# documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that
+# the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting
+# documentation, and that the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or
+# publicity pertaining to distribution of the software without specific,
+# written prior permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the
+# suitability of this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is"
+# without express or implied warranty.
+#
+# Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent
+# `make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it
+# when there is no Makefile.
+#
+# This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written
+# from scratch. It can only install one file at a time, a restriction
+# shared with many OS's install programs.
+
+
+# set DOITPROG to echo to test this script
+
+# Don't use :- since 4.3BSD and earlier shells don't like it.
+doit="${DOITPROG-}"
+
+
+# put in absolute paths if you don't have them in your path; or use env. vars.
+
+mvprog="${MVPROG-mv}"
+cpprog="${CPPROG-cp}"
+chmodprog="${CHMODPROG-chmod}"
+chownprog="${CHOWNPROG-chown}"
+chgrpprog="${CHGRPPROG-chgrp}"
+stripprog="${STRIPPROG-strip}"
+rmprog="${RMPROG-rm}"
+mkdirprog="${MKDIRPROG-mkdir}"
+
+transformbasename=""
+transform_arg=""
+instcmd="$mvprog"
+chmodcmd="$chmodprog 0755"
+chowncmd=""
+chgrpcmd=""
+stripcmd=""
+rmcmd="$rmprog -f"
+mvcmd="$mvprog"
+src=""
+dst=""
+dir_arg=""
+
+while [ x"$1" != x ]; do
+ case $1 in
+ -c) instcmd="$cpprog"
+ shift
+ continue;;
+
+ -d) dir_arg=true
+ shift
+ continue;;
+
+ -m) chmodcmd="$chmodprog $2"
+ shift
+ shift
+ continue;;
+
+ -o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2"
+ shift
+ shift
+ continue;;
+
+ -g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2"
+ shift
+ shift
+ continue;;
+
+ -s) stripcmd="$stripprog"
+ shift
+ continue;;
+
+ -t=*) transformarg=`echo $1 | sed 's/-t=//'`
+ shift
+ continue;;
+
+ -b=*) transformbasename=`echo $1 | sed 's/-b=//'`
+ shift
+ continue;;
+
+ *) if [ x"$src" = x ]
+ then
+ src=$1
+ else
+ # this colon is to work around a 386BSD /bin/sh bug
+ :
+ dst=$1
+ fi
+ shift
+ continue;;
+ esac
+done
+
+if [ x"$src" = x ]
+then
+ echo "install: no input file specified"
+ exit 1
+else
+ true
+fi
+
+if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ]; then
+ dst=$src
+ src=""
+
+ if [ -d $dst ]; then
+ instcmd=:
+ chmodcmd=""
+ else
+ instcmd=mkdir
+ fi
+else
+
+# Waiting for this to be detected by the "$instcmd $src $dsttmp" command
+# might cause directories to be created, which would be especially bad
+# if $src (and thus $dsttmp) contains '*'.
+
+ if [ -f $src -o -d $src ]
+ then
+ true
+ else
+ echo "install: $src does not exist"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+
+ if [ x"$dst" = x ]
+ then
+ echo "install: no destination specified"
+ exit 1
+ else
+ true
+ fi
+
+# If destination is a directory, append the input filename; if your system
+# does not like double slashes in filenames, you may need to add some logic
+
+ if [ -d $dst ]
+ then
+ dst="$dst"/`basename $src`
+ else
+ true
+ fi
+fi
+
+## this sed command emulates the dirname command
+dstdir=`echo $dst | sed -e 's,[^/]*$,,;s,/$,,;s,^$,.,'`
+
+# Make sure that the destination directory exists.
+# this part is taken from Noah Friedman's mkinstalldirs script
+
+# Skip lots of stat calls in the usual case.
+if [ ! -d "$dstdir" ]; then
+defaultIFS='
+'
+IFS="${IFS-${defaultIFS}}"
+
+oIFS="${IFS}"
+# Some sh's can't handle IFS=/ for some reason.
+IFS='%'
+set - `echo ${dstdir} | sed -e 's@/@%@g' -e 's@^%@/@'`
+IFS="${oIFS}"
+
+pathcomp=''
+
+while [ $# -ne 0 ] ; do
+ pathcomp="${pathcomp}${1}"
+ shift
+
+ if [ ! -d "${pathcomp}" ] ;
+ then
+ $mkdirprog "${pathcomp}"
+ else
+ true
+ fi
+
+ pathcomp="${pathcomp}/"
+done
+fi
+
+if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ]
+then
+ $doit $instcmd $dst &&
+
+ if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dst; else true ; fi &&
+ if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dst; else true ; fi &&
+ if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dst; else true ; fi &&
+ if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dst; else true ; fi
+else
+
+# If we're going to rename the final executable, determine the name now.
+
+ if [ x"$transformarg" = x ]
+ then
+ dstfile=`basename $dst`
+ else
+ dstfile=`basename $dst $transformbasename |
+ sed $transformarg`$transformbasename
+ fi
+
+# don't allow the sed command to completely eliminate the filename
+
+ if [ x"$dstfile" = x ]
+ then
+ dstfile=`basename $dst`
+ else
+ true
+ fi
+
+# Make a temp file name in the proper directory.
+
+ dsttmp=$dstdir/#inst.$$#
+
+# Move or copy the file name to the temp name
+
+ $doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp &&
+
+ trap "rm -f ${dsttmp}" 0 &&
+
+# and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits
+
+# If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing. If we want to
+# ignore errors from any of these, just make sure not to ignore
+# errors from the above "$doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp" command.
+
+ if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dsttmp; else true;fi &&
+ if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi &&
+ if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi &&
+ if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi &&
+
+# Now rename the file to the real destination.
+
+ $doit $rmcmd -f $dstdir/$dstfile &&
+ $doit $mvcmd $dsttmp $dstdir/$dstfile
+
+fi &&
+
+
+exit 0
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.36 2001/06/25 08:25:37 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+
+#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
+
+/* prototype */
+static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *);
+static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *);
+
+/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
+static void
+kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ buffer_clear(b);
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ buffer_put_char(b, rand & 0xff);
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, proposal[i]);
+ buffer_put_char(b, 0); /* first_kex_packet_follows */
+ buffer_put_int(b, 0); /* uint32 reserved */
+}
+
+/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */
+static char **
+kex_buf2prop(Buffer *raw)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ int i;
+ char **proposal;
+
+ proposal = xmalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX * sizeof(char *));
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(raw), buffer_len(raw));
+ /* skip cookie */
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
+ buffer_get_char(&b);
+ /* extract kex init proposal strings */
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+ proposal[i] = buffer_get_string(&b,NULL);
+ debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: %s", proposal[i]);
+ }
+ /* first kex follows / reserved */
+ i = buffer_get_char(&b);
+ debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: first_kex_follows %d ", i);
+ i = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: reserved %d ", i);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return proposal;
+}
+
+static void
+kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+ xfree(proposal[i]);
+ xfree(proposal);
+}
+
+static void
+kex_protocol_error(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ error("Hm, kex protocol error: type %d plen %d", type, plen);
+}
+
+static void
+kex_clear_dispatch(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* Numbers 30-49 are used for kex packets */
+ for (i = 30; i <= 49; i++)
+ dispatch_set(i, &kex_protocol_error);
+}
+
+void
+kex_finish(Kex *kex)
+{
+ int plen;
+
+ kex_clear_dispatch();
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+ packet_send();
+ /* packet_write_wait(); */
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+
+ debug("waiting for SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
+
+ kex->done = 1;
+ buffer_clear(&kex->peer);
+ /* buffer_clear(&kex->my); */
+ kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT;
+ xfree(kex->name);
+ kex->name = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+kex_send_kexinit(Kex *kex)
+{
+ if (kex == NULL) {
+ error("kex_send_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) {
+ debug("KEX_INIT_SENT");
+ return;
+ }
+ kex->done = 0;
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my));
+ packet_send();
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
+ kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
+}
+
+void
+kex_input_kexinit(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ char *ptr;
+ int dlen;
+ int i;
+ Kex *kex = (Kex *)ctxt;
+
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
+ if (kex == NULL)
+ fatal("kex_input_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey");
+
+ ptr = packet_get_raw(&dlen);
+ buffer_append(&kex->peer, ptr, dlen);
+
+ /* discard packet */
+ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++)
+ packet_get_char();
+ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+ xfree(packet_get_string(NULL));
+ packet_get_char();
+ packet_get_int();
+ packet_done();
+
+ kex_kexinit_finish(kex);
+}
+
+Kex *
+kex_setup(char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+ Kex *kex;
+
+ kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex));
+ memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex));
+ buffer_init(&kex->peer);
+ buffer_init(&kex->my);
+ kex_prop2buf(&kex->my, proposal);
+ kex->done = 0;
+
+ kex_send_kexinit(kex); /* we start */
+ kex_clear_dispatch();
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+
+ return kex;
+}
+
+static void
+kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *kex)
+{
+ if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+ kex_send_kexinit(kex);
+
+ kex_choose_conf(kex);
+
+ switch(kex->kex_type) {
+ case DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+ kexdh(kex);
+ break;
+ case DH_GEX_SHA1:
+ kexgex(kex);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+{
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+ if (name == NULL)
+ fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s", client, server);
+ enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name);
+ if (enc->cipher == NULL)
+ fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
+ enc->name = name;
+ enc->enabled = 0;
+ enc->iv = NULL;
+ enc->key = NULL;
+}
+static void
+choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
+{
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+ if (name == NULL)
+ fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s", client, server);
+ if (mac_init(mac, name) < 0)
+ fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
+ /* truncate the key */
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
+ mac->key_len = 16;
+ mac->name = name;
+ mac->key = NULL;
+ mac->enabled = 0;
+}
+static void
+choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+{
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+ if (name == NULL)
+ fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
+ if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
+ comp->type = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ comp->type = 0;
+ } else {
+ fatal("unsupported comp %s", name);
+ }
+ comp->name = name;
+}
+static void
+choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+{
+ k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+ if (k->name == NULL)
+ fatal("no kex alg");
+ if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DH1) == 0) {
+ k->kex_type = DH_GRP1_SHA1;
+ } else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX) == 0) {
+ k->kex_type = DH_GEX_SHA1;
+ } else
+ fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
+}
+static void
+choose_hostkeyalg(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+{
+ char *hostkeyalg = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+ if (hostkeyalg == NULL)
+ fatal("no hostkey alg");
+ k->hostkey_type = key_type_from_name(hostkeyalg);
+ if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ fatal("bad hostkey alg '%s'", hostkeyalg);
+ xfree(hostkeyalg);
+}
+
+static void
+kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
+{
+ Newkeys *newkeys;
+ char **my, **peer;
+ char **cprop, **sprop;
+ int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
+ int mode;
+ int ctos; /* direction: if true client-to-server */
+ int need;
+
+ my = kex_buf2prop(&kex->my);
+ peer = kex_buf2prop(&kex->peer);
+
+ if (kex->server) {
+ cprop=peer;
+ sprop=my;
+ } else {
+ cprop=my;
+ sprop=peer;
+ }
+
+ /* Algorithm Negotiation */
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ newkeys = xmalloc(sizeof(*newkeys));
+ memset(newkeys, 0, sizeof(*newkeys));
+ kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
+ ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+ nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
+ nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
+ ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
+ choose_enc (&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], sprop[nenc]);
+ choose_mac (&newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac]);
+ choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp]);
+ debug("kex: %s %s %s %s",
+ ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
+ newkeys->enc.name,
+ newkeys->mac.name,
+ newkeys->comp.name);
+ }
+ choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+ choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]);
+ need = 0;
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
+ if (need < newkeys->enc.cipher->key_len)
+ need = newkeys->enc.cipher->key_len;
+ if (need < newkeys->enc.cipher->block_size)
+ need = newkeys->enc.cipher->block_size;
+ if (need < newkeys->mac.key_len)
+ need = newkeys->mac.key_len;
+ }
+ /* XXX need runden? */
+ kex->we_need = need;
+
+ kex_prop_free(my);
+ kex_prop_free(peer);
+}
+
+static u_char *
+derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, int need, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ char c = id;
+ int have;
+ int mdsz = evp_md->md_size;
+ u_char *digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
+
+ /* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY))
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, hash, mdsz);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, &c, 1);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * expand key:
+ * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1)
+ * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
+ */
+ for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY))
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, hash, mdsz);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, digest, have);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest + have, NULL);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&b);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c);
+ dump_digest("key", digest, need);
+#endif
+ return digest;
+}
+
+Newkeys *current_keys[MODE_MAX];
+
+#define NKEYS 6
+void
+kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
+{
+ u_char *keys[NKEYS];
+ int i, mode, ctos;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++)
+ keys[i] = derive_key(kex, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, shared_secret);
+
+ debug("kex_derive_keys");
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ current_keys[mode] = kex->newkeys[mode];
+ kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+ ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+ current_keys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
+ current_keys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
+ current_keys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
+ }
+}
+
+Newkeys *
+kex_get_newkeys(int mode)
+{
+ Newkeys *ret;
+
+ ret = current_keys[mode];
+ current_keys[mode] = NULL;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH)
+void
+dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
+ for (i = 0; i< len; i++){
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x", digest[i]);
+ if (i%32 == 31)
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ else if (i%8 == 7)
+ fprintf(stderr, " ");
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+}
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.26 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef KEX_H
+#define KEX_H
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
+
+#define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#define KEX_DHGEX "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
+
+enum kex_init_proposals {
+ PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS,
+ PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS,
+ PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS,
+ PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC,
+ PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS,
+ PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC,
+ PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS,
+ PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC,
+ PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS,
+ PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC,
+ PROPOSAL_MAX
+};
+
+enum kex_modes {
+ MODE_IN,
+ MODE_OUT,
+ MODE_MAX
+};
+
+enum kex_exchange {
+ DH_GRP1_SHA1,
+ DH_GEX_SHA1
+};
+
+#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001
+
+typedef struct Kex Kex;
+typedef struct Mac Mac;
+typedef struct Comp Comp;
+typedef struct Enc Enc;
+typedef struct Newkeys Newkeys;
+
+struct Enc {
+ char *name;
+ Cipher *cipher;
+ int enabled;
+ u_char *key;
+ u_char *iv;
+};
+struct Mac {
+ char *name;
+ int enabled;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ int mac_len;
+ u_char *key;
+ int key_len;
+};
+struct Comp {
+ int type;
+ int enabled;
+ char *name;
+};
+struct Newkeys {
+ Enc enc;
+ Mac mac;
+ Comp comp;
+};
+struct Kex {
+ u_char *session_id;
+ int session_id_len;
+ Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+ int we_need;
+ int server;
+ char *name;
+ int hostkey_type;
+ int kex_type;
+ Buffer my;
+ Buffer peer;
+ int done;
+ int flags;
+ char *client_version_string;
+ char *server_version_string;
+ int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
+ Key *(*load_host_key)(int);
+};
+
+Kex *kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+void kex_finish(Kex *);
+
+void kex_send_kexinit(Kex *);
+void kex_input_kexinit(int, int, void *);
+void kex_derive_keys(Kex *, u_char *, BIGNUM *);
+
+void kexdh(Kex *);
+void kexgex(Kex *);
+
+Newkeys *kex_get_newkeys(int);
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH)
+void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int);
+#endif
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.7 2001/09/17 19:27:15 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+static u_char *
+kex_dh_hash(
+ char *client_version_string,
+ char *server_version_string,
+ char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
+ char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
+ u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
+ BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
+ BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ static u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
+
+ /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+ buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
+ buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
+
+ buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, client_dh_pub);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, server_dh_pub);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ dump_digest("hash", digest, evp_md->md_size);
+#endif
+ return digest;
+}
+
+/* client */
+
+static void
+kexdh_client(Kex *kex)
+{
+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
+ DH *dh;
+ Key *server_host_key;
+ u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
+ u_int klen, kout, slen, sbloblen;
+ int dlen, plen;
+
+ /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+ dh = dh_new_group1();
+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+ packet_send();
+
+ debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY");
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
+
+ /* key, cert */
+ server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
+ server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
+ if (server_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
+
+ if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
+ if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
+ fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
+
+ /* DH paramter f, server public DH key */
+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub, &dlen);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
+#endif
+
+ /* signed H */
+ signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
+ packet_done();
+
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
+
+ klen = DH_size(dh);
+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+ shared_secret = BN_new();
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+ xfree(kbuf);
+
+ /* calc and verify H */
+ hash = kex_dh_hash(
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ dh->pub_key,
+ dh_server_pub,
+ shared_secret
+ );
+ xfree(server_host_key_blob);
+ BN_free(dh_server_pub);
+ DH_free(dh);
+
+ if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, 20) != 1)
+ fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
+ key_free(server_host_key);
+ xfree(signature);
+
+ /* save session id */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = 20;
+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ kex_finish(kex);
+}
+
+/* server */
+
+static void
+kexdh_server(Kex *kex)
+{
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+ DH *dh;
+ Key *server_host_key;
+ u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ u_int sbloblen, klen, kout;
+ int dlen, slen, plen;
+
+ /* generate server DH public key */
+ dh = dh_new_group1();
+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT");
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
+
+ if (kex->load_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
+ server_host_key = kex->load_host_key(kex->hostkey_type);
+ if (server_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
+
+ /* key, cert */
+ dh_client_pub = BN_new();
+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub, &dlen);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+
+ klen = DH_size(dh);
+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+ shared_secret = BN_new();
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+ xfree(kbuf);
+
+ key_to_blob(server_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
+
+ /* calc H */
+ hash = kex_dh_hash(
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ dh_client_pub,
+ dh->pub_key,
+ shared_secret
+ );
+ BN_free(dh_client_pub);
+
+ /* save session id := H */
+ /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = 20;
+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ /* sign H */
+ /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
+ key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
+
+ /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
+
+ /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
+ packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); /* f */
+ packet_put_string(signature, slen);
+ packet_send();
+
+ xfree(signature);
+ xfree(server_host_key_blob);
+ /* have keys, free DH */
+ DH_free(dh);
+
+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ kex_finish(kex);
+}
+
+void
+kexdh(Kex *kex)
+{
+ if (kex->server)
+ kexdh_server(kex);
+ else
+ kexdh_client(kex);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.9 2001/09/17 19:27:15 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+
+static u_char *
+kexgex_hash(
+ char *client_version_string,
+ char *server_version_string,
+ char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
+ char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
+ u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
+ int min, int wantbits, int max, BIGNUM *prime, BIGNUM *gen,
+ BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
+ BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ static u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
+
+ /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+ buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
+ buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
+
+ buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
+ if (min == -1 || max == -1)
+ buffer_put_int(&b, wantbits);
+ else {
+ buffer_put_int(&b, min);
+ buffer_put_int(&b, wantbits);
+ buffer_put_int(&b, max);
+ }
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, prime);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, gen);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, client_dh_pub);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, server_dh_pub);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("hash", digest, evp_md->md_size);
+#endif
+ return digest;
+}
+
+/* client */
+
+static void
+kexgex_client(Kex *kex)
+{
+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
+ Key *server_host_key;
+ u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ u_int klen, kout, slen, sbloblen;
+ int dlen, plen, min, max, nbits;
+ DH *dh;
+
+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) {
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD sent");
+
+ /* Old GEX request */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD);
+ packet_put_int(nbits);
+ min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+ max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ } else {
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST sent");
+
+ /* New GEX request */
+ min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+ max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_int(min);
+ packet_put_int(nbits);
+ packet_put_int(max);
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n",
+ min, nbits, max);
+#endif
+ packet_send();
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new");
+ packet_get_bignum2(p, &dlen);
+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new");
+ packet_get_bignum2(g, &dlen);
+ packet_done();
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
+ fatal("DH_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
+
+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
+ /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+ packet_send();
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
+
+ /* key, cert */
+ server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
+ server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
+ if (server_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
+
+ if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
+ if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
+ fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
+
+ /* DH paramter f, server public DH key */
+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub, &dlen);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
+#endif
+
+ /* signed H */
+ signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
+ packet_done();
+
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
+
+ klen = DH_size(dh);
+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+ shared_secret = BN_new();
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+ xfree(kbuf);
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
+ min = max = -1;
+
+ /* calc and verify H */
+ hash = kexgex_hash(
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ min, nbits, max,
+ dh->p, dh->g,
+ dh->pub_key,
+ dh_server_pub,
+ shared_secret
+ );
+ /* have keys, free DH */
+ DH_free(dh);
+ xfree(server_host_key_blob);
+ BN_free(dh_server_pub);
+
+ if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, 20) != 1)
+ fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
+ key_free(server_host_key);
+ xfree(signature);
+
+ /* save session id */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = 20;
+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+
+ kex_finish(kex);
+}
+
+/* server */
+
+static void
+kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
+{
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+ Key *server_host_key;
+ DH *dh = dh;
+ u_char *kbuf, *hash, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+ u_int sbloblen, klen, kout;
+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1, type, plen, dlen, slen;
+
+ if (kex->load_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
+ server_host_key = kex->load_host_key(kex->hostkey_type);
+ if (server_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
+
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ switch(type){
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST:
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
+ min = packet_get_int();
+ nbits = packet_get_int();
+ max = packet_get_int();
+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD:
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received");
+ nbits = packet_get_int();
+ min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+ max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ /* unused for old GEX */
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("protocol error during kex, no DH_GEX_REQUEST: %d", type);
+ }
+ packet_done();
+
+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
+ fatal("DH_GEX_REQUEST, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
+ min, nbits, max);
+
+ dh = choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching DH grp found");
+
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent");
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
+ packet_send();
+
+ /* flush */
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT");
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
+
+ /* key, cert */
+ dh_client_pub = BN_new();
+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub, &dlen);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
+ fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+
+ klen = DH_size(dh);
+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+ shared_secret = BN_new();
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+ xfree(kbuf);
+
+ key_to_blob(server_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
+
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD)
+ min = max = -1;
+
+ /* calc H */ /* XXX depends on 'kex' */
+ hash = kexgex_hash(
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ min, nbits, max,
+ dh->p, dh->g,
+ dh_client_pub,
+ dh->pub_key,
+ shared_secret
+ );
+ BN_free(dh_client_pub);
+
+ /* save session id := H */
+ /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = 20;
+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ /* sign H */
+ /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
+ key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
+
+ /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
+
+ /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY sent");
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
+ packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); /* f */
+ packet_put_string(signature, slen);
+ packet_send();
+ xfree(signature);
+ xfree(server_host_key_blob);
+ /* have keys, free DH */
+ DH_free(dh);
+
+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+
+ kex_finish(kex);
+}
+
+void
+kexgex(Kex *kex)
+{
+ if (kex->server)
+ kexgex_server(kex);
+ else
+ kexgex_client(kex);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * read_bignum():
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.33 2001/10/04 14:34:16 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "ssh-dss.h"
+#include "ssh-rsa.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+Key *
+key_new(int type)
+{
+ Key *k;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ DSA *dsa;
+ k = xmalloc(sizeof(*k));
+ k->type = type;
+ k->flags = 0;
+ k->dsa = NULL;
+ k->rsa = NULL;
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ rsa = RSA_new();
+ rsa->n = BN_new();
+ rsa->e = BN_new();
+ k->rsa = rsa;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ dsa = DSA_new();
+ dsa->p = BN_new();
+ dsa->q = BN_new();
+ dsa->g = BN_new();
+ dsa->pub_key = BN_new();
+ k->dsa = dsa;
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_new: bad key type %d", k->type);
+ break;
+ }
+ return k;
+}
+Key *
+key_new_private(int type)
+{
+ Key *k = key_new(type);
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ k->rsa->d = BN_new();
+ k->rsa->iqmp = BN_new();
+ k->rsa->q = BN_new();
+ k->rsa->p = BN_new();
+ k->rsa->dmq1 = BN_new();
+ k->rsa->dmp1 = BN_new();
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new();
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return k;
+}
+void
+key_free(Key *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if (k->rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(k->rsa);
+ k->rsa = NULL;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (k->dsa != NULL)
+ DSA_free(k->dsa);
+ k->dsa = NULL;
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type);
+ break;
+ }
+ xfree(k);
+}
+int
+key_equal(Key *a, Key *b)
+{
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type)
+ return 0;
+ switch (a->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
+ BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
+ BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_equal: bad key type %d", a->type);
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u_char*
+key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, size_t *dgst_raw_length)
+{
+ EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ u_char *blob = NULL;
+ u_char *retval = NULL;
+ int len = 0;
+ int nlen, elen;
+
+ *dgst_raw_length = 0;
+
+ switch (dgst_type) {
+ case SSH_FP_MD5:
+ md = EVP_md5();
+ break;
+ case SSH_FP_SHA1:
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: bad digest type %d",
+ dgst_type);
+ }
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
+ elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
+ len = nlen + elen;
+ blob = xmalloc(len);
+ BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob);
+ BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen);
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len);
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ return retval;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: bad key type %d", k->type);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (blob != NULL) {
+ retval = xmalloc(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, blob, len);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, retval, NULL);
+ *dgst_raw_length = md->md_size;
+ memset(blob, 0, len);
+ xfree(blob);
+ } else {
+ fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: blob is null");
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static char*
+key_fingerprint_hex(u_char* dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+ char *retval;
+ int i;
+
+ retval = xmalloc(dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
+ retval[0] = '\0';
+ for(i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
+ char hex[4];
+ snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]);
+ strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3);
+ }
+ retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = '\0';
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static char*
+key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char* dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+ char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
+ char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
+ 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' };
+ u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1;
+ char *retval;
+
+ rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
+ retval = xmalloc(sizeof(char) * (rounds*6));
+ retval[j++] = 'x';
+ for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
+ u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
+ if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) {
+ idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) +
+ seed) % 6;
+ idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15;
+ idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) +
+ (seed / 6)) % 6;
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
+ if ((i + 1) < rounds) {
+ idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15;
+ idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15;
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx3];
+ retval[j++] = '-';
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx4];
+ seed = ((seed * 5) +
+ ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) +
+ ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36;
+ }
+ } else {
+ idx0 = seed % 6;
+ idx1 = 16;
+ idx2 = seed / 6;
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
+ retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
+ retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
+ }
+ }
+ retval[j++] = 'x';
+ retval[j++] = '\0';
+ return retval;
+}
+
+char*
+key_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
+{
+ char *retval = NULL;
+ u_char *dgst_raw;
+ size_t dgst_raw_len;
+
+ dgst_raw = key_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &dgst_raw_len);
+ if (!dgst_raw)
+ fatal("key_fingerprint: null from key_fingerprint_raw()");
+ switch(dgst_rep) {
+ case SSH_FP_HEX:
+ retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ break;
+ case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
+ retval = key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_fingerprint_ex: bad digest representation %d",
+ dgst_rep);
+ break;
+ }
+ memset(dgst_raw, 0, dgst_raw_len);
+ xfree(dgst_raw);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
+ * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is
+ * permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the
+ * last processed (and maybe modified) character. Note that this may modify
+ * the buffer containing the number.
+ */
+static int
+read_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM * value)
+{
+ char *cp = *cpp;
+ int old;
+
+ /* Skip any leading whitespace. */
+ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+
+ /* Check that it begins with a decimal digit. */
+ if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9')
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Save starting position. */
+ *cpp = cp;
+
+ /* Move forward until all decimal digits skipped. */
+ for (; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++)
+ ;
+
+ /* Save the old terminating character, and replace it by \0. */
+ old = *cp;
+ *cp = 0;
+
+ /* Parse the number. */
+ if (BN_dec2bn(&value, *cpp) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Restore old terminating character. */
+ *cp = old;
+
+ /* Move beyond the number and return success. */
+ *cpp = cp;
+ return 1;
+}
+static int
+write_bignum(FILE *f, BIGNUM *num)
+{
+ char *buf = BN_bn2dec(num);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ error("write_bignum: BN_bn2dec() failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(f, " %s", buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* returns 1 ok, -1 error */
+int
+key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
+{
+ Key *k;
+ int success = -1;
+ char *cp, *space;
+ int len, n, type;
+ u_int bits;
+ u_char *blob;
+
+ cp = *cpp;
+
+ switch(ret->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ /* Get number of bits. */
+ if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9')
+ return -1; /* Bad bit count... */
+ for (bits = 0; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++)
+ bits = 10 * bits + *cp - '0';
+ if (bits == 0)
+ return -1;
+ *cpp = cp;
+ /* Get public exponent, public modulus. */
+ if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->e))
+ return -1;
+ if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->n))
+ return -1;
+ success = 1;
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ space = strchr(cp, ' ');
+ if (space == NULL) {
+ debug3("key_read: no space");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *space = '\0';
+ type = key_type_from_name(cp);
+ *space = ' ';
+ if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ debug3("key_read: no key found");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ cp = space+1;
+ if (*cp == '\0') {
+ debug3("key_read: short string");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ret->type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ ret->type = type;
+ } else if (ret->type != type) {
+ /* is a key, but different type */
+ debug3("key_read: type mismatch");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ len = 2*strlen(cp);
+ blob = xmalloc(len);
+ n = uudecode(cp, blob, len);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ error("key_read: uudecode %s failed", cp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ k = key_from_blob(blob, n);
+ if (k == NULL) {
+ error("key_read: key_from_blob %s failed", cp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ xfree(blob);
+ if (k->type != type) {
+ error("key_read: type mismatch: encoding error");
+ key_free(k);
+ return -1;
+ }
+/*XXXX*/
+ if (ret->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ if (ret->rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(ret->rsa);
+ ret->rsa = k->rsa;
+ k->rsa = NULL;
+ success = 1;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ if (ret->dsa != NULL)
+ DSA_free(ret->dsa);
+ ret->dsa = k->dsa;
+ k->dsa = NULL;
+ success = 1;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+ }
+/*XXXX*/
+ if (success != 1)
+ break;
+ key_free(k);
+ /* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */
+ while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
+ cp++;
+ while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')
+ cp++;
+ *cpp = cp;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_read: bad key type: %d", ret->type);
+ break;
+ }
+ return success;
+}
+int
+key_write(Key *key, FILE *f)
+{
+ int success = 0;
+ u_int bits = 0;
+
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1 && key->rsa != NULL) {
+ /* size of modulus 'n' */
+ bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+ fprintf(f, "%u", bits);
+ if (write_bignum(f, key->rsa->e) &&
+ write_bignum(f, key->rsa->n)) {
+ success = 1;
+ } else {
+ error("key_write: failed for RSA key");
+ }
+ } else if ((key->type == KEY_DSA && key->dsa != NULL) ||
+ (key->type == KEY_RSA && key->rsa != NULL)) {
+ int len, n;
+ u_char *blob, *uu;
+ key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len);
+ uu = xmalloc(2*len);
+ n = uuencode(blob, len, uu, 2*len);
+ if (n > 0) {
+ fprintf(f, "%s %s", key_ssh_name(key), uu);
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ xfree(blob);
+ xfree(uu);
+ }
+ return success;
+}
+char *
+key_type(Key *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ return "RSA1";
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return "RSA";
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return "DSA";
+ break;
+ }
+ return "unknown";
+}
+char *
+key_ssh_name(Key *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return "ssh-rsa";
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return "ssh-dss";
+ break;
+ }
+ return "ssh-unknown";
+}
+u_int
+key_size(Key *k){
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static RSA *
+rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
+{
+ RSA *private;
+ private = RSA_generate_key(bits, 35, NULL, NULL);
+ if (private == NULL)
+ fatal("rsa_generate_private_key: key generation failed.");
+ return private;
+}
+
+static DSA*
+dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
+{
+ DSA *private = DSA_generate_parameters(bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (private == NULL)
+ fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: DSA_generate_parameters failed");
+ if (!DSA_generate_key(private))
+ fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: DSA_generate_key failed.");
+ if (private == NULL)
+ fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: NULL.");
+ return private;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_generate(int type, u_int bits)
+{
+ Key *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ k->dsa = dsa_generate_private_key(bits);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ k->rsa = rsa_generate_private_key(bits);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_generate: unknown type %d", type);
+ }
+ k->type = type;
+ return k;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_from_private(Key *k)
+{
+ Key *n = NULL;
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ n = key_new(k->type);
+ BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p);
+ BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q);
+ BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g);
+ BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ n = key_new(k->type);
+ BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n);
+ BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_from_private: unknown type %d", k->type);
+ break;
+ }
+ return n;
+}
+
+int
+key_type_from_name(char *name)
+{
+ if (strcmp(name, "rsa1") == 0){
+ return KEY_RSA1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "rsa") == 0){
+ return KEY_RSA;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "dsa") == 0){
+ return KEY_DSA;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-rsa") == 0){
+ return KEY_RSA;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0){
+ return KEY_DSA;
+ }
+ debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
+ return KEY_UNSPEC;
+}
+
+int
+key_names_valid2(const char *names)
+{
+ char *s, *cp, *p;
+
+ if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+ return 0;
+ s = cp = xstrdup(names);
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ switch (key_type_from_name(p)) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ xfree(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ debug3("key names ok: [%s]", names);
+ xfree(s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+Key *
+key_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ char *ktype;
+ int rlen, type;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen);
+#endif
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
+ ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ type = key_type_from_name(ktype);
+
+ switch(type){
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ key = key_new(type);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ key = key_new(type);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->q);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->g);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ key = key_new(type);
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("key_from_blob: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
+ break;
+ }
+ rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+ if (key != NULL && rlen != 0)
+ error("key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
+ xfree(ktype);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return key;
+}
+
+int
+key_to_blob(Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ int len;
+ u_char *buf;
+
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error("key_to_blob: key == NULL");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ switch(key->type){
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->q);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->g);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n);
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("key_to_blob: unsupported key type %d", key->type);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = buffer_len(&b);
+ buf = xmalloc(len);
+ memcpy(buf, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+ memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ if (blobp != NULL)
+ *blobp = buf;
+ return len;
+}
+
+int
+key_sign(
+ Key *key,
+ u_char **sigp, int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ switch(key->type){
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("key_sign: illegal key type %d", key->type);
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+key_verify(
+ Key *key,
+ u_char *signature, int signaturelen,
+ u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ if (signaturelen == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ switch(key->type){
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return ssh_rsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("key_verify: illegal key type %d", key->type);
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.17 2001/09/17 19:27:15 stevesk Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef KEY_H
+#define KEY_H
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+typedef struct Key Key;
+enum types {
+ KEY_RSA1,
+ KEY_RSA,
+ KEY_DSA,
+ KEY_UNSPEC
+};
+enum fp_type {
+ SSH_FP_SHA1,
+ SSH_FP_MD5
+};
+enum fp_rep {
+ SSH_FP_HEX,
+ SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE
+};
+
+/* key is stored in external hardware */
+#define KEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001
+
+struct Key {
+ int type;
+ int flags;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ DSA *dsa;
+};
+
+Key *key_new(int);
+Key *key_new_private(int);
+void key_free(Key *);
+int key_equal(Key *, Key *);
+char *key_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
+char *key_type(Key *);
+int key_write(Key *, FILE *);
+int key_read(Key *, char **);
+u_int key_size(Key *);
+
+Key *key_generate(int, u_int);
+Key *key_from_private(Key *);
+int key_type_from_name(char *);
+
+Key *key_from_blob(u_char *, int);
+int key_to_blob(Key *, u_char **, u_int *);
+char *key_ssh_name(Key *);
+int key_names_valid2(const char *);
+
+int key_sign(Key *, u_char **, int *, u_char *, int);
+int key_verify(Key *, u_char *, int, u_char *, int);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.18 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#include <syslog.h>
+
+static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+static int log_on_stderr = 1;
+static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+static char *argv0;
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */
+
+static struct {
+ const char *name;
+ SyslogFacility val;
+} log_facilities[] = {
+ { "DAEMON", SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON },
+ { "USER", SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER },
+ { "AUTH", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH },
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+ { "AUTHPRIV", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV },
+#endif
+ { "LOCAL0", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 },
+ { "LOCAL1", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 },
+ { "LOCAL2", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 },
+ { "LOCAL3", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 },
+ { "LOCAL4", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 },
+ { "LOCAL5", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 },
+ { "LOCAL6", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 },
+ { "LOCAL7", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 },
+ { NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+static struct {
+ const char *name;
+ LogLevel val;
+} log_levels[] =
+{
+ { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
+ { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
+ { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
+ { "INFO", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO },
+ { "VERBOSE", SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE },
+ { "DEBUG", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
+ { "DEBUG1", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
+ { "DEBUG2", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 },
+ { "DEBUG3", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 },
+ { NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+static void do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args);
+
+SyslogFacility
+log_facility_number(char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (name != NULL)
+ for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
+ if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0)
+ return log_facilities[i].val;
+ return (SyslogFacility) - 1;
+}
+
+LogLevel
+log_level_number(char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (name != NULL)
+ for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++)
+ if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0)
+ return log_levels[i].val;
+ return (LogLevel) - 1;
+}
+/* Fatal messages. This function never returns. */
+
+void
+fatal(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ fatal_cleanup();
+}
+
+/* Error messages that should be logged. */
+
+void
+error(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+/* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */
+
+void
+log(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+/* More detailed messages (information that does not need to go to the log). */
+
+void
+verbose(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+/* Debugging messages that should not be logged during normal operation. */
+
+void
+debug(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+debug2(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+/* Fatal cleanup */
+
+struct fatal_cleanup {
+ struct fatal_cleanup *next;
+ void (*proc) (void *);
+ void *context;
+};
+
+static struct fatal_cleanup *fatal_cleanups = NULL;
+
+/* Registers a cleanup function to be called by fatal() before exiting. */
+
+void
+fatal_add_cleanup(void (*proc) (void *), void *context)
+{
+ struct fatal_cleanup *cu;
+
+ cu = xmalloc(sizeof(*cu));
+ cu->proc = proc;
+ cu->context = context;
+ cu->next = fatal_cleanups;
+ fatal_cleanups = cu;
+}
+
+/* Removes a cleanup frunction to be called at fatal(). */
+
+void
+fatal_remove_cleanup(void (*proc) (void *context), void *context)
+{
+ struct fatal_cleanup **cup, *cu;
+
+ for (cup = &fatal_cleanups; *cup; cup = &cu->next) {
+ cu = *cup;
+ if (cu->proc == proc && cu->context == context) {
+ *cup = cu->next;
+ xfree(cu);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ fatal("fatal_remove_cleanup: no such cleanup function: 0x%lx 0x%lx",
+ (u_long) proc, (u_long) context);
+}
+
+/* Cleanup and exit */
+void
+fatal_cleanup(void)
+{
+ struct fatal_cleanup *cu, *next_cu;
+ static int called = 0;
+
+ if (called)
+ exit(255);
+ called = 1;
+ /* Call cleanup functions. */
+ for (cu = fatal_cleanups; cu; cu = next_cu) {
+ next_cu = cu->next;
+ debug("Calling cleanup 0x%lx(0x%lx)",
+ (u_long) cu->proc, (u_long) cu->context);
+ (*cu->proc) (cu->context);
+ }
+ exit(255);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the log.
+ */
+
+void
+log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+{
+ argv0 = av0;
+
+ switch (level) {
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
+ log_level = level;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n",
+ (int) level);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+ if (on_stderr)
+ return;
+
+ switch (facility) {
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON:
+ log_facility = LOG_DAEMON;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER:
+ log_facility = LOG_USER;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH:
+ log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+ break;
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV:
+ log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7:
+ log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n",
+ (int) facility);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
+#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
+
+static void
+do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+ char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+ char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+ char *txt = NULL;
+ int pri = LOG_INFO;
+
+ if (level > log_level)
+ return;
+
+ switch (level) {
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+ if (!log_on_stderr)
+ txt = "fatal";
+ pri = LOG_CRIT;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
+ if (!log_on_stderr)
+ txt = "error";
+ pri = LOG_ERR;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
+ pri = LOG_INFO;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
+ pri = LOG_INFO;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
+ txt = "debug1";
+ pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
+ txt = "debug2";
+ pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+ break;
+ case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
+ txt = "debug3";
+ pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+ break;
+ default:
+ txt = "internal error";
+ pri = LOG_ERR;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (txt != NULL) {
+ snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args);
+ } else {
+ vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args);
+ }
+ if (log_on_stderr) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\r\n", msgbuf);
+ } else {
+ openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+ syslog(pri, "%.500s", msgbuf);
+ closelog();
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef SSH_LOG_H
+#define SSH_LOG_H
+
+#include <syslog.h> /* Needed for LOG_AUTHPRIV (if present) */
+
+/* Supported syslog facilities and levels. */
+typedef enum {
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH,
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV,
+#endif
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7
+} SyslogFacility;
+
+typedef enum {
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2,
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3
+} LogLevel;
+
+void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+
+SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *);
+LogLevel log_level_number(char *);
+
+void fatal(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void error(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void log(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void verbose(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+
+void fatal_cleanup(void);
+void fatal_add_cleanup(void (*) (void *), void *);
+void fatal_remove_cleanup(void (*) (void *), void *);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved.
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by Markus Friedl.
+ * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/**
+ ** loginrec.c: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+/*
+ The new login code explained
+ ============================
+
+ This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording
+ (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval.
+
+ Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a
+ union of all the useful fields in the various different types of
+ system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants.
+
+ We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be
+ used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures
+ on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code
+ gets compiled here.
+
+ The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular
+ recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so
+ many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in
+ the old code.
+
+ For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as
+ these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems
+ this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably
+ in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back
+ to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method
+ requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing
+ information. These files and their access methods are very system
+ specific indeed.
+
+ For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are
+ setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have
+ these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such
+ a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp
+ code should suffice.
+
+ Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even
+ more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a
+ simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a
+ relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in
+ a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the
+ information separately at all. For systems in the latter category,
+ we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry
+ for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could
+ incur a significant performance penalty.
+
+ Calling the new code
+ --------------------
+
+ In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in
+ login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c
+ program there are more examples.
+
+ Internal handler calling method
+ -------------------------------
+
+ When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both
+ routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in,
+ or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which
+ calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf
+ selects for the local system.
+
+ The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both
+ struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see
+ construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems
+ that introduce new features to either structure.
+
+ While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar
+ code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to
+ write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining
+ support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is
+ a difficult and time-consuming task.
+
+ Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog()
+ (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call
+ getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last
+ login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can,
+ otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0,
+ meaning "tilt".
+
+ Maintenance
+ -----------
+
+ In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct
+ methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection
+ code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_<method> or CONF_<method>_FILE
+ symbols for the platform.
+
+ Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying
+ configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself
+ with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.)
+
+ Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful!
+
+*/
+
+/**
+ ** TODO:
+ ** homegrown ttyslot()
+ ** test, test, test
+ **
+ ** Platform status:
+ ** ----------------
+ **
+ ** Known good:
+ ** Linux (Redhat 6.2, Debian)
+ ** Solaris
+ ** HP-UX 10.20 (gcc only)
+ ** IRIX
+ ** NeXT - M68k/HPPA/Sparc (4.2/3.3)
+ **
+ ** Testing required: Please send reports!
+ ** NetBSD
+ ** HP-UX 11
+ ** AIX
+ **
+ ** Platforms with known problems:
+ ** Some variants of Slackware Linux
+ **
+ **/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
+# include <libutil.h>
+#endif
+
+/**
+ ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
+ **/
+
+#if HAVE_UTMP_H
+void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
+void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
+void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
+#endif
+
+int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+/* pick the shortest string */
+#define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) ( sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2) )
+
+/**
+ ** platform-independent login functions
+ **/
+
+/* login_login(struct logininfo *) -Record a login
+ *
+ * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with
+ * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry()
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * >0 if successful
+ * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+int
+login_login (struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
+ return login_write(li);
+}
+
+
+/* login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout
+ *
+ * Call as with login_login()
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * >0 if successful
+ * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+int
+login_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT;
+ return login_write(li);
+}
+
+/* login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time
+ *
+ * Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the
+ * system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back
+ * to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 on failure, or if user has never logged in
+ * Time in seconds from the epoch if successful
+ *
+ * Useful preprocessor symbols:
+ * DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog
+ * info
+ * USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog
+ * facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set,
+ * try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx.
+ */
+unsigned int
+login_get_lastlog_time(const int uid)
+{
+ struct logininfo li;
+
+ if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid))
+ return li.tv_sec;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int) - Retrieve a lastlog entry
+ *
+ * Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with
+ * information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no
+ * system lastlog information exists.
+ *
+ * Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful
+ * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ *
+ */
+struct logininfo *
+login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const int uid)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li));
+ li->uid = uid;
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to
+ * reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see
+ * wtmp_get_entry().)
+ */
+ pw = getpwuid(uid);
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ fatal("login_get_lastlog: Cannot find account for uid %i", uid);
+
+ /* No MIN_SIZEOF here - we absolutely *must not* truncate the
+ * username */
+ strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username));
+
+ if (getlast_entry(li))
+ return li;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/* login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*) - Allocate and initialise
+ * a logininfo structure
+ *
+ * This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure
+ * meant to carry the information required to portably record login info.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory
+ * allocation fails, the program halts.
+ */
+struct
+logininfo *login_alloc_entry(int pid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *line)
+{
+ struct logininfo *newli;
+
+ newli = (struct logininfo *) xmalloc (sizeof(*newli));
+ (void)login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line);
+ return newli;
+}
+
+
+/* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *) - free struct memory */
+void
+login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ xfree(li);
+}
+
+
+/* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*)
+ * - initialise a struct logininfo
+ *
+ * Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry
+ * the information required to portably record login info.
+ *
+ * Returns: 1
+ */
+int
+login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, int pid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *line)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li));
+
+ li->pid = pid;
+
+ /* set the line information */
+ if (line)
+ line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line));
+
+ if (username) {
+ strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username));
+ pw = getpwnam(li->username);
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ fatal("login_init_entry: Cannot find user \"%s\"", li->username);
+ li->uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ }
+
+ if (hostname)
+ strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname));
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *) - set the current time
+ *
+ * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is
+ * meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for
+ * time handling.
+ */
+void
+login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+
+ li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
+ li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
+}
+
+/* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */
+void
+login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
+ const unsigned int sa_size)
+{
+ unsigned int bufsize = sa_size;
+
+ /* make sure we don't overrun our union */
+ if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size)
+ bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr);
+
+ memcpy((void *)&(li->hostaddr.sa), (const void *)sa, bufsize);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf
+ ** results
+ **/
+int
+login_write (struct logininfo *li)
+{
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if ((int)geteuid() != 0) {
+ log("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* set the timestamp */
+ login_set_current_time(li);
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+ syslogin_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+ if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN) {
+ lastlog_write_entry(li);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+ utmp_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+ wtmp_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+ utmpx_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+ wtmpx_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+int
+login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
+ login_set_current_time(li);
+# ifdef USE_UTMP
+ utmp_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_WTMP
+ wtmp_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_UTMPX
+ utmpx_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_WTMPX
+ wtmpx_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ ** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login
+ ** time.
+ **/
+
+/* take the uid in li and return the last login time */
+int
+getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+ return(lastlog_get_entry(li));
+#else /* !USE_LASTLOG */
+
+#ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG
+ /* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login
+ * time, e.g. AIX */
+ return 0;
+# else /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */
+ /* Try to retrieve the last login time from wtmp */
+# if defined(USE_WTMP) && (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP))
+ /* retrieve last login time from utmp */
+ return (wtmp_get_entry(li));
+# else /* defined(USE_WTMP) && (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)) */
+ /* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */
+# if defined(USE_WTMPX) && (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX))
+ /* retrieve last login time from utmpx */
+ return (wtmpx_get_entry(li));
+# else
+ /* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */
+ return 0;
+# endif /* USE_WTMPX && (HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX || HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX) */
+# endif /* USE_WTMP && (HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP || HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP) */
+# endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */
+#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * 'line' string utility functions
+ *
+ * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
+ *
+ * 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
+ * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
+ * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
+ * /dev/pts/1 -> ts/1 )
+ *
+ * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
+ * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
+ * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
+ * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
+ */
+
+
+/* line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make
+ * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh) */
+char *
+line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+ memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+ if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5))) {
+ strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
+ } else {
+ strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize);
+ strlcat(dst, src, dstsize);
+ }
+ return dst;
+}
+
+/* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */
+char *
+line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+ memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+ if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize);
+ else
+ strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
+ return dst;
+}
+
+/* line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character)
+ * form of the line (Just use the last <dstsize> characters of the
+ * full name.)
+ *
+ * NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero
+ * termination */
+char *
+line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+
+ /* Always skip prefix if present */
+ if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ src += 5;
+
+ len = strlen(src);
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
+ src += ((int)len - dstsize);
+
+ /* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */
+ strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize);
+ }
+
+ return dst;
+}
+
+/**
+ ** utmp utility functions
+ **
+ ** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences
+ ** into account.
+ **/
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN)
+
+/* build the utmp structure */
+void
+set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
+ ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
+ ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
+# else
+# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+ ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
+# endif
+# endif
+}
+
+void
+construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ struct utmp *ut)
+{
+ memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut));
+
+ /* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
+ line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id));
+# endif
+
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+ /* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */
+ switch (li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+#ifdef _CRAY
+ cray_set_tmpdir(ut);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+#ifdef _CRAY
+ cray_retain_utmp(ut, li->pid);
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+# endif
+ set_utmp_time(li, ut);
+
+ line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line));
+
+# ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
+ ut->ut_pid = li->pid;
+# endif
+
+ /* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */
+ if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
+ * for logouts.
+ */
+
+ /* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
+ strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username, MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+ strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
+ /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
+ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+ ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */
+
+/**
+ ** utmpx utility functions
+ **
+ ** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system
+ ** variations.
+ **/
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX)
+/* build the utmpx structure */
+void
+set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
+ utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
+ utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
+# else /* HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX */
+# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX
+ utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
+# endif /* HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX */
+# endif /* HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX */
+}
+
+void
+construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+ memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx));
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+ line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id));
+# endif
+
+ /* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */
+ switch (li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+ break;
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+ break;
+ }
+ line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line));
+ set_utmpx_time(li, utx);
+ utx->ut_pid = li->pid;
+
+ if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
+ * for logouts.
+ */
+
+ /* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */
+ strncpy(utx->ut_name, li->username, MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_name, li->username));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
+ strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname, MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
+ /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
+ if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+ utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
+ /* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */
+ utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host));
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level utmp functions
+ **/
+
+/* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+
+/* if we can, use pututline() etc. */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \
+ defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE)
+# define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+# endif
+
+
+/* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+static int
+utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+ setutent();
+ pututline(ut);
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT
+ endutent();
+# endif
+ return 1;
+}
+# else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */
+/* This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c */
+static int
+utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+ struct utmp old_ut;
+ register int fd;
+ int tty;
+
+ /* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT)
+ register struct ttyent *ty;
+
+ tty=0;
+
+ setttyent();
+ while ((struct ttyent *)0 != (ty = getttyent())) {
+ tty++;
+ if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)))
+ break;
+ }
+ endttyent();
+
+ if((struct ttyent *)0 == ty) {
+ log("utmp_write_entry: tty not found");
+ return(1);
+ }
+#else /* FIXME */
+
+ tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */
+
+ if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) {
+ (void)lseek(fd, (off_t)(tty * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_SET);
+ /*
+ * Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host.
+ * If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not
+ * and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line.
+ */
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) &&
+ (ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') &&
+ (strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) &&
+ (strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0)) {
+ (void)memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host));
+ }
+
+ (void)lseek(fd, (off_t)(tty * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_SET);
+ if (atomicio(write, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut))
+ log("utmp_write_direct: error writing %s: %s",
+ UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+
+ (void)close(fd);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+# endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+static int
+utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmp ut;
+
+ construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+ if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
+ log("utmp_perform_login: utmp_write_library() failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+# else
+ if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+ log("utmp_perform_login: utmp_write_direct() failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmp ut;
+
+ construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+ if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
+ log("utmp_perform_logout: utmp_write_library() failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+# else
+ if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+ log("utmp_perform_logout: utmp_write_direct() failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+int
+utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return utmp_perform_login(li);
+
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ return utmp_perform_logout(li);
+
+ default:
+ log("utmp_write_entry: invalid type field");
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMP */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level utmpx functions
+ **/
+
+/* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+
+/* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \
+ defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE)
+# define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+# endif
+
+
+/* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+static int
+utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+ setutxent();
+ pututxline(utx);
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
+ endutxent();
+# endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */
+static int
+utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+ log("utmpx_write_direct: not implemented!");
+ return 0;
+}
+# endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+static int
+utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmpx utx;
+
+ construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+ if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) {
+ log("utmpx_perform_login: utmp_write_library() failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+# else
+ if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+ log("utmpx_perform_login: utmp_write_direct() failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+# endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmpx utx;
+
+ memset(&utx, '\0', sizeof(utx));
+ set_utmpx_time(li, &utx);
+ line_stripname(utx.ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_line));
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+ line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+ utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+# endif
+
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+ utmpx_write_library(li, &utx);
+# else
+ utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx);
+# endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return utmpx_perform_login(li);
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ return utmpx_perform_logout(li);
+ default:
+ log("utmpx_write_entry: invalid type field");
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level wtmp functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+
+/* write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file */
+/* This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c */
+static int
+wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+ struct stat buf;
+ int fd, ret = 1;
+
+ if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
+ log("wtmp_write: problem writing %s: %s",
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
+ if (atomicio(write, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
+ ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
+ log("wtmp_write: problem writing %s: %s",
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ (void)close(fd);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmp ut;
+
+ construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+ return wtmp_write(li, &ut);
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmp ut;
+
+ construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+ return wtmp_write(li, &ut);
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return wtmp_perform_login(li);
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ return wtmp_perform_logout(li);
+ default:
+ log("wtmp_write_entry: invalid type field");
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx
+ *
+ * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank
+ * username on a given tty line. However, some systems (HP-UX is one)
+ * leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS.
+ *
+ * Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username
+ * must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for
+ * ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.)
+ *
+ * Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS
+ * to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also,
+ * it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in
+ * place and not have ut_type.
+ */
+
+/* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */
+static int
+wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+ if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+ if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS)
+ return 1;
+# else
+ return 1;
+# endif
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ struct utmp ut;
+ int fd, found=0;
+
+ /* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */
+ li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
+
+ if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ log("wtmp_get_entry: problem opening %s: %s",
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
+ log("wtmp_get_entry: couldn't stat %s: %s",
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */
+ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) {
+ /* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while (!found) {
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) {
+ log("wtmp_get_entry: read of %s failed: %s",
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ close (fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ( wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) {
+ found = 1;
+ /* We've already checked for a time in struct
+ * utmp, in login_getlast(). */
+# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+ li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time;
+# else
+# if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
+ li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec;
+# endif
+# endif
+ line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+ strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host));
+# endif
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */
+ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+ /* We've found the start of the file, so quit */
+ close (fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */
+ close(fd);
+ return 1;
+}
+# endif /* USE_WTMP */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level wtmpx functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+/* write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file */
+/* This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c */
+static int
+wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+ struct stat buf;
+ int fd, ret = 1;
+
+ if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
+ log("wtmpx_write: problem opening %s: %s",
+ WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
+ if (atomicio(write, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) {
+ ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
+ log("wtmpx_write: problem writing %s: %s",
+ WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ (void)close(fd);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmpx utx;
+
+ construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+ return wtmpx_write(li, &utx);
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmpx utx;
+
+ construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+ return wtmpx_write(li, &utx);
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return wtmpx_perform_login(li);
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ return wtmpx_perform_logout(li);
+ default:
+ log("wtmpx_write_entry: invalid type field");
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the
+ next two functions */
+
+/* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */
+static int
+wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+ if ( strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_name,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_name)) == 0 ) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+ if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)
+ return 1;
+# else
+ return 1;
+# endif
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ struct utmpx utx;
+ int fd, found=0;
+
+ /* Clear the time entries */
+ li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
+
+ if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ log("wtmpx_get_entry: problem opening %s: %s",
+ WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
+ log("wtmpx_get_entry: couldn't stat %s: %s",
+ WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */
+ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) {
+ /* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while (!found) {
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) {
+ log("wtmpx_get_entry: read of %s failed: %s",
+ WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ close (fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular line.
+ * So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx */
+ if ( wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx) ) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
+ li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec;
+# else
+# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX
+ li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time;
+# endif
+# endif
+ line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
+ strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host));
+# endif
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+ close (fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ close(fd);
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* USE_WTMPX */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level libutil login() functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+static int
+syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct utmp *ut;
+
+ if (! (ut = (struct utmp *)malloc(sizeof(*ut)))) {
+ log("syslogin_perform_login: couldn't malloc()");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ construct_utmp(li, ut);
+ login(ut);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT
+ char line[8];
+
+ (void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line));
+
+ if (!logout(line)) {
+ log("syslogin_perform_logout: logout() returned an error");
+# ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP
+ } else {
+ logwtmp(line, "", "");
+# endif
+ }
+ /* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have
+ * login, but no logout? what if logout but no logwtmp? All
+ * routines are in libutil so they should all be there,
+ * but... */
+# endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch (li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return syslogin_perform_login(li);
+ case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+ return syslogin_perform_logout(li);
+ default:
+ log("syslogin_write_entry: Invalid type field");
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* USE_LOGIN */
+
+/* end of file log-syslogin.c */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level lastlog functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+#define LL_FILE 1
+#define LL_DIR 2
+#define LL_OTHER 3
+
+static void
+lastlog_construct(struct logininfo *li, struct lastlog *last)
+{
+ /* clear the structure */
+ memset(last, '\0', sizeof(*last));
+
+ (void)line_stripname(last->ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last->ll_line));
+ strlcpy(last->ll_host, li->hostname,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(last->ll_host, li->hostname));
+ last->ll_time = li->tv_sec;
+}
+
+static int
+lastlog_filetype(char *filename)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) {
+ log("lastlog_perform_login: Couldn't stat %s: %s", LASTLOG_FILE,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+ return LL_DIR;
+ else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
+ return LL_FILE;
+ else
+ return LL_OTHER;
+}
+
+
+/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */
+static int
+lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
+{
+ off_t offset;
+ int type;
+ char lastlog_file[1024];
+
+ type = lastlog_filetype(LASTLOG_FILE);
+ switch (type) {
+ case LL_FILE:
+ strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file));
+ break;
+ case LL_DIR:
+ snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s",
+ LASTLOG_FILE, li->username);
+ break;
+ default:
+ log("lastlog_openseek: %.100s is not a file or directory!",
+ LASTLOG_FILE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode);
+ if ( *fd < 0) {
+ debug("lastlog_openseek: Couldn't open %s: %s",
+ lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (type == LL_FILE) {
+ /* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */
+ offset = (off_t) ((long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog));
+
+ if ( lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset ) {
+ log("lastlog_openseek: %s->lseek(): %s",
+ lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+lastlog_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct lastlog last;
+ int fd;
+
+ /* create our struct lastlog */
+ lastlog_construct(li, &last);
+
+ if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT))
+ return(0);
+
+ /* write the entry */
+ if (atomicio(write, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
+ close(fd);
+ log("lastlog_write_filemode: Error writing to %s: %s",
+ LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ close(fd);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ switch(li->type) {
+ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+ return lastlog_perform_login(li);
+ default:
+ log("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+lastlog_populate_entry(struct logininfo *li, struct lastlog *last)
+{
+ line_fullname(li->line, last->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+ strlcpy(li->hostname, last->ll_host,
+ MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last->ll_host));
+ li->tv_sec = last->ll_time;
+}
+
+int
+lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+ struct lastlog last;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
+ close(fd);
+ log("lastlog_get_entry: Error reading from %s: %s",
+ LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ close(fd);
+
+ lastlog_populate_entry(li, &last);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
--- /dev/null
+#ifndef _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_
+#define _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by Markus Friedl.
+ * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/**
+ ** loginrec.h: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+/* RCSID("$Id$"); */
+
+/**
+ ** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies
+ **/
+
+/*
+ * login_netinfo structure
+ */
+
+union login_netinfo {
+ struct sockaddr sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in sa_in;
+ struct sockaddr_storage sa_storage;
+};
+
+/*
+ * * logininfo structure *
+ */
+/* types - different to utmp.h 'type' macros */
+/* (though set to the same value as linux, openbsd and others...) */
+#define LTYPE_LOGIN 7
+#define LTYPE_LOGOUT 8
+
+/* string lengths - set very long */
+#define LINFO_PROGSIZE 64
+#define LINFO_LINESIZE 64
+#define LINFO_NAMESIZE 64
+#define LINFO_HOSTSIZE 256
+
+struct logininfo {
+ char progname[LINFO_PROGSIZE]; /* name of program (for PAM) */
+ int progname_null;
+ short int type; /* type of login (LTYPE_*) */
+ int pid; /* PID of login process */
+ int uid; /* UID of this user */
+ char line[LINFO_LINESIZE]; /* tty/pty name */
+ char username[LINFO_NAMESIZE]; /* login username */
+ char hostname[LINFO_HOSTSIZE]; /* remote hostname */
+ /* 'exit_status' structure components */
+ int exit; /* process exit status */
+ int termination; /* process termination status */
+ /* struct timeval (sys/time.h) isn't always available, if it isn't we'll
+ * use time_t's value as tv_sec and set tv_usec to 0
+ */
+ unsigned int tv_sec;
+ unsigned int tv_usec;
+ union login_netinfo hostaddr; /* caller's host address(es) */
+}; /* struct logininfo */
+
+/*
+ * login recording functions
+ */
+
+/** 'public' functions */
+
+/* construct a new login entry */
+struct logininfo *login_alloc_entry(int pid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *line);
+/* free a structure */
+void login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+/* fill out a pre-allocated structure with useful information */
+int login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, int pid, const char *username,
+ const char *hostname, const char *line);
+/* place the current time in a logininfo struct */
+void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li);
+
+/* record the entry */
+int login_login (struct logininfo *li);
+int login_logout(struct logininfo *li);
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li);
+#endif
+
+/** End of public functions */
+
+/* record the entry */
+int login_write (struct logininfo *li);
+int login_log_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+/* set the network address based on network address type */
+void login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
+ const unsigned int sa_size);
+
+/*
+ * lastlog retrieval functions
+ */
+/* lastlog *entry* functions fill out a logininfo */
+struct logininfo *login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const int uid);
+/* lastlog *time* functions return time_t equivalent (uint) */
+unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const int uid);
+
+/* produce various forms of the line filename */
+char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+char *line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+
+#endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by Markus Friedl.
+ * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/**
+ ** logintest.c: simple test driver for platform-independent login recording
+ ** and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "loginrec.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+#define PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT 3
+
+int nologtest = 0;
+int compile_opts_only = 0;
+int be_verbose = 0;
+
+
+/* Dump a logininfo to stdout. Assumes a tab size of 8 chars. */
+void
+dump_logininfo(struct logininfo *li, char *descname)
+{
+ /* yes I know how nasty this is */
+ printf("struct logininfo %s = {\n\t"
+ "progname\t'%s'\n\ttype\t\t%d\n\t"
+ "pid\t\t%d\n\tuid\t\t%d\n\t"
+ "line\t\t'%s'\n\tusername\t'%s'\n\t"
+ "hostname\t'%s'\n\texit\t\t%d\n\ttermination\t%d\n\t"
+ "tv_sec\t%d\n\ttv_usec\t%d\n\t"
+ "struct login_netinfo hostaddr {\n\t\t"
+ "struct sockaddr sa {\n"
+ "\t\t\tfamily\t%d\n\t\t}\n"
+ "\t}\n"
+ "}\n",
+ descname, li->progname, li->type,
+ li->pid, li->uid, li->line,
+ li->username, li->hostname, li->exit,
+ li->termination, li->tv_sec, li->tv_usec,
+ li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family);
+}
+
+
+int
+testAPI()
+{
+ struct logininfo *li1;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct hostent *he;
+ struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
+ char cmdstring[256], stripline[8];
+ char username[32];
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+ time_t t0, t1, t2, logintime, logouttime;
+ char s_t0[64],s_t1[64],s_t2[64];
+ char s_logintime[64], s_logouttime[64]; /* ctime() strings */
+#endif
+
+ printf("**\n** Testing the API...\n**\n");
+
+ pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+ strlcpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
+
+ /* gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); */
+
+ printf("login_alloc_entry test (no host info):\n");
+
+ /* FIXME fake tty more effectively - this could upset some platforms */
+ li1 = login_alloc_entry((int)getpid(), username, NULL, ttyname(0));
+ strlcpy(li1->progname, "OpenSSH-logintest", sizeof(li1->progname));
+
+ if (be_verbose)
+ dump_logininfo(li1, "li1");
+
+ printf("Setting host address info for 'localhost' (may call out):\n");
+ if (! (he = gethostbyname("localhost"))) {
+ printf("Couldn't set hostname(lookup failed)\n");
+ } else {
+ /* NOTE: this is messy, but typically a program wouldn't have to set
+ * any of this, a sockaddr_in* would be already prepared */
+ memcpy((void *)&(sa_in4.sin_addr), (void *)&(he->h_addr_list[0][0]),
+ sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ login_set_addr(li1, (struct sockaddr *) &sa_in4, sizeof(sa_in4));
+ strlcpy(li1->hostname, "localhost", sizeof(li1->hostname));
+ }
+ if (be_verbose)
+ dump_logininfo(li1, "li1");
+
+ if ((int)geteuid() != 0) {
+ printf("NOT RUNNING LOGIN TESTS - you are not root!\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (nologtest)
+ return 1;
+
+ line_stripname(stripline, li1->line, sizeof(stripline));
+
+ printf("Performing an invalid login attempt (no type field)\n--\n");
+ login_write(li1);
+ printf("--\n(Should have written errors to stderr)\n");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+ (void)time(&t0);
+ strlcpy(s_t0, ctime(&t0), sizeof(s_t0));
+ t1 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid());
+ strlcpy(s_t1, ctime(&t1), sizeof(s_t1));
+ printf("Before logging in:\n\tcurrent time is %d - %s\t"
+ "lastlog time is %d - %s\n",
+ (int)t0, s_t0, (int)t1, s_t1);
+#endif
+
+ printf("Performing a login on line %s ", stripline);
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+ (void)time(&logintime);
+ strlcpy(s_logintime, ctime(&logintime), sizeof(s_logintime));
+ printf("at %d - %s", (int)logintime, s_logintime);
+#endif
+ printf("--\n");
+ login_login(li1);
+
+ snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "who | grep '%s '",
+ stripline);
+ system(cmdstring);
+
+ printf("--\nPausing for %d second(s)...\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+ sleep(PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+
+ printf("Performing a logout ");
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+ (void)time(&logouttime);
+ strlcpy(s_logouttime, ctime(&logouttime), sizeof(s_logouttime));
+ printf("at %d - %s", (int)logouttime, s_logouttime);
+#endif
+ printf("\nThe root login shown above should be gone.\n"
+ "If the root login hasn't gone, but another user on the same\n"
+ "pty has, this is OK - we're hacking it here, and there\n"
+ "shouldn't be two users on one pty in reality...\n"
+ "-- ('who' output follows)\n");
+ login_logout(li1);
+
+ system(cmdstring);
+ printf("-- ('who' output ends)\n");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+ t2 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid());
+ strlcpy(s_t2, ctime(&t2), sizeof(s_t2));
+ printf("After logging in, lastlog time is %d - %s\n", (int)t2, s_t2);
+ if (t1 == t2)
+ printf("The lastlog times before and after logging in are the "
+ "same.\nThis indicates that lastlog is ** NOT WORKING "
+ "CORRECTLY **\n");
+ else if (t0 != t2)
+ /* We can be off by a second or so, even when recording works fine.
+ * I'm not 100% sure why, but it's true. */
+ printf("** The login time and the lastlog time differ.\n"
+ "** This indicates that lastlog is either recording the "
+ "wrong time,\n** or retrieving the wrong entry.\n"
+ "If it's off by less than %d second(s) "
+ "run the test again.\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+ else
+ printf("lastlog agrees with the login time. This is a good thing.\n");
+
+#endif
+
+ printf("--\nThe output of 'last' shown next should have "
+ "an entry for root \n on %s for the time shown above:\n--\n",
+ stripline);
+ snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "last | grep '%s ' | head -3",
+ stripline);
+ system(cmdstring);
+
+ printf("--\nEnd of login test.\n");
+
+ login_free_entry(li1);
+
+ return 1;
+} /* testAPI() */
+
+
+void
+testLineName(char *line)
+{
+ /* have to null-terminate - these functions are designed for
+ * structures with fixed-length char arrays, and don't null-term.*/
+ char full[17], strip[9], abbrev[5];
+
+ memset(full, '\0', sizeof(full));
+ memset(strip, '\0', sizeof(strip));
+ memset(abbrev, '\0', sizeof(abbrev));
+
+ line_fullname(full, line, sizeof(full)-1);
+ line_stripname(strip, full, sizeof(strip)-1);
+ line_abbrevname(abbrev, full, sizeof(abbrev)-1);
+ printf("%s: %s, %s, %s\n", line, full, strip, abbrev);
+
+} /* testLineName() */
+
+
+int
+testOutput()
+{
+ printf("**\n** Testing linename functions\n**\n");
+ testLineName("/dev/pts/1");
+ testLineName("pts/1");
+ testLineName("pts/999");
+ testLineName("/dev/ttyp00");
+ testLineName("ttyp00");
+
+ return 1;
+} /* testOutput() */
+
+
+/* show which options got compiled in */
+void
+showOptions(void)
+{
+ printf("**\n** Compile-time options\n**\n");
+
+ printf("login recording methods selected:\n");
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+ printf("\tUSE_LOGIN\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+ printf("\tUSE_UTMP (UTMP_FILE=%s)\n", UTMP_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+ printf("\tUSE_UTMPX (UTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", UTMPX_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+ printf("\tUSE_WTMP (WTMP_FILE=%s)\n", WTMP_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+ printf("\tUSE_WTMPX (WTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", WTMPX_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+ printf("\tUSE_LASTLOG (LASTLOG_FILE=%s)\n", LASTLOG_FILE);
+#endif
+ printf("\n");
+
+} /* showOptions() */
+
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ printf("Platform-independent login recording test driver\n");
+
+ __progname = get_progname(argv[0]);
+ if (argc == 2) {
+ if (strncmp(argv[1], "-i", 3) == 0)
+ compile_opts_only = 1;
+ else if (strncmp(argv[1], "-v", 3) == 0)
+ be_verbose=1;
+ }
+
+ if (!compile_opts_only) {
+ if (be_verbose && !testOutput())
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!testAPI())
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ showOptions();
+
+ return 0;
+} /* main() */
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.2 2001/04/05 10:42:51 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "getput.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+
+struct {
+ char *name;
+ EVP_MD * (*mdfunc)(void);
+ int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */
+} macs[] = {
+ { "hmac-sha1", EVP_sha1, 0, },
+ { "hmac-sha1-96", EVP_sha1, 96 },
+ { "hmac-md5", EVP_md5, 0 },
+ { "hmac-md5-96", EVP_md5, 96 },
+ { "hmac-ripemd160", EVP_ripemd160, 0 },
+ { "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com", EVP_ripemd160, 0 },
+ { NULL, NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+int
+mac_init(Mac *mac, char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) {
+ if (mac != NULL) {
+ mac->md = (*macs[i].mdfunc)();
+ mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = mac->md->md_size;
+ if (macs[i].truncatebits != 0)
+ mac->mac_len = macs[i].truncatebits/8;
+ }
+ debug2("mac_init: found %s", name);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ debug2("mac_init: unknown %s", name);
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+u_char *
+mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ HMAC_CTX c;
+ static u_char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ u_char b[4];
+
+ if (mac->key == NULL)
+ fatal("mac_compute: no key");
+ if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(m))
+ fatal("mac_compute: mac too long");
+ HMAC_Init(&c, mac->key, mac->key_len, mac->md);
+ PUT_32BIT(b, seqno);
+ HMAC_Update(&c, b, sizeof(b));
+ HMAC_Update(&c, data, datalen);
+ HMAC_Final(&c, m, NULL);
+ HMAC_cleanup(&c);
+ return (m);
+}
+
+/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
+#define MAC_SEP ","
+int
+mac_valid(const char *names)
+{
+ char *maclist, *cp, *p;
+
+ if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+ return (0);
+ maclist = cp = xstrdup(names);
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) {
+ if (mac_init(NULL, p) < 0) {
+ debug("bad mac %s [%s]", p, names);
+ xfree(maclist);
+ return (0);
+ } else {
+ debug3("mac ok: %s [%s]", p, names);
+ }
+ }
+ debug3("macs ok: [%s]", names);
+ xfree(maclist);
+ return (1);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+int mac_valid(const char *);
+int mac_init(Mac *, char *);
+u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.14 2001/06/27 04:48:53 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "match.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
+ * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
+ */
+
+int
+match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
+ if (!*pattern)
+ return !*s;
+
+ if (*pattern == '*') {
+ /* Skip the asterisk. */
+ pattern++;
+
+ /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
+ if (!*pattern)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
+ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
+ /*
+ * Look instances of the next character in
+ * pattern, and try to match starting from
+ * those.
+ */
+ for (; *s; s++)
+ if (*s == *pattern &&
+ match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
+ return 1;
+ /* Failed. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Move ahead one character at a time and try to
+ * match at each position.
+ */
+ for (; *s; s++)
+ if (match_pattern(s, pattern))
+ return 1;
+ /* Failed. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * There must be at least one more character in the string.
+ * If we are at the end, fail.
+ */
+ if (!*s)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
+ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
+ s++;
+ pattern++;
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
+ * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
+ * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
+ * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
+ */
+
+int
+match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern, u_int len)
+{
+ char sub[1024];
+ int negated;
+ int got_positive;
+ u_int i, subi;
+
+ got_positive = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < len;) {
+ /* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
+ if (pattern[i] == '!') {
+ negated = 1;
+ i++;
+ } else
+ negated = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the
+ * subpattern to lowercase.
+ */
+ for (subi = 0;
+ i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
+ subi++, i++)
+ sub[subi] = isupper(pattern[i]) ? tolower(pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
+ /* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
+ if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */
+ if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
+ i++;
+
+ /* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
+ sub[subi] = '\0';
+
+ /* Try to match the subpattern against the host name. */
+ if (match_pattern(host, sub)) {
+ if (negated)
+ return -1; /* Negative */
+ else
+ got_positive = 1; /* Positive */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative
+ * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
+ */
+ return got_positive;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip
+ * or if we get no match at all. returns 1 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+ const char *patterns)
+{
+ int mhost, mip;
+
+ /* negative ipaddr match */
+ if ((mip = match_hostname(ipaddr, patterns, strlen(patterns))) == -1)
+ return 0;
+ /* negative hostname match */
+ if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns, strlen(patterns))) == -1)
+ return 0;
+ /* no match at all */
+ if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern
+ */
+int
+match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+ const char *pattern)
+{
+ char *p, *pat;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL)
+ return match_pattern(user, pattern);
+
+ pat = xstrdup(pattern);
+ p = strchr(pat, '@');
+ *p++ = '\0';
+
+ if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
+ ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p);
+ xfree(pat);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list,
+ * caller must xfree() returned string.
+ */
+#define MAX_PROP 20
+#define SEP ","
+char *
+match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
+{
+ char *sproposals[MAX_PROP];
+ char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp;
+ int i, j, nproposals;
+
+ c = cp = xstrdup(client);
+ s = sp = xstrdup(server);
+
+ for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) {
+ if (i < MAX_PROP)
+ sproposals[i] = p;
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ nproposals = i;
+
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) {
+ if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) {
+ ret = xstrdup(p);
+ if (next != NULL)
+ *next = (cp == NULL) ?
+ strlen(c) : cp - c;
+ xfree(c);
+ xfree(s);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (next != NULL)
+ *next = strlen(c);
+ xfree(c);
+ xfree(s);
+ return NULL;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.9 2001/06/26 06:32:56 itojun Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+#ifndef MATCH_H
+#define MATCH_H
+
+int match_pattern(const char *, const char *);
+int match_hostname(const char *, const char *, u_int);
+int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+ * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you
+ * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think
+ * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Ported from FreeBSD to Linux, only minimal changes. --marekm
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Adapted from shadow-19990607 by Tudor Bosman, tudorb@jm.nu
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+static unsigned char itoa64[] = /* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */
+ "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+static char *magic = "$1$"; /*
+ * This string is magic for
+ * this algorithm. Having
+ * it this way, we can get
+ * get better later on
+ */
+
+static void
+to64(char *s, unsigned long v, int n)
+{
+ while (--n >= 0) {
+ *s++ = itoa64[v&0x3f];
+ v >>= 6;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+is_md5_salt(const char *salt)
+{
+ return (!strncmp(salt, magic, strlen(magic)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * UNIX password
+ *
+ * Use MD5 for what it is best at...
+ */
+
+char *
+md5_crypt(const char *pw, const char *salt)
+{
+ static char passwd[120], *p;
+ static const char *sp,*ep;
+ unsigned char final[16];
+ int sl,pl,i,j;
+ MD5_CTX ctx,ctx1;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ /* Refine the Salt first */
+ sp = salt;
+
+ /* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */
+ if(!strncmp(sp,magic,strlen(magic)))
+ sp += strlen(magic);
+
+ /* It stops at the first '$', max 8 chars */
+ for(ep=sp;*ep && *ep != '$' && ep < (sp+8);ep++)
+ continue;
+
+ /* get the length of the true salt */
+ sl = ep - sp;
+
+ MD5_Init(&ctx);
+
+ /* The password first, since that is what is most unknown */
+ MD5_Update(&ctx,pw,strlen(pw));
+
+ /* Then our magic string */
+ MD5_Update(&ctx,magic,strlen(magic));
+
+ /* Then the raw salt */
+ MD5_Update(&ctx,sp,sl);
+
+ /* Then just as many characters of the MD5(pw,salt,pw) */
+ MD5_Init(&ctx1);
+ MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw));
+ MD5_Update(&ctx1,sp,sl);
+ MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw));
+ MD5_Final(final,&ctx1);
+ for(pl = strlen(pw); pl > 0; pl -= 16)
+ MD5_Update(&ctx,final,pl>16 ? 16 : pl);
+
+ /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
+ memset(final,0,sizeof final);
+
+ /* Then something really weird... */
+ for (j=0,i = strlen(pw); i ; i >>= 1)
+ if(i&1)
+ MD5_Update(&ctx, final+j, 1);
+ else
+ MD5_Update(&ctx, pw+j, 1);
+
+ /* Now make the output string */
+ strcpy(passwd,magic);
+ strncat(passwd,sp,sl);
+ strcat(passwd,"$");
+
+ MD5_Final(final,&ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * and now, just to make sure things don't run too fast
+ * On a 60 Mhz Pentium this takes 34 msec, so you would
+ * need 30 seconds to build a 1000 entry dictionary...
+ */
+ for(i=0;i<1000;i++) {
+ MD5_Init(&ctx1);
+ if(i & 1)
+ MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw));
+ else
+ MD5_Update(&ctx1,final,16);
+
+ if(i % 3)
+ MD5_Update(&ctx1,sp,sl);
+
+ if(i % 7)
+ MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw));
+
+ if(i & 1)
+ MD5_Update(&ctx1,final,16);
+ else
+ MD5_Update(&ctx1,pw,strlen(pw));
+ MD5_Final(final,&ctx1);
+ }
+
+ p = passwd + strlen(passwd);
+
+ l = (final[ 0]<<16) | (final[ 6]<<8) | final[12]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4;
+ l = (final[ 1]<<16) | (final[ 7]<<8) | final[13]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4;
+ l = (final[ 2]<<16) | (final[ 8]<<8) | final[14]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4;
+ l = (final[ 3]<<16) | (final[ 9]<<8) | final[15]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4;
+ l = (final[ 4]<<16) | (final[10]<<8) | final[ 5]; to64(p,l,4); p += 4;
+ l = final[11] ; to64(p,l,2); p += 2;
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
+ memset(final,0,sizeof final);
+
+ return passwd;
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+ * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you
+ * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think
+ * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Ported from FreeBSD to Linux, only minimal changes. --marekm
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Adapted from shadow-19990607 by Tudor Bosman, tudorb@jm.nu
+ */
+
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _MD5CRYPT_H
+#define _MD5CRYPT_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT)
+
+int is_md5_salt(const char *salt);
+char *md5_crypt(const char *pw, const char *salt);
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */
+
+#endif /* MD5CRYPT_H */
--- /dev/null
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+###
+### Quick usage: mdoc2man.pl < mdoc_manpage.8 > man_manpage.8
+###
+###
+### Copyright (c) 2001 University of Illinois Board of Trustees
+### Copyright (c) 2001 Mark D. Roth
+### All rights reserved.
+###
+### Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+### modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+### are met:
+### 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+### notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+### 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+### notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+### documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+### 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+### must display the following acknowledgement:
+### This product includes software developed by the University of
+### Illinois at Urbana, and their contributors.
+### 4. The University nor the names of their
+### contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
+### this software without specific prior written permission.
+###
+### THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE TRUSTEES AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+### ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+### IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+### ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE TRUSTEES OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+### FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+### DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+### OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+### HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+### LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+### OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+### SUCH DAMAGE.
+###
+
+use strict;
+
+my ($name, $date, $id);
+my ($line);
+my ($optlist, $oldoptlist, $nospace, $enum, $synopsis);
+my ($reference, $block, $ext, $extopt, $literal);
+my (@refauthors, $reftitle, $refissue, $refdate, $refopt);
+
+
+$optlist = 0; ### 1 = bullet, 2 = enum, 3 = tag, 4 = item
+$oldoptlist = 0;
+$nospace = 0;
+$synopsis = 0;
+$reference = 0;
+$block = 0;
+$ext = 0;
+$extopt = 0;
+$literal = 0;
+
+while ($line = <STDIN>)
+{
+ if ($line !~ /^\./)
+ {
+ print $line;
+ print ".br\n"
+ if ($literal);
+ next;
+ }
+
+ $line =~ s/^\.//;
+
+ next
+ if ($line =~ m/\\"/);
+
+ $line = ParseMacro($line);
+ print($line)
+ if (defined $line);
+}
+
+
+
+sub ParseMacro # ($line)
+{
+ my ($line) = @_;
+ my (@words, $retval, $option, $parens);
+
+ @words = split(/\s+/, $line);
+ $retval = '';
+ $option = 0;
+ $parens = 0;
+
+# print('@words = ', scalar(@words), ': ', join(' ', @words), "\n");
+
+ while ($_ = shift @words)
+ {
+# print "WORD: $_\n";
+
+ next
+ if (/^(Li|Pf)$/);
+
+ if (/^Xo$/)
+ {
+ $ext = 1;
+ $retval .= ' '
+ if ($retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/[\n ]$/);
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Xc$/)
+ {
+ $ext = 0;
+ $retval .= "\n"
+ if (! $extopt);
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Bd$/)
+ {
+ $literal = 1
+ if ($words[0] eq '-literal');
+ $retval .= "\n";
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Ed$/)
+ {
+ $literal = 0;
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Ns$/)
+ {
+ $nospace = 1
+ if (! $nospace);
+ $retval =~ s/ $//;
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^No$/)
+ {
+ $retval =~ s/ $//;
+ $retval .= shift @words;
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Dq$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '``';
+ do
+ {
+ $retval .= (shift @words) . ' ';
+ }
+ while (@words > 0 && $words[0] !~ m/^[\.,]/);
+ $retval =~ s/ $//;
+ $retval .= '\'\'';
+ $nospace = 1
+ if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/);
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^(Sq|Ql)$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '`' . (shift @words) . '\'';
+ $nospace = 1
+ if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/);
+ next;
+ }
+
+# if (/^Ic$/)
+# {
+# $retval .= '\\fB' . shift(@words) . '\\fP';
+# next;
+# }
+
+ if (/^Oo$/)
+ {
+# $retval .= "[\\c\n";
+ $extopt = 1;
+ $nospace = 1
+ if (! $nospace);
+ $retval .= '[';
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Oc$/)
+ {
+ $extopt = 0;
+ $retval .= ']';
+ next;
+ }
+
+ $retval .= ' '
+ if (! $nospace && $retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/[\n ]$/);
+ $nospace = 0
+ if ($nospace == 1);
+
+ if (/^Dd$/)
+ {
+ $date = join(' ', @words);
+ return undef;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Dt$/)
+ {
+ $id = join(' ', @words);
+ return undef;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Os$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '.TH '
+ . $id
+ . " \"$date\" \""
+ . join(' ', @words)
+ . "\"";
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Sh$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '.SH';
+ if ($words[0] eq 'SYNOPSIS')
+ {
+ $synopsis = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $synopsis = 0;
+ }
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Xr$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '\\fB' . (shift @words) .
+ '\\fP(' . (shift @words) . ')'
+ . (shift @words);
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Rs/)
+ {
+ @refauthors = ();
+ $reftitle = '';
+ $refissue = '';
+ $refdate = '';
+ $refopt = '';
+ $reference = 1;
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Re/)
+ {
+ $retval .= "\n";
+
+ # authors
+ while (scalar(@refauthors) > 1)
+ {
+ $retval .= shift(@refauthors) . ', ';
+ }
+ $retval .= 'and '
+ if ($retval ne '');
+ $retval .= shift(@refauthors);
+
+ # title
+ $retval .= ', \\fI' . $reftitle . '\\fP';
+
+ # issue
+ $retval .= ', ' . $refissue
+ if ($refissue ne '');
+
+ # date
+ $retval .= ', ' . $refdate
+ if ($refdate ne '');
+
+ # optional info
+ $retval .= ', ' . $refopt
+ if ($refopt ne '');
+
+ $retval .= ".\n";
+
+ $reference = 0;
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if ($reference)
+ {
+ if (/^%A$/)
+ {
+ unshift(@refauthors, join(' ', @words));
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^%T$/)
+ {
+ $reftitle = join(' ', @words);
+ $reftitle =~ s/^"//;
+ $reftitle =~ s/"$//;
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^%N$/)
+ {
+ $refissue = join(' ', @words);
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^%D$/)
+ {
+ $refdate = join(' ', @words);
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^%O$/)
+ {
+ $refopt = join(' ', @words);
+ last;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (/^Nm$/)
+ {
+ $name = shift @words
+ if (@words > 0);
+ $retval .= ".br\n"
+ if ($synopsis);
+ $retval .= "\\fB$name\\fP";
+ $nospace = 1
+ if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/);
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Nd$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '\\-';
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Fl$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '\\fB\\-' . (shift @words) . '\\fP';
+ $nospace = 1
+ if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/);
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Ar$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '\\fI';
+ if (! defined $words[0])
+ {
+ $retval .= 'file ...\\fP';
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $retval .= shift(@words) . '\\fP';
+ while ($words[0] eq '|')
+ {
+ $retval .= ' ' . shift(@words);
+ $retval .= ' \\fI' . shift(@words);
+ $retval .= '\\fP';
+ }
+ }
+ $nospace = 1
+ if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,]/);
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Cm$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '\\fB' . (shift @words) . '\\fP';
+ while ($words[0] =~ m/^[\.,:)]$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= shift(@words);
+ }
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Op$/)
+ {
+ $option = 1;
+ $nospace = 1
+ if (! $nospace);
+ $retval .= '[';
+# my $tmp = pop(@words);
+# $tmp .= ']';
+# push(@words, $tmp);
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Pp$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= "\n";
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Ss$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '.SS';
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Pa$/ && ! $option)
+ {
+ $retval .= '\\fI';
+ $retval .= '\\&'
+ if ($words[0] =~ m/^\./);
+ $retval .= (shift @words) . '\\fP';
+ while ($words[0] =~ m/^[\.,:;)]$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= shift(@words);
+ }
+# $nospace = 1
+# if (! $nospace && $words[0] =~ m/^[\.,:)]/);
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Dv$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '.BR';
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^(Em|Ev)$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '.IR';
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Pq$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '(';
+ $nospace = 1;
+ $parens = 1;
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^(S[xy])$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '.B ' . join(' ', @words);
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Ic$/)
+ {
+ $retval .= '\\fB';
+ while (defined $words[0]
+ && $words[0] !~ m/^[\.,]/)
+ {
+ if ($words[0] eq 'Op')
+ {
+ shift(@words);
+ $retval .= '[';
+ my $tmp = pop(@words);
+ $tmp .= ']';
+ push(@words, $tmp);
+ next;
+ }
+ if ($words[0] eq 'Ar')
+ {
+ shift @words;
+ $retval .= '\\fI';
+ $retval .= shift @words;
+ $retval .= '\\fP';
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ $retval .= shift @words;
+ }
+ $retval .= ' '
+ if (! $nospace);
+ }
+ $retval =~ s/ $//;
+ $retval .= '\\fP';
+ $retval .= shift @words
+ if (defined $words[0]);
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Bl$/)
+ {
+ $oldoptlist = $optlist;
+ if ($words[0] eq '-bullet')
+ {
+ $optlist = 1;
+ }
+ elsif ($words[0] eq '-enum')
+ {
+ $optlist = 2;
+ $enum = 0;
+ }
+ elsif ($words[0] eq '-tag')
+ {
+ $optlist = 3;
+ }
+ elsif ($words[0] eq '-item')
+ {
+ $optlist = 4;
+ }
+ last;
+ }
+
+ if (/^El$/)
+ {
+ $optlist = $oldoptlist;
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if ($optlist && /^It$/)
+ {
+ if ($optlist == 1)
+ {
+ # bullets
+ $retval .= '.IP \\(bu';
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if ($optlist == 2)
+ {
+ # enum
+ $retval .= '.IP ' . (++$enum) . '.';
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if ($optlist == 3)
+ {
+ # tags
+ $retval .= ".TP\n";
+ if ($words[0] =~ m/^(Pa|Ev)$/)
+ {
+ shift @words;
+ $retval .= '.B';
+ }
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if ($optlist == 4)
+ {
+ # item
+ $retval .= ".IP\n";
+ next;
+ }
+
+ next;
+ }
+
+ if (/^Sm$/)
+ {
+ if ($words[0] eq 'off')
+ {
+ $nospace = 2;
+ }
+ elsif ($words[0] eq 'on')
+ {
+# $retval .= "\n";
+ $nospace = 0;
+ }
+ shift @words;
+ next;
+ }
+
+ $retval .= "$_";
+ }
+
+ return undef
+ if ($retval eq '.');
+
+ $retval =~ s/^\.([^a-zA-Z])/$1/;
+# $retval =~ s/ $//;
+
+ $retval .= ')'
+ if ($parens == 1);
+
+ $retval .= ']'
+ if ($option == 1);
+
+# $retval .= ' '
+# if ($nospace && $retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/\n$/);
+
+# $retval .= ' '
+# if ($extended && $retval !~ m/ $/);
+
+ $retval .= ' '
+ if ($ext && ! $extopt && $retval !~ m/ $/);
+
+ $retval .= "\n"
+ if (! $ext && ! $extopt && $retval ne '' && $retval !~ m/\n$/);
+
+ return $retval;
+}
+
+
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.12 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.12 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* remove newline at end of string */
+char *
+chop(char *s)
+{
+ char *t = s;
+ while (*t) {
+ if(*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') {
+ *t = '\0';
+ return s;
+ }
+ t++;
+ }
+ return s;
+
+}
+
+/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
+void
+set_nonblock(int fd)
+{
+ int val;
+
+ val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
+ if (val < 0) {
+ error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ if (val & O_NONBLOCK) {
+ debug2("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+ return;
+ }
+ debug("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+ val |= O_NONBLOCK;
+ if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1)
+ if (errno != ENODEV)
+ error("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s",
+ fd, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+unset_nonblock(int fd)
+{
+ int val;
+
+ val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
+ if (val < 0) {
+ error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
+ debug2("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+ return;
+ }
+ debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+ val &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
+ if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1)
+ if (errno != ENODEV)
+ error("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s",
+ fd, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
+/* return next token in configuration line */
+char *
+strdelim(char **s)
+{
+ char *old;
+ int wspace = 0;
+
+ if (*s == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ old = *s;
+
+ *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE "=");
+ if (*s == NULL)
+ return (old);
+
+ /* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */
+ if (*s[0] == '=')
+ wspace = 1;
+ *s[0] = '\0';
+
+ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
+ if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace)
+ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
+
+ return (old);
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ struct passwd *copy = xmalloc(sizeof(*copy));
+
+ memset(copy, 0, sizeof(*copy));
+ copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
+ copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos);
+ copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_EXPIRE_IN_PASSWD
+ copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CHANGE_IN_PASSWD
+ copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+ copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
+#endif
+ copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+ copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
+ return copy;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
+ * Port must be >0 and <=65535.
+ * Return 0 if invalid.
+ */
+int
+a2port(const char *s)
+{
+ long port;
+ char *endp;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ port = strtol(s, &endp, 0);
+ if (s == endp || *endp != '\0' ||
+ (errno == ERANGE && (port == LONG_MIN || port == LONG_MAX)) ||
+ port <= 0 || port > 65535)
+ return 0;
+
+ return port;
+}
+
+#define SECONDS 1
+#define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60)
+#define HOURS (MINUTES * 60)
+#define DAYS (HOURS * 24)
+#define WEEKS (DAYS * 7)
+
+/*
+ * Convert a time string into seconds; format is
+ * a sequence of:
+ * time[qualifier]
+ *
+ * Valid time qualifiers are:
+ * <none> seconds
+ * s|S seconds
+ * m|M minutes
+ * h|H hours
+ * d|D days
+ * w|W weeks
+ *
+ * Examples:
+ * 90m 90 minutes
+ * 1h30m 90 minutes
+ * 2d 2 days
+ * 1w 1 week
+ *
+ * Return -1 if time string is invalid.
+ */
+long
+convtime(const char *s)
+{
+ long total, secs;
+ const char *p;
+ char *endp;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ total = 0;
+ p = s;
+
+ if (p == NULL || *p == '\0')
+ return -1;
+
+ while (*p) {
+ secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10);
+ if (p == endp ||
+ (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) ||
+ secs < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (*endp++) {
+ case '\0':
+ endp--;
+ case 's':
+ case 'S':
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ case 'M':
+ secs *= MINUTES;
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ case 'H':
+ secs *= HOURS;
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ case 'D':
+ secs *= DAYS;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ case 'W':
+ secs *= WEEKS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ total += secs;
+ if (total < 0)
+ return -1;
+ p = endp;
+ }
+
+ return total;
+}
+
+char *
+cleanhostname(char *host)
+{
+ if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') {
+ host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0';
+ return (host + 1);
+ } else
+ return host;
+}
+
+char *
+colon(char *cp)
+{
+ int flag = 0;
+
+ if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ return (0);
+ if (*cp == '[')
+ flag = 1;
+
+ for (; *cp; ++cp) {
+ if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[')
+ flag = 1;
+ if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag)
+ return (cp+1);
+ if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
+ return (cp);
+ if (*cp == '/')
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* function to assist building execv() arguments */
+void
+addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (args->list == NULL) {
+ args->nalloc = 32;
+ args->num = 0;
+ } else if (args->num+2 >= args->nalloc)
+ args->nalloc *= 2;
+
+ args->list = xrealloc(args->list, args->nalloc * sizeof(char *));
+ args->list[args->num++] = xstrdup(buf);
+ args->list[args->num] = NULL;
+}
+
+mysig_t
+mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
+ struct sigaction sa, osa;
+
+ if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &osa) == -1)
+ return (mysig_t) -1;
+ if (osa.sa_handler != act) {
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ sa.sa_flags = 0;
+#if defined(SA_INTERRUPT)
+ if (sig == SIGALRM)
+ sa.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT;
+#endif
+ sa.sa_handler = act;
+ if (sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL) == -1)
+ return (mysig_t) -1;
+ }
+ return (osa.sa_handler);
+#else
+ return (signal(sig, act));
+#endif
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.10 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+char *chop(char *);
+char *strdelim(char **);
+void set_nonblock(int);
+void unset_nonblock(int);
+int a2port(const char *);
+char *cleanhostname(char *);
+char *colon(char *);
+long convtime(const char *);
+
+struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
+
+typedef struct arglist arglist;
+struct arglist {
+ char **list;
+ int num;
+ int nalloc;
+};
+void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+
+/* wrapper for signal interface */
+typedef void (*mysig_t)(int);
+mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act);
--- /dev/null
+#! /bin/sh
+# mkinstalldirs --- make directory hierarchy
+# Author: Noah Friedman <friedman@prep.ai.mit.edu>
+# Created: 1993-05-16
+# Public domain
+
+# $Id$
+
+errstatus=0
+
+for file
+do
+ set fnord `echo ":$file" | sed -ne 's/^:\//#/;s/^://;s/\// /g;s/^#/\//;p'`
+ shift
+
+ pathcomp=
+ for d
+ do
+ pathcomp="$pathcomp$d"
+ case "$pathcomp" in
+ -* ) pathcomp=./$pathcomp ;;
+ esac
+
+ if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then
+ echo "mkdir $pathcomp"
+
+ mkdir "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$?
+
+ if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then
+ errstatus=$lasterr
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ pathcomp="$pathcomp/"
+ done
+done
+
+exit $errstatus
+
+# mkinstalldirs ends here
--- /dev/null
+# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.1 2001/06/22 22:07:54 provos Exp $
+
+# Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
+20010328182134 2 6 100 1023 2 DCFAC4EFE89F5B082962AB9A67E8D63E84FA491E5D3874978815868595469163DA0661E6208A8C2CD4F83893B53864ADFD2154E8D8EFA146BAD808562E4BF6C90348FD79EEB3387D93FC7943BC450BA55399BA3CF3DFBD0D4E71800007B0E9D5F12E7A2CB7EA4E49812E715F8DC570C478DC2DEB1C49B0AE87A5DF5449C221CB
+20010328182222 2 6 100 1023 2 DCFAC4EFE89F5B082962AB9A67E8D63E84FA491E5D3874978815868595469163DA0661E6208A8C2CD4F83893B53864ADFD2154E8D8EFA146BAD808562E4BF6C90348FD79EEB3387D93FC7943BC450BA55399BA3CF3DFBD0D4E71800007B0E9D5F12E7A2CB7EA4E49812E715F8DC570C478DC2DEB1C49B0AE87A5DF5449C95A43
+20010328182256 2 6 100 1023 2 DCFAC4EFE89F5B082962AB9A67E8D63E84FA491E5D3874978815868595469163DA0661E6208A8C2CD4F83893B53864ADFD2154E8D8EFA146BAD808562E4BF6C90348FD79EEB3387D93FC7943BC450BA55399BA3CF3DFBD0D4E71800007B0E9D5F12E7A2CB7EA4E49812E715F8DC570C478DC2DEB1C49B0AE87A5DF5449CC8CFB
+20010328182409 2 6 100 1023 5 DCFAC4EFE89F5B082962AB9A67E8D63E84FA491E5D3874978815868595469163DA0661E6208A8C2CD4F83893B53864ADFD2154E8D8EFA146BAD808562E4BF6C90348FD79EEB3387D93FC7943BC450BA55399BA3CF3DFBD0D4E71800007B0E9D5F12E7A2CB7EA4E49812E715F8DC570C478DC2DEB1C49B0AE87A5DF5449D9BDB7
+20010328182628 2 6 100 1023 2 DCFAC4EFE89F5B082962AB9A67E8D63E84FA491E5D3874978815868595469163DA0661E6208A8C2CD4F83893B53864ADFD2154E8D8EFA146BAD808562E4BF6C90348FD79EEB3387D93FC7943BC450BA55399BA3CF3DFBD0D4E71800007B0E9D5F12E7A2CB7EA4E49812E715F8DC570C478DC2DEB1C49B0AE87A5DF5449FB6EF3
+20010328182708 2 6 100 1023 2 DCFAC4EFE89F5B082962AB9A67E8D63E84FA491E5D3874978815868595469163DA0661E6208A8C2CD4F83893B53864ADFD2154E8D8EFA146BAD808562E4BF6C90348FD79EEB3387D93FC7943BC450BA55399BA3CF3DFBD0D4E71800007B0E9D5F12E7A2CB7EA4E49812E715F8DC570C478DC2DEB1C49B0AE87A5DF544A000153
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--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file contains various auxiliary functions related to multiple
+ * precision integers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: mpaux.c,v 1.16 2001/02/08 19:30:52 itojun Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include "getput.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#include "mpaux.h"
+
+void
+compute_session_id(u_char session_id[16],
+ u_char cookie[8],
+ BIGNUM* host_key_n,
+ BIGNUM* session_key_n)
+{
+ u_int host_key_bytes = BN_num_bytes(host_key_n);
+ u_int session_key_bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_n);
+ u_int bytes = host_key_bytes + session_key_bytes;
+ u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
+ MD5_CTX md;
+
+ BN_bn2bin(host_key_n, buf);
+ BN_bn2bin(session_key_n, buf + host_key_bytes);
+ MD5_Init(&md);
+ MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
+ MD5_Update(&md, cookie, 8);
+ MD5_Final(session_id, &md);
+ memset(buf, 0, bytes);
+ xfree(buf);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file contains various auxiliary functions related to multiple
+ * precision integers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: mpaux.h,v 1.11 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef MPAUX_H
+#define MPAUX_H
+
+void compute_session_id(u_char[16], u_char[8], BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
+
+#endif /* MPAUX_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.12 2001/03/05 15:56:16 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG "ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
+ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour," \
+ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc," \
+ "rijndael128-cbc,rijndael192-cbc,rijndael256-cbc," \
+ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \
+ "hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160," \
+ "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \
+ "hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96"
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib"
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
+
+
+static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+ KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
+ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+ KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT,
+ KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT,
+ KEX_DEFAULT_MAC,
+ KEX_DEFAULT_MAC,
+ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP,
+ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP,
+ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG,
+ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
+};
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.32 2001/10/10 22:18:47 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/*
+ * SSH Protocol 1.5 aka New Channel Protocol
+ * Thanks to Martina, Axel and everyone who left Erlangen, leaving me bored.
+ * Written by Markus Friedl in October 1999
+ *
+ * Protocol versions 1.3 and 1.5 differ in the handshake protocol used for the
+ * tear down of channels:
+ *
+ * 1.3: strict request-ack-protocol:
+ * CLOSE ->
+ * <- CLOSE_CONFIRM
+ *
+ * 1.5: uses variations of:
+ * IEOF ->
+ * <- OCLOSE
+ * <- IEOF
+ * OCLOSE ->
+ * i.e. both sides have to close the channel
+ *
+ * 2.0: the EOF messages are optional
+ *
+ * See the debugging output from 'ssh -v' and 'sshd -d' of
+ * ssh-1.2.27 as an example.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* functions manipulating channel states */
+/*
+ * EVENTS update channel input/output states execute ACTIONS
+ */
+/* events concerning the INPUT from socket for channel (istate) */
+chan_event_fn *chan_rcvd_oclose = NULL;
+chan_event_fn *chan_read_failed = NULL;
+chan_event_fn *chan_ibuf_empty = NULL;
+/* events concerning the OUTPUT from channel for socket (ostate) */
+chan_event_fn *chan_rcvd_ieof = NULL;
+chan_event_fn *chan_write_failed = NULL;
+chan_event_fn *chan_obuf_empty = NULL;
+/*
+ * ACTIONS: should never update the channel states
+ */
+static void chan_send_ieof1(Channel *);
+static void chan_send_oclose1(Channel *);
+static void chan_send_close2(Channel *);
+static void chan_send_eof2(Channel *);
+
+/* helper */
+static void chan_shutdown_write(Channel *);
+static void chan_shutdown_read(Channel *);
+
+/*
+ * SSH1 specific implementation of event functions
+ */
+
+static void
+chan_rcvd_oclose1(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: rcvd oclose", c->self);
+ switch (c->istate) {
+ case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE:
+ debug("channel %d: input wait_oclose -> closed", c->self);
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+ break;
+ case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+ debug("channel %d: input open -> closed", c->self);
+ chan_shutdown_read(c);
+ chan_send_ieof1(c);
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+ break;
+ case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ /* both local read_failed and remote write_failed */
+ log("channel %d: input drain -> closed", c->self);
+ chan_send_ieof1(c);
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: protocol error: rcvd_oclose for istate %d",
+ c->self, c->istate);
+ return;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_read_failed_12(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: read failed", c->self);
+ switch (c->istate) {
+ case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+ debug("channel %d: input open -> drain", c->self);
+ chan_shutdown_read(c);
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
+#if 0
+ if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) {
+ debug("channel %d: input: no drain shortcut", c->self);
+ chan_ibuf_empty(c);
+ }
+#endif
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: chan_read_failed for istate %d",
+ c->self, c->istate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_ibuf_empty1(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: ibuf empty", c->self);
+ if (buffer_len(&c->input)) {
+ error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for non empty buffer",
+ c->self);
+ return;
+ }
+ switch (c->istate) {
+ case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ debug("channel %d: input drain -> wait_oclose", c->self);
+ chan_send_ieof1(c);
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for istate %d",
+ c->self, c->istate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_rcvd_ieof1(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: rcvd ieof", c->self);
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+ debug("channel %d: non-open", c->self);
+ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) {
+ debug("channel %d: non-open: input open -> wait_oclose",
+ c->self);
+ chan_shutdown_read(c);
+ chan_send_ieof1(c);
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE;
+ } else {
+ error("channel %d: non-open: istate %d != open",
+ c->self, c->istate);
+ }
+ if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) {
+ debug("channel %d: non-open: output open -> closed",
+ c->self);
+ chan_send_oclose1(c);
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
+ } else {
+ error("channel %d: non-open: ostate %d != open",
+ c->self, c->ostate);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ switch (c->ostate) {
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+ debug("channel %d: output open -> drain", c->self);
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
+ break;
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF:
+ debug("channel %d: output wait_ieof -> closed", c->self);
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: protocol error: rcvd_ieof for ostate %d",
+ c->self, c->ostate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_write_failed1(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: write failed", c->self);
+ switch (c->ostate) {
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+ debug("channel %d: output open -> wait_ieof", c->self);
+ chan_send_oclose1(c);
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF;
+ break;
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ debug("channel %d: output wait_drain -> closed", c->self);
+ chan_send_oclose1(c);
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d",
+ c->self, c->ostate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_obuf_empty1(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: obuf empty", c->self);
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output)) {
+ error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for non empty buffer",
+ c->self);
+ return;
+ }
+ switch (c->ostate) {
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ debug("channel %d: output drain -> closed", c->self);
+ chan_send_oclose1(c);
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: internal error: obuf_empty for ostate %d",
+ c->self, c->ostate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_send_ieof1(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: send ieof", c->self);
+ switch (c->istate) {
+ case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+ case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_INPUT_EOF);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: cannot send ieof for istate %d",
+ c->self, c->istate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_send_oclose1(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: send oclose", c->self);
+ switch (c->ostate) {
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ chan_shutdown_write(c);
+ buffer_consume(&c->output, buffer_len(&c->output));
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_CLOSE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: cannot send oclose for ostate %d",
+ c->self, c->ostate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * the same for SSH2
+ */
+static void
+chan_rcvd_oclose2(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: rcvd close", c->self);
+ if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)
+ error("channel %d: protocol error: close rcvd twice", c->self);
+ c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD;
+ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
+ /* tear down larval channels immediately */
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+ return;
+ }
+ switch (c->ostate) {
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+ /*
+ * wait until a data from the channel is consumed if a CLOSE
+ * is received
+ */
+ debug("channel %d: output open -> drain", c->self);
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
+ break;
+ }
+ switch (c->istate) {
+ case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+ debug("channel %d: input open -> closed", c->self);
+ chan_shutdown_read(c);
+ break;
+ case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ debug("channel %d: input drain -> closed", c->self);
+ chan_send_eof2(c);
+ break;
+ }
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+}
+static void
+chan_ibuf_empty2(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: ibuf empty", c->self);
+ if (buffer_len(&c->input)) {
+ error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for non empty buffer",
+ c->self);
+ return;
+ }
+ switch (c->istate) {
+ case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ debug("channel %d: input drain -> closed", c->self);
+ if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT))
+ chan_send_eof2(c);
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for istate %d",
+ c->self, c->istate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_rcvd_ieof2(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: rcvd eof", c->self);
+ if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) {
+ debug("channel %d: output open -> drain", c->self);
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_write_failed2(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: write failed", c->self);
+ switch (c->ostate) {
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+ debug("channel %d: output open -> closed", c->self);
+ chan_shutdown_write(c); /* ?? */
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
+ break;
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ debug("channel %d: output drain -> closed", c->self);
+ chan_shutdown_write(c);
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d",
+ c->self, c->ostate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_obuf_empty2(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: obuf empty", c->self);
+ if (buffer_len(&c->output)) {
+ error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for non empty buffer",
+ c->self);
+ return;
+ }
+ switch (c->ostate) {
+ case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ debug("channel %d: output drain -> closed", c->self);
+ chan_shutdown_write(c);
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for ostate %d",
+ c->self, c->ostate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_send_eof2(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: send eof", c->self);
+ switch (c->istate) {
+ case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("channel %d: cannot send eof for istate %d",
+ c->self, c->istate);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_send_close2(Channel *c)
+{
+ debug("channel %d: send close", c->self);
+ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED ||
+ c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) {
+ error("channel %d: cannot send close for istate/ostate %d/%d",
+ c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
+ } else if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) {
+ error("channel %d: already sent close", c->self);
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT;
+ }
+}
+
+/* shared */
+
+void
+chan_mark_dead(Channel *c)
+{
+ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE;
+}
+
+int
+chan_is_dead(Channel *c, int send)
+{
+ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE) {
+ debug("channel %d: zombie", c->self);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+ return 0;
+ if (!compat20) {
+ debug("channel %d: is dead", c->self);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * we have to delay the close message if the efd (for stderr) is
+ * still active
+ */
+ if (((c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
+ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)
+#if 0
+ || ((c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) &&
+ c->efd != -1)
+#endif
+ ) {
+ debug2("channel %d: active efd: %d len %d type %s",
+ c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended),
+ c->extended_usage==CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ?
+ "read": "write");
+ } else {
+ if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
+ if (send) {
+ chan_send_close2(c);
+ } else {
+ /* channel would be dead if we sent a close */
+ if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) {
+ debug("channel %d: almost dead",
+ c->self);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ((c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) &&
+ (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) {
+ debug("channel %d: is dead", c->self);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+chan_init_iostates(Channel *c)
+{
+ c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
+ c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
+ c->flags = 0;
+}
+
+/* init */
+void
+chan_init(void)
+{
+ if (compat20) {
+ chan_rcvd_oclose = chan_rcvd_oclose2;
+ chan_read_failed = chan_read_failed_12;
+ chan_ibuf_empty = chan_ibuf_empty2;
+
+ chan_rcvd_ieof = chan_rcvd_ieof2;
+ chan_write_failed = chan_write_failed2;
+ chan_obuf_empty = chan_obuf_empty2;
+ } else {
+ chan_rcvd_oclose = chan_rcvd_oclose1;
+ chan_read_failed = chan_read_failed_12;
+ chan_ibuf_empty = chan_ibuf_empty1;
+
+ chan_rcvd_ieof = chan_rcvd_ieof1;
+ chan_write_failed = chan_write_failed1;
+ chan_obuf_empty = chan_obuf_empty1;
+ }
+}
+
+/* helper */
+static void
+chan_shutdown_write(Channel *c)
+{
+ buffer_consume(&c->output, buffer_len(&c->output));
+ if (compat20 && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
+ return;
+ /* shutdown failure is allowed if write failed already */
+ debug("channel %d: close_write", c->self);
+ if (c->sock != -1) {
+ if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_WR) < 0)
+ debug("channel %d: chan_shutdown_write: "
+ "shutdown() failed for fd%d: %.100s",
+ c->self, c->sock, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ if (channel_close_fd(&c->wfd) < 0)
+ log("channel %d: chan_shutdown_write: "
+ "close() failed for fd%d: %.100s",
+ c->self, c->wfd, strerror(errno));
+ }
+}
+static void
+chan_shutdown_read(Channel *c)
+{
+ if (compat20 && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
+ return;
+ debug("channel %d: close_read", c->self);
+ if (c->sock != -1) {
+ /*
+ * shutdown(sock, SHUT_READ) may return ENOTCONN if the
+ * write side has been closed already. (bug on Linux)
+ * HP-UX may return ENOTCONN also.
+ */
+ if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RD) < 0
+ && errno != ENOTCONN)
+ error("channel %d: chan_shutdown_read: "
+ "shutdown() failed for fd%d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
+ c->self, c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate,
+ strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ if (channel_close_fd(&c->rfd) < 0)
+ log("channel %d: chan_shutdown_read: "
+ "close() failed for fd%d: %.100s",
+ c->self, c->rfd, strerror(errno));
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+.\" $OpenBSD: nchan.ms,v 1.7 2001/01/29 01:58:17 niklas Exp $
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.TL
+OpenSSH Channel Close Protocol 1.5 Implementation
+.SH
+Channel Input State Diagram
+.PS
+reset
+l=1
+s=1.2
+ellipsewid=s*ellipsewid
+boxwid=s*boxwid
+ellipseht=s*ellipseht
+S1: ellipse "INPUT" "OPEN"
+move right 2*l from last ellipse.e
+S4: ellipse "INPUT" "CLOSED"
+move down l from last ellipse.s
+S3: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "OCLOSED"
+move down l from 1st ellipse.s
+S2: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN"
+arrow "" "rcvd OCLOSE/" "shutdown_read" "send IEOF" from S1.e to S4.w
+arrow "ibuf_empty/" "send IEOF" from S2.e to S3.w
+arrow from S1.s to S2.n
+box invis "read_failed/" "shutdown_read" with .e at last arrow.c
+arrow from S3.n to S4.s
+box invis "rcvd OCLOSE/" "-" with .w at last arrow.c
+ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4
+arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w
+arrow from S2.ne to S4.sw
+box invis "rcvd OCLOSE/ " with .e at last arrow.c
+box invis " send IEOF" with .w at last arrow.c
+.PE
+.SH
+Channel Output State Diagram
+.PS
+S1: ellipse "OUTPUT" "OPEN"
+move right 2*l from last ellipse.e
+S3: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "IEOF"
+move down l from last ellipse.s
+S4: ellipse "OUTPUT" "CLOSED"
+move down l from 1st ellipse.s
+S2: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN"
+arrow "" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send OCLOSE" from S1.e to S3.w
+arrow "obuf_empty ||" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send OCLOSE" from S2.e to S4.w
+arrow from S1.s to S2.n
+box invis "rcvd IEOF/" "-" with .e at last arrow.c
+arrow from S3.s to S4.n
+box invis "rcvd IEOF/" "-" with .w at last arrow.c
+ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4
+arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w
+.PE
+.SH
+Notes
+.PP
+The input buffer is filled with data from the socket
+(the socket represents the local consumer/producer of the
+forwarded channel).
+The data is then sent over the INPUT-end (transmit-end) of the channel to the
+remote peer.
+Data sent by the peer is received on the OUTPUT-end (receive-end),
+saved in the output buffer and written to the socket.
+.PP
+If the local protocol instance has forwarded all data on the
+INPUT-end of the channel, it sends an IEOF message to the peer.
+If the peer receives the IEOF and has consumed all
+data he replies with an OCLOSE.
+When the local instance receives the OCLOSE
+he considers the INPUT-half of the channel closed.
+The peer has his OUTOUT-half closed.
+.PP
+A channel can be deallocated by a protocol instance
+if both the INPUT- and the OUTOUT-half on his
+side of the channel are closed.
+Note that when an instance is unable to consume the
+received data, he is permitted to send an OCLOSE
+before the matching IEOF is received.
--- /dev/null
+.\" $OpenBSD: nchan2.ms,v 1.2 2001/10/03 10:05:57 markus Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.TL
+OpenSSH Channel Close Protocol 2.0 Implementation
+.SH
+Channel Input State Diagram
+.PS
+reset
+l=1
+s=1.2
+ellipsewid=s*ellipsewid
+boxwid=s*boxwid
+ellipseht=s*ellipseht
+S1: ellipse "INPUT" "OPEN"
+move right 2*l from last ellipse.e
+S3: ellipse invis
+move down l from last ellipse.s
+S4: ellipse "INPUT" "CLOSED"
+move down l from 1st ellipse.s
+S2: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN"
+arrow from S1.e to S4.n
+box invis "rcvd CLOSE/" "shutdown_read" with .sw at last arrow.c
+arrow "ibuf_empty ||" "rcvd CLOSE/" "send EOF" "" from S2.e to S4.w
+arrow from S1.s to S2.n
+box invis "read_failed/" "shutdown_read" with .e at last arrow.c
+ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4
+arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w
+.PE
+.SH
+Channel Output State Diagram
+.PS
+S1: ellipse "OUTPUT" "OPEN"
+move right 2*l from last ellipse.e
+S3: ellipse invis
+move down l from last ellipse.s
+S4: ellipse "OUTPUT" "CLOSED"
+move down l from 1st ellipse.s
+S2: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN"
+arrow from S1.e to S4.n
+box invis "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" with .sw at last arrow.c
+arrow "obuf_empty ||" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "" from S2.e to S4.w
+arrow from S1.s to S2.n
+box invis "rcvd EOF ||" "rcvd CLOSE/" "-" with .e at last arrow.c
+ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4
+arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w
+.PE
+.SH
+Notes
+.PP
+The input buffer is filled with data from the socket
+(the socket represents the local consumer/producer of the
+forwarded channel).
+The data is then sent over the INPUT-end (transmit-end) of the channel to the
+remote peer.
+Data sent by the peer is received on the OUTPUT-end (receive-end),
+saved in the output buffer and written to the socket.
+.PP
+If the local protocol instance has forwarded all data on the
+INPUT-end of the channel, it sends an EOF message to the peer.
+.PP
+A CLOSE message is sent to the peer if
+both the INPUT- and the OUTOUT-half of the local
+end of the channel are closed.
+.PP
+The channel can be deallocated by a protocol instance
+if a CLOSE message he been both sent and received.
--- /dev/null
+# $Id$
+
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+AR=@AR@
+RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
+
+OPENBSD=base64.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strsep.o
+
+COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-getaddrinfo.o fake-getnameinfo.o
+
+.c.o:
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+
+all: libopenbsd-compat.a
+
+$(COMPAT): ../config.h
+$(OPENBSD): ../config.h
+
+libopenbsd-compat.a: $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD)
+ $(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD)
+ $(RANLIB) $@
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.o *.a core
+
+distclean: clean
+ rm -f Makefile *~
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: base64.c,v 1.3 1997/11/08 20:46:55 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc.
+ *
+ * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants
+ * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this
+ * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and
+ * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM
+ * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating
+ * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit
+ * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to
+ * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System
+ * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software. No immunity is
+ * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL,
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "base64.h"
+
+#define Assert(Cond) if (!(Cond)) abort()
+
+static const char Base64[] =
+ "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+static const char Pad64 = '=';
+
+/* (From RFC1521 and draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt)
+ The following encoding technique is taken from RFC 1521 by Borenstein
+ and Freed. It is reproduced here in a slightly edited form for
+ convenience.
+
+ A 65-character subset of US-ASCII is used, enabling 6 bits to be
+ represented per printable character. (The extra 65th character, "=",
+ is used to signify a special processing function.)
+
+ The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output
+ strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a
+ 24-bit input group is formed by concatenating 3 8-bit input groups.
+ These 24 bits are then treated as 4 concatenated 6-bit groups, each
+ of which is translated into a single digit in the base64 alphabet.
+
+ Each 6-bit group is used as an index into an array of 64 printable
+ characters. The character referenced by the index is placed in the
+ output string.
+
+ Table 1: The Base64 Alphabet
+
+ Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding
+ 0 A 17 R 34 i 51 z
+ 1 B 18 S 35 j 52 0
+ 2 C 19 T 36 k 53 1
+ 3 D 20 U 37 l 54 2
+ 4 E 21 V 38 m 55 3
+ 5 F 22 W 39 n 56 4
+ 6 G 23 X 40 o 57 5
+ 7 H 24 Y 41 p 58 6
+ 8 I 25 Z 42 q 59 7
+ 9 J 26 a 43 r 60 8
+ 10 K 27 b 44 s 61 9
+ 11 L 28 c 45 t 62 +
+ 12 M 29 d 46 u 63 /
+ 13 N 30 e 47 v
+ 14 O 31 f 48 w (pad) =
+ 15 P 32 g 49 x
+ 16 Q 33 h 50 y
+
+ Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available
+ at the end of the data being encoded. A full encoding quantum is
+ always completed at the end of a quantity. When fewer than 24 input
+ bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on the
+ right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups. Padding at the
+ end of the data is performed using the '=' character.
+
+ Since all base64 input is an integral number of octets, only the
+ -------------------------------------------------
+ following cases can arise:
+
+ (1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral
+ multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded
+ output will be an integral multiple of 4 characters
+ with no "=" padding,
+ (2) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits;
+ here, the final unit of encoded output will be two
+ characters followed by two "=" padding characters, or
+ (3) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 16 bits;
+ here, the final unit of encoded output will be three
+ characters followed by one "=" padding character.
+ */
+
+int
+b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+ size_t datalength = 0;
+ u_char input[3];
+ u_char output[4];
+ int i;
+
+ while (2 < srclength) {
+ input[0] = *src++;
+ input[1] = *src++;
+ input[2] = *src++;
+ srclength -= 3;
+
+ output[0] = input[0] >> 2;
+ output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4);
+ output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6);
+ output[3] = input[2] & 0x3f;
+ Assert(output[0] < 64);
+ Assert(output[1] < 64);
+ Assert(output[2] < 64);
+ Assert(output[3] < 64);
+
+ if (datalength + 4 > targsize)
+ return (-1);
+ target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]];
+ target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]];
+ target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]];
+ target[datalength++] = Base64[output[3]];
+ }
+
+ /* Now we worry about padding. */
+ if (0 != srclength) {
+ /* Get what's left. */
+ input[0] = input[1] = input[2] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < srclength; i++)
+ input[i] = *src++;
+
+ output[0] = input[0] >> 2;
+ output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4);
+ output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6);
+ Assert(output[0] < 64);
+ Assert(output[1] < 64);
+ Assert(output[2] < 64);
+
+ if (datalength + 4 > targsize)
+ return (-1);
+ target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]];
+ target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]];
+ if (srclength == 1)
+ target[datalength++] = Pad64;
+ else
+ target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]];
+ target[datalength++] = Pad64;
+ }
+ if (datalength >= targsize)
+ return (-1);
+ target[datalength] = '\0'; /* Returned value doesn't count \0. */
+ return (datalength);
+}
+
+/* skips all whitespace anywhere.
+ converts characters, four at a time, starting at (or after)
+ src from base - 64 numbers into three 8 bit bytes in the target area.
+ it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or -1 on error.
+ */
+
+int
+b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+ int tarindex, state, ch;
+ char *pos;
+
+ state = 0;
+ tarindex = 0;
+
+ while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') {
+ if (isspace(ch)) /* Skip whitespace anywhere. */
+ continue;
+
+ if (ch == Pad64)
+ break;
+
+ pos = strchr(Base64, ch);
+ if (pos == 0) /* A non-base64 character. */
+ return (-1);
+
+ switch (state) {
+ case 0:
+ if (target) {
+ if (tarindex >= targsize)
+ return (-1);
+ target[tarindex] = (pos - Base64) << 2;
+ }
+ state = 1;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ if (target) {
+ if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize)
+ return (-1);
+ target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64) >> 4;
+ target[tarindex+1] = ((pos - Base64) & 0x0f)
+ << 4 ;
+ }
+ tarindex++;
+ state = 2;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (target) {
+ if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize)
+ return (-1);
+ target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64) >> 2;
+ target[tarindex+1] = ((pos - Base64) & 0x03)
+ << 6;
+ }
+ tarindex++;
+ state = 3;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ if (target) {
+ if (tarindex >= targsize)
+ return (-1);
+ target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64);
+ }
+ tarindex++;
+ state = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We are done decoding Base-64 chars. Let's see if we ended
+ * on a byte boundary, and/or with erroneous trailing characters.
+ */
+
+ if (ch == Pad64) { /* We got a pad char. */
+ ch = *src++; /* Skip it, get next. */
+ switch (state) {
+ case 0: /* Invalid = in first position */
+ case 1: /* Invalid = in second position */
+ return (-1);
+
+ case 2: /* Valid, means one byte of info */
+ /* Skip any number of spaces. */
+ for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++)
+ if (!isspace(ch))
+ break;
+ /* Make sure there is another trailing = sign. */
+ if (ch != Pad64)
+ return (-1);
+ ch = *src++; /* Skip the = */
+ /* Fall through to "single trailing =" case. */
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+
+ case 3: /* Valid, means two bytes of info */
+ /*
+ * We know this char is an =. Is there anything but
+ * whitespace after it?
+ */
+ for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++)
+ if (!isspace(ch))
+ return (-1);
+
+ /*
+ * Now make sure for cases 2 and 3 that the "extra"
+ * bits that slopped past the last full byte were
+ * zeros. If we don't check them, they become a
+ * subliminal channel.
+ */
+ if (target && target[tarindex] != 0)
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We ended by seeing the end of the string. Make sure we
+ * have no partial bytes lying around.
+ */
+ if (state != 0)
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ return (tarindex);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_BASE64_H
+#define _BSD_BASE64_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE___B64_NTOP
+# ifndef HAVE_B64_NTOP
+int b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target,
+ size_t targsize);
+int b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize);
+# endif /* !HAVE_B64_NTOP */
+# define __b64_ntop b64_ntop
+# define __b64_pton b64_pton
+#endif /* HAVE___B64_NTOP */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_BINRESVPORT_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* This file has be modified from the original OpenBSD source */
+
+/*
+ * Sun RPC is a product of Sun Microsystems, Inc. and is provided for
+ * unrestricted use provided that this legend is included on all tape
+ * media and as a part of the software program in whole or part. Users
+ * may copy or modify Sun RPC without charge, but are not authorized
+ * to license or distribute it to anyone else except as part of a product or
+ * program developed by the user.
+ *
+ * SUN RPC IS PROVIDED AS IS WITH NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND INCLUDING THE
+ * WARRANTIES OF DESIGN, MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE, OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE OR TRADE PRACTICE.
+ *
+ * Sun RPC is provided with no support and without any obligation on the
+ * part of Sun Microsystems, Inc. to assist in its use, correction,
+ * modification or enhancement.
+ *
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE
+ * INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHTS, TRADE SECRETS OR ANY PATENTS BY SUN RPC
+ * OR ANY PART THEREOF.
+ *
+ * In no event will Sun Microsystems, Inc. be liable for any lost revenue
+ * or profits or other special, indirect and consequential damages, even if
+ * Sun has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
+ *
+ * Sun Microsystems, Inc.
+ * 2550 Garcia Avenue
+ * Mountain View, California 94043
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: bindresvport.c,v 1.13 2000/01/26 03:43:21 deraadt Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1987 by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright(C) 1996, Jason Downs. All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#define STARTPORT 600
+#define ENDPORT (IPPORT_RESERVED - 1)
+#define NPORTS (ENDPORT - STARTPORT + 1)
+
+/*
+ * Bind a socket to a privileged IP port
+ */
+int
+bindresvport_sa(sd, sa)
+ int sd;
+ struct sockaddr *sa;
+{
+ int error, af;
+ struct sockaddr_storage myaddr;
+ struct sockaddr_in *sin;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
+ u_int16_t *portp;
+ u_int16_t port;
+ socklen_t salen;
+ int i;
+
+ if (sa == NULL) {
+ memset(&myaddr, 0, sizeof(myaddr));
+ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&myaddr;
+
+ if (getsockname(sd, sa, &salen) == -1)
+ return -1; /* errno is correctly set */
+
+ af = sa->sa_family;
+ memset(&myaddr, 0, salen);
+ } else
+ af = sa->sa_family;
+
+ if (af == AF_INET) {
+ sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ portp = &sin->sin_port;
+ } else if (af == AF_INET6) {
+ sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+ portp = &sin6->sin6_port;
+ } else {
+ errno = EPFNOSUPPORT;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ sa->sa_family = af;
+
+ port = ntohs(*portp);
+ if (port == 0)
+ port = (arc4random() % NPORTS) + STARTPORT;
+
+ /* Avoid warning */
+ error = -1;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < NPORTS; i++) {
+ *portp = htons(port);
+
+ error = bind(sd, sa, salen);
+
+ /* Terminate on success */
+ if (error == 0)
+ break;
+
+ /* Terminate on errors, except "address already in use" */
+ if ((error < 0) && !((errno == EADDRINUSE) || (errno == EINVAL)))
+ break;
+
+ port++;
+ if (port > ENDPORT)
+ port = STARTPORT;
+ }
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_BINDRESVPORT_H
+#define _BSD_BINDRESVPORT_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa);
+#endif /* !HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_BINDRESVPORT_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/rc4.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+/* Size of key to use */
+#define SEED_SIZE 20
+
+/* Number of bytes to reseed after */
+#define REKEY_BYTES (1 << 24)
+
+static int rc4_ready = 0;
+static RC4_KEY rc4;
+
+unsigned int arc4random(void)
+{
+ unsigned int r = 0;
+ static int first_time = 1;
+
+ if (rc4_ready <= 0) {
+ if (!first_time)
+ seed_rng();
+ first_time = 0;
+ arc4random_stir();
+ }
+
+ RC4(&rc4, sizeof(r), (unsigned char *)&r, (unsigned char *)&r);
+
+ rc4_ready -= sizeof(r);
+
+ return(r);
+}
+
+void arc4random_stir(void)
+{
+ unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE];
+
+ memset(&rc4, 0, sizeof(rc4));
+ if (!RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)))
+ fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
+ ERR_get_error());
+ RC4_set_key(&rc4, sizeof(rand_buf), rand_buf);
+ memset(rand_buf, 0, sizeof(rand_buf));
+
+ rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_ARC4RANDOM_H
+#define _BSD_ARC4RANDOM_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+unsigned int arc4random(void);
+void arc4random_stir(void);
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_ARC4RANDOM_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * XXX: license?
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The modules contains code to support cray t3e and sv1 computers.
+ * It is here to minimize the modifcations to the openssh base code.
+ */
+
+#ifdef _CRAY
+
+#include <udb.h>
+#include <tmpdir.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/category.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#include <sys/jtab.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/priv.h>
+#include <sys/secparm.h>
+#include <sys/usrv.h>
+#include <sys/sysv.h>
+#include <sys/sectab.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "bsd-cray.h"
+
+char cray_tmpdir[TPATHSIZ+1]; /* job TMPDIR path */
+
+/*
+ * Functions.
+ */
+void cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *, int);
+void cray_delete_tmpdir(char *, int, uid_t);
+void cray_init_job(struct passwd *);
+void cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *);
+
+
+/*
+ * Orignal written by:
+ * Wayne Schroeder
+ * San Diego Supercomputer Center
+ * schroeder@sdsc.edu
+*/
+void
+cray_setup(uid_t uid, char *username)
+{
+ struct udb *p;
+ extern char *setlimits();
+ int i, j;
+ int accts[MAXVIDS];
+ int naccts;
+ int err;
+ char *sr;
+ int pid;
+ struct jtab jbuf;
+ int jid;
+
+ if ((jid = getjtab(&jbuf)) < 0)
+ fatal("getjtab: no jid");
+
+ err = setudb(); /* open and rewind the Cray User DataBase */
+ if (err != 0)
+ fatal("UDB open failure");
+ naccts = 0;
+ p = getudbnam(username);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ fatal("No UDB entry for %.100s", username);
+ if (uid != p->ue_uid)
+ fatal("UDB entry %.100s uid(%d) does not match uid %d",
+ username, (int) p->ue_uid, (int) uid);
+ for (j = 0; p->ue_acids[j] != -1 && j < MAXVIDS; j++) {
+ accts[naccts] = p->ue_acids[j];
+ naccts++;
+ }
+ endudb(); /* close the udb */
+
+ if (naccts != 0) {
+ /* Perhaps someday we'll prompt users who have multiple accounts
+ to let them pick one (like CRI's login does), but for now just set
+ the account to the first entry. */
+ if (acctid(0, accts[0]) < 0)
+ fatal("System call acctid failed, accts[0]=%d", accts[0]);
+ }
+
+ /* Now set limits, including CPU time for the (interactive) job and process,
+ and set up permissions (for chown etc), etc. This is via an internal CRI
+ routine, setlimits, used by CRI's login. */
+
+ pid = getpid();
+ sr = setlimits(username, C_PROC, pid, UDBRC_INTER);
+ if (sr != NULL)
+ fatal("%.200s", sr);
+
+ sr = setlimits(username, C_JOB, jid, UDBRC_INTER);
+ if (sr != NULL)
+ fatal("%.200s", sr);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * The rc.* and /etc/sdaemon methods of starting a program on unicos/unicosmk
+ * can have pal privileges that sshd can inherit which
+ * could allow a user to su to root with out a password.
+ * This subroutine clears all privileges.
+ */
+void
+drop_cray_privs()
+{
+#if defined(_SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU)
+ priv_proc_t* privstate;
+ int result;
+ extern int priv_set_proc();
+ extern priv_proc_t* priv_init_proc();
+ struct usrv usrv;
+
+ /*
+ * If ether of theses two flags are not set
+ * then don't allow this version of ssh to run.
+ */
+ if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU))
+ fatal("Not PRIV_SU system.");
+ if (!sysconf(_SC_CRAY_POSIX_PRIV))
+ fatal("Not POSIX_PRIV.");
+
+ debug("Dropping privileges.");
+
+ memset(&usrv, 0, sizeof(usrv));
+ if (setusrv(&usrv) < 0)
+ fatal("%s(%d): setusrv(): %s", __FILE__, __LINE__,
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ if ((privstate = priv_init_proc()) != NULL) {
+ result = priv_set_proc(privstate);
+ if (result != 0 )
+ fatal("%s(%d): priv_set_proc(): %s",
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, strerror(errno));
+ priv_free_proc(privstate);
+ }
+ debug ("Privileges should be cleared...");
+#else
+ /* XXX: do this differently */
+# error Cray systems must be run with _SC_CRAY_PRIV_SU on!
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Retain utmp/wtmp information - used by cray accounting.
+ */
+void
+cray_retain_utmp(struct utmp *ut, int pid)
+{
+ int fd;
+ struct utmp utmp;
+
+ if ((fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+ while (read(fd, (char *)&utmp, sizeof(utmp)) == sizeof(utmp)) {
+ if (pid == utmp.ut_pid) {
+ ut->ut_jid = utmp.ut_jid;
+ /* XXX: MIN_SIZEOF here? can this go in loginrec? */
+ strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, utmp.ut_tpath, sizeof(utmp.ut_tpath));
+ strncpy(ut->ut_host, utmp.ut_host, sizeof(utmp.ut_host));
+ strncpy(ut->ut_name, utmp.ut_name, sizeof(utmp.ut_name));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ /* XXX: error message? */
+}
+
+/*
+ * tmpdir support.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * find and delete jobs tmpdir.
+ */
+void
+cray_delete_tmpdir(char *login, int jid, uid_t uid)
+{
+ int child;
+ static char jtmp[TPATHSIZ];
+ struct stat statbuf;
+ int c;
+ int wstat;
+
+ for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) {
+ snprintf(jtmp, TPATHSIZ, "%s/jtmp.%06d%c", JTMPDIR, jid, c);
+ if (stat(jtmp, &statbuf) == 0 && statbuf.st_uid == uid)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (c > 'z')
+ return;
+
+ if ((child = fork()) == 0) {
+ execl(CLEANTMPCMD, CLEANTMPCMD, login, jtmp, (char *)NULL);
+ fatal("cray_delete_tmpdir: execl of CLEANTMPCMD failed");
+ }
+
+ while (waitpid(child, &wstat, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+ ;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove tmpdir on job termination.
+ */
+void
+cray_job_termination_handler(int sig)
+{
+ int jid;
+ char *login = NULL;
+ struct jtab jtab;
+
+ debug("Received SIG JOB.");
+
+ if ((jid = waitjob(&jtab)) == -1 ||
+ (login = uid2nam(jtab.j_uid)) == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ cray_delete_tmpdir(login, jid, jtab.j_uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set job id and create tmpdir directory.
+ */
+void
+cray_init_job(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ int jid;
+ int c;
+
+ jid = setjob(pw->pw_uid, WJSIGNAL);
+ if (jid < 0)
+ fatal("System call setjob failure");
+
+ for (c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) {
+ snprintf(cray_tmpdir, TPATHSIZ, "%s/jtmp.%06d%c", JTMPDIR, jid, c);
+ if (mkdir(cray_tmpdir, JTMPMODE) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (chown(cray_tmpdir, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ rmdir(cray_tmpdir);
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (c > 'z')
+ cray_tmpdir[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+cray_set_tmpdir(struct utmp *ut)
+{
+ int jid;
+ struct jtab jbuf;
+
+ if ((jid = getjtab(&jbuf)) < 0)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Set jid and tmpdir in utmp record.
+ */
+ ut->ut_jid = jid;
+ strncpy(ut->ut_tpath, cray_tmpdir, TPATHSIZ);
+}
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+#ifndef _BSD_CRAY_H
+#define _BSD_CRAY_H
+
+#ifdef _CRAY
+void cray_init_job(struct passwd *); /* init cray job */
+void cray_job_termination_handler(int); /* process end of job signal */
+void cray_setup(uid_t, char *); /* set cray limits */
+extern char cray_tmpdir[]; /* cray tmpdir */
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _BSD_CRAY_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ *
+ * cygwin_util.c
+ *
+ * Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>, Duisburg, Germany
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
+ *
+ * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
+ * binary mode on Windows systems.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <windows.h>
+#define is_winnt (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+
+#define ntsec_on(c) ((c) && strstr((c),"ntsec") && !strstr((c),"nontsec"))
+#define ntea_on(c) ((c) && strstr((c),"ntea") && !strstr((c),"nontea"))
+
+#if defined(open) && open == binary_open
+# undef open
+#endif
+#if defined(pipe) && open == binary_pipe
+# undef pipe
+#endif
+
+int binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ mode_t mode;
+
+ va_start(ap, flags);
+ mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode);
+}
+
+int binary_pipe(int fd[2])
+{
+ int ret = pipe(fd);
+
+ if (!ret) {
+ setmode (fd[0], O_BINARY);
+ setmode (fd[1], O_BINARY);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int check_nt_auth(int pwd_authenticated, uid_t uid)
+{
+ /*
+ * The only authentication which is able to change the user
+ * context on NT systems is the password authentication. So
+ * we deny all requsts for changing the user context if another
+ * authentication method is used.
+ *
+ * This doesn't apply to Cygwin versions >= 1.3.2 anymore which
+ * uses the undocumented NtCreateToken() call to create a user
+ * token if the process has the appropriate privileges and if
+ * CYGWIN ntsec setting is on.
+ */
+ static int has_create_token = -1;
+
+ if (is_winnt) {
+ if (has_create_token < 0) {
+ struct utsname uts;
+ int major_high = 0, major_low = 0, minor = 0;
+ char *cygwin = getenv("CYGWIN");
+
+ has_create_token = 0;
+ if (ntsec_on(cygwin) && !uname(&uts)) {
+ sscanf(uts.release, "%d.%d.%d",
+ &major_high, &major_low, &minor);
+ if (major_high > 1 ||
+ (major_high == 1 && (major_low > 3 ||
+ (major_low == 3 && minor >= 2))))
+ has_create_token = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (has_create_token < 1 &&
+ !pwd_authenticated && geteuid() != uid)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int check_ntsec(const char *filename)
+{
+ char *cygwin;
+ int allow_ntea = 0;
+ int allow_ntsec = 0;
+ struct statfs fsstat;
+
+ /* Windows 95/98/ME don't support file system security at all. */
+ if (!is_winnt)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Evaluate current CYGWIN settings. */
+ cygwin = getenv("CYGWIN");
+ allow_ntea = ntea_on(cygwin);
+ allow_ntsec = ntsec_on(cygwin);
+
+ /*
+ * `ntea' is an emulation of POSIX attributes. It doesn't support
+ * real file level security as ntsec on NTFS file systems does
+ * but it supports FAT filesystems. `ntea' is minimum requirement
+ * for security checks.
+ */
+ if (allow_ntea)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Retrieve file system flags. In Cygwin, file system flags are
+ * copied to f_type which has no meaning in Win32 itself.
+ */
+ if (statfs(filename, &fsstat))
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Only file systems supporting ACLs are able to set permissions.
+ * `ntsec' is the setting in Cygwin which switches using of NTFS
+ * ACLs to support POSIX permissions on files.
+ */
+ if (fsstat.f_type & FS_PERSISTENT_ACLS)
+ return allow_ntsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ *
+ * cygwin_util.c
+ *
+ * Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@cygnus.com>, Duisburg, Germany
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
+ *
+ * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
+ * binary mode on Windows systems.
+ */
+
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
+#define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+#include <io.h>
+
+int binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...);
+int binary_pipe(int fd[2]);
+int check_nt_auth(int pwd_authenticated, uid_t uid);
+int check_ntsec(const char *filename);
+
+#define open binary_open
+#define pipe binary_pipe
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+char *get_progname(char *argv0)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+ extern char *__progname;
+
+ return __progname;
+#else
+ char *p;
+
+ if (argv0 == NULL)
+ return "unknown"; /* XXX */
+ p = strrchr(argv0, '/');
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = argv0;
+ else
+ p++;
+ return p;
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+int setlogin(const char *name)
+{
+ return(0);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
+int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host,
+ const char *user, const char *domain)
+{
+ return(0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+int seteuid(uid_t euid)
+{
+ return(setreuid(-1,euid));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+int setegid(uid_t egid)
+{
+ return(setresgid(-1,egid,-1));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+const char *strerror(int e)
+{
+ extern int sys_nerr;
+ extern char *sys_errlist[];
+
+ if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr))
+ return(sys_errlist[e]);
+ else
+ return("unlisted error");
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
+int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp)
+{
+ struct utimbuf ub;
+
+ ub.actime = tvp->tv_sec;
+ ub.modtime = tvp->tv_usec;
+
+ return(utime(filename, &ub));
+}
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_MISC_H
+#define _BSD_MISC_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+char *get_progname(char *argv0);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETSID
+#define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid())
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+int setenv(const char *name, const char *value, int overwrite);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+int setlogin(const char *name);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
+int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host,
+ const char *user, const char *domain);
+#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+int seteuid(uid_t euid);
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+int setegid(uid_t egid);
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+const char *strerror(int e);
+#endif
+
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
+struct timeval {
+ long tv_sec;
+ long tv_usec;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */
+
+int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp);
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */
+
+
+#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include "bsd-nextstep.h"
+
+pid_t
+posix_wait(int *status)
+{
+ union wait statusp;
+ pid_t wait_pid;
+
+ #undef wait /* Use NeXT's wait() function */
+ wait_pid = wait(&statusp);
+ if (status)
+ *status = (int) statusp.w_status;
+
+ return wait_pid;
+}
+
+int
+tcgetattr(int fd, struct termios *t)
+{
+ return (ioctl(fd, TIOCGETA, t));
+}
+
+int
+tcsetattr(int fd, int opt, const struct termios *t)
+{
+ struct termios localterm;
+
+ if (opt & TCSASOFT) {
+ localterm = *t;
+ localterm.c_cflag |= CIGNORE;
+ t = &localterm;
+ }
+ switch (opt & ~TCSASOFT) {
+ case TCSANOW:
+ return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETA, t));
+ case TCSADRAIN:
+ return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAW, t));
+ case TCSAFLUSH:
+ return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAF, t));
+ default:
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+}
+
+int tcsetpgrp(int fd, pid_t pgrp)
+{
+ return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSPGRP, &pgrp));
+}
+
+speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *t)
+{
+ return (t->c_ospeed);
+}
+
+speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *t)
+{
+ return (t->c_ispeed);
+}
+
+int
+cfsetospeed(struct termios *t,int speed)
+{
+ t->c_ospeed = speed;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+cfsetispeed(struct termios *t, int speed)
+{
+ t->c_ispeed = speed;
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _NEXT_POSIX_H
+#define _NEXT_POSIX_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+
+/* NGROUPS_MAX is behind -lposix. Use the BSD version which is NGROUPS */
+#undef NGROUPS_MAX
+#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
+
+/* NeXT's readdir() is BSD (struct direct) not POSIX (struct dirent) */
+#define dirent direct
+
+/* Swap out NeXT's BSD wait() for a more POSIX complient one */
+pid_t posix_wait(int *status);
+#define wait(a) posix_wait(a)
+
+/* #ifdef wrapped functions that need defining for clean compiling */
+pid_t getppid(void);
+void vhangup(void);
+int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host, const char *user,
+ const char *domain);
+
+/* TERMCAP */
+int tcgetattr(int fd, struct termios *t);
+int tcsetattr(int fd, int opt, const struct termios *t);
+int tcsetpgrp(int fd, pid_t pgrp);
+speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *t);
+speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *t);
+int cfsetospeed(struct termios *t, int speed);
+int cfsetispeed(struct termios *t, int speed);
+#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */
+#endif /* _NEXT_POSIX_H */
--- /dev/null
+/**************************************************************
+ * Original:
+ * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995
+ * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included.
+ * Sigh. This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with. Note that
+ * the version here does not include floating point...
+ *
+ * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks
+ * for string length. This covers a nasty loophole.
+ *
+ * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from
+ * causing nast effects.
+ *
+ * More Recently:
+ * Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43
+ * This was ugly. It is still ugly. I opted out of floating point
+ * numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything
+ * from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from
+ * the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page.
+ *
+ * Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1
+ * Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this
+ * probably requires libm on most operating systems. Don't yet
+ * support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G). Also, fmtint()
+ * was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways
+ * which showed it, so that's been fixed. Also, formated the code
+ * to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the
+ * original. Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with:
+ * gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm
+ * and run snprintf for results.
+ *
+ * Thomas Roessler <roessler@guug.de> 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i
+ * The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats.
+ * Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work.
+ *
+ * Michael Elkins <me@cs.hmc.edu> 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8
+ * The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were
+ * missing. Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so
+ * the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF.
+ *
+ * Ben Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org> 09/27/00 for OpenSSH
+ * Welcome to the world of %lld and %qd support. With other
+ * long long support. This is needed for sftp-server to work
+ * right.
+ *
+ * Ben Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org> 02/12/01 for OpenSSH
+ * Removed all hint of VARARGS stuff and banished it to the void,
+ * and did a bit of KNF style work to make things a bit more
+ * acceptable. Consider stealing from mutt or enlightenment.
+ **************************************************************/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) /* For those with broken snprintf() */
+# undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+# undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+
+static void
+dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args);
+
+static void
+fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char *value, int flags,
+ int min, int max);
+
+static void
+fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, long value, int base,
+ int min, int max, int flags);
+
+static void
+fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, long double fvalue,
+ int min, int max, int flags);
+
+static void
+dopr_outch(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char c);
+
+/*
+ * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf
+ */
+
+/* format read states */
+#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
+#define DP_S_FLAGS 1
+#define DP_S_MIN 2
+#define DP_S_DOT 3
+#define DP_S_MAX 4
+#define DP_S_MOD 5
+#define DP_S_CONV 6
+#define DP_S_DONE 7
+
+/* format flags - Bits */
+#define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0)
+#define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1)
+#define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2)
+#define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3)
+#define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4)
+#define DP_F_UP (1 << 5)
+#define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6)
+
+/* Conversion Flags */
+#define DP_C_SHORT 1
+#define DP_C_LONG 2
+#define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3
+#define DP_C_LONG_LONG 4
+
+#define char_to_int(p) (p - '0')
+#define abs_val(p) (p < 0 ? -p : p)
+
+
+static void
+dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args)
+{
+ char *strvalue;
+ char ch;
+ long value;
+ long double fvalue;
+ int min = 0;
+ int max = -1;
+ int state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+ int flags = 0;
+ int cflags = 0;
+ size_t currlen = 0;
+
+ ch = *format++;
+
+ while (state != DP_S_DONE) {
+ if ((ch == '\0') || (currlen >= maxlen))
+ state = DP_S_DONE;
+
+ switch(state) {
+ case DP_S_DEFAULT:
+ if (ch == '%')
+ state = DP_S_FLAGS;
+ else
+ dopr_outch(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case DP_S_FLAGS:
+ switch (ch) {
+ case '-':
+ flags |= DP_F_MINUS;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case '+':
+ flags |= DP_F_PLUS;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case ' ':
+ flags |= DP_F_SPACE;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case '#':
+ flags |= DP_F_NUM;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case '0':
+ flags |= DP_F_ZERO;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ state = DP_S_MIN;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case DP_S_MIN:
+ if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+ min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch);
+ ch = *format++;
+ } else if (ch == '*') {
+ min = va_arg (args, int);
+ ch = *format++;
+ state = DP_S_DOT;
+ } else
+ state = DP_S_DOT;
+ break;
+ case DP_S_DOT:
+ if (ch == '.') {
+ state = DP_S_MAX;
+ ch = *format++;
+ } else
+ state = DP_S_MOD;
+ break;
+ case DP_S_MAX:
+ if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+ if (max < 0)
+ max = 0;
+ max = 10*max + char_to_int(ch);
+ ch = *format++;
+ } else if (ch == '*') {
+ max = va_arg (args, int);
+ ch = *format++;
+ state = DP_S_MOD;
+ } else
+ state = DP_S_MOD;
+ break;
+ case DP_S_MOD:
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'h':
+ cflags = DP_C_SHORT;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ cflags = DP_C_LONG;
+ ch = *format++;
+ if (ch == 'l') {
+ cflags = DP_C_LONG_LONG;
+ ch = *format++;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ cflags = DP_C_LONG_LONG;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ case 'L':
+ cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE;
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ state = DP_S_CONV;
+ break;
+ case DP_S_CONV:
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'd':
+ case 'i':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+ value = va_arg(args, int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+ value = va_arg(args, long int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG_LONG)
+ value = va_arg (args, long long);
+ else
+ value = va_arg (args, int);
+ fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags);
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned long int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG_LONG)
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned long long);
+ else
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned int);
+ fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 8, min, max, flags);
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned long int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG_LONG)
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned long long);
+ else
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned int);
+ fmtint (buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags);
+ break;
+ case 'X':
+ flags |= DP_F_UP;
+ case 'x':
+ flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned long int);
+ else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG_LONG)
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned long long);
+ else
+ value = va_arg(args, unsigned int);
+ fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 16, min, max, flags);
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+ fvalue = va_arg(args, long double);
+ else
+ fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
+ /* um, floating point? */
+ fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags);
+ break;
+ case 'E':
+ flags |= DP_F_UP;
+ case 'e':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+ fvalue = va_arg(args, long double);
+ else
+ fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
+ break;
+ case 'G':
+ flags |= DP_F_UP;
+ case 'g':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+ fvalue = va_arg(args, long double);
+ else
+ fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ dopr_outch(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, va_arg(args, int));
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ strvalue = va_arg(args, char *);
+ if (max < 0)
+ max = maxlen; /* ie, no max */
+ fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue, flags, min, max);
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ strvalue = va_arg(args, void *);
+ fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags);
+ break;
+ case 'n':
+ if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
+ short int *num;
+ num = va_arg(args, short int *);
+ *num = currlen;
+ } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) {
+ long int *num;
+ num = va_arg(args, long int *);
+ *num = currlen;
+ } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG_LONG) {
+ long long *num;
+ num = va_arg(args, long long *);
+ *num = currlen;
+ } else {
+ int *num;
+ num = va_arg(args, int *);
+ *num = currlen;
+ }
+ break;
+ case '%':
+ dopr_outch(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
+ break;
+ case 'w': /* not supported yet, treat as next char */
+ ch = *format++;
+ break;
+ default: /* Unknown, skip */
+ break;
+ }
+ ch = *format++;
+ state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+ flags = cflags = min = 0;
+ max = -1;
+ break;
+ case DP_S_DONE:
+ break;
+ default: /* hmm? */
+ break; /* some picky compilers need this */
+ }
+ }
+ if (currlen < maxlen - 1)
+ buffer[currlen] = '\0';
+ else
+ buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0';
+}
+
+static void
+fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+ char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
+{
+ int padlen, strln; /* amount to pad */
+ int cnt = 0;
+
+ if (value == 0)
+ value = "<NULL>";
+
+ for (strln = 0; value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */
+ padlen = min - strln;
+ if (padlen < 0)
+ padlen = 0;
+ if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+ padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */
+
+ while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ --padlen;
+ ++cnt;
+ }
+ while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++);
+ ++cnt;
+ }
+ while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ ++padlen;
+ ++cnt;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */
+
+static void
+fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+ long value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+ unsigned long uvalue;
+ char convert[20];
+ int signvalue = 0;
+ int place = 0;
+ int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */
+ int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */
+ int caps = 0;
+
+ if (max < 0)
+ max = 0;
+
+ uvalue = value;
+
+ if (!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
+ if (value < 0) {
+ signvalue = '-';
+ uvalue = -value;
+ } else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */
+ signvalue = '+';
+ else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+ signvalue = ' ';
+ }
+
+ if (flags & DP_F_UP)
+ caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
+
+ do {
+ convert[place++] =
+ (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")
+ [uvalue % (unsigned)base];
+ uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base );
+ } while (uvalue && (place < 20));
+ if (place == 20)
+ place--;
+ convert[place] = 0;
+
+ zpadlen = max - place;
+ spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0);
+ if (zpadlen < 0)
+ zpadlen = 0;
+ if (spadlen < 0)
+ spadlen = 0;
+ if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) {
+ zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen);
+ spadlen = 0;
+ }
+ if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+ spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */
+
+
+ /* Spaces */
+ while (spadlen > 0) {
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ --spadlen;
+ }
+
+ /* Sign */
+ if (signvalue)
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+
+ /* Zeros */
+ if (zpadlen > 0) {
+ while (zpadlen > 0) {
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
+ --zpadlen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Digits */
+ while (place > 0)
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]);
+
+ /* Left Justified spaces */
+ while (spadlen < 0) {
+ dopr_outch (buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ ++spadlen;
+ }
+}
+
+static long double
+pow10(int exp)
+{
+ long double result = 1;
+
+ while (exp) {
+ result *= 10;
+ exp--;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static long
+round(long double value)
+{
+ long intpart = value;
+
+ value -= intpart;
+ if (value >= 0.5)
+ intpart++;
+
+ return intpart;
+}
+
+static void
+fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, long double fvalue,
+ int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+ char iconvert[20];
+ char fconvert[20];
+ int signvalue = 0;
+ int iplace = 0;
+ int fplace = 0;
+ int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */
+ int zpadlen = 0;
+ int caps = 0;
+ long intpart;
+ long fracpart;
+ long double ufvalue;
+
+ /*
+ * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default
+ * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6
+ */
+ if (max < 0)
+ max = 6;
+
+ ufvalue = abs_val(fvalue);
+
+ if (fvalue < 0)
+ signvalue = '-';
+ else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */
+ signvalue = '+';
+ else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+ signvalue = ' ';
+
+ intpart = ufvalue;
+
+ /*
+ * Sorry, we only support 9 digits past the decimal because of our
+ * conversion method
+ */
+ if (max > 9)
+ max = 9;
+
+ /* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by
+ * multiplying by a factor of 10
+ */
+ fracpart = round((pow10 (max)) * (ufvalue - intpart));
+
+ if (fracpart >= pow10 (max)) {
+ intpart++;
+ fracpart -= pow10 (max);
+ }
+
+ /* Convert integer part */
+ do {
+ iconvert[iplace++] =
+ (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[intpart % 10];
+ intpart = (intpart / 10);
+ } while(intpart && (iplace < 20));
+ if (iplace == 20)
+ iplace--;
+ iconvert[iplace] = 0;
+
+ /* Convert fractional part */
+ do {
+ fconvert[fplace++] =
+ (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[fracpart % 10];
+ fracpart = (fracpart / 10);
+ } while(fracpart && (fplace < 20));
+ if (fplace == 20)
+ fplace--;
+ fconvert[fplace] = 0;
+
+ /* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */
+ padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0);
+ zpadlen = max - fplace;
+ if (zpadlen < 0)
+ zpadlen = 0;
+ if (padlen < 0)
+ padlen = 0;
+ if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
+ padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */
+
+ if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
+ if (signvalue) {
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+ --padlen;
+ signvalue = 0;
+ }
+ while (padlen > 0) {
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
+ --padlen;
+ }
+ }
+ while (padlen > 0) {
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ --padlen;
+ }
+ if (signvalue)
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+
+ while (iplace > 0)
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]);
+
+ /*
+ * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct
+ * char to print out.
+ */
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.');
+
+ while (fplace > 0)
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, fconvert[--fplace]);
+
+ while (zpadlen > 0) {
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
+ --zpadlen;
+ }
+
+ while (padlen < 0) {
+ dopr_outch(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ ++padlen;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+dopr_outch(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char c)
+{
+ if (*currlen < maxlen)
+ buffer[(*currlen)++] = c;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+int
+vsnprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+ str[0] = 0;
+ dopr(str, count, fmt, args);
+
+ return(strlen(str));
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_VSNPRINTF */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+int
+snprintf(char *str,size_t count,const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ (void) vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ return(strlen(str));
+}
+
+#ifdef TEST_SNPRINTF
+int
+main(void)
+{
+#define LONG_STRING 1024
+ char buf1[LONG_STRING];
+ char buf2[LONG_STRING];
+ char *fp_fmt[] = {
+ "%-1.5f",
+ "%1.5f",
+ "%123.9f",
+ "%10.5f",
+ "% 10.5f",
+ "%+22.9f",
+ "%+4.9f",
+ "%01.3f",
+ "%4f",
+ "%3.1f",
+ "%3.2f",
+ NULL
+ };
+ double fp_nums[] = {
+ -1.5,
+ 134.21,
+ 91340.2,
+ 341.1234,
+ 0203.9,
+ 0.96,
+ 0.996,
+ 0.9996,
+ 1.996,
+ 4.136,
+ 0
+ };
+ char *int_fmt[] = {
+ "%-1.5d",
+ "%1.5d",
+ "%123.9d",
+ "%5.5d",
+ "%10.5d",
+ "% 10.5d",
+ "%+22.33d",
+ "%01.3d",
+ "%4d",
+ "%lld",
+ "%qd",
+ NULL
+ };
+ long long int_nums[] = { -1, 134, 91340, 341, 0203, 0, 9999999 };
+ int x, y;
+ int fail = 0;
+ int num = 0;
+
+ printf("Testing snprintf format codes against system sprintf...\n");
+
+ for (x = 0; fp_fmt[x] != NULL ; x++) {
+ for (y = 0; fp_nums[y] != 0 ; y++) {
+ snprintf(buf1, sizeof (buf1), fp_fmt[x], fp_nums[y]);
+ sprintf (buf2, fp_fmt[x], fp_nums[y]);
+ if (strcmp (buf1, buf2)) {
+ printf("snprintf doesn't match Format: %s\n\t"
+ "snprintf = %s\n\tsprintf = %s\n",
+ fp_fmt[x], buf1, buf2);
+ fail++;
+ }
+ num++;
+ }
+ }
+ for (x = 0; int_fmt[x] != NULL ; x++) {
+ for (y = 0; int_nums[y] != 0 ; y++) {
+ snprintf(buf1, sizeof (buf1), int_fmt[x], int_nums[y]);
+ sprintf(buf2, int_fmt[x], int_nums[y]);
+ if (strcmp (buf1, buf2)) {
+ printf("snprintf doesn't match Format: %s\n\t"
+ "snprintf = %s\n\tsprintf = %s\n",
+ int_fmt[x], buf1, buf2);
+ fail++;
+ }
+ num++;
+ }
+ }
+ printf("%d tests failed out of %d.\n", fail, num);
+ return(0);
+}
+#endif /* SNPRINTF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_SNPRINTF */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_SNPRINTF_H
+#define _BSD_SNPRINTF_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h> /* For size_t */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+int snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SNPRINTF */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+int vsnprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SNPRINTF */
+
+
+#endif /* _BSD_SNPRINTF_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
+
+pid_t
+waitpid(int pid, int *stat_loc, int options)
+{
+ union wait statusp;
+ pid_t wait_pid;
+
+ if (pid <= 0) {
+ if (pid != -1) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ pid = 0; /* wait4() wants pid=0 for indiscriminate wait. */
+ }
+ wait_pid = wait4(pid, &statusp, options, NULL);
+ if (stat_loc)
+ *stat_loc = (int) statusp.w_status;
+
+ return wait_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_WAITPID_H
+#define _BSD_WAITPID_H
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID
+/* Clean out any potental issues */
+#undef WIFEXITED
+#undef WIFSTOPPED
+#undef WIFSIGNALED
+
+/* Define required functions to mimic a POSIX look and feel */
+#define _W_INT(w) (*(int*)&(w)) /* convert union wait to int */
+#define WIFEXITED(w) (!((_W_INT(w)) & 0377))
+#define WIFSTOPPED(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & 0100)
+#define WIFSIGNALED(w) (!WIFEXITED(w) && !WIFSTOPPED(w))
+#define WEXITSTATUS(w) (int)(WIFEXITED(w) ? ((_W_INT(w) >> 8) & 0377) : -1)
+#define WTERMSIG(w) (int)(WIFSIGNALED(w) ? (_W_INT(w) & 0177) : -1)
+#define WCOREFLAG 0x80
+#define WCOREDUMP(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & WCOREFLAG)
+
+/* Prototype */
+pid_t waitpid(int pid, int *stat_loc, int options);
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */
+#endif /* _BSD_WAITPID_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: daemon.c,v 1.2 1996/08/19 08:22:13 tholo Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+int
+daemon(nochdir, noclose)
+ int nochdir, noclose;
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ switch (fork()) {
+ case -1:
+ return (-1);
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ default:
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * This sleep avoids a race condition which kills the
+ * child process if parent is started by a NT/W2K service.
+ */
+ sleep(1);
+#endif
+ _exit(0);
+ }
+
+ if (setsid() == -1)
+ return (-1);
+
+ if (!nochdir)
+ (void)chdir("/");
+
+ if (!noclose && (fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+ (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+ (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
+ if (fd > 2)
+ (void)close (fd);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_DAEMON */
+
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_DAEMON_H
+#define _BSD_DAEMON_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
+int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose);
+#endif /* !HAVE_DAEMON */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_DAEMON_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.5 2001/06/27 00:58:54 lebel Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
+ * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.5 2001/06/27 00:58:54 lebel Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+char *
+dirname(path)
+ const char *path;
+{
+ static char bname[MAXPATHLEN];
+ register const char *endp;
+
+ /* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */
+ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+ (void)strcpy(bname, ".");
+ return(bname);
+ }
+
+ /* Strip trailing slashes */
+ endp = path + strlen(path) - 1;
+ while (endp > path && *endp == '/')
+ endp--;
+
+ /* Find the start of the dir */
+ while (endp > path && *endp != '/')
+ endp--;
+
+ /* Either the dir is "/" or there are no slashes */
+ if (endp == path) {
+ (void)strcpy(bname, *endp == '/' ? "/" : ".");
+ return(bname);
+ } else {
+ do {
+ endp--;
+ } while (endp > path && *endp == '/');
+ }
+
+ if (endp - path + 1 > sizeof(bname)) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ strlcpy(bname, path, endp - path + 2);
+ return(bname);
+}
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
+
+char *dirname(const char *path);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * fake library for ssh
+ *
+ * This file is included in getaddrinfo.c and getnameinfo.c.
+ * See getaddrinfo.c and getnameinfo.c.
+ */
+
+/* $Id$ */
+
+/* for old netdb.h */
+#ifndef EAI_NODATA
+#define EAI_NODATA 1
+#define EAI_MEMORY 2
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * fake library for ssh
+ *
+ * This file includes getaddrinfo(), freeaddrinfo() and gai_strerror().
+ * These funtions are defined in rfc2133.
+ *
+ * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
+ * is implemented for ssh use only. For exapmle, this routine assumes
+ * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+char *gai_strerror(int ecode)
+{
+ switch (ecode) {
+ case EAI_NODATA:
+ return "no address associated with hostname.";
+ case EAI_MEMORY:
+ return "memory allocation failure.";
+ default:
+ return "unknown error.";
+ }
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *next;
+
+ do {
+ next = ai->ai_next;
+ free(ai);
+ } while (NULL != (ai = next));
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+static struct addrinfo *malloc_ai(int port, u_long addr)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *ai;
+
+ ai = malloc(sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+ if (ai == NULL)
+ return(NULL);
+
+ memset(ai, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+
+ ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1);
+ /* XXX -- ssh doesn't use sa_len */
+ ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ ai->ai_addr->sa_family = ai->ai_family = AF_INET;
+
+ ((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_port = port;
+ ((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr = addr;
+
+ return(ai);
+}
+
+int getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname,
+ const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *cur, *prev = NULL;
+ struct hostent *hp;
+ struct in_addr in;
+ int i, port;
+
+ if (servname)
+ port = htons(atoi(servname));
+ else
+ port = 0;
+
+ if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE) {
+ if (NULL != (*res = malloc_ai(port, htonl(0x00000000))))
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return EAI_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if (!hostname) {
+ if (NULL != (*res = malloc_ai(port, htonl(0x7f000001))))
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return EAI_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if (inet_aton(hostname, &in)) {
+ if (NULL != (*res = malloc_ai(port, in.s_addr)))
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return EAI_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ hp = gethostbyname(hostname);
+ if (hp && hp->h_name && hp->h_name[0] && hp->h_addr_list[0]) {
+ for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) {
+ cur = malloc_ai(port, ((struct in_addr *)hp->h_addr_list[i])->s_addr);
+ if (cur == NULL) {
+ if (*res)
+ freeaddrinfo(*res);
+ return EAI_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if (prev)
+ prev->ai_next = cur;
+ else
+ *res = cur;
+
+ prev = cur;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return EAI_NODATA;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _FAKE_GETADDRINFO_H
+#define _FAKE_GETADDRINFO_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include "fake-gai-errnos.h"
+
+#ifndef AI_PASSIVE
+# define AI_PASSIVE 1
+# define AI_CANONNAME 2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NI_NUMERICHOST
+# define NI_NUMERICHOST 2
+# define NI_NAMEREQD 4
+# define NI_NUMERICSERV 8
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
+struct addrinfo {
+ int ai_flags; /* AI_PASSIVE, AI_CANONNAME */
+ int ai_family; /* PF_xxx */
+ int ai_socktype; /* SOCK_xxx */
+ int ai_protocol; /* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */
+ size_t ai_addrlen; /* length of ai_addr */
+ char *ai_canonname; /* canonical name for hostname */
+ struct sockaddr *ai_addr; /* binary address */
+ struct addrinfo *ai_next; /* next structure in linked list */
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+int getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname,
+ const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+char *gai_strerror(int ecode);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai);
+#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
+
+#endif /* _FAKE_GETADDRINFO_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * fake library for ssh
+ *
+ * This file includes getnameinfo().
+ * These funtions are defined in rfc2133.
+ *
+ * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
+ * is implemented for ssh use only. For exapmle, this routine assumes
+ * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host,
+ size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+ struct hostent *hp;
+ char tmpserv[16];
+
+ if (serv) {
+ snprintf(tmpserv, sizeof(tmpserv), "%d", ntohs(sin->sin_port));
+ if (strlen(tmpserv) >= servlen)
+ return EAI_MEMORY;
+ else
+ strcpy(serv, tmpserv);
+ }
+
+ if (host) {
+ if (flags & NI_NUMERICHOST) {
+ if (strlen(inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr)) >= hostlen)
+ return EAI_MEMORY;
+
+ strcpy(host, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr));
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&sin->sin_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
+ if (hp == NULL)
+ return EAI_NODATA;
+
+ if (strlen(hp->h_name) >= hostlen)
+ return EAI_MEMORY;
+
+ strcpy(host, hp->h_name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _FAKE_GETNAMEINFO_H
+#define _FAKE_GETNAMEINFO_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host,
+ size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
+
+#ifndef NI_MAXSERV
+# define NI_MAXSERV 32
+#endif /* !NI_MAXSERV */
+#ifndef NI_MAXHOST
+# define NI_MAXHOST 1025
+#endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */
+
+#endif /* _FAKE_GETNAMEINFO_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.16 2000/09/07 19:47:59 art Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * @(#)queue.h 8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SYS_QUEUE_H_
+#define _SYS_QUEUE_H_
+
+/*
+ * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists,
+ * lists, simple queues, tail queues, and circular queues.
+ *
+ *
+ * A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements
+ * are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at
+ * the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be
+ * added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list.
+ * Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit
+ * macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may
+ * only be traversed in the forward direction. Singly-linked lists are ideal
+ * for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for
+ * implementing a LIFO queue.
+ *
+ * A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward
+ * pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked
+ * so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before
+ * or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list
+ * may only be traversed in the forward direction.
+ *
+ * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are singly
+ * linked to save space, so elements can only be removed from the
+ * head of the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
+ * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the
+ * list. A simple queue may only be traversed in the forward direction.
+ *
+ * A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
+ * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or
+ * after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of
+ * the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction.
+ *
+ * A circle queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
+ * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
+ * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the list.
+ * A circle queue may be traversed in either direction, but has a more
+ * complex end of list detection.
+ *
+ * For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List definitions.
+ */
+#define SLIST_HEAD(name, type) \
+struct name { \
+ struct type *slh_first; /* first element */ \
+}
+
+#define SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
+ { NULL }
+
+#define SLIST_ENTRY(type) \
+struct { \
+ struct type *sle_next; /* next element */ \
+}
+
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List access methods.
+ */
+#define SLIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->slh_first)
+#define SLIST_END(head) NULL
+#define SLIST_EMPTY(head) (SLIST_FIRST(head) == SLIST_END(head))
+#define SLIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sle_next)
+
+#define SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
+ for((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \
+ (var) != SLIST_END(head); \
+ (var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field))
+
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List functions.
+ */
+#define SLIST_INIT(head) { \
+ SLIST_FIRST(head) = SLIST_END(head); \
+}
+
+#define SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.sle_next = (slistelm)->field.sle_next; \
+ (slistelm)->field.sle_next = (elm); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.sle_next = (head)->slh_first; \
+ (head)->slh_first = (elm); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \
+ (head)->slh_first = (head)->slh_first->field.sle_next; \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * List definitions.
+ */
+#define LIST_HEAD(name, type) \
+struct name { \
+ struct type *lh_first; /* first element */ \
+}
+
+#define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
+ { NULL }
+
+#define LIST_ENTRY(type) \
+struct { \
+ struct type *le_next; /* next element */ \
+ struct type **le_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \
+}
+
+/*
+ * List access methods
+ */
+#define LIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->lh_first)
+#define LIST_END(head) NULL
+#define LIST_EMPTY(head) (LIST_FIRST(head) == LIST_END(head))
+#define LIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.le_next)
+
+#define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
+ for((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \
+ (var)!= LIST_END(head); \
+ (var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field))
+
+/*
+ * List functions.
+ */
+#define LIST_INIT(head) do { \
+ LIST_FIRST(head) = LIST_END(head); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.le_next = (listelm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \
+ (listelm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \
+ &(elm)->field.le_next; \
+ (listelm)->field.le_next = (elm); \
+ (elm)->field.le_prev = &(listelm)->field.le_next; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev; \
+ (elm)->field.le_next = (listelm); \
+ *(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm); \
+ (listelm)->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.le_next = (head)->lh_first) != NULL) \
+ (head)->lh_first->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;\
+ (head)->lh_first = (elm); \
+ (elm)->field.le_prev = &(head)->lh_first; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do { \
+ if ((elm)->field.le_next != NULL) \
+ (elm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \
+ (elm)->field.le_prev; \
+ *(elm)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_next; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_REPLACE(elm, elm2, field) do { \
+ if (((elm2)->field.le_next = (elm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \
+ (elm2)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \
+ &(elm2)->field.le_next; \
+ (elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_prev; \
+ *(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm2); \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue definitions.
+ */
+#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \
+struct name { \
+ struct type *sqh_first; /* first element */ \
+ struct type **sqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \
+}
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
+ { NULL, &(head).sqh_first }
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type) \
+struct { \
+ struct type *sqe_next; /* next element */ \
+}
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue access methods.
+ */
+#define SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->sqh_first)
+#define SIMPLEQ_END(head) NULL
+#define SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head) (SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == SIMPLEQ_END(head))
+#define SIMPLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sqe_next)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
+ for((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \
+ (var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head); \
+ (var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue functions.
+ */
+#define SIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do { \
+ (head)->sqh_first = NULL; \
+ (head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (head)->sqh_first) == NULL) \
+ (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
+ (head)->sqh_first = (elm); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.sqe_next = NULL; \
+ *(head)->sqh_last = (elm); \
+ (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (listelm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL)\
+ (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \
+ (listelm)->field.sqe_next = (elm); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((head)->sqh_first = (elm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL) \
+ (head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Tail queue definitions.
+ */
+#define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type) \
+struct name { \
+ struct type *tqh_first; /* first element */ \
+ struct type **tqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \
+}
+
+#define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
+ { NULL, &(head).tqh_first }
+
+#define TAILQ_ENTRY(type) \
+struct { \
+ struct type *tqe_next; /* next element */ \
+ struct type **tqe_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \
+}
+
+/*
+ * tail queue access methods
+ */
+#define TAILQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->tqh_first)
+#define TAILQ_END(head) NULL
+#define TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.tqe_next)
+#define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname) \
+ (*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last))
+/* XXX */
+#define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field) \
+ (*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last))
+#define TAILQ_EMPTY(head) \
+ (TAILQ_FIRST(head) == TAILQ_END(head))
+
+#define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
+ for((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \
+ (var) != TAILQ_END(head); \
+ (var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field, headname) \
+ for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \
+ (var) != TAILQ_END(head); \
+ (var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field))
+
+/*
+ * Tail queue functions.
+ */
+#define TAILQ_INIT(head) do { \
+ (head)->tqh_first = NULL; \
+ (head)->tqh_last = &(head)->tqh_first; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (head)->tqh_first) != NULL) \
+ (head)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = \
+ &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
+ else \
+ (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
+ (head)->tqh_first = (elm); \
+ (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(head)->tqh_first; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.tqe_next = NULL; \
+ (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last; \
+ *(head)->tqh_last = (elm); \
+ (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)\
+ (elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \
+ &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
+ else \
+ (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
+ (listelm)->field.tqe_next = (elm); \
+ (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(listelm)->field.tqe_next; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev; \
+ (elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm); \
+ *(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm); \
+ (listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \
+ if (((elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \
+ (elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \
+ (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \
+ else \
+ (head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \
+ *(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_next; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \
+ if (((elm2)->field.tqe_next = (elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \
+ (elm2)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \
+ &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \
+ else \
+ (head)->tqh_last = &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \
+ (elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \
+ *(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm2); \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Circular queue definitions.
+ */
+#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \
+struct name { \
+ struct type *cqh_first; /* first element */ \
+ struct type *cqh_last; /* last element */ \
+}
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \
+ { CIRCLEQ_END(&head), CIRCLEQ_END(&head) }
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_ENTRY(type) \
+struct { \
+ struct type *cqe_next; /* next element */ \
+ struct type *cqe_prev; /* previous element */ \
+}
+
+/*
+ * Circular queue access methods
+ */
+#define CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->cqh_first)
+#define CIRCLEQ_LAST(head) ((head)->cqh_last)
+#define CIRCLEQ_END(head) ((void *)(head))
+#define CIRCLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_next)
+#define CIRCLEQ_PREV(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_prev)
+#define CIRCLEQ_EMPTY(head) \
+ (CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) == CIRCLEQ_END(head))
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \
+ for((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \
+ (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
+ (var) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field) \
+ for((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head); \
+ (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
+ (var) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, field))
+
+/*
+ * Circular queue functions.
+ */
+#define CIRCLEQ_INIT(head) do { \
+ (head)->cqh_first = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
+ (head)->cqh_last = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm)->field.cqe_next; \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm); \
+ if ((listelm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
+ (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \
+ else \
+ (listelm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \
+ (listelm)->field.cqe_next = (elm); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm); \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm)->field.cqe_prev; \
+ if ((listelm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
+ (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \
+ else \
+ (listelm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm); \
+ (listelm)->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_next = (head)->cqh_first; \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_prev = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
+ if ((head)->cqh_last == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
+ (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \
+ else \
+ (head)->cqh_first->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \
+ (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_next = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (head)->cqh_last; \
+ if ((head)->cqh_first == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
+ (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \
+ else \
+ (head)->cqh_last->field.cqe_next = (elm); \
+ (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \
+ if ((elm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
+ (head)->cqh_last = (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \
+ else \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \
+ if ((elm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
+ (head)->cqh_first = (elm)->field.cqe_next; \
+ else \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = \
+ (elm)->field.cqe_next; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CIRCLEQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \
+ if (((elm2)->field.cqe_next = (elm)->field.cqe_next) == \
+ CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
+ (head).cqh_last = (elm2); \
+ else \
+ (elm2)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm2); \
+ if (((elm2)->field.cqe_prev = (elm)->field.cqe_prev) == \
+ CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \
+ (head).cqh_first = (elm2); \
+ else \
+ (elm2)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm2); \
+} while (0)
+
+#endif /* !_SYS_QUEUE_H_ */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: regex.h,v 1.3 1997/09/21 10:45:48 niklas Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: regex.h,v 1.4.6.1 1996/06/10 18:57:07 explorer Exp $ */
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1992 Henry Spencer.
+ * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Henry Spencer of the University of Toronto.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * @(#)regex.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
+ */
+
+#ifndef _REGEX_H_
+#define _REGEX_H_
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+/* types */
+typedef off_t regoff_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ int re_magic;
+ size_t re_nsub; /* number of parenthesized subexpressions */
+ const char *re_endp; /* end pointer for REG_PEND */
+ struct re_guts *re_g; /* none of your business :-) */
+} regex_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ regoff_t rm_so; /* start of match */
+ regoff_t rm_eo; /* end of match */
+} regmatch_t;
+
+/* regcomp() flags */
+#define REG_BASIC 0000
+#define REG_EXTENDED 0001
+#define REG_ICASE 0002
+#define REG_NOSUB 0004
+#define REG_NEWLINE 0010
+#define REG_NOSPEC 0020
+#define REG_PEND 0040
+#define REG_DUMP 0200
+
+/* regerror() flags */
+#define REG_NOMATCH 1
+#define REG_BADPAT 2
+#define REG_ECOLLATE 3
+#define REG_ECTYPE 4
+#define REG_EESCAPE 5
+#define REG_ESUBREG 6
+#define REG_EBRACK 7
+#define REG_EPAREN 8
+#define REG_EBRACE 9
+#define REG_BADBR 10
+#define REG_ERANGE 11
+#define REG_ESPACE 12
+#define REG_BADRPT 13
+#define REG_EMPTY 14
+#define REG_ASSERT 15
+#define REG_INVARG 16
+#define REG_ATOI 255 /* convert name to number (!) */
+#define REG_ITOA 0400 /* convert number to name (!) */
+
+/* regexec() flags */
+#define REG_NOTBOL 00001
+#define REG_NOTEOL 00002
+#define REG_STARTEND 00004
+#define REG_TRACE 00400 /* tracing of execution */
+#define REG_LARGE 01000 /* force large representation */
+#define REG_BACKR 02000 /* force use of backref code */
+
+int regcomp(regex_t*, const char*, int);
+size_t regerror(int, const regex_t*, char*, size_t);
+int regexec(const regex_t*, const char*, size_t, regmatch_t[], int);
+void regfree(regex_t*);
+
+#endif /* !_REGEX_H_ */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _FAKE_SOCKET_H
+#define _FAKE_SOCKET_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "sys/types.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+# define _SS_MAXSIZE 128 /* Implementation specific max size */
+# define _SS_PADSIZE (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr))
+
+struct sockaddr_storage {
+ struct sockaddr ss_sa;
+ char __ss_pad2[_SS_PADSIZE];
+};
+# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */
+
+#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \
+ (((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0 && \
+ ((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *) (a))[3] == htonl (1))
+#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
+struct in6_addr {
+ u_int8_t s6_addr[16];
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
+struct sockaddr_in6 {
+ unsigned short sin6_family;
+ u_int16_t sin6_port;
+ u_int32_t sin6_flowinfo;
+ struct in6_addr sin6_addr;
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */
+
+#ifndef AF_INET6
+/* Define it to something that should never appear */
+#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !_FAKE_SOCKET_H */
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1991, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD)
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: getcwd.c,v 1.6 2000/07/19 15:25:13 deraadt Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#define ISDOT(dp) \
+ (dp->d_name[0] == '.' && (dp->d_name[1] == '\0' || \
+ (dp->d_name[1] == '.' && dp->d_name[2] == '\0')))
+
+char *
+getcwd(char *pt,size_t size)
+{
+ register struct dirent *dp;
+ register DIR *dir = NULL;
+ register dev_t dev;
+ register ino_t ino;
+ register int first;
+ register char *bpt, *bup;
+ struct stat s;
+ dev_t root_dev;
+ ino_t root_ino;
+ size_t ptsize, upsize;
+ int save_errno;
+ char *ept, *eup, *up;
+
+ /*
+ * If no buffer specified by the user, allocate one as necessary.
+ * If a buffer is specified, the size has to be non-zero. The path
+ * is built from the end of the buffer backwards.
+ */
+ if (pt) {
+ ptsize = 0;
+ if (!size) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ ept = pt + size;
+ } else {
+ if ((pt = malloc(ptsize = 1024 - 4)) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ ept = pt + ptsize;
+ }
+ bpt = ept - 1;
+ *bpt = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate bytes (1024 - malloc space) for the string of "../"'s.
+ * Should always be enough (it's 340 levels). If it's not, allocate
+ * as necessary. Special * case the first stat, it's ".", not "..".
+ */
+ if ((up = malloc(upsize = 1024 - 4)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ eup = up + MAXPATHLEN;
+ bup = up;
+ up[0] = '.';
+ up[1] = '\0';
+
+ /* Save root values, so know when to stop. */
+ if (stat("/", &s))
+ goto err;
+ root_dev = s.st_dev;
+ root_ino = s.st_ino;
+
+ errno = 0; /* XXX readdir has no error return. */
+
+ for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+ /* Stat the current level. */
+ if (lstat(up, &s))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Save current node values. */
+ ino = s.st_ino;
+ dev = s.st_dev;
+
+ /* Check for reaching root. */
+ if (root_dev == dev && root_ino == ino) {
+ *--bpt = '/';
+ /*
+ * It's unclear that it's a requirement to copy the
+ * path to the beginning of the buffer, but it's always
+ * been that way and stuff would probably break.
+ */
+ memmove(pt, bpt, ept - bpt);
+ free(up);
+ return (pt);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Build pointer to the parent directory, allocating memory
+ * as necessary. Max length is 3 for "../", the largest
+ * possible component name, plus a trailing NULL.
+ */
+ if (bup + 3 + MAXNAMLEN + 1 >= eup) {
+ char *nup;
+
+ if ((nup = realloc(up, upsize *= 2)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ up = nup;
+ bup = up;
+ eup = up + upsize;
+ }
+ *bup++ = '.';
+ *bup++ = '.';
+ *bup = '\0';
+
+ /* Open and stat parent directory.
+ * RACE?? - replaced fstat(dirfd(dir), &s) w/ lstat(up,&s)
+ */
+ if (!(dir = opendir(up)) || lstat(up,&s))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Add trailing slash for next directory. */
+ *bup++ = '/';
+
+ /*
+ * If it's a mount point, have to stat each element because
+ * the inode number in the directory is for the entry in the
+ * parent directory, not the inode number of the mounted file.
+ */
+ save_errno = 0;
+ if (s.st_dev == dev) {
+ for (;;) {
+ if (!(dp = readdir(dir)))
+ goto notfound;
+ if (dp->d_fileno == ino)
+ break;
+ }
+ } else
+ for (;;) {
+ if (!(dp = readdir(dir)))
+ goto notfound;
+ if (ISDOT(dp))
+ continue;
+ memmove(bup, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen + 1);
+
+ /* Save the first error for later. */
+ if (lstat(up, &s)) {
+ if (!save_errno)
+ save_errno = errno;
+ errno = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (s.st_dev == dev && s.st_ino == ino)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check for length of the current name, preceding slash,
+ * leading slash.
+ */
+ if (bpt - pt < dp->d_namlen + (first ? 1 : 2)) {
+ size_t len, off;
+ char *npt;
+
+ if (!ptsize) {
+ errno = ERANGE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ off = bpt - pt;
+ len = ept - bpt;
+ if ((npt = realloc(pt, ptsize *= 2)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ pt = npt;
+ bpt = pt + off;
+ ept = pt + ptsize;
+ memmove(ept - len, bpt, len);
+ bpt = ept - len;
+ }
+ if (!first)
+ *--bpt = '/';
+ bpt -= dp->d_namlen;
+ memmove(bpt, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen);
+ (void)closedir(dir);
+
+ /* Truncate any file name. */
+ *bup = '\0';
+ }
+
+notfound:
+ /*
+ * If readdir set errno, use it, not any saved error; otherwise,
+ * didn't find the current directory in its parent directory, set
+ * errno to ENOENT.
+ */
+ if (!errno)
+ errno = save_errno ? save_errno : ENOENT;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+err:
+ if (ptsize)
+ free(pt);
+ if (up)
+ free(up);
+ if (dir)
+ (void)closedir(dir);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_GETCWD_H
+#define _BSD_GETCWD_H
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD)
+
+char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) */
+#endif /* _BSD_GETCWD_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: getgrouplist.c,v 1.7 1997/08/19 19:13:27 deraadt Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+/*
+ * get credential
+ */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+
+int
+getgrouplist(uname, agroup, groups, grpcnt)
+ const char *uname;
+ gid_t agroup;
+ register gid_t *groups;
+ int *grpcnt;
+{
+ register struct group *grp;
+ register int i, ngroups;
+ int ret, maxgroups;
+ int bail;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ ngroups = 0;
+ maxgroups = *grpcnt;
+
+ /*
+ * install primary group
+ */
+ if (ngroups >= maxgroups) {
+ *grpcnt = ngroups;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ groups[ngroups++] = agroup;
+
+ /*
+ * Scan the group file to find additional groups.
+ */
+ setgrent();
+ while ((grp = getgrent())) {
+ if (grp->gr_gid == agroup)
+ continue;
+ for (bail = 0, i = 0; bail == 0 && i < ngroups; i++)
+ if (groups[i] == grp->gr_gid)
+ bail = 1;
+ if (bail)
+ continue;
+ for (i = 0; grp->gr_mem[i]; i++) {
+ if (!strcmp(grp->gr_mem[i], uname)) {
+ if (ngroups >= maxgroups) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ groups[ngroups++] = grp->gr_gid;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ endgrent();
+ *grpcnt = ngroups;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_GETGROUPLIST */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_GETGROUPLIST_H
+#define _BSD_GETGROUPLIST_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+
+#include <grp.h>
+
+int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
+
+#endif
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1987, 1993, 1994
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: getopt.c,v 1.2 1996/08/19 08:33:32 tholo Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+int opterr = 1, /* if error message should be printed */
+ optind = 1, /* index into parent argv vector */
+ optopt, /* character checked for validity */
+ optreset; /* reset getopt */
+char *optarg; /* argument associated with option */
+
+#define BADCH (int)'?'
+#define BADARG (int)':'
+#define EMSG ""
+
+/*
+ * getopt --
+ * Parse argc/argv argument vector.
+ */
+int
+BSDgetopt(nargc, nargv, ostr)
+ int nargc;
+ char * const *nargv;
+ const char *ostr;
+{
+ extern char *__progname;
+ static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */
+ char *oli; /* option letter list index */
+
+ if (optreset || !*place) { /* update scanning pointer */
+ optreset = 0;
+ if (optind >= nargc || *(place = nargv[optind]) != '-') {
+ place = EMSG;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (place[1] && *++place == '-') { /* found "--" */
+ ++optind;
+ place = EMSG;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ } /* option letter okay? */
+ if ((optopt = (int)*place++) == (int)':' ||
+ !(oli = strchr(ostr, optopt))) {
+ /*
+ * if the user didn't specify '-' as an option,
+ * assume it means -1.
+ */
+ if (optopt == (int)'-')
+ return (-1);
+ if (!*place)
+ ++optind;
+ if (opterr && *ostr != ':')
+ (void)fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s: illegal option -- %c\n", __progname, optopt);
+ return (BADCH);
+ }
+ if (*++oli != ':') { /* don't need argument */
+ optarg = NULL;
+ if (!*place)
+ ++optind;
+ }
+ else { /* need an argument */
+ if (*place) /* no white space */
+ optarg = place;
+ else if (nargc <= ++optind) { /* no arg */
+ place = EMSG;
+ if (*ostr == ':')
+ return (BADARG);
+ if (opterr)
+ (void)fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s: option requires an argument -- %c\n",
+ __progname, optopt);
+ return (BADCH);
+ }
+ else /* white space */
+ optarg = nargv[optind];
+ place = EMSG;
+ ++optind;
+ }
+ return (optopt); /* dump back option letter */
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_OPTRESET) */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSDGETOPT_H
+#define _BSDGETOPT_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
+
+int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts);
+
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _BSDGETOPT_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Guido van Rossum.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+static long
+get_arg_max(void)
+{
+#ifdef ARG_MAX
+ return(ARG_MAX);
+#elif defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_ARG_MAX)
+ return(sysconf(_SC_ARG_MAX));
+#else
+ return(256); /* XXX: arbitrary */
+#endif
+}
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC)
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+#if 0
+static char sccsid[] = "@(#)glob.c 8.3 (Berkeley) 10/13/93";
+#else
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.16 2001/04/05 18:36:12 deraadt Exp $";
+#endif
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+/*
+ * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2.
+ *
+ * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh).
+ *
+ * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX:
+ *
+ * GLOB_QUOTE:
+ * Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following
+ * character might have (except \ at end of string is retained).
+ * GLOB_MAGCHAR:
+ * Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character.
+ * GLOB_NOMAGIC:
+ * Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did
+ * not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing]
+ * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC:
+ * Use alternately specified directory access functions.
+ * GLOB_TILDE:
+ * expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo
+ * GLOB_BRACE:
+ * expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b
+ * gl_matchc:
+ * Number of matches in the current invocation of glob.
+ */
+
+
+#define DOLLAR '$'
+#define DOT '.'
+#define EOS '\0'
+#define LBRACKET '['
+#define NOT '!'
+#define QUESTION '?'
+#define QUOTE '\\'
+#define RANGE '-'
+#define RBRACKET ']'
+#define SEP '/'
+#define STAR '*'
+#define TILDE '~'
+#define UNDERSCORE '_'
+#define LBRACE '{'
+#define RBRACE '}'
+#define SLASH '/'
+#define COMMA ','
+
+#ifndef DEBUG
+
+#define M_QUOTE 0x8000
+#define M_PROTECT 0x4000
+#define M_MASK 0xffff
+#define M_ASCII 0x00ff
+
+typedef u_short Char;
+
+#else
+
+#define M_QUOTE 0x80
+#define M_PROTECT 0x40
+#define M_MASK 0xff
+#define M_ASCII 0x7f
+
+typedef char Char;
+
+#endif
+
+
+#define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII))
+#define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE))
+#define M_ALL META('*')
+#define M_END META(']')
+#define M_NOT META('!')
+#define M_ONE META('?')
+#define M_RNG META('-')
+#define M_SET META('[')
+#define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0)
+
+
+static int compare __P((const void *, const void *));
+static int g_Ctoc __P((const Char *, char *, u_int));
+static int g_lstat __P((Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *));
+static DIR *g_opendir __P((Char *, glob_t *));
+static Char *g_strchr __P((Char *, int));
+static int g_stat __P((Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *));
+static int glob0 __P((const Char *, glob_t *));
+static int glob1 __P((Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *));
+static int glob2 __P((Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
+ glob_t *, size_t *));
+static int glob3 __P((Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
+ Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *));
+static int globextend __P((const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *));
+static const Char *
+ globtilde __P((const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *));
+static int globexp1 __P((const Char *, glob_t *));
+static int globexp2 __P((const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *));
+static int match __P((Char *, Char *, Char *));
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void qprintf __P((const char *, Char *));
+#endif
+
+int
+glob(pattern, flags, errfunc, pglob)
+ const char *pattern;
+ int flags, (*errfunc) __P((const char *, int));
+ glob_t *pglob;
+{
+ const u_char *patnext;
+ int c;
+ Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ patnext = (u_char *) pattern;
+ if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) {
+ pglob->gl_pathc = 0;
+ pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+ if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS))
+ pglob->gl_offs = 0;
+ }
+ pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+ pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc;
+ pglob->gl_matchc = 0;
+
+ bufnext = patbuf;
+ bufend = bufnext + MAXPATHLEN - 1;
+ if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE)
+ while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
+ *bufnext++ = c;
+ else {
+ /* Protect the quoted characters. */
+ while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
+ if (c == QUOTE) {
+ if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) {
+ c = QUOTE;
+ --patnext;
+ }
+ *bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT;
+ } else
+ *bufnext++ = c;
+ }
+ *bufnext = EOS;
+
+ if (flags & GLOB_BRACE)
+ return globexp1(patbuf, pglob);
+ else
+ return glob0(patbuf, pglob);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion
+ * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic
+ * characters
+ */
+static int
+globexp1(pattern, pglob)
+ const Char *pattern;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+{
+ const Char* ptr = pattern;
+ int rv;
+
+ /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
+ if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS)
+ return glob0(pattern, pglob);
+
+ while ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr((Char *) ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL)
+ if (!globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, &rv))
+ return rv;
+
+ return glob0(pattern, pglob);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace.
+ * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern.
+ * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns.
+ */
+static int
+globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, rv)
+ const Char *ptr, *pattern;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+ int *rv;
+{
+ int i;
+ Char *lm, *ls;
+ const Char *pe, *pm, *pl;
+ Char patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ /* copy part up to the brace */
+ for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++)
+ ;
+ *lm = EOS;
+ ls = lm;
+
+ /* Find the balanced brace */
+ for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++)
+ if (*pe == LBRACKET) {
+ /* Ignore everything between [] */
+ for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++)
+ ;
+ if (*pe == EOS) {
+ /*
+ * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
+ * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
+ */
+ pe = pm;
+ }
+ } else if (*pe == LBRACE)
+ i++;
+ else if (*pe == RBRACE) {
+ if (i == 0)
+ break;
+ i--;
+ }
+
+ /* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */
+ if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS) {
+ *rv = glob0(patbuf, pglob);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) {
+ switch (*pm) {
+ case LBRACKET:
+ /* Ignore everything between [] */
+ for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++)
+ ;
+ if (*pm == EOS) {
+ /*
+ * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
+ * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
+ */
+ pm = pl;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case LBRACE:
+ i++;
+ break;
+
+ case RBRACE:
+ if (i) {
+ i--;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case COMMA:
+ if (i && *pm == COMMA)
+ break;
+ else {
+ /* Append the current string */
+ for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++)
+ ;
+
+ /*
+ * Append the rest of the pattern after the
+ * closing brace
+ */
+ for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; )
+ ;
+
+ /* Expand the current pattern */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf);
+#endif
+ *rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob);
+
+ /* move after the comma, to the next string */
+ pl = pm + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ *rv = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * expand tilde from the passwd file.
+ */
+static const Char *
+globtilde(pattern, patbuf, patbuf_len, pglob)
+ const Char *pattern;
+ Char *patbuf;
+ size_t patbuf_len;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ char *h;
+ const Char *p;
+ Char *b, *eb;
+
+ if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE))
+ return pattern;
+
+ /* Copy up to the end of the string or / */
+ eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1];
+ for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf;
+ h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++)
+ ;
+
+ *h = EOS;
+
+#if 0
+ if (h == (char *)eb)
+ return what;
+#endif
+
+ if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) {
+ /*
+ * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME
+ * first and then trying the password file
+ */
+#if 0
+ if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
+#endif
+ if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
+ if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
+ return pattern;
+ else
+ h = pwd->pw_dir;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Expand a ~user
+ */
+ if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL)
+ return pattern;
+ else
+ h = pwd->pw_dir;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the home directory */
+ for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++)
+ ;
+
+ /* Append the rest of the pattern */
+ while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS)
+ ;
+ *b = EOS;
+
+ return patbuf;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing
+ * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally
+ * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0
+ * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error
+ * to find no matches.
+ */
+static int
+glob0(pattern, pglob)
+ const Char *pattern;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+{
+ const Char *qpatnext;
+ int c, err, oldpathc;
+ Char *bufnext, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ size_t limit = 0;
+
+ qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, MAXPATHLEN, pglob);
+ oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc;
+ bufnext = patbuf;
+
+ /* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */
+ while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) {
+ switch (c) {
+ case LBRACKET:
+ c = *qpatnext;
+ if (c == NOT)
+ ++qpatnext;
+ if (*qpatnext == EOS ||
+ g_strchr((Char *) qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) {
+ *bufnext++ = LBRACKET;
+ if (c == NOT)
+ --qpatnext;
+ break;
+ }
+ *bufnext++ = M_SET;
+ if (c == NOT)
+ *bufnext++ = M_NOT;
+ c = *qpatnext++;
+ do {
+ *bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+ if (*qpatnext == RANGE &&
+ (c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) {
+ *bufnext++ = M_RNG;
+ *bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+ qpatnext += 2;
+ }
+ } while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET);
+ pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+ *bufnext++ = M_END;
+ break;
+ case QUESTION:
+ pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+ *bufnext++ = M_ONE;
+ break;
+ case STAR:
+ pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+ /* collapse adjacent stars to one,
+ * to avoid exponential behavior
+ */
+ if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL)
+ *bufnext++ = M_ALL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ *bufnext = EOS;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ qprintf("glob0:", patbuf);
+#endif
+
+ if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pglob, &limit)) != 0)
+ return(err);
+
+ /*
+ * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern
+ * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified
+ * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters
+ * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh.
+ */
+ if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) {
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) ||
+ ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) &&
+ !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR)))
+ return(globextend(pattern, pglob, &limit));
+ else
+ return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
+ }
+ if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT))
+ qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc,
+ pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *), compare);
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+compare(p, q)
+ const void *p, *q;
+{
+ return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q));
+}
+
+static int
+glob1(pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp)
+ Char *pattern, *pattern_last;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+ size_t *limitp;
+{
+ Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ /* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */
+ if (*pattern == EOS)
+ return(0);
+ return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
+ pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
+ pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level
+ * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more
+ * meta characters.
+ */
+static int
+glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend, pathend_last, pattern,
+ pattern_last, pglob, limitp)
+ Char *pathbuf, *pathbuf_last, *pathend, *pathend_last;
+ Char *pattern, *pattern_last;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+ size_t *limitp;
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+ Char *p, *q;
+ int anymeta;
+
+ /*
+ * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until
+ * segment with meta character found.
+ */
+ for (anymeta = 0;;) {
+ if (*pattern == EOS) { /* End of pattern? */
+ *pathend = EOS;
+ if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
+ return(0);
+
+ if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) &&
+ pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) ||
+ (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) &&
+ (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) &&
+ S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
+ if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
+ return (1);
+ *pathend++ = SEP;
+ *pathend = EOS;
+ }
+ ++pglob->gl_matchc;
+ return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp));
+ }
+
+ /* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */
+ q = pathend;
+ p = pattern;
+ while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) {
+ if (ismeta(*p))
+ anymeta = 1;
+ if (q+1 > pathend_last)
+ return (1);
+ *q++ = *p++;
+ }
+
+ if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */
+ pathend = q;
+ pattern = p;
+ while (*pattern == SEP) {
+ if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
+ return (1);
+ *pathend++ = *pattern++;
+ }
+ } else
+ /* Need expansion, recurse. */
+ return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend,
+ pathend_last, pattern, pattern_last,
+ p, pattern_last, pglob, limitp));
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+static int
+glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend, pathend_last, pattern, pattern_last,
+ restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp)
+ Char *pathbuf, *pathbuf_last, *pathend, *pathend_last;
+ Char *pattern, *pattern_last, *restpattern, *restpattern_last;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+ size_t *limitp;
+{
+ register struct dirent *dp;
+ DIR *dirp;
+ int err;
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ /*
+ * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is
+ * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h
+ * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque
+ * structures.
+ */
+ struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)();
+
+ if (pathend > pathend_last)
+ return (1);
+ *pathend = EOS;
+ errno = 0;
+
+ if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) {
+ /* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */
+ if (pglob->gl_errfunc) {
+ if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ return(GLOB_ABORTED);
+ if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) ||
+ pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR)
+ return(GLOB_ABORTED);
+ }
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ err = 0;
+
+ /* Search directory for matching names. */
+ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir;
+ else
+ readdirfunc = readdir;
+ while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) {
+ register u_char *sc;
+ register Char *dc;
+
+ /* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */
+ if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT)
+ continue;
+ dc = pathend;
+ sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name;
+ while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS)
+ ;
+ if (dc >= pathend_last) {
+ *dc = EOS;
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern)) {
+ *pathend = EOS;
+ continue;
+ }
+ err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last,
+ restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp);
+ if (err)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ (*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp);
+ else
+ closedir(dirp);
+ return(err);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accomodate a new item,
+ * add the new item, and update gl_pathc.
+ *
+ * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size
+ * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic
+ * behavior.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated.
+ *
+ * Invariant of the glob_t structure:
+ * Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and
+ * gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items.
+ */
+static int
+globextend(path, pglob, limitp)
+ const Char *path;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+ size_t *limitp;
+{
+ register char **pathv;
+ register int i;
+ u_int newsize, len;
+ char *copy;
+ const Char *p;
+
+ newsize = sizeof(*pathv) * (2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs);
+ pathv = pglob->gl_pathv ? realloc((char *)pglob->gl_pathv, newsize) :
+ malloc(newsize);
+ if (pathv == NULL) {
+ if (pglob->gl_pathv) {
+ free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+ pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+ }
+ return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+ }
+
+ if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
+ /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
+ pathv += pglob->gl_offs;
+ for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
+ *--pathv = NULL;
+ }
+ pglob->gl_pathv = pathv;
+
+ for (p = path; *p++;)
+ ;
+ len = (size_t)(p - path);
+ *limitp += len;
+ if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) {
+ if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) {
+ free(copy);
+ return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+ }
+ pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy;
+ }
+ pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
+
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+ newsize + *limitp >= (u_int) get_arg_max()) {
+ errno = 0;
+ return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+ }
+
+ return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the *
+ * pattern causes a recursion level.
+ */
+static int
+match(name, pat, patend)
+ register Char *name, *pat, *patend;
+{
+ int ok, negate_range;
+ Char c, k;
+
+ while (pat < patend) {
+ c = *pat++;
+ switch (c & M_MASK) {
+ case M_ALL:
+ if (pat == patend)
+ return(1);
+ do
+ if (match(name, pat, patend))
+ return(1);
+ while (*name++ != EOS)
+ ;
+ return(0);
+ case M_ONE:
+ if (*name++ == EOS)
+ return(0);
+ break;
+ case M_SET:
+ ok = 0;
+ if ((k = *name++) == EOS)
+ return(0);
+ if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS)
+ ++pat;
+ while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END)
+ if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) {
+ if (c <= k && k <= pat[1])
+ ok = 1;
+ pat += 2;
+ } else if (c == k)
+ ok = 1;
+ if (ok == negate_range)
+ return(0);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (*name++ != c)
+ return(0);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return(*name == EOS);
+}
+
+/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */
+void
+globfree(pglob)
+ glob_t *pglob;
+{
+ register int i;
+ register char **pp;
+
+ if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) {
+ pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs;
+ for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp)
+ if (*pp)
+ free(*pp);
+ free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+ pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static DIR *
+g_opendir(str, pglob)
+ register Char *str;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+{
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (!*str)
+ strcpy(buf, ".");
+ else {
+ if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf));
+
+ return(opendir(buf));
+}
+
+static int
+g_lstat(fn, sb, pglob)
+ register Char *fn;
+ struct stat *sb;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+{
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ return(-1);
+ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb));
+ return(lstat(buf, sb));
+}
+
+static int
+g_stat(fn, sb, pglob)
+ register Char *fn;
+ struct stat *sb;
+ glob_t *pglob;
+{
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ return(-1);
+ if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+ return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb));
+ return(stat(buf, sb));
+}
+
+static Char *
+g_strchr(str, ch)
+ Char *str;
+ int ch;
+{
+ do {
+ if (*str == ch)
+ return (str);
+ } while (*str++);
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+g_Ctoc(str, buf, len)
+ register const Char *str;
+ char *buf;
+ u_int len;
+{
+
+ while (len--) {
+ if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS)
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void
+qprintf(str, s)
+ const char *str;
+ register Char *s;
+{
+ register Char *p;
+
+ (void)printf("%s:\n", str);
+ for (p = s; *p; p++)
+ (void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p));
+ (void)printf("\n");
+ for (p = s; *p; p++)
+ (void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' ');
+ (void)printf("\n");
+ for (p = s; *p; p++)
+ (void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' ');
+ (void)printf("\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
+ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) */
+
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 2001/03/18 17:18:58 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Guido van Rossum.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
+ */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC)
+
+#ifndef _GLOB_H_
+#define _GLOB_H_
+
+struct stat;
+typedef struct {
+ int gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */
+ int gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */
+ int gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */
+ int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */
+ char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */
+ /* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */
+ int (*gl_errfunc) __P((const char *, int));
+
+ /*
+ * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement
+ * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2)
+ * and lstat(2).
+ */
+ void (*gl_closedir) __P((void *));
+ struct dirent *(*gl_readdir) __P((void *));
+ void *(*gl_opendir) __P((const char *));
+ int (*gl_lstat) __P((const char *, struct stat *));
+ int (*gl_stat) __P((const char *, struct stat *));
+} glob_t;
+
+/* Flags */
+#define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */
+#define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */
+#define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */
+#define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */
+#define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */
+#define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */
+
+#define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */
+#define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */
+#define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */
+#define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */
+#define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */
+#define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */
+#define GLOB_NOESCAPE 0x1000 /* Disable backslash escaping. */
+#define GLOB_LIMIT 0x2000 /* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */
+
+/* Error values returned by glob(3) */
+#define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */
+#define GLOB_ABORTED (-2) /* Unignored error. */
+#define GLOB_NOMATCH (-3) /* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */
+#define GLOB_NOSYS (-4) /* Function not supported. */
+#define GLOB_ABEND GLOB_ABORTED
+
+int glob __P((const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *));
+void globfree __P((glob_t *));
+
+#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
+ !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC */
+
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.6 1999/05/03 22:31:14 yanick Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * ++Copyright++ 1983, 1990, 1993
+ * -
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * -
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, and that
+ * the name of Digital Equipment Corporation not be used in advertising or
+ * publicity pertaining to distribution of the document or software without
+ * specific, written prior permission.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. DISCLAIMS ALL
+ * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL DIGITAL EQUIPMENT
+ * CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ * -
+ * --Copyright--
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON)
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+#if 0
+static char sccsid[] = "@(#)inet_addr.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/17/93";
+static char rcsid[] = "$From: inet_addr.c,v 8.5 1996/08/05 08:31:35 vixie Exp $";
+#else
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.6 1999/05/03 22:31:14 yanick Exp $";
+#endif
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#if 0
+/*
+ * Ascii internet address interpretation routine.
+ * The value returned is in network order.
+ */
+in_addr_t
+inet_addr(cp)
+ register const char *cp;
+{
+ struct in_addr val;
+
+ if (inet_aton(cp, &val))
+ return (val.s_addr);
+ return (INADDR_NONE);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation
+ * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address.
+ * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not.
+ * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which
+ * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address.
+ */
+int
+inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr)
+{
+ register u_int32_t val;
+ register int base, n;
+ register char c;
+ unsigned int parts[4];
+ register unsigned int *pp = parts;
+
+ c = *cp;
+ for (;;) {
+ /*
+ * Collect number up to ``.''.
+ * Values are specified as for C:
+ * 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal.
+ */
+ if (!isdigit(c))
+ return (0);
+ val = 0; base = 10;
+ if (c == '0') {
+ c = *++cp;
+ if (c == 'x' || c == 'X')
+ base = 16, c = *++cp;
+ else
+ base = 8;
+ }
+ for (;;) {
+ if (isascii(c) && isdigit(c)) {
+ val = (val * base) + (c - '0');
+ c = *++cp;
+ } else if (base == 16 && isascii(c) && isxdigit(c)) {
+ val = (val << 4) |
+ (c + 10 - (islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A'));
+ c = *++cp;
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
+ if (c == '.') {
+ /*
+ * Internet format:
+ * a.b.c.d
+ * a.b.c (with c treated as 16 bits)
+ * a.b (with b treated as 24 bits)
+ */
+ if (pp >= parts + 3)
+ return (0);
+ *pp++ = val;
+ c = *++cp;
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check for trailing characters.
+ */
+ if (c != '\0' && (!isascii(c) || !isspace(c)))
+ return (0);
+ /*
+ * Concoct the address according to
+ * the number of parts specified.
+ */
+ n = pp - parts + 1;
+ switch (n) {
+
+ case 0:
+ return (0); /* initial nondigit */
+
+ case 1: /* a -- 32 bits */
+ break;
+
+ case 2: /* a.b -- 8.24 bits */
+ if ((val > 0xffffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff))
+ return (0);
+ val |= parts[0] << 24;
+ break;
+
+ case 3: /* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */
+ if ((val > 0xffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff))
+ return (0);
+ val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16);
+ break;
+
+ case 4: /* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */
+ if ((val > 0xff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff))
+ return (0);
+ val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (addr)
+ addr->s_addr = htonl(val);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_INET_ATON_H
+#define _BSD_INET_ATON_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
+int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr);
+#endif /* HAVE_INET_ATON */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_INET_ATON_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_ntoa.c,v 1.2 1996/08/19 08:29:16 tholo Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+/*
+ * Convert network-format internet address
+ * to base 256 d.d.d.d representation.
+ */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "inet_ntoa.h"
+
+char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in)
+{
+ static char b[18];
+ register char *p;
+
+ p = (char *)∈
+#define UC(b) (((int)b)&0xff)
+ (void)snprintf(b, sizeof(b),
+ "%d.%d.%d.%d", UC(p[0]), UC(p[1]), UC(p[2]), UC(p[3]));
+ return (b);
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_INET_NTOA_H
+#define _BSD_INET_NTOA_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
+char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in);
+#endif /* defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_INET_NTOA_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.1 1997/03/13 19:07:32 downsj Exp $ */
+
+/* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+#if 0
+static char rcsid[] = "$From: inet_ntop.c,v 8.7 1996/08/05 08:41:18 vixie Exp $";
+#else
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.1 1997/03/13 19:07:32 downsj Exp $";
+#endif
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h"
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifndef IN6ADDRSZ
+#define IN6ADDRSZ 16 /* IPv6 T_AAAA */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INT16SZ
+#define INT16SZ 2 /* for systems without 16-bit ints */
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * WARNING: Don't even consider trying to compile this on a system where
+ * sizeof(int) < 4. sizeof(int) > 4 is fine; all the world's not a VAX.
+ */
+
+static const char *inet_ntop4 __P((const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size));
+static const char *inet_ntop6 __P((const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size));
+
+/* char *
+ * inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size)
+ * convert a network format address to presentation format.
+ * return:
+ * pointer to presentation format address (`dst'), or NULL (see errno).
+ * author:
+ * Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+const char *
+inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size)
+ int af;
+ const void *src;
+ char *dst;
+ size_t size;
+{
+ switch (af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ return (inet_ntop4(src, dst, size));
+ case AF_INET6:
+ return (inet_ntop6(src, dst, size));
+ default:
+ errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/* const char *
+ * inet_ntop4(src, dst, size)
+ * format an IPv4 address, more or less like inet_ntoa()
+ * return:
+ * `dst' (as a const)
+ * notes:
+ * (1) uses no statics
+ * (2) takes a u_char* not an in_addr as input
+ * author:
+ * Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+static const char *
+inet_ntop4(src, dst, size)
+ const u_char *src;
+ char *dst;
+ size_t size;
+{
+ static const char fmt[] = "%u.%u.%u.%u";
+ char tmp[sizeof "255.255.255.255"];
+
+ if (snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), fmt, src[0], src[1], src[2],
+ src[3]) > size) {
+ errno = ENOSPC;
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ strcpy(dst, tmp);
+ return (dst);
+}
+
+/* const char *
+ * inet_ntop6(src, dst, size)
+ * convert IPv6 binary address into presentation (printable) format
+ * author:
+ * Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+static const char *
+inet_ntop6(src, dst, size)
+ const u_char *src;
+ char *dst;
+ size_t size;
+{
+ /*
+ * Note that int32_t and int16_t need only be "at least" large enough
+ * to contain a value of the specified size. On some systems, like
+ * Crays, there is no such thing as an integer variable with 16 bits.
+ * Keep this in mind if you think this function should have been coded
+ * to use pointer overlays. All the world's not a VAX.
+ */
+ char tmp[sizeof "ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:255.255.255.255"], *tp;
+ struct { int base, len; } best, cur;
+ u_int words[IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ];
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Preprocess:
+ * Copy the input (bytewise) array into a wordwise array.
+ * Find the longest run of 0x00's in src[] for :: shorthanding.
+ */
+ memset(words, '\0', sizeof words);
+ for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++)
+ words[i / 2] |= (src[i] << ((1 - (i % 2)) << 3));
+ best.base = -1;
+ cur.base = -1;
+ for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ); i++) {
+ if (words[i] == 0) {
+ if (cur.base == -1)
+ cur.base = i, cur.len = 1;
+ else
+ cur.len++;
+ } else {
+ if (cur.base != -1) {
+ if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len)
+ best = cur;
+ cur.base = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (cur.base != -1) {
+ if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len)
+ best = cur;
+ }
+ if (best.base != -1 && best.len < 2)
+ best.base = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Format the result.
+ */
+ tp = tmp;
+ for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ); i++) {
+ /* Are we inside the best run of 0x00's? */
+ if (best.base != -1 && i >= best.base &&
+ i < (best.base + best.len)) {
+ if (i == best.base)
+ *tp++ = ':';
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Are we following an initial run of 0x00s or any real hex? */
+ if (i != 0)
+ *tp++ = ':';
+ /* Is this address an encapsulated IPv4? */
+ if (i == 6 && best.base == 0 &&
+ (best.len == 6 || (best.len == 5 && words[5] == 0xffff))) {
+ if (!inet_ntop4(src+12, tp, sizeof tmp - (tp - tmp)))
+ return (NULL);
+ tp += strlen(tp);
+ break;
+ }
+ snprintf(tp, sizeof(tmp - (tp - tmp)), "%x", words[i]);
+ tp += strlen(tp);
+ }
+ /* Was it a trailing run of 0x00's? */
+ if (best.base != -1 && (best.base + best.len) == (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ))
+ *tp++ = ':';
+ *tp++ = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * Check for overflow, copy, and we're done.
+ */
+ if ((size_t)(tp - tmp) > size) {
+ errno = ENOSPC;
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ strcpy(dst, tmp);
+ return (dst);
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_INET_NTOP */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_INET_NTOP_H
+#define _BSD_INET_NTOP_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+const char *
+inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, size_t size);
+#endif /* !HAVE_INET_NTOP */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_INET_NTOP_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* THIS FILE HAS BEEN MODIFIED FROM THE ORIGINAL OPENBSD SOURCE */
+/* Changes: Removed mktemp */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1987, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MKDTEMP
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.13 1998/06/30 23:03:13 deraadt Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+#define open binary_open
+extern int binary_open();
+#endif
+
+static int _gettemp(char *, int *, int, int);
+
+int
+mkstemps(path, slen)
+ char *path;
+ int slen;
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ return (_gettemp(path, &fd, 0, slen) ? fd : -1);
+}
+
+int
+mkstemp(path)
+ char *path;
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ return (_gettemp(path, &fd, 0, 0) ? fd : -1);
+}
+
+char *
+mkdtemp(path)
+ char *path;
+{
+ return(_gettemp(path, (int *)NULL, 1, 0) ? path : (char *)NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+_gettemp(path, doopen, domkdir, slen)
+ char *path;
+ register int *doopen;
+ int domkdir;
+ int slen;
+{
+ register char *start, *trv, *suffp;
+ struct stat sbuf;
+ int pid, rval;
+
+ if (doopen && domkdir) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ for (trv = path; *trv; ++trv)
+ ;
+ trv -= slen;
+ suffp = trv;
+ --trv;
+ if (trv < path) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ pid = getpid();
+ while (*trv == 'X' && pid != 0) {
+ *trv-- = (pid % 10) + '0';
+ pid /= 10;
+ }
+ while (*trv == 'X') {
+ char c;
+
+ pid = (arc4random() & 0xffff) % (26+26);
+ if (pid < 26)
+ c = pid + 'A';
+ else
+ c = (pid - 26) + 'a';
+ *trv-- = c;
+ }
+ start = trv + 1;
+
+ /*
+ * check the target directory; if you have six X's and it
+ * doesn't exist this runs for a *very* long time.
+ */
+ if (doopen || domkdir) {
+ for (;; --trv) {
+ if (trv <= path)
+ break;
+ if (*trv == '/') {
+ *trv = '\0';
+ rval = stat(path, &sbuf);
+ *trv = '/';
+ if (rval != 0)
+ return(0);
+ if (!S_ISDIR(sbuf.st_mode)) {
+ errno = ENOTDIR;
+ return(0);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (doopen) {
+ if ((*doopen =
+ open(path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, 0600)) >= 0)
+ return(1);
+ if (errno != EEXIST)
+ return(0);
+ } else if (domkdir) {
+ if (mkdir(path, 0700) == 0)
+ return(1);
+ if (errno != EEXIST)
+ return(0);
+ } else if (lstat(path, &sbuf))
+ return(errno == ENOENT ? 1 : 0);
+
+ /* tricky little algorithm for backward compatibility */
+ for (trv = start;;) {
+ if (!*trv)
+ return (0);
+ if (*trv == 'Z') {
+ if (trv == suffp)
+ return (0);
+ *trv++ = 'a';
+ } else {
+ if (isdigit(*trv))
+ *trv = 'a';
+ else if (*trv == 'z') /* inc from z to A */
+ *trv = 'A';
+ else {
+ if (trv == suffp)
+ return (0);
+ ++*trv;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*NOTREACHED*/
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_MKDTEMP */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_MKTEMP_H
+#define _BSD_MKTEMP_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_MKDTEMP
+int mkstemps(char *path, int slen);
+int mkstemp(char *path);
+char *mkdtemp(char *path);
+#endif /* !HAVE_MKDTEMP */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_MKTEMP_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _OPENBSD_H
+#define _OPENBSD_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+/* OpenBSD function replacements */
+#include "bindresvport.h"
+#include "getcwd.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+#include "rresvport.h"
+#include "strlcpy.h"
+#include "strlcat.h"
+#include "strmode.h"
+#include "mktemp.h"
+#include "daemon.h"
+#include "dirname.h"
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "sigact.h"
+#include "inet_ntoa.h"
+#include "inet_ntop.h"
+#include "strsep.h"
+#include "setproctitle.h"
+#include "getgrouplist.h"
+#include "glob.h"
+#include "readpassphrase.h"
+#include "getopt.h"
+
+/* Home grown routines */
+#include "bsd-arc4random.h"
+#include "bsd-misc.h"
+#include "bsd-snprintf.h"
+#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
+
+/* rfc2553 socket API replacements */
+#include "fake-getaddrinfo.h"
+#include "fake-getnameinfo.h"
+#include "fake-socket.h"
+
+/* Routines for a single OS platform */
+#include "bsd-cray.h"
+
+#endif /* _OPENBSD_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
+ * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.5 2001/06/27 13:23:30 djm Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <readpassphrase.h>
+
+#ifdef TCSASOFT
+# define _T_FLUSH (TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT)
+#else
+# define _T_FLUSH (TCSAFLUSH)
+#endif
+
+/* SunOS 4.x which lacks _POSIX_VDISABLE, but has VDISABLE */
+#if !defined(_POSIX_VDISABLE) && defined(VDISABLE)
+# define _POSIX_VDISABLE VDISABLE
+#endif
+
+char *
+readpassphrase(prompt, buf, bufsiz, flags)
+ const char *prompt;
+ char *buf;
+ size_t bufsiz;
+ int flags;
+{
+ struct termios term;
+ char ch, *p, *end;
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+ u_char status;
+#endif
+ int echo, input, output;
+ sigset_t oset, nset;
+
+ /* I suppose we could alloc on demand in this case (XXX). */
+ if (bufsiz == 0) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Read and write to /dev/tty if available. If not, read from
+ * stdin and write to stderr unless a tty is required.
+ */
+ if ((input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ if (flags & RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) {
+ errno = ENOTTY;
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ input = STDIN_FILENO;
+ output = STDERR_FILENO;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We block SIGINT and SIGTSTP so the terminal is not left
+ * in an inconsistent state (ie: no echo). It would probably
+ * be better to simply catch these though.
+ */
+ sigemptyset(&nset);
+ sigaddset(&nset, SIGINT);
+ sigaddset(&nset, SIGTSTP);
+ (void)sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
+
+ /* Turn off echo if possible. */
+ echo = 0;
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+ status = _POSIX_VDISABLE;
+#endif
+ if (tcgetattr(input, &term) == 0) {
+ if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON) && (term.c_lflag & ECHO)) {
+ echo = 1;
+ term.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
+ }
+#ifdef VSTATUS
+ if (term.c_cc[VSTATUS] != _POSIX_VDISABLE) {
+ status = term.c_cc[VSTATUS];
+ term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = _POSIX_VDISABLE;
+ }
+#endif
+ (void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term);
+ }
+ if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON)) {
+ if (tcgetattr(input, &term) == 0 && (term.c_lflag & ECHO)) {
+ echo = 1;
+ term.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
+ (void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term);
+ }
+ }
+
+ (void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt));
+ end = buf + bufsiz - 1;
+ for (p = buf; read(input, &ch, 1) == 1 && ch != '\n' && ch != '\r';) {
+ if (p < end) {
+ if ((flags & RPP_SEVENBIT))
+ ch &= 0x7f;
+ if (isalpha(ch)) {
+ if ((flags & RPP_FORCELOWER))
+ ch = tolower(ch);
+ if ((flags & RPP_FORCEUPPER))
+ ch = toupper(ch);
+ }
+ *p++ = ch;
+ }
+ }
+ *p = '\0';
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+ if (echo || status != _POSIX_VDISABLE) {
+#else
+ if (echo) {
+#endif
+ if (echo) {
+ (void)write(output, "\n", 1);
+ term.c_lflag |= ECHO;
+ }
+#ifdef VSTATUS
+ if (status != _POSIX_VDISABLE)
+ term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = status;
+#endif
+ (void)tcsetattr(input, _T_FLUSH, &term);
+ }
+ (void)sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+ if (input != STDIN_FILENO)
+ (void)close(input);
+ return(buf);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
+
+#if 0
+char *
+getpass(prompt)
+ const char *prompt;
+{
+ static char buf[_PASSWORD_LEN + 1];
+
+ return(readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof(buf), RPP_ECHO_OFF));
+}
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.h,v 1.1 2000/11/21 00:48:38 millert Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
+ * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _READPASSPHRASE_H_
+#define _READPASSPHRASE_H_
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+#define RPP_ECHO_OFF 0x00 /* Turn off echo (default). */
+#define RPP_ECHO_ON 0x01 /* Leave echo on. */
+#define RPP_REQUIRE_TTY 0x02 /* Fail if there is no tty. */
+#define RPP_FORCELOWER 0x04 /* Force input to lower case. */
+#define RPP_FORCEUPPER 0x08 /* Force input to upper case. */
+#define RPP_SEVENBIT 0x10 /* Strip the high bit from input. */
+
+char *readpassphrase(const char *, char *, size_t, int);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
+
+#endif /* !_READPASSPHRASE_H_ */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1994
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Jan-Simon Pendry.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.5 2001/06/27 00:58:56 lebel Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/*
+ * MAXSYMLINKS
+ */
+#ifndef MAXSYMLINKS
+#define MAXSYMLINKS 5
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN]);
+ *
+ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
+ * components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
+ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
+ */
+char *
+realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+ int fd, n, rootd, serrno = 0;
+ char *p, *q, wbuf[MAXPATHLEN], start[MAXPATHLEN];
+ int symlinks = 0;
+
+ /* Save the starting point. */
+ getcwd(start,MAXPATHLEN);
+ if ((fd = open(".", O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ (void)strcpy(resolved, ".");
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Find the dirname and basename from the path to be resolved.
+ * Change directory to the dirname component.
+ * lstat the basename part.
+ * if it is a symlink, read in the value and loop.
+ * if it is a directory, then change to that directory.
+ * get the current directory name and append the basename.
+ */
+ strlcpy(resolved, path, MAXPATHLEN);
+loop:
+ q = strrchr(resolved, '/');
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ p = q + 1;
+ if (q == resolved)
+ q = "/";
+ else {
+ do {
+ --q;
+ } while (q > resolved && *q == '/');
+ q[1] = '\0';
+ q = resolved;
+ }
+ if (chdir(q) < 0)
+ goto err1;
+ } else
+ p = resolved;
+
+ /* Deal with the last component. */
+ if (lstat(p, &sb) == 0) {
+ if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
+ if (++symlinks > MAXSYMLINKS) {
+ serrno = ELOOP;
+ goto err1;
+ }
+ n = readlink(p, resolved, MAXPATHLEN-1);
+ if (n < 0)
+ goto err1;
+ resolved[n] = '\0';
+ goto loop;
+ }
+ if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
+ if (chdir(p) < 0)
+ goto err1;
+ p = "";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Save the last component name and get the full pathname of
+ * the current directory.
+ */
+ (void)strcpy(wbuf, p);
+ if (getcwd(resolved, MAXPATHLEN) == 0)
+ goto err1;
+
+ /*
+ * Join the two strings together, ensuring that the right thing
+ * happens if the last component is empty, or the dirname is root.
+ */
+ if (resolved[0] == '/' && resolved[1] == '\0')
+ rootd = 1;
+ else
+ rootd = 0;
+
+ if (*wbuf) {
+ if (strlen(resolved) + strlen(wbuf) + rootd + 1 > MAXPATHLEN) {
+ serrno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ goto err1;
+ }
+ if (rootd == 0)
+ (void)strcat(resolved, "/");
+ (void)strcat(resolved, wbuf);
+ }
+
+ /* Go back to where we came from. */
+ if (chdir(start) < 0) {
+ serrno = errno;
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ return (resolved);
+
+err1: chdir(start);
+err2: errno = serrno;
+ return (NULL);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_REALPATH_H
+#define _BSD_REALPATH_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH)
+
+char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */
+#endif /* _BSD_REALPATH_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1998 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * This product includes software developed by Theo de Raadt.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: rresvport.c,v 1.5 2000/01/26 03:43:20 deraadt Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if 0
+int
+rresvport(alport)
+ int *alport;
+{
+ return rresvport_af(alport, AF_INET);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+ struct sockaddr *sa;
+ u_int16_t *portp;
+ int s;
+ socklen_t salen;
+
+ memset(&ss, '\0', sizeof ss);
+ sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
+
+ switch (af) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ portp = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_port;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+ portp = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_port;
+ break;
+ default:
+ errno = EPFNOSUPPORT;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ sa->sa_family = af;
+
+ s = socket(af, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (s < 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ *portp = htons(*alport);
+ if (*alport < IPPORT_RESERVED - 1) {
+ if (bind(s, sa, salen) >= 0)
+ return (s);
+ if (errno != EADDRINUSE) {
+ (void)close(s);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ *portp = 0;
+ sa->sa_family = af;
+ if (bindresvport_sa(s, sa) == -1) {
+ (void)close(s);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ *alport = ntohs(*portp);
+ return (s);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_RRESVPORT_H
+#define _BSD_RRESVPORT_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af);
+#endif /* !HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_RRESVPORT_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1987 Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: setenv.c,v 1.3 1998/02/02 22:44:53 millert Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * __findenv --
+ * Returns pointer to value associated with name, if any, else NULL.
+ * Sets offset to be the offset of the name/value combination in the
+ * environmental array, for use by setenv(3) and unsetenv(3).
+ * Explicitly removes '=' in argument name.
+ *
+ * This routine *should* be a static; don't use it.
+ */
+char *
+__findenv(name, offset)
+ register const char *name;
+ int *offset;
+{
+ extern char **environ;
+ register int len, i;
+ register const char *np;
+ register char **p, *cp;
+
+ if (name == NULL || environ == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np)
+ ;
+ len = np - name;
+ for (p = environ; (cp = *p) != NULL; ++p) {
+ for (np = name, i = len; i && *cp; i--)
+ if (*cp++ != *np++)
+ break;
+ if (i == 0 && *cp++ == '=') {
+ *offset = p - environ;
+ return (cp);
+ }
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * setenv --
+ * Set the value of the environmental variable "name" to be
+ * "value". If rewrite is set, replace any current value.
+ */
+int
+setenv(name, value, rewrite)
+ register const char *name;
+ register const char *value;
+ int rewrite;
+{
+ extern char **environ;
+ static int alloced; /* if allocated space before */
+ register char *C;
+ int l_value, offset;
+ char *__findenv();
+
+ if (*value == '=') /* no `=' in value */
+ ++value;
+ l_value = strlen(value);
+ if ((C = __findenv(name, &offset))) { /* find if already exists */
+ if (!rewrite)
+ return (0);
+ if (strlen(C) >= l_value) { /* old larger; copy over */
+ while ((*C++ = *value++));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ } else { /* create new slot */
+ register int cnt;
+ register char **P;
+
+ for (P = environ, cnt = 0; *P; ++P, ++cnt);
+ if (alloced) { /* just increase size */
+ P = (char **)realloc((void *)environ,
+ (size_t)(sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2)));
+ if (!P)
+ return (-1);
+ environ = P;
+ }
+ else { /* get new space */
+ alloced = 1; /* copy old entries into it */
+ P = (char **)malloc((size_t)(sizeof(char *) *
+ (cnt + 2)));
+ if (!P)
+ return (-1);
+ memmove(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *));
+ environ = P;
+ }
+ environ[cnt + 1] = NULL;
+ offset = cnt;
+ }
+ for (C = (char *)name; *C && *C != '='; ++C); /* no `=' in name */
+ if (!(environ[offset] = /* name + `=' + value */
+ malloc((size_t)((int)(C - name) + l_value + 2))))
+ return (-1);
+ for (C = environ[offset]; (*C = *name++) && *C != '='; ++C)
+ ;
+ for (*C++ = '='; (*C++ = *value++); )
+ ;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * unsetenv(name) --
+ * Delete environmental variable "name".
+ */
+void
+unsetenv(name)
+ const char *name;
+{
+ extern char **environ;
+ register char **P;
+ int offset;
+ char *__findenv();
+
+ while (__findenv(name, &offset)) /* if set multiple times */
+ for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P)
+ if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
+ break;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SETENV */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_SETENV_H
+#define _BSD_SETENV_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+
+int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite);
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_SETENV_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Modified for OpenSSH by Kevin Steves
+ * October 2000
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1994, 1995 Christopher G. Demetriou
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by Christopher G. Demetriou
+ * for the NetBSD Project.
+ * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: setproctitle.c,v 1.7 1999/02/25 22:10:12 art Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+
+#define SPT_NONE 0
+#define SPT_PSTAT 1
+
+#ifndef SPT_TYPE
+#define SPT_TYPE SPT_NONE
+#endif
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/pstat.h>
+#endif /* SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT */
+
+#define MAX_PROCTITLE 2048
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/*
+ * Set Process Title (SPT) defines. Modeled after sendmail's
+ * SPT type definition strategy.
+ *
+ * SPT_TYPE:
+ *
+ * SPT_NONE: Don't set the process title. Default.
+ * SPT_PSTAT: Use pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD). HP-UX specific.
+ */
+
+void
+setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+#if SPT_TYPE != SPT_NONE
+ va_list ap;
+
+ char buf[MAX_PROCTITLE];
+ size_t used;
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
+ union pstun pst;
+#endif /* SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT */
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ if (fmt != NULL) {
+ used = snprintf(buf, MAX_PROCTITLE, "%s: ", __progname);
+ if (used >= MAX_PROCTITLE)
+ used = MAX_PROCTITLE - 1;
+ (void)vsnprintf(buf + used, MAX_PROCTITLE - used, fmt, ap);
+ } else
+ (void)snprintf(buf, MAX_PROCTITLE, "%s", __progname);
+ va_end(ap);
+ used = strlen(buf);
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
+ pst.pst_command = buf;
+ pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, pst, used, 0, 0);
+#endif /* SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT */
+
+#endif /* SPT_TYPE != SPT_NONE */
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_SETPROCTITLE_H
+#define _BSD_SETPROCTITLE_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _BSD_SETPROCTITLE_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sigaction.c,v 1.3 1999/06/27 08:14:21 millert Exp $ */
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. *
+ * *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a *
+ * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the *
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including *
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, *
+ * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell *
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is *
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: *
+ * *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included *
+ * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. *
+ * *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS *
+ * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF *
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, *
+ * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR *
+ * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR *
+ * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. *
+ * *
+ * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright *
+ * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the *
+ * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written *
+ * authorization. *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ * Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim <zmbenhal@netcom.com> 1992,1995 *
+ * and: Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com> *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include <signal.h>
+#include "sigact.h"
+
+/* This file provides sigaction() emulation using sigvec() */
+/* Use only if this is non POSIX system */
+
+#if !HAVE_SIGACTION && HAVE_SIGVEC
+
+int
+sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact)
+{
+ return sigvec(sig, &(sigact->sv), &(osigact->sv));
+}
+
+int
+sigemptyset (sigset_t * mask)
+{
+ *mask = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigprocmask (int mode, sigset_t * mask, sigset_t * omask)
+{
+ sigset_t current = sigsetmask(0);
+
+ if (omask) *omask = current;
+
+ if (mode==SIG_BLOCK)
+ current |= *mask;
+ else if (mode==SIG_UNBLOCK)
+ current &= ~*mask;
+ else if (mode==SIG_SETMASK)
+ current = *mask;
+
+ sigsetmask(current);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigsuspend (sigset_t * mask)
+{
+ return sigpause(*mask);
+}
+
+int
+sigdelset (sigset_t * mask, int sig)
+{
+ *mask &= ~sigmask(sig);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigaddset (sigset_t * mask, int sig)
+{
+ *mask |= sigmask(sig);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigismember (sigset_t * mask, int sig)
+{
+ return (*mask & sigmask(sig)) != 0;
+}
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: SigAction.h,v 1.2 1999/06/27 08:15:19 millert Exp $ */
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. *
+ * *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a *
+ * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the *
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including *
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, *
+ * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell *
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is *
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: *
+ * *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included *
+ * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. *
+ * *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS *
+ * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF *
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, *
+ * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR *
+ * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR *
+ * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. *
+ * *
+ * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright *
+ * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the *
+ * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written *
+ * authorization. *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ * Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim <zmbenhal@netcom.com> 1992,1995 *
+ * and: Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com> *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * $From: SigAction.h,v 1.5 1999/06/19 23:00:54 tom Exp $
+ *
+ * This file exists to handle non-POSIX systems which don't have <unistd.h>,
+ * and usually no sigaction() nor <termios.h>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SIGACTION_H
+#define _SIGACTION_H
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC)
+
+#undef SIG_BLOCK
+#define SIG_BLOCK 00
+
+#undef SIG_UNBLOCK
+#define SIG_UNBLOCK 01
+
+#undef SIG_SETMASK
+#define SIG_SETMASK 02
+
+/*
+ * <bsd/signal.h> is in the Linux 1.2.8 + gcc 2.7.0 configuration,
+ * and is useful for testing this header file.
+ */
+#if HAVE_BSD_SIGNAL_H
+# include <bsd/signal.h>
+#endif
+
+struct sigaction
+{
+ struct sigvec sv;
+};
+
+typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+
+#undef sa_mask
+#define sa_mask sv.sv_mask
+#undef sa_handler
+#define sa_handler sv.sv_handler
+#undef sa_flags
+#define sa_flags sv.sv_flags
+
+int sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact);
+int sigprocmask (int how, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask);
+int sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask);
+int sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask);
+int sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig);
+int sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SIGACTION_H) */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: strlcat.c,v 1.8 2001/05/13 15:40:15 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
+ * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: strlcat.c,v 1.8 2001/05/13 15:40:15 deraadt Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "strlcat.h"
+
+/*
+ * Appends src to string dst of size siz (unlike strncat, siz is the
+ * full size of dst, not space left). At most siz-1 characters
+ * will be copied. Always NUL terminates (unless siz <= strlen(dst)).
+ * Returns strlen(src) + MIN(siz, strlen(initial dst)).
+ * If retval >= siz, truncation occurred.
+ */
+size_t
+strlcat(dst, src, siz)
+ char *dst;
+ const char *src;
+ size_t siz;
+{
+ register char *d = dst;
+ register const char *s = src;
+ register size_t n = siz;
+ size_t dlen;
+
+ /* Find the end of dst and adjust bytes left but don't go past end */
+ while (n-- != 0 && *d != '\0')
+ d++;
+ dlen = d - dst;
+ n = siz - dlen;
+
+ if (n == 0)
+ return(dlen + strlen(s));
+ while (*s != '\0') {
+ if (n != 1) {
+ *d++ = *s;
+ n--;
+ }
+ s++;
+ }
+ *d = '\0';
+
+ return(dlen + (s - src)); /* count does not include NUL */
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCAT */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_STRLCAT_H
+#define _BSD_STRLCAT_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
+#include <sys/types.h>
+size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCAT */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_STRLCAT_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: strlcpy.c,v 1.5 2001/05/13 15:40:16 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
+ * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: strlcpy.c,v 1.5 2001/05/13 15:40:16 deraadt Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "strlcpy.h"
+
+/*
+ * Copy src to string dst of size siz. At most siz-1 characters
+ * will be copied. Always NUL terminates (unless siz == 0).
+ * Returns strlen(src); if retval >= siz, truncation occurred.
+ */
+size_t
+strlcpy(dst, src, siz)
+ char *dst;
+ const char *src;
+ size_t siz;
+{
+ register char *d = dst;
+ register const char *s = src;
+ register size_t n = siz;
+
+ /* Copy as many bytes as will fit */
+ if (n != 0 && --n != 0) {
+ do {
+ if ((*d++ = *s++) == 0)
+ break;
+ } while (--n != 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Not enough room in dst, add NUL and traverse rest of src */
+ if (n == 0) {
+ if (siz != 0)
+ *d = '\0'; /* NUL-terminate dst */
+ while (*s++)
+ ;
+ }
+
+ return(s - src - 1); /* count does not include NUL */
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCPY */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_STRLCPY_H
+#define _BSD_STRLCPY_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
+#include <sys/types.h>
+size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCPY */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_STRLCPY_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: strmode.c,v 1.3 1997/06/13 13:57:20 deraadt Exp $";
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+void
+strmode(register mode_t mode, register char *p)
+{
+ /* print type */
+ switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case S_IFDIR: /* directory */
+ *p++ = 'd';
+ break;
+ case S_IFCHR: /* character special */
+ *p++ = 'c';
+ break;
+ case S_IFBLK: /* block special */
+ *p++ = 'b';
+ break;
+ case S_IFREG: /* regular */
+ *p++ = '-';
+ break;
+ case S_IFLNK: /* symbolic link */
+ *p++ = 'l';
+ break;
+#ifdef S_IFSOCK
+ case S_IFSOCK: /* socket */
+ *p++ = 's';
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef S_IFIFO
+ case S_IFIFO: /* fifo */
+ *p++ = 'p';
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef S_IFWHT
+ case S_IFWHT: /* whiteout */
+ *p++ = 'w';
+ break;
+#endif
+ default: /* unknown */
+ *p++ = '?';
+ break;
+ }
+ /* usr */
+ if (mode & S_IRUSR)
+ *p++ = 'r';
+ else
+ *p++ = '-';
+ if (mode & S_IWUSR)
+ *p++ = 'w';
+ else
+ *p++ = '-';
+ switch (mode & (S_IXUSR | S_ISUID)) {
+ case 0:
+ *p++ = '-';
+ break;
+ case S_IXUSR:
+ *p++ = 'x';
+ break;
+ case S_ISUID:
+ *p++ = 'S';
+ break;
+ case S_IXUSR | S_ISUID:
+ *p++ = 's';
+ break;
+ }
+ /* group */
+ if (mode & S_IRGRP)
+ *p++ = 'r';
+ else
+ *p++ = '-';
+ if (mode & S_IWGRP)
+ *p++ = 'w';
+ else
+ *p++ = '-';
+ switch (mode & (S_IXGRP | S_ISGID)) {
+ case 0:
+ *p++ = '-';
+ break;
+ case S_IXGRP:
+ *p++ = 'x';
+ break;
+ case S_ISGID:
+ *p++ = 'S';
+ break;
+ case S_IXGRP | S_ISGID:
+ *p++ = 's';
+ break;
+ }
+ /* other */
+ if (mode & S_IROTH)
+ *p++ = 'r';
+ else
+ *p++ = '-';
+ if (mode & S_IWOTH)
+ *p++ = 'w';
+ else
+ *p++ = '-';
+ switch (mode & (S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX)) {
+ case 0:
+ *p++ = '-';
+ break;
+ case S_IXOTH:
+ *p++ = 'x';
+ break;
+ case S_ISVTX:
+ *p++ = 'T';
+ break;
+ case S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX:
+ *p++ = 't';
+ break;
+ }
+ *p++ = ' '; /* will be a '+' if ACL's implemented */
+ *p = '\0';
+}
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
+
+void strmode(register mode_t mode, register char *p);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: strsep.c,v 1.3 1997/08/20 04:28:14 millert Exp $ */
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP)
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
+#if 0
+static char sccsid[] = "@(#)strsep.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93";
+#else
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: strsep.c,v 1.3 1997/08/20 04:28:14 millert Exp $";
+#endif
+#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
+
+/*
+ * Get next token from string *stringp, where tokens are possibly-empty
+ * strings separated by characters from delim.
+ *
+ * Writes NULs into the string at *stringp to end tokens.
+ * delim need not remain constant from call to call.
+ * On return, *stringp points past the last NUL written (if there might
+ * be further tokens), or is NULL (if there are definitely no more tokens).
+ *
+ * If *stringp is NULL, strsep returns NULL.
+ */
+char *
+strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim)
+{
+ register char *s;
+ register const char *spanp;
+ register int c, sc;
+ char *tok;
+
+ if ((s = *stringp) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ for (tok = s;;) {
+ c = *s++;
+ spanp = delim;
+ do {
+ if ((sc = *spanp++) == c) {
+ if (c == 0)
+ s = NULL;
+ else
+ s[-1] = 0;
+ *stringp = s;
+ return (tok);
+ }
+ } while (sc != 0);
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) */
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_STRSEP_H
+#define _BSD_STRSEP_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP
+char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim);
+#endif /* HAVE_STRSEP */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_STRSEP_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
+ * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.72 2001/11/10 13:37:20 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "crc32.h"
+#include "getput.h"
+
+#include "compress.h"
+#include "deattack.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+#define DBG(x) x
+#else
+#define DBG(x)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This variable contains the file descriptors used for communicating with
+ * the other side. connection_in is used for reading; connection_out for
+ * writing. These can be the same descriptor, in which case it is assumed to
+ * be a socket.
+ */
+static int connection_in = -1;
+static int connection_out = -1;
+
+/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
+static u_int remote_protocol_flags = 0;
+
+/* Encryption context for receiving data. This is only used for decryption. */
+static CipherContext receive_context;
+
+/* Encryption context for sending data. This is only used for encryption. */
+static CipherContext send_context;
+
+/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
+static Buffer input;
+
+/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
+static Buffer output;
+
+/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
+static Buffer outgoing_packet;
+
+/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
+static Buffer incoming_packet;
+
+/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
+static Buffer compression_buffer;
+static int compression_buffer_ready = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is enabled. */
+static int packet_compression = 0;
+
+/* default maximum packet size */
+int max_packet_size = 32768;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
+static int initialized = 0;
+
+/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
+static int interactive_mode = 0;
+
+/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
+Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+
+/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
+static u_char extra_pad = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until
+ * packet_set_encryption_key is called.
+ */
+void
+packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
+{
+ Cipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
+ if (none == NULL)
+ fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'");
+ connection_in = fd_in;
+ connection_out = fd_out;
+ cipher_init(&send_context, none, (u_char *) "", 0, NULL, 0);
+ cipher_init(&receive_context, none, (u_char *) "", 0, NULL, 0);
+ newkeys[MODE_IN] = newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+ if (!initialized) {
+ initialized = 1;
+ buffer_init(&input);
+ buffer_init(&output);
+ buffer_init(&outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_init(&incoming_packet);
+ }
+ /* Kludge: arrange the close function to be called from fatal(). */
+ fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
+
+int
+packet_connection_is_on_socket()
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
+ socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+
+ /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
+ if (connection_in == connection_out)
+ return 1;
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ tolen = sizeof(to);
+ memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
+ if (getpeername(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* returns 1 if connection is via ipv4 */
+
+int
+packet_connection_is_ipv4()
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage to;
+ socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
+
+ memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
+ if (getsockname(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (to.ss_family != AF_INET)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
+
+void
+packet_set_nonblocking()
+{
+ /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
+ if (fcntl(connection_in, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
+ error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (connection_out != connection_in) {
+ if (fcntl(connection_out, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
+ error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+}
+
+/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
+
+int
+packet_get_connection_in()
+{
+ return connection_in;
+}
+
+/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
+
+int
+packet_get_connection_out()
+{
+ return connection_out;
+}
+
+/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
+
+void
+packet_close()
+{
+ if (!initialized)
+ return;
+ initialized = 0;
+ if (connection_in == connection_out) {
+ shutdown(connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(connection_out);
+ } else {
+ close(connection_in);
+ close(connection_out);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&input);
+ buffer_free(&output);
+ buffer_free(&outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_free(&incoming_packet);
+ if (compression_buffer_ready) {
+ buffer_free(&compression_buffer);
+ buffer_compress_uninit();
+ }
+}
+
+/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
+
+void
+packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
+{
+ remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
+}
+
+/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
+
+u_int
+packet_get_protocol_flags()
+{
+ return remote_protocol_flags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
+ * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
+ */
+
+static void
+packet_init_compression(void)
+{
+ if (compression_buffer_ready == 1)
+ return;
+ compression_buffer_ready = 1;
+ buffer_init(&compression_buffer);
+}
+
+void
+packet_start_compression(int level)
+{
+ if (packet_compression && !compat20)
+ fatal("Compression already enabled.");
+ packet_compression = 1;
+ packet_init_compression();
+ buffer_compress_init_send(level);
+ buffer_compress_init_recv();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same
+ * key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are
+ * encrypted independently of each other.
+ */
+void
+packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen,
+ int number)
+{
+ Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: unknown cipher number %d", number);
+ if (keylen < 20)
+ fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too small: %d", keylen);
+ cipher_init(&receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0);
+ cipher_init(&send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/* Start constructing a packet to send. */
+void
+packet_start(u_char type)
+{
+ u_char buf[9];
+ int len;
+
+ DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
+ len = compat20 ? 6 : 9;
+ memset(buf, 0, len - 1);
+ buf[len - 1] = type;
+ buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+}
+
+/* Append payload. */
+void
+packet_put_char(int value)
+{
+ char ch = value;
+ buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
+}
+void
+packet_put_int(u_int value)
+{
+ buffer_put_int(&outgoing_packet, value);
+}
+void
+packet_put_string(const char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ buffer_put_string(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+}
+void
+packet_put_cstring(const char *str)
+{
+ buffer_put_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str);
+}
+void
+packet_put_raw(const char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+}
+void
+packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
+{
+ buffer_put_bignum(&outgoing_packet, value);
+}
+void
+packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
+{
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&outgoing_packet, value);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set,
+ * encrypts the packet before sending.
+ */
+
+static void
+packet_send1(void)
+{
+ char buf[8], *cp;
+ int i, padding, len;
+ u_int checksum;
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
+ * packet.
+ */
+ if (packet_compression) {
+ buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
+ /* Skip padding. */
+ buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8);
+ /* padding */
+ buffer_append(&compression_buffer, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8);
+ buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer);
+ buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+ }
+ /* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */
+ len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
+
+ /* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */
+ padding = 8 - len % 8;
+ if (send_context.cipher->number != SSH_CIPHER_NONE) {
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+ for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ cp[7 - i] = rand & 0xff;
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+ buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8 - padding);
+
+ /* Add check bytes. */
+ checksum = ssh_crc32((u_char *) buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
+ buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+ PUT_32BIT(buf, checksum);
+ buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: ");
+ buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet);
+#endif
+
+ /* Append to output. */
+ PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
+ buffer_append(&output, buf, 4);
+ buffer_append_space(&output, &cp, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+ cipher_encrypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
+ buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
+ buffer_dump(&output);
+#endif
+
+ buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
+
+ /*
+ * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won\'t be
+ * actually sent until packet_write_wait or packet_write_poll is
+ * called.
+ */
+}
+
+static void
+set_newkeys(int mode)
+{
+ Enc *enc;
+ Mac *mac;
+ Comp *comp;
+ CipherContext *cc;
+
+ debug("newkeys: mode %d", mode);
+
+ cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? &send_context : &receive_context;
+ if (newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
+ debug("newkeys: rekeying");
+ /* todo: free old keys, reset compression/cipher-ctxt; */
+ memset(cc, 0, sizeof(*cc));
+ enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
+ mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
+ comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
+ xfree(enc->name);
+ xfree(enc->iv);
+ xfree(enc->key);
+ xfree(mac->name);
+ xfree(mac->key);
+ xfree(comp->name);
+ xfree(newkeys[mode]);
+ }
+ newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
+ if (newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+ fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode);
+ enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
+ mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
+ comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ if (mac->md != NULL)
+ mac->enabled = 1;
+ DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
+ cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->cipher->key_len,
+ enc->iv, enc->cipher->block_size);
+ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->cipher->block_size);
+ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->cipher->key_len);
+ if (comp->type != 0 && comp->enabled == 0) {
+ packet_init_compression();
+ if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+ buffer_compress_init_send(6);
+ else
+ buffer_compress_init_recv();
+ comp->enabled = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
+ */
+static void
+packet_send2(void)
+{
+ static u_int32_t seqnr = 0;
+ u_char type, *ucp, *macbuf = NULL;
+ u_char padlen, pad;
+ char *cp;
+ u_int packet_length = 0;
+ u_int i, len;
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ Enc *enc = NULL;
+ Mac *mac = NULL;
+ Comp *comp = NULL;
+ int block_size;
+
+ if (newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
+ enc = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
+ mac = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
+ comp = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
+ }
+ block_size = enc ? enc->cipher->block_size : 8;
+
+ ucp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+ type = ucp[5];
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "plain: ");
+ buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet);
+#endif
+
+ if (comp && comp->enabled) {
+ len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
+ /* skip header, compress only payload */
+ buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 5);
+ buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
+ buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer);
+ buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5);
+ buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+ DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %d", len,
+ buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)));
+ }
+
+ /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
+ len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
+
+ /*
+ * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
+ * minimum padding is 4 bytes
+ */
+ padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
+ if (padlen < 4)
+ padlen += block_size;
+ if (extra_pad) {
+ /* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */
+ extra_pad = roundup(extra_pad, block_size);
+ pad = extra_pad - ((len + padlen) % extra_pad);
+ debug("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
+ pad, len, padlen, extra_pad);
+ padlen += pad;
+ extra_pad = 0;
+ }
+ buffer_append_space(&outgoing_packet, &cp, padlen);
+ if (enc && enc->cipher->number != SSH_CIPHER_NONE) {
+ /* random padding */
+ for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ cp[i] = rand & 0xff;
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* clear padding */
+ memset(cp, 0, padlen);
+ }
+ /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
+ packet_length = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) - 4;
+ ucp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+ PUT_32BIT(ucp, packet_length);
+ ucp[4] = padlen;
+ DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d)", packet_length+4, padlen));
+
+ /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
+ if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+ macbuf = mac_compute(mac, seqnr,
+ (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
+ buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+ DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", seqnr));
+ }
+ /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
+ buffer_append_space(&output, &cp, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+ cipher_encrypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
+ buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+ /* append unencrypted MAC */
+ if (mac && mac->enabled)
+ buffer_append(&output, (char *)macbuf, mac->mac_len);
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
+ buffer_dump(&output);
+#endif
+ /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+ if (++seqnr == 0)
+ log("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
+ buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
+
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
+}
+
+void
+packet_send()
+{
+ if (compat20)
+ packet_send2();
+ else
+ packet_send1();
+ DBG(debug("packet_send done"));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that
+ * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
+ * be used during the interactive session.
+ */
+
+int
+packet_read(int *payload_len_ptr)
+{
+ int type, len;
+ fd_set *setp;
+ char buf[8192];
+ DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
+
+ setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS) *
+ sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+ /* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+ type = packet_read_poll(payload_len_ptr);
+ if (!compat20 && (
+ type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
+ || type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE
+ || type == SSH_CMSG_EOF
+ || type == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION))
+ packet_integrity_check(*payload_len_ptr, 0, type);
+ /* If we got a packet, return it. */
+ if (type != SSH_MSG_NONE) {
+ xfree(setp);
+ return type;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
+ * buffer, and try again.
+ */
+ memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) *
+ sizeof(fd_mask));
+ FD_SET(connection_in, setp);
+
+ /* Wait for some data to arrive. */
+ while (select(connection_in + 1, setp, NULL, NULL, NULL) == -1 &&
+ (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+ ;
+
+ /* Read data from the socket. */
+ len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len == 0) {
+ log("Connection closed by %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ if (len < 0)
+ fatal("Read from socket failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ /* Append it to the buffer. */
+ packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
+ * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_read_expect(int *payload_len_ptr, int expected_type)
+{
+ int type;
+
+ type = packet_read(payload_len_ptr);
+ if (type != expected_type)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
+ expected_type, type);
+}
+
+/* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via
+ * packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns
+ * SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection.
+ *
+ * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also,
+ * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned
+ * to higher levels.
+ *
+ * The returned payload_len does include space consumed by:
+ * Packet length
+ * Padding
+ * Packet type
+ * Check bytes
+ */
+
+static int
+packet_read_poll1(int *payload_len_ptr)
+{
+ u_int len, padded_len;
+ u_char *ucp, type;
+ char *cp;
+ u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
+
+ /* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
+ if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + 8)
+ return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+ /* Get length of incoming packet. */
+ ucp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&input);
+ len = GET_32BIT(ucp);
+ if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
+ packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %d.", len);
+ padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
+
+ /* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
+ if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + padded_len)
+ return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+
+ /* The entire packet is in buffer. */
+
+ /* Consume packet length. */
+ buffer_consume(&input, 4);
+
+ /*
+ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
+ * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
+ * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
+ */
+ if (receive_context.cipher->number != SSH_CIPHER_NONE &&
+ detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len, NULL) == DEATTACK_DETECTED)
+ packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: network attack detected");
+
+ /* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
+ buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
+ buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, &cp, padded_len);
+ cipher_decrypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len);
+
+ buffer_consume(&input, padded_len);
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
+ buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
+#endif
+
+ /* Compute packet checksum. */
+ checksum = ssh_crc32((u_char *) buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
+ buffer_len(&incoming_packet) - 4);
+
+ /* Skip padding. */
+ buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8);
+
+ /* Test check bytes. */
+ if (len != buffer_len(&incoming_packet))
+ packet_disconnect("packet_read_poll: len %d != buffer_len %d.",
+ len, buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
+
+ ucp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + len - 4;
+ stored_checksum = GET_32BIT(ucp);
+ if (checksum != stored_checksum)
+ packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input.");
+ buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, 4);
+
+ if (packet_compression) {
+ buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
+ buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer);
+ buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
+ buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet);
+ *payload_len_ptr = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
+ return type;
+}
+
+static int
+packet_read_poll2(int *payload_len_ptr)
+{
+ static u_int32_t seqnr = 0;
+ static u_int packet_length = 0;
+ u_int padlen, need;
+ u_char *macbuf, *ucp, type;
+ char *cp;
+ int maclen, block_size;
+ Enc *enc = NULL;
+ Mac *mac = NULL;
+ Comp *comp = NULL;
+
+ if (newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
+ enc = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
+ mac = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
+ comp = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
+ }
+ maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
+ block_size = enc ? enc->cipher->block_size : 8;
+
+ if (packet_length == 0) {
+ /*
+ * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
+ * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
+ */
+ if (buffer_len(&input) < block_size)
+ return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+ buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
+ buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, &cp, block_size);
+ cipher_decrypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input),
+ block_size);
+ ucp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
+ packet_length = GET_32BIT(ucp);
+ if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > 256 * 1024) {
+ buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
+ packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %d.", packet_length);
+ }
+ DBG(debug("input: packet len %d", packet_length+4));
+ buffer_consume(&input, block_size);
+ }
+ /* we have a partial packet of block_size bytes */
+ need = 4 + packet_length - block_size;
+ DBG(debug("partial packet %d, need %d, maclen %d", block_size,
+ need, maclen));
+ if (need % block_size != 0)
+ fatal("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
+ need, block_size, need % block_size);
+ /*
+ * check if the entire packet has been received and
+ * decrypt into incoming_packet
+ */
+ if (buffer_len(&input) < need + maclen)
+ return SSH_MSG_NONE;
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
+ buffer_dump(&input);
+#endif
+ buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, &cp, need);
+ cipher_decrypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), need);
+ buffer_consume(&input, need);
+ /*
+ * compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
+ * increment sequence number for incoming packet
+ */
+ if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+ macbuf = mac_compute(mac, seqnr,
+ (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
+ buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
+ if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&input), mac->mac_len) != 0)
+ packet_disconnect("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+ DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", seqnr));
+ buffer_consume(&input, mac->mac_len);
+ }
+ if (++seqnr == 0)
+ log("incoming seqnr wraps around");
+
+ /* get padlen */
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + 4;
+ padlen = (u_char) *cp;
+ DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
+ if (padlen < 4)
+ packet_disconnect("Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen);
+
+ /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
+ buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 4 + 1);
+ buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, padlen);
+
+ DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d", buffer_len(&incoming_packet)));
+ if (comp && comp->enabled) {
+ buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
+ buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer);
+ buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
+ buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+ DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d", buffer_len(&incoming_packet)));
+ }
+ /*
+ * get packet type, implies consume.
+ * return length of payload (without type field)
+ */
+ type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet);
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
+ *payload_len_ptr = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", type);
+ buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
+#endif
+ /* reset for next packet */
+ packet_length = 0;
+ return type;
+}
+
+int
+packet_read_poll(int *payload_len_ptr)
+{
+ int reason;
+ u_char type;
+ char *msg;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (compat20) {
+ type = packet_read_poll2(payload_len_ptr);
+ if (type)
+ DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
+ switch(type) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
+ packet_get_char();
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ xfree(msg);
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ xfree(msg);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+ reason = packet_get_int();
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ log("Received disconnect from %s: %d: %.400s", get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ reason, msg);
+ xfree(msg);
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ break;
+ default:
+ return type;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ type = packet_read_poll1(payload_len_ptr);
+ switch(type) {
+ case SSH_MSG_IGNORE:
+ break;
+ case SSH_MSG_DEBUG:
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ xfree(msg);
+ break;
+ case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ log("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s", get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ msg);
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ xfree(msg);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (type)
+ DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
+ return type;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used
+ * together with packet_read_poll.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+ buffer_append(&input, buf, len);
+}
+
+/* Returns a character from the packet. */
+
+u_int
+packet_get_char()
+{
+ char ch;
+ buffer_get(&incoming_packet, &ch, 1);
+ return (u_char) ch;
+}
+
+/* Returns an integer from the packet data. */
+
+u_int
+packet_get_int()
+{
+ return buffer_get_int(&incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns an arbitrary precision integer from the packet data. The integer
+ * must have been initialized before this call.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value, int *length_ptr)
+{
+ *length_ptr = buffer_get_bignum(&incoming_packet, value);
+}
+
+void
+packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value, int *length_ptr)
+{
+ *length_ptr = buffer_get_bignum2(&incoming_packet, value);
+}
+
+char *
+packet_get_raw(int *length_ptr)
+{
+ int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
+ if (length_ptr != NULL)
+ *length_ptr = bytes;
+ return buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
+}
+
+int
+packet_remaining(void)
+{
+ return buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a string from the packet data. The string is allocated using
+ * xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling program to free it when
+ * no longer needed. The length_ptr argument may be NULL, or point to an
+ * integer into which the length of the string is stored.
+ */
+
+char *
+packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr)
+{
+ return buffer_get_string(&incoming_packet, length_ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message
+ * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
+ * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
+ * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
+ * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not
+ * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call packet_write_wait.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ va_list args;
+
+ if (compat20 && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
+ return;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG);
+ packet_put_char(0); /* bool: always display */
+ packet_put_cstring(buf);
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_DEBUG);
+ packet_put_cstring(buf);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
+ * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message
+ * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must
+ * not exceed 1024 bytes.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ va_list args;
+ static int disconnecting = 0;
+ if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */
+ fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
+ disconnecting = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the
+ * message is of limited size.
+ */
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
+ /* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait for it to get sent. */
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+ packet_put_cstring(buf);
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+ packet_put_cstring(buf);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Stop listening for connections. */
+ channel_close_all();
+
+ /* Close the connection. */
+ packet_close();
+
+ /* Display the error locally and exit. */
+ log("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
+ fatal_cleanup();
+}
+
+/* Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of the output. */
+
+void
+packet_write_poll()
+{
+ int len = buffer_len(&output);
+ if (len > 0) {
+ len = write(connection_out, buffer_ptr(&output), len);
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ if (errno == EAGAIN)
+ return;
+ else
+ fatal("Write failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ buffer_consume(&output, len);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
+ * written.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_write_wait()
+{
+ fd_set *setp;
+
+ setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
+ sizeof(fd_mask));
+ packet_write_poll();
+ while (packet_have_data_to_write()) {
+ memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
+ sizeof(fd_mask));
+ FD_SET(connection_out, setp);
+ while (select(connection_out + 1, NULL, setp, NULL, NULL) == -1 &&
+ (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+ ;
+ packet_write_poll();
+ }
+ xfree(setp);
+}
+
+/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
+
+int
+packet_have_data_to_write()
+{
+ return buffer_len(&output) != 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
+
+int
+packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()
+{
+ if (interactive_mode)
+ return buffer_len(&output) < 16384;
+ else
+ return buffer_len(&output) < 128 * 1024;
+}
+
+/* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */
+
+void
+packet_set_interactive(int interactive)
+{
+ static int called = 0;
+#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
+ int lowdelay = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
+ int throughput = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
+#endif
+ int on = 1;
+
+ if (called)
+ return;
+ called = 1;
+
+ /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
+ interactive_mode = interactive;
+
+ /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
+ if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+ return;
+ /*
+ * IPTOS_LOWDELAY and IPTOS_THROUGHPUT are IPv4 only
+ */
+ if (interactive) {
+ /*
+ * Set IP options for an interactive connection. Use
+ * IPTOS_LOWDELAY and TCP_NODELAY.
+ */
+#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
+ if (packet_connection_is_ipv4()) {
+ if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
+ (void *) &lowdelay, sizeof(lowdelay)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt IPTOS_LOWDELAY: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+#endif
+ if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *) &on,
+ sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ } else if (packet_connection_is_ipv4()) {
+ /*
+ * Set IP options for a non-interactive connection. Use
+ * IPTOS_THROUGHPUT.
+ */
+#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
+ if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, (void *) &throughput,
+ sizeof(throughput)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt IPTOS_THROUGHPUT: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
+
+int
+packet_is_interactive()
+{
+ return interactive_mode;
+}
+
+int
+packet_set_maxsize(int s)
+{
+ static int called = 0;
+ if (called) {
+ log("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
+ max_packet_size, s);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
+ log("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ called = 1;
+ debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
+ max_packet_size = s;
+ return s;
+}
+
+/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
+void
+packet_add_padding(u_char pad)
+{
+ extra_pad = pad;
+}
+
+/*
+ * 9.2. Ignored Data Message
+ *
+ * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE
+ * string data
+ *
+ * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
+ * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
+ * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
+ * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
+ */
+void
+packet_send_ignore(int nbytes)
+{
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE);
+ packet_put_int(nbytes);
+ for(i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ packet_put_char(rand & 0xff);
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Interface for the packet protocol functions.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.26 2001/11/07 16:03:17 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef PACKET_H
+#define PACKET_H
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+void packet_set_connection(int, int);
+void packet_set_nonblocking(void);
+int packet_get_connection_in(void);
+int packet_get_connection_out(void);
+void packet_close(void);
+void packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *, u_int, int);
+void packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int);
+u_int packet_get_protocol_flags(void);
+void packet_start_compression(int);
+void packet_set_interactive(int);
+int packet_is_interactive(void);
+
+void packet_start(u_char);
+void packet_put_char(int ch);
+void packet_put_int(u_int value);
+void packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
+void packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
+void packet_put_string(const char *buf, u_int len);
+void packet_put_cstring(const char *str);
+void packet_put_raw(const char *buf, u_int len);
+void packet_send(void);
+
+int packet_read(int *payload_len_ptr);
+void packet_read_expect(int *payload_len_ptr, int type);
+int packet_read_poll(int *packet_len_ptr);
+void packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len);
+
+u_int packet_get_char(void);
+u_int packet_get_int(void);
+void packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value, int *length_ptr);
+void packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value, int *length_ptr);
+char *packet_get_raw(int *length_ptr);
+char *packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr);
+void packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+
+void packet_write_poll(void);
+void packet_write_wait(void);
+int packet_have_data_to_write(void);
+int packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void);
+
+int packet_connection_is_on_socket(void);
+int packet_connection_is_ipv4(void);
+int packet_remaining(void);
+void packet_send_ignore(int);
+void packet_add_padding(u_char);
+
+void tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *);
+void tty_parse_modes(int, int *);
+
+extern int max_packet_size;
+int packet_set_maxsize(int);
+#define packet_get_maxsize() max_packet_size
+
+#define packet_integrity_check(payload_len, expected_len, type) \
+do { \
+ int _p = (payload_len), _e = (expected_len); \
+ if (_p != _e) { \
+ log("Packet integrity error (%d != %d) at %s:%d", \
+ _p, _e, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+ packet_disconnect("Packet integrity error. (%d)", (type)); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+#define packet_done() \
+do { \
+ int _len = packet_remaining(); \
+ if (_len > 0) { \
+ log("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \
+ _len ,__FILE__, __LINE__); \
+ packet_disconnect("Packet integrity error."); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+#endif /* PACKET_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.9 2001/06/23 02:34:30 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef ETCDIR
+#define ETCDIR "/etc"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
+#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * System-wide file containing host keys of known hosts. This file should be
+ * world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE ETCDIR "/ssh_known_hosts"
+/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2 ETCDIR "/ssh_known_hosts2"
+
+/*
+ * Of these, ssh_host_key must be readable only by root, whereas ssh_config
+ * should be world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE ETCDIR "/sshd_config"
+#define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE ETCDIR "/ssh_config"
+#define _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE ETCDIR "/ssh_host_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE ETCDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE ETCDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
+#define _PATH_DH_MODULI ETCDIR "/moduli"
+/* Backwards compatibility */
+#define _PATH_DH_PRIMES ETCDIR "/primes"
+
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
+#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to
+ * make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid"
+
+/*
+ * The directory in user\'s home directory in which the files reside. The
+ * directory should be world-readable (though not all files are).
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR ".ssh"
+
+/*
+ * Per-user file containing host keys of known hosts. This file need not be
+ * readable by anyone except the user him/herself, though this does not
+ * contain anything particularly secret.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE "~/.ssh/known_hosts"
+/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2 "~/.ssh/known_hosts2"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This
+ * file should only be readable by the user him/herself.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY ".ssh/identity"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA ".ssh/id_dsa"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA ".ssh/id_rsa"
+
+/*
+ * Configuration file in user\'s home directory. This file need not be
+ * readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything
+ * particularly secret. If the user\'s home directory resides on an NFS
+ * volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE ".ssh/config"
+
+/*
+ * File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this
+ * user. This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself,
+ * but does not contain anything particularly secret. If the user\'s home
+ * directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this
+ * may need to be world-readable. (This file is read by the daemon which is
+ * running as root.)
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS ".ssh/authorized_keys"
+
+/* backward compat for protocol v2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2 ".ssh/authorized_keys2"
+
+/*
+ * Per-user and system-wide ssh "rc" files. These files are executed with
+ * /bin/sh before starting the shell or command if they exist. They will be
+ * passed "proto cookie" as arguments if X11 forwarding with spoofing is in
+ * use. xauth will be run if neither of these exists.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_RC ".ssh/rc"
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC ETCDIR "/sshrc"
+
+/*
+ * Ssh-only version of /etc/hosts.equiv. Additionally, the daemon may use
+ * ~/.rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv if rhosts authentication is enabled.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV ETCDIR "/shosts.equiv"
+#define _PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv"
+
+/*
+ * Default location of askpass
+ */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT
+#define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT "/usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass"
+#endif
+
+/* xauth for X11 forwarding */
+#ifndef _PATH_XAUTH
+#define _PATH_XAUTH "/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth"
+#endif
+
+/* for scp */
+#ifndef _PATH_CP
+#define _PATH_CP "cp"
+#endif
+
+/* for sftp */
+#ifndef _PATH_SFTP_SERVER
+#define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER "/usr/libexec/sftp-server"
+#endif
+#ifndef _PATH_LS
+#define _PATH_LS "ls"
+#endif
+
+/* path to login program */
+#ifndef LOGIN_PROGRAM
+# ifdef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+# define LOGIN_PROGRAM LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+# else
+# define LOGIN_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/login"
+# endif
+#endif /* LOGIN_PROGRAM */
+
+/* Askpass program define */
+#ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM
+#define ASKPASS_PROGRAM "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass"
+#endif /* ASKPASS_PROGRAM */
+
+/*
+ * Relevant only when using builtin PRNG.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE
+# define SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR"/prng_seed"
+#endif /* SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE */
+#ifndef SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE
+# define SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE ETCDIR "/ssh_prng_cmds"
+#endif /* SSH_PRNG_COMMAND_FILE */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
+
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: radix.c,v 1.16 2001/06/23 15:12:19 itojun Exp $");
+
+#ifdef AFS
+#include <krb.h>
+
+#include <radix.h>
+
+typedef u_char my_u_char;
+typedef u_int my_u_int32_t;
+typedef u_short my_u_short;
+
+/* Nasty macros from BIND-4.9.2 */
+
+#define GETSHORT(s, cp) { \
+ register my_u_char *t_cp = (my_u_char *)(cp); \
+ (s) = (((my_u_short)t_cp[0]) << 8) \
+ | (((my_u_short)t_cp[1])) \
+ ; \
+ (cp) += 2; \
+}
+
+#define GETLONG(l, cp) { \
+ register my_u_char *t_cp = (my_u_char *)(cp); \
+ (l) = (((my_u_int32_t)t_cp[0]) << 24) \
+ | (((my_u_int32_t)t_cp[1]) << 16) \
+ | (((my_u_int32_t)t_cp[2]) << 8) \
+ | (((my_u_int32_t)t_cp[3])) \
+ ; \
+ (cp) += 4; \
+}
+
+#define PUTSHORT(s, cp) { \
+ register my_u_short t_s = (my_u_short)(s); \
+ register my_u_char *t_cp = (my_u_char *)(cp); \
+ *t_cp++ = t_s >> 8; \
+ *t_cp = t_s; \
+ (cp) += 2; \
+}
+
+#define PUTLONG(l, cp) { \
+ register my_u_int32_t t_l = (my_u_int32_t)(l); \
+ register my_u_char *t_cp = (my_u_char *)(cp); \
+ *t_cp++ = t_l >> 24; \
+ *t_cp++ = t_l >> 16; \
+ *t_cp++ = t_l >> 8; \
+ *t_cp = t_l; \
+ (cp) += 4; \
+}
+
+#define GETSTRING(s, p, p_l) { \
+ register char *p_targ = (p) + p_l; \
+ register char *s_c = (s); \
+ register char *p_c = (p); \
+ while (*p_c && (p_c < p_targ)) { \
+ *s_c++ = *p_c++; \
+ } \
+ if (p_c == p_targ) { \
+ return 1; \
+ } \
+ *s_c = *p_c++; \
+ (p_l) = (p_l) - (p_c - (p)); \
+ (p) = p_c; \
+}
+
+
+int
+creds_to_radix(CREDENTIALS *creds, u_char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ char *p, *s;
+ int len;
+ char temp[2048];
+
+ p = temp;
+ *p++ = 1; /* version */
+ s = creds->service;
+ while (*s)
+ *p++ = *s++;
+ *p++ = *s;
+ s = creds->instance;
+ while (*s)
+ *p++ = *s++;
+ *p++ = *s;
+ s = creds->realm;
+ while (*s)
+ *p++ = *s++;
+ *p++ = *s;
+
+ s = creds->pname;
+ while (*s)
+ *p++ = *s++;
+ *p++ = *s;
+ s = creds->pinst;
+ while (*s)
+ *p++ = *s++;
+ *p++ = *s;
+ /* Null string to repeat the realm. */
+ *p++ = '\0';
+
+ PUTLONG(creds->issue_date, p);
+ {
+ u_int endTime;
+ endTime = (u_int) krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date,
+ creds->lifetime);
+ PUTLONG(endTime, p);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(p, &creds->session, sizeof(creds->session));
+ p += sizeof(creds->session);
+
+ PUTSHORT(creds->kvno, p);
+ PUTLONG(creds->ticket_st.length, p);
+
+ memcpy(p, creds->ticket_st.dat, creds->ticket_st.length);
+ p += creds->ticket_st.length;
+ len = p - temp;
+
+ return (uuencode((u_char *)temp, len, (char *)buf, buflen));
+}
+
+int
+radix_to_creds(const char *buf, CREDENTIALS *creds)
+{
+
+ char *p;
+ int len, tl;
+ char version;
+ char temp[2048];
+
+ len = uudecode(buf, (u_char *)temp, sizeof(temp));
+ if (len < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = temp;
+
+ /* check version and length! */
+ if (len < 1)
+ return 0;
+ version = *p;
+ p++;
+ len--;
+
+ GETSTRING(creds->service, p, len);
+ GETSTRING(creds->instance, p, len);
+ GETSTRING(creds->realm, p, len);
+
+ GETSTRING(creds->pname, p, len);
+ GETSTRING(creds->pinst, p, len);
+ /* Ignore possibly different realm. */
+ while (*p && len)
+ p++, len--;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ p++, len--;
+
+ /* Enough space for remaining fixed-length parts? */
+ if (len < (4 + 4 + sizeof(creds->session) + 2 + 4))
+ return 0;
+
+ GETLONG(creds->issue_date, p);
+ len -= 4;
+ {
+ u_int endTime;
+ GETLONG(endTime, p);
+ len -= 4;
+ creds->lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds->issue_date, endTime);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&creds->session, p, sizeof(creds->session));
+ p += sizeof(creds->session);
+ len -= sizeof(creds->session);
+
+ GETSHORT(creds->kvno, p);
+ len -= 2;
+ GETLONG(creds->ticket_st.length, p);
+ len -= 4;
+
+ tl = creds->ticket_st.length;
+ if (tl < 0 || tl > len || tl > sizeof(creds->ticket_st.dat))
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(creds->ticket_st.dat, p, tl);
+ p += tl;
+ len -= tl;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* AFS */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: radix.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+int creds_to_radix(CREDENTIALS *, u_char *, size_t);
+int radix_to_creds(const char *, CREDENTIALS *);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for reading the configuration files.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.91 2001/10/01 21:51:16 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+
+/* Format of the configuration file:
+
+ # Configuration data is parsed as follows:
+ # 1. command line options
+ # 2. user-specific file
+ # 3. system-wide file
+ # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+ # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
+ # configuration file, and defaults at the end.
+
+ # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single
+ # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order
+ # that they are given in.
+
+ Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi
+ FallBackToRsh no
+
+ Host fake.com
+ HostName another.host.name.real.org
+ User blaah
+ Port 34289
+ ForwardX11 no
+ ForwardAgent no
+
+ Host books.com
+ RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
+ Cipher 3des
+
+ Host fascist.blob.com
+ Port 23123
+ User tylonen
+ RhostsAuthentication no
+ PasswordAuthentication no
+
+ Host puukko.hut.fi
+ User t35124p
+ ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p
+
+ Host *.fr
+ UseRsh yes
+
+ Host *.su
+ Cipher none
+ PasswordAuthentication no
+
+ # Defaults for various options
+ Host *
+ ForwardAgent no
+ ForwardX11 no
+ RhostsAuthentication yes
+ PasswordAuthentication yes
+ RSAAuthentication yes
+ RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
+ FallBackToRsh no
+ UseRsh no
+ StrictHostKeyChecking yes
+ KeepAlives no
+ IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
+ Port 22
+ EscapeChar ~
+
+*/
+
+/* Keyword tokens. */
+
+typedef enum {
+ oBadOption,
+ oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oGatewayPorts, oRhostsAuthentication,
+ oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication, oFallBackToRsh, oUseRsh,
+ oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ oKerberosAuthentication,
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ oKerberosTgtPassing,
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ oAFSTokenPassing,
+#endif
+ oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
+ oUser, oHost, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand,
+ oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts,
+ oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression,
+ oCompressionLevel, oKeepAlives, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
+ oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs,
+ oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication,
+ oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
+ oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
+ oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oSmartcardDevice,
+ oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+} OpCodes;
+
+/* Textual representations of the tokens. */
+
+static struct {
+ const char *name;
+ OpCodes opcode;
+} keywords[] = {
+ { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
+ { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
+ { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
+ { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
+ { "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort },
+ { "rhostsauthentication", oRhostsAuthentication },
+ { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
+ { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
+ { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication },
+ { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
+ { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
+ { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication },
+ { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
+ { "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
+ { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ { "kerberosauthentication", oKerberosAuthentication },
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ { "kerberostgtpassing", oKerberosTgtPassing },
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ { "afstokenpassing", oAFSTokenPassing },
+#endif
+ { "fallbacktorsh", oFallBackToRsh },
+ { "usersh", oUseRsh },
+ { "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
+ { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* alias */
+ { "hostname", oHostName },
+ { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
+ { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand },
+ { "port", oPort },
+ { "cipher", oCipher },
+ { "ciphers", oCiphers },
+ { "macs", oMacs },
+ { "protocol", oProtocol },
+ { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward },
+ { "localforward", oLocalForward },
+ { "user", oUser },
+ { "host", oHost },
+ { "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
+ { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
+ { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile }, /* obsolete */
+ { "globalknownhostsfile2", oGlobalKnownHostsFile2 },
+ { "userknownhostsfile2", oUserKnownHostsFile2 }, /* obsolete */
+ { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
+ { "batchmode", oBatchMode },
+ { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
+ { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
+ { "compression", oCompression },
+ { "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel },
+ { "keepalive", oKeepAlives },
+ { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
+ { "loglevel", oLogLevel },
+ { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward },
+ { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
+ { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
+ { "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
+ { "smartcarddevice", oSmartcardDevice },
+ { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
+ { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost },
+ { NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an
+ * error.
+ */
+
+void
+add_local_forward(Options *options, u_short port, const char *host,
+ u_short host_port)
+{
+ Forward *fwd;
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ extern uid_t original_real_uid;
+ if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && original_real_uid != 0)
+ fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root.");
+#endif
+ if (options->num_local_forwards >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+ fatal("Too many local forwards (max %d).", SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION);
+ fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
+ fwd->port = port;
+ fwd->host = xstrdup(host);
+ fwd->host_port = host_port;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is
+ * an error.
+ */
+
+void
+add_remote_forward(Options *options, u_short port, const char *host,
+ u_short host_port)
+{
+ Forward *fwd;
+ if (options->num_remote_forwards >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+ fatal("Too many remote forwards (max %d).",
+ SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION);
+ fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
+ fwd->port = port;
+ fwd->host = xstrdup(host);
+ fwd->host_port = host_port;
+}
+
+static void
+clear_forwardings(Options *options)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++)
+ xfree(options->local_forwards[i].host);
+ options->num_local_forwards = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++)
+ xfree(options->remote_forwards[i].host);
+ options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption.
+ */
+
+static OpCodes
+parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
+ if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
+ return keywords[i].opcode;
+
+ error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
+ filename, linenum, cp);
+ return oBadOption;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This
+ * only sets those values that have not already been set.
+ */
+
+int
+process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
+ char *line, const char *filename, int linenum,
+ int *activep)
+{
+ char buf[256], *s, *string, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg;
+ int opcode, *intptr, value;
+ u_short fwd_port, fwd_host_port;
+ char sfwd_host_port[6];
+
+ s = line;
+ /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
+ keyword = strdelim(&s);
+ /* Ignore leading whitespace. */
+ if (*keyword == '\0')
+ keyword = strdelim(&s);
+ if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#')
+ return 0;
+
+ opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum);
+
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case oBadOption:
+ /* don't panic, but count bad options */
+ return -1;
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ case oForwardAgent:
+ intptr = &options->forward_agent;
+parse_flag:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
+ value = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
+ value = 0;
+ else
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oForwardX11:
+ intptr = &options->forward_x11;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oGatewayPorts:
+ intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oUsePrivilegedPort:
+ intptr = &options->use_privileged_port;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oRhostsAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rhosts_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oPasswordAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oKbdInteractiveDevices:
+ charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oPubkeyAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oRSAAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rsa_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oRhostsRSAAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oHostbasedAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oChallengeResponseAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ case oKerberosAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ case oKerberosTgtPassing:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_tgt_passing;
+ goto parse_flag;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ case oAFSTokenPassing:
+ intptr = &options->afs_token_passing;
+ goto parse_flag;
+#endif
+ case oFallBackToRsh:
+ intptr = &options->fallback_to_rsh;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oUseRsh:
+ intptr = &options->use_rsh;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oBatchMode:
+ intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oCheckHostIP:
+ intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
+ intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing yes/no/ask argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
+ value = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
+ value = 0;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "ask") == 0)
+ value = 2;
+ else
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad yes/no/ask argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oCompression:
+ intptr = &options->compression;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oKeepAlives:
+ intptr = &options->keepalives;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost:
+ intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts:
+ intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case oCompressionLevel:
+ intptr = &options->compression_level;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case oIdentityFile:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep) {
+ intptr = &options->num_identity_files;
+ if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).",
+ filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+ charptr = &options->identity_files[*intptr];
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ *intptr = *intptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oXAuthLocation:
+ charptr=&options->xauth_location;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oUser:
+ charptr = &options->user;
+parse_string:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case oGlobalKnownHostsFile:
+ charptr = &options->system_hostfile;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oUserKnownHostsFile:
+ charptr = &options->user_hostfile;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oGlobalKnownHostsFile2:
+ charptr = &options->system_hostfile2;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oUserKnownHostsFile2:
+ charptr = &options->user_hostfile2;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oHostName:
+ charptr = &options->hostname;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oHostKeyAlias:
+ charptr = &options->host_key_alias;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oPreferredAuthentications:
+ charptr = &options->preferred_authentications;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oBindAddress:
+ charptr = &options->bind_address;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oSmartcardDevice:
+ charptr = &options->smartcard_device;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oProxyCommand:
+ charptr = &options->proxy_command;
+ string = xstrdup("");
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ string = xrealloc(string, strlen(string) + strlen(arg) + 2);
+ strcat(string, " ");
+ strcat(string, arg);
+ }
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = string;
+ else
+ xfree(string);
+ return 0;
+
+ case oPort:
+ intptr = &options->port;
+parse_int:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
+
+ /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */
+ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0);
+ if (arg == endofnumber)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oConnectionAttempts:
+ intptr = &options->connection_attempts;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case oCipher:
+ intptr = &options->cipher;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = cipher_number(arg);
+ if (value == -1)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oCiphers:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!ciphers_valid(arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
+ options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case oMacs:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!mac_valid(arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
+ options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!key_names_valid2(arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol 2 host key algorithms '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && options->hostkeyalgorithms == NULL)
+ options->hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case oProtocol:
+ intptr = &options->protocol;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = proto_spec(arg);
+ if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case oLogLevel:
+ intptr = (int *) &options->log_level;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ value = log_level_number(arg);
+ if (value == (LogLevel) - 1)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*activep && (LogLevel) * intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = (LogLevel) value;
+ break;
+
+ case oLocalForward:
+ case oRemoteForward:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if ((fwd_port = a2port(arg)) == 0)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad listen port.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing second argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (sscanf(arg, "%255[^:]:%5[0-9]", buf, sfwd_host_port) != 2 &&
+ sscanf(arg, "%255[^/]/%5[0-9]", buf, sfwd_host_port) != 2)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if ((fwd_host_port = a2port(sfwd_host_port)) == 0)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding port.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep) {
+ if (opcode == oLocalForward)
+ add_local_forward(options, fwd_port, buf,
+ fwd_host_port);
+ else if (opcode == oRemoteForward)
+ add_remote_forward(options, fwd_port, buf,
+ fwd_host_port);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case oDynamicForward:
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ fwd_port = a2port(arg);
+ if (fwd_port == 0)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep)
+ add_local_forward(options, fwd_port, "socks4", 0);
+ break;
+
+ case oClearAllForwardings:
+ intptr = &options->clear_forwardings;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case oHost:
+ *activep = 0;
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')
+ if (match_pattern(host, arg)) {
+ debug("Applying options for %.100s", arg);
+ *activep = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */
+ return 0;
+
+ case oEscapeChar:
+ intptr = &options->escape_char;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 &&
+ (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128)
+ value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31;
+ else if (strlen(arg) == 1)
+ value = (u_char) arg[0];
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+ value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
+ else {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */
+ }
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode);
+ }
+
+ /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options
+ * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if
+ * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0.
+ */
+
+int
+read_config_file(const char *filename, const char *host, Options *options)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[1024];
+ int active, linenum;
+ int bad_options = 0;
+
+ /* Open the file. */
+ f = fopen(filename, "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return 0;
+
+ debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename);
+
+ /*
+ * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned
+ * on/off by Host specifications.
+ */
+ active = 1;
+ linenum = 0;
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ /* Update line number counter. */
+ linenum++;
+ if (process_config_line(options, host, line, filename, linenum, &active) != 0)
+ bad_options++;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ if (bad_options > 0)
+ fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
+ filename, bad_options);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet
+ * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options
+ * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file,
+ * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called.
+ */
+
+void
+initialize_options(Options * options)
+{
+ memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options));
+ options->forward_agent = -1;
+ options->forward_x11 = -1;
+ options->xauth_location = NULL;
+ options->gateway_ports = -1;
+ options->use_privileged_port = -1;
+ options->rhosts_authentication = -1;
+ options->rsa_authentication = -1;
+ options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ options->kerberos_tgt_passing = -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ options->afs_token_passing = -1;
+#endif
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+ options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
+ options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
+ options->fallback_to_rsh = -1;
+ options->use_rsh = -1;
+ options->batch_mode = -1;
+ options->check_host_ip = -1;
+ options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
+ options->compression = -1;
+ options->keepalives = -1;
+ options->compression_level = -1;
+ options->port = -1;
+ options->connection_attempts = -1;
+ options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
+ options->cipher = -1;
+ options->ciphers = NULL;
+ options->macs = NULL;
+ options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
+ options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+ options->num_identity_files = 0;
+ options->hostname = NULL;
+ options->host_key_alias = NULL;
+ options->proxy_command = NULL;
+ options->user = NULL;
+ options->escape_char = -1;
+ options->system_hostfile = NULL;
+ options->user_hostfile = NULL;
+ options->system_hostfile2 = NULL;
+ options->user_hostfile2 = NULL;
+ options->num_local_forwards = 0;
+ options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
+ options->clear_forwardings = -1;
+ options->log_level = (LogLevel) - 1;
+ options->preferred_authentications = NULL;
+ options->bind_address = NULL;
+ options->smartcard_device = NULL;
+ options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those
+ * options for which no value has been specified with their default values.
+ */
+
+void
+fill_default_options(Options * options)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ if (options->forward_agent == -1)
+ options->forward_agent = 0;
+ if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
+ options->forward_x11 = 0;
+#ifdef _PATH_XAUTH
+ if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+ options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
+#endif
+ if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
+ options->gateway_ports = 0;
+ if (options->use_privileged_port == -1)
+ options->use_privileged_port = 0;
+ if (options->rhosts_authentication == -1)
+ options->rhosts_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
+ options->rsa_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
+ options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
+ options->kerberos_authentication = 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ if (options->kerberos_tgt_passing == -1)
+ options->kerberos_tgt_passing = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ if (options->afs_token_passing == -1)
+ options->afs_token_passing = 1;
+#endif
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
+ options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
+ options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->fallback_to_rsh == -1)
+ options->fallback_to_rsh = 0;
+ if (options->use_rsh == -1)
+ options->use_rsh = 0;
+ if (options->batch_mode == -1)
+ options->batch_mode = 0;
+ if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
+ options->check_host_ip = 1;
+ if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1)
+ options->strict_host_key_checking = 2; /* 2 is default */
+ if (options->compression == -1)
+ options->compression = 0;
+ if (options->keepalives == -1)
+ options->keepalives = 1;
+ if (options->compression_level == -1)
+ options->compression_level = 6;
+ if (options->port == -1)
+ options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */
+ if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
+ options->connection_attempts = 1;
+ if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
+ options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
+ /* Selected in ssh_login(). */
+ if (options->cipher == -1)
+ options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET;
+ /* options->ciphers, default set in myproposals.h */
+ /* options->macs, default set in myproposals.h */
+ /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
+ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2;
+ if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
+ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
+ len = 2 + strlen(_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY) + 1;
+ options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files] =
+ xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++],
+ len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY);
+ }
+ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ len = 2 + strlen(_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA) + 1;
+ options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files] =
+ xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++],
+ len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA);
+
+ len = 2 + strlen(_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA) + 1;
+ options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files] =
+ xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++],
+ len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA);
+ }
+ }
+ if (options->escape_char == -1)
+ options->escape_char = '~';
+ if (options->system_hostfile == NULL)
+ options->system_hostfile = _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE;
+ if (options->user_hostfile == NULL)
+ options->user_hostfile = _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE;
+ if (options->system_hostfile2 == NULL)
+ options->system_hostfile2 = _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2;
+ if (options->user_hostfile2 == NULL)
+ options->user_hostfile2 = _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2;
+ if (options->log_level == (LogLevel) - 1)
+ options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ if (options->clear_forwardings == 1)
+ clear_forwardings(options);
+ if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1)
+ options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0;
+ /* options->proxy_command should not be set by default */
+ /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
+ /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
+ /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */
+ /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for reading the configuration file.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.40 2001/10/01 21:51:16 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef READCONF_H
+#define READCONF_H
+
+#include "key.h"
+
+/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
+
+typedef struct {
+ u_short port; /* Port to forward. */
+ char *host; /* Host to connect. */
+ u_short host_port; /* Port to connect on host. */
+} Forward;
+/* Data structure for representing option data. */
+
+typedef struct {
+ int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */
+ int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */
+ char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */
+ int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
+ int use_privileged_port; /* Don't use privileged port if false. */
+ int rhosts_authentication; /* Try rhosts authentication. */
+ int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* Try rhosts with RSA
+ * authentication. */
+ int rsa_authentication; /* Try RSA authentication. */
+ int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
+ int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
+ int challenge_response_authentication;
+ /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ int kerberos_authentication; /* Try Kerberos authentication. */
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ int kerberos_tgt_passing; /* Try Kerberos TGT passing. */
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ int afs_token_passing; /* Try AFS token passing. */
+#endif
+ int password_authentication; /* Try password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+ char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
+ int fallback_to_rsh;/* Use rsh if cannot connect with ssh. */
+ int use_rsh; /* Always use rsh (don\'t try ssh). */
+ int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
+ int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
+ int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */
+ int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */
+ int compression_level; /* Compression level 1 (fast) to 9
+ * (best). */
+ int keepalives; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
+ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */
+
+ int port; /* Port to connect. */
+ int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before
+ * giving up */
+ int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password
+ * prompts. */
+ int cipher; /* Cipher to use. */
+ char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
+ char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
+ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
+ int protocol; /* Protocol in order of preference. */
+ char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */
+ char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
+ char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
+ char *user; /* User to log in as. */
+ int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */
+
+ char *system_hostfile;/* Path for /etc/ssh_known_hosts. */
+ char *user_hostfile; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts. */
+ char *system_hostfile2;
+ char *user_hostfile2;
+ char *preferred_authentications;
+ char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */
+ char *smartcard_device; /* Smartcard reader device */
+
+ int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */
+ char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+ Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+
+ /* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */
+ int num_local_forwards;
+ Forward local_forwards[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
+
+ /* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */
+ int num_remote_forwards;
+ Forward remote_forwards[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
+ int clear_forwardings;
+ int no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+} Options;
+
+
+void initialize_options(Options *);
+void fill_default_options(Options *);
+int read_config_file(const char *, const char *, Options *);
+
+int
+process_config_line(Options *, const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *);
+
+void add_local_forward(Options *, u_short, const char *, u_short);
+void add_remote_forward(Options *, u_short, const char *, u_short);
+
+#endif /* READCONF_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.23 2001/11/08 10:51:08 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "readpass.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+static char *
+ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ size_t len;
+ char *pass;
+ int p[2], status;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
+ error("ssh_askpass: fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (askpass == NULL)
+ fatal("internal error: askpass undefined");
+ if (pipe(p) < 0) {
+ error("ssh_askpass: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return xstrdup("");
+ }
+ if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
+ error("ssh_askpass: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return xstrdup("");
+ }
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ seteuid(getuid());
+ setuid(getuid());
+ close(p[0]);
+ if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+ fatal("ssh_askpass: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *) 0);
+ fatal("ssh_askpass: exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ close(p[1]);
+ len = read(p[0], buf, sizeof buf -1);
+ close(p[0]);
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ break;
+ if (len <= 1)
+ return xstrdup("");
+ buf[len] = '\0';
+ buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0';
+ pass = xstrdup(buf);
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ return pass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on. Returns the
+ * passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered. If
+ * RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no
+ * tty is available
+ */
+char *
+read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags)
+{
+ char *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024];
+ int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd;
+
+ rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF;
+ if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) {
+ if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
+ use_askpass = 1;
+ } else {
+ rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY;
+ ttyfd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
+ if (ttyfd >= 0)
+ close(ttyfd);
+ else
+ use_askpass = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) {
+ if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV))
+ askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV);
+ else
+ askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
+ return ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt);
+ }
+
+ if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL)
+ return xstrdup("");
+
+ ret = xstrdup(buf);
+ memset(buf, 'x', sizeof buf);
+ return ret;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: readpass.h,v 1.6 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#define RP_ECHO 0x0001
+#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002
+
+char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.12 2001/09/13 09:48:39 markus Exp $ */
+
+/**
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.c
+ *
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "rijndael.h"
+
+#define FULL_UNROLL
+
+/*
+Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03];
+Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01];
+Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01];
+Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02];
+Te4[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 01, 01];
+
+Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b];
+Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d];
+Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09];
+Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e];
+Td4[x] = Si[x].[01, 01, 01, 01];
+*/
+
+static const u32 Te0[256] = {
+ 0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU,
+ 0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U,
+ 0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU,
+ 0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU,
+ 0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U,
+ 0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU,
+ 0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU,
+ 0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU,
+ 0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU,
+ 0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU,
+ 0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U,
+ 0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU,
+ 0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU,
+ 0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U,
+ 0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU,
+ 0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU,
+ 0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU,
+ 0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU,
+ 0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU,
+ 0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U,
+ 0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU,
+ 0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU,
+ 0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU,
+ 0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU,
+ 0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U,
+ 0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U,
+ 0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U,
+ 0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U,
+ 0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU,
+ 0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U,
+ 0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U,
+ 0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU,
+ 0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU,
+ 0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U,
+ 0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U,
+ 0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U,
+ 0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU,
+ 0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U,
+ 0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU,
+ 0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U,
+ 0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU,
+ 0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U,
+ 0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U,
+ 0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU,
+ 0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U,
+ 0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U,
+ 0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U,
+ 0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U,
+ 0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U,
+ 0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U,
+ 0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U,
+ 0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U,
+ 0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU,
+ 0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U,
+ 0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U,
+ 0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U,
+ 0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U,
+ 0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U,
+ 0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U,
+ 0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU,
+ 0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U,
+ 0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U,
+ 0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U,
+ 0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU,
+};
+static const u32 Te1[256] = {
+ 0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU,
+ 0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U,
+ 0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU,
+ 0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U,
+ 0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU,
+ 0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U,
+ 0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU,
+ 0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U,
+ 0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U,
+ 0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU,
+ 0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U,
+ 0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U,
+ 0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U,
+ 0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU,
+ 0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U,
+ 0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U,
+ 0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU,
+ 0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U,
+ 0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U,
+ 0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U,
+ 0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU,
+ 0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU,
+ 0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U,
+ 0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU,
+ 0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU,
+ 0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U,
+ 0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU,
+ 0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U,
+ 0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU,
+ 0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U,
+ 0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U,
+ 0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U,
+ 0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU,
+ 0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U,
+ 0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU,
+ 0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U,
+ 0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU,
+ 0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U,
+ 0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U,
+ 0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU,
+ 0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU,
+ 0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU,
+ 0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U,
+ 0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U,
+ 0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU,
+ 0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U,
+ 0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU,
+ 0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U,
+ 0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU,
+ 0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U,
+ 0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU,
+ 0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU,
+ 0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U,
+ 0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU,
+ 0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U,
+ 0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU,
+ 0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U,
+ 0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U,
+ 0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U,
+ 0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU,
+ 0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU,
+ 0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U,
+ 0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU,
+ 0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U,
+};
+static const u32 Te2[256] = {
+ 0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU,
+ 0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U,
+ 0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU,
+ 0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U,
+ 0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU,
+ 0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U,
+ 0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU,
+ 0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U,
+ 0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U,
+ 0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU,
+ 0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U,
+ 0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U,
+ 0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U,
+ 0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU,
+ 0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U,
+ 0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U,
+ 0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU,
+ 0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U,
+ 0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U,
+ 0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U,
+ 0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU,
+ 0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU,
+ 0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U,
+ 0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU,
+ 0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU,
+ 0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U,
+ 0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU,
+ 0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U,
+ 0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU,
+ 0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U,
+ 0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U,
+ 0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U,
+ 0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU,
+ 0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U,
+ 0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU,
+ 0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U,
+ 0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU,
+ 0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U,
+ 0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U,
+ 0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU,
+ 0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU,
+ 0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU,
+ 0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U,
+ 0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U,
+ 0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU,
+ 0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U,
+ 0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU,
+ 0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U,
+ 0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU,
+ 0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U,
+ 0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU,
+ 0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU,
+ 0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U,
+ 0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU,
+ 0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U,
+ 0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU,
+ 0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U,
+ 0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U,
+ 0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U,
+ 0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU,
+ 0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU,
+ 0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U,
+ 0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU,
+ 0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U,
+};
+static const u32 Te3[256] = {
+
+ 0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U,
+ 0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U,
+ 0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U,
+ 0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU,
+ 0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU,
+ 0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU,
+ 0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U,
+ 0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU,
+ 0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU,
+ 0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U,
+ 0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U,
+ 0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU,
+ 0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU,
+ 0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU,
+ 0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU,
+ 0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU,
+ 0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U,
+ 0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU,
+ 0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU,
+ 0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U,
+ 0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U,
+ 0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U,
+ 0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U,
+ 0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U,
+ 0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU,
+ 0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U,
+ 0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU,
+ 0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU,
+ 0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U,
+ 0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U,
+ 0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U,
+ 0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU,
+ 0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U,
+ 0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU,
+ 0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU,
+ 0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U,
+ 0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U,
+ 0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU,
+ 0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U,
+ 0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU,
+ 0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U,
+ 0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U,
+ 0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U,
+ 0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U,
+ 0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU,
+ 0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U,
+ 0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU,
+ 0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U,
+ 0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU,
+ 0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U,
+ 0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU,
+ 0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU,
+ 0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU,
+ 0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU,
+ 0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U,
+ 0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U,
+ 0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U,
+ 0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U,
+ 0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U,
+ 0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U,
+ 0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU,
+ 0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U,
+ 0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU,
+ 0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU,
+};
+static const u32 Te4[256] = {
+ 0x63636363U, 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0x77777777U, 0x7b7b7b7bU,
+ 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0x6b6b6b6bU, 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xc5c5c5c5U,
+ 0x30303030U, 0x01010101U, 0x67676767U, 0x2b2b2b2bU,
+ 0xfefefefeU, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xababababU, 0x76767676U,
+ 0xcacacacaU, 0x82828282U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x7d7d7d7dU,
+ 0xfafafafaU, 0x59595959U, 0x47474747U, 0xf0f0f0f0U,
+ 0xadadadadU, 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0xafafafafU,
+ 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x72727272U, 0xc0c0c0c0U,
+ 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0x93939393U, 0x26262626U,
+ 0x36363636U, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xccccccccU,
+ 0x34343434U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0xf1f1f1f1U,
+ 0x71717171U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0x31313131U, 0x15151515U,
+ 0x04040404U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x23232323U, 0xc3c3c3c3U,
+ 0x18181818U, 0x96969696U, 0x05050505U, 0x9a9a9a9aU,
+ 0x07070707U, 0x12121212U, 0x80808080U, 0xe2e2e2e2U,
+ 0xebebebebU, 0x27272727U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, 0x75757575U,
+ 0x09090909U, 0x83838383U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1a1a1a1aU,
+ 0x1b1b1b1bU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xa0a0a0a0U,
+ 0x52525252U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0xb3b3b3b3U,
+ 0x29292929U, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0x84848484U,
+ 0x53535353U, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xededededU,
+ 0x20202020U, 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x5b5b5b5bU,
+ 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xcbcbcbcbU, 0xbebebebeU, 0x39393939U,
+ 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x58585858U, 0xcfcfcfcfU,
+ 0xd0d0d0d0U, 0xefefefefU, 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0xfbfbfbfbU,
+ 0x43434343U, 0x4d4d4d4dU, 0x33333333U, 0x85858585U,
+ 0x45454545U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x02020202U, 0x7f7f7f7fU,
+ 0x50505050U, 0x3c3c3c3cU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, 0xa8a8a8a8U,
+ 0x51515151U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x40404040U, 0x8f8f8f8fU,
+ 0x92929292U, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x38383838U, 0xf5f5f5f5U,
+ 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0xdadadadaU, 0x21212121U,
+ 0x10101010U, 0xffffffffU, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd2d2d2d2U,
+ 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x13131313U, 0xececececU,
+ 0x5f5f5f5fU, 0x97979797U, 0x44444444U, 0x17171717U,
+ 0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, 0x3d3d3d3dU,
+ 0x64646464U, 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x19191919U, 0x73737373U,
+ 0x60606060U, 0x81818181U, 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0xdcdcdcdcU,
+ 0x22222222U, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0x90909090U, 0x88888888U,
+ 0x46464646U, 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0x14141414U,
+ 0xdedededeU, 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x0b0b0b0bU, 0xdbdbdbdbU,
+ 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x32323232U, 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x0a0a0a0aU,
+ 0x49494949U, 0x06060606U, 0x24242424U, 0x5c5c5c5cU,
+ 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0xacacacacU, 0x62626262U,
+ 0x91919191U, 0x95959595U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x79797979U,
+ 0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0x37373737U, 0x6d6d6d6dU,
+ 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, 0xa9a9a9a9U,
+ 0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x56565656U, 0xf4f4f4f4U, 0xeaeaeaeaU,
+ 0x65656565U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x08080808U,
+ 0xbabababaU, 0x78787878U, 0x25252525U, 0x2e2e2e2eU,
+ 0x1c1c1c1cU, 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xc6c6c6c6U,
+ 0xe8e8e8e8U, 0xddddddddU, 0x74747474U, 0x1f1f1f1fU,
+ 0x4b4b4b4bU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0x8a8a8a8aU,
+ 0x70707070U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x66666666U,
+ 0x48484848U, 0x03030303U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x0e0e0e0eU,
+ 0x61616161U, 0x35353535U, 0x57575757U, 0xb9b9b9b9U,
+ 0x86868686U, 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x9e9e9e9eU,
+ 0xe1e1e1e1U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0x98989898U, 0x11111111U,
+ 0x69696969U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x94949494U,
+ 0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x87878787U, 0xe9e9e9e9U,
+ 0xcecececeU, 0x55555555U, 0x28282828U, 0xdfdfdfdfU,
+ 0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x89898989U, 0x0d0d0d0dU,
+ 0xbfbfbfbfU, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x42424242U, 0x68686868U,
+ 0x41414141U, 0x99999999U, 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0x0f0f0f0fU,
+ 0xb0b0b0b0U, 0x54545454U, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x16161616U,
+};
+static const u32 Td0[256] = {
+ 0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U,
+ 0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U,
+ 0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U,
+ 0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU,
+ 0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U,
+ 0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U,
+ 0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU,
+ 0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U,
+ 0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU,
+ 0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U,
+ 0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U,
+ 0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U,
+ 0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U,
+ 0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU,
+ 0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U,
+ 0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU,
+ 0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U,
+ 0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU,
+ 0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U,
+ 0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U,
+ 0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U,
+ 0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU,
+ 0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U,
+ 0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU,
+ 0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U,
+ 0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU,
+ 0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U,
+ 0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU,
+ 0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU,
+ 0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U,
+ 0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU,
+ 0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U,
+ 0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU,
+ 0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U,
+ 0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U,
+ 0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U,
+ 0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU,
+ 0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U,
+ 0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U,
+ 0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU,
+ 0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U,
+ 0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U,
+ 0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U,
+ 0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U,
+ 0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U,
+ 0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU,
+ 0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U,
+ 0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U,
+ 0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U,
+ 0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U,
+ 0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U,
+ 0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU,
+ 0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU,
+ 0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU,
+ 0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU,
+ 0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U,
+ 0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U,
+ 0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU,
+ 0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU,
+ 0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U,
+ 0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU,
+ 0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U,
+ 0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U,
+ 0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U,
+};
+static const u32 Td1[256] = {
+ 0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU,
+ 0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U,
+ 0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU,
+ 0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U,
+ 0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U,
+ 0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U,
+ 0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U,
+ 0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U,
+ 0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U,
+ 0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU,
+ 0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU,
+ 0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU,
+ 0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U,
+ 0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU,
+ 0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U,
+ 0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U,
+ 0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U,
+ 0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU,
+ 0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU,
+ 0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U,
+ 0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU,
+ 0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U,
+ 0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU,
+ 0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU,
+ 0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U,
+ 0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U,
+ 0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U,
+ 0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU,
+ 0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U,
+ 0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU,
+ 0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U,
+ 0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U,
+ 0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U,
+ 0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU,
+ 0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U,
+ 0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U,
+ 0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U,
+ 0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U,
+ 0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U,
+ 0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U,
+ 0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU,
+ 0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU,
+ 0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U,
+ 0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU,
+ 0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U,
+ 0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU,
+ 0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU,
+ 0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U,
+ 0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU,
+ 0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U,
+ 0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U,
+ 0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U,
+ 0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U,
+ 0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U,
+ 0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U,
+ 0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U,
+ 0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU,
+ 0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U,
+ 0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U,
+ 0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU,
+ 0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U,
+ 0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U,
+ 0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U,
+ 0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U,
+};
+static const u32 Td2[256] = {
+ 0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U,
+ 0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U,
+ 0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U,
+ 0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U,
+ 0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU,
+ 0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U,
+ 0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U,
+ 0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U,
+ 0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U,
+ 0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU,
+ 0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U,
+ 0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U,
+ 0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU,
+ 0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U,
+ 0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U,
+ 0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U,
+ 0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U,
+ 0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U,
+ 0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U,
+ 0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU,
+
+ 0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U,
+ 0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U,
+ 0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U,
+ 0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U,
+ 0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U,
+ 0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU,
+ 0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU,
+ 0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U,
+ 0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU,
+ 0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U,
+ 0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU,
+ 0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU,
+ 0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU,
+ 0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU,
+ 0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U,
+ 0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U,
+ 0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U,
+ 0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U,
+ 0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U,
+ 0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U,
+ 0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U,
+ 0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU,
+ 0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU,
+ 0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U,
+ 0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U,
+ 0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU,
+ 0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU,
+ 0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U,
+ 0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U,
+ 0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U,
+ 0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U,
+ 0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U,
+ 0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U,
+ 0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U,
+ 0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU,
+ 0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U,
+ 0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U,
+ 0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U,
+ 0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U,
+ 0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U,
+ 0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U,
+ 0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU,
+ 0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U,
+ 0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U,
+};
+static const u32 Td3[256] = {
+ 0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU,
+ 0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU,
+ 0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U,
+ 0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U,
+ 0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU,
+ 0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU,
+ 0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U,
+ 0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU,
+ 0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U,
+ 0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU,
+ 0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U,
+ 0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U,
+ 0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U,
+ 0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U,
+ 0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U,
+ 0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU,
+ 0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU,
+ 0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U,
+ 0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U,
+ 0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU,
+ 0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU,
+ 0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U,
+ 0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U,
+ 0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U,
+ 0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U,
+ 0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU,
+ 0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U,
+ 0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U,
+ 0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU,
+ 0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU,
+ 0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U,
+ 0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U,
+ 0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U,
+ 0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU,
+ 0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U,
+ 0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U,
+ 0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U,
+ 0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U,
+ 0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U,
+ 0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U,
+ 0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U,
+ 0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU,
+ 0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U,
+ 0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U,
+ 0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU,
+ 0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU,
+ 0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U,
+ 0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU,
+ 0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U,
+ 0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U,
+ 0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U,
+ 0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U,
+ 0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U,
+ 0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U,
+ 0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU,
+ 0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU,
+ 0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU,
+ 0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU,
+ 0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U,
+ 0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U,
+ 0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U,
+ 0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU,
+ 0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U,
+ 0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U,
+};
+static const u32 Td4[256] = {
+ 0x52525252U, 0x09090909U, 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xd5d5d5d5U,
+ 0x30303030U, 0x36363636U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0x38383838U,
+ 0xbfbfbfbfU, 0x40404040U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x9e9e9e9eU,
+ 0x81818181U, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xfbfbfbfbU,
+ 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x39393939U, 0x82828282U,
+ 0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0xffffffffU, 0x87878787U,
+ 0x34343434U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x43434343U, 0x44444444U,
+ 0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xdedededeU, 0xe9e9e9e9U, 0xcbcbcbcbU,
+ 0x54545454U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, 0x94949494U, 0x32323232U,
+ 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0x23232323U, 0x3d3d3d3dU,
+ 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x95959595U, 0x0b0b0b0bU,
+ 0x42424242U, 0xfafafafaU, 0xc3c3c3c3U, 0x4e4e4e4eU,
+ 0x08080808U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x66666666U,
+ 0x28282828U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x24242424U, 0xb2b2b2b2U,
+ 0x76767676U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0x49494949U,
+ 0x6d6d6d6dU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x25252525U,
+ 0x72727272U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x64646464U,
+ 0x86868686U, 0x68686868U, 0x98989898U, 0x16161616U,
+ 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, 0xccccccccU,
+ 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x65656565U, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0x92929292U,
+ 0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x70707070U, 0x48484848U, 0x50505050U,
+ 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0xededededU, 0xb9b9b9b9U, 0xdadadadaU,
+ 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x15151515U, 0x46464646U, 0x57575757U,
+ 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x84848484U,
+ 0x90909090U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0xababababU, 0x00000000U,
+ 0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0x0a0a0a0aU,
+ 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x58585858U, 0x05050505U,
+ 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, 0x45454545U, 0x06060606U,
+ 0xd0d0d0d0U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x8f8f8f8fU,
+ 0xcacacacaU, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, 0x02020202U,
+ 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0xafafafafU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x03030303U,
+ 0x01010101U, 0x13131313U, 0x8a8a8a8aU, 0x6b6b6b6bU,
+ 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x91919191U, 0x11111111U, 0x41414141U,
+ 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0x67676767U, 0xdcdcdcdcU, 0xeaeaeaeaU,
+ 0x97979797U, 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, 0xcecececeU,
+ 0xf0f0f0f0U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x73737373U,
+ 0x96969696U, 0xacacacacU, 0x74747474U, 0x22222222U,
+ 0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xadadadadU, 0x35353535U, 0x85858585U,
+ 0xe2e2e2e2U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x37373737U, 0xe8e8e8e8U,
+ 0x1c1c1c1cU, 0x75757575U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, 0x6e6e6e6eU,
+ 0x47474747U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, 0x1a1a1a1aU, 0x71717171U,
+ 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x29292929U, 0xc5c5c5c5U, 0x89898989U,
+ 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0x62626262U, 0x0e0e0e0eU,
+ 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0x18181818U, 0xbebebebeU, 0x1b1b1b1bU,
+ 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0x56565656U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0x4b4b4b4bU,
+ 0xc6c6c6c6U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, 0x79797979U, 0x20202020U,
+ 0x9a9a9a9aU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, 0xc0c0c0c0U, 0xfefefefeU,
+ 0x78787878U, 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xf4f4f4f4U,
+ 0x1f1f1f1fU, 0xddddddddU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, 0x33333333U,
+ 0x88888888U, 0x07070707U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x31313131U,
+ 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x12121212U, 0x10101010U, 0x59595959U,
+ 0x27272727U, 0x80808080U, 0xececececU, 0x5f5f5f5fU,
+ 0x60606060U, 0x51515151U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, 0xa9a9a9a9U,
+ 0x19191919U, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x0d0d0d0dU,
+ 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0x9f9f9f9fU,
+ 0x93939393U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xefefefefU,
+ 0xa0a0a0a0U, 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0x4d4d4d4dU,
+ 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0xf5f5f5f5U, 0xb0b0b0b0U,
+ 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0xebebebebU, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x3c3c3c3cU,
+ 0x83838383U, 0x53535353U, 0x99999999U, 0x61616161U,
+ 0x17171717U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, 0x04040404U, 0x7e7e7e7eU,
+ 0xbabababaU, 0x77777777U, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0x26262626U,
+ 0xe1e1e1e1U, 0x69696969U, 0x14141414U, 0x63636363U,
+ 0x55555555U, 0x21212121U, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x7d7d7d7dU,
+};
+static const u32 rcon[] = {
+ 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000,
+ 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000,
+ 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */
+};
+
+#define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3]))
+#define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); }
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule.
+ *
+ * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
+ */
+static int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) {
+ int i = 0;
+ u32 temp;
+
+ rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey );
+ rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey + 4);
+ rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey + 8);
+ rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12);
+ if (keyBits == 128) {
+ for (;;) {
+ temp = rk[3];
+ rk[4] = rk[0] ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rcon[i];
+ rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
+ rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
+ rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6];
+ if (++i == 10) {
+ return 10;
+ }
+ rk += 4;
+ }
+ }
+ rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16);
+ rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20);
+ if (keyBits == 192) {
+ for (;;) {
+ temp = rk[ 5];
+ rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rcon[i];
+ rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
+ rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
+ rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8];
+ if (++i == 8) {
+ return 12;
+ }
+ rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9];
+ rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10];
+ rk += 6;
+ }
+ }
+ rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24);
+ rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28);
+ if (keyBits == 256) {
+ for (;;) {
+ temp = rk[ 7];
+ rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rcon[i];
+ rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
+ rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
+ rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10];
+ if (++i == 7) {
+ return 14;
+ }
+ temp = rk[11];
+ rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
+ rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
+ rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
+ rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
+
+ rk += 8;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule.
+ *
+ * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
+ */
+static int
+rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits,
+ int have_encrypt) {
+ int Nr, i, j;
+ u32 temp;
+
+ if (have_encrypt) {
+ Nr = have_encrypt;
+ } else {
+ /* expand the cipher key: */
+ Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits);
+ }
+ /* invert the order of the round keys: */
+ for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) {
+ temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp;
+ temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp;
+ temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp;
+ temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp;
+ }
+ /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */
+ for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) {
+ rk += 4;
+ rk[0] =
+ Td0[Te4[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
+ Td1[Te4[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[Te4[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[Te4[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+ rk[1] =
+ Td0[Te4[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
+ Td1[Te4[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[Te4[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[Te4[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+ rk[2] =
+ Td0[Te4[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
+ Td1[Te4[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[Te4[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[Te4[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+ rk[3] =
+ Td0[Te4[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^
+ Td1[Te4[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[Te4[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[Te4[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+ }
+ return Nr;
+}
+
+static void rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]) {
+ u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
+#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
+ int r;
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+
+ /*
+ * map byte array block to cipher state
+ * and add initial round key:
+ */
+ s0 = GETU32(pt ) ^ rk[0];
+ s1 = GETU32(pt + 4) ^ rk[1];
+ s2 = GETU32(pt + 8) ^ rk[2];
+ s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3];
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+ /* round 1: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
+ /* round 2: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
+ /* round 3: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
+ /* round 4: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
+ /* round 5: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
+ /* round 6: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
+ /* round 7: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
+ /* round 8: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
+ /* round 9: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
+ if (Nr > 10) {
+ /* round 10: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
+ /* round 11: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
+ if (Nr > 12) {
+ /* round 12: */
+ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
+ s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
+ s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
+ s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
+ /* round 13: */
+ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
+ t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
+ t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
+ t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
+ }
+ }
+ rk += Nr << 2;
+#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */
+ /*
+ * Nr - 1 full rounds:
+ */
+ r = Nr >> 1;
+ for (;;) {
+ t0 =
+ Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[4];
+ t1 =
+ Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[5];
+ t2 =
+ Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[6];
+ t3 =
+ Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[7];
+
+ rk += 8;
+ if (--r == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ s0 =
+ Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[0];
+ s1 =
+ Te0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[1];
+ s2 =
+ Te0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[2];
+ s3 =
+ Te0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^
+ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Te3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[3];
+ }
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+ /*
+ * apply last round and
+ * map cipher state to byte array block:
+ */
+ s0 =
+ (Te4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[0];
+ PUTU32(ct , s0);
+ s1 =
+ (Te4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[1];
+ PUTU32(ct + 4, s1);
+ s2 =
+ (Te4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[2];
+ PUTU32(ct + 8, s2);
+ s3 =
+ (Te4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Te4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Te4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Te4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[3];
+ PUTU32(ct + 12, s3);
+}
+
+static void rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], u8 pt[16]) {
+ u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
+#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
+ int r;
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+
+ /*
+ * map byte array block to cipher state
+ * and add initial round key:
+ */
+ s0 = GETU32(ct ) ^ rk[0];
+ s1 = GETU32(ct + 4) ^ rk[1];
+ s2 = GETU32(ct + 8) ^ rk[2];
+ s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3];
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+ /* round 1: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
+ /* round 2: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
+ /* round 3: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
+ /* round 4: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
+ /* round 5: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
+ /* round 6: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
+ /* round 7: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
+ /* round 8: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
+ /* round 9: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
+ if (Nr > 10) {
+ /* round 10: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
+ /* round 11: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
+ if (Nr > 12) {
+ /* round 12: */
+ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
+ s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
+ s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
+ s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
+ /* round 13: */
+ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
+ t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
+ t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
+ t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
+ }
+ }
+ rk += Nr << 2;
+#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */
+ /*
+ * Nr - 1 full rounds:
+ */
+ r = Nr >> 1;
+ for (;;) {
+ t0 =
+ Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[4];
+ t1 =
+ Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[5];
+ t2 =
+ Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[6];
+ t3 =
+ Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[7];
+
+ rk += 8;
+ if (--r == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ s0 =
+ Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[0];
+ s1 =
+ Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[1];
+ s2 =
+ Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[2];
+ s3 =
+ Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^
+ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
+ Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^
+ rk[3];
+ }
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+ /*
+ * apply last round and
+ * map cipher state to byte array block:
+ */
+ s0 =
+ (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[0];
+ PUTU32(pt , s0);
+ s1 =
+ (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[1];
+ PUTU32(pt + 4, s1);
+ s2 =
+ (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[2];
+ PUTU32(pt + 8, s2);
+ s3 =
+ (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
+ (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+ (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+ (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+ rk[3];
+ PUTU32(pt + 12, s3);
+}
+
+void
+rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *key, int bits, int encrypt)
+{
+ ctx->Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->ek, key, bits);
+ if (encrypt) {
+ ctx->decrypt = 0;
+ memset(ctx->dk, 0, sizeof(ctx->dk));
+ } else {
+ ctx->decrypt = 1;
+ memcpy(ctx->dk, ctx->ek, sizeof(ctx->ek));
+ rijndaelKeySetupDec(ctx->dk, key, bits, ctx->Nr);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *src, u_char *dst)
+{
+ rijndaelDecrypt(ctx->dk, ctx->Nr, src, dst);
+}
+
+void
+rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *src, u_char *dst)
+{
+ rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->ek, ctx->Nr, src, dst);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.h,v 1.11 2001/09/13 09:48:39 markus Exp $ */
+
+/**
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.h
+ *
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef __RIJNDAEL_H
+#define __RIJNDAEL_H
+
+#define MAXKC (256/32)
+#define MAXKB (256/8)
+#define MAXNR 14
+
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+typedef unsigned short u16;
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+
+/* The structure for key information */
+typedef struct {
+ int decrypt;
+ int Nr; /* key-length-dependent number of rounds */
+ u32 ek[4*(MAXNR + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */
+ u32 dk[4*(MAXNR + 1)]; /* decrypt key schedule */
+} rijndael_ctx;
+
+void rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, int, int);
+void rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *);
+void rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *);
+
+#endif /* __RIJNDAEL_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *
+ * Description of the RSA algorithm can be found e.g. from the following
+ * sources:
+ *
+ * Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994.
+ *
+ * Jennifer Seberry and Josed Pieprzyk: Cryptography: An Introduction to
+ * Computer Security. Prentice-Hall, 1989.
+ *
+ * Man Young Rhee: Cryptography and Secure Data Communications. McGraw-Hill,
+ * 1994.
+ *
+ * R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman: Cryptographic Communications
+ * System and Method. US Patent 4,405,829, 1983.
+ *
+ * Hans Riesel: Prime Numbers and Computer Methods for Factorization.
+ * Birkhauser, 1994.
+ *
+ * The RSA Frequently Asked Questions document by RSA Data Security,
+ * Inc., 1995.
+ *
+ * RSA in 3 lines of perl by Adam Back <aba@atlax.ex.ac.uk>, 1995, as
+ * included below:
+ *
+ * [gone - had to be deleted - what a pity]
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.23 2001/06/27 05:42:24 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+void
+rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
+{
+ u_char *inbuf, *outbuf;
+ int len, ilen, olen;
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e))
+ fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() exponent too small or not odd");
+
+ olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+ outbuf = xmalloc(olen);
+
+ ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
+ inbuf = xmalloc(ilen);
+ BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
+
+ if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0)
+ fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() failed");
+
+ BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out);
+
+ memset(outbuf, 0, olen);
+ memset(inbuf, 0, ilen);
+ xfree(outbuf);
+ xfree(inbuf);
+}
+
+int
+rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key)
+{
+ u_char *inbuf, *outbuf;
+ int len, ilen, olen;
+
+ olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n);
+ outbuf = xmalloc(olen);
+
+ ilen = BN_num_bytes(in);
+ inbuf = xmalloc(ilen);
+ BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf);
+
+ if ((len = RSA_private_decrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) {
+ error("rsa_private_decrypt() failed");
+ } else {
+ BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out);
+ }
+ memset(outbuf, 0, olen);
+ memset(inbuf, 0, ilen);
+ xfree(outbuf);
+ xfree(inbuf);
+ return len;
+}
+
+void
+rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ BIGNUM *aux;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ /* Generate additional parameters */
+ aux = BN_new();
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+
+ BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one());
+ BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx);
+
+ BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one());
+ BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx);
+
+ BN_clear_free(aux);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * RSA key generation, encryption and decryption.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.14 2001/06/27 05:42:24 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef RSA_H
+#define RSA_H
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+void rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
+int rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *);
+void rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *);
+
+#endif /* RSA_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: scard.c,v 1.15 2001/09/28 09:49:31 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <sectok.h>
+
+#include "key.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "scard.h"
+
+#define CLA_SSH 0x05
+#define INS_DECRYPT 0x10
+#define INS_GET_KEYLENGTH 0x20
+#define INS_GET_PUBKEY 0x30
+#define INS_GET_RESPONSE 0xc0
+
+#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 256
+
+static int sc_fd = -1;
+static char *sc_reader_id = NULL;
+static int cla = 0x00; /* class */
+
+/* interface to libsectok */
+
+static int
+sc_open(void)
+{
+ int sw;
+
+ if (sc_fd >= 0)
+ return sc_fd;
+
+ sc_fd = sectok_friendly_open(sc_reader_id, STONOWAIT, &sw);
+ if (sc_fd < 0) {
+ error("sectok_open failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ return SCARD_ERROR_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (! sectok_cardpresent(sc_fd)) {
+ debug("smartcard in reader %s not present, skipping",
+ sc_reader_id);
+ sc_close();
+ return SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD;
+ }
+ if (sectok_reset(sc_fd, 0, NULL, &sw) <= 0) {
+ error("sectok_reset failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ sc_fd = -1;
+ return SCARD_ERROR_FAIL;
+ }
+ if ((cla = cyberflex_inq_class(sc_fd)) < 0)
+ cla = 0;
+
+ debug("sc_open ok %d", sc_fd);
+ return sc_fd;
+}
+
+static int
+sc_enable_applet(void)
+{
+ static u_char aid[] = {0xfc, 0x53, 0x73, 0x68, 0x2e, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6e};
+ int sw = 0;
+
+ /* select applet id */
+ sectok_apdu(sc_fd, cla, 0xa4, 0x04, 0, sizeof aid, aid, 0, NULL, &sw);
+ if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+ error("sectok_apdu failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ sc_close();
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sc_init(void)
+{
+ int status;
+
+ status = sc_open();
+ if (status == SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD) {
+ return SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD;
+ }
+ if (status < 0 ) {
+ error("sc_open failed");
+ return status;
+ }
+ if (sc_enable_applet() < 0) {
+ error("sc_enable_applet failed");
+ return SCARD_ERROR_APPLET;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sc_read_pubkey(Key * k)
+{
+ u_char buf[2], *n;
+ char *p;
+ int len, sw, status = -1;
+
+ len = sw = 0;
+ n = NULL;
+
+ if (sc_fd < 0) {
+ status = sc_init();
+ if (status < 0 )
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* get key size */
+ sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_KEYLENGTH, 0, 0, 0, NULL,
+ sizeof(buf), buf, &sw);
+ if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+ error("could not obtain key length: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1];
+ len /= 8;
+ debug("INS_GET_KEYLENGTH: len %d sw %s", len, sectok_get_sw(sw));
+
+ n = xmalloc(len);
+ /* get n */
+ sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_PUBKEY, 0, 0, 0, NULL, len, n, &sw);
+ if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+ error("could not obtain public key: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ debug("INS_GET_KEYLENGTH: sw %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->rsa->n) == NULL) {
+ error("c_read_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* currently the java applet just stores 'n' */
+ if (!BN_set_word(k->rsa->e, 35)) {
+ error("c_read_pubkey: BN_set_word(e, 35) failed");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ status = 0;
+ p = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ debug("fingerprint %d %s", key_size(k), p);
+ xfree(p);
+
+err:
+ if (n != NULL)
+ xfree(n);
+ sc_close();
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* private key operations */
+
+static int
+sc_private_decrypt(int flen, u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ u_char *padded = NULL;
+ int sw, len, olen, status = -1;
+
+ debug("sc_private_decrypt called");
+
+ olen = len = sw = 0;
+ if (sc_fd < 0) {
+ status = sc_init();
+ if (status < 0 )
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ goto err;
+
+ len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ padded = xmalloc(len);
+
+ sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_DECRYPT, 0, 0, len, from, 0, NULL, &sw);
+ if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+ error("sc_private_decrypt: INS_DECRYPT failed: %s",
+ sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_RESPONSE, 0, 0, 0, NULL,
+ len, padded, &sw);
+ if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+ error("sc_private_decrypt: INS_GET_RESPONSE failed: %s",
+ sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ olen = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, len, padded + 1, len - 1,
+ len);
+err:
+ if (padded)
+ xfree(padded);
+ sc_close();
+ return (olen >= 0 ? olen : status);
+}
+
+static int
+sc_private_encrypt(int flen, u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ u_char *padded = NULL;
+ int sw, len, status = -1;
+
+ len = sw = 0;
+ if (sc_fd < 0) {
+ status = sc_init();
+ if (status < 0 )
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ goto err;
+
+ debug("sc_private_encrypt called");
+ len = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ padded = xmalloc(len);
+
+ if (RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(padded, len, from, flen) <= 0) {
+ error("RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1 failed");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_DECRYPT, 0, 0, len, padded, 0, NULL, &sw);
+ if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+ error("sc_private_decrypt: INS_DECRYPT failed: %s",
+ sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ sectok_apdu(sc_fd, CLA_SSH, INS_GET_RESPONSE, 0, 0, 0, NULL,
+ len, to, &sw);
+ if (!sectok_swOK(sw)) {
+ error("sc_private_decrypt: INS_GET_RESPONSE failed: %s",
+ sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ goto err;
+ }
+err:
+ if (padded)
+ xfree(padded);
+ sc_close();
+ return (len >= 0 ? len : status);
+}
+
+/* called on free */
+
+static int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa) = NULL;
+
+static int
+sc_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ if (orig_finish)
+ orig_finish(rsa);
+ sc_close();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* engine for overloading private key operations */
+
+static ENGINE *smart_engine = NULL;
+static RSA_METHOD smart_rsa =
+{
+ "sectok",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+ENGINE *
+sc_get_engine(void)
+{
+ RSA_METHOD *def;
+
+ def = RSA_get_default_openssl_method();
+
+ /* overload */
+ smart_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = sc_private_encrypt;
+ smart_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = sc_private_decrypt;
+
+ /* save original */
+ orig_finish = def->finish;
+ smart_rsa.finish = sc_finish;
+
+ /* just use the OpenSSL version */
+ smart_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = def->rsa_pub_enc;
+ smart_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = def->rsa_pub_dec;
+ smart_rsa.rsa_mod_exp = def->rsa_mod_exp;
+ smart_rsa.bn_mod_exp = def->bn_mod_exp;
+ smart_rsa.init = def->init;
+ smart_rsa.flags = def->flags;
+ smart_rsa.app_data = def->app_data;
+ smart_rsa.rsa_sign = def->rsa_sign;
+ smart_rsa.rsa_verify = def->rsa_verify;
+
+ smart_engine = ENGINE_new();
+
+ ENGINE_set_id(smart_engine, "sectok");
+ ENGINE_set_name(smart_engine, "libsectok");
+ ENGINE_set_RSA(smart_engine, &smart_rsa);
+ ENGINE_set_DSA(smart_engine, DSA_get_default_openssl_method());
+ ENGINE_set_DH(smart_engine, DH_get_default_openssl_method());
+ ENGINE_set_RAND(smart_engine, RAND_SSLeay());
+ ENGINE_set_BN_mod_exp(smart_engine, BN_mod_exp);
+
+ return smart_engine;
+}
+
+void
+sc_close(void)
+{
+ if (sc_fd >= 0) {
+ sectok_close(sc_fd);
+ sc_fd = -1;
+ }
+}
+
+Key *
+sc_get_key(const char *id)
+{
+ Key *k;
+ int status;
+
+ if (sc_reader_id != NULL)
+ xfree(sc_reader_id);
+ sc_reader_id = xstrdup(id);
+
+ k = key_new(KEY_RSA);
+ if (k == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ status = sc_read_pubkey(k);
+ if (status == SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD) {
+ key_free(k);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (status < 0 ) {
+ error("sc_read_pubkey failed");
+ key_free(k);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return k;
+}
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: scard.h,v 1.6 2001/08/01 22:03:33 markus Exp $ */
+
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+#ifndef SCARD_H
+#define SCARD_H
+
+#define SCARD_ERROR_FAIL -1
+#define SCARD_ERROR_NOCARD -2
+#define SCARD_ERROR_APPLET -3
+
+Key *sc_get_key(const char*);
+ENGINE *sc_get_engine(void);
+void sc_close(void);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+# $Id$
+
+prefix=@prefix@
+datadir=@datadir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+
+all:
+
+Ssh.bin: Ssh.bin.uu
+ uudecode Ssh.bin.uu
+
+clean:
+ rm -rf Ssh.bin
+
+distprep: Ssh.bin
+
+distclean: clean
+ rm -f Makefile *~
+
+install: $(srcdir)/Ssh.bin
+ $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(datadir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0644 $(srcdir)/Ssh.bin $(DESTDIR)$(datadir)/Ssh.bin
--- /dev/null
+begin 644 Ssh.bin
+M`P)!%P`501P`;``!`C@"`/Y@\`4`_J'P!0!!%T$;`?Z@\`4`01=!&@'^>/,!
+M`4$701P!_G#S%P'^0],1`?Y@\!0`_G/S'0#^<]4``D$7L`4`_F'3``!!%T$9
+M`?YATP4`_G/5"P7^8=,'`OZAT`$!_J#0$@1!%T$8`0```$$7!`$&`/Y@`;@`
+M`$$8\`H(`$$9\`H``$$:\@\``$$;\B$``$$<\A```/`&__(```0(`!8```9C
+M""T#"<(H+00$*"T%""A;`&19``#P$/_R`P(&`0#(```38`!!70!&$UP`1@09
+M":1+``D*D`!@`"@37`!&!!E6`````*(````$____P````*$````0````*@``
+M`"````"-````,````&H37`!&`QD(2@`)"FX`8``H$UP`1@<9"@#_/2!@`$L1
+M2@`)"F<`8``H$UP`'A-<`$8($1-<`$8(7@!0"!%@`%59"C\`8`!:*PIS:&``
+M6BL37`!&`P,*`(!@`%\K`PH`@&``55D37`!&`P<H$UP`1@0#*`,%8`!565D*
+M;0!@`"A9`/`"__(!`0$)``@```J0`&``*%D`\!/_\@$!`@D`#```8D$7+5\`
+M/"M9````\!+_]@$!`P$`&```$UP`'EX`,D4`#Q-<`!X*`,@)$%X`-P17L`7_
+M\@$!!`(`/```$U\``!-B_J$M7P`%70`*$V+^H"U?``]=`!038OYX+0H$`%\`
+<&5T`'@H$`&``(T4`"0IG`&``*!->`"U9````````
+`
+end
--- /dev/null
+// $Id$
+//
+// Ssh.java
+// SSH / smartcard integration project, smartcard side
+//
+// Tomoko Fukuzawa, created, Feb., 2000
+//
+// Naomaru Itoi, modified, Apr., 2000
+//
+
+// copyright 2000
+// the regents of the university of michigan
+// all rights reserved
+//
+// permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works
+// and redistribute this software and such derivative works
+// for any purpose, so long as the name of the university of
+// michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity
+// pertaining to the use or distribution of this software
+// without specific, written prior authorization. if the
+// above copyright notice or any other identification of the
+// university of michigan is included in any copy of any
+// portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must
+// also be included.
+//
+// this software is provided as is, without representation
+// from the university of michigan as to its fitness for any
+// purpose, and without warranty by the university of
+// michigan of any kind, either express or implied, including
+// without limitation the implied warranties of
+// merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. the
+// regents of the university of michigan shall not be liable
+// for any damages, including special, indirect, incidental, or
+// consequential damages, with respect to any claim arising
+// out of or in connection with the use of the software, even
+// if it has been or is hereafter advised of the possibility of
+// such damages.
+
+import javacard.framework.*;
+import javacardx.framework.*;
+import javacardx.crypto.*;
+
+public class Ssh extends javacard.framework.Applet
+{
+ /* constants declaration */
+ // code of CLA byte in the command APDU header
+ static final byte Ssh_CLA =(byte)0x05;
+
+ // codes of INS byte in the command APDU header
+ static final byte DECRYPT = (byte) 0x10;
+ static final byte GET_KEYLENGTH = (byte) 0x20;
+ static final byte GET_PUBKEY = (byte) 0x30;
+ static final byte GET_RESPONSE = (byte) 0xc0;
+
+ /* instance variables declaration */
+ static final short keysize = 1024;
+
+ //RSA_CRT_PrivateKey rsakey;
+ AsymKey rsakey;
+ CyberflexFile file;
+ CyberflexOS os;
+
+ byte buffer[];
+
+ static byte[] keyHdr = {(byte)0xC2, (byte)0x01, (byte)0x05};
+
+ private Ssh()
+ {
+ file = new CyberflexFile();
+ os = new CyberflexOS();
+
+ rsakey = new RSA_CRT_PrivateKey (keysize);
+
+ if ( ! rsakey.isSupportedLength (keysize) )
+ ISOException.throwIt (ISO.SW_WRONG_LENGTH);
+
+ register();
+ } // end of the constructor
+
+ public boolean select() {
+ if (!rsakey.isInitialized())
+ rsakey.setKeyInstance ((short)0xc8, (short)0x10);
+
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ public static void install(APDU apdu)
+ {
+ new Ssh(); // create a Ssh applet instance (card)
+ } // end of install method
+
+ public static void main(String args[]) {
+ ISOException.throwIt((short) 0x9000);
+ }
+
+ public void process(APDU apdu)
+ {
+ // APDU object carries a byte array (buffer) to
+ // transfer incoming and outgoing APDU header
+ // and data bytes between card and CAD
+ buffer = apdu.getBuffer();
+
+ // verify that if the applet can accept this
+ // APDU message
+ // NI: change suggested by Wayne Dyksen, Purdue
+ if (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS] == ISO.INS_SELECT)
+ ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_NO_ERROR);
+
+ switch (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_INS]) {
+ case DECRYPT:
+ if (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_CLA] != Ssh_CLA)
+ ISOException.throwIt(ISO.SW_CLA_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ //decrypt (apdu);
+ short size = (short) (buffer[ISO.OFFSET_LC] & 0x00FF);
+
+ if (apdu.setIncomingAndReceive() != size)
+ ISOException.throwIt (ISO.SW_WRONG_LENGTH);
+
+ rsakey.cryptoUpdate (buffer, (short) ISO.OFFSET_CDATA, size,
+ buffer, (short) ISO.OFFSET_CDATA);
+
+ apdu.setOutgoingAndSend ((short) ISO.OFFSET_CDATA, size);
+ return;
+ case GET_PUBKEY:
+ file.selectFile((short)(0x3f<<8)); // select root
+ file.selectFile((short)(('s'<<8)|'h')); // select public key file
+ os.readBinaryFile (buffer, (short)0, (short)0, (short)(keysize/8));
+ apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0, (short)(keysize/8));
+ return;
+ case GET_KEYLENGTH:
+ buffer[0] = (byte)((keysize >> 8) & 0xff);
+ buffer[1] = (byte)(keysize & 0xff);
+ apdu.setOutgoingAndSend ((short)0, (short)2);
+ return;
+ case GET_RESPONSE:
+ return;
+ default:
+ ISOException.throwIt (ISO.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ }
+
+ } // end of process method
+
+} // end of class Ssh
--- /dev/null
+.\" -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" scp.1
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.20 2001/09/17 23:56:07 stevesk Exp $
+.\"
+.Dd September 25, 1999
+.Dt SCP 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm scp
+.Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm scp
+.Op Fl pqrvBC46
+.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+.Op Fl S Ar program
+.Op Fl P Ar port
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Sm off
+.Oo
+.Op Ar user@
+.Ar host1 No :
+.Oc Ns Ar file1
+.Sm on
+.Op Ar ...
+.Sm off
+.Oo
+.Op Ar user@
+.Ar host2 No :
+.Oc Ar file2
+.Sm on
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+copies files between hosts on a network.
+It uses
+.Xr ssh 1
+for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
+same security as
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+Unlike
+.Xr rcp 1 ,
+.Nm
+will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
+authentication.
+.Pp
+Any file name may contain a host and user specification to indicate
+that the file is to be copied to/from that host.
+Copies between two remote hosts are permitted.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl c Ar cipher
+Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for RSA
+authentication is read.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl p
+Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+original file.
+.It Fl r
+Recursively copy entire directories.
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+and
+.Xr ssh 1
+to print debugging messages about their progress.
+This is helpful in
+debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+.It Fl B
+Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases).
+.It Fl q
+Disables the progress meter.
+.It Fl C
+Compression enable.
+Passes the
+.Fl C
+flag to
+.Xr ssh 1
+to enable compression.
+.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
+Specifies an alternative
+per-user configuration file for
+.Nm ssh .
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl P Ar port
+Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+Note that this option is written with a capital
+.Sq P ,
+because
+.Fl p
+is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file in
+.Xr rcp 1 .
+.It Fl S Ar program
+Name of
+.Ar program
+to use for the encrypted connection.
+The program must understand
+.Xr ssh 1
+options.
+.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
+Can be used to pass options to
+.Nm ssh
+in the format used in the
+.Xr ssh 1
+configuration file. This is useful for specifying options
+for which there is no separate
+.Nm scp
+command-line flag. For example, forcing the use of protocol
+version 1 is specified using
+.Ic scp -oProtocol=1 .
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.El
+.Sh AUTHORS
+Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi> and Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+is based on the
+.Xr rcp 1
+program in BSD source code from the Regents of the University of
+California.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr rcp 1 ,
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
+ * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
+ *
+ * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to
+ * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.)
+ *
+ * 1995 Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>, Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Parts from:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.85 2001/10/01 08:06:28 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+/* For progressmeter() -- number of seconds before xfer considered "stalled" */
+#define STALLTIME 5
+/* alarm() interval for updating progress meter */
+#define PROGRESSTIME 1
+
+/* Progress meter bar */
+#define BAR \
+ "************************************************************"\
+ "************************************************************"\
+ "************************************************************"\
+ "************************************************************"
+#define MAX_BARLENGTH (sizeof(BAR) - 1)
+
+/* Visual statistics about files as they are transferred. */
+void progressmeter(int);
+
+/* Returns width of the terminal (for progress meter calculations). */
+int getttywidth(void);
+int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc);
+
+/* Struct for addargs */
+arglist args;
+
+/* Time a transfer started. */
+static struct timeval start;
+
+/* Number of bytes of current file transferred so far. */
+volatile off_t statbytes;
+
+/* Total size of current file. */
+off_t totalbytes = 0;
+
+/* Name of current file being transferred. */
+char *curfile;
+
+/* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */
+int verbose_mode = 0;
+
+/* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */
+int showprogress = 1;
+
+/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */
+char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
+
+/*
+ * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the
+ * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This
+ * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success.
+ */
+
+int
+do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc)
+{
+ int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2];
+
+ if (verbose_mode)
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
+ ssh_program, host,
+ remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
+
+ /*
+ * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get
+ * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below.
+ */
+ pipe(reserved);
+
+ /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
+ if (pipe(pin) < 0)
+ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (pipe(pout) < 0)
+ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Free the reserved descriptors. */
+ close(reserved[0]);
+ close(reserved[1]);
+
+ /* For a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
+ if (fork() == 0) {
+ /* Child. */
+ close(pin[1]);
+ close(pout[0]);
+ dup2(pin[0], 0);
+ dup2(pout[1], 1);
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+
+ args.list[0] = ssh_program;
+ if (remuser != NULL)
+ addargs(&args, "-l%s", remuser);
+ addargs(&args, "%s", host);
+ addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
+
+ execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
+ perror(ssh_program);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */
+ close(pin[0]);
+ *fdout = pin[1];
+ close(pout[1]);
+ *fdin = pout[0];
+ return 0;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+ int cnt;
+ char *buf;
+} BUF;
+
+BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int);
+void lostconn(int);
+void nospace(void);
+int okname(char *);
+void run_err(const char *,...);
+void verifydir(char *);
+
+struct passwd *pwd;
+uid_t userid;
+int errs, remin, remout;
+int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
+
+#define CMDNEEDS 64
+char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
+
+int response(void);
+void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
+void sink(int, char *[]);
+void source(int, char *[]);
+void tolocal(int, char *[]);
+void toremote(char *, int, char *[]);
+void usage(void);
+
+int
+main(argc, argv)
+ int argc;
+ char *argv[];
+{
+ int ch, fflag, tflag;
+ char *targ;
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern int optind;
+
+ __progname = get_progname(argv[0]);
+
+ args.list = NULL;
+ addargs(&args, "ssh"); /* overwritten with ssh_program */
+ addargs(&args, "-x");
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oFallBackToRsh no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
+
+ fflag = tflag = 0;
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfprtvBCc:i:P:q46S:o:F:")) != -1)
+ switch (ch) {
+ /* User-visible flags. */
+ case '4':
+ case '6':
+ case 'C':
+ addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ case 'c':
+ case 'i':
+ case 'F':
+ addargs(&args, "-%c%s", ch, optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ addargs(&args, "-p%s", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'B':
+ addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode yes");
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ pflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ iamrecursive = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ addargs(&args, "-v");
+ verbose_mode = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ showprogress = 0;
+ break;
+
+ /* Server options. */
+ case 'd':
+ targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'f': /* "from" */
+ iamremote = 1;
+ fflag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 't': /* "to" */
+ iamremote = 1;
+ tflag = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ setmode(0, O_BINARY);
+#endif
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+
+ if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
+ fatal("unknown user %d", (int) userid);
+
+ if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
+ showprogress = 0;
+
+ remin = STDIN_FILENO;
+ remout = STDOUT_FILENO;
+
+ if (fflag) {
+ /* Follow "protocol", send data. */
+ (void) response();
+ source(argc, argv);
+ exit(errs != 0);
+ }
+ if (tflag) {
+ /* Receive data. */
+ sink(argc, argv);
+ exit(errs != 0);
+ }
+ if (argc < 2)
+ usage();
+ if (argc > 2)
+ targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
+
+ remin = remout = -1;
+ /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
+ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s",
+ verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
+ iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
+ targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
+
+ (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
+
+ if ((targ = colon(argv[argc - 1]))) /* Dest is remote host. */
+ toremote(targ, argc, argv);
+ else {
+ tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */
+ if (targetshouldbedirectory)
+ verifydir(argv[argc - 1]);
+ }
+ exit(errs != 0);
+}
+
+void
+toremote(targ, argc, argv)
+ char *targ, *argv[];
+ int argc;
+{
+ int i, len;
+ char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser;
+
+ *targ++ = 0;
+ if (*targ == 0)
+ targ = ".";
+
+ if ((thost = strchr(argv[argc - 1], '@'))) {
+ /* user@host */
+ *thost++ = 0;
+ tuser = argv[argc - 1];
+ if (*tuser == '\0')
+ tuser = NULL;
+ else if (!okname(tuser))
+ exit(1);
+ } else {
+ thost = argv[argc - 1];
+ tuser = NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
+ src = colon(argv[i]);
+ if (src) { /* remote to remote */
+ static char *ssh_options =
+ "-x -o'FallBackToRsh no' "
+ "-o'ClearAllForwardings yes'";
+ *src++ = 0;
+ if (*src == 0)
+ src = ".";
+ host = strchr(argv[i], '@');
+ len = strlen(ssh_program) + strlen(argv[i]) +
+ strlen(src) + (tuser ? strlen(tuser) : 0) +
+ strlen(thost) + strlen(targ) +
+ strlen(ssh_options) + CMDNEEDS + 20;
+ bp = xmalloc(len);
+ if (host) {
+ *host++ = 0;
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ suser = argv[i];
+ if (*suser == '\0')
+ suser = pwd->pw_name;
+ else if (!okname(suser))
+ continue;
+ snprintf(bp, len,
+ "%s%s %s -n "
+ "-l %s %s %s %s '%s%s%s:%s'",
+ ssh_program, verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
+ ssh_options, suser, host, cmd, src,
+ tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
+ thost, targ);
+ } else {
+ host = cleanhostname(argv[i]);
+ snprintf(bp, len,
+ "exec %s%s %s -n %s "
+ "%s %s '%s%s%s:%s'",
+ ssh_program, verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
+ ssh_options, host, cmd, src,
+ tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
+ thost, targ);
+ }
+ if (verbose_mode)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Executing: %s\n", bp);
+ (void) system(bp);
+ (void) xfree(bp);
+ } else { /* local to remote */
+ if (remin == -1) {
+ len = strlen(targ) + CMDNEEDS + 20;
+ bp = xmalloc(len);
+ (void) snprintf(bp, len, "%s -t %s", cmd, targ);
+ host = cleanhostname(thost);
+ if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin,
+ &remout, argc) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ if (response() < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ (void) xfree(bp);
+ }
+ source(1, argv + i);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void
+tolocal(argc, argv)
+ int argc;
+ char *argv[];
+{
+ int i, len;
+ char *bp, *host, *src, *suser;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
+ if (!(src = colon(argv[i]))) { /* Local to local. */
+ len = strlen(_PATH_CP) + strlen(argv[i]) +
+ strlen(argv[argc - 1]) + 20;
+ bp = xmalloc(len);
+ (void) snprintf(bp, len, "exec %s%s%s %s %s", _PATH_CP,
+ iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
+ argv[i], argv[argc - 1]);
+ if (verbose_mode)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Executing: %s\n", bp);
+ if (system(bp))
+ ++errs;
+ (void) xfree(bp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ *src++ = 0;
+ if (*src == 0)
+ src = ".";
+ if ((host = strchr(argv[i], '@')) == NULL) {
+ host = argv[i];
+ suser = NULL;
+ } else {
+ *host++ = 0;
+ suser = argv[i];
+ if (*suser == '\0')
+ suser = pwd->pw_name;
+ else if (!okname(suser))
+ continue;
+ }
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ len = strlen(src) + CMDNEEDS + 20;
+ bp = xmalloc(len);
+ (void) snprintf(bp, len, "%s -f %s", cmd, src);
+ if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout, argc) < 0) {
+ (void) xfree(bp);
+ ++errs;
+ continue;
+ }
+ xfree(bp);
+ sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
+ (void) close(remin);
+ remin = remout = -1;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+source(argc, argv)
+ int argc;
+ char *argv[];
+{
+ struct stat stb;
+ static BUF buffer;
+ BUF *bp;
+ off_t i, amt, result;
+ int fd, haderr, indx;
+ char *last, *name, buf[2048];
+ int len;
+
+ for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
+ name = argv[indx];
+ statbytes = 0;
+ len = strlen(name);
+ while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
+ name[--len] = '\0';
+ if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) {
+ run_err("%s: skipping, filename contains a newline",
+ name);
+ goto next;
+ }
+ if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
+ goto syserr;
+ if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
+syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
+ goto next;
+ }
+ switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case S_IFREG:
+ break;
+ case S_IFDIR:
+ if (iamrecursive) {
+ rsource(name, &stb);
+ goto next;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ run_err("%s: not a regular file", name);
+ goto next;
+ }
+ if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL)
+ last = name;
+ else
+ ++last;
+ curfile = last;
+ if (pflag) {
+ /*
+ * Make it compatible with possible future
+ * versions expecting microseconds.
+ */
+ (void) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "T%lu 0 %lu 0\n",
+ (u_long) stb.st_mtime,
+ (u_long) stb.st_atime);
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
+ if (response() < 0)
+ goto next;
+ }
+#define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
+#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
+ (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
+ (long long) stb.st_size, last);
+#else
+ /* XXX: Handle integer overflow? */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lu %s\n",
+ (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
+ (u_long) stb.st_size, last);
+#endif
+
+ if (verbose_mode) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ }
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
+ if (response() < 0)
+ goto next;
+ if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, 2048)) == NULL) {
+next: (void) close(fd);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (showprogress) {
+ totalbytes = stb.st_size;
+ progressmeter(-1);
+ }
+ /* Keep writing after an error so that we stay sync'd up. */
+ for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) {
+ amt = bp->cnt;
+ if (i + amt > stb.st_size)
+ amt = stb.st_size - i;
+ if (!haderr) {
+ result = atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt);
+ if (result != amt)
+ haderr = result >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
+ }
+ if (haderr)
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, bp->buf, amt);
+ else {
+ result = atomicio(write, remout, bp->buf, amt);
+ if (result != amt)
+ haderr = result >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
+ statbytes += result;
+ }
+ }
+ if (showprogress)
+ progressmeter(1);
+
+ if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr)
+ haderr = errno;
+ if (!haderr)
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+ else
+ run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
+ (void) response();
+ }
+}
+
+void
+rsource(name, statp)
+ char *name;
+ struct stat *statp;
+{
+ DIR *dirp;
+ struct dirent *dp;
+ char *last, *vect[1], path[1100];
+
+ if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) {
+ run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
+ return;
+ }
+ last = strrchr(name, '/');
+ if (last == 0)
+ last = name;
+ else
+ last++;
+ if (pflag) {
+ (void) snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "T%lu 0 %lu 0\n",
+ (u_long) statp->st_mtime,
+ (u_long) statp->st_atime);
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, path, strlen(path));
+ if (response() < 0) {
+ closedir(dirp);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n",
+ (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last);
+ if (verbose_mode)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path);
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, path, strlen(path));
+ if (response() < 0) {
+ closedir(dirp);
+ return;
+ }
+ while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+ if (dp->d_ino == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, ".."))
+ continue;
+ if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) {
+ run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name);
+ continue;
+ }
+ (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name);
+ vect[0] = path;
+ source(1, vect);
+ }
+ (void) closedir(dirp);
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, "E\n", 2);
+ (void) response();
+}
+
+void
+sink(argc, argv)
+ int argc;
+ char *argv[];
+{
+ static BUF buffer;
+ struct stat stb;
+ enum {
+ YES, NO, DISPLAYED
+ } wrerr;
+ BUF *bp;
+ off_t i, j;
+ int amt, count, exists, first, mask, mode, ofd, omode;
+ off_t size;
+ int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
+ char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048];
+ struct timeval tv[2];
+
+#define atime tv[0]
+#define mtime tv[1]
+#define SCREWUP(str) do { why = str; goto screwup; } while (0)
+
+ setimes = targisdir = 0;
+ mask = umask(0);
+ if (!pflag)
+ (void) umask(mask);
+ if (argc != 1) {
+ run_err("ambiguous target");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ targ = *argv;
+ if (targetshouldbedirectory)
+ verifydir(targ);
+
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+ if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+ targisdir = 1;
+ for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+ cp = buf;
+ if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) <= 0)
+ return;
+ if (*cp++ == '\n')
+ SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
+ do {
+ if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
+ SCREWUP("lost connection");
+ *cp++ = ch;
+ } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
+ *cp = 0;
+
+ if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') {
+ if (iamremote == 0)
+ (void) atomicio(write, STDERR_FILENO,
+ buf + 1, strlen(buf + 1));
+ if (buf[0] == '\02')
+ exit(1);
+ ++errs;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (buf[0] == 'E') {
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (ch == '\n')
+ *--cp = 0;
+
+ cp = buf;
+ if (*cp == 'T') {
+ setimes++;
+ cp++;
+ mtime.tv_sec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+ if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+ SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited");
+ mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+ if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+ SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited");
+ atime.tv_sec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+ if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+ SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited");
+ atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+ if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0')
+ SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited");
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
+ /*
+ * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar".
+ * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned
+ * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is
+ * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't
+ * followed.
+ */
+ if (first) {
+ run_err("%s", cp);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ SCREWUP("expected control record");
+ }
+ mode = 0;
+ for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) {
+ if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7')
+ SCREWUP("bad mode");
+ mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0');
+ }
+ if (*cp++ != ' ')
+ SCREWUP("mode not delimited");
+
+ for (size = 0; isdigit(*cp);)
+ size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0');
+ if (*cp++ != ' ')
+ SCREWUP("size not delimited");
+ if (targisdir) {
+ static char *namebuf;
+ static int cursize;
+ size_t need;
+
+ need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250;
+ if (need > cursize) {
+ if (namebuf)
+ xfree(namebuf);
+ namebuf = xmalloc(need);
+ cursize = need;
+ }
+ (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ,
+ *targ ? "/" : "", cp);
+ np = namebuf;
+ } else
+ np = targ;
+ curfile = cp;
+ exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0;
+ if (buf[0] == 'D') {
+ int mod_flag = pflag;
+ if (exists) {
+ if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) {
+ errno = ENOTDIR;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (pflag)
+ (void) chmod(np, mode);
+ } else {
+ /* Handle copying from a read-only
+ directory */
+ mod_flag = 1;
+ if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
+ sink(1, vect);
+ if (setimes) {
+ setimes = 0;
+ if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
+ run_err("%s: set times: %s",
+ vect[0], strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (mod_flag)
+ (void) chmod(vect[0], mode);
+ if (vect[0])
+ xfree(vect[0]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ omode = mode;
+ mode |= S_IWRITE;
+ if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) {
+bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+ if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, 4096)) == NULL) {
+ (void) close(ofd);
+ continue;
+ }
+ cp = bp->buf;
+ wrerr = NO;
+
+ if (showprogress) {
+ totalbytes = size;
+ progressmeter(-1);
+ }
+ statbytes = 0;
+ for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += 4096) {
+ amt = 4096;
+ if (i + amt > size)
+ amt = size - i;
+ count += amt;
+ do {
+ j = read(remin, cp, amt);
+ if (j == -1 && (errno == EINTR ||
+ errno == EAGAIN)) {
+ continue;
+ } else if (j <= 0) {
+ run_err("%s", j ? strerror(errno) :
+ "dropped connection");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ amt -= j;
+ cp += j;
+ statbytes += j;
+ } while (amt > 0);
+ if (count == bp->cnt) {
+ /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */
+ if (wrerr == NO) {
+ j = atomicio(write, ofd, bp->buf, count);
+ if (j != count) {
+ wrerr = YES;
+ wrerrno = j >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
+ }
+ }
+ count = 0;
+ cp = bp->buf;
+ }
+ }
+ if (showprogress)
+ progressmeter(1);
+ if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO &&
+ (j = atomicio(write, ofd, bp->buf, count)) != count) {
+ wrerr = YES;
+ wrerrno = j >= 0 ? EIO : errno;
+ }
+ if (ftruncate(ofd, size)) {
+ run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+ wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+ }
+ if (pflag) {
+ if (exists || omode != mode)
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+ if (fchmod(ofd, omode))
+#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+ if (chmod(np, omode))
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+ run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
+ np, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ if (!exists && omode != mode)
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+ if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask))
+#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+ if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask))
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+ run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
+ np, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (close(ofd) == -1) {
+ wrerr = YES;
+ wrerrno = errno;
+ }
+ (void) response();
+ if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
+ setimes = 0;
+ if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) {
+ run_err("%s: set times: %s",
+ np, strerror(errno));
+ wrerr = DISPLAYED;
+ }
+ }
+ switch (wrerr) {
+ case YES:
+ run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno));
+ break;
+ case NO:
+ (void) atomicio(write, remout, "", 1);
+ break;
+ case DISPLAYED:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+screwup:
+ run_err("protocol error: %s", why);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+response()
+{
+ char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048];
+
+ if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp))
+ lostconn(0);
+
+ cp = rbuf;
+ switch (resp) {
+ case 0: /* ok */
+ return (0);
+ default:
+ *cp++ = resp;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */
+ case 2: /* fatal error, "" */
+ do {
+ if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
+ lostconn(0);
+ *cp++ = ch;
+ } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
+
+ if (!iamremote)
+ (void) atomicio(write, STDERR_FILENO, rbuf, cp - rbuf);
+ ++errs;
+ if (resp == 1)
+ return (-1);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+void
+usage()
+{
+ (void) fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: scp [-pqrvBC46] [-F config] [-S ssh] [-P port] [-c cipher] [-i identity]\n"
+ " [-o option] f1 f2\n"
+ " or: scp [options] f1 ... fn directory\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+run_err(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+ static FILE *fp;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ ++errs;
+ if (fp == NULL && !(fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))
+ return;
+ (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
+ (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ (void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
+ (void) fflush(fp);
+
+ if (!iamremote) {
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+}
+
+void
+verifydir(cp)
+ char *cp;
+{
+ struct stat stb;
+
+ if (!stat(cp, &stb)) {
+ if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+ return;
+ errno = ENOTDIR;
+ }
+ run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+okname(cp0)
+ char *cp0;
+{
+ int c;
+ char *cp;
+
+ cp = cp0;
+ do {
+ c = (int)*cp;
+ if (c & 0200)
+ goto bad;
+ if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit(c) &&
+ c != '_' && c != '-' && c != '.' && c != '+')
+ goto bad;
+ } while (*++cp);
+ return (1);
+
+bad: fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+BUF *
+allocbuf(bp, fd, blksize)
+ BUF *bp;
+ int fd, blksize;
+{
+ size_t size;
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
+ struct stat stb;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
+ run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (stb.st_blksize == 0)
+ size = blksize;
+ else
+ size = blksize + (stb.st_blksize - blksize % stb.st_blksize) %
+ stb.st_blksize;
+#else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
+ size = blksize;
+#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
+ if (bp->cnt >= size)
+ return (bp);
+ if (bp->buf == NULL)
+ bp->buf = xmalloc(size);
+ else
+ bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, size);
+ memset(bp->buf, 0, size);
+ bp->cnt = size;
+ return (bp);
+}
+
+void
+lostconn(signo)
+ int signo;
+{
+ if (!iamremote)
+ write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16);
+ if (signo)
+ _exit(1);
+ else
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+updateprogressmeter(int ignore)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+
+ progressmeter(0);
+ signal(SIGALRM, updateprogressmeter);
+ alarm(PROGRESSTIME);
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+static int
+foregroundproc(void)
+{
+ static pid_t pgrp = -1;
+ int ctty_pgrp;
+
+ if (pgrp == -1)
+ pgrp = getpgrp();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+ return ((ctty_pgrp = tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO)) != -1 &&
+ ctty_pgrp == pgrp);
+#else
+ return ((ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) != -1 &&
+ ctty_pgrp == pgrp));
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+progressmeter(int flag)
+{
+ static const char prefixes[] = " KMGTP";
+ static struct timeval lastupdate;
+ static off_t lastsize;
+ struct timeval now, td, wait;
+ off_t cursize, abbrevsize;
+ double elapsed;
+ int ratio, barlength, i, remaining;
+ char buf[256];
+
+ if (flag == -1) {
+ (void) gettimeofday(&start, (struct timezone *) 0);
+ lastupdate = start;
+ lastsize = 0;
+ }
+ if (foregroundproc() == 0)
+ return;
+
+ (void) gettimeofday(&now, (struct timezone *) 0);
+ cursize = statbytes;
+ if (totalbytes != 0) {
+ ratio = 100.0 * cursize / totalbytes;
+ ratio = MAX(ratio, 0);
+ ratio = MIN(ratio, 100);
+ } else
+ ratio = 100;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "\r%-20.20s %3d%% ", curfile, ratio);
+
+ barlength = getttywidth() - 51;
+ barlength = (barlength <= MAX_BARLENGTH)?barlength:MAX_BARLENGTH;
+ if (barlength > 0) {
+ i = barlength * ratio / 100;
+ snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf),
+ "|%.*s%*s|", i, BAR, barlength - i, "");
+ }
+ i = 0;
+ abbrevsize = cursize;
+ while (abbrevsize >= 100000 && i < sizeof(prefixes)) {
+ i++;
+ abbrevsize >>= 10;
+ }
+ snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), " %5lu %c%c ",
+ (unsigned long) abbrevsize, prefixes[i],
+ prefixes[i] == ' ' ? ' ' : 'B');
+
+ timersub(&now, &lastupdate, &wait);
+ if (cursize > lastsize) {
+ lastupdate = now;
+ lastsize = cursize;
+ if (wait.tv_sec >= STALLTIME) {
+ start.tv_sec += wait.tv_sec;
+ start.tv_usec += wait.tv_usec;
+ }
+ wait.tv_sec = 0;
+ }
+ timersub(&now, &start, &td);
+ elapsed = td.tv_sec + (td.tv_usec / 1000000.0);
+
+ if (flag != 1 &&
+ (statbytes <= 0 || elapsed <= 0.0 || cursize > totalbytes)) {
+ snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf),
+ " --:-- ETA");
+ } else if (wait.tv_sec >= STALLTIME) {
+ snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf),
+ " - stalled -");
+ } else {
+ if (flag != 1)
+ remaining = (int)(totalbytes / (statbytes / elapsed) -
+ elapsed);
+ else
+ remaining = elapsed;
+
+ i = remaining / 3600;
+ if (i)
+ snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf),
+ "%2d:", i);
+ else
+ snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf),
+ " ");
+ i = remaining % 3600;
+ snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf),
+ "%02d:%02d%s", i / 60, i % 60,
+ (flag != 1) ? " ETA" : " ");
+ }
+ atomicio(write, fileno(stdout), buf, strlen(buf));
+
+ if (flag == -1) {
+ mysignal(SIGALRM, updateprogressmeter);
+ alarm(PROGRESSTIME);
+ } else if (flag == 1) {
+ alarm(0);
+ atomicio(write, fileno(stdout), "\n", 1);
+ statbytes = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+getttywidth(void)
+{
+ struct winsize winsize;
+
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdout), TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1)
+ return (winsize.ws_col ? winsize.ws_col : 80);
+ else
+ return (80);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.91 2001/11/12 18:17:07 markus Exp $");
+
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+#include <krb.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+#include <kafs.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "tildexpand.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+
+static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
+static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
+
+/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
+extern int IPv4or6;
+
+/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
+
+void
+initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+ memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
+
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+ options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int = -1;
+
+ /* Standard Options */
+ options->num_ports = 0;
+ options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
+ options->listen_addrs = NULL;
+ options->num_host_key_files = 0;
+ options->pid_file = NULL;
+ options->server_key_bits = -1;
+ options->login_grace_time = -1;
+ options->key_regeneration_time = -1;
+ options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET;
+ options->ignore_rhosts = -1;
+ options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1;
+ options->print_motd = -1;
+ options->print_lastlog = -1;
+ options->x11_forwarding = -1;
+ options->x11_display_offset = -1;
+ options->xauth_location = NULL;
+ options->strict_modes = -1;
+ options->keepalives = -1;
+ options->log_facility = (SyslogFacility) - 1;
+ options->log_level = (LogLevel) - 1;
+ options->rhosts_authentication = -1;
+ options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1;
+ options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
+ options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1;
+ options->rsa_authentication = -1;
+ options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
+ options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ options->kerberos_tgt_passing = -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ options->afs_token_passing = -1;
+#endif
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+ options->use_login = -1;
+ options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1;
+ options->num_allow_users = 0;
+ options->num_deny_users = 0;
+ options->num_allow_groups = 0;
+ options->num_deny_groups = 0;
+ options->ciphers = NULL;
+ options->macs = NULL;
+ options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+ options->gateway_ports = -1;
+ options->num_subsystems = 0;
+ options->max_startups_begin = -1;
+ options->max_startups_rate = -1;
+ options->max_startups = -1;
+ options->banner = NULL;
+ options->reverse_mapping_check = -1;
+ options->client_alive_interval = -1;
+ options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
+ options->authorized_keys_file = NULL;
+ options->authorized_keys_file2 = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+ if (options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int == -1)
+ options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int = 0;
+
+ /* Standard Options */
+ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2;
+ if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
+ /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
+ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+ options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE;
+ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
+ options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE;
+ }
+ if (options->num_ports == 0)
+ options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+ if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
+ add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0);
+ if (options->pid_file == NULL)
+ options->pid_file = _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE;
+ if (options->server_key_bits == -1)
+ options->server_key_bits = 768;
+ if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
+ options->login_grace_time = 600;
+ if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1)
+ options->key_regeneration_time = 3600;
+ if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
+ options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
+ if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
+ options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
+ if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
+ options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
+ if (options->print_motd == -1)
+ options->print_motd = 1;
+ if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
+ options->print_lastlog = 1;
+ if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
+ options->x11_forwarding = 0;
+ if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
+ options->x11_display_offset = 10;
+#ifdef _PATH_XAUTH
+ if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+ options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
+#endif
+ if (options->strict_modes == -1)
+ options->strict_modes = 1;
+ if (options->keepalives == -1)
+ options->keepalives = 1;
+ if (options->log_facility == (SyslogFacility) (-1))
+ options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+ if (options->log_level == (LogLevel) (-1))
+ options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ if (options->rhosts_authentication == -1)
+ options->rhosts_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1)
+ options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
+ options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1)
+ options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0;
+ if (options->rsa_authentication == -1)
+ options->rsa_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
+ options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
+ options->kerberos_authentication = (access(KEYFILE, R_OK) == 0);
+ if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
+ options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
+ if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ if (options->kerberos_tgt_passing == -1)
+ options->kerberos_tgt_passing = 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ if (options->afs_token_passing == -1)
+ options->afs_token_passing = k_hasafs();
+#endif
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
+ options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
+ if (options->use_login == -1)
+ options->use_login = 0;
+ if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
+ options->allow_tcp_forwarding = 1;
+ if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
+ options->gateway_ports = 0;
+ if (options->max_startups == -1)
+ options->max_startups = 10;
+ if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
+ options->max_startups_rate = 100; /* 100% */
+ if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
+ options->max_startups_begin = options->max_startups;
+ if (options->reverse_mapping_check == -1)
+ options->reverse_mapping_check = 0;
+ if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
+ options->client_alive_interval = 0;
+ if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
+ options->client_alive_count_max = 3;
+ if (options->authorized_keys_file2 == NULL) {
+ /* authorized_keys_file2 falls back to authorized_keys_file */
+ if (options->authorized_keys_file != NULL)
+ options->authorized_keys_file2 = options->authorized_keys_file;
+ else
+ options->authorized_keys_file2 = _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2;
+ }
+ if (options->authorized_keys_file == NULL)
+ options->authorized_keys_file = _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS;
+}
+
+/* Keyword tokens. */
+typedef enum {
+ sBadOption, /* == unknown option */
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+ sPAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt,
+ /* Standard Options */
+ sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime,
+ sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ sRhostsAuthentication, sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ sKerberosTgtPassing,
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ sAFSTokenPassing,
+#endif
+ sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress,
+ sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+ sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset,
+ sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sKeepAlives,
+ sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding,
+ sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+ sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
+ sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups,
+ sBanner, sReverseMappingCheck, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+ sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+ sDeprecated
+} ServerOpCodes;
+
+/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
+static struct {
+ const char *name;
+ ServerOpCodes opcode;
+} keywords[] = {
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+ { "PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt", sPAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt },
+ /* Standard Options */
+ { "port", sPort },
+ { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile },
+ { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile }, /* alias */
+ { "pidfile", sPidFile },
+ { "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits },
+ { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime },
+ { "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime },
+ { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin },
+ { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility },
+ { "loglevel", sLogLevel },
+ { "rhostsauthentication", sRhostsAuthentication },
+ { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication },
+ { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication },
+ { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly },
+ { "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication },
+ { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication },
+ { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication },
+ { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd },
+ { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup },
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ { "kerberostgtpassing", sKerberosTgtPassing },
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ { "afstokenpassing", sAFSTokenPassing },
+#endif
+ { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication },
+ { "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
+ { "checkmail", sDeprecated },
+ { "listenaddress", sListenAddress },
+ { "printmotd", sPrintMotd },
+ { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog },
+ { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts },
+ { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts },
+ { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding },
+ { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset },
+ { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation },
+ { "strictmodes", sStrictModes },
+ { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd },
+ { "uselogin", sUseLogin },
+ { "keepalive", sKeepAlives },
+ { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding },
+ { "allowusers", sAllowUsers },
+ { "denyusers", sDenyUsers },
+ { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups },
+ { "denygroups", sDenyGroups },
+ { "ciphers", sCiphers },
+ { "macs", sMacs },
+ { "protocol", sProtocol },
+ { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts },
+ { "subsystem", sSubsystem },
+ { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups },
+ { "banner", sBanner },
+ { "reversemappingcheck", sReverseMappingCheck },
+ { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval },
+ { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax },
+ { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile },
+ { "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2 },
+ { NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption.
+ */
+
+static ServerOpCodes
+parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
+ int linenum)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
+ if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
+ return keywords[i].opcode;
+
+ error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
+ filename, linenum, cp);
+ return sBadOption;
+}
+
+static void
+add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (options->num_ports == 0)
+ options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+ if (port == 0)
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++)
+ add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]);
+ else
+ add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, port);
+}
+
+static void
+add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int gaierr;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
+ fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)",
+ addr ? addr : "<NULL>",
+ gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next)
+ ;
+ ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs;
+ options->listen_addrs = aitop;
+}
+
+/* Reads the server configuration file. */
+
+void
+read_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[1024];
+ char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
+ int linenum, *intptr, value;
+ int bad_options = 0;
+ ServerOpCodes opcode;
+ int i, n;
+
+ f = fopen(filename, "r");
+ if (!f) {
+ perror(filename);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ linenum = 0;
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ linenum++;
+ cp = line;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ /* Ignore leading whitespace */
+ if (*arg == '\0')
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
+ continue;
+ intptr = NULL;
+ charptr = NULL;
+ opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum);
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case sBadOption:
+ bad_options++;
+ continue;
+
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+ case sPAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt:
+ intptr = &options->pam_authentication_via_kbd_int;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ /* Standard Options */
+ case sPort:
+ /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
+ if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
+ continue;
+ if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
+ fatal("%s line %d: ports must be specified before "
+ "ListenAdress.", filename, linenum);
+ if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg);
+ if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] == 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ break;
+
+ case sServerKeyBits:
+ intptr = &options->server_key_bits;
+parse_int:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ value = atoi(arg);
+ if (*intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sLoginGraceTime:
+ intptr = &options->login_grace_time;
+parse_time:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sKeyRegenerationTime:
+ intptr = &options->key_regeneration_time;
+ goto parse_time;
+
+ case sListenAddress:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0' || strncmp(arg, "[]", 2) == 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing inet addr.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*arg == '[') {
+ if ((p = strchr(arg, ']')) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s line %d: bad ipv6 inet addr usage.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ arg++;
+ memmove(p, p+1, strlen(p+1)+1);
+ } else if (((p = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL) ||
+ (strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL)) {
+ add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (*p == ':') {
+ u_short port;
+
+ p++;
+ if (*p == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: bad inet addr:port usage.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ else {
+ *(p-1) = '\0';
+ if ((port = a2port(p)) == 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: bad port number.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ add_listen_addr(options, arg, port);
+ }
+ } else if (*p == '\0')
+ add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
+ else
+ fatal("%s line %d: bad inet addr usage.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ break;
+
+ case sHostKeyFile:
+ intptr = &options->num_host_key_files;
+ if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many host keys specified (max %d).",
+ filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTKEYS);
+ charptr = &options->host_key_files[*intptr];
+parse_filename:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*charptr == NULL) {
+ *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ /* increase optional counter */
+ if (intptr != NULL)
+ *intptr = *intptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sPidFile:
+ charptr = &options->pid_file;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
+ case sPermitRootLogin:
+ intptr = &options->permit_root_login;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/"
+ "without-password/forced-commands-only/no "
+ "argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = 0; /* silence compiler */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "without-password") == 0)
+ value = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "forced-commands-only") == 0)
+ value = PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+ value = PERMIT_YES;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+ value = PERMIT_NO;
+ else
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/"
+ "without-password/forced-commands-only/no "
+ "argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sIgnoreRhosts:
+ intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts;
+parse_flag:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ value = 0; /* silence compiler */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+ value = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+ value = 0;
+ else
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
+ intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sRhostsAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rhosts_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sRhostsRSAAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sHostbasedAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
+ intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sRSAAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rsa_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPubkeyAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ case sKerberosAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sKerberosTicketCleanup:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
+ goto parse_flag;
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ case sKerberosTgtPassing:
+ intptr = &options->kerberos_tgt_passing;
+ goto parse_flag;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ case sAFSTokenPassing:
+ intptr = &options->afs_token_passing;
+ goto parse_flag;
+#endif
+
+ case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sChallengeResponseAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPrintMotd:
+ intptr = &options->print_motd;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPrintLastLog:
+ intptr = &options->print_lastlog;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sX11Forwarding:
+ intptr = &options->x11_forwarding;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sX11DisplayOffset:
+ intptr = &options->x11_display_offset;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case sXAuthLocation:
+ charptr = &options->xauth_location;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
+ case sStrictModes:
+ intptr = &options->strict_modes;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sKeepAlives:
+ intptr = &options->keepalives;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sEmptyPasswd:
+ intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sUseLogin:
+ intptr = &options->use_login;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sGatewayPorts:
+ intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sReverseMappingCheck:
+ intptr = &options->reverse_mapping_check;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sLogFacility:
+ intptr = (int *) &options->log_facility;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ value = log_facility_number(arg);
+ if (value == (SyslogFacility) - 1)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
+ break;
+
+ case sLogLevel:
+ intptr = (int *) &options->log_level;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ value = log_level_number(arg);
+ if (value == (LogLevel) - 1)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = (LogLevel) value;
+ break;
+
+ case sAllowTcpForwarding:
+ intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sAllowUsers:
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sDenyUsers:
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
+ fatal( "%s line %d: too many deny users.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sAllowGroups:
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_allow_groups >= MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many allow groups.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sDenyGroups:
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (options->num_deny_groups >= MAX_DENY_GROUPS)
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many deny groups.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->deny_groups[options->num_deny_groups++] = xstrdup(arg);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sCiphers:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!ciphers_valid(arg))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (options->ciphers == NULL)
+ options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case sMacs:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!mac_valid(arg))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (options->macs == NULL)
+ options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case sProtocol:
+ intptr = &options->protocol;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = proto_spec(arg);
+ if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+ if (*intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sSubsystem:
+ if(options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+ if(strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
+ options->num_subsystems++;
+ break;
+
+ case sMaxStartups:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d",
+ &options->max_startups_begin,
+ &options->max_startups_rate,
+ &options->max_startups)) == 3) {
+ if (options->max_startups_begin >
+ options->max_startups ||
+ options->max_startups_rate > 100 ||
+ options->max_startups_rate < 1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ } else if (n != 1)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ else
+ options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin;
+ break;
+
+ case sBanner:
+ charptr = &options->banner;
+ goto parse_filename;
+ /*
+ * These options can contain %X options expanded at
+ * connect time, so that you can specify paths like:
+ *
+ * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u
+ */
+ case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
+ case sAuthorizedKeysFile2:
+ charptr = (opcode == sAuthorizedKeysFile ) ?
+ &options->authorized_keys_file :
+ &options->authorized_keys_file2;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
+ case sClientAliveInterval:
+ intptr = &options->client_alive_interval;
+ goto parse_time;
+
+ case sClientAliveCountMax:
+ intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max;
+ goto parse_int;
+
+ case sDeprecated:
+ log("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ while(arg)
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)",
+ filename, linenum, arg, opcode);
+ }
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ if (bad_options > 0)
+ fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
+ filename, bad_options);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.49 2001/08/17 18:59:47 stevesk Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef SERVCONF_H
+#define SERVCONF_H
+
+#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */
+
+#define MAX_ALLOW_USERS 256 /* Max # users on allow list. */
+#define MAX_DENY_USERS 256 /* Max # users on deny list. */
+#define MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on allow list. */
+#define MAX_DENY_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on deny list. */
+#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */
+#define MAX_HOSTKEYS 256 /* Max # hostkeys. */
+
+/* permit_root_login */
+#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1
+#define PERMIT_NO 0
+#define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1
+#define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2
+#define PERMIT_YES 3
+
+
+typedef struct {
+ u_int num_ports;
+ u_int ports_from_cmdline;
+ u_short ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */
+ char *listen_addr; /* Address on which the server listens. */
+ struct addrinfo *listen_addrs; /* Addresses on which the server listens. */
+ char *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS]; /* Files containing host keys. */
+ int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */
+ char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */
+ int server_key_bits;/* Size of the server key. */
+ int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time
+ * (sec). */
+ int key_regeneration_time; /* Server key lifetime (seconds). */
+ int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */
+ int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */
+ int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+ * for RhostsRsaAuth */
+ int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */
+ int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */
+ int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
+ int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start
+ * searching at */
+ char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */
+ int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */
+ int keepalives; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
+ char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
+ char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */
+ int protocol; /* Supported protocol versions. */
+ int gateway_ports; /* If true, allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
+ SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
+ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */
+ int rhosts_authentication; /* If true, permit rhosts
+ * authentication. */
+ int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit rhosts RSA
+ * authentication. */
+ int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
+ int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
+ int rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit RSA authentication. */
+ int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos
+ * authentication. */
+ int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos
+ * and any other password
+ * authentication mechanism,
+ * such as SecurID or
+ * /etc/passwd */
+ int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket
+ * file on logout. */
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ int kerberos_tgt_passing; /* If true, permit Kerberos TGT
+ * passing. */
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ int afs_token_passing; /* If true, permit AFS token passing. */
+#endif
+ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+ int challenge_response_authentication;
+ int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty
+ * passwords. */
+ int use_login; /* If true, login(1) is used */
+ int allow_tcp_forwarding;
+ u_int num_allow_users;
+ char *allow_users[MAX_ALLOW_USERS];
+ u_int num_deny_users;
+ char *deny_users[MAX_DENY_USERS];
+ u_int num_allow_groups;
+ char *allow_groups[MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS];
+ u_int num_deny_groups;
+ char *deny_groups[MAX_DENY_GROUPS];
+
+ u_int num_subsystems;
+ char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+ char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+
+ int max_startups_begin;
+ int max_startups_rate;
+ int max_startups;
+ char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */
+ int reverse_mapping_check; /* cross-check ip and dns */
+ int client_alive_interval; /*
+ * poke the client this often to
+ * see if it's still there
+ */
+ int client_alive_count_max; /*
+ * If the client is unresponsive
+ * for this many intervals above,
+ * disconnect the session
+ */
+
+ char *authorized_keys_file; /* File containing public keys */
+ char *authorized_keys_file2;
+ int pam_authentication_via_kbd_int;
+
+} ServerOptions;
+
+void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
+void read_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *);
+void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
+
+#endif /* SERVCONF_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Server main loop for handling the interactive session.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.83 2001/11/09 18:59:23 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "serverloop.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/* XXX */
+extern Kex *xxx_kex;
+static Authctxt *xxx_authctxt;
+
+static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */
+static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */
+static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */
+static int fdin; /* Descriptor for stdin (for writing) */
+static int fdout; /* Descriptor for stdout (for reading);
+ May be same number as fdin. */
+static int fderr; /* Descriptor for stderr. May be -1. */
+static long stdin_bytes = 0; /* Number of bytes written to stdin. */
+static long stdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes sent to client. */
+static long stderr_bytes = 0; /* Number of stderr bytes sent to client. */
+static long fdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes read from program. */
+static int stdin_eof = 0; /* EOF message received from client. */
+static int fdout_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered reading from fdout. */
+static int fderr_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered readung from fderr. */
+static int fdin_is_tty = 0; /* fdin points to a tty. */
+static int connection_in; /* Connection to client (input). */
+static int connection_out; /* Connection to client (output). */
+static int connection_closed = 0; /* Connection to client closed. */
+static u_int buffer_high; /* "Soft" max buffer size. */
+static int client_alive_timeouts = 0;
+
+/*
+ * This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server
+ * will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated.
+ */
+
+static volatile int child_terminated; /* The child has terminated. */
+
+/* prototypes */
+static void server_init_dispatch(void);
+
+static void
+sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+ debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
+ child_terminated = 1;
+ mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make packets from buffered stderr data, and buffer it for sending
+ * to the client.
+ */
+static void
+make_packets_from_stderr_data(void)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ /* Send buffered stderr data to the client. */
+ while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0 &&
+ packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+ len = buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
+ if (packet_is_interactive()) {
+ if (len > 512)
+ len = 512;
+ } else {
+ /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+ if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
+ len = packet_get_maxsize();
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), len);
+ packet_send();
+ buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len);
+ stderr_bytes += len;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make packets from buffered stdout data, and buffer it for sending to the
+ * client.
+ */
+static void
+make_packets_from_stdout_data(void)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ /* Send buffered stdout data to the client. */
+ while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0 &&
+ packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+ len = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+ if (packet_is_interactive()) {
+ if (len > 512)
+ len = 512;
+ } else {
+ /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */
+ if (len > packet_get_maxsize())
+ len = packet_get_maxsize();
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), len);
+ packet_send();
+ buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len);
+ stdout_bytes += len;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+client_alive_check(void)
+{
+ int id;
+
+ /* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
+ if (++client_alive_timeouts > options.client_alive_count_max)
+ packet_disconnect("Timeout, your session not responding.");
+
+ id = channel_find_open();
+ if (id == -1)
+ packet_disconnect("No open channels after timeout!");
+ /*
+ * send a bogus channel request with "wantreply",
+ * we should get back a failure
+ */
+ channel_request_start(id, "keepalive@openssh.com", 1);
+ packet_send();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the
+ * select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors
+ * have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified
+ * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite).
+ */
+static void
+wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
+ int *nallocp, u_int max_time_milliseconds)
+{
+ struct timeval tv, *tvp;
+ int ret;
+ int client_alive_scheduled = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly,
+ * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client
+ * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag.
+ *
+ * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
+ * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
+ */
+ if (compat20 &&
+ max_time_milliseconds == 0 && options.client_alive_interval) {
+ client_alive_scheduled = 1;
+ max_time_milliseconds = options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */
+ channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, 0);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+#if 0
+ /* wrong: bad condition XXX */
+ if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+#endif
+ FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Read packets from the client unless we have too much
+ * buffered stdin or channel data.
+ */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) < buffer_high &&
+ channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+ FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
+ /*
+ * If there is not too much data already buffered going to
+ * the client, try to get some more data from the program.
+ */
+ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) {
+ if (!fdout_eof)
+ FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp);
+ if (!fderr_eof)
+ FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
+ * to the program.
+ */
+ if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
+ FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that
+ * descriptor.
+ */
+ if (packet_have_data_to_write())
+ FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
+
+ /*
+ * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read
+ * from it, then read as much as is available and exit.
+ */
+ if (child_terminated && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ if (max_time_milliseconds == 0 || client_alive_scheduled)
+ max_time_milliseconds = 100;
+
+ if (max_time_milliseconds == 0)
+ tvp = NULL;
+ else {
+ tv.tv_sec = max_time_milliseconds / 1000;
+ tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_milliseconds % 1000);
+ tvp = &tv;
+ }
+ if (tvp!=NULL)
+ debug3("tvp!=NULL kid %d mili %d", child_terminated, max_time_milliseconds);
+
+ /* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */
+ ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
+ memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ } else if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled)
+ client_alive_check();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored
+ * in buffers and processed later.
+ */
+static void
+process_input(fd_set * readset)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[16384];
+
+ /* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
+ len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len == 0) {
+ verbose("Connection closed by remote host.");
+ connection_closed = 1;
+ if (compat20)
+ return;
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ } else if (len < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) {
+ verbose("Read error from remote host: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Buffer any received data. */
+ packet_process_incoming(buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+ if (compat20)
+ return;
+
+ /* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */
+ if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) {
+ len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) {
+ /* do nothing */
+ } else if (len <= 0) {
+ fdout_eof = 1;
+ } else {
+ buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len);
+ fdout_bytes += len;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */
+ if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) {
+ len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) {
+ /* do nothing */
+ } else if (len <= 0) {
+ fderr_eof = 1;
+ } else {
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
+ */
+static void
+process_output(fd_set * writeset)
+{
+ struct termios tio;
+ u_char *data;
+ u_int dlen;
+ int len;
+
+ /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
+ if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
+ data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
+ dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
+ len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) {
+ /* do nothing */
+ } else if (len <= 0) {
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ close(fdin);
+#else
+ if (fdin != fdout)
+ close(fdin);
+ else
+ shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
+#endif
+ fdin = -1;
+ } else {
+ /* Successful write. */
+ if (fdin_is_tty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r' &&
+ tcgetattr(fdin, &tio) == 0 &&
+ !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
+ /*
+ * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
+ * traffic analysis
+ */
+ packet_send_ignore(len);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ /* Consume the data from the buffer. */
+ buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len);
+ /* Update the count of bytes written to the program. */
+ stdin_bytes += len;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
+ packet_write_poll();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wait until all buffered output has been sent to the client.
+ * This is used when the program terminates.
+ */
+static void
+drain_output(void)
+{
+ /* Send any buffered stdout data to the client. */
+ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&stdout_buffer));
+ packet_send();
+ /* Update the count of sent bytes. */
+ stdout_bytes += buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+ }
+ /* Send any buffered stderr data to the client. */
+ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&stderr_buffer));
+ packet_send();
+ /* Update the count of sent bytes. */
+ stderr_bytes += buffer_len(&stderr_buffer);
+ }
+ /* Wait until all buffered data has been written to the client. */
+ packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+static void
+process_buffered_input_packets(void)
+{
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between
+ * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and
+ * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to
+ * stdin (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the
+ * child program).
+ */
+void
+server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
+{
+ fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
+ int max_fd = 0, nalloc = 0;
+ int wait_status; /* Status returned by wait(). */
+ pid_t wait_pid; /* pid returned by wait(). */
+ int waiting_termination = 0; /* Have displayed waiting close message. */
+ u_int max_time_milliseconds;
+ u_int previous_stdout_buffer_bytes;
+ u_int stdout_buffer_bytes;
+ int type;
+
+ debug("Entering interactive session.");
+
+ /* Initialize the SIGCHLD kludge. */
+ child_terminated = 0;
+ mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+
+ /* Initialize our global variables. */
+ fdin = fdin_arg;
+ fdout = fdout_arg;
+ fderr = fderr_arg;
+
+ /* nonblocking IO */
+ set_nonblock(fdin);
+ set_nonblock(fdout);
+ /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
+ if (fderr != -1)
+ set_nonblock(fderr);
+
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
+ fdin_is_tty = 1;
+
+ connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+ connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+
+ previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = 0;
+
+ /* Set approximate I/O buffer size. */
+ if (packet_is_interactive())
+ buffer_high = 4096;
+ else
+ buffer_high = 64 * 1024;
+
+#if 0
+ /* Initialize max_fd to the maximum of the known file descriptors. */
+ max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
+ if (fderr != -1)
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
+#endif
+
+ /* Initialize Initialize buffers. */
+ buffer_init(&stdin_buffer);
+ buffer_init(&stdout_buffer);
+ buffer_init(&stderr_buffer);
+
+ /*
+ * If we have no separate fderr (which is the case when we have a pty
+ * - there we cannot make difference between data sent to stdout and
+ * stderr), indicate that we have seen an EOF from stderr. This way
+ * we don\'t need to check the descriptor everywhere.
+ */
+ if (fderr == -1)
+ fderr_eof = 1;
+
+ server_init_dispatch();
+
+ /* Main loop of the server for the interactive session mode. */
+ for (;;) {
+
+ /* Process buffered packets from the client. */
+ process_buffered_input_packets();
+
+ /*
+ * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
+ * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
+ */
+ if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ close(fdin);
+#else
+ if (fdin != fdout)
+ close(fdin);
+ else
+ shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */
+#endif
+ fdin = -1;
+ }
+ /* Make packets from buffered stderr data to send to the client. */
+ make_packets_from_stderr_data();
+
+ /*
+ * Make packets from buffered stdout data to send to the
+ * client. If there is very little to send, this arranges to
+ * not send them now, but to wait a short while to see if we
+ * are getting more data. This is necessary, as some systems
+ * wake up readers from a pty after each separate character.
+ */
+ max_time_milliseconds = 0;
+ stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+ if (stdout_buffer_bytes != 0 && stdout_buffer_bytes < 256 &&
+ stdout_buffer_bytes != previous_stdout_buffer_bytes) {
+ /* try again after a while */
+ max_time_milliseconds = 10;
+ } else {
+ /* Send it now. */
+ make_packets_from_stdout_data();
+ }
+ previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer);
+
+ /* Send channel data to the client. */
+ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ channel_output_poll();
+
+ /*
+ * Bail out of the loop if the program has closed its output
+ * descriptors, and we have no more data to send to the
+ * client, and there is no pending buffered data.
+ */
+ if (fdout_eof && fderr_eof && !packet_have_data_to_write() &&
+ buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) == 0 && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) == 0) {
+ if (!channel_still_open())
+ break;
+ if (!waiting_termination) {
+ const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n";
+ char *cp;
+ waiting_termination = 1;
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s));
+
+ /* Display list of open channels. */
+ cp = channel_open_message();
+ buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, cp, strlen(cp));
+ xfree(cp);
+ }
+ }
+ max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
+ max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
+
+ /* Sleep in select() until we can do something. */
+ wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
+ &nalloc, max_time_milliseconds);
+
+ /* Process any channel events. */
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+
+ /* Process input from the client and from program stdout/stderr. */
+ process_input(readset);
+
+ /* Process output to the client and to program stdin. */
+ process_output(writeset);
+ }
+ if (readset)
+ xfree(readset);
+ if (writeset)
+ xfree(writeset);
+
+ /* Cleanup and termination code. */
+
+ /* Wait until all output has been sent to the client. */
+ drain_output();
+
+ debug("End of interactive session; stdin %ld, stdout (read %ld, sent %ld), stderr %ld bytes.",
+ stdin_bytes, fdout_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes);
+
+ /* Free and clear the buffers. */
+ buffer_free(&stdin_buffer);
+ buffer_free(&stdout_buffer);
+ buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
+
+ /* Close the file descriptors. */
+ if (fdout != -1)
+ close(fdout);
+ fdout = -1;
+ fdout_eof = 1;
+ if (fderr != -1)
+ close(fderr);
+ fderr = -1;
+ fderr_eof = 1;
+ if (fdin != -1)
+ close(fdin);
+ fdin = -1;
+
+ channel_free_all();
+
+ /* We no longer want our SIGCHLD handler to be called. */
+ mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+ wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, child_terminated ? WNOHANG : 0);
+ if (wait_pid == -1)
+ packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ else if (wait_pid != pid)
+ error("Strange, wait returned pid %d, expected %d",
+ wait_pid, pid);
+
+ /* Check if it exited normally. */
+ if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) {
+ /* Yes, normal exit. Get exit status and send it to the client. */
+ debug("Command exited with status %d.", WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS);
+ packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(wait_status));
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for exit confirmation. Note that there might be
+ * other packets coming before it; however, the program has
+ * already died so we just ignore them. The client is
+ * supposed to respond with the confirmation when it receives
+ * the exit status.
+ */
+ do {
+ int plen;
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ }
+ while (type != SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION);
+
+ debug("Received exit confirmation.");
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Check if the program terminated due to a signal. */
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(wait_status))
+ packet_disconnect("Command terminated on signal %d.",
+ WTERMSIG(wait_status));
+
+ /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
+ packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", wait_status);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+static void
+collect_children(void)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ sigset_t oset, nset;
+ int status;
+
+ /* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */
+ sigemptyset(&nset);
+ sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD);
+ sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
+ if (child_terminated) {
+ while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0)
+ session_close_by_pid(pid, status);
+ child_terminated = 0;
+ }
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
+ int rekeying = 0, max_fd, nalloc = 0;
+
+ debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
+
+ mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+ child_terminated = 0;
+ connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+ connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+
+ max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
+ xxx_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+ server_init_dispatch();
+
+ for (;;) {
+ process_buffered_input_packets();
+
+ rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done);
+
+ if (!rekeying && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write())
+ channel_output_poll();
+ wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd,
+ &nalloc, 0);
+
+ collect_children();
+ if (!rekeying)
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+ process_input(readset);
+ if (connection_closed)
+ break;
+ process_output(writeset);
+ }
+ collect_children();
+
+ if (readset)
+ xfree(readset);
+ if (writeset)
+ xfree(writeset);
+
+ /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
+ channel_free_all();
+
+ /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
+ session_destroy_all();
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_channel_failure(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ debug("Got CHANNEL_FAILURE for keepalive");
+ /*
+ * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client.
+ * even if this was generated by something other than
+ * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives.
+ */
+ client_alive_timeouts = 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+server_input_stdin_data(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ char *data;
+ u_int data_len;
+
+ /* Stdin data from the client. Append it to the buffer. */
+ /* Ignore any data if the client has closed stdin. */
+ if (fdin == -1)
+ return;
+ data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + data_len), type);
+ buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, data, data_len);
+ memset(data, 0, data_len);
+ xfree(data);
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_eof(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ /*
+ * Eof from the client. The stdin descriptor to the
+ * program will be closed when all buffered data has
+ * drained.
+ */
+ debug("EOF received for stdin.");
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 0, type);
+ stdin_eof = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_window_size(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int row = packet_get_int();
+ int col = packet_get_int();
+ int xpixel = packet_get_int();
+ int ypixel = packet_get_int();
+
+ debug("Window change received.");
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 * 4, type);
+ if (fdin != -1)
+ pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_direct_tcpip(char *ctype)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int sock;
+ char *target, *originator;
+ int target_port, originator_port;
+
+ target = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ target_port = packet_get_int();
+ originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ originator_port = packet_get_int();
+ packet_done();
+
+ debug("server_request_direct_tcpip: originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
+ originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+
+ /* XXX check permission */
+ sock = channel_connect_to(target, target_port);
+ xfree(target);
+ xfree(originator);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING,
+ sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT,
+ CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, xstrdup("direct-tcpip"), 1);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ error("server_request_direct_tcpip: channel_new failed");
+ close(sock);
+ }
+ return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_session(char *ctype)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+
+ debug("input_session_request");
+ packet_done();
+ /*
+ * A server session has no fd to read or write until a
+ * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to
+ * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all
+ * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered.
+ */
+ c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
+ -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, xstrdup("server-session"), 1);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ error("server_request_session: channel_new failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (session_open(xxx_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
+ debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
+ channel_free(c);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ channel_register_callback(c->self, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST,
+ session_input_channel_req, (void *)0);
+ channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel);
+ return c;
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_channel_open(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Channel *c = NULL;
+ char *ctype;
+ u_int len;
+ int rchan;
+ int rmaxpack;
+ int rwindow;
+
+ ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
+ rchan = packet_get_int();
+ rwindow = packet_get_int();
+ rmaxpack = packet_get_int();
+
+ debug("server_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
+ ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
+
+ if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
+ c = server_request_session(ctype);
+ } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
+ c = server_request_direct_tcpip(ctype);
+ }
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ debug("server_input_channel_open: confirm %s", ctype);
+ c->remote_id = rchan;
+ c->remote_window = rwindow;
+ c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
+ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ } else {
+ debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(rchan);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) {
+ packet_put_cstring("open failed");
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ xfree(ctype);
+}
+
+static void
+server_input_global_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ char *rtype;
+ int want_reply;
+ int success = 0;
+
+ rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ want_reply = packet_get_char();
+ debug("server_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply);
+
+ /* -R style forwarding */
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ char *listen_address;
+ u_short listen_port;
+
+ pw = auth_get_user();
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ fatal("server_input_global_request: no user");
+ listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL); /* XXX currently ignored */
+ listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int();
+ debug("server_input_global_request: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d",
+ listen_address, listen_port);
+
+ /* check permissions */
+ if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding ||
+ no_port_forwarding_flag ||
+ (listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && pw->pw_uid != 0)) {
+ success = 0;
+ packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+ } else {
+ /* Start listening on the port */
+ success = channel_request_forwarding(
+ listen_address, listen_port,
+ /*unspec host_to_connect*/ "<unspec host>",
+ /*unspec port_to_connect*/ 0,
+ options.gateway_ports, /*remote*/ 1);
+ }
+ xfree(listen_address);
+ }
+ if (want_reply) {
+ packet_start(success ?
+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ }
+ xfree(rtype);
+}
+
+static void
+server_init_dispatch_20(void)
+{
+ debug("server_init_dispatch_20");
+ dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &channel_input_channel_request);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request);
+ /* client_alive */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_channel_failure);
+ /* rekeying */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+}
+static void
+server_init_dispatch_13(void)
+{
+ debug("server_init_dispatch_13");
+ dispatch_init(NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_EOF, &server_input_eof);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, &server_input_stdin_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE, &server_input_window_size);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open);
+}
+static void
+server_init_dispatch_15(void)
+{
+ server_init_dispatch_13();
+ debug("server_init_dispatch_15");
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof);
+ dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_oclose);
+}
+static void
+server_init_dispatch(void)
+{
+ if (compat20)
+ server_init_dispatch_20();
+ else if (compat13)
+ server_init_dispatch_13();
+ else
+ server_init_dispatch_15();
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.5 2001/06/27 02:12:53 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between
+ * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and
+ * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to stdin
+ * (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the child
+ * program).
+ */
+#ifndef SERVERLOOP_H
+#define SERVERLOOP_H
+
+void server_loop(pid_t, int, int, int);
+void server_loop2(Authctxt *);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.108 2001/10/11 13:45:21 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "mpaux.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "serverloop.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "session.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+#include <proj.h>
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+#include <sat.h>
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_USERSEC_H)
+#include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <sys/cygwin.h>
+#define is_winnt (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+#endif
+
+/* AIX limits */
+#if defined(HAVE_GETUSERATTR) && !defined(S_UFSIZE_HARD) && defined(S_UFSIZE)
+# define S_UFSIZE_HARD S_UFSIZE "_hard"
+# define S_UCPU_HARD S_UCPU "_hard"
+# define S_UDATA_HARD S_UDATA "_hard"
+# define S_USTACK_HARD S_USTACK "_hard"
+# define S_URSS_HARD S_URSS "_hard"
+# define S_UCORE_HARD S_UCORE "_hard"
+# define S_UNOFILE_HARD S_UNOFILE "_hard"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+# include <uinfo.h>
+#endif
+
+/* types */
+
+#define TTYSZ 64
+typedef struct Session Session;
+struct Session {
+ int used;
+ int self;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
+ pid_t pid;
+ /* tty */
+ char *term;
+ int ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
+ int row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
+ char tty[TTYSZ];
+ /* X11 */
+ char *display;
+ int screen;
+ char *auth_proto;
+ char *auth_data;
+ int single_connection;
+ /* proto 2 */
+ int chanid;
+ int is_subsystem;
+};
+
+/* func */
+
+Session *session_new(void);
+void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int);
+static void session_pty_cleanup(void *);
+void session_proctitle(Session *);
+int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *);
+void do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *);
+void do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *);
+void do_exec(Session *, const char *);
+void do_login(Session *, const char *);
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+static void do_pre_login(Session *s);
+#endif
+void do_child(Session *, const char *);
+void do_motd(void);
+int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
+
+static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
+static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
+
+static void session_close(Session *);
+static int session_pty_req(Session *);
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern char *__progname;
+extern int log_stderr;
+extern int debug_flag;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern int startup_pipe;
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+
+/* original command from peer. */
+const char *original_command = NULL;
+
+/* data */
+#define MAX_SESSIONS 10
+Session sessions[MAX_SESSIONS];
+
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+char *aixloginmsg;
+#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+static login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
+
+void
+do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ /*
+ * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ alarm(0);
+ if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+ close(startup_pipe);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ }
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD)
+ if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
+ error("unable to get login class");
+ return;
+ }
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ if (auth_approval(NULL, lc, authctxt->pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
+ packet_disconnect("Approval failure for %s",
+ authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ /* We don't have a pty yet, so just label the line as "ssh" */
+ if (loginsuccess(authctxt->user,
+ get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check),
+ "ssh", &aixloginmsg) < 0)
+ aixloginmsg = NULL;
+#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+
+ /* setup the channel layer */
+ if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
+ channel_permit_all_opens();
+
+ if (compat20)
+ do_authenticated2(authctxt);
+ else
+ do_authenticated1(authctxt);
+
+ /* remove agent socket */
+ if (auth_get_socket_name())
+ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
+#ifdef KRB4
+ if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
+ krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has
+ * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo
+ * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings
+ * are requested, etc.
+ */
+static void
+do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Session *s;
+ char *command;
+ int success, type, plen, screen_flag;
+ int compression_level = 0, enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
+ u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen;
+
+ s = session_new();
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+
+ /*
+ * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
+ * or a command.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ success = 0;
+
+ /* Get a packet from the client. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+
+ /* Process the packet. */
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION:
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4, type);
+ compression_level = packet_get_int();
+ if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) {
+ packet_send_debug("Received illegal compression level %d.",
+ compression_level);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */
+ enable_compression_after_reply = 1;
+ success = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY:
+ success = session_pty_req(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
+ s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len);
+ s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
+
+ screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() &
+ SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER;
+ debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", screen_flag);
+
+ if (packet_remaining() == 4) {
+ if (!screen_flag)
+ debug2("Buggy client: "
+ "X11 screen flag missing");
+ s->screen = packet_get_int();
+ } else {
+ s->screen = 0;
+ }
+ packet_done();
+ success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
+ if (!success) {
+ xfree(s->auth_proto);
+ xfree(s->auth_data);
+ s->auth_proto = NULL;
+ s->auth_data = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
+ if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) {
+ debug("Authentication agent forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
+ break;
+ }
+ debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request.");
+ success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST:
+ if (no_port_forwarding_flag) {
+ debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding) {
+ debug("Port forwarding not permitted.");
+ break;
+ }
+ debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request.");
+ channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0, options.gateway_ports);
+ success = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE:
+ if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0)
+ success = 1;
+ break;
+
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
+ if (!options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
+ verbose("Kerberos TGT passing disabled.");
+ } else {
+ char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+
+ /* XXX - 0x41, see creds_to_radix version */
+ if (kdata[0] != 0x41) {
+#ifdef KRB5
+ krb5_data tgt;
+ tgt.data = kdata;
+ tgt.length = dlen;
+
+ if (auth_krb5_tgt(s->authctxt, &tgt))
+ success = 1;
+ else
+ verbose("Kerberos v5 TGT refused for %.100s", s->authctxt->user);
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+ } else {
+#ifdef AFS
+ if (auth_krb4_tgt(s->authctxt, kdata))
+ success = 1;
+ else
+ verbose("Kerberos v4 TGT refused for %.100s", s->authctxt->user);
+#endif /* AFS */
+ }
+ xfree(kdata);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* AFS || KRB5 */
+
+#ifdef AFS
+ case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
+ if (!options.afs_token_passing || !k_hasafs()) {
+ verbose("AFS token passing disabled.");
+ } else {
+ /* Accept AFS token. */
+ char *token = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+
+ if (auth_afs_token(s->authctxt, token))
+ success = 1;
+ else
+ verbose("AFS token refused for %.100s",
+ s->authctxt->user);
+ xfree(token);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* AFS */
+
+ case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL:
+ case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD:
+ if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) {
+ command = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command);
+ do_exec(s, command);
+ xfree(command);
+ } else {
+ do_exec(s, NULL);
+ }
+ packet_done();
+ session_close(s);
+ return;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored,
+ * and a failure message is returned.
+ */
+ log("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type);
+ }
+ packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Enable compression now that we have replied if appropriate. */
+ if (enable_compression_after_reply) {
+ enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
+ packet_start_compression(compression_level);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
+ * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
+ * setting up file descriptors and such.
+ */
+void
+do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ int pid;
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
+ /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
+ if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0 || pipe(perr) < 0)
+ packet_disconnect("Could not create pipes: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+#else /* USE_PIPES */
+ int inout[2], err[2];
+ /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0 ||
+ socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0)
+ packet_disconnect("Could not create socket pairs: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+#endif /* USE_PIPES */
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
+
+ session_proctitle(s);
+
+#if defined(USE_PAM)
+ do_pam_session(s->pw->pw_name, NULL);
+ do_pam_setcred(1);
+ if (is_pam_password_change_required())
+ packet_disconnect("Password change required but no "
+ "TTY available");
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+ /* Fork the child. */
+ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+ /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+ * setlogin() affects the entire process group.
+ */
+ if (setsid() < 0)
+ error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ /*
+ * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket
+ * pair, and make the child side the standard input.
+ */
+ close(pin[1]);
+ if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stdin");
+ close(pin[0]);
+
+ /* Redirect stdout. */
+ close(pout[0]);
+ if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stdout");
+ close(pout[1]);
+
+ /* Redirect stderr. */
+ close(perr[0]);
+ if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stderr");
+ close(perr[1]);
+#else /* USE_PIPES */
+ /*
+ * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will
+ * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
+ * seem to depend on it.
+ */
+ close(inout[1]);
+ close(err[1]);
+ if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */
+ perror("dup2 stdin");
+ if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout. Note: same socket as stdin. */
+ perror("dup2 stdout");
+ if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */
+ perror("dup2 stderr");
+#endif /* USE_PIPES */
+
+ /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+ do_child(s, command);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (is_winnt)
+ cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+#endif
+ if (pid < 0)
+ packet_disconnect("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ s->pid = pid;
+ /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */
+ packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL);
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+ close(perr[1]);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], s->is_subsystem ? -1 : perr[0]);
+ } else {
+ /* Enter the interactive session. */
+ server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]);
+ /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */
+ }
+#else /* USE_PIPES */
+ /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
+ close(inout[0]);
+ close(err[0]);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to
+ * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
+ */
+ if (compat20) {
+ session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], s->is_subsystem ? -1 : err[1]);
+ } else {
+ server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]);
+ /* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */
+ }
+#endif /* USE_PIPES */
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This
+ * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
+ * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp,
+ * lastlog, and other such operations.
+ */
+void
+do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
+ ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
+ ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
+
+#if defined(USE_PAM)
+ do_pam_session(s->pw->pw_name, s->tty);
+ do_pam_setcred(1);
+#endif
+
+ /* Fork the child. */
+ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+
+ /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ptyfd);
+
+ /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
+ pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
+
+ /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0)
+ error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0)
+ error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0)
+ error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ttyfd);
+
+ /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
+ do_login(s, command);
+# ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+ else
+ do_pre_login(s);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+ /* Do common processing for the child, such as execing the command. */
+ do_child(s, command);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (is_winnt)
+ cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+#endif
+ if (pid < 0)
+ packet_disconnect("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ s->pid = pid;
+
+ /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ttyfd);
+
+ /*
+ * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
+ * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this
+ * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional.
+ */
+ fdout = dup(ptyfd);
+ if (fdout < 0)
+ packet_disconnect("dup #1 failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* we keep a reference to the pty master */
+ ptymaster = dup(ptyfd);
+ if (ptymaster < 0)
+ packet_disconnect("dup #2 failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
+
+ /* Enter interactive session. */
+ packet_set_interactive(1);
+ if (compat20) {
+ session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
+ } else {
+ server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
+ /* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+static void
+do_pre_login(Session *s)
+{
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+ * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ }
+
+ record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name,
+ get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.reverse_mapping_check),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is
+ * to be forced, execute that instead.
+ */
+void
+do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ if (forced_command) {
+ original_command = command;
+ command = forced_command;
+ debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command);
+ }
+
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ do_exec_pty(s, command);
+ else
+ do_exec_no_pty(s, command);
+
+ original_command = NULL;
+}
+
+/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
+void
+do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ char *time_string;
+ char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ time_t last_login_time;
+ struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
+ pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+ * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Get the time and hostname when the user last logged in. */
+ if (options.print_lastlog) {
+ hostname[0] = '\0';
+ last_login_time = get_last_login_time(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name,
+ hostname, sizeof(hostname));
+ }
+
+ /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+ record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+ get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.reverse_mapping_check),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ /*
+ * If password change is needed, do it now.
+ * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
+ */
+ if (is_pam_password_change_required()) {
+ print_pam_messages();
+ do_pam_chauthtok();
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
+ return;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (!is_pam_password_change_required())
+ print_pam_messages();
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ if (aixloginmsg && *aixloginmsg)
+ printf("%s\n", aixloginmsg);
+#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+
+ if (options.print_lastlog && last_login_time != 0) {
+ time_string = ctime(&last_login_time);
+ if (strchr(time_string, '\n'))
+ *strchr(time_string, '\n') = 0;
+ if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0)
+ printf("Last login: %s\r\n", time_string);
+ else
+ printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, hostname);
+ }
+
+ do_motd();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Display the message of the day.
+ */
+void
+do_motd(void)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char buf[256];
+
+ if (options.print_motd) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
+ "/etc/motd"), "r");
+#else
+ f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
+#endif
+ if (f) {
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+ fputs(buf, stdout);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
+ */
+int
+check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
+ if (command != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+ return 1;
+#else
+ if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable
+ * already exists, its value is overriden.
+ */
+static void
+child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
+ const char *value)
+{
+ u_int i, namelen;
+ char **env;
+
+ /*
+ * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable
+ * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
+ * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
+ */
+ env = *envp;
+ namelen = strlen(name);
+ for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+ if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=')
+ break;
+ if (env[i]) {
+ /* Reuse the slot. */
+ xfree(env[i]);
+ } else {
+ /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */
+ if (i >= (*envsizep) - 1) {
+ (*envsizep) += 50;
+ env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, (*envsizep) * sizeof(char *));
+ }
+ /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
+ env[i + 1] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */
+ env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1);
+ snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them
+ * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing.
+ * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
+ * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed.
+ */
+static void
+read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
+ const char *filename)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char buf[4096];
+ char *cp, *value;
+
+ f = fopen(filename, "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return;
+
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
+ for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
+ continue;
+ if (strchr(cp, '\n'))
+ *strchr(cp, '\n') = '\0';
+ value = strchr(cp, '=');
+ if (value == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad line in %.100s: %.200s\n", filename, buf);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
+ * the value string.
+ */
+ *value = '\0';
+ value++;
+ child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+/*
+ * Sets any environment variables which have been specified by PAM
+ */
+void do_pam_environment(char ***env, u_int *envsize)
+{
+ char *equals, var_name[512], var_val[512];
+ char **pam_env;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((pam_env = fetch_pam_environment()) == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ for(i = 0; pam_env[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if ((equals = strstr(pam_env[i], "=")) == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ if (strlen(pam_env[i]) < (sizeof(var_name) - 1)) {
+ memset(var_name, '\0', sizeof(var_name));
+ memset(var_val, '\0', sizeof(var_val));
+
+ strncpy(var_name, pam_env[i], equals - pam_env[i]);
+ strcpy(var_val, equals + 1);
+
+ debug3("PAM environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
+
+ child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
+ }
+ }
+}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+void copy_environment(char ***env, u_int *envsize)
+{
+ char *equals, var_name[512], var_val[512];
+ int i;
+
+ for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if ((equals = strstr(environ[i], "=")) == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ if (strlen(environ[i]) < (sizeof(var_name) - 1)) {
+ memset(var_name, '\0', sizeof(var_name));
+ memset(var_val, '\0', sizeof(var_val));
+
+ strncpy(var_name, environ[i], equals - environ[i]);
+ strcpy(var_val, equals + 1);
+
+ debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
+
+ child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
+ }
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETUSERATTR)
+/*
+ * AIX-specific login initialisation
+ */
+void set_limit(char *user, char *soft, char *hard, int resource, int mult)
+{
+ struct rlimit rlim;
+ int slim, hlim;
+
+ getrlimit(resource, &rlim);
+
+ slim = 0;
+ if (getuserattr(user, soft, &slim, SEC_INT) != -1) {
+ if (slim < 0) {
+ rlim.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
+ } else if (slim != 0) {
+ /* See the wackiness below */
+ if (rlim.rlim_cur == slim * mult)
+ slim = 0;
+ else
+ rlim.rlim_cur = slim * mult;
+ }
+ }
+
+ hlim = 0;
+ if (getuserattr(user, hard, &hlim, SEC_INT) != -1) {
+ if (hlim < 0) {
+ rlim.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
+ } else if (hlim != 0) {
+ rlim.rlim_max = hlim * mult;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX For cpu and fsize the soft limit is set to the hard limit
+ * if the hard limit is left at its default value and the soft limit
+ * is changed from its default value, either by requesting it
+ * (slim == 0) or by setting it to the current default. At least
+ * that's how rlogind does it. If you're confused you're not alone.
+ * Bug or feature? AIX 4.3.1.2
+ */
+ if ((!strcmp(soft, "fsize") || !strcmp(soft, "cpu"))
+ && hlim == 0 && slim != 0)
+ rlim.rlim_max = rlim.rlim_cur;
+ /* A specified hard limit limits the soft limit */
+ else if (hlim > 0 && rlim.rlim_cur > rlim.rlim_max)
+ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max;
+ /* A soft limit can increase a hard limit */
+ else if (rlim.rlim_cur > rlim.rlim_max)
+ rlim.rlim_max = rlim.rlim_cur;
+
+ if (setrlimit(resource, &rlim) != 0)
+ error("setrlimit(%.10s) failed: %.100s", soft, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void set_limits_from_userattr(char *user)
+{
+ int mask;
+ char buf[16];
+
+ set_limit(user, S_UFSIZE, S_UFSIZE_HARD, RLIMIT_FSIZE, 512);
+ set_limit(user, S_UCPU, S_UCPU_HARD, RLIMIT_CPU, 1);
+ set_limit(user, S_UDATA, S_UDATA_HARD, RLIMIT_DATA, 512);
+ set_limit(user, S_USTACK, S_USTACK_HARD, RLIMIT_STACK, 512);
+ set_limit(user, S_URSS, S_URSS_HARD, RLIMIT_RSS, 512);
+ set_limit(user, S_UCORE, S_UCORE_HARD, RLIMIT_CORE, 512);
+#if defined(S_UNOFILE)
+ set_limit(user, S_UNOFILE, S_UNOFILE_HARD, RLIMIT_NOFILE, 1);
+#endif
+
+ if (getuserattr(user, S_UMASK, &mask, SEC_INT) != -1) {
+ /* Convert decimal to octal */
+ (void) snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", mask);
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%o", &mask) == 1)
+ umask(mask);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_GETUSERATTR) */
+
+/*
+ * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+ * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+ * ids, and executing the command or shell.
+ */
+void
+do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ const char *shell, *hostname = NULL, *cp = NULL;
+ struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ char buf[256];
+ char cmd[1024];
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ u_int envsize, i;
+ char **env;
+ extern char **environ;
+ struct stat st;
+ char *argv[10];
+ int do_xauth;
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+ prid_t projid;
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+ jid_t jid = 0;
+#else
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
+ int jid = 0;
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */
+
+ do_xauth =
+ s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
+
+ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+ destroy_sensitive_data();
+
+ /* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */
+ if (options.use_login && command != NULL)
+ options.use_login = 0;
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+# ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (!login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) && pw->pw_uid)
+ f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", _PATH_NOLOGIN,
+ _PATH_NOLOGIN), "r");
+# else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+ if (pw->pw_uid)
+ f = fopen(_PATH_NOLOGIN, "r");
+# endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+ if (f) {
+ /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents and exit. */
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+ fputs(buf, stderr);
+ fclose(f);
+ exit(254);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+
+ /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
+ /* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
+ switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. */
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ session_setup_sia(pw->pw_name, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
+ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+ do_motd();
+#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (is_winnt) {
+#else
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+#endif
+# ifdef HAVE_GETUSERATTR
+ set_limits_from_userattr(pw->pw_name);
+# endif /* HAVE_GETUSERATTR */
+# ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ (LOGIN_SETALL & ~LOGIN_SETPATH)) < 0) {
+ perror("unable to set user context");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+# else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+#if defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID)
+ /* Sets login uid for accounting */
+ if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+ error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno));
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID) */
+
+ if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
+ error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
+ perror("setgid");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Initialize the group list. */
+ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
+ perror("initgroups");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ endgrent();
+# ifdef USE_PAM
+ /*
+ * PAM credentials may take the form of
+ * supplementary groups. These will have been
+ * wiped by the above initgroups() call.
+ * Reestablish them here.
+ */
+ do_pam_setcred(0);
+# endif /* USE_PAM */
+# ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+ jid = jlimit_startjob(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, "interactive");
+ if (jid == -1) {
+ fatal("Failed to create job container: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+# endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */
+# ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
+ /* initialize array session */
+ if (jid == 0) {
+ if (newarraysess() != 0)
+ fatal("Failed to set up new array session: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+# endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */
+# ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+ /* initialize irix project info */
+ if ((projid = getdfltprojuser(pw->pw_name)) == -1) {
+ debug("Failed to get project id, using projid 0");
+ projid = 0;
+ }
+ if (setprid(projid))
+ fatal("Failed to initialize project %d for %s: %.100s",
+ (int)projid, pw->pw_name, strerror(errno));
+# endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+ if (sysconf(_SC_AUDIT)) {
+ debug("Setting sat id to %d", (int) pw->pw_uid);
+ if (satsetid(pw->pw_uid))
+ debug("error setting satid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+ /*
+ * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and
+ * other stuff is stored - a few applications
+ * actually use this and die if it's not set
+ */
+ if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+ s->tty[0] = '\0';
+ cp = xmalloc(22 + strlen(s->tty) +
+ 2 * strlen(pw->pw_name));
+ i = sprintf(cp, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%cTTY=%s%c%c",
+ pw->pw_name, 0, pw->pw_name, 0, s->tty, 0, 0);
+ if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ debug3("AIX/UsrInfo: set len %d", i);
+ xfree(cp);
+#endif
+
+ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+# endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (is_winnt)
+#endif
+ if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
+ fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
+ * legal, and means /bin/sh.
+ */
+ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
+#endif
+
+ /* Initialize the environment. */
+ envsize = 100;
+ env = xmalloc(envsize * sizeof(char *));
+ env[0] = NULL;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * The Windows environment contains some setting which are
+ * important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
+ */
+ copy_environment(&env, &envsize);
+#endif
+
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+ /* Set basic environment. */
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
+#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
+ * important components pointing to the system directories,
+ * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
+ * remains intact here.
+ */
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
+ _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
+
+ /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
+ }
+ if (getenv("TZ"))
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
+
+ /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+ while (custom_environment) {
+ struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
+ char *s = ce->s;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; s[i] != '=' && s[i]; i++)
+ ;
+ if (s[i] == '=') {
+ s[i] = 0;
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s, s + i + 1);
+ }
+ custom_environment = ce->next;
+ xfree(ce->s);
+ xfree(ce);
+ }
+ }
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port());
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
+
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
+ if (s->term)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
+ if (s->display)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
+ if (original_command)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
+ original_command);
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+ if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
+ if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
+ read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB4
+ if (s->authctxt->krb4_ticket_file)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRBTKFILE",
+ s->authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if (s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+ s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ /* Pull in any environment variables that may have been set by PAM. */
+ do_pam_environment(&env, &envsize);
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+ if (auth_get_socket_name() != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+ auth_get_socket_name());
+
+ /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
+ pw->pw_dir);
+ read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
+ }
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ /* dump the environment */
+ fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
+ for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
+ }
+ /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
+ if (options.use_login)
+ hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
+ options.reverse_mapping_check);
+ /*
+ * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
+ * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
+ * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be
+ * closed before building the environment, as we call
+ * get_remote_ipaddr there.
+ */
+ if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
+ close(packet_get_connection_in());
+ else {
+ close(packet_get_connection_in());
+ close(packet_get_connection_out());
+ }
+ /*
+ * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain
+ * open in the parent.
+ */
+ /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
+ channel_close_all();
+
+ /*
+ * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be
+ * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
+ */
+ endpwent();
+
+ /*
+ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don\'t have them
+ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
+ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+ * descriptors open.
+ */
+ for (i = 3; i < 64; i++)
+ close(i);
+
+ /*
+ * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc and
+ * xauth are run in the proper environment.
+ */
+ environ = env;
+
+#ifdef AFS
+ /* Try to get AFS tokens for the local cell. */
+ if (k_hasafs()) {
+ char cell[64];
+
+ if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
+ krb_afslog(cell, 0);
+
+ krb_afslog(0, 0);
+ }
+#endif /* AFS */
+
+ /* Change current directory to the user\'s home directory. */
+ if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home directory %s: %s\n",
+ pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno));
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0))
+ exit(1);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found first
+ * in this order).
+ */
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+ /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems */
+ if (!s->is_subsystem && (stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0)) {
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
+ shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+ if (debug_flag)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
+ f = popen(cmd, "w");
+ if (f) {
+ if (do_xauth)
+ fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
+ s->auth_data);
+ pclose(f);
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+ } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
+ if (debug_flag)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
+ f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
+ if (f) {
+ if (do_xauth)
+ fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
+ s->auth_data);
+ pclose(f);
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
+ } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
+ /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
+ char *screen = strchr(s->display, ':');
+
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Running %.100s add "
+ "%.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
+ options.xauth_location, s->display,
+ s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
+ if (screen != NULL)
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Adding %.*s/unix%s %s %s\n",
+ (int)(screen - s->display),
+ s->display, screen,
+ s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
+ }
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
+ options.xauth_location);
+ f = popen(cmd, "w");
+ if (f) {
+ fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", s->display,
+ s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
+ if (screen != NULL)
+ fprintf(f, "add %.*s/unix%s %s %s\n",
+ (int)(screen - s->display),
+ s->display, screen,
+ s->auth_proto,
+ s->auth_data);
+ pclose(f);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ cmd);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+ cp = strrchr(shell, '/');
+ if (cp)
+ cp++;
+ else
+ cp = shell;
+ }
+
+ /* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /*
+ * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell
+ * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
+ * this is a login shell.
+ */
+ if (!command) {
+ if (!options.use_login) {
+ char buf[256];
+
+ /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */
+ buf[0] = '-';
+ strncpy(buf + 1, cp, sizeof(buf) - 1);
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* Execute the shell. */
+ argv[0] = buf;
+ argv[1] = NULL;
+ execve(shell, argv, env);
+
+ /* Executing the shell failed. */
+ perror(shell);
+ exit(1);
+
+ } else {
+ /* Launch login(1). */
+
+ execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname,
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM
+ s->term? s->term : "unknown",
+#endif
+ "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+
+ /* Login couldn't be executed, die. */
+
+ perror("login");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c
+ * option to execute the command.
+ */
+ argv[0] = (char *) cp;
+ argv[1] = "-c";
+ argv[2] = (char *) command;
+ argv[3] = NULL;
+ execve(shell, argv, env);
+ perror(shell);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+Session *
+session_new(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ static int did_init = 0;
+ if (!did_init) {
+ debug("session_new: init");
+ for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+ sessions[i].used = 0;
+ }
+ did_init = 1;
+ }
+ for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (! s->used) {
+ memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
+ s->chanid = -1;
+ s->ptyfd = -1;
+ s->ttyfd = -1;
+ s->used = 1;
+ s->self = i;
+ debug("session_new: session %d", i);
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+session_dump(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ debug("dump: used %d session %d %p channel %d pid %d",
+ s->used,
+ s->self,
+ s,
+ s->chanid,
+ s->pid);
+ }
+}
+
+int
+session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
+{
+ Session *s = session_new();
+ debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ error("no more sessions");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+ if (s->pw == NULL)
+ fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
+ debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
+ s->chanid = chanid;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_channel(int id)
+{
+ int i;
+ for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->chanid == id) {
+ debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d", i, id);
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
+{
+ int i;
+ debug("session_by_pid: pid %d", pid);
+ for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
+ return s;
+ }
+ error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %d", pid);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+session_window_change_req(Session *s)
+{
+ s->col = packet_get_int();
+ s->row = packet_get_int();
+ s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
+ s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
+ packet_done();
+ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_pty_req(Session *s)
+{
+ u_int len;
+ int n_bytes;
+
+ if (no_pty_flag) {
+ debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ s->col = packet_get_int();
+ s->row = packet_get_int();
+ } else {
+ s->row = packet_get_int();
+ s->col = packet_get_int();
+ }
+ s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
+ s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
+
+ if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
+ xfree(s->term);
+ s->term = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a pty and open it. */
+ debug("Allocating pty.");
+ if (!pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty))) {
+ if (s->term)
+ xfree(s->term);
+ s->term = NULL;
+ s->ptyfd = -1;
+ s->ttyfd = -1;
+ error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+ /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */
+ if (!compat20)
+ n_bytes = packet_remaining();
+ tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
+
+ /*
+ * Add a cleanup function to clear the utmp entry and record logout
+ * time in case we call fatal() (e.g., the connection gets closed).
+ */
+ fatal_add_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s);
+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+
+ /* Set window size from the packet. */
+ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+
+ packet_done();
+ session_proctitle(s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ u_int len;
+ int success = 0;
+ char *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
+ int i;
+
+ packet_done();
+ log("subsystem request for %s", subsys);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
+ cmd = options.subsystem_command[i];
+ if (stat(cmd, &st) < 0) {
+ error("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", cmd,
+ strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
+ debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
+ s->is_subsystem = 1;
+ do_exec(s, cmd);
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!success)
+ log("subsystem request for %s failed, subsystem not found",
+ subsys);
+
+ xfree(subsys);
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_x11_req(Session *s)
+{
+ int success;
+
+ s->single_connection = packet_get_char();
+ s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ s->screen = packet_get_int();
+ packet_done();
+
+ success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
+ if (!success) {
+ xfree(s->auth_proto);
+ xfree(s->auth_data);
+ s->auth_proto = NULL;
+ s->auth_data = NULL;
+ }
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_shell_req(Session *s)
+{
+ packet_done();
+ do_exec(s, NULL);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_exec_req(Session *s)
+{
+ u_int len;
+ char *command = packet_get_string(&len);
+ packet_done();
+ do_exec(s, command);
+ xfree(command);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_auth_agent_req(Session *s)
+{
+ static int called = 0;
+ packet_done();
+ if (no_agent_forwarding_flag) {
+ debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (called) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ called = 1;
+ return auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+session_input_channel_req(int id, void *arg)
+{
+ u_int len;
+ int reply;
+ int success = 0;
+ char *rtype;
+ Session *s;
+ Channel *c;
+
+ rtype = packet_get_string(&len);
+ reply = packet_get_char();
+
+ s = session_by_channel(id);
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("session_input_channel_req: channel %d: no session", id);
+ c = channel_lookup(id);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ fatal("session_input_channel_req: channel %d: bad channel", id);
+
+ debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d channel %d request %s reply %d",
+ s->self, id, rtype, reply);
+
+ /*
+ * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
+ * or a subsystem is executed
+ */
+ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
+ success = session_shell_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
+ success = session_exec_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
+ success = session_pty_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
+ success = session_x11_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ success = session_auth_agent_req(s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
+ success = session_subsystem_req(s);
+ }
+ }
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
+ success = session_window_change_req(s);
+ }
+
+ if (reply) {
+ packet_start(success ?
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ xfree(rtype);
+}
+
+void
+session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr)
+{
+ if (!compat20)
+ fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0");
+ /*
+ * now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
+ * we can activate our channel and register the fd's
+ */
+ if (s->chanid == -1)
+ fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
+ channel_set_fds(s->chanid,
+ fdout, fdin, fderr,
+ fderr == -1 ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
+ 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
+ * (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
+ */
+static void
+session_pty_cleanup(void *session)
+{
+ Session *s = session;
+
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ error("session_pty_cleanup: no session");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+ return;
+
+ debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+ /* Record that the user has logged out. */
+ if (s->pid != 0)
+ record_logout(s->pid, s->tty);
+
+ /* Release the pseudo-tty. */
+ pty_release(s->tty);
+
+ /*
+ * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
+ * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
+ * while we're still cleaning up.
+ */
+ if (close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
+ error("close(s->ptymaster): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* unlink pty from session */
+ s->ttyfd = -1;
+}
+
+static void
+session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("session_close: no session");
+ c = channel_lookup(s->chanid);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d",
+ s->self, s->chanid);
+ debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %d",
+ s->self, s->chanid, s->pid);
+
+ if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ channel_request_start(s->chanid,
+ "exit-status", 0);
+ packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ packet_send();
+ } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+ channel_request_start(s->chanid,
+ "exit-signal", 0);
+ packet_put_int(WTERMSIG(status));
+#ifdef WCOREDUMP
+ packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status));
+#else /* WCOREDUMP */
+ packet_put_char(0);
+#endif /* WCOREDUMP */
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
+ packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status);
+ }
+
+ /* disconnect channel */
+ debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid);
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid);
+ /*
+ * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be
+ * interested in data we write.
+ * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
+ * be some more data waiting in the pipe.
+ */
+ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+ s->chanid = -1;
+}
+
+static void
+session_close(Session *s)
+{
+ debug("session_close: session %d pid %d", s->self, s->pid);
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s);
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ }
+ if (s->term)
+ xfree(s->term);
+ if (s->display)
+ xfree(s->display);
+ if (s->auth_data)
+ xfree(s->auth_data);
+ if (s->auth_proto)
+ xfree(s->auth_proto);
+ s->used = 0;
+ session_proctitle(s);
+}
+
+void
+session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status)
+{
+ Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %d", pid);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (s->chanid != -1)
+ session_exit_message(s, status);
+ session_close(s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * this is called when a channel dies before
+ * the session 'child' itself dies
+ */
+void
+session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg)
+{
+ Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %d", id, s->pid);
+ if (s->pid != 0) {
+ debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", id);
+ /*
+ * delay detach of session, but release pty, since
+ * the fd's to the child are already closed
+ */
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s);
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ /* detach by removing callback */
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid);
+ s->chanid = -1;
+ session_close(s);
+}
+
+void
+session_destroy_all(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used)
+ session_close(s);
+ }
+}
+
+static char *
+session_tty_list(void)
+{
+ static char buf[1024];
+ int i;
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
+ strlcat(buf, strrchr(s->tty, '/') + 1, sizeof buf);
+ }
+ }
+ if (buf[0] == '\0')
+ strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+void
+session_proctitle(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->pw == NULL)
+ error("no user for session %d", s->self);
+ else
+ setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
+}
+
+int
+session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
+ packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
+ debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!options.xauth_location ||
+ (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
+ packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options.use_login) {
+ packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; "
+ "not compatible with UseLogin=yes.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->display != NULL) {
+ debug("X11 display already set.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->display = x11_create_display_inet(s->screen, options.x11_display_offset);
+ if (s->display == NULL) {
+ debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ server_loop2(authctxt);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.13 2001/10/10 22:18:47 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SESSION_H
+#define SESSION_H
+
+void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
+
+int session_open(Authctxt*, int);
+void session_input_channel_req(int, void *);
+void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
+void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
+void session_destroy_all(void);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* XXX: memleaks */
+/* XXX: signed vs unsigned */
+/* XXX: redesign to allow concurrent overlapped operations */
+/* XXX: we use fatal too much, error may be more appropriate in places */
+/* XXX: copy between two remote sites */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.18 2001/07/14 15:10:16 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "getput.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
+/* How much data to read/write at at time during copies */
+/* XXX: what should this be? */
+#define COPY_SIZE 8192
+
+/* Message ID */
+static u_int msg_id = 1;
+
+static void
+send_msg(int fd, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int mlen = buffer_len(m);
+ int len;
+ Buffer oqueue;
+
+ buffer_init(&oqueue);
+ buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen);
+ buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen);
+ buffer_consume(m, mlen);
+
+ len = atomicio(write, fd, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), buffer_len(&oqueue));
+ if (len <= 0)
+ fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ buffer_free(&oqueue);
+}
+
+static void
+get_msg(int fd, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_int len, msg_len;
+ unsigned char buf[4096];
+
+ len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4);
+ if (len == 0)
+ fatal("Connection closed");
+ else if (len == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+ if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
+ fatal("Received message too long %d", msg_len);
+
+ while (msg_len) {
+ len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, MIN(msg_len, sizeof(buf)));
+ if (len == 0)
+ fatal("Connection closed");
+ else if (len == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ msg_len -= len;
+ buffer_append(m, buf, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+send_string_request(int fd, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
+ u_int len)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len);
+ send_msg(fd, &msg);
+ debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%d I:%d", fd, code, id);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_string_attrs_request(int fd, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
+ u_int len, Attrib *a)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len);
+ encode_attrib(&msg, a);
+ send_msg(fd, &msg);
+ debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%d I:%d", fd, code, id);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static u_int
+get_status(int fd, int expected_id)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ u_int type, id, status;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ get_msg(fd, &msg);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+ if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, got %d",
+ SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
+
+ status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+
+ debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status);
+
+ return(status);
+}
+
+static char *
+get_handle(int fd, u_int expected_id, u_int *len)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ u_int type, id;
+ char *handle;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ get_msg(fd, &msg);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ error("Couldn't get handle: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ return(NULL);
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE)
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%d) packet, got %d",
+ SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type);
+
+ handle = buffer_get_string(&msg, len);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+
+ return(handle);
+}
+
+static Attrib *
+get_decode_stat(int fd, u_int expected_id, int quiet)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ u_int type, id;
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ get_msg(fd, &msg);
+
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ debug3("Received stat reply T:%d I:%d", type, id);
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ if (quiet)
+ debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ else
+ error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ return(NULL);
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) {
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%d) packet, got %d",
+ SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type);
+ }
+ a = decode_attrib(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+
+ return(a);
+}
+
+int
+do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out)
+{
+ int type, version;
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION);
+ send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+ get_msg(fd_in, &msg);
+
+ /* Expecting a VERSION reply */
+ if ((type = buffer_get_char(&msg)) != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) {
+ error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %d)",
+ type);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ version = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ debug2("Remote version: %d", version);
+
+ /* Check for extensions */
+ while (buffer_len(&msg) > 0) {
+ char *name = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+ char *value = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+
+ debug2("Init extension: \"%s\"", name);
+ xfree(name);
+ xfree(value);
+ }
+
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+
+ return(version);
+}
+
+int
+do_close(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+{
+ u_int id, status;
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ id = msg_id++;
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
+ send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%d", id);
+
+ status = get_status(fd_in, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+
+ return(status);
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_lsreaddir(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, int printflag,
+ SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ u_int type, id, handle_len, i, expected_id, ents = 0;
+ char *handle;
+
+ id = msg_id++;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, path);
+ send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+ handle = get_handle(fd_in, id, &handle_len);
+ if (handle == NULL)
+ return(-1);
+
+ if (dir) {
+ ents = 0;
+ *dir = xmalloc(sizeof(**dir));
+ (*dir)[0] = NULL;
+ }
+
+
+ for(;;) {
+ int count;
+
+ id = expected_id = msg_id++;
+
+ debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%d", id);
+
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
+ send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+ get_msg(fd_in, &msg);
+
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ debug3("Received reply T:%d I:%d", type, id);
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status);
+
+ if (status == SSH2_FX_EOF) {
+ break;
+ } else {
+ error("Couldn't read directory: %s",
+ fx2txt(status));
+ do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len);
+ return(status);
+ }
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%d) packet, got %d",
+ SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+ count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+ if (count == 0)
+ break;
+ debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count);
+ for(i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ char *filename, *longname;
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+ longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+ a = decode_attrib(&msg);
+
+ if (printflag)
+ printf("%s\n", longname);
+
+ if (dir) {
+ *dir = xrealloc(*dir, sizeof(**dir) *
+ (ents + 2));
+ (*dir)[ents] = xmalloc(sizeof(***dir));
+ (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename);
+ (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname);
+ memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, a, sizeof(*a));
+ (*dir)[++ents] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ xfree(filename);
+ xfree(longname);
+ }
+ }
+
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len);
+ xfree(handle);
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+int
+do_ls(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path)
+{
+ return(do_lsreaddir(fd_in, fd_out, path, 1, NULL));
+}
+
+int
+do_readdir(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+{
+ return(do_lsreaddir(fd_in, fd_out, path, 0, dir));
+}
+
+void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for(i = 0; s[i]; i++) {
+ xfree(s[i]->filename);
+ xfree(s[i]->longname);
+ xfree(s[i]);
+ }
+ xfree(s);
+}
+
+int
+do_rm(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path)
+{
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path);
+
+ id = msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path));
+ status = get_status(fd_in, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ return(status);
+}
+
+int
+do_mkdir(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, Attrib *a)
+{
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ id = msg_id++;
+ send_string_attrs_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path,
+ strlen(path), a);
+
+ status = get_status(fd_in, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+ return(status);
+}
+
+int
+do_rmdir(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path)
+{
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ id = msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path, strlen(path));
+
+ status = get_status(fd_in, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+ return(status);
+}
+
+Attrib *
+do_stat(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, int quiet)
+{
+ u_int id;
+
+ id = msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_STAT, path, strlen(path));
+ return(get_decode_stat(fd_in, id, quiet));
+}
+
+Attrib *
+do_lstat(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, int quiet)
+{
+ u_int id;
+
+ id = msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path, strlen(path));
+ return(get_decode_stat(fd_in, id, quiet));
+}
+
+Attrib *
+do_fstat(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet)
+{
+ u_int id;
+
+ id = msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle, handle_len);
+ return(get_decode_stat(fd_in, id, quiet));
+}
+
+int
+do_setstat(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path, Attrib *a)
+{
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ id = msg_id++;
+ send_string_attrs_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path,
+ strlen(path), a);
+
+ status = get_status(fd_in, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path,
+ fx2txt(status));
+
+ return(status);
+}
+
+int
+do_fsetstat(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+ Attrib *a)
+{
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ id = msg_id++;
+ send_string_attrs_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle,
+ handle_len, a);
+
+ status = get_status(fd_in, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+ return(status);
+}
+
+char *
+do_realpath(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
+ char *filename, *longname;
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ expected_id = id = msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path, strlen(path));
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ get_msg(fd_in, &msg);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ error("Couldn't canonicalise: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ return(NULL);
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%d) packet, got %d",
+ SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+ count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+ if (count != 1)
+ fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count);
+
+ filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+ longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+ a = decode_attrib(&msg);
+
+ debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s", path, filename);
+
+ xfree(longname);
+
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+
+ return(filename);
+}
+
+int
+do_rename(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ /* Send rename request */
+ id = msg_id++;
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath);
+ send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_RENAME \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath,
+ newpath);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+
+ status = get_status(fd_in, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath,
+ fx2txt(status));
+
+ return(status);
+}
+
+int
+do_symlink(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ u_int status, id;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ /* Send rename request */
+ id = msg_id++;
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath);
+ send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath,
+ newpath);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+
+ status = get_status(fd_in, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath,
+ fx2txt(status));
+
+ return(status);
+}
+
+char *
+do_readlink(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *path)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
+ char *filename, *longname;
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ expected_id = id = msg_id++;
+ send_string_request(fd_out, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path));
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ get_msg(fd_in, &msg);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ return(NULL);
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%d) packet, got %d",
+ SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+ count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+ if (count != 1)
+ fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count);
+
+ filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+ longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL);
+ a = decode_attrib(&msg);
+
+ debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename);
+
+ xfree(longname);
+
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+
+ return(filename);
+}
+
+int
+do_download(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
+ int pflag)
+{
+ int local_fd;
+ u_int expected_id, handle_len, mode, type, id;
+ u_int64_t offset;
+ char *handle;
+ Buffer msg;
+ Attrib junk, *a;
+ int status;
+
+ a = do_stat(fd_in, fd_out, remote_path, 0);
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return(-1);
+
+ /* XXX: should we preserve set[ug]id? */
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+ mode = S_IWRITE | (a->perm & 0777);
+ else
+ mode = 0666;
+
+ if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
+ (a->perm & S_IFDIR)) {
+ error("Cannot download a directory: %s", remote_path);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, mode);
+ if (local_fd == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s",
+ local_path, strerror(errno));
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ /* Send open request */
+ id = msg_id++;
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, remote_path);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_READ);
+ attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */
+ encode_attrib(&msg, &junk);
+ send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%d P:%s", id, remote_path);
+
+ handle = get_handle(fd_in, id, &handle_len);
+ if (handle == NULL) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ close(local_fd);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Read from remote and write to local */
+ offset = 0;
+ for(;;) {
+ u_int len;
+ char *data;
+
+ id = expected_id = msg_id++;
+
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READ);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
+ buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, COPY_SIZE);
+ send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_READ I:%d O:%llu S:%u",
+ id, (u_int64_t)offset, COPY_SIZE);
+
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+ get_msg(fd_in, &msg);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+ debug3("Received reply T:%d I:%d", type, id);
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
+
+ if (status == SSH2_FX_EOF)
+ break;
+ else {
+ error("Couldn't read from remote "
+ "file \"%s\" : %s", remote_path,
+ fx2txt(status));
+ do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_DATA) {
+ fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%d) packet, got %d",
+ SSH2_FXP_DATA, type);
+ }
+
+ data = buffer_get_string(&msg, &len);
+ if (len > COPY_SIZE)
+ fatal("Received more data than asked for %d > %d",
+ len, COPY_SIZE);
+
+ debug3("In read loop, got %d offset %llu", len,
+ (u_int64_t)offset);
+ if (atomicio(write, local_fd, data, len) != len) {
+ error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len);
+ status = -1;
+ xfree(data);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ offset += len;
+ xfree(data);
+ }
+ status = do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len);
+
+ /* Override umask and utimes if asked */
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+ if (pflag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1)
+#else
+ if (pflag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1)
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+ error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (pflag && (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) {
+ struct timeval tv[2];
+ tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
+ tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
+ tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
+ if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1)
+ error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+done:
+ close(local_fd);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ xfree(handle);
+ return status;
+}
+
+int
+do_upload(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
+ int pflag)
+{
+ int local_fd;
+ u_int handle_len, id;
+ u_int64_t offset;
+ char *handle;
+ Buffer msg;
+ struct stat sb;
+ Attrib a;
+ int status;
+
+ if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s",
+ local_path, strerror(errno));
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s",
+ local_path, strerror(errno));
+ close(local_fd);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
+
+ a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+ a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+ a.perm &= 0777;
+ if (!pflag)
+ a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ /* Send open request */
+ id = msg_id++;
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, remote_path);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC);
+ encode_attrib(&msg, &a);
+ send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%d P:%s", id, remote_path);
+
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+ handle = get_handle(fd_in, id, &handle_len);
+ if (handle == NULL) {
+ close(local_fd);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Read from local and write to remote */
+ offset = 0;
+ for(;;) {
+ int len;
+ char data[COPY_SIZE];
+
+ /*
+ * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF, thus losing
+ * the last block of the file
+ */
+ do
+ len = read(local_fd, data, COPY_SIZE);
+ while ((len == -1) && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN));
+
+ if (len == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (len == 0)
+ break;
+
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, ++id);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
+ buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, data, len);
+ send_msg(fd_out, &msg);
+ debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%d O:%llu S:%u",
+ id, (u_int64_t)offset, len);
+
+ status = get_status(fd_in, id);
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
+ error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s",
+ remote_path, fx2txt(status));
+ do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len);
+ close(local_fd);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ debug3("In write loop, got %d offset %llu", len,
+ (u_int64_t)offset);
+
+ offset += len;
+ }
+
+ if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len);
+ status = -1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Override umask and utimes if asked */
+ if (pflag)
+ do_fsetstat(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len, &a);
+
+ status = do_close(fd_in, fd_out, handle, handle_len);
+
+done:
+ xfree(handle);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return status;
+}
+
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.6 2001/06/26 06:33:01 itojun Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */
+
+typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT;
+
+struct SFTP_DIRENT {
+ char *filename;
+ char *longname;
+ Attrib a;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialiase a SSH filexfer connection. Returns -1 on error or
+ * protocol version on success.
+ */
+int do_init(int, int);
+
+/* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
+int do_close(int, int, char *, u_int);
+
+/* List contents of directory 'path' to stdout */
+int do_ls(int, int, char *);
+
+/* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
+int do_readdir(int, int, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
+
+/* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
+void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
+
+/* Delete file 'path' */
+int do_rm(int, int, char *);
+
+/* Create directory 'path' */
+int do_mkdir(int, int, char *, Attrib *);
+
+/* Remove directory 'path' */
+int do_rmdir(int, int, char *);
+
+/* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
+Attrib *do_stat(int, int, char *, int);
+
+/* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
+Attrib *do_lstat(int, int, char *, int);
+
+/* Get file attributes of open file 'handle' */
+Attrib *do_fstat(int, int, char *, u_int, int);
+
+/* Set file attributes of 'path' */
+int do_setstat(int, int, char *, Attrib *);
+
+/* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
+int do_fsetstat(int, int, char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+
+/* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+char *do_realpath(int, int, char *);
+
+/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_rename(int, int, char *, char *);
+
+/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_symlink(int, int, char *, char *);
+
+/* Return target of symlink 'path' - caller must free result */
+char *do_readlink(int, int, char *);
+
+/* XXX: add callbacks to do_download/do_upload so we can do progress meter */
+
+/*
+ * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+ * if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int do_download(int, int, char *, char *, int);
+
+/*
+ * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+ * if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int do_upload(int, int, char *, char *, int);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.4 2001/07/14 15:10:17 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+
+/* Clear contents of attributes structure */
+void
+attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
+{
+ a->flags = 0;
+ a->size = 0;
+ a->uid = 0;
+ a->gid = 0;
+ a->perm = 0;
+ a->atime = 0;
+ a->mtime = 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert from struct stat to filexfer attribs */
+void
+stat_to_attrib(struct stat *st, Attrib *a)
+{
+ attrib_clear(a);
+ a->flags = 0;
+ a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+ a->size = st->st_size;
+ a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+ a->uid = st->st_uid;
+ a->gid = st->st_gid;
+ a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+ a->perm = st->st_mode;
+ a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+ a->atime = st->st_atime;
+ a->mtime = st->st_mtime;
+}
+
+/* Decode attributes in buffer */
+Attrib *
+decode_attrib(Buffer *b)
+{
+ static Attrib a;
+ attrib_clear(&a);
+ a.flags = buffer_get_int(b);
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+ a.size = buffer_get_int64(b);
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+ a.uid = buffer_get_int(b);
+ a.gid = buffer_get_int(b);
+ }
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+ a.perm = buffer_get_int(b);
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ a.atime = buffer_get_int(b);
+ a.mtime = buffer_get_int(b);
+ }
+ /* vendor-specific extensions */
+ if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) {
+ char *type, *data;
+ int i, count;
+ count = buffer_get_int(b);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ type = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
+ data = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
+ debug3("Got file attribute \"%s\"", type);
+ xfree(type);
+ xfree(data);
+ }
+ }
+ return &a;
+}
+
+/* Encode attributes to buffer */
+void
+encode_attrib(Buffer *b, Attrib *a)
+{
+ buffer_put_int(b, a->flags);
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+ buffer_put_int64(b, a->size);
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+ buffer_put_int(b, a->uid);
+ buffer_put_int(b, a->gid);
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+ buffer_put_int(b, a->perm);
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ buffer_put_int(b, a->atime);
+ buffer_put_int(b, a->mtime);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Convert from SSH2_FX_ status to text error message */
+const char *
+fx2txt(int status)
+{
+ switch (status) {
+ case SSH2_FX_OK:
+ return("No error");
+ case SSH2_FX_EOF:
+ return("End of file");
+ case SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE:
+ return("No such file or directory");
+ case SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+ return("Permission denied");
+ case SSH2_FX_FAILURE:
+ return("Failure");
+ case SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE:
+ return("Bad message");
+ case SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION:
+ return("No connection");
+ case SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST:
+ return("Connection lost");
+ case SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED:
+ return("Operation unsupported");
+ default:
+ return("Unknown status");
+ };
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+typedef struct Attrib Attrib;
+
+/* File attributes */
+struct Attrib {
+ u_int32_t flags;
+ u_int64_t size;
+ u_int32_t uid;
+ u_int32_t gid;
+ u_int32_t perm;
+ u_int32_t atime;
+ u_int32_t mtime;
+};
+
+void attrib_clear(Attrib *);
+void stat_to_attrib(struct stat *, Attrib *);
+Attrib *decode_attrib(Buffer *);
+void encode_attrib(Buffer *, Attrib *);
+
+const char *fx2txt(int);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.8 2001/07/14 15:10:17 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+#include "sftp-glob.h"
+
+struct SFTP_OPENDIR {
+ SFTP_DIRENT **dir;
+ int offset;
+};
+
+static struct {
+ int fd_in;
+ int fd_out;
+} cur;
+
+static void *
+fudge_opendir(const char *path)
+{
+ struct SFTP_OPENDIR *r;
+
+ r = xmalloc(sizeof(*r));
+
+ if (do_readdir(cur.fd_in, cur.fd_out, (char*)path, &r->dir))
+ return(NULL);
+
+ r->offset = 0;
+
+ return((void*)r);
+}
+
+static struct dirent *
+fudge_readdir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
+{
+ /* Solaris needs sizeof(dirent) + path length (see below) */
+ static char buf[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
+ struct dirent *ret = (struct dirent *)buf;
+#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
+ static int inum = 1;
+#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
+
+ if (od->dir[od->offset] == NULL)
+ return(NULL);
+
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+ /*
+ * Solaris defines dirent->d_name as a one byte array and expects
+ * you to hack around it.
+ */
+#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
+ strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, MAXPATHLEN);
+#else
+ strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename,
+ sizeof(ret->d_name));
+#endif
+#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
+ /*
+ * Idiot glibc uses extensions to struct dirent for readdir with
+ * ALTDIRFUNCs. Not that this is documented anywhere but the
+ * source... Fake an inode number to appease it.
+ */
+ ret->d_ino = inum++;
+ if (!inum)
+ inum = 1;
+#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
+
+ return(ret);
+}
+
+static void
+fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
+{
+ free_sftp_dirents(od->dir);
+ xfree(od);
+}
+
+static void
+attrib_to_stat(Attrib *a, struct stat *st)
+{
+ memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
+
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+ st->st_size = a->size;
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+ st->st_uid = a->uid;
+ st->st_gid = a->gid;
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+ st->st_mode = a->perm;
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ st->st_atime = a->atime;
+ st->st_mtime = a->mtime;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
+{
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.fd_in, cur.fd_out, (char*)path, 0)))
+ return(-1);
+
+ attrib_to_stat(a, st);
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
+{
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ if (!(a = do_stat(cur.fd_in, cur.fd_out, (char*)path, 0)))
+ return(-1);
+
+ attrib_to_stat(a, st);
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+int
+remote_glob(int fd_in, int fd_out, const char *pattern, int flags,
+ int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob)
+{
+ pglob->gl_opendir = fudge_opendir;
+ pglob->gl_readdir = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))fudge_readdir;
+ pglob->gl_closedir = (void (*)(void *))fudge_closedir;
+ pglob->gl_lstat = fudge_lstat;
+ pglob->gl_stat = fudge_stat;
+
+ memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
+ cur.fd_in = fd_in;
+ cur.fd_out = fd_out;
+
+ return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc,
+ pglob));
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.h,v 1.5 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* Remote sftp filename globbing */
+
+int
+remote_glob(int, int, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* XXX: globbed ls */
+/* XXX: recursive operations */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-int.c,v 1.40 2001/08/14 09:23:02 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-glob.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+#include "sftp-int.h"
+
+/* File to read commands from */
+extern FILE *infile;
+
+/* Version of server we are speaking to */
+int version;
+
+/* Seperators for interactive commands */
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
+/* Commands for interactive mode */
+#define I_CHDIR 1
+#define I_CHGRP 2
+#define I_CHMOD 3
+#define I_CHOWN 4
+#define I_GET 5
+#define I_HELP 6
+#define I_LCHDIR 7
+#define I_LLS 8
+#define I_LMKDIR 9
+#define I_LPWD 10
+#define I_LS 11
+#define I_LUMASK 12
+#define I_MKDIR 13
+#define I_PUT 14
+#define I_PWD 15
+#define I_QUIT 16
+#define I_RENAME 17
+#define I_RM 18
+#define I_RMDIR 19
+#define I_SHELL 20
+#define I_SYMLINK 21
+#define I_VERSION 22
+
+struct CMD {
+ const char *c;
+ const int n;
+};
+
+const struct CMD cmds[] = {
+ { "bye", I_QUIT },
+ { "cd", I_CHDIR },
+ { "chdir", I_CHDIR },
+ { "chgrp", I_CHGRP },
+ { "chmod", I_CHMOD },
+ { "chown", I_CHOWN },
+ { "dir", I_LS },
+ { "exit", I_QUIT },
+ { "get", I_GET },
+ { "mget", I_GET },
+ { "help", I_HELP },
+ { "lcd", I_LCHDIR },
+ { "lchdir", I_LCHDIR },
+ { "lls", I_LLS },
+ { "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR },
+ { "ln", I_SYMLINK },
+ { "lpwd", I_LPWD },
+ { "ls", I_LS },
+ { "lumask", I_LUMASK },
+ { "mkdir", I_MKDIR },
+ { "put", I_PUT },
+ { "mput", I_PUT },
+ { "pwd", I_PWD },
+ { "quit", I_QUIT },
+ { "rename", I_RENAME },
+ { "rm", I_RM },
+ { "rmdir", I_RMDIR },
+ { "symlink", I_SYMLINK },
+ { "version", I_VERSION },
+ { "!", I_SHELL },
+ { "?", I_HELP },
+ { NULL, -1}
+};
+
+static void
+help(void)
+{
+ printf("Available commands:\n");
+ printf("cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n");
+ printf("lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n");
+ printf("chgrp grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n");
+ printf("chmod mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n");
+ printf("chown own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n");
+ printf("help Display this help text\n");
+ printf("get remote-path [local-path] Download file\n");
+ printf("lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n");
+ printf("ln oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n");
+ printf("lmkdir path Create local directory\n");
+ printf("lpwd Print local working directory\n");
+ printf("ls [path] Display remote directory listing\n");
+ printf("lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n");
+ printf("mkdir path Create remote directory\n");
+ printf("put local-path [remote-path] Upload file\n");
+ printf("pwd Display remote working directory\n");
+ printf("exit Quit sftp\n");
+ printf("quit Quit sftp\n");
+ printf("rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n");
+ printf("rmdir path Remove remote directory\n");
+ printf("rm path Delete remote file\n");
+ printf("symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n");
+ printf("version Show SFTP version\n");
+ printf("!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n");
+ printf("! Escape to local shell\n");
+ printf("? Synonym for help\n");
+}
+
+static void
+local_do_shell(const char *args)
+{
+ int status;
+ char *shell;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (!*args)
+ args = NULL;
+
+ if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
+ shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ /* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */
+ if (args) {
+ debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
+ execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+ } else {
+ debug3("Executing %s", shell);
+ execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status))
+ error("Shell exited abormally");
+ else if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
+ error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+static void
+local_do_ls(const char *args)
+{
+ if (!args || !*args)
+ local_do_shell(_PATH_LS);
+ else {
+ int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1;
+ char *buf = xmalloc(len);
+
+ /* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */
+ snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args);
+ local_do_shell(buf);
+ xfree(buf);
+ }
+}
+
+static char *
+path_append(char *p1, char *p2)
+{
+ char *ret;
+ int len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
+
+ ret = xmalloc(len);
+ strlcpy(ret, p1, len);
+ if (strcmp(p1, "/") != 0)
+ strlcat(ret, "/", len);
+ strlcat(ret, p2, len);
+
+ return(ret);
+}
+
+static char *
+make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd)
+{
+ char *abs;
+
+ /* Derelativise */
+ if (p && p[0] != '/') {
+ abs = path_append(pwd, p);
+ xfree(p);
+ return(abs);
+ } else
+ return(p);
+}
+
+static int
+infer_path(const char *p, char **ifp)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ cp = strrchr(p, '/');
+ if (cp == NULL) {
+ *ifp = xstrdup(p);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ if (!cp[1]) {
+ error("Invalid path");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ *ifp = xstrdup(cp + 1);
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_getput_flags(const char **cpp, int *pflag)
+{
+ const char *cp = *cpp;
+
+ /* Check for flags */
+ if (cp[0] == '-' && cp[1] && strchr(WHITESPACE, cp[2])) {
+ switch (cp[1]) {
+ case 'p':
+ case 'P':
+ *pflag = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("Invalid flag -%c", cp[1]);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ cp += 2;
+ *cpp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ }
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+get_pathname(const char **cpp, char **path)
+{
+ const char *cp = *cpp, *end;
+ char quot;
+ int i;
+
+ cp += strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ if (!*cp) {
+ *cpp = cp;
+ *path = NULL;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* Check for quoted filenames */
+ if (*cp == '\"' || *cp == '\'') {
+ quot = *cp++;
+
+ end = strchr(cp, quot);
+ if (end == NULL) {
+ error("Unterminated quote");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (cp == end) {
+ error("Empty quotes");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ *cpp = end + 1 + strspn(end + 1, WHITESPACE);
+ } else {
+ /* Read to end of filename */
+ end = strpbrk(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ if (end == NULL)
+ end = strchr(cp, '\0');
+ *cpp = end + strspn(end, WHITESPACE);
+ }
+
+ i = end - cp;
+
+ *path = xmalloc(i + 1);
+ memcpy(*path, cp, i);
+ (*path)[i] = '\0';
+ return(0);
+
+ fail:
+ *path = NULL;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+static int
+is_dir(char *path)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ /* XXX: report errors? */
+ if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
+ return(0);
+
+ return(sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR);
+}
+
+static int
+remote_is_dir(int in, int out, char *path)
+{
+ Attrib *a;
+
+ /* XXX: report errors? */
+ if ((a = do_stat(in, out, path, 1)) == NULL)
+ return(0);
+ if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
+ return(0);
+ return(a->perm & S_IFDIR);
+}
+
+static int
+process_get(int in, int out, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag)
+{
+ char *abs_src = NULL;
+ char *abs_dst = NULL;
+ char *tmp;
+ glob_t g;
+ int err = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ abs_src = xstrdup(src);
+ abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd);
+
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+ debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src);
+ if (remote_glob(in, out, abs_src, 0, NULL, &g)) {
+ error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Only one match, dst may be file, directory or unspecified */
+ if (g.gl_pathv[0] && g.gl_matchc == 1) {
+ if (dst) {
+ /* If directory specified, append filename */
+ if (is_dir(dst)) {
+ if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &tmp)) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ abs_dst = path_append(dst, tmp);
+ xfree(tmp);
+ } else
+ abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+ } else if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &abs_dst)) {
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ printf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[0], abs_dst);
+ err = do_download(in, out, g.gl_pathv[0], abs_dst, pflag);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */
+ if (dst && !is_dir(dst)) {
+ error("Multiple files match, but \"%s\" is not a directory",
+ dst);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) {
+ if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[i], &tmp)) {
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (dst) {
+ abs_dst = path_append(dst, tmp);
+ xfree(tmp);
+ } else
+ abs_dst = tmp;
+
+ printf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+ if (do_download(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ xfree(abs_dst);
+ abs_dst = NULL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ xfree(abs_src);
+ if (abs_dst)
+ xfree(abs_dst);
+ globfree(&g);
+ return(err);
+}
+
+static int
+process_put(int in, int out, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag)
+{
+ char *tmp_dst = NULL;
+ char *abs_dst = NULL;
+ char *tmp;
+ glob_t g;
+ int err = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ if (dst) {
+ tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+ tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd);
+ }
+
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+ debug3("Looking up %s", src);
+ if (glob(src, 0, NULL, &g)) {
+ error("File \"%s\" not found.", src);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Only one match, dst may be file, directory or unspecified */
+ if (g.gl_pathv[0] && g.gl_matchc == 1) {
+ if (tmp_dst) {
+ /* If directory specified, append filename */
+ if (remote_is_dir(in, out, tmp_dst)) {
+ if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &tmp)) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, tmp);
+ xfree(tmp);
+ } else
+ abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst);
+ } else {
+ if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &abs_dst)) {
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ abs_dst = make_absolute(abs_dst, pwd);
+ }
+ printf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[0], abs_dst);
+ err = do_upload(in, out, g.gl_pathv[0], abs_dst, pflag);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */
+ if (tmp_dst && !remote_is_dir(in, out, tmp_dst)) {
+ error("Multiple files match, but \"%s\" is not a directory",
+ tmp_dst);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) {
+ if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[i], &tmp)) {
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (tmp_dst) {
+ abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, tmp);
+ xfree(tmp);
+ } else
+ abs_dst = make_absolute(tmp, pwd);
+
+ printf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+ if (do_upload(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, pflag) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (abs_dst)
+ xfree(abs_dst);
+ if (tmp_dst)
+ xfree(tmp_dst);
+ return(err);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_args(const char **cpp, int *pflag, unsigned long *n_arg,
+ char **path1, char **path2)
+{
+ const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp;
+ char *cp2;
+ int base = 0;
+ long l;
+ int i, cmdnum;
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace */
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+
+ /* Ignore blank lines */
+ if (!*cp)
+ return(-1);
+
+ /* Figure out which command we have */
+ for(i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) {
+ int cmdlen = strlen(cmds[i].c);
+
+ /* Check for command followed by whitespace */
+ if (!strncasecmp(cp, cmds[i].c, cmdlen) &&
+ strchr(WHITESPACE, cp[cmdlen])) {
+ cp += cmdlen;
+ cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ cmdnum = cmds[i].n;
+ cmd = cmds[i].c;
+
+ /* Special case */
+ if (*cp == '!') {
+ cp++;
+ cmdnum = I_SHELL;
+ } else if (cmdnum == -1) {
+ error("Invalid command.");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Get arguments and parse flags */
+ *pflag = *n_arg = 0;
+ *path1 = *path2 = NULL;
+ switch (cmdnum) {
+ case I_GET:
+ case I_PUT:
+ if (parse_getput_flags(&cp, pflag))
+ return(-1);
+ /* Get first pathname (mandatory) */
+ if (get_pathname(&cp, path1))
+ return(-1);
+ if (*path1 == NULL) {
+ error("You must specify at least one path after a "
+ "%s command.", cmd);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ /* Try to get second pathname (optional) */
+ if (get_pathname(&cp, path2))
+ return(-1);
+ break;
+ case I_RENAME:
+ case I_SYMLINK:
+ if (get_pathname(&cp, path1))
+ return(-1);
+ if (get_pathname(&cp, path2))
+ return(-1);
+ if (!*path1 || !*path2) {
+ error("You must specify two paths after a %s "
+ "command.", cmd);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_RM:
+ case I_MKDIR:
+ case I_RMDIR:
+ case I_CHDIR:
+ case I_LCHDIR:
+ case I_LMKDIR:
+ /* Get pathname (mandatory) */
+ if (get_pathname(&cp, path1))
+ return(-1);
+ if (*path1 == NULL) {
+ error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
+ cmd);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_LS:
+ /* Path is optional */
+ if (get_pathname(&cp, path1))
+ return(-1);
+ break;
+ case I_LLS:
+ case I_SHELL:
+ /* Uses the rest of the line */
+ break;
+ case I_LUMASK:
+ base = 8;
+ case I_CHMOD:
+ base = 8;
+ case I_CHOWN:
+ case I_CHGRP:
+ /* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */
+ l = strtol(cp, &cp2, base);
+ if (cp2 == cp || ((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) &&
+ errno == ERANGE) || l < 0) {
+ error("You must supply a numeric argument "
+ "to the %s command.", cmd);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ cp = cp2;
+ *n_arg = l;
+ if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK && strchr(WHITESPACE, *cp))
+ break;
+ if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK || !strchr(WHITESPACE, *cp)) {
+ error("You must supply a numeric argument "
+ "to the %s command.", cmd);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ cp += strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+
+ /* Get pathname (mandatory) */
+ if (get_pathname(&cp, path1))
+ return(-1);
+ if (*path1 == NULL) {
+ error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
+ cmd);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_QUIT:
+ case I_PWD:
+ case I_LPWD:
+ case I_HELP:
+ case I_VERSION:
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Command not implemented");
+ }
+
+ *cpp = cp;
+ return(cmdnum);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_dispatch_command(int in, int out, const char *cmd, char **pwd)
+{
+ char *path1, *path2, *tmp;
+ int pflag, cmdnum, i;
+ unsigned long n_arg;
+ Attrib a, *aa;
+ char path_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ int err = 0;
+ glob_t g;
+
+ path1 = path2 = NULL;
+ cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &pflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2);
+
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+ /* Perform command */
+ switch (cmdnum) {
+ case -1:
+ break;
+ case I_GET:
+ err = process_get(in, out, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag);
+ break;
+ case I_PUT:
+ err = process_put(in, out, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag);
+ break;
+ case I_RENAME:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
+ err = do_rename(in, out, path1, path2);
+ break;
+ case I_SYMLINK:
+ if (version < 3) {
+ error("The server (version %d) does not support "
+ "this operation", version);
+ err = -1;
+ } else {
+ path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
+ err = do_symlink(in, out, path1, path2);
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_RM:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ remote_glob(in, out, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+ for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) {
+ printf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ if (do_rm(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i]) == -1)
+ err = -1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_MKDIR:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ attrib_clear(&a);
+ a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+ a.perm = 0777;
+ err = do_mkdir(in, out, path1, &a);
+ break;
+ case I_RMDIR:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ err = do_rmdir(in, out, path1);
+ break;
+ case I_CHDIR:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ if ((tmp = do_realpath(in, out, path1)) == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((aa = do_stat(in, out, tmp, 0)) == NULL) {
+ xfree(tmp);
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) {
+ error("Can't change directory: Can't check target");
+ xfree(tmp);
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) {
+ error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not "
+ "a directory", tmp);
+ xfree(tmp);
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ xfree(*pwd);
+ *pwd = tmp;
+ break;
+ case I_LS:
+ if (!path1) {
+ do_ls(in, out, *pwd);
+ break;
+ }
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ if ((tmp = do_realpath(in, out, path1)) == NULL)
+ break;
+ xfree(path1);
+ path1 = tmp;
+ if ((aa = do_stat(in, out, path1, 0)) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if ((aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
+ !S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) {
+ error("Can't ls: \"%s\" is not a directory", path1);
+ break;
+ }
+ do_ls(in, out, path1);
+ break;
+ case I_LCHDIR:
+ if (chdir(path1) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't change local directory to "
+ "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_LMKDIR:
+ if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) {
+ error("Couldn't create local directory "
+ "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_LLS:
+ local_do_ls(cmd);
+ break;
+ case I_SHELL:
+ local_do_shell(cmd);
+ break;
+ case I_LUMASK:
+ umask(n_arg);
+ printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg);
+ break;
+ case I_CHMOD:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ attrib_clear(&a);
+ a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+ a.perm = n_arg;
+ remote_glob(in, out, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+ for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) {
+ printf("Changing mode on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ do_setstat(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], &a);
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_CHOWN:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ remote_glob(in, out, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+ for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) {
+ if (!(aa = do_stat(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], 0)))
+ continue;
+ if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) {
+ error("Can't get current ownership of "
+ "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ printf("Changing owner on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+ aa->uid = n_arg;
+ do_setstat(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], aa);
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_CHGRP:
+ path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+ remote_glob(in, out, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+ for(i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) {
+ if (!(aa = do_stat(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], 0)))
+ continue;
+ if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) {
+ error("Can't get current ownership of "
+ "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ printf("Changing group on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+ aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+ aa->gid = n_arg;
+ do_setstat(in, out, g.gl_pathv[i], aa);
+ }
+ break;
+ case I_PWD:
+ printf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd);
+ break;
+ case I_LPWD:
+ if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf)))
+ error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ else
+ printf("Local working directory: %s\n",
+ path_buf);
+ break;
+ case I_QUIT:
+ return(-1);
+ case I_HELP:
+ help();
+ break;
+ case I_VERSION:
+ printf("SFTP protocol version %d\n", version);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum);
+ }
+
+ if (g.gl_pathc)
+ globfree(&g);
+ if (path1)
+ xfree(path1);
+ if (path2)
+ xfree(path2);
+
+ /* If an error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */
+ if (infile != stdin && err > 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+void
+interactive_loop(int fd_in, int fd_out, char *file1, char *file2)
+{
+ char *pwd;
+ char *dir = NULL;
+ char cmd[2048];
+
+ version = do_init(fd_in, fd_out);
+ if (version == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server");
+
+ pwd = do_realpath(fd_in, fd_out, ".");
+ if (pwd == NULL)
+ fatal("Need cwd");
+
+ if (file1 != NULL) {
+ dir = xstrdup(file1);
+ dir = make_absolute(dir, pwd);
+
+ if (remote_is_dir(fd_in, fd_out, dir) && file2 == NULL) {
+ printf("Changing to: %s\n", dir);
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir);
+ parse_dispatch_command(fd_in, fd_out, cmd, &pwd);
+ } else {
+ if (file2 == NULL)
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get %s", dir);
+ else
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get %s %s", dir,
+ file2);
+
+ parse_dispatch_command(fd_in, fd_out, cmd, &pwd);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+#if HAVE_SETVBUF
+ setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+ setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+#else
+ setlinebuf(stdout);
+ setlinebuf(infile);
+#endif
+
+ for(;;) {
+ char *cp;
+
+ printf("sftp> ");
+
+ /* XXX: use libedit */
+ if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) {
+ printf("\n");
+ break;
+ } else if (infile != stdin) /* Bluff typing */
+ printf("%s", cmd);
+
+ cp = strrchr(cmd, '\n');
+ if (cp)
+ *cp = '\0';
+
+ if (parse_dispatch_command(fd_in, fd_out, cmd, &pwd))
+ break;
+ }
+ xfree(pwd);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-int.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+void interactive_loop(int, int, char *, char *);
--- /dev/null
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.8 2001/06/23 05:57:08 deraadt Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd August 30, 2000
+.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sftp-server
+.Nd SFTP server subsystem
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sftp-server
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
+to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
+.Nm
+is not intended to be called directly, but from
+.Xr sshd 8
+using the
+.Cm Subsystem
+option.
+See
+.Xr sshd 8
+for more information.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
+.%D January 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
+.Sh AUTHORS
+Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8 .
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.30 2001/07/31 12:42:50 jakob Exp $");
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "getput.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+
+/* helper */
+#define get_int64() buffer_get_int64(&iqueue);
+#define get_int() buffer_get_int(&iqueue);
+#define get_string(lenp) buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp);
+#define TRACE debug
+
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+/* input and output queue */
+Buffer iqueue;
+Buffer oqueue;
+
+/* Version of client */
+int version;
+
+/* portable attibutes, etc. */
+
+typedef struct Stat Stat;
+
+struct Stat {
+ char *name;
+ char *long_name;
+ Attrib attrib;
+};
+
+static int
+errno_to_portable(int unixerrno)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (unixerrno) {
+ case 0:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ break;
+ case ENOENT:
+ case ENOTDIR:
+ case EBADF:
+ case ELOOP:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
+ break;
+ case EPERM:
+ case EACCES:
+ case EFAULT:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+ break;
+ case ENAMETOOLONG:
+ case EINVAL:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+flags_from_portable(int pflags)
+{
+ int flags = 0;
+
+ if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) &&
+ (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) {
+ flags = O_RDWR;
+ } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) {
+ flags = O_RDONLY;
+ } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) {
+ flags = O_WRONLY;
+ }
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
+ flags |= O_CREAT;
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
+ flags |= O_TRUNC;
+ if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
+ flags |= O_EXCL;
+ return flags;
+}
+
+static Attrib *
+get_attrib(void)
+{
+ return decode_attrib(&iqueue);
+}
+
+/* handle handles */
+
+typedef struct Handle Handle;
+struct Handle {
+ int use;
+ DIR *dirp;
+ int fd;
+ char *name;
+};
+
+enum {
+ HANDLE_UNUSED,
+ HANDLE_DIR,
+ HANDLE_FILE
+};
+
+Handle handles[100];
+
+static void
+handle_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle); i++)
+ handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_new(int use, char *name, int fd, DIR *dirp)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle); i++) {
+ if (handles[i].use == HANDLE_UNUSED) {
+ handles[i].use = use;
+ handles[i].dirp = dirp;
+ handles[i].fd = fd;
+ handles[i].name = name;
+ return i;
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_is_ok(int i, int type)
+{
+ return i >= 0 && i < sizeof(handles)/sizeof(Handle) &&
+ handles[i].use == type;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_to_string(int handle, char **stringp, int *hlenp)
+{
+ if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ *stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t));
+ PUT_32BIT(*stringp, handle);
+ *hlenp = sizeof(int32_t);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_from_string(char *handle, u_int hlen)
+{
+ int val;
+
+ if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t))
+ return -1;
+ val = GET_32BIT(handle);
+ if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) ||
+ handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR))
+ return val;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static char *
+handle_to_name(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)||
+ handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+ return handles[handle].name;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static DIR *
+handle_to_dir(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR))
+ return handles[handle].dirp;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_to_fd(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+ return handles[handle].fd;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_close(int handle)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
+ ret = close(handles[handle].fd);
+ handles[handle].use = HANDLE_UNUSED;
+ } else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) {
+ ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp);
+ handles[handle].use = HANDLE_UNUSED;
+ } else {
+ errno = ENOENT;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+get_handle(void)
+{
+ char *handle;
+ int val = -1;
+ u_int hlen;
+
+ handle = get_string(&hlen);
+ if (hlen < 256)
+ val = handle_from_string(handle, hlen);
+ xfree(handle);
+ return val;
+}
+
+/* send replies */
+
+static void
+send_msg(Buffer *m)
+{
+ int mlen = buffer_len(m);
+
+ buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen);
+ buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen);
+ buffer_consume(m, mlen);
+}
+
+static void
+send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t error)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ const char *status_messages[] = {
+ "Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */
+ "End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */
+ "No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */
+ "Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */
+ "Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */
+ "Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */
+ "No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */
+ "Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */
+ "Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */
+ "Unknown error" /* Others */
+ };
+
+ TRACE("sent status id %d error %d", id, error);
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, error);
+ if (version >= 3) {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg,
+ status_messages[MIN(error,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "");
+ }
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+static void
+send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, char *data, int dlen)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, data, dlen);
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_data(u_int32_t id, char *data, int dlen)
+{
+ TRACE("sent data id %d len %d", id, dlen);
+ send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle)
+{
+ char *string;
+ int hlen;
+
+ handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen);
+ TRACE("sent handle id %d handle %d", id, handle);
+ send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen);
+ xfree(string);
+}
+
+static void
+send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, Stat *stats)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ int i;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, count);
+ TRACE("sent names id %d count %d", id, count);
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].name);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].long_name);
+ encode_attrib(&msg, &stats[i].attrib);
+ }
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_attrib(u_int32_t id, Attrib *a)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ TRACE("sent attrib id %d have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
+ encode_attrib(&msg, a);
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+/* parse incoming */
+
+static void
+process_init(void)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ version = buffer_get_int(&iqueue);
+ TRACE("client version %d", version);
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION);
+ send_msg(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_open(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t id, pflags;
+ Attrib *a;
+ char *name;
+ int handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ name = get_string(NULL);
+ pflags = get_int(); /* portable flags */
+ a = get_attrib();
+ flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+ mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666;
+ TRACE("open id %d name %s flags %d mode 0%o", id, name, pflags, mode);
+ fd = open(name, flags, mode);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else {
+ handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, xstrdup(name), fd, NULL);
+ if (handle < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ } else {
+ send_handle(id, handle);
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ }
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ send_status(id, status);
+ xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_close(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t id;
+ int handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ handle = get_handle();
+ TRACE("close id %d handle %d", id, handle);
+ ret = handle_close(handle);
+ status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_read(void)
+{
+ char buf[64*1024];
+ u_int32_t id, len;
+ int handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ u_int64_t off;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ handle = get_handle();
+ off = get_int64();
+ len = get_int();
+
+ TRACE("read id %d handle %d off %llu len %d", id, handle,
+ (u_int64_t)off, len);
+ if (len > sizeof buf) {
+ len = sizeof buf;
+ log("read change len %d", len);
+ }
+ fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ error("process_read: seek failed");
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else {
+ ret = read(fd, buf, len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else if (ret == 0) {
+ status = SSH2_FX_EOF;
+ } else {
+ send_data(id, buf, ret);
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_write(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t id;
+ u_int64_t off;
+ u_int len;
+ int handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ char *data;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ handle = get_handle();
+ off = get_int64();
+ data = get_string(&len);
+
+ TRACE("write id %d handle %d off %llu len %d", id, handle,
+ (u_int64_t)off, len);
+ fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ error("process_write: seek failed");
+ } else {
+/* XXX ATOMICIO ? */
+ ret = write(fd, data, len);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ error("process_write: write failed");
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else if (ret == len) {
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ } else {
+ log("nothing at all written");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ send_status(id, status);
+ xfree(data);
+}
+
+static void
+process_do_stat(int do_lstat)
+{
+ Attrib a;
+ struct stat st;
+ u_int32_t id;
+ char *name;
+ int ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ name = get_string(NULL);
+ TRACE("%sstat id %d name %s", do_lstat ? "l" : "", id, name);
+ ret = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else {
+ stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
+ send_attrib(id, &a);
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ send_status(id, status);
+ xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_stat(void)
+{
+ process_do_stat(0);
+}
+
+static void
+process_lstat(void)
+{
+ process_do_stat(1);
+}
+
+static void
+process_fstat(void)
+{
+ Attrib a;
+ struct stat st;
+ u_int32_t id;
+ int fd, ret, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ handle = get_handle();
+ TRACE("fstat id %d handle %d", id, handle);
+ fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ ret = fstat(fd, &st);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else {
+ stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
+ send_attrib(id, &a);
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ }
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static struct timeval *
+attrib_to_tv(Attrib *a)
+{
+ static struct timeval tv[2];
+
+ tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
+ tv[0].tv_usec = 0;
+ tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
+ tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
+ return tv;
+}
+
+static void
+process_setstat(void)
+{
+ Attrib *a;
+ u_int32_t id;
+ char *name;
+ int ret;
+ int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ name = get_string(NULL);
+ a = get_attrib();
+ TRACE("setstat id %d name %s", id, name);
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+ ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 0777);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+ ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a));
+ if (ret == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+ ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ send_status(id, status);
+ xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_fsetstat(void)
+{
+ Attrib *a;
+ u_int32_t id;
+ int handle, fd, ret;
+ int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ char *name;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ handle = get_handle();
+ a = get_attrib();
+ TRACE("fsetstat id %d handle %d", id, handle);
+ fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+ name = handle_to_name(handle);
+ if (fd < 0 || name == NULL) {
+ status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ } else {
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+ ret = fchmod(fd, a->perm & 0777);
+#else
+ ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 0777);
+#endif
+ if (ret == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
+ ret = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(a));
+#else
+ ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a));
+#endif
+ if (ret == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN
+ ret = fchown(fd, a->uid, a->gid);
+#else
+ ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid);
+#endif
+ if (ret == -1)
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ }
+ }
+ send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_opendir(void)
+{
+ DIR *dirp = NULL;
+ char *path;
+ int handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ u_int32_t id;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ path = get_string(NULL);
+ TRACE("opendir id %d path %s", id, path);
+ dirp = opendir(path);
+ if (dirp == NULL) {
+ status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+ } else {
+ handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, xstrdup(path), 0, dirp);
+ if (handle < 0) {
+ closedir(dirp);
+ } else {
+ send_handle(id, handle);
+ status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+
+ }
+ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+ send_status(id, status);
+ xfree(path);
+}
+
+/*
+ * drwxr-xr-x 5 markus markus 1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh
+ */
+static char *
+ls_file(char *name, struct stat *st)
+{
+ int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct group *gr;
+ struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
+ char *user, *group;
+ char buf[1024], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
+
+ strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
+ if ((pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid)) != NULL) {
+ user = pw->pw_name;
+ } else {
+ snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%d", st->st_uid);
+ user = ubuf;
+ }
+ if ((gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid)) != NULL) {
+ group = gr->gr_name;
+ } else {
+ snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%d", st->st_gid);
+ group = gbuf;
+ }
+ if (ltime != NULL) {
+ if (time(NULL) - st->st_mtime < (365*24*60*60)/2)
+ sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime);
+ else
+ sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %Y", ltime);
+ }
+ if (sz == 0)
+ tbuf[0] = '\0';
+ ulen = MAX(strlen(user), 8);
+ glen = MAX(strlen(group), 8);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3d %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", mode,
+ st->st_nlink, ulen, user, glen, group,
+ (u_int64_t)st->st_size, tbuf, name);
+ return xstrdup(buf);
+}
+
+static void
+process_readdir(void)
+{
+ DIR *dirp;
+ struct dirent *dp;
+ char *path;
+ int handle;
+ u_int32_t id;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ handle = get_handle();
+ TRACE("readdir id %d handle %d", id, handle);
+ dirp = handle_to_dir(handle);
+ path = handle_to_name(handle);
+ if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) {
+ send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
+ } else {
+ struct stat st;
+ char pathname[1024];
+ Stat *stats;
+ int nstats = 10, count = 0, i;
+ stats = xmalloc(nstats * sizeof(Stat));
+ while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+ if (count >= nstats) {
+ nstats *= 2;
+ stats = xrealloc(stats, nstats * sizeof(Stat));
+ }
+/* XXX OVERFLOW ? */
+ snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path,
+ strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name);
+ if (lstat(pathname, &st) < 0)
+ continue;
+ stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib));
+ stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name);
+ stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st);
+ count++;
+ /* send up to 100 entries in one message */
+ /* XXX check packet size instead */
+ if (count == 100)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (count > 0) {
+ send_names(id, count, stats);
+ for(i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ xfree(stats[i].name);
+ xfree(stats[i].long_name);
+ }
+ } else {
+ send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF);
+ }
+ xfree(stats);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove(void)
+{
+ char *name;
+ u_int32_t id;
+ int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ int ret;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ name = get_string(NULL);
+ TRACE("remove id %d name %s", id, name);
+ ret = unlink(name);
+ status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+ xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_mkdir(void)
+{
+ Attrib *a;
+ u_int32_t id;
+ char *name;
+ int ret, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ name = get_string(NULL);
+ a = get_attrib();
+ mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
+ a->perm & 0777 : 0777;
+ TRACE("mkdir id %d name %s mode 0%o", id, name, mode);
+ ret = mkdir(name, mode);
+ status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+ xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_rmdir(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t id;
+ char *name;
+ int ret, status;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ name = get_string(NULL);
+ TRACE("rmdir id %d name %s", id, name);
+ ret = rmdir(name);
+ status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ send_status(id, status);
+ xfree(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_realpath(void)
+{
+ char resolvedname[MAXPATHLEN];
+ u_int32_t id;
+ char *path;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ path = get_string(NULL);
+ if (path[0] == '\0') {
+ xfree(path);
+ path = xstrdup(".");
+ }
+ TRACE("realpath id %d path %s", id, path);
+ if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+ send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+ } else {
+ Stat s;
+ attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+ s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname;
+ send_names(id, 1, &s);
+ }
+ xfree(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_rename(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t id;
+ struct stat st;
+ char *oldpath, *newpath;
+ int ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ oldpath = get_string(NULL);
+ newpath = get_string(NULL);
+ TRACE("rename id %d old %s new %s", id, oldpath, newpath);
+ /* fail if 'newpath' exists */
+ if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
+ ret = rename(oldpath, newpath);
+ status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ send_status(id, status);
+ xfree(oldpath);
+ xfree(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_readlink(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t id;
+ int len;
+ char link[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char *path;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ path = get_string(NULL);
+ TRACE("readlink id %d path %s", id, path);
+ if ((len = readlink(path, link, sizeof(link) - 1)) == -1)
+ send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+ else {
+ Stat s;
+
+ link[len] = '\0';
+ attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+ s.name = s.long_name = link;
+ send_names(id, 1, &s);
+ }
+ xfree(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_symlink(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t id;
+ struct stat st;
+ char *oldpath, *newpath;
+ int ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ oldpath = get_string(NULL);
+ newpath = get_string(NULL);
+ TRACE("symlink id %d old %s new %s", id, oldpath, newpath);
+ /* fail if 'newpath' exists */
+ if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
+ ret = symlink(oldpath, newpath);
+ status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+ }
+ send_status(id, status);
+ xfree(oldpath);
+ xfree(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t id;
+ char *request;
+
+ id = get_int();
+ request = get_string(NULL);
+ send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */
+ xfree(request);
+}
+
+/* stolen from ssh-agent */
+
+static void
+process(void)
+{
+ u_int msg_len;
+ u_int type;
+ u_char *cp;
+
+ if (buffer_len(&iqueue) < 5)
+ return; /* Incomplete message. */
+ cp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&iqueue);
+ msg_len = GET_32BIT(cp);
+ if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
+ error("bad message ");
+ exit(11);
+ }
+ if (buffer_len(&iqueue) < msg_len + 4)
+ return;
+ buffer_consume(&iqueue, 4);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&iqueue);
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH2_FXP_INIT:
+ process_init();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_OPEN:
+ process_open();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_CLOSE:
+ process_close();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_READ:
+ process_read();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_WRITE:
+ process_write();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_LSTAT:
+ process_lstat();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_FSTAT:
+ process_fstat();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT:
+ process_setstat();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT:
+ process_fsetstat();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR:
+ process_opendir();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_READDIR:
+ process_readdir();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_REMOVE:
+ process_remove();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_MKDIR:
+ process_mkdir();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_RMDIR:
+ process_rmdir();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_REALPATH:
+ process_realpath();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_STAT:
+ process_stat();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_RENAME:
+ process_rename();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_READLINK:
+ process_readlink();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK:
+ process_symlink();
+ break;
+ case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED:
+ process_extended();
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("Unknown message %d", type);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ fd_set *rset, *wset;
+ int in, out, max;
+ ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
+
+ /* XXX should use getopt */
+
+ __progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+ handle_init();
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SFTP_SERVER
+ log_init("sftp-server", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
+#endif
+
+ in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ setmode(in, O_BINARY);
+ setmode(out, O_BINARY);
+#endif
+
+ max = 0;
+ if (in > max)
+ max = in;
+ if (out > max)
+ max = out;
+
+ buffer_init(&iqueue);
+ buffer_init(&oqueue);
+
+ set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ rset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size);
+ wset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ memset(rset, 0, set_size);
+ memset(wset, 0, set_size);
+
+ FD_SET(in, rset);
+ olen = buffer_len(&oqueue);
+ if (olen > 0)
+ FD_SET(out, wset);
+
+ if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ exit(2);
+ }
+
+ /* copy stdin to iqueue */
+ if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) {
+ char buf[4*4096];
+ len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ debug("read eof");
+ exit(0);
+ } else if (len < 0) {
+ error("read error");
+ exit(1);
+ } else {
+ buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len);
+ }
+ }
+ /* send oqueue to stdout */
+ if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) {
+ len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ error("write error");
+ exit(1);
+ } else {
+ buffer_consume(&oqueue, len);
+ }
+ }
+ /* process requests from client */
+ process();
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.26 2001/09/17 20:38:09 stevesk Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd February 4, 2001
+.Dt SFTP 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sftp
+.Nd Secure file transfer program
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sftp
+.Op Fl 1Cv
+.Op Fl b Ar batchfile
+.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
+.Op Fl S Ar program
+.Ar host
+.Nm sftp
+.Op [\fIuser\fR@]\fIhost\fR[:\fIfile\fR [\fIfile\fR]]
+.Nm sftp
+.Op [\fIuser\fR@]\fIhost\fR[:\fIdir\fR[\fI/\fR]]
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is an interactive file transfer program, similar to
+.Xr ftp 1 ,
+which performs all operations over an encrypted
+.Xr ssh 1
+transport.
+It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
+compression.
+.Nm
+connects and logs into the specified
+.Ar host ,
+then enters an interactive command mode.
+.Pp
+The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive
+authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
+successful interactive authentication.
+.Pp
+The last usage format allows the sftp client to start in a remote directory.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 1
+Specify the use of protocol version 1.
+.It Fl b Ar batchfile
+Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input
+.Ar batchfile
+instead of
+.Em stdin .
+Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with
+non-interactive authentication.
+.Nm
+will abort if any of the following
+commands fail:
+.Ic get , put , rename , ln , rm , mkdir , chdir , lchdir
+and
+.Ic lmkdir .
+.It Fl C
+Enables compression (via ssh's
+.Fl C
+flag).
+.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
+Specifies an alternative
+per-user configuration file for
+.Nm ssh .
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
+Can be used to pass options to
+.Nm ssh
+in the format used in the
+.Xr ssh 1
+configuration file. This is useful for specifying options
+for which there is no separate
+.Nm sftp
+command-line flag. For example, to specify an alternate
+port use:
+.Ic sftp -oPort=24 .
+.It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
+Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server
+on the remote host. A path is useful for using sftp over
+protocol version 1, or when the remote
+.Nm sshd
+does not have an sftp subsystem configured.
+.It Fl S Ar program
+Name of the
+.Ar program
+to use for the encrypted connection.
+The program must understand
+.Xr ssh 1
+options.
+.It Fl v
+Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh.
+.El
+.Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
+Once in interactive mode,
+.Nm
+understands a set of commands similar to those of
+.Xr ftp 1 .
+Commands are case insensitive and pathnames may be enclosed in quotes if they
+contain spaces.
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ic bye
+Quit sftp.
+.It Ic cd Ar path
+Change remote directory to
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic lcd Ar path
+Change local directory to
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic chgrp Ar grp Ar path
+Change group of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar grp .
+.Ar grp
+must be a numeric GID.
+.It Ic chmod Ar mode Ar path
+Change permissions of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar mode .
+.It Ic chown Ar own Ar path
+Change owner of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar own .
+.Ar own
+must be a numeric UID.
+.It Ic exit
+Quit sftp.
+.It Xo Ic get
+.Op Ar flags
+.Ar remote-path
+.Op Ar local-path
+.Xc
+Retrieve the
+.Ar remote-path
+and store it on the local machine.
+If the local
+path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the
+remote machine. If the
+.Fl P
+flag is specified, then the file's full permission and access time are
+copied too.
+.It Ic help
+Display help text.
+.It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path
+Display local directory listing of either
+.Ar path
+or current directory if
+.Ar path
+is not specified.
+.It Ic lmkdir Ar path
+Create local directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic ln Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+Create a symbolic link from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.It Ic lpwd
+Print local working directory.
+.It Ic ls Op Ar path
+Display remote directory listing of either
+.Ar path
+or current directory if
+.Ar path
+is not specified.
+.It Ic lumask Ar umask
+Set local umask to
+.Ar umask .
+.It Ic mkdir Ar path
+Create remote directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Xo Ic put
+.Op Ar flags
+.Ar local-path
+.Op Ar local-path
+.Xc
+Upload
+.Ar local-path
+and store it on the remote machine. If the remote path name is not
+specified, it is given the same name it has on the local machine. If the
+.Fl P
+flag is specified, then the file's full permission and access time are
+copied too.
+.It Ic pwd
+Display remote working directory.
+.It Ic quit
+Quit sftp.
+.It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+Rename remote file from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.It Ic rmdir Ar path
+Remove remote directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic rm Ar path
+Delete remote file specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+Create a symbolic link from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.It Ic ! Ar command
+Execute
+.Ar command
+in local shell.
+.It Ic !
+Escape to local shell.
+.It Ic ?
+Synonym for help.
+.El
+.Sh AUTHORS
+Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
+.%D January 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.21 2001/09/19 19:24:19 stevesk Exp $");
+
+/* XXX: commandline mode */
+/* XXX: short-form remote directory listings (like 'ls -C') */
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+#include "sftp-int.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
+FILE* infile;
+
+static void
+connect_to_server(char **args, int *in, int *out, pid_t *sshpid)
+{
+ int c_in, c_out;
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ int pin[2], pout[2];
+ if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1))
+ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ *in = pin[0];
+ *out = pout[1];
+ c_in = pout[0];
+ c_out = pin[1];
+#else /* USE_PIPES */
+ int inout[2];
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1)
+ fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+ *in = *out = inout[0];
+ c_in = c_out = inout[1];
+#endif /* USE_PIPES */
+
+ if ((*sshpid = fork()) == -1)
+ fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ else if (*sshpid == 0) {
+ if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+ (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ close(*in);
+ close(*out);
+ close(c_in);
+ close(c_out);
+ execv(ssh_program, args);
+ fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", ssh_program, strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ close(c_in);
+ close(c_out);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usage: sftp [-1Cv] [-b batchfile] [-F config] [-o option] [-s subsystem|path]\n"
+ " [-S program] [user@]host[:file [file]]\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int in, out, ch;
+ pid_t sshpid;
+ char *host, *userhost, *cp, *file2;
+ int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2;
+ char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL;
+ LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ arglist args;
+ extern int optind;
+ extern char *optarg;
+
+ __progname = get_progname(argv[0]);
+ args.list = NULL;
+ addargs(&args, "ssh"); /* overwritten with ssh_program */
+ addargs(&args, "-oFallBackToRsh no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
+ ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ infile = stdin; /* Read from STDIN unless changed by -b */
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1hvCo:s:S:b:F:")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'C':
+ addargs(&args, "-C");
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (debug_level < 3) {
+ addargs(&args, "-v");
+ ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level;
+ }
+ debug_level++;
+ break;
+ case 'F':
+ case 'o':
+ addargs(&args, "-%c%s", ch, optarg);
+ break;
+ case '1':
+ sshver = 1;
+ if (sftp_server == NULL)
+ sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ sftp_server = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ ssh_program = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ if (infile == stdin) {
+ infile = fopen(optarg, "r");
+ if (infile == NULL)
+ fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg);
+ } else
+ fatal("Filename already specified.");
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2))
+ usage();
+
+ userhost = xstrdup(argv[optind]);
+ file2 = argv[optind+1];
+
+ if ((cp = colon(userhost)) != NULL) {
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ file1 = cp;
+ }
+
+ if ((host = strchr(userhost, '@')) == NULL)
+ host = userhost;
+ else {
+ *host++ = '\0';
+ if (!userhost[0]) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missing username\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+ addargs(&args, "-l%s",userhost);
+ }
+
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ if (!*host) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+
+ log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+ addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver);
+
+ /* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */
+ if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL)
+ addargs(&args, "-s");
+
+ addargs(&args, "%s", host);
+ addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ? sftp_server : "sftp"));
+ args.list[0] = ssh_program;
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "Connecting to %s...\n", host);
+
+ connect_to_server(args.list, &in, &out, &sshpid);
+
+ interactive_loop(in, out, file1, file2);
+
+#if !defined(USE_PIPES)
+ shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR);
+ shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR);
+#endif
+
+ close(in);
+ close(out);
+ if (infile != stdin)
+ fclose(infile);
+
+ if (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1)
+ fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ exit(0);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.h,v 1.3 2001/03/07 10:11:23 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-01.txt
+ */
+
+/* version */
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION 3
+
+/* client to server */
+#define SSH2_FXP_INIT 1
+#define SSH2_FXP_OPEN 3
+#define SSH2_FXP_CLOSE 4
+#define SSH2_FXP_READ 5
+#define SSH2_FXP_WRITE 6
+#define SSH2_FXP_LSTAT 7
+#define SSH2_FXP_FSTAT 8
+#define SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT 9
+#define SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT 10
+#define SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR 11
+#define SSH2_FXP_READDIR 12
+#define SSH2_FXP_REMOVE 13
+#define SSH2_FXP_MKDIR 14
+#define SSH2_FXP_RMDIR 15
+#define SSH2_FXP_REALPATH 16
+#define SSH2_FXP_STAT 17
+#define SSH2_FXP_RENAME 18
+#define SSH2_FXP_READLINK 19
+#define SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK 20
+
+/* server to client */
+#define SSH2_FXP_VERSION 2
+#define SSH2_FXP_STATUS 101
+#define SSH2_FXP_HANDLE 102
+#define SSH2_FXP_DATA 103
+#define SSH2_FXP_NAME 104
+#define SSH2_FXP_ATTRS 105
+
+#define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED 200
+#define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY 201
+
+/* attributes */
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE 0x00000001
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID 0x00000002
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS 0x00000004
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME 0x00000008
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED 0x80000000
+
+/* portable open modes */
+#define SSH2_FXF_READ 0x00000001
+#define SSH2_FXF_WRITE 0x00000002
+#define SSH2_FXF_APPEND 0x00000004
+#define SSH2_FXF_CREAT 0x00000008
+#define SSH2_FXF_TRUNC 0x00000010
+#define SSH2_FXF_EXCL 0x00000020
+
+/* status messages */
+#define SSH2_FX_OK 0
+#define SSH2_FX_EOF 1
+#define SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE 2
+#define SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED 3
+#define SSH2_FX_FAILURE 4
+#define SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE 5
+#define SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION 6
+#define SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST 7
+#define SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED 8
+#define SSH2_FX_MAX 8
--- /dev/null
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.27 2001/08/23 18:08:59 stevesk Exp $
+.\"
+.\" -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd September 25, 1999
+.Dt SSH-ADD 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Nd adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Op Fl lLdD
+.Op Ar
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Fl s Ar reader
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Fl e Ar reader
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+When run without arguments, it adds the file
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity .
+Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
+If any file requires a passphrase,
+.Nm
+asks for the passphrase from the user.
+The passphrase is read from the user's tty.
+.Nm
+retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
+.Pp
+The authentication agent must be running and must be an ancestor of
+the current process for
+.Nm
+to work.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl l
+Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent.
+.It Fl L
+Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented by the agent.
+.It Fl d
+Instead of adding the identity, removes the identity from the agent.
+.It Fl D
+Deletes all identities from the agent.
+.It Fl s Ar reader
+Add key in smartcard
+.Ar reader .
+.It Fl e Ar reader
+Remove key in smartcard
+.Ar reader .
+.El
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+Note that
+.Nm
+ignores this file if it is accessible by others.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file.
+This is the default file added by
+.Nm
+when no other files have been specified.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS"
+If
+.Nm
+needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
+terminal if it was run from a terminal.
+If
+.Nm
+does not have a terminal associated with it but
+.Ev DISPLAY
+and
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+are set, it will execute the program specified by
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
+This is particularly useful when calling
+.Nm
+from a
+.Pa .Xsession
+or related script.
+(Note that on some machines it
+may be necessary to redirect the input from
+.Pa /dev/null
+to make this work.)
+.El
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.46 2001/10/02 08:38:50 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "readpass.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+/* argv0 */
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* we keep a cache of one passphrases */
+static char *pass = NULL;
+static void
+clear_pass(void)
+{
+ if (pass) {
+ memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
+ xfree(pass);
+ pass = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
+{
+ Key *public;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ public = key_load_public(filename, &comment);
+ if (public == NULL) {
+ printf("Bad key file %s\n", filename);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, public)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
+ ret = 0;
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", filename);
+
+ key_free(public);
+ xfree(comment);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Send a request to remove all identities. */
+static int
+delete_all(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 1))
+ ret = 0;
+ /* ignore error-code for ssh2 */
+ ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 2);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n");
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n");
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ Key *private;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ char msg[1024];
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
+ perror(filename);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* At first, try empty passphrase */
+ private = key_load_private(filename, "", &comment);
+ if (comment == NULL)
+ comment = xstrdup(filename);
+ /* try last */
+ if (private == NULL && pass != NULL)
+ private = key_load_private(filename, pass, NULL);
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ /* clear passphrase since it did not work */
+ clear_pass();
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %.200s: ",
+ comment);
+ for (;;) {
+ pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) {
+ clear_pass();
+ xfree(comment);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ private = key_load_private(filename, pass, &comment);
+ if (private != NULL)
+ break;
+ clear_pass();
+ strlcpy(msg, "Bad passphrase, try again: ", sizeof msg);
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssh_add_identity(ac, private, comment)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
+ ret = 0;
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename);
+
+ xfree(comment);
+ key_free(private);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id)
+{
+ if (ssh_update_card(ac, add, id)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
+ add ? "added" : "removed", id);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card: %s\n",
+ add ? "add" : "remove", id);
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ char *comment, *fp;
+ int had_identities = 0;
+ int version;
+
+ for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) {
+ for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, version);
+ key != NULL;
+ key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
+ had_identities = 1;
+ if (do_fp) {
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+ SSH_FP_HEX);
+ printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
+ key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
+ xfree(fp);
+ } else {
+ if (!key_write(key, stdout))
+ fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed");
+ fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", comment);
+ }
+ key_free(key);
+ xfree(comment);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!had_identities)
+ printf("The agent has no identities.\n");
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -l List fingerprints of all identities.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -L List public key parameters of all identities.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n");
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+ fprintf(stderr, " -s reader Add key in smartcard reader.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -e reader Remove key in smartcard reader.\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern int optind;
+ AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ char buf[1024];
+ char *sc_reader_id = NULL;
+ int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0;
+
+ __progname = get_progname(argv[0]);
+ init_rng();
+ seed_rng();
+
+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+ /* At first, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
+ ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+ if (ac == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLdDe:s:")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'l':
+ case 'L':
+ list_identities(ac, ch == 'l' ? 1 : 0);
+ goto done;
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ deleting = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ if (delete_all(ac) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ sc_reader_id = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ deleting = 1;
+ sc_reader_id = optarg;
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+ if (sc_reader_id != NULL) {
+ if (update_card(ac, !deleting, sc_reader_id) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (argc == 0) {
+ pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+ if (!pw) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n",
+ (u_int)getuid());
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY);
+ if (deleting) {
+ if (delete_file(ac, buf) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (add_file(ac, buf) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if (deleting) {
+ if (delete_file(ac, argv[i]) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (add_file(ac, argv[i]) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ clear_pass();
+
+done:
+ ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+ return ret;
+}
--- /dev/null
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.28 2001/09/05 06:23:07 deraadt Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd September 25, 1999
+.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Nd authentication agent
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl c Li | Fl s
+.Op Fl d
+.Op Ar command Op Ar args ...
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl c Li | Fl s
+.Fl k
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
+(RSA, DSA).
+The idea is that
+.Nm
+is started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and
+all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent
+program.
+Through use of environment variables the agent can be located
+and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other
+machines using
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl c
+Generate C-shell commands on
+.Dv stdout .
+This is the default if
+.Ev SHELL
+looks like it's a csh style of shell.
+.It Fl s
+Generate Bourne shell commands on
+.Dv stdout .
+This is the default if
+.Ev SHELL
+does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
+.It Fl k
+Kill the current agent (given by the
+.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+environment variable).
+.It Fl d
+Debug mode. When this option is specified
+.Nm
+will not fork.
+.El
+.Pp
+If a commandline is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
+When the command dies, so does the agent.
+.Pp
+The agent initially does not have any private keys.
+Keys are added using
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+When executed without arguments,
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+adds the
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+file.
+If the identity has a passphrase,
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+asks for the passphrase (using a small X11 application if running
+under X11, or from the terminal if running without X).
+It then sends the identity to the agent.
+Several identities can be stored in the
+agent; the agent can automatically use any of these identities.
+.Ic ssh-add -l
+displays the identities currently held by the agent.
+.Pp
+The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or
+terminal.
+Authentication data need not be stored on any other
+machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network.
+However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH
+remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the
+identities anywhere in the network in a secure way.
+.Pp
+There are two main ways to get an agent setup:
+Either the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment
+variables are exported, or the agent prints the needed shell commands
+(either
+.Xr sh 1
+or
+.Xr csh 1
+syntax can be generated) which can be evalled in the calling shell.
+Later
+.Xr ssh 1
+looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent.
+.Pp
+A unix-domain socket is created
+.Pq Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<pid> ,
+and the name of this socket is stored in the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment
+variable.
+The socket is made accessible only to the current user.
+This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same
+user.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+environment variable holds the agent's PID.
+.Pp
+The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
+line terminates.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file.
+This file is not used by
+.Nm
+but is normally added to the agent using
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+at login time.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<pid>
+Unix-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
+authentication agent.
+These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
+The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
+.El
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.72 2001/08/03 10:31:30 jakob Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * The authentication agent program.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.72 2001/08/03 10:31:30 jakob Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "getput.h"
+#include "mpaux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "scard.h"
+#endif
+
+typedef struct {
+ int fd;
+ enum {
+ AUTH_UNUSED, AUTH_SOCKET, AUTH_CONNECTION
+ } type;
+ Buffer input;
+ Buffer output;
+} SocketEntry;
+
+u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
+SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
+
+typedef struct {
+ Key *key;
+ char *comment;
+} Identity;
+
+typedef struct {
+ int nentries;
+ Identity *identities;
+} Idtab;
+
+/* private key table, one per protocol version */
+Idtab idtable[3];
+
+int max_fd = 0;
+
+/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
+pid_t parent_pid = -1;
+
+/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
+char socket_name[1024];
+char socket_dir[1024];
+
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+static void
+idtab_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i <=2; i++){
+ idtable[i].identities = NULL;
+ idtable[i].nentries = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* return private key table for requested protocol version */
+static Idtab *
+idtab_lookup(int version)
+{
+ if (version < 1 || version > 2)
+ fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version);
+ return &idtable[version];
+}
+
+/* return matching private key for given public key */
+static Key *
+lookup_private_key(Key *key, int *idx, int version)
+{
+ int i;
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) {
+ if (key_equal(key, tab->identities[i].key)) {
+ if (idx != NULL)
+ *idx = i;
+ return tab->identities[i].key;
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
+static void
+process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ Buffer msg;
+ int i;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, (version == 1) ?
+ SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, tab->nentries);
+ for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) {
+ Identity *id = &tab->identities[i];
+ if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n));
+ buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->n);
+ } else {
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ }
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, id->comment);
+ }
+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
+ buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+/* ssh1 only */
+static void
+process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ Key *key, *private;
+ BIGNUM *challenge;
+ int i, len;
+ Buffer msg;
+ MD5_CTX md;
+ u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16];
+ u_int response_type;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ challenge = BN_new();
+
+ buffer_get_int(&e->input); /* ignored */
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, challenge);
+
+ /* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */
+ if (buffer_len(&e->input) == 0)
+ goto failure;
+ buffer_get(&e->input, (char *) session_id, 16);
+ response_type = buffer_get_int(&e->input);
+ if (response_type != 1)
+ goto failure;
+
+ private = lookup_private_key(key, NULL, 1);
+ if (private != NULL) {
+ /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) <= 0)
+ goto failure;
+
+ /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
+ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
+ if (len <= 0 || len > 32) {
+ log("process_authentication_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
+ goto failure;
+ }
+ memset(buf, 0, 32);
+ BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
+ MD5_Init(&md);
+ MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
+ MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
+ MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
+
+ /* Send the response. */
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, mdbuf[i]);
+ goto send;
+ }
+
+failure:
+ /* Unknown identity or protocol error. Send failure. */
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+send:
+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
+ buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg));
+ key_free(key);
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+}
+
+/* ssh2 only */
+static void
+process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ extern int datafellows;
+ Key *key, *private;
+ u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
+ u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0;
+ int flags;
+ Buffer msg;
+ int ok = -1;
+
+ datafellows = 0;
+
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &blen);
+ data = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &dlen);
+
+ flags = buffer_get_int(&e->input);
+ if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE)
+ datafellows = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB;
+
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ private = lookup_private_key(key, NULL, 2);
+ if (private != NULL)
+ ok = key_sign(private, &signature, &slen, data, dlen);
+ }
+ key_free(key);
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ if (ok == 0) {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg));
+ buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg),
+ buffer_len(&msg));
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ xfree(data);
+ xfree(blob);
+ if (signature != NULL)
+ xfree(signature);
+}
+
+/* shared */
+static void
+process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+ Key *key = NULL, *private;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ u_int bits;
+ int success = 0;
+
+ switch(version){
+ case 1:
+ key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ bits = buffer_get_int(&e->input);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->n);
+
+ if (bits != key_size(key))
+ log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %d",
+ key_size(key), bits);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &blen);
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ int idx;
+ private = lookup_private_key(key, &idx, version);
+ if (private != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We have this key. Free the old key. Since we
+ * don\'t want to leave empty slots in the middle of
+ * the array, we actually free the key there and move
+ * all the entries between the empty slot and the end
+ * of the array.
+ */
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ key_free(tab->identities[idx].key);
+ xfree(tab->identities[idx].comment);
+ if (tab->nentries < 1)
+ fatal("process_remove_identity: "
+ "internal error: tab->nentries %d",
+ tab->nentries);
+ if (idx != tab->nentries - 1) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = idx; i < tab->nentries - 1; i++)
+ tab->identities[i] = tab->identities[i+1];
+ }
+ tab->identities[tab->nentries - 1].key = NULL;
+ tab->identities[tab->nentries - 1].comment = NULL;
+ tab->nentries--;
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ key_free(key);
+ }
+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+ buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+ success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+
+ /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
+ for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) {
+ key_free(tab->identities[i].key);
+ xfree(tab->identities[i].comment);
+ }
+
+ /* Mark that there are no identities. */
+ tab->nentries = 0;
+
+ /* Send success. */
+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+ buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS);
+ return;
+}
+
+static void
+process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
+{
+ Key *k = NULL;
+ char *type_name;
+ char *comment;
+ int type, success = 0;
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+ k = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
+ buffer_get_int(&e->input); /* ignored */
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->n);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->d);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->iqmp);
+
+ /* SSH and SSL have p and q swapped */
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->q); /* p */
+ buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->rsa->p); /* q */
+
+ /* Generate additional parameters */
+ rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ type_name = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL);
+ type = key_type_from_name(type_name);
+ xfree(type_name);
+ switch(type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ k = key_new_private(type);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->p);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->q);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->g);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->pub_key);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->priv_key);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ k = key_new_private(type);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->n);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->d);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->iqmp);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->p);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->rsa->q);
+
+ /* Generate additional parameters */
+ rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
+ break;
+ default:
+ buffer_clear(&e->input);
+ goto send;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ comment = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL);
+ if (k == NULL) {
+ xfree(comment);
+ goto send;
+ }
+ success = 1;
+ if (lookup_private_key(k, NULL, version) == NULL) {
+ if (tab->nentries == 0)
+ tab->identities = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
+ else
+ tab->identities = xrealloc(tab->identities,
+ (tab->nentries + 1) * sizeof(Identity));
+ tab->identities[tab->nentries].key = k;
+ tab->identities[tab->nentries].comment = comment;
+ /* Increment the number of identities. */
+ tab->nentries++;
+ } else {
+ key_free(k);
+ xfree(comment);
+ }
+send:
+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+ buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+ success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+static void
+process_add_smartcard_key (SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ Idtab *tab;
+ Key *n = NULL, *k = NULL;
+ char *sc_reader_id = NULL;
+ int success = 0;
+
+ sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL);
+ k = sc_get_key(sc_reader_id);
+ xfree(sc_reader_id);
+
+ if (k == NULL) {
+ error("sc_get_pubkey failed");
+ goto send;
+ }
+ success = 1;
+
+ tab = idtab_lookup(1);
+ k->type = KEY_RSA1;
+ if (lookup_private_key(k, NULL, 1) == NULL) {
+ if (tab->nentries == 0)
+ tab->identities = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
+ else
+ tab->identities = xrealloc(tab->identities,
+ (tab->nentries + 1) * sizeof(Identity));
+ n = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n);
+ BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e);
+ RSA_set_method(n->rsa, sc_get_engine());
+ tab->identities[tab->nentries].key = n;
+ tab->identities[tab->nentries].comment =
+ xstrdup("rsa1 smartcard");
+ tab->nentries++;
+ }
+ k->type = KEY_RSA;
+ tab = idtab_lookup(2);
+ if (lookup_private_key(k, NULL, 2) == NULL) {
+ if (tab->nentries == 0)
+ tab->identities = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
+ else
+ tab->identities = xrealloc(tab->identities,
+ (tab->nentries + 1) * sizeof(Identity));
+ n = key_new(KEY_RSA);
+ BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n);
+ BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e);
+ RSA_set_method(n->rsa, sc_get_engine());
+ tab->identities[tab->nentries].key = n;
+ tab->identities[tab->nentries].comment =
+ xstrdup("rsa smartcard");
+ tab->nentries++;
+ }
+ key_free(k);
+send:
+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+ buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+ success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ Key *k = NULL, *private;
+ int idx;
+ int success = 0;
+ char *sc_reader_id = NULL;
+
+ sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL);
+ k = sc_get_key(sc_reader_id);
+ xfree(sc_reader_id);
+
+ if (k == NULL) {
+ error("sc_get_pubkey failed");
+ } else {
+ k->type = KEY_RSA1;
+ private = lookup_private_key(k, &idx, 1);
+ if (private != NULL) {
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(1);
+ key_free(tab->identities[idx].key);
+ xfree(tab->identities[idx].comment);
+ if (idx != tab->nentries)
+ tab->identities[idx] = tab->identities[tab->nentries];
+ tab->nentries--;
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ k->type = KEY_RSA;
+ private = lookup_private_key(k, &idx, 2);
+ if (private != NULL) {
+ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(2);
+ key_free(tab->identities[idx].key);
+ xfree(tab->identities[idx].comment);
+ if (idx != tab->nentries)
+ tab->identities[idx] = tab->identities[tab->nentries];
+ tab->nentries--;
+ success = 1;
+ }
+ key_free(k);
+ }
+
+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+ buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+ success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+}
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+
+/* dispatch incoming messages */
+
+static void
+process_message(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+ u_int msg_len;
+ u_int type;
+ u_char *cp;
+ if (buffer_len(&e->input) < 5)
+ return; /* Incomplete message. */
+ cp = (u_char *) buffer_ptr(&e->input);
+ msg_len = GET_32BIT(cp);
+ if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
+ shutdown(e->fd, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(e->fd);
+ e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (buffer_len(&e->input) < msg_len + 4)
+ return;
+ buffer_consume(&e->input, 4);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&e->input);
+
+ debug("type %d", type);
+ switch (type) {
+ /* ssh1 */
+ case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE:
+ process_authentication_challenge1(e);
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES:
+ process_request_identities(e, 1);
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY:
+ process_add_identity(e, 1);
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY:
+ process_remove_identity(e, 1);
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
+ process_remove_all_identities(e, 1);
+ break;
+ /* ssh2 */
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
+ process_sign_request2(e);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
+ process_request_identities(e, 2);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
+ process_add_identity(e, 2);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
+ process_remove_identity(e, 2);
+ break;
+ case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
+ process_remove_all_identities(e, 2);
+ break;
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+ process_add_smartcard_key(e);
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+ process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
+ break;
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+ default:
+ /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
+ error("Unknown message %d", type);
+ buffer_clear(&e->input);
+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+ buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+new_socket(int type, int fd)
+{
+ u_int i, old_alloc;
+ if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
+ error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if (fd > max_fd)
+ max_fd = fd;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
+ if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
+ sockets[i].fd = fd;
+ sockets[i].type = type;
+ buffer_init(&sockets[i].input);
+ buffer_init(&sockets[i].output);
+ return;
+ }
+ old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
+ sockets_alloc += 10;
+ if (sockets)
+ sockets = xrealloc(sockets, sockets_alloc * sizeof(sockets[0]));
+ else
+ sockets = xmalloc(sockets_alloc * sizeof(sockets[0]));
+ for (i = old_alloc; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
+ sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+ sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
+ sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
+ buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].input);
+ buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].output);
+}
+
+static int
+prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, int *nallocp)
+{
+ u_int i, sz;
+ int n = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
+ switch (sockets[i].type) {
+ case AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+ n = MAX(n, sockets[i].fd);
+ break;
+ case AUTH_UNUSED:
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ if (*fdrp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
+ if (*fdrp)
+ xfree(*fdrp);
+ if (*fdwp)
+ xfree(*fdwp);
+ *fdrp = xmalloc(sz);
+ *fdwp = xmalloc(sz);
+ *nallocp = sz;
+ }
+ if (n < *fdl)
+ debug("XXX shrink: %d < %d", n, *fdl);
+ *fdl = n;
+ memset(*fdrp, 0, sz);
+ memset(*fdwp, 0, sz);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
+ switch (sockets[i].type) {
+ case AUTH_SOCKET:
+ case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+ FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdrp);
+ if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0)
+ FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdwp);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+{
+ u_int i;
+ int len, sock;
+ socklen_t slen;
+ char buf[1024];
+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
+ switch (sockets[i].type) {
+ case AUTH_UNUSED:
+ break;
+ case AUTH_SOCKET:
+ if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
+ slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
+ sock = accept(sockets[i].fd,
+ (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, &slen);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ perror("accept from AUTH_SOCKET");
+ break;
+ }
+ new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock);
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+ if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0 &&
+ FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, writeset)) {
+ do {
+ len = write(sockets[i].fd,
+ buffer_ptr(&sockets[i].output),
+ buffer_len(&sockets[i].output));
+ if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EINTR))
+ continue;
+ break;
+ } while (1);
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ shutdown(sockets[i].fd, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(sockets[i].fd);
+ sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+ buffer_free(&sockets[i].input);
+ buffer_free(&sockets[i].output);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer_consume(&sockets[i].output, len);
+ }
+ if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
+ do {
+ len = read(sockets[i].fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN ||
+ errno == EINTR))
+ continue;
+ break;
+ } while (1);
+ if (len <= 0) {
+ shutdown(sockets[i].fd, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(sockets[i].fd);
+ sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+ buffer_free(&sockets[i].input);
+ buffer_free(&sockets[i].output);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer_append(&sockets[i].input, buf, len);
+ process_message(&sockets[i]);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Unknown type %d", sockets[i].type);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_socket(void)
+{
+ if (socket_name[0])
+ unlink(socket_name);
+ if (socket_dir[0])
+ rmdir(socket_dir);
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ cleanup_socket();
+ exit(i);
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_handler(int sig)
+{
+ cleanup_socket();
+ _exit(2);
+}
+
+static void
+check_parent_exists(int sig)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+
+ if (parent_pid != -1 && kill(parent_pid, 0) < 0) {
+ /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
+ cleanup_handler(sig); /* safe */
+ }
+ signal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists);
+ alarm(10);
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] [command [args ...]]\n",
+ __progname);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -k Kill the current agent.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -d Debug mode.\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ int sock, c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0, ch, nalloc;
+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+ struct rlimit rlim;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ int prev_mask;
+#endif
+ pid_t pid;
+ char *shell, *format, *pidstr, pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
+ extern int optind;
+ fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
+
+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+ __progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+ init_rng();
+ seed_rng();
+
+#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
+ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "+cdks")) != -1) {
+#else /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
+ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdks")) != -1) {
+#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'c':
+ if (s_flag)
+ usage();
+ c_flag++;
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ k_flag++;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ if (c_flag)
+ usage();
+ s_flag++;
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ if (d_flag)
+ usage();
+ d_flag++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+ ac -= optind;
+ av += optind;
+
+ if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag))
+ usage();
+
+ if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !k_flag && !s_flag && !d_flag) {
+ shell = getenv("SHELL");
+ if (shell != NULL && strncmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
+ c_flag = 1;
+ }
+ if (k_flag) {
+ pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+ if (pidstr == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
+ SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ pid = atoi(pidstr);
+ if (pid < 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID\n",
+ SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
+ perror("kill");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
+ printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+ printf("echo Agent pid %d killed;\n", pid);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ parent_pid = getpid();
+
+ /* Create private directory for agent socket */
+ strlcpy(socket_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", sizeof socket_dir);
+ if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
+ perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%d", socket_dir,
+ parent_pid);
+
+ /*
+ * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
+ * the parent.
+ */
+ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ perror("socket");
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+ memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
+ sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, socket_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ prev_mask = umask(0177);
+#endif
+ if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+ perror("bind");
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ umask(prev_mask);
+#endif
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ umask(prev_mask);
+#endif
+ if (listen(sock, 5) < 0) {
+ perror("listen");
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
+ * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent.
+ */
+ if (d_flag) {
+ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+ format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
+ printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
+ SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ printf("echo Agent pid %d;\n", parent_pid);
+ goto skip;
+ }
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ perror("fork");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */
+ close(sock);
+ snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%d", pid);
+ if (ac == 0) {
+ format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
+ printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
+ SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
+ SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+ printf("echo Agent pid %d;\n", pid);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
+ setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
+ perror("setenv");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ execvp(av[0], av);
+ perror(av[0]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (setsid() == -1) {
+ perror("setsid");
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+
+ (void)chdir("/");
+ close(0);
+ close(1);
+ close(2);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+ /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
+ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) {
+ perror("setrlimit rlimit_core failed");
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+#endif
+
+skip:
+ if (atexit(cleanup_socket) < 0) {
+ perror("atexit");
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
+ new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
+ if (ac > 0) {
+ signal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists);
+ alarm(10);
+ }
+ idtab_init();
+ if (!d_flag)
+ signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
+ signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
+ nalloc = 0;
+
+ while (1) {
+ prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc);
+ if (select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ after_select(readsetp, writesetp);
+ }
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.9 2001/11/07 22:10:28 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "ssh-dss.h"
+
+#define INTBLOB_LEN 20
+#define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN)
+
+int
+ssh_dss_sign(
+ Key *key,
+ u_char **sigp, int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ DSA_SIG *sig;
+ EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ u_char *digest, *ret, sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+ u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen;
+ Buffer b;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) {
+ error("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dlen = evp_md->md_size;
+ digest = xmalloc(dlen);
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+ sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa);
+
+ memset(digest, 0, dlen);
+ xfree(digest);
+ if (sig == NULL) {
+ error("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
+ slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
+ if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
+ error("bad sig size %d %d", rlen, slen);
+ DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memset(sigblob, 0, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
+ DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
+ ret = xmalloc(SIGBLOB_LEN);
+ memcpy(ret, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN;
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = ret;
+ } else {
+ /* ietf-drafts */
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-dss");
+ buffer_put_string(&b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+ len = buffer_len(&b);
+ ret = xmalloc(len);
+ memcpy(ret, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+int
+ssh_dss_verify(
+ Key *key,
+ u_char *signature, int signaturelen,
+ u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ DSA_SIG *sig;
+ EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ u_char *digest, *sigblob;
+ u_int len, dlen;
+ int rlen, ret;
+ Buffer b;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) {
+ error("ssh_dss_verify: no DSA key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* fetch signature */
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
+ sigblob = signature;
+ len = signaturelen;
+ } else {
+ /* ietf-drafts */
+ char *ktype;
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
+ ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) {
+ error("ssh_dss_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ xfree(ktype);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ xfree(ktype);
+ sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+ rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ if(rlen != 0) {
+ error("ssh_dss_verify: "
+ "remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen);
+ xfree(sigblob);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) {
+ fatal("bad sigbloblen %d != SIGBLOB_LEN", len);
+ }
+
+ /* parse signature */
+ sig = DSA_SIG_new();
+ sig->r = BN_new();
+ sig->s = BN_new();
+ BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r);
+ BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s);
+
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)) {
+ memset(sigblob, 0, len);
+ xfree(sigblob);
+ }
+
+ /* sha1 the data */
+ dlen = evp_md->md_size;
+ digest = xmalloc(dlen);
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+ ret = DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa);
+
+ memset(digest, 0, dlen);
+ xfree(digest);
+ DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+
+ debug("ssh_dss_verify: signature %s",
+ ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error");
+ return ret;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.h,v 1.5 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef DSA_H
+#define DSA_H
+
+int ssh_dss_sign(Key *, u_char **, int *, u_char *, int);
+int ssh_dss_verify(Key *, u_char *, int, u_char *, int);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.50 2001/10/25 21:14:32 markus Exp $
+.\"
+.\" -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd September 25, 1999
+.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Op Fl q
+.Op Fl b Ar bits
+.Op Fl t Ar type
+.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl C Ar comment
+.Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl p
+.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase
+.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl i
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl e
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl y
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl c
+.Op Fl P Ar passphrase
+.Op Fl C Ar comment
+.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl l
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl B
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl D Ar reader
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl U Ar reader
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Nm
+defaults to generating a RSA1 key for use by SSH protocol version 1.
+Specifying the
+.Fl t
+option instead creates a key for use by SSH protocol version 2.
+.Pp
+Normally each user wishing to use SSH
+with RSA or DSA authentication runs this once to create the authentication
+key in
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity ,
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+or
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa .
+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
+as seen in
+.Pa /etc/rc .
+.Pp
+Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
+to store the private key.
+The public key is stored in a file with the same name but
+.Dq .pub
+appended.
+The program also asks for a passphrase.
+The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase
+(host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of
+arbitrary length.
+Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long and are
+not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English
+prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad
+passphrases).
+The passphrase can be changed later by using the
+.Fl p
+option.
+.Pp
+There is no way to recover a lost passphrase.
+If the passphrase is
+lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated and copied to the
+corresponding public key to other machines.
+.Pp
+For RSA1 keys,
+there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for
+convenience to the user to help identify the key.
+The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful.
+The comment is initialized to
+.Dq user@host
+when the key is created, but can be changed using the
+.Fl c
+option.
+.Pp
+After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys
+should be placed to be activated.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl b Ar bits
+Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.
+Minimum is 512 bits.
+Generally 1024 bits is considered sufficient, and key sizes
+above that no longer improve security but make things slower.
+The default is 1024 bits.
+.It Fl c
+Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files.
+This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys.
+The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
+the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
+.It Fl e
+This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
+print the key in a
+.Sq SECSH Public Key File Format
+to stdout.
+This option allows exporting keys for use by several commercial
+SSH implementations.
+.It Fl f Ar filename
+Specifies the filename of the key file.
+.It Fl i
+This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
+in SSH2-compatible format and print an OpenSSH compatible private
+(or public) key to stdout.
+.Nm
+also reads the
+.Sq SECSH Public Key File Format .
+This option allows importing keys from several commercial
+SSH implementations.
+.It Fl l
+Show fingerprint of specified public key file.
+Private RSA1 keys are also supported.
+For RSA and DSA keys
+.Nm
+tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint.
+.It Fl p
+Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
+creating a new private key.
+The program will prompt for the file
+containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the
+new passphrase.
+.It Fl q
+Silence
+.Nm ssh-keygen .
+Used by
+.Pa /etc/rc
+when creating a new key.
+.It Fl y
+This option will read a private
+OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+.It Fl t Ar type
+Specifies the type of the key to create.
+The possible values are
+.Dq rsa1
+for protocol version 1 and
+.Dq rsa
+or
+.Dq dsa
+for protocol version 2.
+The default is
+.Dq rsa1 .
+.It Fl B
+Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file.
+.It Fl C Ar comment
+Provides the new comment.
+.It Fl D Ar reader
+Download the RSA public key stored in the smartcard in
+.Ar reader .
+.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+Provides the new passphrase.
+.It Fl P Ar passphrase
+Provides the (old) passphrase.
+.It Fl U Ar reader
+Upload an existing RSA private key into the smartcard in
+.Ar reader .
+.El
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES.
+This file is not automatically accessed by
+.Nm
+but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
+.Xr ssh 1
+will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub
+Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentication.
+The contents of this file should be added to
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using RSA authentication.
+There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES.
+This file is not automatically accessed by
+.Nm
+but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
+.Xr ssh 1
+will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+Contains the protocol version 2 DSA public key for authentication.
+The contents of this file should be added to
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
+There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES.
+This file is not automatically accessed by
+.Nm
+but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
+.Xr ssh 1
+will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+Contains the protocol version 2 RSA public key for authentication.
+The contents of this file should be added to
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
+There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+.El
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A J. Galbraith
+.%A R. Thayer
+.%T "SECSH Public Key File Format"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-publickeyfile-01.txt
+.%D March 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Identity and host key generation and maintenance.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.83 2001/10/25 21:14:32 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readpass.h"
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+#include <sectok.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "scard.h"
+#endif
+
+/* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be changed on the command line. */
+int bits = 1024;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase. This can be
+ * set on the command line.
+ */
+int change_passphrase = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that we just want to change the comment. This can be set
+ * on the command line.
+ */
+int change_comment = 0;
+
+int quiet = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */
+int print_fingerprint = 0;
+int print_bubblebabble = 0;
+
+/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */
+char identity_file[1024];
+int have_identity = 0;
+
+/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */
+char *identity_passphrase = NULL;
+
+/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */
+char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL;
+
+/* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */
+char *identity_comment = NULL;
+
+/* Dump public key file in format used by real and the original SSH 2 */
+int convert_to_ssh2 = 0;
+int convert_from_ssh2 = 0;
+int print_public = 0;
+
+/* default to RSA for SSH-1 */
+char *key_type_name = "rsa1";
+
+/* argv0 */
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+
+static void
+ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ char *name = NULL;
+
+ switch (key_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "bad key type");
+ exit(1);
+ break;
+ }
+ snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
+ fflush(stderr);
+ if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+ if (strchr(buf, '\n'))
+ *strchr(buf, '\n') = 0;
+ if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0)
+ strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file));
+ have_identity = 1;
+}
+
+static Key *
+load_identity(char *filename)
+{
+ char *pass;
+ Key *prv;
+
+ prv = key_load_private(filename, "", NULL);
+ if (prv == NULL) {
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else
+ pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ prv = key_load_private(filename, pass, NULL);
+ memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
+ xfree(pass);
+ }
+ return prv;
+}
+
+#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb
+
+static void
+do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ Key *k;
+ int len;
+ u_char *blob;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+ perror(identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if ((k = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ if ((k = load_identity(identity_file)) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "load failed\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len) <= 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "key_to_blob failed\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN);
+ fprintf(stdout,
+ "Comment: \"%d-bit %s, converted from OpenSSH by %s@%s\"\n",
+ key_size(k), key_type(k),
+ pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ dump_base64(stdout, blob, len);
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END);
+ key_free(k);
+ xfree(blob);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+buffer_get_bignum_bits(Buffer *b, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+ int bits = buffer_get_int(b);
+ int bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+
+ if (buffer_len(b) < bytes)
+ fatal("buffer_get_bignum_bits: input buffer too small: "
+ "need %d have %d", bytes, buffer_len(b));
+ BN_bin2bn((u_char *)buffer_ptr(b), bytes, value);
+ buffer_consume(b, bytes);
+}
+
+static Key *
+do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ char *type, *cipher;
+ u_char *sig, data[] = "abcde12345";
+ int magic, rlen, ktype, i1, i2, i3, i4;
+ u_int slen;
+ u_long e;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
+
+ magic = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) {
+ error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ i1 = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ type = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ cipher = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ i2 = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ i3 = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ i4 = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1,i2,i3,i4);
+ if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) {
+ error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher);
+ xfree(cipher);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ xfree(type);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ xfree(cipher);
+
+ if (strstr(type, "dsa")) {
+ ktype = KEY_DSA;
+ } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) {
+ ktype = KEY_RSA;
+ } else {
+ xfree(type);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ key = key_new_private(ktype);
+ xfree(type);
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->p);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->g);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->q);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->priv_key);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ e = buffer_get_char(&b);
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ if (e < 30) {
+ e <<= 8;
+ e += buffer_get_char(&b);
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ e <<= 8;
+ e += buffer_get_char(&b);
+ debug("e %lx", e);
+ }
+ if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) {
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ key_free(key);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->d);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->iqmp);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->q);
+ buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->p);
+ rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa);
+ break;
+ }
+ rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+ if(rlen != 0)
+ error("do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob: "
+ "remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+
+ /* try the key */
+ key_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data));
+ key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data));
+ xfree(sig);
+ return key;
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ Key *k;
+ int blen;
+ char line[1024], *p;
+ u_char blob[8096];
+ char encoded[8096];
+ struct stat st;
+ int escaped = 0, private = 0, ok;
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+ perror(identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ fp = fopen(identity_file, "r");
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ perror(identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ encoded[0] = '\0';
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) {
+ if (!(p = strchr(line, '\n'))) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "input line too long.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (p > line && p[-1] == '\\')
+ escaped++;
+ if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 ||
+ strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) {
+ if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL)
+ private = 1;
+ if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (escaped) {
+ escaped--;
+ /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */
+ continue;
+ }
+ *p = '\0';
+ strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded));
+ }
+ blen = uudecode(encoded, (u_char *)blob, sizeof(blob));
+ if (blen < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "uudecode failed.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ k = private ?
+ do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen) :
+ key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+ if (k == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "decode blob failed.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ ok = private ?
+ (k->type == KEY_DSA ?
+ PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) :
+ PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) :
+ key_write(k, stdout);
+ if (!ok) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "key write failed");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ key_free(k);
+ fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ Key *prv;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+ perror(identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ prv = load_identity(identity_file);
+ if (prv == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "load failed\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!key_write(prv, stdout))
+ fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed");
+ key_free(prv);
+ fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+#define NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS 5+1
+#define COPY_RSA_KEY(x, i) \
+ do { \
+ len = BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->x); \
+ elements[i] = xmalloc(len); \
+ debug("#bytes %d", len); \
+ if (BN_bn2bin(prv->rsa->x, elements[i]) < 0) \
+ goto done; \
+ } while(0)
+
+static int
+get_AUT0(char *aut0)
+{
+ EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ char *pass;
+
+ pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for smartcard: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (pass == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, pass, strlen(pass));
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, aut0, NULL);
+ memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
+ xfree(pass);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+do_upload(struct passwd *pw, const char *sc_reader_id)
+{
+ Key *prv = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ u_char *elements[NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS];
+ u_char key_fid[2];
+ u_char DEFAUT0[] = {0xad, 0x9f, 0x61, 0xfe, 0xfa, 0x20, 0xce, 0x63};
+ u_char AUT0[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int len, status = 1, i, fd = -1, ret;
+ int sw = 0, cla = 0x00;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS; i++)
+ elements[i] = NULL;
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+ perror(identity_file);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ prv = load_identity(identity_file);
+ if (prv == NULL) {
+ error("load failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ COPY_RSA_KEY(q, 0);
+ COPY_RSA_KEY(p, 1);
+ COPY_RSA_KEY(iqmp, 2);
+ COPY_RSA_KEY(dmq1, 3);
+ COPY_RSA_KEY(dmp1, 4);
+ COPY_RSA_KEY(n, 5);
+ len = BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->n);
+ fd = sectok_friendly_open(sc_reader_id, STONOWAIT, &sw);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ error("sectok_open failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (! sectok_cardpresent(fd)) {
+ error("smartcard in reader %s not present",
+ sc_reader_id);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ret = sectok_reset(fd, 0, NULL, &sw);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ error("sectok_reset failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((cla = cyberflex_inq_class(fd)) < 0) {
+ error("cyberflex_inq_class failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ memcpy(AUT0, DEFAUT0, sizeof(DEFAUT0));
+ if (cyberflex_verify_AUT0(fd, cla, AUT0, sizeof(DEFAUT0)) < 0) {
+ if (get_AUT0(AUT0) < 0 ||
+ cyberflex_verify_AUT0(fd, cla, AUT0, sizeof(DEFAUT0)) < 0) {
+ error("cyberflex_verify_AUT0 failed");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ key_fid[0] = 0x00;
+ key_fid[1] = 0x12;
+ if (cyberflex_load_rsa_priv(fd, cla, key_fid, 5, 8*len, elements,
+ &sw) < 0) {
+ error("cyberflex_load_rsa_priv failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!sectok_swOK(sw))
+ goto done;
+ log("cyberflex_load_rsa_priv done");
+ key_fid[0] = 0x73;
+ key_fid[1] = 0x68;
+ if (cyberflex_load_rsa_pub(fd, cla, key_fid, len, elements[5],
+ &sw) < 0) {
+ error("cyberflex_load_rsa_pub failed: %s", sectok_get_sw(sw));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!sectok_swOK(sw))
+ goto done;
+ log("cyberflex_load_rsa_pub done");
+ status = 0;
+ log("loading key done");
+done:
+
+ memset(elements[0], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->q));
+ memset(elements[1], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->p));
+ memset(elements[2], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->iqmp));
+ memset(elements[3], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->dmq1));
+ memset(elements[4], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->dmp1));
+ memset(elements[5], '\0', BN_num_bytes(prv->rsa->n));
+
+ if (prv)
+ key_free(prv);
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_RSA_KEY_ELEMENTS; i++)
+ if (elements[i])
+ xfree(elements[i]);
+ if (fd != -1)
+ sectok_close(fd);
+ exit(status);
+}
+
+static void
+do_download(struct passwd *pw, const char *sc_reader_id)
+{
+ Key *pub = NULL;
+
+ pub = sc_get_key(sc_reader_id);
+ if (pub == NULL)
+ fatal("cannot read public key from smartcard");
+ key_write(pub, stdout);
+ key_free(pub);
+ fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ exit(0);
+}
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+
+static void
+do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ Key *public;
+ char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp;
+ int i, skip = 0, num = 1, invalid = 1, rep, fptype;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
+ rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+ perror(identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
+ if (public != NULL) {
+ fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+ printf("%d %s %s\n", key_size(public), fp, comment);
+ key_free(public);
+ xfree(comment);
+ xfree(fp);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ if (comment)
+ xfree(comment);
+
+ f = fopen(identity_file, "r");
+ if (f != NULL) {
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ i = strlen(line) - 1;
+ if (line[i] != '\n') {
+ error("line %d too long: %.40s...", num, line);
+ skip = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ num++;
+ if (skip) {
+ skip = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ line[i] = '\0';
+
+ /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+ continue ;
+ i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
+ if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
+ int quoted = 0;
+ comment = cp;
+ for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+ cp++; /* Skip both */
+ else if (*cp == '"')
+ quoted = !quoted;
+ }
+ if (!*cp)
+ continue;
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ }
+ ep = cp;
+ public = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) {
+ cp = ep;
+ key_free(public);
+ public = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) {
+ key_free(public);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
+ fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+ printf("%d %s %s\n", key_size(public), fp,
+ comment ? comment : "no comment");
+ xfree(fp);
+ key_free(public);
+ invalid = 0;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ if (invalid) {
+ printf("%s is not a public key file.\n", identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure
+ * for the current user.
+ */
+static void
+do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char *comment;
+ char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+ struct stat st;
+ Key *private;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+ perror(identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */
+ private = key_load_private(identity_file, "", &comment);
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else
+ old_passphrase =
+ read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ private = key_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase,
+ &comment);
+ memset(old_passphrase, 0, strlen(old_passphrase));
+ xfree(old_passphrase);
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ printf("Bad passphrase.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+
+ /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
+ if (identity_new_passphrase) {
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+ passphrase2 = NULL;
+ } else {
+ passphrase1 =
+ read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no "
+ "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+
+ /* Verify that they are the same. */
+ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
+ memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+ memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+ xfree(passphrase1);
+ xfree(passphrase2);
+ printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Destroy the other copy. */
+ memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+ xfree(passphrase2);
+ }
+
+ /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
+ if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment)) {
+ printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
+ memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+ xfree(passphrase1);
+ key_free(private);
+ xfree(comment);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */
+ memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+ xfree(passphrase1);
+ key_free(private); /* Destroys contents */
+ xfree(comment);
+
+ printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n");
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Change the comment of a private key file.
+ */
+static void
+do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase;
+ Key *private;
+ Key *public;
+ struct stat st;
+ FILE *f;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) {
+ perror(identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ private = key_load_private(identity_file, "", &comment);
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else if (identity_new_passphrase)
+ passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+ else
+ passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ /* Try to load using the passphrase. */
+ private = key_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &comment);
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+ xfree(passphrase);
+ printf("Bad passphrase.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ passphrase = xstrdup("");
+ }
+ if (private->type != KEY_RSA1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys.\n");
+ key_free(private);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+
+ if (identity_comment) {
+ strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
+ } else {
+ printf("Enter new comment: ");
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) {
+ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+ key_free(private);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (strchr(new_comment, '\n'))
+ *strchr(new_comment, '\n') = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
+ if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment)) {
+ printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
+ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+ xfree(passphrase);
+ key_free(private);
+ xfree(comment);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+ xfree(passphrase);
+ public = key_from_private(private);
+ key_free(private);
+
+ strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+ fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ f = fdopen(fd, "w");
+ if (f == NULL) {
+ printf("fdopen %s failed", identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!key_write(public, f))
+ fprintf(stderr, "write key failed");
+ key_free(public);
+ fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment);
+ fclose(f);
+
+ xfree(comment);
+
+ printf("The comment in your key file has been changed.\n");
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Number of bits in the key to create.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -c Change comment in private and public key files.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -e Convert OpenSSH to IETF SECSH key file.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -f filename Filename of the key file.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -i Convert IETF SECSH to OpenSSH key file.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -l Show fingerprint of key file.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -p Change passphrase of private key file.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -y Read private key file and print public key.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -t type Specify type of key to create.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -B Show bubblebabble digest of key file.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -C comment Provide new comment.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -N phrase Provide new passphrase.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -P phrase Provide old passphrase.\n");
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+ fprintf(stderr, " -D reader Download public key from smartcard.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -U reader Upload private key to smartcard.\n");
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for key management.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ char dotsshdir[16 * 1024], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+ char *reader_id = NULL;
+ Key *private, *public;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct stat st;
+ int opt, type, fd, download = 0;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ extern int optind;
+ extern char *optarg;
+
+ __progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+ init_rng();
+ seed_rng();
+
+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+
+ /* we need this for the home * directory. */
+ pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+ if (!pw) {
+ printf("You don't exist, go away!\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) {
+ perror("gethostname");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "deiqpclBRxXyb:f:t:U:D:P:N:C:")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'b':
+ bits = atoi(optarg);
+ if (bits < 512 || bits > 32768) {
+ printf("Bits has bad value.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ print_fingerprint = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'B':
+ print_bubblebabble = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ change_passphrase = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ change_comment = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file));
+ have_identity = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ identity_passphrase = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'N':
+ identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'C':
+ identity_comment = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ quiet = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'R':
+ /* unused */
+ exit(0);
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ case 'x':
+ /* export key */
+ convert_to_ssh2 = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ case 'X':
+ /* import key */
+ convert_from_ssh2 = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'y':
+ print_public = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ key_type_name = "dsa";
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ key_type_name = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ download = 1;
+ case 'U':
+ reader_id = optarg;
+ break;
+ case '?':
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+ if (optind < ac) {
+ printf("Too many arguments.\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+ if (change_passphrase && change_comment) {
+ printf("Can only have one of -p and -c.\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+ if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble)
+ do_fingerprint(pw);
+ if (change_passphrase)
+ do_change_passphrase(pw);
+ if (change_comment)
+ do_change_comment(pw);
+ if (convert_to_ssh2)
+ do_convert_to_ssh2(pw);
+ if (convert_from_ssh2)
+ do_convert_from_ssh2(pw);
+ if (print_public)
+ do_print_public(pw);
+ if (reader_id != NULL) {
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+ if (download)
+ do_download(pw, reader_id);
+ else
+ do_upload(pw, reader_id);
+#else /* SMARTCARD */
+ fatal("no support for smartcards.");
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+ }
+
+ arc4random_stir();
+
+ type = key_type_from_name(key_type_name);
+ if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name);
+ private = key_generate(type, bits);
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ public = key_from_private(private);
+
+ if (!have_identity)
+ ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key");
+
+ /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn\'t already exist. */
+ snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+ if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL &&
+ stat(dotsshdir, &st) < 0) {
+ if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) < 0)
+ error("Could not create directory '%s'.", dotsshdir);
+ else if (!quiet)
+ printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir);
+ }
+ /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
+ if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) {
+ char yesno[3];
+ printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file);
+ printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");
+ fflush(stdout);
+ if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+ if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else if (identity_new_passphrase)
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+ else {
+passphrase_again:
+ passphrase1 =
+ read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no "
+ "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and
+ * retry.
+ */
+ memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+ memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+ xfree(passphrase1);
+ xfree(passphrase2);
+ printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n");
+ goto passphrase_again;
+ }
+ /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */
+ memset(passphrase2, 0, strlen(passphrase2));
+ xfree(passphrase2);
+ }
+
+ if (identity_comment) {
+ strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment));
+ } else {
+ /* Create default commend field for the passphrase. */
+ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+ }
+
+ /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
+ if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment)) {
+ printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file);
+ memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+ xfree(passphrase1);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Clear the passphrase. */
+ memset(passphrase1, 0, strlen(passphrase1));
+ xfree(passphrase1);
+
+ /* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */
+ key_free(private);
+ arc4random_stir();
+
+ if (!quiet)
+ printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file);
+
+ strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+ fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ f = fdopen(fd, "w");
+ if (f == NULL) {
+ printf("fdopen %s failed", identity_file);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!key_write(public, f))
+ fprintf(stderr, "write key failed");
+ fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
+ fclose(f);
+
+ if (!quiet) {
+ char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
+ identity_file);
+ printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
+ printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
+ xfree(fp);
+ }
+
+ key_free(public);
+ exit(0);
+}
--- /dev/null
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.12 2001/09/05 06:23:07 deraadt Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+.\"
+.\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+.\"
+.Dd January 1, 1996
+.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keyscan
+.Nd gather ssh public keys
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-keyscan
+.Op Fl v46
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl T Ar timeout
+.Op Fl t Ar type
+.Op Fl f Ar file
+.Op Ar host | addrlist namelist
+.Op Ar ...
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a number of
+hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying
+.Pa ssh_known_hosts
+files.
+.Nm
+provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl
+scripts.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in
+parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of 1,000
+hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
+hosts are down or do not run ssh. For scanning, one does not need
+login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the
+scanning process involve any encryption.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Port to connect to on the remote host.
+.It Fl T Ar timeout
+Set the timeout for connection attempts. If
+.Pa timeout
+seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
+last time anything was read from that host, then the connection is
+closed and the host in question considered unavailable. Default is 5
+seconds.
+.It Fl t Ar type
+Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
+The possible values are
+.Dq rsa1
+for protocol version 1 and
+.Dq rsa
+or
+.Dq dsa
+for protocol version 2.
+Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas.
+The default is
+.Dq rsa1 .
+.It Fl f Ar filename
+Read hosts or
+.Pa addrlist namelist
+pairs from this file, one per line.
+If
+.Pa -
+is supplied instead of a filename,
+.Nm
+will read hosts or
+.Pa addrlist namelist
+pairs from the standard input.
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.El
+.Sh SECURITY
+If a ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using
+.Nm
+without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to
+.I man in the middle
+attacks.
+On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
+.Nm
+can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle
+attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created.
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+.Pp
+Print the
+.Pa rsa1
+host key for machine
+.Pa hostname :
+.Bd -literal
+ssh-keyscan hostname
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Find all hosts from the file
+.Pa ssh_hosts
+which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file
+.Pa ssh_known_hosts :
+.Bd -literal
+ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa -f ssh_hosts | \e\
+ sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
+.Ed
+.Sh FILES
+.Pa Input format:
+.Bd -literal
+1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
+.Ed
+.Pp
+.Pa Output format for rsa1 keys:
+.Bd -literal
+host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus
+.Ed
+.Pp
+.Pa Output format for rsa and dsa keys:
+.Bd -literal
+host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Where
+.Pa keytype
+is either
+.Dq ssh-rsa
+or
+.Dq ssh-dsa .
+.Pp
+.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts
+.Sh BUGS
+It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles
+of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9.
+This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public
+key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>
+wrote the initial version, and
+Wayne Davison <wayned@users.sourceforge.net>
+added support for protocol version 2.
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+ *
+ * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+ * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+ * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.30 2001/10/08 19:05:05 markus Exp $");
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_QUEUE_H) && !defined(HAVE_BOGUS_SYS_QUEUE_H)
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+#else
+#include "openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h"
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
+ Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
+#ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT
+int IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+#else
+int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
+#endif
+
+int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+
+#define KT_RSA1 1
+#define KT_DSA 2
+#define KT_RSA 4
+
+int get_keytypes = KT_RSA1; /* Get only RSA1 keys by default */
+
+#define MAXMAXFD 256
+
+/* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */
+int timeout = 5;
+
+int maxfd;
+#define MAXCON (maxfd - 10)
+
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+fd_set *read_wait;
+size_t read_wait_size;
+int ncon;
+int nonfatal_fatal = 0;
+jmp_buf kexjmp;
+Key *kexjmp_key;
+
+/*
+ * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state
+ * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n].
+ */
+typedef struct Connection {
+ u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */
+#define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */
+#define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */
+#define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */
+#define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */
+ int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */
+ int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */
+ int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */
+ int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */
+ int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */
+ char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */
+ char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */
+ char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */
+ char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */
+ char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */
+ Kex *c_kex; /* The key-exchange struct for ssh2 */
+ struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */
+} con;
+
+TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */
+con *fdcon;
+
+/*
+ * This is just a wrapper around fgets() to make it usable.
+ */
+
+/* Stress-test. Increase this later. */
+#define LINEBUF_SIZE 16
+
+typedef struct {
+ char *buf;
+ u_int size;
+ int lineno;
+ const char *filename;
+ FILE *stream;
+ void (*errfun) (const char *,...);
+} Linebuf;
+
+static Linebuf *
+Linebuf_alloc(const char *filename, void (*errfun) (const char *,...))
+{
+ Linebuf *lb;
+
+ if (!(lb = malloc(sizeof(*lb)))) {
+ if (errfun)
+ (*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n", lb->filename);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (filename) {
+ lb->filename = filename;
+ if (!(lb->stream = fopen(filename, "r"))) {
+ xfree(lb);
+ if (errfun)
+ (*errfun) ("%s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno));
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ } else {
+ lb->filename = "(stdin)";
+ lb->stream = stdin;
+ }
+
+ if (!(lb->buf = malloc(lb->size = LINEBUF_SIZE))) {
+ if (errfun)
+ (*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n", lb->filename);
+ xfree(lb);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ lb->errfun = errfun;
+ lb->lineno = 0;
+ return (lb);
+}
+
+static void
+Linebuf_free(Linebuf * lb)
+{
+ fclose(lb->stream);
+ xfree(lb->buf);
+ xfree(lb);
+}
+
+#if 0
+static void
+Linebuf_restart(Linebuf * lb)
+{
+ clearerr(lb->stream);
+ rewind(lb->stream);
+ lb->lineno = 0;
+}
+
+static int
+Linebuf_lineno(Linebuf * lb)
+{
+ return (lb->lineno);
+}
+#endif
+
+static char *
+Linebuf_getline(Linebuf * lb)
+{
+ int n = 0;
+
+ lb->lineno++;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Read a line */
+ if (!fgets(&lb->buf[n], lb->size - n, lb->stream)) {
+ if (ferror(lb->stream) && lb->errfun)
+ (*lb->errfun) ("%s: %s\n", lb->filename,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ n = strlen(lb->buf);
+
+ /* Return it or an error if it fits */
+ if (n > 0 && lb->buf[n - 1] == '\n') {
+ lb->buf[n - 1] = '\0';
+ return (lb->buf);
+ }
+ if (n != lb->size - 1) {
+ if (lb->errfun)
+ (*lb->errfun) ("%s: skipping incomplete last line\n",
+ lb->filename);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ /* Double the buffer if we need more space */
+ if (!(lb->buf = realloc(lb->buf, (lb->size *= 2)))) {
+ if (lb->errfun)
+ (*lb->errfun) ("linebuf (%s): realloc failed\n",
+ lb->filename);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+fdlim_get(int hard)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+ struct rlimit rlfd;
+
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY)
+ return 10000;
+ else
+ return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur;
+#elif defined (HAVE_SYSCONF)
+ return sysconf (_SC_OPEN_MAX);
+#else
+ return 10000;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+fdlim_set(int lim)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+ struct rlimit rlfd;
+#endif
+ if (lim <= 0)
+ return (-1);
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ rlfd.rlim_cur = lim;
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+#elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE)
+ setdtablesize(lim);
+#endif
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent
+ * separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the
+ * one in the GNU libc.
+ */
+static char *
+xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim)
+{
+ char *s, *e;
+
+ if (!**str)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ s = *str;
+ e = s + strcspn(s, delim);
+
+ if (*e != '\0')
+ *e++ = '\0';
+ *str = e;
+
+ return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a
+ * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop.
+ */
+static char *
+strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim)
+{
+ char *tok;
+
+ do {
+ tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim);
+ } while (tok && *tok == '\0');
+ return (tok);
+}
+
+static Key *
+keygrab_ssh1(con *c)
+{
+ static Key *rsa;
+ static Buffer msg;
+
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ rsa = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ }
+ buffer_append(&msg, c->c_data, c->c_plen);
+ buffer_consume(&msg, 8 - (c->c_plen & 7)); /* padding */
+ if (buffer_get_char(&msg) != (int) SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) {
+ error("%s: invalid packet type", c->c_name);
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ buffer_consume(&msg, 8); /* cookie */
+
+ /* server key */
+ (void) buffer_get_int(&msg);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n);
+
+ /* host key */
+ (void) buffer_get_int(&msg);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n);
+
+ buffer_clear(&msg);
+
+ return (rsa);
+}
+
+static int
+hostjump(Key *hostkey)
+{
+ kexjmp_key = hostkey;
+ longjmp(kexjmp, 1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor)
+{
+ switch (remote_major) {
+ case 1:
+ if (remote_minor == 99)
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static Key *
+keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
+{
+ int j;
+
+ packet_set_connection(c->c_fd, c->c_fd);
+ enable_compat20();
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = c->c_keytype == KT_DSA?
+ "ssh-dss": "ssh-rsa";
+ c->c_kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ c->c_kex->verify_host_key = hostjump;
+
+ if (!(j = setjmp(kexjmp))) {
+ nonfatal_fatal = 1;
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_kex->done, c->c_kex);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Impossible! dispatch_run() returned!\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ nonfatal_fatal = 0;
+ xfree(c->c_kex);
+ c->c_kex = NULL;
+ packet_close();
+
+ return j < 0? NULL : kexjmp_key;
+}
+
+static void
+keyprint(con *c, Key *key)
+{
+ if (!key)
+ return;
+
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s ", c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name);
+ key_write(key, stdout);
+ fputs("\n", stdout);
+}
+
+static int
+tcpconnect(char *host)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int gaierr, s = -1;
+
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port);
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
+ fatal("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ s = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (s < 0) {
+ error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
+ fatal("F_SETFL: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 &&
+ errno != EINPROGRESS)
+ error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ break;
+ close(s);
+ s = -1;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ return s;
+}
+
+static int
+conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype)
+{
+ int s;
+ char *namebase, *name, *namelist;
+
+ namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname);
+
+ do {
+ name = xstrsep(&namelist, ",");
+ if (!name) {
+ xfree(namebase);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ } while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0);
+
+ if (s >= maxfd)
+ fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s);
+ if (fdcon[s].c_status)
+ fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s);
+
+ fdcon[s].c_fd = s;
+ fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON;
+ fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase;
+ fdcon[s].c_name = name;
+ fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist;
+ fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname);
+ fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen;
+ fdcon[s].c_len = 4;
+ fdcon[s].c_off = 0;
+ fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype;
+ gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL);
+ fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+ FD_SET(s, read_wait);
+ ncon++;
+ return (s);
+}
+
+static void
+confree(int s)
+{
+ if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED)
+ fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s);
+ close(s);
+ xfree(fdcon[s].c_namebase);
+ xfree(fdcon[s].c_output_name);
+ if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS)
+ xfree(fdcon[s].c_data);
+ fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED;
+ fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0;
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+ FD_CLR(s, read_wait);
+ ncon--;
+}
+
+static void
+contouch(int s)
+{
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+ gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL);
+ fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+}
+
+static int
+conrecycle(int s)
+{
+ int ret;
+ con *c = &fdcon[s];
+
+ ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype);
+ confree(s);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+congreet(int s)
+{
+ char buf[256], *cp;
+ size_t bufsiz;
+ int n = 0;
+ con *c = &fdcon[s];
+
+ bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
+ cp = buf;
+ while (bufsiz-- && (n = read(s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') {
+ if (*cp == '\r')
+ *cp = '\n';
+ cp++;
+ }
+ if (n < 0) {
+ if (errno != ECONNREFUSED)
+ error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+ conrecycle(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
+ error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ *cp = '\0';
+ if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) {
+ int remote_major, remote_minor;
+ char remote_version[sizeof buf];
+
+ if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+ &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3)
+ compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+ else
+ datafellows = 0;
+ if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) {
+ debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name);
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "# %s %s\n", c->c_name, chop(buf));
+ n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
+ c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2,
+ c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
+ if (atomicio(write, s, buf, n) != n) {
+ error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) {
+ keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh2(c));
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->c_status = CS_SIZE;
+ contouch(s);
+}
+
+static void
+conread(int s)
+{
+ int n;
+ con *c = &fdcon[s];
+
+ if (c->c_status == CS_CON) {
+ congreet(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ n = read(s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ c->c_off += n;
+
+ if (c->c_off == c->c_len)
+ switch (c->c_status) {
+ case CS_SIZE:
+ c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen);
+ c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7);
+ c->c_off = 0;
+ c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len);
+ c->c_status = CS_KEYS;
+ break;
+ case CS_KEYS:
+ keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c));
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ contouch(s);
+}
+
+static void
+conloop(void)
+{
+ fd_set *r, *e;
+ struct timeval seltime, now;
+ int i;
+ con *c;
+
+ gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+ c = tq.tqh_first;
+
+ if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec ||
+ (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) {
+ seltime = c->c_tv;
+ seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec;
+ seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec;
+ if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) {
+ seltime.tv_usec += 1000000;
+ seltime.tv_sec--;
+ }
+ } else
+ seltime.tv_sec = seltime.tv_usec = 0;
+
+ r = xmalloc(read_wait_size);
+ memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_size);
+ e = xmalloc(read_wait_size);
+ memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_size);
+
+ while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 &&
+ (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+ ;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) {
+ if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) {
+ error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name);
+ confree(i);
+ } else if (FD_ISSET(i, r))
+ conread(i);
+ }
+ xfree(r);
+ xfree(e);
+
+ c = tq.tqh_first;
+ while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec ||
+ (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) {
+ int s = c->c_fd;
+
+ c = c->c_link.tqe_next;
+ conrecycle(s);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+do_host(char *host)
+{
+ char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n");
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = KT_RSA1; j <= KT_RSA; j *= 2) {
+ if (get_keytypes & j) {
+ while (ncon >= MAXCON)
+ conloop();
+ conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+fatal_callback(void *arg)
+{
+ if (nonfatal_fatal)
+ longjmp(kexjmp, -1);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] host ...\n",
+ __progname);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -f file Read hosts or addresses from file.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -p port Connect to the specified port.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -t keytype Specify the host key type.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -T timeout Set connection timeout.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only.\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ int opt, fopt_count = 0;
+ char *tname;
+
+ extern int optind;
+ extern char *optarg;
+
+ __progname = get_progname(argv[0]);
+ init_rng();
+ seed_rng();
+ TAILQ_INIT(&tq);
+
+ if (argc <= 1)
+ usage();
+
+ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "v46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'p':
+ ssh_port = a2port(optarg);
+ if (ssh_port == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ timeout = atoi(optarg);
+ if (timeout <= 0)
+ usage();
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (!debug_flag) {
+ debug_flag = 1;
+ log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ }
+ else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ log_level++;
+ else
+ fatal("Too high debugging level.");
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0)
+ optarg = NULL;
+ argv[fopt_count++] = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ get_keytypes = 0;
+ tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
+ while (tname) {
+ int type = key_type_from_name(tname);
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1;
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_RSA;
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ fatal("unknown key type %s\n", tname);
+ }
+ tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
+ }
+ break;
+ case '4':
+ IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case '6':
+ IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ case '?':
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+ if (optind == argc && !fopt_count)
+ usage();
+
+ log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+ fatal_add_cleanup(fatal_callback, NULL);
+
+ maxfd = fdlim_get(1);
+ if (maxfd < 0)
+ fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname);
+ if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD)
+ maxfd = MAXMAXFD;
+ if (MAXCON <= 0)
+ fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname);
+ if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
+ fdlim_set(maxfd);
+ fdcon = xmalloc(maxfd * sizeof(con));
+ memset(fdcon, 0, maxfd * sizeof(con));
+
+ read_wait_size = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ read_wait = xmalloc(read_wait_size);
+ memset(read_wait, 0, read_wait_size);
+
+ if (fopt_count) {
+ Linebuf *lb;
+ char *line;
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) {
+ lb = Linebuf_alloc(argv[j], error);
+ if (!lb)
+ continue;
+ while ((line = Linebuf_getline(lb)) != NULL)
+ do_host(line);
+ Linebuf_free(lb);
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (optind < argc)
+ do_host(argv[optind++]);
+
+ while (ncon > 0)
+ conloop();
+
+ return (0);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.13 2001/11/10 13:22:42 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "ssh-rsa.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+
+/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */
+int
+ssh_rsa_sign(
+ Key *key,
+ u_char **sigp, int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ u_char *digest, *sig, *ret;
+ u_int slen, dlen, len;
+ int ok, nid;
+ Buffer b;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA || key->rsa == NULL) {
+ error("ssh_rsa_sign: no RSA key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
+ error("ssh_rsa_sign: SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB not supported");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1;
+ if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) {
+ error("ssh_rsa_sign: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dlen = evp_md->md_size;
+ digest = xmalloc(dlen);
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+ slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+ sig = xmalloc(slen);
+
+ ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa);
+ memset(digest, 'd', dlen);
+ xfree(digest);
+
+ if (ok != 1) {
+ int ecode = ERR_get_error();
+ error("ssh_rsa_sign: RSA_sign failed: %s", ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
+ xfree(sig);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (len < slen) {
+ int diff = slen - len;
+ debug("slen %d > len %d", slen, len);
+ memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
+ memset(sig, 0, diff);
+ } else if (len > slen) {
+ error("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %d slen2 %d", slen, len);
+ xfree(sig);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* encode signature */
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-rsa");
+ buffer_put_string(&b, sig, slen);
+ len = buffer_len(&b);
+ ret = xmalloc(len);
+ memcpy(ret, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ memset(sig, 's', slen);
+ xfree(sig);
+
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = ret;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_rsa_verify(
+ Key *key,
+ u_char *signature, int signaturelen,
+ u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ char *ktype;
+ u_char *sigblob, *digest;
+ u_int len, dlen;
+ int rlen, ret, nid;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA || key->rsa == NULL) {
+ error("ssh_rsa_verify: no RSA key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
+ error("ssh_rsa_verify: SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB not supported");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < 768) {
+ error("ssh_rsa_verify: n too small: %d bits",
+ BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
+ ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) {
+ error("ssh_rsa_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ xfree(ktype);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ xfree(ktype);
+ sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+ rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ if(rlen != 0) {
+ error("ssh_rsa_verify: remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen);
+ xfree(sigblob);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1;
+ if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) {
+ error("ssh_rsa_verify: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid);
+ xfree(sigblob);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dlen = evp_md->md_size;
+ digest = xmalloc(dlen);
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+ ret = RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa);
+ memset(digest, 'd', dlen);
+ xfree(digest);
+ memset(sigblob, 's', len);
+ xfree(sigblob);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ int ecode = ERR_get_error();
+ error("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA_verify failed: %s", ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
+ }
+ debug("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : "");
+ return ret;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.h,v 1.5 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_RSA_H
+#define SSH_RSA_H
+
+int ssh_rsa_sign(Key *, u_char **, int *, u_char *, int);
+int ssh_rsa_verify(Key *, u_char *, int, u_char *, int);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+.\" -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.141 2001/11/08 17:49:53 markus Exp $
+.Dd September 25, 1999
+.Dt SSH 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh
+.Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh
+.Op Fl l Ar login_name
+.Ar hostname | user@hostname
+.Op Ar command
+.Pp
+.Nm ssh
+.Op Fl afgknqstvxACNPTX1246
+.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
+.Op Fl e Ar escape_char
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl l Ar login_name
+.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec
+.Op Fl o Ar option
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl F Ar configfile
+.Oo Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar port :
+.Ar host :
+.Ar hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.Oc
+.Oo Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar port :
+.Ar host :
+.Ar hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.Oc
+.Op Fl D Ar port
+.Ar hostname | user@hostname
+.Op Ar command
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands on a remote machine.
+It is intended to replace
+rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
+X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+connects and logs into the specified
+.Ar hostname .
+The user must prove
+his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods
+depending on the protocol version used:
+.Pp
+.Ss SSH protocol version 1
+.Pp
+First, if the machine the user logs in from is listed in
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+or
+.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+on the remote machine, and the user names are
+the same on both sides, the user is immediately permitted to log in.
+Second, if
+.Pa \&.rhosts
+or
+.Pa \&.shosts
+exists in the user's home directory on the
+remote machine and contains a line containing the name of the client
+machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
+permitted to log in.
+This form of authentication alone is normally not
+allowed by the server because it is not secure.
+.Pp
+The second authentication method is the
+.Pa rhosts
+or
+.Pa hosts.equiv
+method combined with RSA-based host authentication.
+It means that if the login would be permitted by
+.Pa $HOME/.rhosts ,
+.Pa $HOME/.shosts ,
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
+or
+.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv ,
+and if additionally the server can verify the client's
+host key (see
+.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts
+and
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+in the
+.Sx FILES
+section), only then login is permitted.
+This authentication method closes security holes due to IP
+spoofing, DNS spoofing and routing spoofing.
+[Note to the administrator:
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
+.Pa $HOME/.rhosts ,
+and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
+disabled if security is desired.]
+.Pp
+As a third authentication method,
+.Nm
+supports RSA based authentication.
+The scheme is based on public-key cryptography: there are cryptosystems
+where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it
+is not possible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key.
+RSA is one such system.
+The idea is that each user creates a public/private
+key pair for authentication purposes.
+The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
+The file
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+lists the public keys that are permitted for logging
+in.
+When the user logs in, the
+.Nm
+program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for
+authentication.
+The server checks if this key is permitted, and if
+so, sends the user (actually the
+.Nm
+program running on behalf of the user) a challenge, a random number,
+encrypted by the user's public key.
+The challenge can only be
+decrypted using the proper private key.
+The user's client then decrypts the
+challenge using the private key, proving that he/she knows the private
+key but without disclosing it to the server.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+implements the RSA authentication protocol automatically.
+The user creates his/her RSA key pair by running
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+This stores the private key in
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+and the public key in
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub
+in the user's home directory.
+The user should then copy the
+.Pa identity.pub
+to
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+in his/her home directory on the remote machine (the
+.Pa authorized_keys
+file corresponds to the conventional
+.Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+file, and has one key
+per line, though the lines can be very long).
+After this, the user can log in without giving the password.
+RSA authentication is much
+more secure than rhosts authentication.
+.Pp
+The most convenient way to use RSA authentication may be with an
+authentication agent.
+See
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+for more information.
+.Pp
+If other authentication methods fail,
+.Nm
+prompts the user for a password.
+The password is sent to the remote
+host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted,
+the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network.
+.Pp
+.Ss SSH protocol version 2
+.Pp
+When a user connects using the protocol version 2
+different authentication methods are available.
+Using the default values for
+.Cm PreferredAuthentications ,
+the client will try to authenticate first using the hostbased method;
+if this method fails public key authentication is attempted,
+and finally if this method fails keyboard-interactive and
+password authentication are tried.
+.Pp
+The public key method is similar to RSA authentication described
+in the previous section and allows the RSA or DSA algorithm to be used:
+The client uses his private key,
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+or
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+to sign the session identifier and sends the result to the server.
+The server checks whether the matching public key is listed in
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+and grants access if both the key is found and the signature is correct.
+The session identifier is derived from a shared Diffie-Hellman value
+and is only known to the client and the server.
+.Pp
+If public key authentication fails or is not available a password
+can be sent encrypted to the remote host for proving the user's identity.
+.Pp
+Additionally,
+.Nm
+supports hostbased or challenge response authentication.
+.Pp
+Protocol 2 provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality
+(the traffic is encrypted using 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128 or Arcfour)
+and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1).
+Note that protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the
+integrity of the connection.
+.Pp
+.Ss Login session and remote execution
+.Pp
+When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
+either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives
+the user a normal shell on the remote machine.
+All communication with
+the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
+.Pp
+If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the
+user may use the escape characters noted below.
+.Pp
+If no pseudo tty has been allocated, the
+session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary
+data.
+On most systems, setting the escape character to
+.Dq none
+will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.
+.Pp
+The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote
+machine exits and all X11 and TCP/IP connections have been closed.
+The exit status of the remote program is returned as the exit status
+of
+.Nm ssh .
+.Pp
+.Ss Escape Characters
+.Pp
+When a pseudo terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of functions
+through the use of an escape character.
+.Pp
+A single tilde character can be sent as
+.Ic ~~
+or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below.
+The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as
+special.
+The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the
+.Cm EscapeChar
+configuration directive or on the command line by the
+.Fl e
+option.
+.Pp
+The supported escapes (assuming the default
+.Ql ~ )
+are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm ~.
+Disconnect
+.It Cm ~^Z
+Background ssh
+.It Cm ~#
+List forwarded connections
+.It Cm ~&
+Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions
+to terminate
+.It Cm ~?
+Display a list of escape characters
+.It Cm ~R
+Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol version 2
+and if the peer supports it)
+.El
+.Pp
+.Ss X11 and TCP forwarding
+.Pp
+If the
+.Cm ForwardX11
+variable is set to
+.Dq yes
+(or, see the description of the
+.Fl X
+and
+.Fl x
+options described later)
+and the user is using X11 (the
+.Ev DISPLAY
+environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
+automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
+programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
+encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
+from the local machine.
+The user should not manually set
+.Ev DISPLAY .
+Forwarding of X11 connections can be
+configured on the command line or in configuration files.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ev DISPLAY
+value set by
+.Nm
+will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater
+than zero.
+This is normal, and happens because
+.Nm
+creates a
+.Dq proxy
+X server on the server machine for forwarding the
+connections over the encrypted channel.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
+For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie,
+store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded
+connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when
+the connection is opened.
+The real authentication cookie is never
+sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
+.Pp
+If the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent
+is automatically forwarded to the remote side unless disabled on
+the command line or in a configuration file.
+.Pp
+Forwarding of arbitrary TCP/IP connections over the secure channel can
+be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.
+One possible application of TCP/IP forwarding is a secure connection to an
+electronic purse; another is going through firewalls.
+.Pp
+.Ss Server authentication
+.Pp
+.Nm
+automatically maintains and checks a database containing
+identifications for all hosts it has ever been used with.
+Host keys are stored in
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+in the user's home directory.
+Additionally, the file
+.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts
+is automatically checked for known hosts.
+Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.
+If a host's identification
+ever changes,
+.Nm
+warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent a
+trojan horse from getting the user's password.
+Another purpose of
+this mechanism is to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks which could
+otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.
+The
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+option (see below) can be used to prevent logins to machines whose
+host key is not known or has changed.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl a
+Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+.It Fl A
+Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
+.It Fl b Ar bind_address
+Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple
+interfaces or aliased addresses.
+.It Fl c Ar blowfish|3des|des
+Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the session.
+.Ar 3des
+is used by default.
+It is believed to be secure.
+.Ar 3des
+(triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three different keys.
+.Ar blowfish
+is a fast block cipher, it appears very secure and is much faster than
+.Ar 3des .
+.Ar des
+is only supported in the
+.Nm
+client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
+that do not support the
+.Ar 3des
+cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic
+weaknesses.
+.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec
+Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of ciphers can
+be specified in order of preference.
+See
+.Cm Ciphers
+for more information.
+.It Fl e Ar ch|^ch|none
+Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default:
+.Ql ~ ) .
+The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line.
+The escape character followed by a dot
+.Pq Ql \&.
+closes the connection, followed
+by control-Z suspends the connection, and followed by itself sends the
+escape character once.
+Setting the character to
+.Dq none
+disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent.
+.It Fl f
+Requests
+.Nm
+to go to background just before command execution.
+This is useful if
+.Nm
+is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user
+wants it in the background.
+This implies
+.Fl n .
+The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with
+something like
+.Ic ssh -f host xterm .
+.It Fl g
+Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for
+RSA or DSA authentication is read.
+Default is
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+in the user's home directory.
+Identity files may also be specified on
+a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+It is possible to have multiple
+.Fl i
+options (and multiple identities specified in
+configuration files).
+.It Fl I Ar smartcard_device
+Specifies which smartcard device to use. The argument is
+the device
+.Nm
+should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's
+private RSA key.
+.It Fl k
+Disables forwarding of Kerberos tickets and AFS tokens.
+This may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+.It Fl l Ar login_name
+Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.
+This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+.It Fl m Ar mac_spec
+Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of MAC
+(message authentication code) algorithms can
+be specified in order of preference.
+See the
+.Cm MACs
+keyword for more information.
+.It Fl n
+Redirects stdin from
+.Pa /dev/null
+(actually, prevents reading from stdin).
+This must be used when
+.Nm
+is run in the background.
+A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine.
+For example,
+.Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs &
+will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11
+connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.
+The
+.Nm
+program will be put in the background.
+(This does not work if
+.Nm
+needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
+.Fl f
+option.)
+.It Fl N
+Do not execute a remote command.
+This is useful for just forwarding ports
+(protocol version 2 only).
+.It Fl o Ar option
+Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
+This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
+command-line flag.
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Port to connect to on the remote host.
+This can be specified on a
+per-host basis in the configuration file.
+.It Fl P
+Use a non-privileged port for outgoing connections.
+This can be used if a firewall does
+not permit connections from privileged ports.
+Note that this option turns off
+.Cm RhostsAuthentication
+and
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+for older servers.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode.
+Causes all warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed.
+Only fatal errors are displayed.
+.It Fl s
+May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use
+of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg. sftp). The
+subsystem is specified as the remote command.
+.It Fl t
+Force pseudo-tty allocation.
+This can be used to execute arbitrary
+screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
+e.g., when implementing menu services.
+Multiple
+.Fl t
+options force tty allocation, even if
+.Nm
+has no local tty.
+.It Fl T
+Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful in
+debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increases the verbosity.
+Maximum is 3.
+.It Fl x
+Disables X11 forwarding.
+.It Fl X
+Enables X11 forwarding.
+This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
+.It Fl C
+Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
+data for forwarded X11 and TCP/IP connections).
+The compression algorithm is the same used by
+.Xr gzip 1 ,
+and the
+.Dq level
+can be controlled by the
+.Cm CompressionLevel
+option (see below).
+Compression is desirable on modem lines and other
+slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
+The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
+configuration files; see the
+.Cm Compression
+option below.
+.It Fl F Ar configfile
+Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.
+If a configuration file is given on the command line,
+the system-wide configuration file
+.Pq Pa /etc/ssh_config
+will be ignored.
+The default for the per-user configuration file is
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/config .
+.It Fl L Ar port:host:hostport
+Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be
+forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to
+.Ar port
+on the local side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
+made to
+.Ar host
+port
+.Ar hostport
+from the remote machine.
+Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+Only root can forward privileged ports.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+.Ar port/host/hostport
+.It Fl R Ar port:host:hostport
+Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to be
+forwarded to the given host and port on the local side.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to
+.Ar port
+on the remote side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
+made to
+.Ar host
+port
+.Ar hostport
+from the local machine.
+Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
+logging in as root on the remote machine.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+.Ar port/host/hostport
+.It Fl D Ar port
+Specifies a local
+.Dq dynamic
+application-level port forwarding.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to
+.Ar port
+on the local side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
+protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
+remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 protocol is supported, and
+.Nm
+will act as a SOCKS4 server.
+Only root can forward privileged ports.
+Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+.It Fl 1
+Forces
+.Nm
+to try protocol version 1 only.
+.It Fl 2
+Forces
+.Nm
+to try protocol version 2 only.
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.El
+.Sh CONFIGURATION FILES
+.Nm
+obtains configuration data from the following sources in
+the following order:
+command line options, user's configuration file
+.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config ,
+and system-wide configuration file
+.Pq Pa /etc/ssh_config .
+For each parameter, the first obtained value
+will be used.
+The configuration files contain sections bracketed by
+.Dq Host
+specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that
+match one of the patterns given in the specification.
+The matched host name is the one given on the command line.
+.Pp
+Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
+host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
+file, and general defaults at the end.
+.Pp
+The configuration file has the following format:
+.Pp
+Empty lines and lines starting with
+.Ql #
+are comments.
+.Pp
+Otherwise a line is of the format
+.Dq keyword arguments .
+Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or
+optional whitespace and exactly one
+.Ql = ;
+the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace
+when specifying configuration options using the
+.Nm ssh ,
+.Nm scp
+and
+.Nm sftp
+.Fl o
+option.
+.Pp
+The possible
+keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm Host
+Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
+.Cm Host
+keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
+given after the keyword.
+.Ql \&*
+and
+.Ql ?
+can be used as wildcards in the
+patterns.
+A single
+.Ql \&*
+as a pattern can be used to provide global
+defaults for all hosts.
+The host is the
+.Ar hostname
+argument given on the command line (i.e., the name is not converted to
+a canonicalized host name before matching).
+.It Cm AFSTokenPassing
+Specifies whether to pass AFS tokens to remote host.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm BatchMode
+If set to
+.Dq yes ,
+passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
+This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
+is present to supply the password.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm BindAddress
+Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple
+interfaces or aliased addresses.
+Note that this option does not work if
+.Cm UsePrivilegedPort
+is set to
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm CheckHostIP
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+ssh will additionally check the host IP address in the
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing.
+If the option is set to
+.Dq no ,
+the check will not be executed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm Cipher
+Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session
+in protocol version 1.
+Currently,
+.Dq blowfish ,
+.Dq 3des ,
+and
+.Dq des
+are supported.
+.Ar des
+is only supported in the
+.Nm
+client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
+that do not support the
+.Ar 3des
+cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic
+weaknesses.
+The default is
+.Dq 3des .
+.It Cm Ciphers
+Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2
+in order of preference.
+Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Pp
+.Bd -literal
+ ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,
+ aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc''
+.Ed
+.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
+Specifies that all local, remote and dynamic port forwardings
+specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
+cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the
+.Nm
+command line to clear port forwardings set in
+configuration files, and is automatically set by
+.Xr scp 1
+and
+.Xr sftp 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Compression
+Specifies whether to use compression.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm CompressionLevel
+Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled.
+The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best).
+The default level is 6, which is good for most applications.
+The meaning of the values is the same as in
+.Xr gzip 1 .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm ConnectionAttempts
+Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before falling
+back to rsh or exiting.
+The argument must be an integer.
+This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
+The default is 1.
+.It Cm DynamicForward
+Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the local machine be forwarded
+over the secure channel, and the application
+protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
+remote machine. The argument must be a port number.
+Currently the SOCKS4 protocol is supported, and
+.Nm
+will act as a SOCKS4 server.
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
+additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only
+the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+.It Cm EscapeChar
+Sets the escape character (default:
+.Ql ~ ) .
+The escape character can also
+be set on the command line.
+The argument should be a single character,
+.Ql ^
+followed by a letter, or
+.Dq none
+to disable the escape
+character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary
+data).
+.It Cm FallBackToRsh
+Specifies that if connecting via
+.Nm
+fails due to a connection refused error (there is no
+.Xr sshd 8
+listening on the remote host),
+.Xr rsh 1
+should automatically be used instead (after a suitable warning about
+the session being unencrypted).
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm ForwardAgent
+Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
+will be forwarded to the remote machine.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm ForwardX11
+Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected
+over the secure channel and
+.Ev DISPLAY
+set.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GatewayPorts
+Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
+forwarded ports.
+By default,
+.Nm
+binds local port forwardings to the loopback addresss. This
+prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+can be used to specify that
+.Nm
+should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address,
+thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile
+Specifies a file to use for the global
+host key database instead of
+.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts .
+.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
+authentication.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only and
+is similar to
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication .
+.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms
+that the client wants to use in order of preference.
+The default for this option is:
+.Dq ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+.It Cm HostKeyAlias
+Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+in the host key database files.
+This option is useful for tunneling ssh connections
+or for multiple servers running on a single host.
+.It Cm HostName
+Specifies the real host name to log into.
+This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
+Default is the name given on the command line.
+Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
+.Cm HostName
+specifications).
+.It Cm IdentityFile
+Specifies the file from which the user's RSA or DSA authentication identity
+is read (default
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+in the user's home directory).
+Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
+will be used for authentication.
+The file name may use the tilde
+syntax to refer to a user's home directory.
+It is possible to have
+multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these
+identities will be tried in sequence.
+.It Cm KeepAlive
+Specifies whether the system should send keepalive messages to the
+other side.
+If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+of the machines will be properly noticed.
+However, this means that
+connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+find it annoying.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq yes
+(to send keepalives), and the client will notice
+if the network goes down or the remote host dies.
+This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
+.Pp
+To disable keepalives, the value should be set to
+.Dq no
+in both the server and the client configuration files.
+.It Cm KerberosAuthentication
+Specifies whether Kerberos authentication will be used.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm KerberosTgtPassing
+Specifies whether a Kerberos TGT will be forwarded to the server.
+This will only work if the Kerberos server is actually an AFS kaserver.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm LocalForward
+Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the local machine be forwarded over
+the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine.
+The first argument must be a port number, and the second must be
+.Ar host:port .
+IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+.Ar host/port .
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
+forwardings can be given on the command line.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+.It Cm LogLevel
+Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+.Nm ssh .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE and DEBUG.
+The default is INFO.
+.It Cm MACs
+Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
+in order of preference.
+The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
+for data integrity protection.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Dq hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 .
+.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines.
+In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of
+the machines and the user will get many warnings about changed host keys.
+However, this option disables host authentication for localhost.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is to check the host key for localhost.
+.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
+The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
+Default is 3.
+.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
+Specifies whether to use password authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm Port
+Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
+Default is 22.
+.It Cm PreferredAuthentications
+Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2
+authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.
+.Cm keyboard-interactive )
+over another method (e.g.
+.Cm password )
+The default for this option is:
+.Dq hostbased,publickey,keyboard-interactive,password
+.It Cm Protocol
+Specifies the protocol versions
+.Nm
+should support in order of preference.
+The possible values are
+.Dq 1
+and
+.Dq 2 .
+Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Dq 2,1 .
+This means that
+.Nm
+tries version 2 and falls back to version 1
+if version 2 is not available.
+.It Cm ProxyCommand
+Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.
+The command
+string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
+.Pa /bin/sh .
+In the command string,
+.Ql %h
+will be substituted by the host name to
+connect and
+.Ql %p
+by the port.
+The command can be basically anything,
+and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output.
+It should eventually connect an
+.Xr sshd 8
+server running on some machine, or execute
+.Ic sshd -i
+somewhere.
+Host key management will be done using the
+HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by
+the user).
+Note that
+.Cm CheckHostIP
+is not available for connects with a proxy command.
+.Pp
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm RemoteForward
+Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
+the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine.
+The first argument must be a port number, and the second must be
+.Ar host:port .
+IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+.Ar host/port .
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
+forwardings can be given on the command line.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+.It Cm RhostsAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication.
+Note that this
+declaration only affects the client side and has no effect whatsoever
+on security.
+Disabling rhosts authentication may reduce
+authentication time on slow connections when rhosts authentication is
+not used.
+Most servers do not permit RhostsAuthentication because it
+is not secure (see
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ) .
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host
+authentication.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm RSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try RSA authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+RSA authentication will only be
+attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is
+running.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+Specifies whether to use challenge response authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm SmartcardDevice
+Specifies which smartcard device to use. The argument to this keyword is
+the device
+.Nm
+should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's
+private RSA key. By default, no device is specified and smartcard support
+is not activated.
+.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+.Nm
+will never automatically add host keys to the
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
+This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks,
+however, can be annoying when the
+.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts
+file is poorly maintained, or connections to new hosts are
+frequently made.
+This option forces the user to manually
+add all new hosts.
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq no ,
+.Nm
+will automatically add new host keys to the
+user known hosts files.
+If this flag is set to
+.Dq ask ,
+new host keys
+will be added to the user known host files only after the user
+has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
+.Nm
+will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
+The host keys of
+known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq no
+or
+.Dq ask .
+The default is
+.Dq ask .
+.It Cm UsePrivilegedPort
+Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option must be set to
+.Dq yes
+if
+.Cm RhostsAuthentication
+and
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+authentications are needed with older servers.
+.It Cm User
+Specifies the user to log in as.
+This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines.
+This saves the trouble of
+having to remember to give the user name on the command line.
+.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+Specifies a file to use for the user
+host key database instead of
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.It Cm UseRsh
+Specifies that rlogin/rsh should be used for this host.
+It is possible that the host does not at all support the
+.Nm
+protocol.
+This causes
+.Nm
+to immediately execute
+.Xr rsh 1 .
+All other options (except
+.Cm HostName )
+are ignored if this has been specified.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm XAuthLocation
+Specifies the location of the
+.Xr xauth 1
+program.
+The default is
+.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
+.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Nm
+will normally set the following environment variables:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ev DISPLAY
+The
+.Ev DISPLAY
+variable indicates the location of the X11 server.
+It is automatically set by
+.Nm
+to point to a value of the form
+.Dq hostname:n
+where hostname indicates
+the host where the shell runs, and n is an integer >= 1.
+.Nm
+uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure
+channel.
+The user should normally not set
+.Ev DISPLAY
+explicitly, as that
+will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to
+manually copy any required authorization cookies).
+.It Ev HOME
+Set to the path of the user's home directory.
+.It Ev LOGNAME
+Synonym for
+.Ev USER ;
+set for compatibility with systems that use this variable.
+.It Ev MAIL
+Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
+.It Ev PATH
+Set to the default
+.Ev PATH ,
+as specified when compiling
+.Nm ssh .
+.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+If
+.Nm
+needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
+terminal if it was run from a terminal.
+If
+.Nm
+does not have a terminal associated with it but
+.Ev DISPLAY
+and
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+are set, it will execute the program specified by
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
+This is particularly useful when calling
+.Nm
+from a
+.Pa .Xsession
+or related script.
+(Note that on some machines it
+may be necessary to redirect the input from
+.Pa /dev/null
+to make this work.)
+.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+Identifies the path of a unix-domain socket used to communicate with the
+agent.
+.It Ev SSH_CLIENT
+Identifies the client end of the connection.
+The variable contains
+three space-separated values: client ip-address, client port number,
+and server port number.
+.It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+The variable contains the original command line if a forced command
+is executed.
+It can be used to extract the original arguments.
+.It Ev SSH_TTY
+This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
+with the current shell or command.
+If the current session has no tty,
+this variable is not set.
+.It Ev TZ
+The timezone variable is set to indicate the present timezone if it
+was set when the daemon was started (i.e., the daemon passes the value
+on to new connections).
+.It Ev USER
+Set to the name of the user logging in.
+.El
+.Pp
+Additionally,
+.Nm
+reads
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment ,
+and adds lines of the format
+.Dq VARNAME=value
+to the environment.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+Records host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not
+in
+.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts .
+See
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the authentication identity of the user.
+They are for protocol 1 RSA, protocol 2 DSA, and protocol 2 RSA, respectively.
+These files
+contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
+accessible by others (read/write/execute).
+Note that
+.Nm
+ignores a private key file if it is accessible by others.
+It is possible to specify a passphrase when
+generating the key; the passphrase will be used to encrypt the
+sensitive part of this file using 3DES.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+Contains the public key for authentication (public part of the
+identity file in human-readable form).
+The contents of the
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub
+file should be added to
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using protocol version 1 RSA authentication.
+The contents of the
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+and
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+file should be added to
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using protocol version 2 DSA/RSA authentication.
+These files are not
+sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
+These files are
+never used automatically and are not necessary; they are only provided for
+the convenience of the user.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/config
+This is the per-user configuration file.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file is used by the
+.Nm
+client.
+This file does not usually contain any sensitive information,
+but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not
+accessible by others.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in as this user.
+The format of this file is described in the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page.
+In the simplest form the format is the same as the .pub
+identity files.
+This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
+permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts
+Systemwide list of known host keys.
+This file should be prepared by the
+system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
+organization.
+This file should be world-readable.
+This file contains
+public keys, one per line, in the following format (fields separated
+by spaces): system name, public key and optional comment field.
+When different names are used
+for the same machine, all such names should be listed, separated by
+commas.
+The format is described on the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page.
+.Pp
+The canonical system name (as returned by name servers) is used by
+.Xr sshd 8
+to verify the client host when logging in; other names are needed because
+.Nm
+does not convert the user-supplied name to a canonical name before
+checking the key, because someone with access to the name servers
+would then be able to fool host authentication.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh_config
+Systemwide configuration file.
+This file provides defaults for those
+values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and
+for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+This file must be world-readable.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These three files contain the private parts of the host keys
+and are used for
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+and
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+Since they are readable only by root
+.Nm
+must be setuid root if these authentication methods are desired.
+.It Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+This file is used in
+.Pa \&.rhosts
+authentication to list the
+host/user pairs that are permitted to log in.
+(Note that this file is
+also used by rlogin and rsh, which makes using this file insecure.)
+Each line of the file contains a host name (in the canonical form
+returned by name servers), and then a user name on that host,
+separated by a space.
+On some machines this file may need to be
+world-readable if the user's home directory is on a NFS partition,
+because
+.Xr sshd 8
+reads it as root.
+Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
+and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
+The recommended
+permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
+accessible by others.
+.Pp
+Note that by default
+.Xr sshd 8
+will be installed so that it requires successful RSA host
+authentication before permitting \s+2.\s0rhosts authentication.
+If the server machine does not have the client's host key in
+.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts ,
+it can be stored in
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+The easiest way to do this is to
+connect back to the client from the server machine using ssh; this
+will automatically add the host key to
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.It Pa $HOME/.shosts
+This file is used exactly the same way as
+.Pa \&.rhosts .
+The purpose for
+having this file is to be able to use rhosts authentication with
+.Nm
+without permitting login with
+.Xr rlogin 1
+or
+.Xr rsh 1 .
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+This file is used during
+.Pa \&.rhosts authentication.
+It contains
+canonical hosts names, one per line (the full format is described on
+the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page).
+If the client host is found in this file, login is
+automatically permitted provided client and server user names are the
+same.
+Additionally, successful RSA host authentication is normally
+required.
+This file should only be writable by root.
+.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+This file is processed exactly as
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv .
+This file may be useful to permit logins using
+.Nm
+but not using rsh/rlogin.
+.It Pa /etc/sshrc
+Commands in this file are executed by
+.Nm
+when the user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is started.
+See the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page for more information.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc
+Commands in this file are executed by
+.Nm
+when the user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is
+started.
+See the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page for more information.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment
+Contains additional definitions for environment variables, see section
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT
+above.
+.El
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr rlogin 1 ,
+.Xr rsh 1 ,
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr telnet 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A T. Kivinen
+.%A M. Saarinen
+.%A T. Rinne
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%T "SSH Protocol Architecture"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-09.txt
+.%D July 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
+ * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
+ * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * in Canada (German citizen).
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.149 2001/10/24 08:51:35 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "tildexpand.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "sshtty.h"
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "scard.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
+ Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
+#ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT
+int IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+#else
+int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
+#endif
+
+/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. This can be set on the command line. */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be allocated */
+int tty_flag = 0;
+int no_tty_flag = 0;
+int force_tty_flag = 0;
+
+/* don't exec a shell */
+int no_shell_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set
+ * on the command line.
+ */
+int stdin_null_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
+ * so that the pasphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
+ * background.
+ */
+int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * General data structure for command line options and options configurable
+ * in configuration files. See readconf.h.
+ */
+Options options;
+
+/* optional user configfile */
+char *config = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
+ * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * configuration file.
+ */
+char *host;
+
+/* socket address the host resolves to */
+struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
+
+/* Private host keys. */
+struct {
+ Key **keys;
+ int nkeys;
+} sensitive_data;
+
+/* Original real UID. */
+uid_t original_real_uid;
+
+/* command to be executed */
+Buffer command;
+
+/* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */
+int subsystem_flag = 0;
+
+/* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] host [command]\n", __progname);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -l user Log in using this user name.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -n Redirect input from " _PATH_DEVNULL ".\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -F config Config file (default: ~/%s).\n",
+ _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
+ fprintf(stderr, " -A Enable authentication agent forwarding.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -a Disable authentication agent forwarding (default).\n");
+#ifdef AFS
+ fprintf(stderr, " -k Disable Kerberos ticket and AFS token forwarding.\n");
+#endif /* AFS */
+ fprintf(stderr, " -X Enable X11 connection forwarding.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -x Disable X11 connection forwarding (default).\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -i file Identity for public key authentication "
+ "(default: ~/.ssh/identity)\n");
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+ fprintf(stderr, " -I reader Set smartcard reader.\n");
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr, " -t Tty; allocate a tty even if command is given.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -T Do not allocate a tty.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " Multiple -v increases verbosity.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -V Display version number only.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -P Don't allocate a privileged port.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet; don't display any warning messages.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -f Fork into background after authentication.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -e char Set escape character; ``none'' = disable (default: ~).\n");
+
+ fprintf(stderr, " -c cipher Select encryption algorithm\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -m macs Specify MAC algorithms for protocol version 2.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -p port Connect to this port. Server must be on the same port.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -L listen-port:host:port Forward local port to remote address\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -R listen-port:host:port Forward remote port to local address\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " These cause %s to listen for connections on a port, and\n", __progname);
+ fprintf(stderr, " forward them to the other side by connecting to host:port.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -D port Enable dynamic application-level port forwarding.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -C Enable compression.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -N Do not execute a shell or command.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -g Allow remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -1 Force protocol version 1.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -2 Force protocol version 2.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -o 'option' Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -s Invoke command (mandatory) as SSH2 subsystem.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -b addr Local IP address.\n");
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Connects to the given host using rsh (or prints an error message and exits
+ * if rsh is not available). This function never returns.
+ */
+static void
+rsh_connect(char *host, char *user, Buffer * command)
+{
+ char *args[10];
+ int i;
+
+ log("Using rsh. WARNING: Connection will not be encrypted.");
+ /* Build argument list for rsh. */
+ i = 0;
+ args[i++] = _PATH_RSH;
+ /* host may have to come after user on some systems */
+ args[i++] = host;
+ if (user) {
+ args[i++] = "-l";
+ args[i++] = user;
+ }
+ if (buffer_len(command) > 0) {
+ buffer_append(command, "\0", 1);
+ args[i++] = buffer_ptr(command);
+ }
+ args[i++] = NULL;
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ for (i = 0; args[i]; i++) {
+ if (i != 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, " ");
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", args[i]);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+ execv(_PATH_RSH, args);
+ perror(_PATH_RSH);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static int ssh_session(void);
+static int ssh_session2(void);
+static void load_public_identity_files(void);
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the ssh client.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ int i, opt, exit_status, cerr;
+ u_short fwd_port, fwd_host_port;
+ char sfwd_port[6], sfwd_host_port[6];
+ char *p, *cp, buf[256];
+ struct stat st;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int dummy;
+ uid_t original_effective_uid;
+ extern int optind, optreset;
+ extern char *optarg;
+
+ __progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+ init_rng();
+
+ /*
+ * Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping
+ * may clobber the real uid).
+ */
+ original_real_uid = getuid();
+ original_effective_uid = geteuid();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+ /* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */
+ if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid) {
+ struct rlimit rlim;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0)
+ fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Get user data. */
+ pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
+ if (!pw) {
+ log("You don't exist, go away!");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
+ pw = pwcopy(pw);
+
+ /*
+ * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of
+ * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are
+ * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop
+ * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection
+ * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times).
+ */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ /*
+ * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
+ * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but
+ * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we
+ * don't set the modes explicitly.
+ */
+ umask(022);
+
+ /* Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been set. */
+ initialize_options(&options);
+
+ /* Parse command-line arguments. */
+ host = NULL;
+
+again:
+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
+ "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvxACD:F:I:L:NPR:TVX")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case '1':
+ options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
+ break;
+ case '2':
+ options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
+ break;
+ case '4':
+ IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case '6':
+ IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ case 'n':
+ stdin_null_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
+ stdin_null_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'x':
+ options.forward_x11 = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'X':
+ options.forward_x11 = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ options.gateway_ports = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ options.use_privileged_port = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ break;
+ case 'A':
+ options.forward_agent = 1;
+ break;
+#ifdef AFS
+ case 'k':
+ options.kerberos_tgt_passing = 0;
+ options.afs_token_passing = 0;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case 'i':
+ if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
+ "does not exist.\n", optarg);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (options.num_identity_files >=
+ SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+ fatal("Too many identity files specified "
+ "(max %d)", SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+ options.identity_files[options.num_identity_files++] =
+ xstrdup(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'I':
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+ options.smartcard_device = xstrdup(optarg);
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr, "no support for smartcards.\n");
+#endif
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ if (tty_flag)
+ force_tty_flag = 1;
+ tty_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (0 == debug_flag) {
+ debug_flag = 1;
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
+ options.log_level++;
+ break;
+ } else
+ fatal("Too high debugging level.");
+ /* fallthrough */
+ case 'V':
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s, SSH protocols %d.%d/%d.%d, OpenSSL 0x%8.8lx\n",
+ SSH_VERSION,
+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, PROTOCOL_MINOR_1,
+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
+ SSLeay());
+ if (opt == 'V')
+ exit(0);
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
+ (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 &&
+ (u_char) optarg[1] < 128)
+ options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31;
+ else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
+ options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0];
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
+ options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
+ else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n",
+ optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'c':
+ if (ciphers_valid(optarg)) {
+ /* SSH2 only */
+ options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg);
+ options.cipher = SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL;
+ } else {
+ /* SSH1 only */
+ options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg);
+ if (options.cipher == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n",
+ optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES)
+ options.ciphers = "3des-cbc";
+ else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH)
+ options.ciphers = "blowfish-cbc";
+ else
+ options.ciphers = (char *)-1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ if (mac_valid(optarg))
+ options.macs = xstrdup(optarg);
+ else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n",
+ optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ options.port = a2port(optarg);
+ if (options.port == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ options.user = optarg;
+ break;
+
+ case 'L':
+ case 'R':
+ if (sscanf(optarg, "%5[0-9]:%255[^:]:%5[0-9]",
+ sfwd_port, buf, sfwd_host_port) != 3 &&
+ sscanf(optarg, "%5[0-9]/%255[^/]/%5[0-9]",
+ sfwd_port, buf, sfwd_host_port) != 3) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Bad forwarding specification '%s'\n",
+ optarg);
+ usage();
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ if ((fwd_port = a2port(sfwd_port)) == 0 ||
+ (fwd_host_port = a2port(sfwd_host_port)) == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Bad forwarding port(s) '%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (opt == 'L')
+ add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf,
+ fwd_host_port);
+ else if (opt == 'R')
+ add_remote_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf,
+ fwd_host_port);
+ break;
+
+ case 'D':
+ fwd_port = a2port(optarg);
+ if (fwd_port == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic port '%s'\n",
+ optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, "socks4", 0);
+ break;
+
+ case 'C':
+ options.compression = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'N':
+ no_shell_flag = 1;
+ no_tty_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ no_tty_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ dummy = 1;
+ if (process_config_line(&options, host ? host : "",
+ optarg, "command-line", 0, &dummy) != 0)
+ exit(1);
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ subsystem_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ options.bind_address = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'F':
+ config = optarg;
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+
+ ac -= optind;
+ av += optind;
+
+ if (ac > 0 && !host && **av != '-') {
+ if (strchr(*av, '@')) {
+ p = xstrdup(*av);
+ cp = strchr(p, '@');
+ if (cp == NULL || cp == p)
+ usage();
+ options.user = p;
+ *cp = '\0';
+ host = ++cp;
+ } else
+ host = *av;
+ ac--, av++;
+ if (ac > 0) {
+ optind = 0;
+ optreset = 1;
+ goto again;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that we got a host name. */
+ if (!host)
+ usage();
+
+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
+
+ /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
+ buffer_init(&command);
+
+ /*
+ * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There
+ * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum
+ * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command.
+ */
+ if (!ac) {
+ /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
+ tty_flag = 1;
+ if (subsystem_flag) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) {
+ if (i)
+ buffer_append(&command, " ", 1);
+ buffer_append(&command, av[i], strlen(av[i]));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 && !no_shell_flag)
+ fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command to execute.");
+
+ /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
+ if (buffer_len(&command) == 0)
+ tty_flag = 1;
+
+ /* Force no tty*/
+ if (no_tty_flag)
+ tty_flag = 0;
+ /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)) && !force_tty_flag) {
+ if (tty_flag)
+ log("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a terminal.");
+ tty_flag = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
+ * actually goes to stderr.
+ */
+ log_init(av[0], options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config
+ * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
+ */
+ if (config != NULL) {
+ if (!read_config_file(config, host, &options))
+ fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
+ "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir,
+ _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
+ (void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options);
+
+ /* Read systemwide configuration file after use config. */
+ (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, host, &options);
+ }
+
+ /* Fill configuration defaults. */
+ fill_default_options(&options);
+
+ /* reinit */
+ log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+ seed_rng();
+
+ if (options.user == NULL)
+ options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
+ if (options.hostname != NULL)
+ host = options.hostname;
+
+ /* Disable rhosts authentication if not running as root. */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /* Ignore uid if running under Windows */
+ if (!options.use_privileged_port) {
+#else
+ if (original_effective_uid != 0 || !options.use_privileged_port) {
+#endif
+ debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, "
+ "originating port will not be trusted.");
+ options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If using rsh has been selected, exec it now (without trying
+ * anything else). Note that we must release privileges first.
+ */
+ if (options.use_rsh) {
+ /*
+ * Restore our superuser privileges. This must be done
+ * before permanently setting the uid.
+ */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /* Switch to the original uid permanently. */
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+
+ /* Execute rsh. */
+ rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command);
+ fatal("rsh_connect returned");
+ }
+ /* Restore our superuser privileges. */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /* Open a connection to the remote host. */
+
+ cerr = ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port, IPv4or6,
+ options.connection_attempts,
+ original_effective_uid != 0 || !options.use_privileged_port,
+ pw, options.proxy_command);
+
+ /*
+ * If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key
+ * in case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts
+ * authentication. This must be done before releasing extra
+ * privileges, because the file is only readable by root.
+ */
+ sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
+ sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
+ if (!cerr && (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
+ options.hostbased_authentication)) {
+ sensitive_data.nkeys = 3;
+ sensitive_data.keys = xmalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys*sizeof(Key));
+ sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
+ _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have. We will no
+ * longer need them. Also, extra privileges could make it very hard
+ * to read identity files and other non-world-readable files from the
+ * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where
+ * root is mapped to nobody.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Note that some legacy systems need to postpone the following call
+ * to permanently_set_uid() until the private hostkey is destroyed
+ * with RSA_free(). Otherwise the calling user could ptrace() the
+ * process, read the private hostkey and impersonate the host.
+ * OpenBSD does not allow ptracing of setuid processes.
+ */
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+
+ /*
+ * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh
+ * directory if it doesn\'t already exist.
+ */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s%s%.100s", pw->pw_dir, strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
+ error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf);
+
+ /* Check if the connection failed, and try "rsh" if appropriate. */
+ if (cerr) {
+ if (!options.fallback_to_rsh)
+ exit(1);
+ if (options.port != 0)
+ log("Secure connection to %.100s on port %hu refused; "
+ "reverting to insecure method",
+ host, options.port);
+ else
+ log("Secure connection to %.100s refused; "
+ "reverting to insecure method.", host);
+
+ rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command);
+ fatal("rsh_connect returned");
+ }
+ /* load options.identity_files */
+ load_public_identity_files();
+
+ /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
+ /* XXX mem-leaks: */
+ options.system_hostfile =
+ tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile, original_real_uid);
+ options.user_hostfile =
+ tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile, original_real_uid);
+ options.system_hostfile2 =
+ tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile2, original_real_uid);
+ options.user_hostfile2 =
+ tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile2, original_real_uid);
+
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
+
+ /* Log into the remote system. This never returns if the login fails. */
+ ssh_login(sensitive_data.keys, sensitive_data.nkeys,
+ host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, pw);
+
+ /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */
+ if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) {
+ /* Destroys contents safely */
+ debug3("clear hostkey %d", i);
+ key_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ xfree(sensitive_data.keys);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+ if (options.identity_files[i]) {
+ xfree(options.identity_files[i]);
+ options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ if (options.identity_keys[i]) {
+ key_free(options.identity_keys[i]);
+ options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session();
+ packet_close();
+ return exit_status;
+}
+
+static void
+x11_get_proto(char *proto, int proto_len, char *data, int data_len)
+{
+ char line[512];
+ FILE *f;
+ int got_data = 0, i;
+
+ if (options.xauth_location) {
+ /* Try to get Xauthority information for the display. */
+ snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.100s list %.200s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ options.xauth_location, getenv("DISPLAY"));
+ f = popen(line, "r");
+ if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
+ sscanf(line, "%*s %s %s", proto, data) == 2)
+ got_data = 1;
+ if (f)
+ pclose(f);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+ * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
+ * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11
+ * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
+ * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
+ * for the local connection.
+ */
+ if (!got_data) {
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+
+ strlcpy(proto, "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", proto_len);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ snprintf(data + 2 * i, data_len - 2 * i, "%02x", rand & 0xff);
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_init_forwarding(void)
+{
+ int success = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ debug("Connections to local port %d forwarded to remote address %.200s:%d",
+ options.local_forwards[i].port,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host_port);
+ success += channel_request_local_forwarding(
+ options.local_forwards[i].port,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host_port,
+ options.gateway_ports);
+ }
+ if (i > 0 && success == 0)
+ error("Could not request local forwarding.");
+
+ /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ debug("Connections to remote port %d forwarded to local address %.200s:%d",
+ options.remote_forwards[i].port,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
+ channel_request_remote_forwarding(
+ options.remote_forwards[i].port,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+check_agent_present(void)
+{
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ /* Clear agent forwarding if we don\'t have an agent. */
+ int authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+ if (authfd < 0)
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ else
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_session(void)
+{
+ int type;
+ int plen;
+ int interactive = 0;
+ int have_tty = 0;
+ struct winsize ws;
+ char *cp;
+
+ /* Enable compression if requested. */
+ if (options.compression) {
+ debug("Requesting compression at level %d.", options.compression_level);
+
+ if (options.compression_level < 1 || options.compression_level > 9)
+ fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best).");
+
+ /* Send the request. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
+ packet_put_int(options.compression_level);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ packet_start_compression(options.compression_level);
+ else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ log("Warning: Remote host refused compression.");
+ else
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for compression response.");
+ }
+ /* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */
+ if (tty_flag) {
+ debug("Requesting pty.");
+
+ /* Start the packet. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
+
+ /* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the
+ length of the string. */
+ cp = getenv("TERM");
+ if (!cp)
+ cp = "";
+ packet_put_cstring(cp);
+
+ /* Store window size in the packet. */
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+
+ /* Store tty modes in the packet. */
+ tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL);
+
+ /* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Read response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ interactive = 1;
+ have_tty = 1;
+ } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ log("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to allocate a pseudo tty.");
+ else
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty request response.");
+ }
+ /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
+ if (options.forward_x11 && getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) {
+ char proto[512], data[512];
+ /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+ x11_get_proto(proto, sizeof proto, data, sizeof data);
+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, proto, data);
+
+ /* Read response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ interactive = 1;
+ } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ log("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding.");
+ } else {
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 forwarding");
+ }
+ }
+ /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
+ packet_set_interactive(interactive);
+
+ /* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */
+ check_agent_present();
+
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+ auth_request_forwarding();
+
+ /* Read response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 0, type);
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ log("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding.");
+ }
+
+ /* Initiate port forwardings. */
+ ssh_init_forwarding();
+
+ /* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
+ if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
+ fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /*
+ * If a command was specified on the command line, execute the
+ * command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell.
+ */
+ if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) {
+ int len = buffer_len(&command);
+ if (len > 900)
+ len = 900;
+ debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, buffer_ptr(&command));
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ } else {
+ debug("Requesting shell.");
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ }
+
+ /* Enter the interactive session. */
+ return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ?
+ options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, 0);
+}
+
+static void
+client_subsystem_reply(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id, len;
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ len = buffer_len(&command);
+ if (len > 900)
+ len = 900;
+ packet_done();
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)
+ fatal("Request for subsystem '%.*s' failed on channel %d",
+ len, buffer_ptr(&command), id);
+}
+
+/* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */
+static void
+ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
+{
+ int len;
+ int interactive = 0;
+ struct termios tio;
+
+ debug("ssh_session2_setup: id %d", id);
+
+ if (tty_flag) {
+ struct winsize ws;
+ char *cp;
+ cp = getenv("TERM");
+ if (!cp)
+ cp = "";
+ /* Store window size in the packet. */
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+
+ channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 0);
+ packet_put_cstring(cp);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+ tio = get_saved_tio();
+ tty_make_modes(/*ignored*/ 0, &tio);
+ packet_send();
+ interactive = 1;
+ /* XXX wait for reply */
+ }
+ if (options.forward_x11 &&
+ getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) {
+ char proto[512], data[512];
+ /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+ x11_get_proto(proto, sizeof proto, data, sizeof data);
+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, proto, data);
+ interactive = 1;
+ /* XXX wait for reply */
+ }
+
+ check_agent_present();
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+ channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+
+ len = buffer_len(&command);
+ if (len > 0) {
+ if (len > 900)
+ len = 900;
+ if (subsystem_flag) {
+ debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, buffer_ptr(&command));
+ channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", /*want reply*/ 1);
+ /* register callback for reply */
+ /* XXX we asume that client_loop has already been called */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &client_subsystem_reply);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &client_subsystem_reply);
+ } else {
+ debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, buffer_ptr(&command));
+ channel_request_start(id, "exec", 0);
+ }
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ channel_request(id, "shell", 0);
+ }
+ /* channel_callback(id, SSH2_MSG_OPEN_CONFIGMATION, client_init, 0); */
+
+ /* register different callback, etc. XXX */
+ packet_set_interactive(interactive);
+}
+
+/* open new channel for a session */
+static int
+ssh_session2_open(void)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int window, packetmax, in, out, err;
+
+ if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
+ } else {
+ in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ }
+ out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+ err = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
+
+ if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0)
+ fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
+
+ /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
+ if (!isatty(in))
+ set_nonblock(in);
+ if (!isatty(out))
+ set_nonblock(out);
+ if (!isatty(err))
+ set_nonblock(err);
+
+ window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+ packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+ if (!tty_flag) {
+ window *= 2;
+ packetmax *=2;
+ }
+ c = channel_new(
+ "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
+ window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
+ xstrdup("client-session"), /*nonblock*/0);
+ if (c == NULL)
+ fatal("ssh_session2_open: channel_new failed");
+
+ debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self);
+
+ channel_send_open(c->self);
+ if (!no_shell_flag)
+ channel_register_callback(c->self,
+ SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ ssh_session2_setup, (void *)0);
+
+ return c->self;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_session2(void)
+{
+ int id = -1;
+
+ /* XXX should be pre-session */
+ ssh_init_forwarding();
+
+ if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN))
+ id = ssh_session2_open();
+
+ /* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
+ if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
+ fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+ return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ?
+ options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
+}
+
+static void
+load_public_identity_files(void)
+{
+ char *filename;
+ Key *public;
+ int i = 0;
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+ if (options.smartcard_device != NULL &&
+ options.num_identity_files + 1 < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
+ (public = sc_get_key(options.smartcard_device)) != NULL ) {
+ Key *new;
+
+ if (options.num_identity_files + 2 > SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+ options.num_identity_files = SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 2;
+ memmove(&options.identity_files[2], &options.identity_files[0],
+ sizeof(char *) * options.num_identity_files);
+ options.num_identity_files += 2;
+ i = 2;
+
+ /* XXX ssh1 vs ssh2 */
+ new = key_new(KEY_RSA);
+ new->flags = KEY_FLAG_EXT;
+ BN_copy(new->rsa->n, public->rsa->n);
+ BN_copy(new->rsa->e, public->rsa->e);
+ RSA_set_method(new->rsa, sc_get_engine());
+ options.identity_keys[0] = new;
+ options.identity_files[0] = xstrdup("smartcard rsa key");;
+
+ new = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ new->flags = KEY_FLAG_EXT;
+ BN_copy(new->rsa->n, public->rsa->n);
+ BN_copy(new->rsa->e, public->rsa->e);
+ RSA_set_method(new->rsa, sc_get_engine());
+ options.identity_keys[1] = new;
+ options.identity_files[1] = xstrdup("smartcard rsa1 key");
+
+ key_free(public);
+ }
+#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+ for (; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+ filename = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i],
+ original_real_uid);
+ public = key_load_public(filename, NULL);
+ debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
+ public ? public->type : -1);
+ xfree(options.identity_files[i]);
+ options.identity_files[i] = filename;
+ options.identity_keys[i] = public;
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.63 2001/05/24 18:57:53 stevesk Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef SSH_H
+#define SSH_H
+
+#include <netinet/in.h> /* For struct sockaddr_in */
+#include <pwd.h> /* For struct pw */
+#include <stdarg.h> /* For va_list */
+#include <syslog.h> /* For LOG_AUTH and friends */
+#include <sys/socket.h> /* For struct sockaddr_storage */
+#include "openbsd-compat/fake-socket.h" /* For struct sockaddr_storage */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */
+#define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER SSH_CIPHER_3DES
+
+/* Default port number. */
+#define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22
+
+/* Maximum number of TCP/IP ports forwarded per direction. */
+#define SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION 100
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified
+ * in configuration files or on the command line.
+ */
+#define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100
+
+/*
+ * Major protocol version. Different version indicates major incompatiblity
+ * that prevents communication.
+ *
+ * Minor protocol version. Different version indicates minor incompatibility
+ * that does not prevent interoperation.
+ */
+#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 1
+#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 5
+
+/* We support both SSH1 and SSH2 */
+#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 2
+#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 0
+
+/*
+ * Name for the service. The port named by this service overrides the
+ * default port if present.
+ */
+#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh"
+
+#if defined(USE_PAM) && !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the
+ * authentication socket.
+ */
+#define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME "SSH_AGENT_PID"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the
+ * authentication socket.
+ */
+#define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK"
+
+/*
+ * Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass
+ */
+#define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS"
+
+/*
+ * Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this
+ * many bits. This is to make double encryption with rsaref work.
+ */
+#define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED 128
+
+/*
+ * Length of the session key in bytes. (Specified as 256 bits in the
+ * protocol.)
+ */
+#define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH 32
+
+/* Name of Kerberos service for SSH to use. */
+#define KRB4_SERVICE_NAME "rcmd"
+
+/* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */
+#define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE -2
+
+#endif /* SSH_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh1.h,v 1.3 2001/05/30 12:55:13 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Definition of message types. New values can be added, but old values
+ * should not be removed or without careful consideration of the consequences
+ * for compatibility. The maximum value is 254; value 255 is reserved for
+ * future extension.
+ */
+/* Message name */ /* msg code */ /* arguments */
+#define SSH_MSG_NONE 0 /* no message */
+#define SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 /* cause (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY 2 /* ck,msk,srvk,hostk */
+#define SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY 3 /* key (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_USER 4 /* user (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS 5 /* user (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA 6 /* modulus (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE 7 /* int (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE 8 /* int (BIGNUM) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD 9 /* pass (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY 10 /* TERM, tty modes */
+#define SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE 11 /* row,col,xpix,ypix */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL 12 /* */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD 13 /* cmd (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS 14 /* */
+#define SSH_SMSG_FAILURE 15 /* */
+#define SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA 16 /* data (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA 17 /* data (string) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA 18 /* data (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EOF 19 /* */
+#define SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS 20 /* status (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 21 /* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 22 /* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 23 /* ch,data (int,str) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 24 /* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION 25 /* channel (int) */
+/* SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 26 OBSOLETE */
+#define SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN 27 /* channel (int) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST 28 /* p,host,hp (i,s,i) */
+#define SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN 29 /* ch,h,p (i,s,i) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING 30 /* */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN 31 /* port (int) */
+#define SSH_MSG_IGNORE 32 /* string */
+#define SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION 33 /* */
+#define SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING 34 /* proto,data (s,s) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 35 /* user,mod (s,mpi) */
+#define SSH_MSG_DEBUG 36 /* string */
+#define SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION 37 /* level 1-9 (int) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE 38 /* size 4k-1024k (int) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS 39 /* we use this for s/key */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE 40 /* challenge (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE 41 /* response (string) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS 42 /* (KTEXT) */
+#define SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE 43 /* (KTEXT) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT 44 /* credentials (s) */
+#define SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN 65 /* token (s) */
+
+/* protocol version 1.5 overloads some version 1.3 message types */
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_INPUT_EOF SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
+#define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_CLOSE SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION
+
+/*
+ * Authentication methods. New types can be added, but old types should not
+ * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31.
+ */
+#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS 1
+#define SSH_AUTH_RSA 2
+#define SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD 3
+#define SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA 4
+#define SSH_AUTH_TIS 5
+#define SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS 6
+#define SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT 7
+ /* 8 to 15 are reserved */
+#define SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN 21
+
+/* Protocol flags. These are bit masks. */
+#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER 1 /* X11 forwarding includes screen */
+#define SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN 2 /* forwarding opens contain host */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt
+ *
+ * Transport layer protocol:
+ *
+ * 1-19 Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug,
+ * etc)
+ * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation
+ * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
+ * different authentication methods)
+ *
+ * User authentication protocol:
+ *
+ * 50-59 User authentication generic
+ * 60-79 User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused
+ * for different authentication methods)
+ *
+ * Connection protocol:
+ *
+ * 80-89 Connection protocol generic
+ * 90-127 Channel related messages
+ *
+ * Reserved for client protocols:
+ *
+ * 128-191 Reserved
+ *
+ * Local extensions:
+ *
+ * 192-255 Local extensions
+ */
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.6 2001/03/27 17:46:49 provos Exp $"); */
+
+/* transport layer: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1
+#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2
+#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3
+#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4
+#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5
+#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6
+
+/* transport layer: alg negotiation */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20
+#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21
+
+/* transport layer: kex specific messages, can be reused */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31
+
+/* dh-group-exchange */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD 30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 34
+
+/* user authentication: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53
+
+/* user authentication: method specific, can be reused */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61
+
+/* connection protocol: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80
+#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81
+#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82
+
+/* channel related messages */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100
+
+/* disconnect reason code */
+
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_RESERVED 4
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15
+
+/* misc */
+
+#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1
+#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2
+#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3
+#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4
+
+#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1
--- /dev/null
+# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.10 2001/04/03 21:19:38 todd Exp $
+
+# This is ssh client systemwide configuration file. See ssh(1) for more
+# information. This file provides defaults for users, and the values can
+# be changed in per-user configuration files or on the command line.
+
+# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
+# 1. command line options
+# 2. user-specific file
+# 3. system-wide file
+# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
+# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
+
+# Site-wide defaults for various options
+
+# Host *
+# ForwardAgent no
+# ForwardX11 no
+# RhostsAuthentication no
+# RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
+# RSAAuthentication yes
+# PasswordAuthentication yes
+# FallBackToRsh no
+# UseRsh no
+# BatchMode no
+# CheckHostIP yes
+# StrictHostKeyChecking yes
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+# Port 22
+# Protocol 2,1
+# Cipher blowfish
+# EscapeChar ~
--- /dev/null
+# entropy gathering commands
+
+# Format is: "program-name args" path rate
+
+# The "rate" represents the number of bits of usuable entropy per
+# byte of command output. Be conservative.
+#
+# $Id$
+
+"ls -alni /var/log" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /var/adm" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /usr/adm" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /var/mail" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /usr/mail" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /var/adm/syslog" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /usr/adm/syslog" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /var/spool/mail" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /proc" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /var/tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alni /usr/tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alTi /var/log" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alTi /var/adm" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alTi /var/mail" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alTi /var/adm/syslog" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alTi /var/spool/mail" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alTi /proc" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alTi /tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alTi /var/tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+"ls -alTi /usr/tmp" @PROG_LS@ 0.02
+
+"netstat -an" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.05
+"netstat -in" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.05
+"netstat -rn" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.02
+"netstat -pn" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.02
+"netstat -ia" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.05
+"netstat -s" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.02
+"netstat -is" @PROG_NETSTAT@ 0.07
+
+"arp -a -n" @PROG_ARP@ 0.02
+
+"ifconfig -a" @PROG_IFCONFIG@ 0.02
+
+"ps laxww" @PROG_PS@ 0.03
+"ps -al" @PROG_PS@ 0.03
+"ps -efl" @PROG_PS@ 0.03
+"jstat" @PROG_JSTAT@ 0.07
+
+"w" @PROG_W@ 0.05
+
+"who -i" @PROG_WHO@ 0.01
+
+"last" @PROG_LAST@ 0.01
+
+"lastlog" @PROG_LASTLOG@ 0.01
+
+"df" @PROG_DF@ 0.01
+"df -i" @PROG_DF@ 0.01
+
+"sar -d" @PROG_SAR@ 0.04
+
+"vmstat" @PROG_VMSTAT@ 0.01
+"uptime" @PROG_UPTIME@ 0.01
+
+"ipcs -a" @PROG_IPCS@ 0.01
+
+"tail -200 /var/log/messages" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01
+"tail -200 /var/log/syslog" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01
+"tail -200 /var/adm/messages" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01
+"tail -200 /var/adm/syslog" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01
+"tail -200 /var/adm/syslog/syslog.log" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01
+"tail -200 /var/log/maillog" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01
+"tail -200 /var/adm/maillog" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01
+"tail -200 /var/adm/syslog/mail.log" @PROG_TAIL@ 0.01
+
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
+ * login (authentication) dialog.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.115 2001/10/08 19:05:05 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+char *client_version_string = NULL;
+char *server_version_string = NULL;
+
+extern Options options;
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */
+#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
+#endif
+
+static const char *
+sockaddr_ntop(struct sockaddr *sa)
+{
+ void *addr;
+ static char addrbuf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+
+ switch (sa->sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ addr = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ addr = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* This case should be protected against elsewhere */
+ abort();
+ }
+ inet_ntop(sa->sa_family, addr, addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf));
+ return addrbuf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, struct passwd *pw,
+ const char *proxy_command)
+{
+ Buffer command;
+ const char *cp;
+ char *command_string;
+ int pin[2], pout[2];
+ pid_t pid;
+ char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+ /* Convert the port number into a string. */
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port);
+
+ /* Build the final command string in the buffer by making the
+ appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command. */
+ buffer_init(&command);
+ for (cp = proxy_command; *cp; cp++) {
+ if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
+ buffer_append(&command, "%", 1);
+ cp++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
+ buffer_append(&command, host, strlen(host));
+ cp++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'p') {
+ buffer_append(&command, strport, strlen(strport));
+ cp++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ buffer_append(&command, cp, 1);
+ }
+ buffer_append(&command, "\0", 1);
+
+ /* Get the final command string. */
+ command_string = buffer_ptr(&command);
+
+ /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
+ if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0)
+ fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string);
+
+ /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
+ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+ char *argv[10];
+
+ /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+
+ /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
+ close(pin[1]);
+ if (pin[0] != 0) {
+ if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stdin");
+ close(pin[0]);
+ }
+ close(pout[0]);
+ if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
+ perror("dup2 stdout");
+ /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */
+ close(pout[1]);
+
+ /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
+ printed on the user's terminal. */
+ argv[0] = _PATH_BSHELL;
+ argv[1] = "-c";
+ argv[2] = command_string;
+ argv[3] = NULL;
+
+ /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
+ extra privileges above. */
+ execv(argv[0], argv);
+ perror(argv[0]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Parent. */
+ if (pid < 0)
+ fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Close child side of the descriptors. */
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+
+ /* Free the command name. */
+ buffer_free(&command);
+
+ /* Set the connection file descriptors. */
+ packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]);
+
+ /* Indicate OK return */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_create_socket(struct passwd *pw, int privileged, int family)
+{
+ int sock, gaierr;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged
+ * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port.
+ */
+ if (privileged) {
+ int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1;
+ sock = rresvport_af(&p, family);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", family, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ debug("Allocated local port %d.", p);
+ return sock;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Just create an ordinary socket on arbitrary port. We use
+ * the user's uid to create the socket.
+ */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ sock = socket(family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
+ if (options.bind_address == NULL)
+ return sock;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+ gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, "0", &hints, &res);
+ if (gaierr) {
+ error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
+ gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ close(sock);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ error("bind: %s: %s", options.bind_address, strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ return sock;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
+ * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
+ * If port is 0, the default port will be used. If anonymous is zero,
+ * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection.
+ * This requires super-user privileges if anonymous is false.
+ * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
+ * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
+ * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
+ * the daemon.
+ * Return values:
+ * 0 for OK
+ * ECONNREFUSED if we got a "Connection Refused" by the peer on any address
+ * ECONNABORTED if we failed without a "Connection refused"
+ * Suitable error messages for the connection failure will already have been
+ * printed.
+ */
+int
+ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
+ u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts,
+ int anonymous, struct passwd *pw, const char *proxy_command)
+{
+ int gaierr;
+ int on = 1;
+ int sock = -1, attempt;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ struct linger linger;
+ struct servent *sp;
+ /*
+ * Did we get only other errors than "Connection refused" (which
+ * should block fallback to rsh and similar), or did we get at least
+ * one "Connection refused"?
+ */
+ int full_failure = 1;
+
+ debug("ssh_connect: getuid %u geteuid %u anon %d",
+ (u_int) getuid(), (u_int) geteuid(), anonymous);
+
+ /* Get default port if port has not been set. */
+ if (port == 0) {
+ sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
+ if (sp)
+ port = ntohs(sp->s_port);
+ else
+ port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+ }
+ /* If a proxy command is given, connect using it. */
+ if (proxy_command != NULL)
+ return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, pw, proxy_command);
+
+ /* No proxy command. */
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: %.100s: %s", __progname, host,
+ gai_strerror(gaierr));
+
+ /*
+ * Try to connect several times. On some machines, the first time
+ * will sometimes fail. In general socket code appears to behave
+ * quite magically on many machines.
+ */
+ for (attempt = 0; ;) {
+ if (attempt > 0)
+ debug("Trying again...");
+
+ /* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
+ sequence until the connection succeeds. */
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+ error("ssh_connect: getnameinfo failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+ debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.",
+ host, ntop, strport);
+
+ /* Create a socket for connecting. */
+ sock = ssh_create_socket(pw,
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ !anonymous,
+#else
+ !anonymous && geteuid() == 0,
+#endif
+ ai->ai_family);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ /* Any error is already output */
+ continue;
+
+ /* Connect to the host. We use the user's uid in the
+ * hope that it will help with tcp_wrappers showing
+ * the remote uid as root.
+ */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) >= 0) {
+ /* Successful connection. */
+ memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+ restore_uid();
+ break;
+ } else {
+ if (errno == ECONNREFUSED)
+ full_failure = 0;
+ log("ssh: connect to address %s port %s: %s",
+ sockaddr_ntop(ai->ai_addr), strport,
+ strerror(errno));
+ restore_uid();
+ /*
+ * Close the failed socket; there appear to
+ * be some problems when reusing a socket for
+ * which connect() has already returned an
+ * error.
+ */
+ shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(sock);
+ }
+ }
+ if (ai)
+ break; /* Successful connection. */
+
+ attempt++;
+ if (attempt >= connection_attempts)
+ break;
+ /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
+ sleep(1);
+ }
+
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+
+ /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
+ if (attempt >= connection_attempts)
+ return full_failure ? ECONNABORTED : ECONNREFUSED;
+
+ debug("Connection established.");
+
+ /*
+ * Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear as soon
+ * as it has been closed for whatever reason.
+ */
+ /* setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */
+ linger.l_onoff = 1;
+ linger.l_linger = 5;
+ setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *)&linger, sizeof(linger));
+
+ /* Set keepalives if requested. */
+ if (options.keepalives &&
+ setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
+ sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Set the connection. */
+ packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own
+ * identification string.
+ */
+static void
+ssh_exchange_identification(void)
+{
+ char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */
+ int remote_major, remote_minor, i, mismatch;
+ int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
+ int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+ int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+
+ /* Read other side\'s version identification. */
+ for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+ int len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
+ if (len < 0)
+ fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (len != 1)
+ fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host");
+ if (buf[i] == '\r') {
+ buf[i] = '\n';
+ buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ continue; /**XXX wait for \n */
+ }
+ if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+ buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+ if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+ break;
+ debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf);
+ }
+ server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
+ * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+ */
+ if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+ &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3)
+ fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf);
+ debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
+ remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+
+ compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+ mismatch = 0;
+
+ switch(remote_major) {
+ case 1:
+ if (remote_minor == 99 &&
+ (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) &&
+ !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) {
+ enable_compat20();
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (remote_minor < 3) {
+ fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version.");
+ } else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) {
+ /* We speak 1.3, too. */
+ enable_compat13();
+ minor1 = 3;
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ log("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3");
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ enable_compat20();
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (mismatch)
+ fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
+ (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
+ remote_major);
+ /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
+ compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
+ compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1,
+ SSH_VERSION);
+ if (atomicio(write, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
+ fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+ chop(client_version_string);
+ chop(server_version_string);
+ debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string);
+}
+
+/* defaults to 'no' */
+static int
+confirm(const char *prompt)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ FILE *f;
+ int retval = -1;
+
+ if (options.batch_mode)
+ return 0;
+ if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
+ f = stdin;
+ else
+ f = fopen(_PATH_TTY, "rw");
+ if (f == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ fflush(stdout);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", prompt);
+ while (1) {
+ if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ strlcpy(buf, "no", sizeof buf);
+ }
+ /* Remove newline from response. */
+ if (strchr(buf, '\n'))
+ *strchr(buf, '\n') = 0;
+ if (strcmp(buf, "yes") == 0)
+ retval = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(buf, "no") == 0)
+ retval = 0;
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Please type 'yes' or 'no': ");
+
+ if (retval != -1) {
+ if (f != stdin)
+ fclose(f);
+ return retval;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
+ * is not valid. the user_hostfile will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
+ */
+
+static int
+check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
+ int readonly, const char *user_hostfile, const char *system_hostfile)
+{
+ Key *file_key;
+ char *type = key_type(host_key);
+ char *ip = NULL;
+ char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp;
+ HostStatus host_status;
+ HostStatus ip_status;
+ int local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0;
+ int salen;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+ int host_line, ip_line;
+ const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
+ * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
+ * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of
+ * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This
+ * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
+ * this is probably not a real problem.
+ */
+ /** hostaddr == 0! */
+ switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ local = (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
+ sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
+ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ local = IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
+ &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
+ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+ break;
+ default:
+ local = 0;
+ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
+ options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
+ debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
+ "loopback/localhost.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
+ * using a proxy command
+ */
+ if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+ if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, salen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+ NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
+ fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed");
+ ip = xstrdup(ntop);
+ } else {
+ ip = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy command>");
+ }
+ /*
+ * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
+ * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
+ */
+ if (options.check_host_ip &&
+ (local || strcmp(host, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
+ options.check_host_ip = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Allow the user to record the key under a different name. This is
+ * useful for ssh tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run
+ * multiple sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
+ */
+ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
+ host = options.host_key_alias;
+ debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", host);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Store the host key from the known host file in here so that we can
+ * compare it with the key for the IP address.
+ */
+ file_key = key_new(host_key->type);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the host key is present in the user\'s list of known
+ * hosts or in the systemwide list.
+ */
+ host_file = user_hostfile;
+ host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key,
+ file_key, &host_line);
+ if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
+ host_file = system_hostfile;
+ host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key,
+ file_key, &host_line);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
+ * localhost or the hostname was an ip address to begin with
+ */
+ if (options.check_host_ip) {
+ Key *ip_key = key_new(host_key->type);
+
+ ip_file = user_hostfile;
+ ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip, host_key,
+ ip_key, &ip_line);
+ if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+ ip_file = system_hostfile;
+ ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip,
+ host_key, ip_key, &ip_line);
+ }
+ if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
+ (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || !key_equal(ip_key, file_key)))
+ host_ip_differ = 1;
+
+ key_free(ip_key);
+ } else
+ ip_status = host_status;
+
+ key_free(file_key);
+
+ switch (host_status) {
+ case HOST_OK:
+ /* The host is known and the key matches. */
+ debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host key.",
+ host, type);
+ debug("Found key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line);
+ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+ if (readonly)
+ log("%s host key for IP address "
+ "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
+ type, ip);
+ else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, ip,
+ host_key))
+ log("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
+ "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
+ "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip, user_hostfile);
+ else
+ log("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
+ "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
+ "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+ }
+ break;
+ case HOST_NEW:
+ if (readonly)
+ goto fail;
+ /* The host is new. */
+ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
+ /*
+ * User has requested strict host key checking. We
+ * will not add the host key automatically. The only
+ * alternative left is to abort.
+ */
+ error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you "
+ "have requested strict checking.", type, host);
+ goto fail;
+ } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
+ /* The default */
+ char prompt[1024];
+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+ "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
+ "established.\n"
+ "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n"
+ "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+ "(yes/no)? ", host, ip, type, fp);
+ xfree(fp);
+ if (!confirm(prompt)) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+ snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
+ hostp = hostline;
+ } else
+ hostp = host;
+
+ /*
+ * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the
+ * local known_hosts file.
+ */
+ if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, hostp, host_key))
+ log("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
+ "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfile);
+ else
+ log("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
+ "list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
+ break;
+ case HOST_CHANGED:
+ if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
+ char *msg;
+ if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
+ msg = "is unknown";
+ else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
+ msg = "is unchanged";
+ else
+ msg = "has a different value";
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
+ error("and the key for the according IP address %s", ip);
+ error("%s. This could either mean that", msg);
+ error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
+ error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
+ if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
+ error("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line);
+ }
+ /* The host key has changed. */
+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
+ error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
+ error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type);
+ error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+ type, fp);
+ error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+ error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
+ user_hostfile);
+ error("Offending key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line);
+ xfree(fp);
+
+ /*
+ * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+ * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+ */
+ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
+ error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
+ "requested strict checking.", type, host);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
+ * the connection but without password authentication or
+ * agent forwarding.
+ */
+ if (options.password_authentication) {
+ error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.password_authentication = 0;
+ }
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ }
+ if (options.forward_x11) {
+ error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.forward_x11 = 0;
+ }
+ if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
+ options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+ error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.num_local_forwards =
+ options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
+ * This could be done by converting the host key to an
+ * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself
+ * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she whishes to
+ * accept the authentication.
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
+ ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) {
+ log("Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
+ "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'",
+ type, host, ip);
+ if (host_status == HOST_OK)
+ log("Matching host key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line);
+ log("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line);
+ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
+ error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
+ goto fail;
+ } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
+ if (!confirm("Are you sure you want "
+ "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ")) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ xfree(ip);
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ xfree(ip);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
+verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* return ok if the key can be found in an old keyfile */
+ if (stat(options.system_hostfile2, &st) == 0 ||
+ stat(options.user_hostfile2, &st) == 0) {
+ if (check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key, /*readonly*/ 1,
+ options.user_hostfile2, options.system_hostfile2) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key, /*readonly*/ 0,
+ options.user_hostfile, options.system_hostfile);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the
+ * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection
+ * to the server must already have been established before this is called.
+ * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns.
+ * This function does not require super-user privileges.
+ */
+void
+ssh_login(Key **keys, int nkeys, const char *orighost,
+ struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char *host, *cp;
+ char *server_user, *local_user;
+
+ local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
+
+ /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
+ host = xstrdup(orighost);
+ for (cp = host; *cp; cp++)
+ if (isupper(*cp))
+ *cp = tolower(*cp);
+
+ /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
+ ssh_exchange_identification();
+
+ /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
+ packet_set_nonblocking();
+
+ /* key exchange */
+ /* authenticate user */
+ if (compat20) {
+ ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr);
+ ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, keys, nkeys);
+ } else {
+ ssh_kex(host, hostaddr);
+ ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, keys, nkeys);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssh_put_password(char *password)
+{
+ int size;
+ char *padded;
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) {
+ packet_put_cstring(password);
+ return;
+ }
+ size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32);
+ padded = xmalloc(size);
+ memset(padded, 0, size);
+ strlcpy(padded, password, size);
+ packet_put_string(padded, size);
+ memset(padded, 0, size);
+ xfree(padded);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.13 2001/10/08 19:05:05 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SSHCONNECT_H
+#define SSHCONNECT_H
+
+int
+ssh_connect(const char *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int,
+ int, struct passwd *, const char *);
+
+void
+ssh_login(Key **, int, const char *, struct sockaddr *, struct passwd *);
+
+int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *);
+
+void ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *);
+void ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *);
+
+void ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Key **, int);
+void ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Key **, int);
+
+void ssh_put_password(char *);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
+ * login (authentication) dialog.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.41 2001/10/06 11:18:19 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#ifdef KRB4
+#include <krb.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <krb5.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+#include <kafs.h>
+#include "radix.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "mpaux.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "readpass.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+/* Session id for the current session. */
+u_char session_id[16];
+u_int supported_authentications = 0;
+
+extern Options options;
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to
+ * authenticate using the agent.
+ */
+static int
+try_agent_authentication(void)
+{
+ int type;
+ char *comment;
+ AuthenticationConnection *auth;
+ u_char response[16];
+ u_int i;
+ int plen, clen;
+ Key *key;
+ BIGNUM *challenge;
+
+ /* Get connection to the agent. */
+ auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+ if (!auth)
+ return 0;
+
+ challenge = BN_new();
+
+ /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */
+ for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, &comment, 1);
+ key != NULL;
+ key = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, &comment, 1)) {
+
+ /* Try this identity. */
+ debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment);
+ xfree(comment);
+
+ /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
+ packet_put_bignum(key->rsa->n);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for server's response. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+
+ /* The server sends failure if it doesn\'t like our key or
+ does not support RSA authentication. */
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ debug("Server refused our key.");
+ key_free(key);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d",
+ type);
+
+ packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen);
+
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type);
+
+ debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
+
+ /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */
+ if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, key, challenge, session_id, 1, response)) {
+ /*
+ * The agent failed to authenticate this identifier
+ * although it advertised it supports this. Just
+ * return a wrong value.
+ */
+ log("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge.");
+ memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
+ }
+ key_free(key);
+ debug("Sending response to RSA challenge.");
+
+ /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ packet_put_char(response[i]);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+
+ /* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth);
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+ debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise it should return failure. */
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d",
+ type);
+ }
+ ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth);
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+ debug("RSA authentication using agent refused.");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to
+ * the server.
+ */
+static void
+respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv)
+{
+ u_char buf[32], response[16];
+ MD5_CTX md;
+ int i, len;
+
+ /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
+ /* XXX think about Bleichenbacher, too */
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv) <= 0)
+ packet_disconnect(
+ "respond_to_rsa_challenge: rsa_private_decrypt failed");
+
+ /* Compute the response. */
+ /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
+ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
+ if (len <= 0 || len > sizeof(buf))
+ packet_disconnect(
+ "respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
+
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len);
+ MD5_Init(&md);
+ MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
+ MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
+ MD5_Final(response, &md);
+
+ debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge.");
+
+ /* Send the response back to the server. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ packet_put_char(response[i]);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
+ memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate
+ * the user using it.
+ */
+static int
+try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *challenge;
+ Key *public, *private;
+ char buf[300], *passphrase, *comment, *authfile;
+ int i, type, quit, plen, clen;
+
+ public = options.identity_keys[idx];
+ authfile = options.identity_files[idx];
+ comment = xstrdup(authfile);
+
+ debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment);
+
+ /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
+ packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for server's response. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+
+ /*
+ * The server responds with failure if it doesn\'t like our key or
+ * doesn\'t support RSA authentication.
+ */
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ debug("Server refused our key.");
+ xfree(comment);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
+
+ /* Get the challenge from the packet. */
+ challenge = BN_new();
+ packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen);
+
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type);
+
+ debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
+
+ /*
+ * If the key is not stored in external hardware, we have to
+ * load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it
+ * fails, ask for a passphrase.
+ */
+ if (public->flags && KEY_FLAG_EXT)
+ private = public;
+ else
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL);
+ if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+ passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
+ if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
+ authfile, passphrase, NULL);
+ quit = 0;
+ } else {
+ debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
+ quit = 1;
+ }
+ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+ xfree(passphrase);
+ if (private != NULL || quit)
+ break;
+ debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
+ }
+ }
+ /* We no longer need the comment. */
+ xfree(comment);
+
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ if (!options.batch_mode)
+ error("Bad passphrase.");
+
+ /* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ packet_put_char(0);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Expect the server to reject it... */
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */
+ respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private->rsa);
+
+ /* Destroy the private key unless it in external hardware. */
+ if (!(private->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
+ key_free(private);
+
+ /* We no longer need the challenge. */
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+
+ /* Wait for response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
+ debug("RSA authentication refused.");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
+ * authentication and RSA host authentication.
+ */
+static int
+try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key)
+{
+ int type;
+ BIGNUM *challenge;
+ int plen, clen;
+
+ debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication.");
+
+ /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
+ packet_put_cstring(local_user);
+ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n));
+ packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Wait for server's response. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+
+ /* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our
+ .rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
+ debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
+
+ /* Get the challenge from the packet. */
+ challenge = BN_new();
+ packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen);
+
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type);
+
+ debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server.");
+
+ /* Compute a response to the challenge. */
+ respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key->rsa);
+
+ /* We no longer need the challenge. */
+ BN_clear_free(challenge);
+
+ /* Wait for response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server.");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
+ debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused.");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef KRB4
+static int
+try_krb4_authentication(void)
+{
+ KTEXT_ST auth; /* Kerberos data */
+ char *reply;
+ char inst[INST_SZ];
+ char *realm;
+ CREDENTIALS cred;
+ int r, type, plen;
+ socklen_t slen;
+ Key_schedule schedule;
+ u_long checksum, cksum;
+ MSG_DAT msg_data;
+ struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
+ if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ strlcpy(inst, (char *)krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname(1)),
+ INST_SZ);
+
+ realm = (char *)krb_realmofhost(get_canonical_hostname(1));
+ if (!realm) {
+ debug("Kerberos v4: no realm for %s", get_canonical_hostname(1));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* This can really be anything. */
+ checksum = (u_long)getpid();
+
+ r = krb_mk_req(&auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, checksum);
+ if (r != KSUCCESS) {
+ debug("Kerberos v4 krb_mk_req failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Get session key to decrypt the server's reply with. */
+ r = krb_get_cred(KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, &cred);
+ if (r != KSUCCESS) {
+ debug("get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ des_key_sched((des_cblock *) cred.session, schedule);
+
+ /* Send authentication info to server. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS);
+ packet_put_string((char *) auth.dat, auth.length);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Zero the buffer. */
+ (void) memset(auth.dat, 0, MAX_KTXT_LEN);
+
+ slen = sizeof(local);
+ memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
+ if (getsockname(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&local, &slen) < 0)
+ debug("getsockname failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ slen = sizeof(foreign);
+ memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
+ if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&foreign, &slen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ /* Get server reply. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
+ /* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */
+ debug("Kerberos v4 authentication failed.");
+ return 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE:
+ /* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */
+ debug("Kerberos v4 authentication accepted.");
+
+ /* Get server's response. */
+ reply = packet_get_string((u_int *) &auth.length);
+ memcpy(auth.dat, reply, auth.length);
+ xfree(reply);
+
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type);
+
+ /*
+ * If his response isn't properly encrypted with the session
+ * key, and the decrypted checksum fails to match, he's
+ * bogus. Bail out.
+ */
+ r = krb_rd_priv(auth.dat, auth.length, schedule, &cred.session,
+ &foreign, &local, &msg_data);
+ if (r != KSUCCESS) {
+ debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_priv failed: %s",
+ krb_err_txt[r]);
+ packet_disconnect("Kerberos v4 challenge failed!");
+ }
+ /* Fetch the (incremented) checksum that we supplied in the request. */
+ memcpy((char *)&cksum, (char *)msg_data.app_data,
+ sizeof(cksum));
+ cksum = ntohl(cksum);
+
+ /* If it matches, we're golden. */
+ if (cksum == checksum + 1) {
+ debug("Kerberos v4 challenge successful.");
+ return 1;
+ } else
+ packet_disconnect("Kerberos v4 challenge failed!");
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos v4 response: %d", type);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* KRB4 */
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+static int
+try_krb5_authentication(krb5_context *context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context)
+{
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ const char *tkfile;
+ struct stat buf;
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ const char *remotehost;
+ krb5_data ap;
+ int type, payload_len;
+ krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *reply = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(&ap, 0, sizeof(ap));
+
+ problem = krb5_init_context(context);
+ if (problem) {
+ debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_init_context failed");
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tkfile = krb5_cc_default_name(*context);
+ if (strncmp(tkfile, "FILE:", 5) == 0)
+ tkfile += 5;
+
+ if (stat(tkfile, &buf) == 0 && getuid() != buf.st_uid) {
+ debug("Kerberos v5: could not get default ccache (permission denied).");
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ problem = krb5_cc_default(*context, &ccache);
+ if (problem) {
+ debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_cc_default failed: %s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(*context, problem));
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ remotehost = get_canonical_hostname(1);
+
+ problem = krb5_mk_req(*context, auth_context, AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED,
+ "host", remotehost, NULL, ccache, &ap);
+ if (problem) {
+ debug("Kerberos v5: krb5_mk_req failed: %s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(*context, problem));
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS);
+ packet_put_string((char *) ap.data, ap.length);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ xfree(ap.data);
+ ap.length = 0;
+
+ type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
+ /* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */
+ debug("Kerberos v5 authentication failed.");
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE:
+ /* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */
+ debug("Kerberos v5 authentication accepted.");
+
+ /* Get server's response. */
+ ap.data = packet_get_string((unsigned int *) &ap.length);
+
+ packet_integrity_check(payload_len, 4 + ap.length, type);
+ /* XXX je to dobre? */
+
+ problem = krb5_rd_rep(*context, *auth_context, &ap, &reply);
+ if (problem) {
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos v5 response: %d",
+ type);
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+
+ }
+
+ out:
+ if (ccache != NULL)
+ krb5_cc_close(*context, ccache);
+ if (reply != NULL)
+ krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(*context, reply);
+ if (ap.length > 0)
+ krb5_data_free(&ap);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+send_krb5_tgt(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context)
+{
+ int fd, type, payload_len;
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ krb5_data outbuf;
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ krb5_creds creds;
+ krb5_kdc_flags flags;
+ const char *remotehost;
+
+ memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+ memset(&outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
+
+ fd = packet_get_connection_in();
+
+ problem = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd(context, auth_context, &fd);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_cc_default(context, &ccache);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &creds.client);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb5_build_principal(context, &creds.server,
+ strlen(creds.client->realm), creds.client->realm,
+ "krbtgt", creds.client->realm, NULL);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ creds.times.endtime = 0;
+
+ flags.i = 0;
+ flags.b.forwarded = 1;
+ flags.b.forwardable = krb5_config_get_bool(context, NULL,
+ "libdefaults", "forwardable", NULL);
+
+ remotehost = get_canonical_hostname(1);
+
+ problem = krb5_get_forwarded_creds(context, auth_context,
+ ccache, flags.i, remotehost, &creds, &outbuf);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT);
+ packet_put_string((char *)outbuf.data, outbuf.length);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ char *pname;
+
+ krb5_unparse_name(context, creds.client, &pname);
+ debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarded (%s).", pname);
+ xfree(pname);
+ } else
+ debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarding failed.");
+
+ return;
+
+ out:
+ if (problem)
+ debug("Kerberos v5 TGT forwarding failed: %s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(context, problem));
+ if (creds.client)
+ krb5_free_principal(context, creds.client);
+ if (creds.server)
+ krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server);
+ if (ccache)
+ krb5_cc_close(context, ccache);
+ if (outbuf.data)
+ xfree(outbuf.data);
+}
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+#ifdef AFS
+static void
+send_krb4_tgt(void)
+{
+ CREDENTIALS *creds;
+ struct stat st;
+ char buffer[4096], pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ];
+ int problem, type, len;
+
+ /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
+ if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
+ return;
+
+ creds = xmalloc(sizeof(*creds));
+
+ problem = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, pname, pinst, prealm);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ problem = krb_get_cred("krbtgt", prealm, prealm, creds);
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (time(0) > krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date, creds->lifetime)) {
+ problem = RD_AP_EXP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ creds_to_radix(creds, (u_char *)buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT);
+ packet_put_cstring(buffer);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ type = packet_read(&len);
+
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ debug("Kerberos v4 TGT forwarded (%s%s%s@%s).",
+ creds->pname, creds->pinst[0] ? "." : "",
+ creds->pinst, creds->realm);
+ else
+ debug("Kerberos v4 TGT rejected.");
+
+ xfree(creds);
+ return;
+
+ out:
+ debug("Kerberos v4 TGT passing failed: %s", krb_err_txt[problem]);
+ xfree(creds);
+}
+
+static void
+send_afs_tokens(void)
+{
+ CREDENTIALS creds;
+ struct ViceIoctl parms;
+ struct ClearToken ct;
+ int i, type, len;
+ char buf[2048], *p, *server_cell;
+ char buffer[8192];
+
+ /* Move over ktc_GetToken, here's something leaner. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { /* just in case */
+ parms.in = (char *) &i;
+ parms.in_size = sizeof(i);
+ parms.out = buf;
+ parms.out_size = sizeof(buf);
+ if (k_pioctl(0, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) != 0)
+ break;
+ p = buf;
+
+ /* Get secret token. */
+ memcpy(&creds.ticket_st.length, p, sizeof(u_int));
+ if (creds.ticket_st.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN)
+ break;
+ p += sizeof(u_int);
+ memcpy(creds.ticket_st.dat, p, creds.ticket_st.length);
+ p += creds.ticket_st.length;
+
+ /* Get clear token. */
+ memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
+ if (len != sizeof(struct ClearToken))
+ break;
+ p += sizeof(len);
+ memcpy(&ct, p, len);
+ p += len;
+ p += sizeof(len); /* primary flag */
+ server_cell = p;
+
+ /* Flesh out our credentials. */
+ strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof(creds.service));
+ creds.instance[0] = '\0';
+ strlcpy(creds.realm, server_cell, REALM_SZ);
+ memcpy(creds.session, ct.HandShakeKey, DES_KEY_SZ);
+ creds.issue_date = ct.BeginTimestamp;
+ creds.lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds.issue_date,
+ ct.EndTimestamp);
+ creds.kvno = ct.AuthHandle;
+ snprintf(creds.pname, sizeof(creds.pname), "AFS ID %d", ct.ViceId);
+ creds.pinst[0] = '\0';
+
+ /* Encode token, ship it off. */
+ if (creds_to_radix(&creds, (u_char *)buffer,
+ sizeof(buffer)) <= 0)
+ break;
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN);
+ packet_put_cstring(buffer);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Roger, Roger. Clearance, Clarence. What's your vector,
+ Victor? */
+ type = packet_read(&len);
+
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ debug("AFS token for cell %s rejected.", server_cell);
+ else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error on AFS token response: %d", type);
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* AFS */
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system.
+ * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS.
+ */
+static int
+try_challenge_response_authentication(void)
+{
+ int type, i;
+ int payload_len;
+ u_int clen;
+ char prompt[1024];
+ char *challenge, *response;
+
+ debug("Doing challenge response authentication.");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+ /* request a challenge */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE &&
+ type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
+ "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS", type);
+ }
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
+ debug("No challenge.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ challenge = packet_get_string(&clen);
+ packet_integrity_check(payload_len, (4 + clen), type);
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "%s%s", challenge,
+ strchr(challenge, '\n') ? "" : "\nResponse: ");
+ xfree(challenge);
+ if (i != 0)
+ error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+ log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
+ "Reponse will be transmitted in clear text.");
+ response = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ if (strcmp(response, "") == 0) {
+ xfree(response);
+ break;
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
+ ssh_put_password(response);
+ memset(response, 0, strlen(response));
+ xfree(response);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ return 1;
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
+ "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE", type);
+ }
+ /* failure */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication.
+ */
+static int
+try_password_authentication(char *prompt)
+{
+ int type, i, payload_len;
+ char *password;
+
+ debug("Doing password authentication.");
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+ log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text.");
+ for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+ if (i != 0)
+ error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+ password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
+ ssh_put_password(password);
+ memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+ xfree(password);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ return 1;
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type);
+ }
+ /* failure */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSH1 key exchange
+ */
+void
+ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+{
+ int i;
+ BIGNUM *key;
+ RSA *host_key;
+ RSA *public_key;
+ Key k;
+ int bits, rbits;
+ int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
+ u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+ u_char cookie[8];
+ u_int supported_ciphers;
+ u_int server_flags, client_flags;
+ int payload_len, clen, sum_len = 0;
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+
+ debug("Waiting for server public key.");
+
+ /* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */
+ packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
+
+ /* Get cookie from the packet. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ cookie[i] = packet_get_char();
+
+ /* Get the public key. */
+ public_key = RSA_new();
+ bits = packet_get_int();/* bits */
+ public_key->e = BN_new();
+ packet_get_bignum(public_key->e, &clen);
+ sum_len += clen;
+ public_key->n = BN_new();
+ packet_get_bignum(public_key->n, &clen);
+ sum_len += clen;
+
+ rbits = BN_num_bits(public_key->n);
+ if (bits != rbits) {
+ log("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
+ "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
+ log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+ }
+ /* Get the host key. */
+ host_key = RSA_new();
+ bits = packet_get_int();/* bits */
+ host_key->e = BN_new();
+ packet_get_bignum(host_key->e, &clen);
+ sum_len += clen;
+ host_key->n = BN_new();
+ packet_get_bignum(host_key->n, &clen);
+ sum_len += clen;
+
+ rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->n);
+ if (bits != rbits) {
+ log("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
+ "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
+ log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+ }
+
+ /* Get protocol flags. */
+ server_flags = packet_get_int();
+ packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags);
+
+ supported_ciphers = packet_get_int();
+ supported_authentications = packet_get_int();
+
+ debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).",
+ BN_num_bits(public_key->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->n));
+
+ packet_integrity_check(payload_len,
+ 8 + 4 + sum_len + 0 + 4 + 0 + 0 + 4 + 4 + 4,
+ SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ k.type = KEY_RSA1;
+ k.rsa = host_key;
+ if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, &k) == -1)
+ fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+
+ client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN;
+
+ compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, host_key->n, public_key->n);
+
+ /* Generate a session key. */
+ arc4random_stir();
+
+ /*
+ * Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit
+ * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least
+ * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ session_key[i] = rand & 0xff;
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key
+ * is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with
+ * the first 16 bytes of the session id.
+ */
+ key = BN_new();
+ BN_set_word(key, 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
+ BN_lshift(key, key, 8);
+ if (i < 16)
+ BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i]);
+ else
+ BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
+ * server (key with smaller modulus first).
+ */
+ if (BN_cmp(public_key->n, host_key->n) < 0) {
+ /* Public key has smaller modulus. */
+ if (BN_num_bits(host_key->n) <
+ BN_num_bits(public_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < public_key %d + "
+ "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
+ BN_num_bits(public_key->n),
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ }
+ rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key);
+ rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key);
+ } else {
+ /* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */
+ if (BN_num_bits(public_key->n) <
+ BN_num_bits(host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: public_key %d < host_key %d + "
+ "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ BN_num_bits(public_key->n),
+ BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ }
+ rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key);
+ rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key);
+ }
+
+ /* Destroy the public keys since we no longer need them. */
+ RSA_free(public_key);
+ RSA_free(host_key);
+
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) {
+ if (cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default))
+ options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
+ } else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL ||
+ !(cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & (1 << options.cipher))) {
+ log("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.",
+ cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default));
+ options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
+ }
+ /* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */
+ if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher)))
+ fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.",
+ cipher_name(options.cipher));
+
+ debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher));
+
+ /* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+ packet_put_char(options.cipher);
+
+ /* Send the cookie back to the server. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
+
+ /* Send and destroy the encrypted encryption key integer. */
+ packet_put_bignum(key);
+ BN_clear_free(key);
+
+ /* Send protocol flags. */
+ packet_put_int(client_flags);
+
+ /* Send the packet now. */
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ debug("Sent encrypted session key.");
+
+ /* Set the encryption key. */
+ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher);
+
+ /* We will no longer need the session key here. Destroy any extra copies. */
+ memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
+
+ /*
+ * Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message
+ * will be received in encrypted form.
+ */
+ packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+
+ debug("Received encrypted confirmation.");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticate user
+ */
+void
+ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
+ Key **keys, int nkeys)
+{
+#ifdef KRB5
+ krb5_context context = NULL;
+ krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
+#endif
+ int i, type;
+ int payload_len;
+
+ if (supported_authentications == 0)
+ fatal("ssh_userauth1: server supports no auth methods");
+
+ /* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER);
+ packet_put_cstring(server_user);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /*
+ * The server should respond with success if no authentication is
+ * needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds
+ * with failure.
+ */
+ type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+
+ /* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ goto success;
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type);
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) &&
+ options.kerberos_authentication) {
+ debug("Trying Kerberos v5 authentication.");
+
+ if (try_krb5_authentication(&context, &auth_context)) {
+ type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ goto success;
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos v5 auth", type);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+#ifdef KRB4
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) &&
+ options.kerberos_authentication) {
+ debug("Trying Kerberos v4 authentication.");
+
+ if (try_krb4_authentication()) {
+ type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ goto success;
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos v4 auth", type);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* KRB4 */
+
+ /*
+ * Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and we
+ * do not wish to remain anonymous.
+ */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS)) &&
+ options.rhosts_authentication) {
+ debug("Trying rhosts authentication.");
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS);
+ packet_put_cstring(local_user);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* The server should respond with success or failure. */
+ type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ goto success;
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to rhosts auth",
+ type);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) &&
+ options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if (keys[i] != NULL && keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
+ try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, keys[i]))
+ goto success;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) &&
+ options.rsa_authentication) {
+ /*
+ * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The
+ * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for
+ * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases.
+ */
+ if (try_agent_authentication())
+ goto success;
+
+ /* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++)
+ if (options.identity_keys[i] != NULL &&
+ options.identity_keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 &&
+ try_rsa_authentication(i))
+ goto success;
+ }
+ /* Try challenge response authentication if the server supports it. */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) &&
+ options.challenge_response_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
+ if (try_challenge_response_authentication())
+ goto success;
+ }
+ /* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) &&
+ options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
+ char prompt[80];
+
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ",
+ server_user, host);
+ if (try_password_authentication(prompt))
+ goto success;
+ }
+ /* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */
+ fatal("Permission denied.");
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+
+ success:
+#ifdef KRB5
+ /* Try Kerberos v5 TGT passing. */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) &&
+ options.kerberos_tgt_passing && context && auth_context) {
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+ log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!");
+ send_krb5_tgt(context, auth_context);
+ }
+ if (auth_context)
+ krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
+ if (context)
+ krb5_free_context(context);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef AFS
+ /* Try Kerberos v4 TGT passing if the server supports it. */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) &&
+ options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+ log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!");
+ send_krb4_tgt();
+ }
+ /* Try AFS token passing if the server supports it. */
+ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN)) &&
+ options.afs_token_passing && k_hasafs()) {
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
+ log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Token will be transmitted in the clear!");
+ send_afs_tokens();
+ }
+#endif /* AFS */
+
+ return; /* need statement after label */
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.85 2001/11/07 16:03:17 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "readpass.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern char *client_version_string;
+extern char *server_version_string;
+extern Options options;
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 key exchange
+ */
+
+u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+int session_id2_len = 0;
+
+char *xxx_host;
+struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
+
+Kex *xxx_kex = NULL;
+
+static int
+verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey)
+{
+ if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
+ fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+{
+ Kex *kex;
+
+ xxx_host = host;
+ xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
+ if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
+ log("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+ options.ciphers = NULL;
+ }
+ if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
+ }
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
+ compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
+ if (options.compression) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib";
+ } else {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ }
+ if (options.macs != NULL) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+ }
+ if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+
+ /* start key exchange */
+ kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
+ xxx_kex = kex;
+
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+
+ session_id2 = kex->session_id;
+ session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ packet_put_cstring("markus");
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+#endif
+ debug("done: ssh_kex2.");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticate user
+ */
+
+typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
+typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
+
+typedef int sign_cb_fn(
+ Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key,
+ u_char **sigp, int *lenp, u_char *data, int datalen);
+
+struct Authctxt {
+ const char *server_user;
+ const char *local_user;
+ const char *host;
+ const char *service;
+ Authmethod *method;
+ int success;
+ char *authlist;
+ /* pubkey */
+ Key *last_key;
+ sign_cb_fn *last_key_sign;
+ int last_key_hint;
+ AuthenticationConnection *agent;
+ /* hostbased */
+ Key **keys;
+ int nkeys;
+ /* kbd-interactive */
+ int info_req_seen;
+};
+struct Authmethod {
+ char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */
+ int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */
+ int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */
+};
+
+void input_userauth_success(int type, int plen, void *ctxt);
+void input_userauth_failure(int type, int plen, void *ctxt);
+void input_userauth_banner(int type, int plen, void *ctxt);
+void input_userauth_error(int type, int plen, void *ctxt);
+void input_userauth_info_req(int type, int plen, void *ctxt);
+void input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, int plen, void *ctxt);
+
+int userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt);
+int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt);
+int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt);
+int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt);
+int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt);
+
+void userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist);
+
+static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Key *, sign_cb_fn *);
+static void clear_auth_state(Authctxt *);
+
+static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
+static char *authmethods_get(void);
+
+Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ {"hostbased",
+ userauth_hostbased,
+ &options.hostbased_authentication,
+ NULL},
+ {"publickey",
+ userauth_pubkey,
+ &options.pubkey_authentication,
+ NULL},
+ {"keyboard-interactive",
+ userauth_kbdint,
+ &options.kbd_interactive_authentication,
+ &options.batch_mode},
+ {"password",
+ userauth_passwd,
+ &options.password_authentication,
+ &options.batch_mode},
+ {"none",
+ userauth_none,
+ NULL,
+ NULL},
+ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+void
+ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
+ Key **keys, int nkeys)
+{
+ Authctxt authctxt;
+ int type;
+ int plen;
+
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+
+ debug("send SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST");
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth");
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
+ fatal("denied SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT: %d", type);
+ }
+ if (packet_remaining() > 0) {
+ char *reply = packet_get_string(&plen);
+ debug("service_accept: %s", reply);
+ xfree(reply);
+ } else {
+ debug("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
+ }
+ packet_done();
+ debug("got SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT");
+
+ if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL)
+ options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get();
+
+ /* setup authentication context */
+ memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
+ authctxt.agent = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+ authctxt.server_user = server_user;
+ authctxt.local_user = local_user;
+ authctxt.host = host;
+ authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */
+ authctxt.success = 0;
+ authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
+ authctxt.authlist = NULL;
+ authctxt.keys = keys;
+ authctxt.nkeys = nkeys;
+ authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
+ if (authctxt.method == NULL)
+ fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request");
+
+ /* initial userauth request */
+ userauth_none(&authctxt);
+
+ dispatch_init(&input_userauth_error);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */
+
+ if (authctxt.agent != NULL)
+ ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt.agent);
+
+ debug("ssh-userauth2 successful: method %s", authctxt.method->name);
+}
+void
+userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
+{
+ if (authlist == NULL) {
+ authlist = authctxt->authlist;
+ } else {
+ if (authctxt->authlist)
+ xfree(authctxt->authlist);
+ authctxt->authlist = authlist;
+ }
+ for (;;) {
+ Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist);
+ if (method == NULL)
+ fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist);
+ authctxt->method = method;
+ if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) {
+ debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name);
+ break;
+ } else {
+ debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method");
+ method->enabled = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+}
+void
+input_userauth_error(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: "
+ "type %d", type);
+}
+void
+input_userauth_banner(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ char *msg, *lang;
+ debug3("input_userauth_banner");
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+ xfree(msg);
+ xfree(lang);
+}
+void
+input_userauth_success(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context");
+ if (authctxt->authlist)
+ xfree(authctxt->authlist);
+ clear_auth_state(authctxt);
+ authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
+}
+void
+input_userauth_failure(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ char *authlist = NULL;
+ int partial;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context");
+
+ authlist = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ partial = packet_get_char();
+ packet_done();
+
+ if (partial != 0)
+ log("Authenticated with partial success.");
+ debug("authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
+
+ clear_auth_state(authctxt);
+ userauth(authctxt, authlist);
+}
+void
+input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ Buffer b;
+ int alen, blen, sent = 0;
+ char *pkalg, *pkblob, *fp;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context");
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKOK) {
+ /* this is similar to SSH_BUG_PKAUTH */
+ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SSH_BUG_PKOK");
+ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
+ pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ } else {
+ pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
+ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+ }
+ packet_done();
+
+ debug("input_userauth_pk_ok: pkalg %s blen %d lastkey %p hint %d",
+ pkalg, blen, authctxt->last_key, authctxt->last_key_hint);
+
+ do {
+ if (authctxt->last_key == NULL ||
+ authctxt->last_key_sign == NULL) {
+ debug("no last key or no sign cb");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (key_type_from_name(pkalg) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) {
+ debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
+ break;
+ }
+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+ xfree(fp);
+ if (!key_equal(key, authctxt->last_key)) {
+ debug("key != last_key");
+ break;
+ }
+ sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, key,
+ authctxt->last_key_sign);
+ } while(0);
+
+ if (key != NULL)
+ key_free(key);
+ xfree(pkalg);
+ xfree(pkblob);
+
+ /* unregister */
+ clear_auth_state(authctxt);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, NULL);
+
+ /* try another method if we did not send a packet*/
+ if (sent == 0)
+ userauth(authctxt, NULL);
+
+}
+
+int
+userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ /* initial userauth request */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_send();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ static int attempt = 0;
+ char prompt[80];
+ char *password;
+
+ if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+ return 0;
+
+ if(attempt != 1)
+ error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ",
+ authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host);
+ password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_put_char(0);
+ packet_put_cstring(password);
+ memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
+ xfree(password);
+ packet_add_padding(64);
+ packet_send();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+clear_auth_state(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ /* XXX clear authentication state */
+ if (authctxt->last_key != NULL && authctxt->last_key_hint == -1) {
+ debug3("clear_auth_state: key_free %p", authctxt->last_key);
+ key_free(authctxt->last_key);
+ }
+ authctxt->last_key = NULL;
+ authctxt->last_key_hint = -2;
+ authctxt->last_key_sign = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ u_char *blob, *signature;
+ int bloblen, slen;
+ int skip = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int have_sig = 1;
+
+ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey");
+
+ if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ /* we cannot handle this key */
+ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* data to be signed */
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+ buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ skip = session_id2_len;
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ skip = buffer_len(&b);
+ }
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+ datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
+ "ssh-userauth" :
+ authctxt->service);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+ buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(k));
+ }
+ buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
+
+ /* generate signature */
+ ret = (*sign_callback)(authctxt, k, &signature, &slen,
+ buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ xfree(blob);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE) {
+ buffer_clear(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ skip = session_id2_len;
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->service);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(k));
+ buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen);
+ }
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ /* append signature */
+ buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen);
+ xfree(signature);
+
+ /* skip session id and packet type */
+ if (buffer_len(&b) < skip + 1)
+ fatal("userauth_pubkey: internal error");
+ buffer_consume(&b, skip + 1);
+
+ /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ packet_send();
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *k, sign_cb_fn *sign_callback,
+ int hint)
+{
+ u_char *blob;
+ int bloblen, have_sig = 0;
+
+ debug3("send_pubkey_test");
+
+ if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ /* we cannot handle this key */
+ debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */
+ authctxt->last_key_sign = sign_callback;
+ authctxt->last_key_hint = hint;
+ authctxt->last_key = k;
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok);
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_put_char(have_sig);
+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH))
+ packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(k));
+ packet_put_string(blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ packet_send();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static Key *
+load_identity_file(char *filename)
+{
+ Key *private;
+ char prompt[300], *passphrase;
+ int quit, i;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
+ debug3("no such identity: %s", filename);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL);
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ if (options.batch_mode)
+ return NULL;
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
+ "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+ passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename,
+ passphrase, NULL);
+ quit = 0;
+ } else {
+ debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
+ quit = 1;
+ }
+ memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
+ xfree(passphrase);
+ if (private != NULL || quit)
+ break;
+ debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
+ }
+ }
+ return private;
+}
+
+static int
+identity_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ Key *private;
+ int idx, ret;
+
+ idx = authctxt->last_key_hint;
+ if (idx < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* private key is stored in external hardware */
+ if (options.identity_keys[idx]->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT)
+ return key_sign(options.identity_keys[idx], sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+
+ private = load_identity_file(options.identity_files[idx]);
+ if (private == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ ret = key_sign(private, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+ key_free(private);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+agent_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ return ssh_agent_sign(authctxt->agent, key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+}
+
+static int
+key_sign_cb(Authctxt *authctxt, Key *key, u_char **sigp, int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ return key_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+}
+
+static int
+userauth_pubkey_agent(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ static int called = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ char *comment;
+ Key *k;
+
+ if (called == 0) {
+ if (ssh_get_num_identities(authctxt->agent, 2) == 0)
+ debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no keys at all");
+ called = 1;
+ }
+ k = ssh_get_next_identity(authctxt->agent, &comment, 2);
+ if (k == NULL) {
+ debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no more keys");
+ } else {
+ debug("userauth_pubkey_agent: testing agent key %s", comment);
+ xfree(comment);
+ ret = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, k, agent_sign_cb, -1);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ key_free(k);
+ }
+ if (ret == 0)
+ debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no message sent");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ static int idx = 0;
+ int sent = 0;
+ Key *key;
+ char *filename;
+
+ if (authctxt->agent != NULL) {
+ do {
+ sent = userauth_pubkey_agent(authctxt);
+ } while(!sent && authctxt->agent->howmany > 0);
+ }
+ while (!sent && idx < options.num_identity_files) {
+ key = options.identity_keys[idx];
+ filename = options.identity_files[idx];
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ debug("try privkey: %s", filename);
+ key = load_identity_file(filename);
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, key,
+ key_sign_cb);
+ key_free(key);
+ }
+ } else if (key->type != KEY_RSA1) {
+ debug("try pubkey: %s", filename);
+ sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, key,
+ identity_sign_cb, idx);
+ }
+ idx++;
+ }
+ return sent;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method.
+ */
+int
+userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ static int attempt = 0;
+
+ if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+ return 0;
+ /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */
+ if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) {
+ debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen");
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ debug2("userauth_kbdint");
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* lang */
+ packet_put_cstring(options.kbd_interactive_devices ?
+ options.kbd_interactive_devices : "");
+ packet_send();
+
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE
+ */
+void
+input_userauth_info_req(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ char *name, *inst, *lang, *prompt, *response;
+ u_int num_prompts, i;
+ int echo = 0;
+
+ debug2("input_userauth_info_req");
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context");
+
+ authctxt->info_req_seen = 1;
+
+ name = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ inst = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ if (strlen(name) > 0)
+ log("%s", name);
+ if (strlen(inst) > 0)
+ log("%s", inst);
+ xfree(name);
+ xfree(inst);
+ xfree(lang);
+
+ num_prompts = packet_get_int();
+ /*
+ * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested.
+ * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if
+ * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to
+ * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response.
+ */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE);
+ packet_put_int(num_prompts);
+
+ debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
+ prompt = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ echo = packet_get_char();
+
+ response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0);
+
+ packet_put_cstring(response);
+ memset(response, 0, strlen(response));
+ xfree(response);
+ xfree(prompt);
+ }
+ packet_done(); /* done with parsing incoming message. */
+
+ packet_add_padding(64);
+ packet_send();
+}
+
+/*
+ * this will be move to an external program (ssh-keysign) ASAP. ssh-keysign
+ * will be setuid-root and the sbit can be removed from /usr/bin/ssh.
+ */
+int
+userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Key *private = NULL;
+ Buffer b;
+ u_char *signature, *blob;
+ char *chost, *pkalg, *p;
+ const char *service;
+ u_int blen, slen;
+ int ok, i, len, found = 0;
+
+ /* check for a useful key */
+ for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nkeys; i++) {
+ private = authctxt->keys[i];
+ if (private && private->type != KEY_RSA1) {
+ found = 1;
+ /* we take and free the key */
+ authctxt->keys[i] = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ debug("userauth_hostbased: no more client hostkeys");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (key_to_blob(private, &blob, &blen) == 0) {
+ key_free(private);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* figure out a name for the client host */
+ p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in());
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ error("userauth_hostbased: cannot get local ipaddr/name");
+ key_free(private);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = strlen(p) + 2;
+ chost = xmalloc(len);
+ strlcpy(chost, p, len);
+ strlcat(chost, ".", len);
+ debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s", chost);
+
+ service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
+ authctxt->service;
+ pkalg = xstrdup(key_ssh_name(private));
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ /* construct data */
+ buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+ buffer_put_string(&b, blob, blen);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->local_user);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+ ok = key_sign(private, &signature, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+ key_free(private);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ if (ok != 0) {
+ error("key_sign failed");
+ xfree(chost);
+ xfree(pkalg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_put_cstring(pkalg);
+ packet_put_string(blob, blen);
+ packet_put_cstring(chost);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->local_user);
+ packet_put_string(signature, slen);
+ memset(signature, 's', slen);
+ xfree(signature);
+ xfree(chost);
+ xfree(pkalg);
+
+ packet_send();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* find auth method */
+
+/*
+ * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill
+ * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false.
+ */
+static int
+authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method)
+{
+ if (method == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */
+ if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */
+ if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
+{
+ Authmethod *method = NULL;
+ if (name != NULL)
+ for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
+ if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
+ return method;
+ debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* XXX internal state */
+static Authmethod *current = NULL;
+static char *supported = NULL;
+static char *preferred = NULL;
+/*
+ * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the
+ * next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list,
+ * use a built-in default list.
+ */
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_get(char *authlist)
+{
+
+ char *name = NULL;
+ int next;
+
+ /* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */
+ if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0)
+ authlist = options.preferred_authentications;
+
+ if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) {
+ debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist);
+ if (supported != NULL)
+ xfree(supported);
+ supported = xstrdup(authlist);
+ preferred = options.preferred_authentications;
+ debug3("preferred %s", preferred);
+ current = NULL;
+ } else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current))
+ return current;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) {
+ debug("no more auth methods to try");
+ current = NULL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ preferred += next;
+ debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name);
+ debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred);
+ if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL &&
+ authmethod_is_enabled(current)) {
+ debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name);
+ debug("next auth method to try is %s", name);
+ return current;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+#define DELIM ","
+
+static char *
+authmethods_get(void)
+{
+ Authmethod *method = NULL;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
+ if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) {
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ strlcat(buf, DELIM, sizeof buf);
+ strlcat(buf, method->name, sizeof buf);
+ }
+ }
+ return xstrdup(buf);
+}
--- /dev/null
+.\" -*- nroff -*-
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\" All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.154 2001/11/07 22:12:01 markus Exp $
+.Dd September 25, 1999
+.Dt SSHD 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sshd
+.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sshd
+.Op Fl deiqtD46
+.Op Fl b Ar bits
+.Op Fl f Ar config_file
+.Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time
+.Op Fl h Ar host_key_file
+.Op Fl k Ar key_gen_time
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl u Ar len
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+(SSH Daemon) is the daemon program for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh, and
+provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
+over an insecure network.
+The programs are intended to be as easy to
+install and use as possible.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is the daemon that listens for connections from clients.
+It is normally started at boot from
+.Pa /etc/rc .
+It forks a new
+daemon for each incoming connection.
+The forked daemons handle
+key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution,
+and data exchange.
+This implementation of
+.Nm
+supports both SSH protocol version 1 and 2 simultaneously.
+.Nm
+works as follows.
+.Pp
+.Ss SSH protocol version 1
+.Pp
+Each host has a host-specific RSA key
+(normally 1024 bits) used to identify the host.
+Additionally, when
+the daemon starts, it generates a server RSA key (normally 768 bits).
+This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and
+is never stored on disk.
+.Pp
+Whenever a client connects the daemon responds with its public
+host and server keys.
+The client compares the
+RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
+The client then generates a 256 bit random number.
+It encrypts this
+random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends
+the encrypted number to the server.
+Both sides then use this
+random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further
+communications in the session.
+The rest of the session is encrypted
+using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES
+being used by default.
+The client selects the encryption algorithm
+to use from those offered by the server.
+.Pp
+Next, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+The client tries to authenticate itself using
+.Pa .rhosts
+authentication,
+.Pa .rhosts
+authentication combined with RSA host
+authentication, RSA challenge-response authentication, or password
+based authentication.
+.Pp
+Rhosts authentication is normally disabled
+because it is fundamentally insecure, but can be enabled in the server
+configuration file if desired.
+System security is not improved unless
+.Xr rshd 8 ,
+.Xr rlogind 8 ,
+and
+.Xr rexecd 8
+are disabled (thus completely disabling
+.Xr rlogin 1
+and
+.Xr rsh 1
+into the machine).
+.Pp
+.Ss SSH protocol version 2
+.Pp
+Version 2 works similarly:
+Each host has a host-specific key (RSA or DSA) used to identify the host.
+However, when the daemon starts, it does not generate a server key.
+Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
+This key agreement results in a shared session key.
+.Pp
+The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently
+128 bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192 bit AES, or 256 bit AES.
+The client selects the encryption algorithm
+to use from those offered by the server.
+Additionally, session integrity is provided
+through a cryptographic message authentication code
+(hmac-sha1 or hmac-md5).
+.Pp
+Protocol version 2 provides a public key based
+user (PubkeyAuthentication) or
+client host (HostbasedAuthentication) authentication method,
+conventional password authentication and challenge response based methods.
+.Pp
+.Ss Command execution and data forwarding
+.Pp
+If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for
+preparing the session is entered.
+At this time the client may request
+things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections,
+forwarding TCP/IP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent
+connection over the secure channel.
+.Pp
+Finally, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
+The sides then enter session mode.
+In this mode, either side may send
+data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or
+command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
+.Pp
+When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
+connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to
+the client, and both sides exit.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+can be configured using command-line options or a configuration
+file.
+Command-line options override values specified in the
+configuration file.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
+.Dv SIGHUP ,
+by executing itself with the name it was started as, i.e.,
+.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd .
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl b Ar bits
+Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
+server key (default 768).
+.It Fl d
+Debug mode.
+The server sends verbose debug output to the system
+log, and does not put itself in the background.
+The server also will not fork and will only process one connection.
+This option is only intended for debugging for the server.
+Multiple -d options increase the debugging level.
+Maximum is 3.
+.It Fl e
+When this option is specified,
+.Nm
+will send the output to the standard error instead of the system log.
+.It Fl f Ar configuration_file
+Specifies the name of the configuration file.
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/sshd_config .
+.Nm
+refuses to start if there is no configuration file.
+.It Fl g Ar login_grace_time
+Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default
+600 seconds).
+If the client fails to authenticate the user within
+this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
+A value of zero indicates no limit.
+.It Fl h Ar host_key_file
+Specifies the file from which the host key is read (default
+.Pa /etc/ssh_host_key ) .
+This option must be given if
+.Nm
+is not run as root (as the normal
+host file is normally not readable by anyone but root).
+It is possible to have multiple host key files for
+the different protocol versions and host key algorithms.
+.It Fl i
+Specifies that
+.Nm
+is being run from inetd.
+.Nm
+is normally not run
+from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can
+respond to the client, and this may take tens of seconds.
+Clients would have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time.
+However, with small key sizes (e.g., 512) using
+.Nm
+from inetd may
+be feasible.
+.It Fl k Ar key_gen_time
+Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is
+regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour).
+The motivation for regenerating the key fairly
+often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour,
+it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted
+communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically
+seized.
+A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated.
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
+(default 22).
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode.
+Nothing is sent to the system log.
+Normally the beginning,
+authentication, and termination of each connection is logged.
+.It Fl t
+Test mode.
+Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.
+This is useful for updating
+.Nm
+reliably as configuration options may change.
+.It Fl u Ar len
+This option is used to specify the size of the field
+in the
+.Li utmp
+structure that holds the remote host name.
+If the resolved host name is longer than
+.Ar len ,
+the dotted decimal value will be used instead.
+This allows hosts with very long host names that
+overflow this field to still be uniquely identified.
+Specifying
+.Fl u0
+indicates that only dotted decimal addresses
+should be put into the
+.Pa utmp
+file.
+.Fl u0
+is also be used to prevent
+.Nm
+from making DNS requests unless the authentication
+mechanism or configuration requires it.
+Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include
+.Cm RhostsAuthentication ,
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+and using a
+.Cm from="pattern-list"
+option in a key file.
+.It Fl D
+When this option is specified
+.Nm
+will not detach and does not become a daemon.
+This allows easy monitoring of
+.Nm sshd .
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.El
+.Sh CONFIGURATION FILE
+.Nm
+reads configuration data from
+.Pa /etc/sshd_config
+(or the file specified with
+.Fl f
+on the command line).
+The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
+Lines starting with
+.Ql #
+and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
+.Pp
+The possible
+keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm AFSTokenPassing
+Specifies whether an AFS token may be forwarded to the server.
+Default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm AllowGroups
+This keyword can be followed by a list of group names, separated
+by spaces.
+If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
+group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
+.Ql \&*
+and
+.Ql ?
+can be used as
+wildcards in the patterns.
+Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
+By default login is allowed regardless of the group list.
+.Pp
+.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
+Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless
+users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
+own forwarders.
+.Pp
+.It Cm AllowUsers
+This keyword can be followed by a list of user names, separated
+by spaces.
+If specified, login is allowed only for users names that
+match one of the patterns.
+.Ql \&*
+and
+.Ql ?
+can be used as
+wildcards in the patterns.
+Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
+By default login is allowed regardless of the user name.
+If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
+are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
+users from particular hosts.
+.Pp
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
+for user authentication.
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
+set-up. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
+%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated and
+%u is replaced by the username of that user.
+After expansion,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
+directory.
+The default is
+.Dq .ssh/authorized_keys
+.It Cm Banner
+In some jurisdictions, sending a warning message before authentication
+may be relevant for getting legal protection.
+The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
+authentication is allowed.
+This option is only available for protocol version 2.
+.Pp
+.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+Specifies whether challenge response authentication is allowed.
+All authentication styles from
+.Xr login.conf 5
+are supported.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm Ciphers
+Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.
+Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Dq aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour.
+.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
+Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+from the client,
+.Nm
+will send a message through the encrypted
+channel to request a response from the client.
+The default
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+Sets the number of client alive messages (see above) which may be
+sent without
+.Nm
+receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is
+reached while client alive messages are being sent,
+.Nm
+will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important
+to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from
+.Cm KeepAlive
+(below). The client alive messages are sent through the
+encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive
+option enabled by
+.Cm KeepAlive
+is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
+server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive.
+.Pp
+The default value is 3. If
+.Cm ClientAliveInterval
+(above) is set to 15, and
+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+is left at the default, unresponsive ssh clients
+will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+.It Cm DenyGroups
+This keyword can be followed by a number of group names, separated
+by spaces.
+Users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches
+one of the patterns aren't allowed to log in.
+.Ql \&*
+and
+.Ql ?
+can be used as
+wildcards in the patterns.
+Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
+By default login is allowed regardless of the group list.
+.Pp
+.It Cm DenyUsers
+This keyword can be followed by a number of user names, separated
+by spaces.
+Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
+.Ql \&*
+and
+.Ql ?
+can be used as wildcards in the patterns.
+Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
+By default login is allowed regardless of the user name.
+.It Cm GatewayPorts
+Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
+forwarded for the client.
+By default,
+.Nm
+binds remote port forwardings to the loopback addresss. This
+prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+can be used to specify that
+.Nm
+should bind remote port forwardings to the wildcard address,
+thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
+(hostbased authentication).
+This option is similar to
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+and applies to protocol version 2 only.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm HostKey
+Specifies the file containing the private host keys (default
+.Pa /etc/ssh_host_key )
+used by SSH protocol versions 1 and 2.
+Note that
+.Nm
+will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible.
+It is possible to have multiple host key files.
+.Dq rsa1
+keys are used for version 1 and
+.Dq dsa
+or
+.Dq rsa
+are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol.
+.It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+Specifies that
+.Pa .rhosts
+and
+.Pa .shosts
+files will not be used in
+.Cm RhostsAuthentication ,
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+or
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+.Pp
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+and
+.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+are still used.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
+Specifies whether
+.Nm
+should ignore the user's
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+during
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+or
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm KeepAlive
+Specifies whether the system should send keepalive messages to the
+other side.
+If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+of the machines will be properly noticed.
+However, this means that
+connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+find it annoying.
+On the other hand, if keepalives are not sent,
+sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving
+.Dq ghost
+users and consuming server resources.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Dq yes
+(to send keepalives), and the server will notice
+if the network goes down or the client host reboots.
+This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
+.Pp
+To disable keepalives, the value should be set to
+.Dq no
+in both the server and the client configuration files.
+.It Cm KerberosAuthentication
+Specifies whether Kerberos authentication is allowed.
+This can be in the form of a Kerberos ticket, or if
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+is yes, the password provided by the user will be validated through
+the Kerberos KDC.
+To use this option, the server needs a
+Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
+Default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd
+If set then if password authentication through Kerberos fails then
+the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
+such as
+.Pa /etc/passwd .
+Default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm KerberosTgtPassing
+Specifies whether a Kerberos TGT may be forwarded to the server.
+Default is
+.Dq no ,
+as this only works when the Kerberos KDC is actually an AFS kaserver.
+.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
+Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+file on logout.
+Default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval
+In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated
+after this many seconds (if it has been used).
+The purpose of regeneration is to prevent
+decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and
+stealing the keys.
+The key is never stored anywhere.
+If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated.
+The default is 3600 (seconds).
+.It Cm ListenAddress
+Specifies the local addresses
+.Nm
+should listen on.
+The following forms may be used:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Ar host No | Ar IPv4_addr No | Ar IPv6_addr
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Ar host No | Ar IPv4_addr No : Ar port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Oo
+.Ar host No | Ar IPv6_addr Oc : Ar port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+If
+.Ar port
+is not specified,
+.Nm
+will listen on the address and all prior
+.Cm Port
+options specified. The default is to listen on all local
+addresses. Multiple
+.Cm ListenAddress
+options are permitted. Additionally, any
+.Cm Port
+options must precede this option for non port qualified addresses.
+.It Cm LoginGraceTime
+The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
+successfully logged in.
+If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
+The default is 600 (seconds).
+.It Cm LogLevel
+Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+.Nm sshd .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE and DEBUG.
+The default is INFO.
+Logging with level DEBUG violates the privacy of users
+and is not recommended.
+.It Cm MACs
+Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
+The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
+for data integrity protection.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Dq hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 .
+.It Cm MaxStartups
+Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the
+.Nm
+daemon.
+Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
+.Cm LoginGraceTime
+expires for a connection.
+The default is 10.
+.Pp
+Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
+the three colon separated values
+.Dq start:rate:full
+(e.g., "10:30:60").
+.Nm
+will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
+.Dq rate/100
+(30%)
+if there are currently
+.Dq start
+(10)
+unauthenticated connections.
+The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts
+are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches
+.Dq full
+(60).
+.It Cm PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt
+Specifies whether PAM challenge response authentication is allowed. This
+allows the use of most PAM challenge response authentication modules, but
+it will allow password authentication regardless of whether
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+is disabled.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
+Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
+When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
+server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm PermitRootLogin
+Specifies whether root can login using
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq without-password ,
+.Dq forced-commands-only
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq without-password
+password authentication is disabled for root.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq forced-commands-only
+root login with public key authentication will be allowed,
+but only if the
+.Ar command
+option has been specified
+(which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is
+normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled
+for root.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Dq no
+root is not allowed to login.
+.It Cm PidFile
+Specifies the file that contains the process identifier of the
+.Nm
+daemon.
+The default is
+.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .
+.It Cm Port
+Specifies the port number that
+.Nm
+listens on.
+The default is 22.
+Multiple options of this type are permitted.
+See also
+.Cm ListenAddress .
+.It Cm PrintLastLog
+Specifies whether
+.Nm
+should print the date and time when the user last logged in.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm PrintMotd
+Specifies whether
+.Nm
+should print
+.Pa /etc/motd
+when a user logs in interactively.
+(On some systems it is also printed by the shell,
+.Pa /etc/profile ,
+or equivalent.)
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm Protocol
+Specifies the protocol versions
+.Nm
+should support.
+The possible values are
+.Dq 1
+and
+.Dq 2 .
+Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
+The default is
+.Dq 2,1 .
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm ReverseMappingCheck
+Specifies whether
+.Nm
+should try to verify the remote host name and check that
+the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
+very same IP address.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm RhostsAuthentication
+Specifies whether authentication using rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
+files is sufficient.
+Normally, this method should not be permitted because it is insecure.
+.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+should be used
+instead, because it performs RSA-based host authentication in addition
+to normal rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+with successful RSA host authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm RSAAuthentication
+Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
+.It Cm ServerKeyBits
+Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
+The minimum value is 512, and the default is 768.
+.It Cm StrictModes
+Specifies whether
+.Nm
+should check file modes and ownership of the
+user's files and home directory before accepting login.
+This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their
+directory or files world-writable.
+The default is
+.Dq yes .
+.It Cm Subsystem
+Configures an external subsystem (e.g., file transfer daemon).
+Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command to execute upon subsystem
+request.
+The command
+.Xr sftp-server 8
+implements the
+.Dq sftp
+file transfer subsystem.
+By default no subsystems are defined.
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm SyslogFacility
+Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+.Nm sshd .
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+The default is AUTH.
+.It Cm UseLogin
+Specifies whether
+.Xr login 1
+is used for interactive login sessions.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that
+.Xr login 1
+is never used for remote command execution.
+Note also, that if this is enabled,
+.Cm X11Forwarding
+will be disabled because
+.Xr login 1
+does not know how to handle
+.Xr xauth 1
+cookies.
+.It Cm X11DisplayOffset
+Specifies the first display number available for
+.Nm sshd Ns 's
+X11 forwarding.
+This prevents
+.Nm
+from interfering with real X11 servers.
+The default is 10.
+.It Cm X11Forwarding
+Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not improve security in any
+way, as users can always install their own forwarders.
+X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if
+.Cm UseLogin
+is enabled.
+.It Cm XAuthLocation
+Specifies the location of the
+.Xr xauth 1
+program.
+The default is
+.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
+.El
+.Ss Time Formats
+.Pp
+.Nm
+command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
+may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
+.Sm off
+.Ar time Oo Ar qualifier Oc ,
+.Sm on
+where
+.Ar time
+is a positive integer value and
+.Ar qualifier
+is one of the following:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
+.It Cm <none>
+seconds
+.It Cm s | Cm S
+seconds
+.It Cm m | Cm M
+minutes
+.It Cm h | Cm H
+hours
+.It Cm d | Cm D
+days
+.It Cm w | Cm W
+weeks
+.El
+.Pp
+Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate
+the total time value.
+.Pp
+Time format examples:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
+.It 600
+600 seconds (10 minutes)
+.It 10m
+10 minutes
+.It 1h30m
+1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
+.El
+.Sh LOGIN PROCESS
+When a user successfully logs in,
+.Nm
+does the following:
+.Bl -enum -offset indent
+.It
+If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
+prints last login time and
+.Pa /etc/motd
+(unless prevented in the configuration file or by
+.Pa $HOME/.hushlogin ;
+see the
+.Sx FILES
+section).
+.It
+If the login is on a tty, records login time.
+.It
+Checks
+.Pa /etc/nologin ;
+if it exists, prints contents and quits
+(unless root).
+.It
+Changes to run with normal user privileges.
+.It
+Sets up basic environment.
+.It
+Reads
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment
+if it exists.
+.It
+Changes to user's home directory.
+.It
+If
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc
+exists, runs it; else if
+.Pa /etc/sshrc
+exists, runs
+it; otherwise runs xauth.
+The
+.Dq rc
+files are given the X11
+authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
+.It
+Runs user's shell or command.
+.El
+.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+is the default file that lists the public keys that are
+permitted for RSA authentication in protocol version 1
+and for public key authentication (PubkeyAuthentication)
+in protocol version 2.
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+may be used to specify an alternative file.
+.Pp
+Each line of the file contains one
+key (empty lines and lines starting with a
+.Ql #
+are ignored as
+comments).
+Each RSA public key consists of the following fields, separated by
+spaces: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
+Each protocol version 2 public key consists of:
+options, keytype, base64 encoded key, comment.
+The options fields
+are optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts
+with a number or not (the option field never starts with a number).
+The bits, exponent, modulus and comment fields give the RSA key for
+protocol version 1; the
+comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
+user to identify the key).
+For protocol version 2 the keytype is
+.Dq ssh-dss
+or
+.Dq ssh-rsa .
+.Pp
+Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
+(because of the size of the RSA key modulus).
+You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
+.Pa identity.pub ,
+.Pa id_dsa.pub
+or the
+.Pa id_rsa.pub
+file and edit it.
+.Pp
+The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
+specifications.
+No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
+The following option specifications are supported (note
+that option keywords are case-insensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm from="pattern-list"
+Specifies that in addition to RSA authentication, the canonical name
+of the remote host must be present in the comma-separated list of
+patterns
+.Pf ( Ql *
+and
+.Ql ?
+serve as wildcards).
+The list may also contain
+patterns negated by prefixing them with
+.Ql ! ;
+if the canonical host name matches a negated pattern, the key is not accepted.
+The purpose
+of this option is to optionally increase security: RSA authentication
+by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but
+the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
+permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
+This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
+servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
+just the key).
+.It Cm command="command"
+Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
+authentication.
+The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored.
+The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty;
+otherwise it is run without a tty.
+If a 8-bit clean channel is required,
+one must not request a pty or should specify
+.Cm no-pty .
+A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
+This option might be useful
+to restrict certain RSA keys to perform just a specific operation.
+An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
+Note that the client may specify TCP/IP and/or X11
+forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited.
+Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
+.It Cm environment="NAME=value"
+Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
+logging in using this key.
+Environment variables set this way
+override other default environment values.
+Multiple options of this type are permitted.
+This option is automatically disabled if
+.Cm UseLogin
+is enabled.
+.It Cm no-port-forwarding
+Forbids TCP/IP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
+This might be used, e.g., in connection with the
+.Cm command
+option.
+.It Cm no-X11-forwarding
+Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
+.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
+Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
+authentication.
+.It Cm no-pty
+Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
+.It Cm permitopen="host:port"
+Limit local
+.Li ``ssh -L''
+port forwarding such that it may only connect to the specified host and
+port.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+.Ar host/port .
+Multiple
+.Cm permitopen
+options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching is
+performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal domains or
+addresses.
+.El
+.Ss Examples
+1024 33 12121.\|.\|.\|312314325 ylo@foo.bar
+.Pp
+from="*.niksula.hut.fi,!pc.niksula.hut.fi" 1024 35 23.\|.\|.\|2334 ylo@niksula
+.Pp
+command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding 1024 33 23.\|.\|.\|2323 backup.hut.fi
+.Pp
+permitopen="10.2.1.55:80",permitopen="10.2.1.56:25" 1024 33 23.\|.\|.\|2323
+.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
+The
+.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts ,
+and
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
+The global file should
+be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
+maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host
+its key is added to the per-user file.
+.Pp
+Each line in these files contains the following fields: hostnames,
+bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
+The fields are separated by spaces.
+.Pp
+Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns ('*' and '?' act as
+wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host
+name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied
+name (when authenticating a server).
+A pattern may also be preceded by
+.Ql !
+to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
+pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
+pattern on the line.
+.Pp
+Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they
+can be obtained, e.g., from
+.Pa /etc/ssh_host_key.pub .
+The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
+.Pp
+Lines starting with
+.Ql #
+and empty lines are ignored as comments.
+.Pp
+When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
+matching line has the proper key.
+It is thus permissible (but not
+recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same
+names.
+This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names
+from different domains are put in the file.
+It is possible
+that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is
+accepted if valid information can be found from either file.
+.Pp
+Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
+long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
+Rather, generate them by a script
+or by taking
+.Pa /etc/ssh_host_key.pub
+and adding the host names at the front.
+.Ss Examples
+.Bd -literal
+closenet,.\|.\|.\|,130.233.208.41 1024 37 159.\|.\|.93 closenet.hut.fi
+cvs.openbsd.org,199.185.137.3 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
+.Ed
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa /etc/sshd_config
+Contains configuration data for
+.Nm sshd .
+This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
+(though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These three files contain the private parts of the host keys.
+These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+accessible to others.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not start if this file is group/world-accessible.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh_host_key.pub, /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+These three files contain the public parts of the host keys.
+These files should be world-readable but writable only by
+root.
+Their contents should match the respective private parts.
+These files are not
+really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
+the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
+These files are created using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Pa /etc/moduli
+Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
+.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
+Contains the process ID of the
+.Nm
+listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
+concurrently for different ports, this contains the pid of the one
+started last).
+The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+Lists the public keys (RSA or DSA) that can be used to log into the user's account.
+This file must be readable by root (which may on some machines imply
+it being world-readable if the user's home directory resides on an NFS
+volume).
+It is recommended that it not be accessible by others.
+The format of this file is described above.
+Users will place the contents of their
+.Pa identity.pub ,
+.Pa id_dsa.pub
+and/or
+.Pa id_rsa.pub
+files into this file, as described in
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Pa "/etc/ssh_known_hosts" and "$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts"
+These files are consulted when using rhosts with RSA host
+authentication or protocol version 2 hostbased authentication
+to check the public key of the host.
+The key must be listed in one of these files to be accepted.
+The client uses the same files
+to verify that it is connecting to the correct remote host.
+These files should be writable only by root/the owner.
+.Pa /etc/ssh_known_hosts
+should be world-readable, and
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+can but need not be world-readable.
+.It Pa /etc/nologin
+If this file exists,
+.Nm
+refuses to let anyone except root log in.
+The contents of the file
+are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
+refused.
+The file should be world-readable.
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny
+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
+Further details are described in
+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
+.It Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+This file contains host-username pairs, separated by a space, one per
+line.
+The given user on the corresponding host is permitted to log in
+without password.
+The same file is used by rlogind and rshd.
+The file must
+be writable only by the user; it is recommended that it not be
+accessible by others.
+.Pp
+If is also possible to use netgroups in the file.
+Either host or user
+name may be of the form +@groupname to specify all hosts or all users
+in the group.
+.It Pa $HOME/.shosts
+For ssh,
+this file is exactly the same as for
+.Pa .rhosts .
+However, this file is
+not used by rlogin and rshd, so using this permits access using SSH only.
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+This file is used during
+.Pa .rhosts
+authentication.
+In the simplest form, this file contains host names, one per line.
+Users on
+those hosts are permitted to log in without a password, provided they
+have the same user name on both machines.
+The host name may also be
+followed by a user name; such users are permitted to log in as
+.Em any
+user on this machine (except root).
+Additionally, the syntax
+.Dq +@group
+can be used to specify netgroups.
+Negated entries start with
+.Ql \&- .
+.Pp
+If the client host/user is successfully matched in this file, login is
+automatically permitted provided the client and server user names are the
+same.
+Additionally, successful RSA host authentication is normally required.
+This file must be writable only by root; it is recommended
+that it be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.Sy "Warning: It is almost never a good idea to use user names in"
+.Pa hosts.equiv .
+Beware that it really means that the named user(s) can log in as
+.Em anybody ,
+which includes bin, daemon, adm, and other accounts that own critical
+binaries and directories.
+Using a user name practically grants the user root access.
+The only valid use for user names that I can think
+of is in negative entries.
+.Pp
+Note that this warning also applies to rsh/rlogin.
+.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+This is processed exactly as
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv .
+However, this file may be useful in environments that want to run both
+rsh/rlogin and ssh.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment
+This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
+It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
+.Ql # ) ,
+and assignment lines of the form name=value.
+The file should be writable
+only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc
+If this file exists, it is run with /bin/sh after reading the
+environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
+If X11 spoofing is in use, this will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
+standard input (and
+.Ev DISPLAY
+in environment).
+This must call
+.Xr xauth 1
+in that case.
+.Pp
+The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
+which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
+accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
+.Pp
+This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
+something similar to:
+.Bd -literal
+ if read proto cookie; then
+ echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie | xauth -q -
+ fi
+.Ed
+.Pp
+If this file does not exist,
+.Pa /etc/sshrc
+is run, and if that
+does not exist either, xauth is used to store the cookie.
+.Pp
+This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+readable by anyone else.
+.It Pa /etc/sshrc
+Like
+.Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc .
+This can be used to specify
+machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
+This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
+.El
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr login.conf 5 ,
+.Xr moduli 5 ,
+.Xr sftp-server 8
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A T. Kivinen
+.%A M. Saarinen
+.%A T. Rinne
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%T "SSH Protocol Architecture"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-09.txt
+.%D July 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%A M. Friedl
+.%A N. Provos
+.%A W. A. Simpson
+.%T "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the SSH Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-dh-group-exchange-01.txt
+.%D April 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
+ * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
+ * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
+ * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
+ * authentication agent connections.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.209 2001/11/10 13:19:45 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "mpaux.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+#include <tcpd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+int allow_severity = LOG_INFO;
+int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
+#ifndef O_NOCTTY
+#define O_NOCTTY 0
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+/* Server configuration options. */
+ServerOptions options;
+
+/* Name of the server configuration file. */
+char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
+ * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6.
+ */
+#ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT
+int IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+#else
+int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
+ * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
+ * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
+ * the first connection.
+ */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
+int test_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+int inetd_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+
+/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+int log_stderr = 0;
+
+/* Saved arguments to main(). */
+char **saved_argv;
+int saved_argc;
+
+/*
+ * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
+ * signal handler.
+ */
+#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
+int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
+int num_listen_socks = 0;
+
+/*
+ * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
+ * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
+ */
+char *client_version_string = NULL;
+char *server_version_string = NULL;
+
+/* for rekeying XXX fixme */
+Kex *xxx_kex;
+
+/*
+ * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
+ * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
+ * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
+ * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
+ * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
+ * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
+ */
+struct {
+ Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
+ Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
+ Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
+ int have_ssh1_key;
+ int have_ssh2_key;
+ u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+} sensitive_data;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
+ * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
+ */
+int key_do_regen = 0;
+
+/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
+int received_sighup = 0;
+int received_sigterm = 0;
+
+/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
+u_char session_id[16];
+
+/* same for ssh2 */
+u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+int session_id2_len = 0;
+
+/* record remote hostname or ip */
+u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
+
+/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+
+static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
+static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
+
+/*
+ * Close all listening sockets
+ */
+static void
+close_listen_socks(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+ close(listen_socks[i]);
+ num_listen_socks = -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
+ * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
+ * the server key).
+ */
+static void
+sighup_handler(int sig)
+{
+ received_sighup = 1;
+ signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
+ * Restarts the server.
+ */
+static void
+sighup_restart(void)
+{
+ log("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
+ close_listen_socks();
+ execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
+ log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
+ */
+static void
+sigterm_handler(int sig)
+{
+ received_sigterm = sig;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
+ * reap any zombies left by exited children.
+ */
+static void
+main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+ int status;
+
+ while (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG) > 0)
+ ;
+
+ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
+ */
+static void
+grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+{
+ /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
+
+ /* Close the connection. */
+ packet_close();
+
+ /* Log error and exit. */
+ fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s.", get_remote_ipaddr());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
+ * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
+ * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
+ * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
+ * problems.
+ */
+static void
+generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
+{
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
+ sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
+ key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
+ options.server_key_bits);
+ verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rand & 0xff;
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+ arc4random_stir();
+}
+
+static void
+key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
+{
+ int save_errno = errno;
+ signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ errno = save_errno;
+ key_do_regen = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
+{
+ int i, mismatch;
+ int remote_major, remote_minor;
+ int major, minor;
+ char *s;
+ char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
+ char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
+ (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
+ major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
+ minor = 99;
+ } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
+ minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
+ } else {
+ major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
+ minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+ }
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
+ server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+
+ if (client_version_string == NULL) {
+ /* Send our protocol version identification. */
+ if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string))
+ != strlen(server_version_string)) {
+ log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+
+ /* Read other side's version identification. */
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+ if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
+ log("Did not receive identification string from %s",
+ get_remote_ipaddr());
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ if (buf[i] == '\r') {
+ buf[i] = 0;
+ /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
+ if (i == 12 &&
+ strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
+ break;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+ buf[i] = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+ client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
+ * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+ */
+ if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+ &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
+ s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
+ (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
+ close(sock_in);
+ close(sock_out);
+ log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
+ client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
+ remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+
+ compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
+ log("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+
+ mismatch = 0;
+ switch(remote_major) {
+ case 1:
+ if (remote_minor == 99) {
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
+ enable_compat20();
+ else
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (remote_minor < 3) {
+ packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
+ "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
+ } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
+ /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
+ enable_compat13();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ enable_compat20();
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ chop(server_version_string);
+ debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
+
+ if (mismatch) {
+ s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
+ (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
+ close(sock_in);
+ close(sock_out);
+ log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
+ get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ server_version_string, client_version_string);
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
+void
+destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+ key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+ }
+ for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
+ memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+}
+
+static char *
+list_hostkey_types(void)
+{
+ static char buf[1024];
+ int i;
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+ if (key == NULL)
+ continue;
+ switch(key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ strlcat(buf, key_ssh_name(key), sizeof buf);
+ strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ i = strlen(buf);
+ if (i > 0 && buf[i-1] == ',')
+ buf[i-1] = '\0';
+ debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", buf);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+static Key *
+get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
+{
+ int i;
+ for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+ if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
+ return key;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
+ * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
+ * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
+ * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
+ */
+static int
+drop_connection(int startups)
+{
+ double p, r;
+
+ if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
+ return 0;
+ if (startups >= options.max_startups)
+ return 1;
+ if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
+ return 1;
+
+ p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
+ p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
+ p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin);
+ p += options.max_startups_rate;
+ p /= 100.0;
+ r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX;
+
+ debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r);
+ return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int *startup_pipes = NULL; /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
+int startup_pipe; /* in child */
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the daemon.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern int optind;
+ int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
+ pid_t pid;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ fd_set *fdset;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ const char *remote_ip;
+ int remote_port;
+ FILE *f;
+ struct linger linger;
+ struct addrinfo *ai;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+ int listen_sock, maxfd;
+ int startup_p[2];
+ int startups = 0;
+ Key *key;
+ int ret, key_used = 0;
+
+ __progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+ init_rng();
+
+ /* Save argv. */
+ saved_argc = ac;
+ saved_argv = av;
+
+ /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
+ initialize_server_options(&options);
+
+ /* Parse command-line arguments. */
+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case '4':
+ IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case '6':
+ IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ case 'f':
+ config_file_name = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'd':
+ if (0 == debug_flag) {
+ debug_flag = 1;
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
+ options.log_level++;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Too high debugging level.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+ no_daemon_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ log_stderr = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ inetd_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'Q':
+ /* ignored */
+ break;
+ case 'q':
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
+ if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
+ if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'V':
+ client_version_string = optarg;
+ /* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */
+ inetd_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ test_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
+ break;
+ case '?':
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE);
+ fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -D Do not fork into daemon mode\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -t Only test configuration file and keys\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 600)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n",
+ _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE);
+ fprintf(stderr, " -u len Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+ channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
+
+ /*
+ * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
+ * key (unless started from inetd)
+ */
+ log_init(__progname,
+ options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility == -1 ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
+ !inetd_flag);
+
+#ifdef _CRAY
+ /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now!
+ * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
+ */
+ drop_cray_privs();
+#endif
+
+ seed_rng();
+
+ /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */
+ read_server_config(&options, config_file_name);
+
+ /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+ fill_default_server_options(&options);
+
+ /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
+ if (optind < ac) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION);
+
+ /* load private host keys */
+ sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files*sizeof(Key*));
+ for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+ sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
+ sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
+ sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ error("Could not load host key: %s",
+ options.host_key_files[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+ switch(key->type){
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
+ sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
+ key_type(key));
+ }
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
+ log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+ }
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+ log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+ }
+ if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+ log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* Check certain values for sanity. */
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
+ if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
+ options.server_key_bits > 32768) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
+ * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
+ * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
+ */
+ if (options.server_key_bits >
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED &&
+ options.server_key_bits <
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ options.server_key_bits =
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
+ debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
+ options.server_key_bits);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
+ if (test_flag)
+ exit(0);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW
+ (void) set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+#endif
+
+ /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
+ if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
+ log_stderr = 1;
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ /*
+ * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
+ * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
+ * exits.
+ */
+ if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+ int fd;
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+ if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
+ fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
+ close(fd);
+ }
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+ }
+ /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ /* Initialize the random number generator. */
+ arc4random_stir();
+
+ /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ unmounted if desired. */
+ chdir("/");
+
+ /* ignore SIGPIPE */
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+ /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
+ if (inetd_flag) {
+ int s1;
+ s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */
+ dup(s1);
+ sock_in = dup(0);
+ sock_out = dup(1);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ /*
+ * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
+ * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if
+ * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
+ */
+ debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+ generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+ } else {
+ for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+ if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
+ fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
+ "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+ error("getnameinfo failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Create socket for listening. */
+ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (listen_sock < 0) {
+ /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
+ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
+ error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
+ close(listen_sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Set socket options. We try to make the port
+ * reusable and have it close as fast as possible
+ * without waiting in unnecessary wait states on
+ * close.
+ */
+ setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
+ (void *) &on, sizeof(on));
+ linger.l_onoff = 1;
+ linger.l_linger = 5;
+ setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER,
+ (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger));
+
+ debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
+
+ /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
+ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ if (!ai->ai_next)
+ error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+ strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
+ close(listen_sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
+ num_listen_socks++;
+
+ /* Start listening on the port. */
+ log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
+ if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0)
+ fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
+
+ if (!num_listen_socks)
+ fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
+
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+ generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+
+ /*
+ * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs
+ * listen_sock.
+ */
+ signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+
+ signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+
+ /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
+ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+
+ /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
+ if (!debug_flag) {
+ /*
+ * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
+ * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to
+ * do this before the bind above because the bind will
+ * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
+ * overwrite any old pid in the file.
+ */
+ f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
+ if (f) {
+ fprintf(f, "%u\n", (u_int) getpid());
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* setup fd set for listen */
+ fdset = NULL;
+ maxfd = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+ if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
+ maxfd = listen_socks[i];
+ /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
+ startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int));
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
+ * the daemon is killed with a signal.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (received_sighup)
+ sighup_restart();
+ if (fdset != NULL)
+ xfree(fdset);
+ fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
+ memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+ FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+ FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
+
+ /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
+ ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
+ error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (received_sigterm) {
+ log("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ received_sigterm);
+ close_listen_socks();
+ unlink(options.pid_file);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
+ generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+ key_used = 0;
+ key_do_regen = 0;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
+ FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
+ /*
+ * the read end of the pipe is ready
+ * if the child has closed the pipe
+ * after successful authentication
+ * or if the child has died
+ */
+ close(startup_pipes[i]);
+ startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+ startups--;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
+ if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
+ continue;
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+ &fromlen);
+ if (newsock < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
+ error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) {
+ error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
+ debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
+ close(newsock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
+ close(newsock);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
+ if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
+ startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
+ if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
+ maxfd = startup_p[0];
+ startups++;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
+ * we are in debugging mode.
+ */
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ /*
+ * In debugging mode. Close the listening
+ * socket, and start processing the
+ * connection without forking.
+ */
+ debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
+ close_listen_socks();
+ sock_in = newsock;
+ sock_out = newsock;
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ pid = getpid();
+ break;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
+ * the child process the connection. The
+ * parent continues listening.
+ */
+ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Child. Close the listening and max_startup
+ * sockets. Start using the accepted socket.
+ * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
+ * changed). We break out of the loop to handle
+ * the connection.
+ */
+ startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
+ for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
+ if (startup_pipes[j] != -1)
+ close(startup_pipes[j]);
+ close_listen_socks();
+ sock_in = newsock;
+ sock_out = newsock;
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
+ if (pid < 0)
+ error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ else
+ debug("Forked child %d.", pid);
+
+ close(startup_p[1]);
+
+ /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
+ key_used == 0) {
+ /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
+ signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
+ alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
+ key_used = 1;
+ }
+
+ arc4random_stir();
+
+ /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
+ close(newsock);
+ }
+ /* child process check (or debug mode) */
+ if (num_listen_socks < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
+
+ /*
+ * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
+ * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
+ * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
+ */
+ alarm(0);
+ signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+
+ /*
+ * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to
+ * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the
+ * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing.
+ */
+ /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */
+ linger.l_onoff = 1;
+ linger.l_linger = 5;
+ setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger));
+
+ /* Set keepalives if requested. */
+ if (options.keepalives &&
+ setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
+ sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /*
+ * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
+ * not have a key.
+ */
+ packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
+
+ remote_port = get_remote_port();
+ remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+ /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
+ {
+ struct request_info req;
+
+ request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
+ fromhost(&req);
+
+ if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
+ debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
+ refuse(&req);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
+ /* Log the connection. */
+ verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+
+ /*
+ * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+ * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
+ * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
+ * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
+ * are about to discover the bug.
+ */
+ signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
+ if (!debug_flag)
+ alarm(options.login_grace_time);
+
+ sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
+ /*
+ * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
+ * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged
+ * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
+ * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these
+ * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
+ */
+ if (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED ||
+ remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2) {
+ debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, "
+ "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port);
+ options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
+ }
+#if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5)
+ if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() &&
+ options.kerberos_authentication) {
+ debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4.");
+ options.kerberos_authentication = 0;
+ }
+#endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */
+#ifdef AFS
+ /* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */
+ if (k_hasafs()) {
+ k_setpag();
+ k_unlog();
+ }
+#endif /* AFS */
+
+ packet_set_nonblocking();
+
+ /* perform the key exchange */
+ /* authenticate user and start session */
+ if (compat20) {
+ do_ssh2_kex();
+ do_authentication2();
+ } else {
+ do_ssh1_kex();
+ do_authentication();
+ }
+ /* The connection has been terminated. */
+ verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ finish_pam();
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+ packet_close();
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSH1 key exchange
+ */
+static void
+do_ssh1_kex(void)
+{
+ int i, len;
+ int plen, slen;
+ int rsafail = 0;
+ BIGNUM *session_key_int;
+ u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+ u_char cookie[8];
+ u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
+ * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
+ * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
+ * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
+ * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
+ * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
+ * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ cookie[i] = rand & 0xff;
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
+ * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
+ * spoofing.
+ */
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
+
+ /* Store our public server RSA key. */
+ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
+ packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+
+ /* Store our public host RSA key. */
+ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
+ packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
+
+ /* Put protocol flags. */
+ packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
+
+ /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
+ packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
+
+ /* Declare supported authentication types. */
+ auth_mask = 0;
+ if (options.rhosts_authentication)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS;
+ if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
+ if (options.rsa_authentication)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
+ if (options.kerberos_authentication)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS;
+#endif
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
+ if (options.afs_token_passing)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN;
+#endif
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
+ if (options.password_authentication)
+ auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
+ packet_put_int(auth_mask);
+
+ /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
+
+ /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
+ packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+
+ /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
+ cipher_type = packet_get_char();
+
+ if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
+ packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
+
+ /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
+ sent earlier with the public key packet. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
+ packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
+
+ debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
+
+ /* Get the encrypted integer. */
+ session_key_int = BN_new();
+ packet_get_bignum(session_key_int, &slen);
+
+ protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
+ packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
+
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 1 + 8 + slen + 4, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt it using our private server key and private host key (key
+ * with larger modulus first).
+ */
+ if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
+ /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
+ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ }
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ } else {
+ /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
+ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ }
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
+ rsafail++;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
+ * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
+ * key is in the highest bits.
+ */
+ if (!rsafail) {
+ BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
+ len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
+ if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
+ error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
+ "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
+ rsafail++;
+ } else {
+ memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
+ BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
+ session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
+
+ compute_session_id(session_id, cookie,
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
+ sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+ /*
+ * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
+ * session id.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
+ }
+ }
+ if (rsafail) {
+ int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
+ char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
+ MD5_CTX md;
+
+ log("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
+ BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
+ MD5_Init(&md);
+ MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
+ MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+ MD5_Final(session_key, &md);
+ MD5_Init(&md);
+ MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16);
+ MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
+ MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+ MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
+ memset(buf, 0, bytes);
+ xfree(buf);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
+ }
+ /* Destroy the private and public keys. They will no longer be needed. */
+ destroy_sensitive_data();
+
+ /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
+ BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
+
+ /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
+ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
+
+ /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
+ memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
+
+ debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
+
+ /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
+ */
+static void
+do_ssh2_kex(void)
+{
+ Kex *kex;
+
+ if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
+ }
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
+ compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
+
+ if (options.macs != NULL) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+ }
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
+
+ /* start key exchange */
+ kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
+
+ xxx_kex = kex;
+
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+
+ session_id2 = kex->session_id;
+ session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
+ packet_put_cstring("markus");
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+#endif
+ debug("KEX done");
+}
--- /dev/null
+# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.42 2001/09/20 20:57:51 mouring Exp $
+
+# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin
+
+# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See sshd(8)
+# for more information.
+
+Port 22
+#Protocol 2,1
+#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+#ListenAddress ::
+
+# HostKey for protocol version 1
+HostKey /etc/ssh_host_key
+# HostKeys for protocol version 2
+HostKey /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key
+HostKey /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key
+
+# Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
+KeyRegenerationInterval 3600
+ServerKeyBits 768
+
+# Logging
+SyslogFacility AUTH
+LogLevel INFO
+#obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
+
+# Authentication:
+
+LoginGraceTime 600
+PermitRootLogin yes
+StrictModes yes
+
+RSAAuthentication yes
+PubkeyAuthentication yes
+#AuthorizedKeysFile %h/.ssh/authorized_keys
+
+# rhosts authentication should not be used
+RhostsAuthentication no
+# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
+IgnoreRhosts yes
+# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh_known_hosts
+RhostsRSAAuthentication no
+# similar for protocol version 2
+HostbasedAuthentication no
+# Uncomment if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for RhostsRSAAuthentication
+#IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes
+
+# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+PasswordAuthentication yes
+PermitEmptyPasswords no
+
+# Uncomment to disable s/key passwords
+#ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+
+# Uncomment to enable PAM keyboard-interactive authentication
+# Warning: enabling this may bypass the setting of 'PasswordAuthentication'
+#PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt yes
+
+# To change Kerberos options
+#KerberosAuthentication no
+#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+#AFSTokenPassing no
+#KerberosTicketCleanup no
+
+# Kerberos TGT Passing does only work with the AFS kaserver
+#KerberosTgtPassing yes
+
+X11Forwarding no
+X11DisplayOffset 10
+PrintMotd yes
+#PrintLastLog no
+KeepAlive yes
+#UseLogin no
+
+#MaxStartups 10:30:60
+#Banner /etc/issue.net
+#ReverseMappingCheck yes
+
+Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does. We cannot
+ * easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are
+ * several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of
+ * login the current system has. Also, we want to be able to execute commands
+ * on a tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.2 2001/03/24 16:43:27 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include "loginrec.h"
+
+/*
+ * Returns the time when the user last logged in. Returns 0 if the
+ * information is not available. This must be called before record_login.
+ * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf.
+ */
+
+u_long
+get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
+ char *buf, u_int bufsize)
+{
+ struct logininfo li;
+
+ login_get_lastlog(&li, uid);
+ strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize);
+ return li.tv_sec;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Records that the user has logged in. I these parts of operating systems
+ * were more standardized.
+ */
+
+void
+record_login(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, uid_t uid,
+ const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr)
+{
+ struct logininfo *li;
+
+ li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname);
+ login_set_addr(li, addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr));
+ login_login(li);
+ login_free_entry(li);
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+void
+record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
+ const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr)
+{
+ struct logininfo *li;
+
+ li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname);
+ login_set_addr(li, addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr));
+ login_utmp_only(li);
+ login_free_entry(li);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Records that the user has logged out. */
+
+void
+record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname)
+{
+ struct logininfo *li;
+
+ li = login_alloc_entry(pid, NULL, NULL, ttyname);
+ login_logout(li);
+ login_free_entry(li);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+#ifndef SSHLOGIN_H
+#define SSHLOGIN_H
+
+void
+record_login(pid_t, const char *, const char *, uid_t,
+ const char *, struct sockaddr *);
+void record_logout(pid_t, const char *);
+u_long get_last_login_time(uid_t, const char *, char *, u_int);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.3 2001/07/22 21:32:27 markus Exp $");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
+
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* Pty allocated with _getpty gets broken if we do I_PUSH:es to it. */
+#if defined(HAVE__GETPTY) || defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
+#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
+# include <pty.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) && defined(HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H)
+# include <sys/stropts.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef O_NOCTTY
+#define O_NOCTTY 0
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Allocates and opens a pty. Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or
+ * nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated. On success, open file
+ * descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are
+ * returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters).
+ */
+
+int
+pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) || defined(BSD4_4)
+ /* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */
+ char *name;
+ int i;
+
+ i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ name = ttyname(*ttyfd);
+ if (!name)
+ fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails.");
+
+ strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); /* possible truncation */
+ return 1;
+#else /* HAVE_OPENPTY */
+#ifdef HAVE__GETPTY
+ /*
+ * _getpty(3) exists in SGI Irix 4.x, 5.x & 6.x -- it generates more
+ * pty's automagically when needed
+ */
+ char *slave;
+
+ slave = _getpty(ptyfd, O_RDWR, 0622, 0);
+ if (slave == NULL) {
+ error("_getpty: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ strlcpy(namebuf, slave, namebuflen);
+ /* Open the slave side. */
+ *ttyfd = open(namebuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (*ttyfd < 0) {
+ error("%.200s: %.100s", namebuf, strerror(errno));
+ close(*ptyfd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+#else /* HAVE__GETPTY */
+#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
+ /*
+ * This code is used e.g. on Solaris 2.x. (Note that Solaris 2.3
+ * also has bsd-style ptys, but they simply do not work.)
+ */
+ int ptm;
+ char *pts;
+ mysig_t old_signal;
+
+ ptm = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (ptm < 0) {
+ error("/dev/ptmx: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ old_signal = mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ if (grantpt(ptm) < 0) {
+ error("grantpt: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ mysignal(SIGCHLD, old_signal);
+ if (unlockpt(ptm) < 0) {
+ error("unlockpt: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pts = ptsname(ptm);
+ if (pts == NULL)
+ error("Slave pty side name could not be obtained.");
+ strlcpy(namebuf, pts, namebuflen);
+ *ptyfd = ptm;
+
+ /* Open the slave side. */
+ *ttyfd = open(namebuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (*ttyfd < 0) {
+ error("%.100s: %.100s", namebuf, strerror(errno));
+ close(*ptyfd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * Push the appropriate streams modules, as described in Solaris pts(7).
+ * HP-UX pts(7) doesn't have ttcompat module.
+ */
+ if (ioctl(*ttyfd, I_PUSH, "ptem") < 0)
+ error("ioctl I_PUSH ptem: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (ioctl(*ttyfd, I_PUSH, "ldterm") < 0)
+ error("ioctl I_PUSH ldterm: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#ifndef __hpux
+ if (ioctl(*ttyfd, I_PUSH, "ttcompat") < 0)
+ error("ioctl I_PUSH ttcompat: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+#endif
+ return 1;
+#else /* HAVE_DEV_PTMX */
+#ifdef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC
+ /* AIX-style pty code. */
+ const char *name;
+
+ *ptyfd = open("/dev/ptc", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (*ptyfd < 0) {
+ error("Could not open /dev/ptc: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ name = ttyname(*ptyfd);
+ if (!name)
+ fatal("Open of /dev/ptc returns device for which ttyname fails.");
+ strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen);
+ *ttyfd = open(name, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (*ttyfd < 0) {
+ error("Could not open pty slave side %.100s: %.100s",
+ name, strerror(errno));
+ close(*ptyfd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+#else /* HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC */
+#ifdef _CRAY
+ char buf[64];
+ int i;
+ int highpty;
+
+#ifdef _SC_CRAY_NPTY
+ highpty = sysconf(_SC_CRAY_NPTY);
+ if (highpty == -1)
+ highpty = 128;
+#else
+ highpty = 128;
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < highpty; i++) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/dev/pty/%03d", i);
+ *ptyfd = open(buf, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
+ if (*ptyfd < 0)
+ continue;
+ snprintf(namebuf, namebuflen, "/dev/ttyp%03d", i);
+ /* Open the slave side. */
+ *ttyfd = open(namebuf, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
+ if (*ttyfd < 0) {
+ error("%.100s: %.100s", namebuf, strerror(errno));
+ close(*ptyfd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+#else
+ /* BSD-style pty code. */
+ char buf[64];
+ int i;
+ const char *ptymajors = "pqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnoABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
+ const char *ptyminors = "0123456789abcdef";
+ int num_minors = strlen(ptyminors);
+ int num_ptys = strlen(ptymajors) * num_minors;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_ptys; i++) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "/dev/pty%c%c", ptymajors[i / num_minors],
+ ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
+ snprintf(namebuf, namebuflen, "/dev/tty%c%c",
+ ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
+
+ *ptyfd = open(buf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (*ptyfd < 0) {
+ /* Try SCO style naming */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "/dev/ptyp%d", i);
+ snprintf(namebuf, namebuflen, "/dev/ttyp%d", i);
+ *ptyfd = open(buf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (*ptyfd < 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Open the slave side. */
+ *ttyfd = open(namebuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (*ttyfd < 0) {
+ error("%.100s: %.100s", namebuf, strerror(errno));
+ close(*ptyfd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+#endif /* CRAY */
+#endif /* HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC */
+#endif /* HAVE_DEV_PTMX */
+#endif /* HAVE__GETPTY */
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */
+}
+
+/* Releases the tty. Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */
+
+void
+pty_release(const char *ttyname)
+{
+ if (chown(ttyname, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0)
+ error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno));
+ if (chmod(ttyname, (mode_t) 0666) < 0)
+ error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/* Makes the tty the processes controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */
+
+void
+pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname)
+{
+ int fd;
+#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
+ void *old;
+#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
+
+#ifdef _CRAY
+ if (setsid() < 0)
+ error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ fd = open(ttyname, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd != -1) {
+ mysignal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
+ ioctl(fd, TCVHUP, (char *)NULL);
+ mysignal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+ setpgid(0, 0);
+ close(fd);
+ } else {
+ error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty.");
+ }
+
+ debug("Setting controlling tty using TCSETCTTY.");
+ ioctl(*ttyfd, TCSETCTTY, NULL);
+ fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ error("%.100s: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno));
+ close(*ttyfd);
+ *ttyfd = fd;
+#else /* _CRAY */
+
+ /* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
+ close(fd);
+ }
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+ if (setsid() < 0)
+ error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling
+ * tty.
+ */
+ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty.");
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ /* Make it our controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCSCTTY
+ debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY.");
+ if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0)
+ error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif /* TIOCSCTTY */
+#ifdef HAVE_NEWS4
+ if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0)
+ error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno));
+#endif /* HAVE_NEWS4 */
+#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
+ old = mysignal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
+ vhangup();
+ mysignal(SIGHUP, old);
+#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
+ fd = open(ttyname, O_RDWR);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ error("%.100s: %.100s", ttyname, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+#ifdef USE_VHANGUP
+ close(*ttyfd);
+ *ttyfd = fd;
+#else /* USE_VHANGUP */
+ close(fd);
+#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */
+ }
+ /* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */
+ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ else {
+ close(fd);
+ }
+#endif /* _CRAY */
+}
+
+/* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */
+
+void
+pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, int row, int col,
+ int xpixel, int ypixel)
+{
+ struct winsize w;
+ w.ws_row = row;
+ w.ws_col = col;
+ w.ws_xpixel = xpixel;
+ w.ws_ypixel = ypixel;
+ (void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w);
+}
+
+void
+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyname)
+{
+ struct group *grp;
+ gid_t gid;
+ mode_t mode;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */
+ grp = getgrnam("tty");
+ if (grp) {
+ gid = grp->gr_gid;
+ mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP;
+ } else {
+ gid = pw->pw_gid;
+ mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Change owner and mode of the tty as required.
+ * Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/
+ * tty is owned by root.
+ */
+ if (stat(ttyname, &st))
+ fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", ttyname,
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
+ if (chown(ttyname, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EROFS &&
+ (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0))
+ error("chown(%.100s, %d, %d) failed: %.100s",
+ ttyname, pw->pw_uid, gid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ else
+ fatal("chown(%.100s, %d, %d) failed: %.100s",
+ ttyname, pw->pw_uid, gid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) {
+ if (chmod(ttyname, mode) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EROFS &&
+ (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0)
+ error("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
+ ttyname, mode, strerror(errno));
+ else
+ fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
+ ttyname, mode, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Functions for allocating a pseudo-terminal and making it the controlling
+ * tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.h,v 1.3 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef SSHPTY_H
+#define SSHPTY_H
+
+int pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, int);
+void pty_release(const char *);
+void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
+void pty_change_window_size(int, int, int, int, int);
+void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
+
+#endif /* SSHPTY_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sshtty.c,v 1.1 2001/04/14 16:33:20 stevesk Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "sshtty.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static struct termios _saved_tio;
+static int _in_raw_mode = 0;
+
+int
+in_raw_mode(void)
+{
+ return _in_raw_mode;
+}
+
+struct termios
+get_saved_tio(void)
+{
+ return _saved_tio;
+}
+
+void
+leave_raw_mode(void)
+{
+ if (!_in_raw_mode)
+ return;
+ if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &_saved_tio) == -1)
+ perror("tcsetattr");
+ else
+ _in_raw_mode = 0;
+
+ fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) leave_raw_mode, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+enter_raw_mode(void)
+{
+ struct termios tio;
+
+ if (tcgetattr(fileno(stdin), &tio) == -1) {
+ perror("tcgetattr");
+ return;
+ }
+ _saved_tio = tio;
+ tio.c_iflag |= IGNPAR;
+ tio.c_iflag &= ~(ISTRIP | INLCR | IGNCR | ICRNL | IXON | IXANY | IXOFF);
+ tio.c_lflag &= ~(ISIG | ICANON | ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL);
+#ifdef IEXTEN
+ tio.c_lflag &= ~IEXTEN;
+#endif
+ tio.c_oflag &= ~OPOST;
+ tio.c_cc[VMIN] = 1;
+ tio.c_cc[VTIME] = 0;
+ if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &tio) == -1)
+ perror("tcsetattr");
+ else
+ _in_raw_mode = 1;
+
+ fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) leave_raw_mode, NULL);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: sshtty.h,v 1.2 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SSHTTY_H
+#define SSHTTY_H
+
+#include <termios.h>
+
+int in_raw_mode(void);
+struct termios get_saved_tio(void);
+void leave_raw_mode(void);
+void enter_raw_mode(void);
+
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: tildexpand.c,v 1.12 2001/08/11 22:51:27 jakob Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "tildexpand.h"
+
+/*
+ * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
+ * Warning: this calls getpw*.
+ */
+char *
+tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t my_uid)
+{
+ const char *cp;
+ u_int userlen;
+ char *expanded;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ char user[100];
+ int len;
+
+ /* Return immediately if no tilde. */
+ if (filename[0] != '~')
+ return xstrdup(filename);
+
+ /* Skip the tilde. */
+ filename++;
+
+ /* Find where the username ends. */
+ cp = strchr(filename, '/');
+ if (cp)
+ userlen = cp - filename; /* Something after username. */
+ else
+ userlen = strlen(filename); /* Nothing after username. */
+ if (userlen == 0)
+ pw = getpwuid(my_uid); /* Own home directory. */
+ else {
+ /* Tilde refers to someone elses home directory. */
+ if (userlen > sizeof(user) - 1)
+ fatal("User name after tilde too long.");
+ memcpy(user, filename, userlen);
+ user[userlen] = 0;
+ pw = getpwnam(user);
+ }
+ if (!pw)
+ fatal("Unknown user %100s.", user);
+
+ /* If referring to someones home directory, return it now. */
+ if (!cp) {
+ /* Only home directory specified */
+ return xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+ }
+ /* Build a path combining the specified directory and path. */
+ len = strlen(pw->pw_dir) + strlen(cp + 1) + 2;
+ if (len > MAXPATHLEN)
+ fatal("Home directory too long (%d > %d", len-1, MAXPATHLEN-1);
+ expanded = xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(expanded, len, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", cp + 1);
+ return expanded;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: tildexpand.h,v 1.4 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Encoding and decoding of terminal modes in a portable way.
+ * Much of the format is defined in ttymodes.h; it is included multiple times
+ * into this file with the appropriate macro definitions to generate the
+ * suitable code.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.14 2001/06/24 17:18:31 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+
+#define TTY_OP_END 0
+/*
+ * uint32 (u_int) follows speed in SSH1 and SSH2
+ */
+#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1 192
+#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1 193
+#define TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2 128
+#define TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2 129
+
+/*
+ * Converts POSIX speed_t to a baud rate. The values of the
+ * constants for speed_t are not themselves portable.
+ */
+static int
+speed_to_baud(speed_t speed)
+{
+ switch (speed) {
+ case B0:
+ return 0;
+ case B50:
+ return 50;
+ case B75:
+ return 75;
+ case B110:
+ return 110;
+ case B134:
+ return 134;
+ case B150:
+ return 150;
+ case B200:
+ return 200;
+ case B300:
+ return 300;
+ case B600:
+ return 600;
+ case B1200:
+ return 1200;
+ case B1800:
+ return 1800;
+ case B2400:
+ return 2400;
+ case B4800:
+ return 4800;
+ case B9600:
+ return 9600;
+
+#ifdef B19200
+ case B19200:
+ return 19200;
+#else /* B19200 */
+#ifdef EXTA
+ case EXTA:
+ return 19200;
+#endif /* EXTA */
+#endif /* B19200 */
+
+#ifdef B38400
+ case B38400:
+ return 38400;
+#else /* B38400 */
+#ifdef EXTB
+ case EXTB:
+ return 38400;
+#endif /* EXTB */
+#endif /* B38400 */
+
+#ifdef B7200
+ case B7200:
+ return 7200;
+#endif /* B7200 */
+#ifdef B14400
+ case B14400:
+ return 14400;
+#endif /* B14400 */
+#ifdef B28800
+ case B28800:
+ return 28800;
+#endif /* B28800 */
+#ifdef B57600
+ case B57600:
+ return 57600;
+#endif /* B57600 */
+#ifdef B76800
+ case B76800:
+ return 76800;
+#endif /* B76800 */
+#ifdef B115200
+ case B115200:
+ return 115200;
+#endif /* B115200 */
+#ifdef B230400
+ case B230400:
+ return 230400;
+#endif /* B230400 */
+ default:
+ return 9600;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Converts a numeric baud rate to a POSIX speed_t.
+ */
+static speed_t
+baud_to_speed(int baud)
+{
+ switch (baud) {
+ case 0:
+ return B0;
+ case 50:
+ return B50;
+ case 75:
+ return B75;
+ case 110:
+ return B110;
+ case 134:
+ return B134;
+ case 150:
+ return B150;
+ case 200:
+ return B200;
+ case 300:
+ return B300;
+ case 600:
+ return B600;
+ case 1200:
+ return B1200;
+ case 1800:
+ return B1800;
+ case 2400:
+ return B2400;
+ case 4800:
+ return B4800;
+ case 9600:
+ return B9600;
+
+#ifdef B19200
+ case 19200:
+ return B19200;
+#else /* B19200 */
+#ifdef EXTA
+ case 19200:
+ return EXTA;
+#endif /* EXTA */
+#endif /* B19200 */
+
+#ifdef B38400
+ case 38400:
+ return B38400;
+#else /* B38400 */
+#ifdef EXTB
+ case 38400:
+ return EXTB;
+#endif /* EXTB */
+#endif /* B38400 */
+
+#ifdef B7200
+ case 7200:
+ return B7200;
+#endif /* B7200 */
+#ifdef B14400
+ case 14400:
+ return B14400;
+#endif /* B14400 */
+#ifdef B28800
+ case 28800:
+ return B28800;
+#endif /* B28800 */
+#ifdef B57600
+ case 57600:
+ return B57600;
+#endif /* B57600 */
+#ifdef B76800
+ case 76800:
+ return B76800;
+#endif /* B76800 */
+#ifdef B115200
+ case 115200:
+ return B115200;
+#endif /* B115200 */
+#ifdef B230400
+ case 230400:
+ return B230400;
+#endif /* B230400 */
+ default:
+ return B9600;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd
+ * or tiop in a portable manner, and appends the modes to a packet
+ * being constructed.
+ */
+void
+tty_make_modes(int fd, struct termios *tiop)
+{
+ struct termios tio;
+ int baud;
+ Buffer buf;
+ int tty_op_ospeed, tty_op_ispeed;
+ void (*put_arg)(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+ buffer_init(&buf);
+ if (compat20) {
+ tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2;
+ tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2;
+ put_arg = buffer_put_int;
+ } else {
+ tty_op_ospeed = TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1;
+ tty_op_ispeed = TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1;
+ put_arg = (void (*)(Buffer *, u_int)) buffer_put_char;
+ }
+
+ if (tiop == NULL) {
+ if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
+ log("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else
+ tio = *tiop;
+
+ /* Store input and output baud rates. */
+ baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetospeed(&tio));
+ debug3("tty_make_modes: ospeed %d", baud);
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ospeed);
+ buffer_put_int(&buf, baud);
+ baud = speed_to_baud(cfgetispeed(&tio));
+ debug3("tty_make_modes: ispeed %d", baud);
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, tty_op_ispeed);
+ buffer_put_int(&buf, baud);
+
+ /* Store values of mode flags. */
+#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
+ debug3("tty_make_modes: %d %d", OP, tio.c_cc[NAME]); \
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \
+ put_arg(&buf, tio.c_cc[NAME]);
+
+#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
+ debug3("tty_make_modes: %d %d", OP, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0)); \
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, OP); \
+ put_arg(&buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0));
+
+#include "ttymodes.h"
+
+#undef TTYCHAR
+#undef TTYMODE
+
+end:
+ /* Mark end of mode data. */
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, TTY_OP_END);
+ if (compat20)
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf));
+ else
+ packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&buf), buffer_len(&buf));
+ buffer_free(&buf);
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd in a portable
+ * manner from a packet being read.
+ */
+void
+tty_parse_modes(int fd, int *n_bytes_ptr)
+{
+ struct termios tio;
+ int opcode, baud;
+ int n_bytes = 0;
+ int failure = 0;
+ u_int (*get_arg)(void);
+ int arg, arg_size;
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ *n_bytes_ptr = packet_get_int();
+ debug3("tty_parse_modes: SSH2 n_bytes %d", *n_bytes_ptr);
+ if (*n_bytes_ptr == 0)
+ return;
+ get_arg = packet_get_int;
+ arg_size = 4;
+ } else {
+ get_arg = packet_get_char;
+ arg_size = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get old attributes for the terminal. We will modify these
+ * flags. I am hoping that if there are any machine-specific
+ * modes, they will initially have reasonable values.
+ */
+ if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
+ log("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ failure = -1;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ n_bytes += 1;
+ opcode = packet_get_char();
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case TTY_OP_END:
+ goto set;
+
+ /* XXX: future conflict possible */
+ case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO1:
+ case TTY_OP_ISPEED_PROTO2:
+ n_bytes += 4;
+ baud = packet_get_int();
+ debug3("tty_parse_modes: ispeed %d", baud);
+ if (failure != -1 && cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
+ error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud);
+ break;
+
+ /* XXX: future conflict possible */
+ case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO1:
+ case TTY_OP_OSPEED_PROTO2:
+ n_bytes += 4;
+ baud = packet_get_int();
+ debug3("tty_parse_modes: ospeed %d", baud);
+ if (failure != -1 && cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
+ error("cfsetospeed failed for %d", baud);
+ break;
+
+#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
+ case OP: \
+ n_bytes += arg_size; \
+ tio.c_cc[NAME] = get_arg(); \
+ debug3("tty_parse_modes: %d %d", OP, tio.c_cc[NAME]); \
+ break;
+#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
+ case OP: \
+ n_bytes += arg_size; \
+ if ((arg = get_arg())) \
+ tio.FIELD |= NAME; \
+ else \
+ tio.FIELD &= ~NAME; \
+ debug3("tty_parse_modes: %d %d", OP, arg); \
+ break;
+
+#include "ttymodes.h"
+
+#undef TTYCHAR
+#undef TTYMODE
+
+ default:
+ debug("Ignoring unsupported tty mode opcode %d (0x%x)",
+ opcode, opcode);
+ if (!compat20) {
+ /*
+ * SSH1:
+ * Opcodes 1 to 127 are defined to have
+ * a one-byte argument.
+ * Opcodes 128 to 159 are defined to have
+ * an integer argument.
+ */
+ if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 128) {
+ n_bytes += 1;
+ (void) packet_get_char();
+ break;
+ } else if (opcode >= 128 && opcode < 160) {
+ n_bytes += 4;
+ (void) packet_get_int();
+ break;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * It is a truly undefined opcode (160 to 255).
+ * We have no idea about its arguments. So we
+ * must stop parsing. Note that some data may be
+ * left in the packet; hopefully there is nothing
+ * more coming after the mode data.
+ */
+ log("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d", opcode);
+ packet_integrity_check(0, 1, SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
+ goto set;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * SSH2:
+ * Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have
+ * a uint32 argument.
+ * Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and
+ * cause parsing to stop.
+ */
+ if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) {
+ n_bytes += 4;
+ (void) packet_get_int();
+ break;
+ } else {
+ log("parse_tty_modes: unknown opcode %d", opcode);
+ goto set;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+set:
+ if (*n_bytes_ptr != n_bytes) {
+ *n_bytes_ptr = n_bytes;
+ log("parse_tty_modes: n_bytes_ptr != n_bytes: %d %d",
+ *n_bytes_ptr, n_bytes);
+ return; /* Don't process bytes passed */
+ }
+ if (failure == -1)
+ return; /* Packet parsed ok but tcgetattr() failed */
+
+ /* Set the new modes for the terminal. */
+ if (tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tio) == -1)
+ log("Setting tty modes failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.11 2001/04/14 16:33:20 stevesk Exp $"); */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH1:
+ * The tty mode description is a stream of bytes. The stream consists of
+ * opcode-arguments pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0).
+ * Opcodes 1-127 have one-byte arguments. Opcodes 128-159 have integer
+ * arguments. Opcodes 160-255 are not yet defined, and cause parsing to
+ * stop (they should only be used after any other data).
+ *
+ * SSH2:
+ * Differences between SSH1 and SSH2 terminal mode encoding include:
+ * 1. Encoded terminal modes are represented as a string, and a stream
+ * of bytes within that string.
+ * 2. Opcode arguments are uint32 (1-159); 160-255 remain undefined.
+ * 3. The values for TTY_OP_ISPEED and TTY_OP_OSPEED are different;
+ * 128 and 129 vs. 192 and 193 respectively.
+ *
+ * The client puts in the stream any modes it knows about, and the
+ * server ignores any modes it does not know about. This allows some degree
+ * of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a posix-like
+ * tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as well, but might
+ * require reimplementing as mode names would likely be different.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Some constants and prototypes are defined in packet.h; this file
+ * is only intended for including from ttymodes.c.
+ */
+
+/* termios macro */
+/* name, op */
+TTYCHAR(VINTR, 1)
+TTYCHAR(VQUIT, 2)
+TTYCHAR(VERASE, 3)
+#if defined(VKILL)
+TTYCHAR(VKILL, 4)
+#endif /* VKILL */
+TTYCHAR(VEOF, 5)
+#if defined(VEOL)
+TTYCHAR(VEOL, 6)
+#endif /* VEOL */
+#ifdef VEOL2
+TTYCHAR(VEOL2, 7)
+#endif /* VEOL2 */
+TTYCHAR(VSTART, 8)
+TTYCHAR(VSTOP, 9)
+#if defined(VSUSP)
+TTYCHAR(VSUSP, 10)
+#endif /* VSUSP */
+#if defined(VDSUSP)
+TTYCHAR(VDSUSP, 11)
+#endif /* VDSUSP */
+#if defined(VREPRINT)
+TTYCHAR(VREPRINT, 12)
+#endif /* VREPRINT */
+#if defined(VWERASE)
+TTYCHAR(VWERASE, 13)
+#endif /* VWERASE */
+#if defined(VLNEXT)
+TTYCHAR(VLNEXT, 14)
+#endif /* VLNEXT */
+#if defined(VFLUSH)
+TTYCHAR(VFLUSH, 15)
+#endif /* VFLUSH */
+#ifdef VSWTCH
+TTYCHAR(VSWTCH, 16)
+#endif /* VSWTCH */
+#if defined(VSTATUS)
+TTYCHAR(VSTATUS, 17)
+#endif /* VSTATUS */
+#ifdef VDISCARD
+TTYCHAR(VDISCARD, 18)
+#endif /* VDISCARD */
+
+/* name, field, op */
+TTYMODE(IGNPAR, c_iflag, 30)
+TTYMODE(PARMRK, c_iflag, 31)
+TTYMODE(INPCK, c_iflag, 32)
+TTYMODE(ISTRIP, c_iflag, 33)
+TTYMODE(INLCR, c_iflag, 34)
+TTYMODE(IGNCR, c_iflag, 35)
+TTYMODE(ICRNL, c_iflag, 36)
+#if defined(IUCLC)
+TTYMODE(IUCLC, c_iflag, 37)
+#endif
+TTYMODE(IXON, c_iflag, 38)
+TTYMODE(IXANY, c_iflag, 39)
+TTYMODE(IXOFF, c_iflag, 40)
+#ifdef IMAXBEL
+TTYMODE(IMAXBEL,c_iflag, 41)
+#endif /* IMAXBEL */
+
+TTYMODE(ISIG, c_lflag, 50)
+TTYMODE(ICANON, c_lflag, 51)
+#ifdef XCASE
+TTYMODE(XCASE, c_lflag, 52)
+#endif
+TTYMODE(ECHO, c_lflag, 53)
+TTYMODE(ECHOE, c_lflag, 54)
+TTYMODE(ECHOK, c_lflag, 55)
+TTYMODE(ECHONL, c_lflag, 56)
+TTYMODE(NOFLSH, c_lflag, 57)
+TTYMODE(TOSTOP, c_lflag, 58)
+#ifdef IEXTEN
+TTYMODE(IEXTEN, c_lflag, 59)
+#endif /* IEXTEN */
+#if defined(ECHOCTL)
+TTYMODE(ECHOCTL,c_lflag, 60)
+#endif /* ECHOCTL */
+#ifdef ECHOKE
+TTYMODE(ECHOKE, c_lflag, 61)
+#endif /* ECHOKE */
+#if defined(PENDIN)
+TTYMODE(PENDIN, c_lflag, 62)
+#endif /* PENDIN */
+
+TTYMODE(OPOST, c_oflag, 70)
+#if defined(OLCUC)
+TTYMODE(OLCUC, c_oflag, 71)
+#endif
+TTYMODE(ONLCR, c_oflag, 72)
+#ifdef OCRNL
+TTYMODE(OCRNL, c_oflag, 73)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONOCR
+TTYMODE(ONOCR, c_oflag, 74)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONLRET
+TTYMODE(ONLRET, c_oflag, 75)
+#endif
+
+TTYMODE(CS7, c_cflag, 90)
+TTYMODE(CS8, c_cflag, 91)
+TTYMODE(PARENB, c_cflag, 92)
+TTYMODE(PARODD, c_cflag, 93)
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Code for uid-swapping.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.18 2001/08/08 21:34:19 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+/*
+ * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases:
+ * 1. euid=0, ruid=0
+ * 2. euid=0, ruid!=0
+ * 3. euid!=0, ruid!=0
+ * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has
+ * POSIX saved uids or not.
+ */
+
+#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
+/* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that
+ is not part of the posix specification. */
+#define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+/* Saved effective uid. */
+static uid_t saved_euid = 0;
+static gid_t saved_egid = 0;
+#endif
+
+/* Saved effective uid. */
+static int privileged = 0;
+static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
+static gid_t saved_egroups[NGROUPS_MAX], user_groups[NGROUPS_MAX];
+static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1;
+
+/*
+ * Temporarily changes to the given uid. If the effective user
+ * id is not root, this does nothing. This call cannot be nested.
+ */
+void
+temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+ saved_euid = geteuid();
+ saved_egid = getegid();
+ debug("temporarily_use_uid: %d/%d (e=%d)",
+ pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid, saved_euid);
+ if (saved_euid != 0) {
+ privileged = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+#else
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ privileged = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+ privileged = 1;
+ temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1;
+ saved_egroupslen = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, saved_egroups);
+ if (saved_egroupslen < 0)
+ fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* set and save the user's groups */
+ if (user_groupslen == -1) {
+ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name,
+ strerror(errno));
+ user_groupslen = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, user_groups);
+ if (user_groupslen < 0)
+ fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */
+ if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0)
+ fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif /* !HAVE_CYWIN */
+#ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+ /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */
+ if (setgid(getegid()) < 0)
+ debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno));
+ /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */
+ if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0)
+ debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno));
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+ if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+ fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
+ strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restores to the original (privileged) uid.
+ */
+void
+restore_uid(void)
+{
+ debug("restore_uid");
+ /* it's a no-op unless privileged */
+ if (!privileged)
+ return;
+ if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective)
+ fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective");
+
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+ /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */
+ if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0)
+ fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) saved_euid, strerror(errno));
+ if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0)
+ fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int) saved_egid,
+ strerror(errno));
+#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+ /*
+ * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value.
+ * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid
+ * as well.
+ */
+ setuid(getuid());
+ setgid(getgid());
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0)
+ fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif /* !HAVE_CYGWIN */
+ temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid. This cannot be
+ * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective.
+ */
+void
+permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ if (temporarily_use_uid_effective)
+ fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective");
+ if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+ fatal("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+ if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0)
+ fatal("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.h,v 1.9 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef UIDSWAP_H
+#define UIDSWAP_H
+
+void temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *);
+void restore_uid(void);
+void permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *);
+
+#endif /* UIDSWAP_H */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.12 2001/03/01 02:27:18 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
+
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.12 2001/03/01 02:27:18 deraadt Exp $");
+
+int
+uuencode(u_char *src, u_int srclength,
+ char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+ return __b64_ntop(src, srclength, target, targsize);
+}
+
+int
+uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+ int len;
+ char *encoded, *p;
+
+ /* copy the 'readonly' source */
+ encoded = xstrdup(src);
+ /* skip whitespace and data */
+ for (p = encoded; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; p++)
+ ;
+ for (; *p != '\0' && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++)
+ ;
+ /* and remote trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
+ *p = '\0';
+ len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
+ xfree(encoded);
+ return len;
+}
+
+void
+dump_base64(FILE *fp, u_char *data, int len)
+{
+ u_char *buf = xmalloc(2*len);
+ int i, n;
+
+ n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
+ if (i % 70 == 69)
+ fprintf(fp, "\n");
+ }
+ if (i % 70 != 69)
+ fprintf(fp, "\n");
+ xfree(buf);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.h,v 1.8 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef UUENCODE_H
+#define UUENCODE_H
+int uuencode(u_char *, u_int, char *, size_t);
+int uudecode(const char *, u_char *, size_t);
+void dump_base64(FILE *, u_char *, int);
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.25 2001/10/15 16:10:50 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_3.0.2p1"
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
+ * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.16 2001/07/23 18:21:46 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+void *
+xmalloc(size_t size)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+
+ if (size == 0)
+ fatal("xmalloc: zero size");
+ ptr = malloc(size);
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %lu bytes)", (u_long) size);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+void *
+xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t new_size)
+{
+ void *new_ptr;
+
+ if (new_size == 0)
+ fatal("xrealloc: zero size");
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ new_ptr = malloc(new_size);
+ else
+ new_ptr = realloc(ptr, new_size);
+ if (new_ptr == NULL)
+ fatal("xrealloc: out of memory (new_size %lu bytes)", (u_long) new_size);
+ return new_ptr;
+}
+
+void
+xfree(void *ptr)
+{
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ fatal("xfree: NULL pointer given as argument");
+ free(ptr);
+}
+
+char *
+xstrdup(const char *str)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ char *cp;
+
+ len = strlen(str) + 1;
+ cp = xmalloc(len);
+ strlcpy(cp, str, len);
+ return cp;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo
+ *
+ * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
+ * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.7 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $"); */
+
+#ifndef XMALLOC_H
+#define XMALLOC_H
+
+void *xmalloc(size_t);
+void *xrealloc(void *, size_t);
+void xfree(void *);
+char *xstrdup(const char *);
+
+#endif /* XMALLOC_H */
andersk / gssapi-openssh.git / commitdiff
