+19991116
+ - Fix some Linux libc5 problems reported by Miles Wilson <mw@mctitle.com>
+ - Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
+ - [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c authfd.c authfd.h hostfile.c mpaux.c]
+ [mpaux.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh.h ssh.c sshd.c]
+ the keysize of rsa-parameter 'n' is passed implizit,
+ a few more checks and warnings about 'pretended' keysizes.
+ - [cipher.c cipher.h packet.c packet.h sshd.c]
+ remove support for cipher RC4
+ - [ssh.c]
+ a note for legay systems about secuity issues with permanently_set_uid(),
+ the private hostkey and ptrace()
+ - [sshconnect.c]
+ more detailed messages about adding and checking hostkeys
+
19991115
- Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
- [ssh-add.c] change passphrase loop logic and remove ref to
its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds. */
int auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user,
- unsigned int client_host_key_bits,
BIGNUM *client_host_key_e, BIGNUM *client_host_key_n)
{
extern ServerOptions options;
ke = BN_new();
kn = BN_new();
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, canonical_hostname,
- client_host_key_bits, client_host_key_e,
- client_host_key_n, ke, kn);
+ client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n, ke, kn);
/* Check user host file unless ignored. */
if (host_status != HOST_OK && !options.ignore_user_known_hosts) {
/* XXX race between stat and the following open() */
temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile, canonical_hostname,
- client_host_key_bits, client_host_key_e,
- client_host_key_n, ke, kn);
+ client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n, ke, kn);
restore_uid();
}
xfree(user_hostfile);
/* A matching host key was found and is known. */
/* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */
- if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key_bits,
- client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n))
+ if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n))
{
log("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.",
canonical_hostname);
our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer. */
int
-auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(unsigned int bits, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n)
+auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n)
{
BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge, *aux;
RSA *pk;
auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
{
extern ServerOptions options;
- char line[8192];
+ char line[8192], file[1024];
int authenticated;
unsigned int bits;
FILE *f;
temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
/* The authorized keys. */
- snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir,
+ snprintf(file, sizeof file, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir,
SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
/* Fail quietly if file does not exist */
- if (stat(line, &st) < 0)
+ if (stat(file, &st) < 0)
{
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
}
/* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */
- f = fopen(line, "r");
+ f = fopen(file, "r");
if (!f)
{
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
- packet_send_debug("Could not open %.900s for reading.", line);
+ packet_send_debug("Could not open %.900s for reading.", file);
packet_send_debug("If your home is on an NFS volume, it may need to be world-readable.");
return 0;
}
(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "RSA authentication refused for %.100s: "
- "bad ownership or modes for '%s'.", pw->pw_name, line);
+ "bad ownership or modes for '%s'.", pw->pw_name, file);
fail=1;
}else{
/* Check path to SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS */
}
/* cp now points to the comment part. */
+ /* check the real bits */
+ if (bits != BN_num_bits(n))
+ error("Warning: error in %s, line %d: keysize mismatch: "
+ "actual size %d vs. announced %d.",
+ file, linenum, BN_num_bits(n), bits);
+
/* Check if the we have found the desired key (identified by its
modulus). */
if (BN_cmp(n, client_n) != 0)
/* We have found the desired key. */
/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
- if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(bits, e, n))
+ if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(e, n))
{
/* Wrong response. */
log("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
int
ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- int *bitsp, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
+ BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
{
unsigned char msg[8192];
int len, l;
fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d\n", auth->howmany);
/* Return the first entry (if any). */
- return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, bitsp, e, n, comment);
+ return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, comment);
}
/* Returns the next authentication identity for the agent. Other functions
int
ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- int *bitsp, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
+ BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
{
+ unsigned int bits;
+
/* Return failure if no more entries. */
if (auth->howmany <= 0)
return 0;
/* Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal
error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data. */
- *bitsp = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+ bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, e);
buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, n);
*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+ if (bits != BN_num_bits(n))
+ error("Warning: keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %s",
+ BN_num_bits(n), bits);
+
/* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
auth->howmany--;
int
ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- int bits, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge,
+ BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge,
unsigned char session_id[16],
unsigned int response_type,
unsigned char response[16])
buf[0] = SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
buffer_init(&buffer);
buffer_append(&buffer, (char *)buf, 1);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, bits);
+ buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(n));
buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, e);
buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, n);
buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
The caller must initialize the integers before the call, and free the
comment after a successful call (before calling ssh_get_next_identity). */
int ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *connection,
- int *bitsp, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment);
+ BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment);
/* Returns the next authentication identity for the agent. Other functions
can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this
function. This returns 0 if there are no more identities. The caller
must free comment after a successful return. */
int ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *connection,
- int *bitsp, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment);
+ BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment);
/* Requests the agent to decrypt the given challenge. Returns true if
the agent claims it was able to decrypt it. */
int ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- int bits, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge,
+ BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge,
unsigned char session_id[16],
unsigned int response_type,
unsigned char response[16]);
break;
default:
- fatal("cipher_set_key: unknown cipher: %d", cipher);
+ fatal("cipher_set_key: unknown cipher: %s", cipher_name(cipher));
}
memset(padded, 0, sizeof(padded));
}
/* RCSID("$Id$"); */
-#include "config.h"
-
#ifndef CIPHER_H
#define CIPHER_H
+#include "config.h"
+
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/des.h>
#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
#define SSH_CIPHER_IDEA 1 /* IDEA CFB */
#define SSH_CIPHER_DES 2 /* DES CBC */
#define SSH_CIPHER_3DES 3 /* 3DES CBC */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_TSS 4 /* TRI's Simple Stream encryption CBC */
-#define SSH_CIPHER_RC4 5 /* Alleged RC4 */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_TSS 4 /* TRI's Simple Stream encryption CBC */
+#define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_RC4 5 /* Alleged RC4 */
#define SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 6
typedef struct {
but used to have a different host key. */
HostStatus
-check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename,
- const char *host, unsigned int bits,
- BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n,
- BIGNUM *ke, BIGNUM *kn)
+check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
+ BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *ke, BIGNUM *kn)
{
FILE *f;
char line[8192];
- unsigned int kbits, hostlen;
+ int linenum = 0;
+ unsigned int bits, kbits, hostlen;
char *cp, *cp2;
HostStatus end_return;
- struct stat st;
/* Open the file containing the list of known hosts. */
f = fopen(filename, "r");
if (!f)
- {
- if (stat(filename, &st) >= 0)
- {
- packet_send_debug("Could not open %.900s for reading.", filename);
- packet_send_debug("If your home directory is on an NFS volume, it may need to be world-readable.");
- }
- return HOST_NEW;
- }
+ return HOST_NEW;
/* Cache the length of the host name. */
hostlen = strlen(host);
one. */
end_return = HOST_NEW;
+ /* size of modulus 'n' */
+ bits = BN_num_bits(n);
+
/* Go trough the file. */
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f))
{
cp = line;
+ linenum++;
/* Skip any leading whitespace. */
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
if (!auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &kbits, ke, kn))
continue;
- /* Check if the current key is the same as the previous one. */
+ if (kbits != BN_num_bits(kn)) {
+ error("Warning: error in %s, line %d: keysize mismatch for host %s: "
+ "actual size %d vs. announced %d.",
+ filename, linenum, host, BN_num_bits(kn), kbits);
+ error("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %d.",
+ kbits, BN_num_bits(kn), filename, linenum);
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key. */
if (kbits == bits && BN_cmp(ke, e) == 0 && BN_cmp(kn, n) == 0)
{
/* Ok, they match. */
int
add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
- unsigned int bits, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n)
+ BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n)
{
FILE *f;
char *buf;
+ unsigned int bits;
/* Open the file for appending. */
f = fopen(filename, "a");
if (!f)
return 0;
+ /* size of modulus 'n' */
+ bits = BN_num_bits(n);
+
/* Print the host name and key to the file. */
fprintf(f, "%s %u ", host, bits);
buf = BN_bn2dec(e);
if (buf == NULL) {
- error("add_host_to_hostfile: BN_bn2dec #1 failed");
+ error("add_host_to_hostfile: BN_bn2dec(e) failed");
fclose(f);
return 0;
}
free (buf);
buf = BN_bn2dec(n);
if (buf == NULL) {
- error("add_host_to_hostfile: BN_bn2dec #2 failed");
+ error("add_host_to_hostfile: BN_bn2dec(n) failed");
fclose(f);
return 0;
}
void
compute_session_id(unsigned char session_id[16],
unsigned char cookie[8],
- unsigned int host_key_bits,
BIGNUM *host_key_n,
- unsigned int session_key_bits,
BIGNUM *session_key_n)
{
+ unsigned int host_key_bits = BN_num_bits(host_key_n);
+ unsigned int session_key_bits = BN_num_bits(session_key_n);
unsigned int bytes = (host_key_bits + 7) / 8 + (session_key_bits + 7) / 8 + 8;
unsigned char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
MD5_CTX md;
-
+
BN_bn2bin(host_key_n, buf);
BN_bn2bin(session_key_n, buf + (host_key_bits + 7 ) / 8);
memcpy(buf + (host_key_bits + 7) / 8 + (session_key_bits + 7) / 8,
first representations of host_key_n, session_key_n, and the cookie. */
void compute_session_id(unsigned char session_id[16],
unsigned char cookie[8],
- unsigned int host_key_bits,
BIGNUM *host_key_n,
- unsigned int session_key_bits,
BIGNUM *session_key_n);
#endif /* MPAUX_H */
void
packet_set_encryption_key(const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen,
- int cipher, int is_client)
+ int cipher)
{
- cipher_type = cipher;
- if (cipher == SSH_CIPHER_RC4)
- {
- if (is_client)
- { /* In client: use first half for receiving, second for sending. */
- cipher_set_key(&receive_context, cipher, key, keylen / 2, 0);
- cipher_set_key(&send_context, cipher, key + keylen / 2,
- keylen / 2, 1);
- }
- else
- { /* In server: use first half for sending, second for receiving. */
- cipher_set_key(&receive_context, cipher, key + keylen / 2,
- keylen / 2, 0);
- cipher_set_key(&send_context, cipher, key, keylen / 2, 1);
- }
- }
- else
- {
- /* All other ciphers use the same key in both directions for now. */
- cipher_set_key(&receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, 0);
- cipher_set_key(&send_context, cipher, key, keylen, 1);
- }
+ /* All other ciphers use the same key in both directions for now. */
+ cipher_set_key(&receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, 0);
+ cipher_set_key(&send_context, cipher, key, keylen, 1);
}
/* Starts constructing a packet to send. */
are encrypted independently of each other. Cipher types are
defined in ssh.h. */
void packet_set_encryption_key(const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen,
- int cipher_type, int is_client);
+ int cipher_type);
/* Sets remote side protocol flags for the current connection. This can
be called at any time. */
list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
{
BIGNUM *e, *n;
- int bits, status;
+ int status;
char *comment;
int had_identities;
e = BN_new();
n = BN_new();
had_identities = 0;
- for (status = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &bits, e, n, &comment);
+ for (status = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, e, n, &comment);
status;
- status = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &bits, e, n, &comment))
+ status = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, e, n, &comment))
{
- char *buf;
+ char *ebuf, *nbuf;
had_identities = 1;
- printf("%d ", bits);
- buf = BN_bn2dec(e);
- if (buf != NULL) {
- printf("%s ", buf);
- free (buf);
- } else {
- error("list_identities: BN_bn2dec #1 failed.");
- }
- buf = BN_bn2dec(n);
- if (buf != NULL) {
- printf("%s %s\n", buf, comment);
- free (buf);
- } else {
- error("list_identities: BN_bn2dec #2 failed.");
+ ebuf = BN_bn2dec(e);
+ if (ebuf == NULL) {
+ error("list_identities: BN_bn2dec(e) failed.");
+ }else{
+ nbuf = BN_bn2dec(n);
+ if (nbuf == NULL) {
+ error("list_identities: BN_bn2dec(n) failed.");
+ }else{
+ unsigned int bits = BN_num_bits(n);
+ printf("%d %s %s %s\n", bits, ebuf, nbuf, comment);
+ free(nbuf);
+ }
+ free(ebuf);
}
xfree(comment);
}
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.16 1999/10/28 20:41:23 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.18 1999/11/15 20:53:24 markus Exp $ */
/*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.17 1999/11/02 19:42:36 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.18 1999/11/15 20:53:24 markus Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "rsa.h"
bits = buffer_get_int(&e->input);
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, dummy);
buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, n);
+
+ if (bits != BN_num_bits(n))
+ error("Warning: keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %s",
+ BN_num_bits(n), bits);
/* Check if we have the key. */
for (i = 0; i < num_identities; i++)
them. Also, extra privileges could make it very hard to read identity
files and other non-world-readable files from the user's home directory
if it happens to be on a NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody. */
+
+ /* Note that some legacy systems need to postpone the following call to
+ permanently_set_uid() until the private hostkey is destroyed with
+ RSA_free(). Otherwise the calling user could ptrace() the process,
+ read the private hostkey and impersonate the host. OpenBSD does not
+ allow ptracing of setuid processes. */
+
permanently_set_uid(original_real_uid);
/* Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh directory
/* Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using
its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds. */
int auth_rhosts_rsa(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user,
- unsigned int bits, BIGNUM *client_host_key_e,
- BIGNUM *client_host_key_n);
+ BIGNUM *client_host_key_e, BIGNUM *client_host_key_n);
/* Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if
authentication succeeds. */
HOST_NEW if the host is not known, and HOST_CHANGED if the host is known
but used to have a different host key. The host must be in all lowercase. */
typedef enum { HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED } HostStatus;
-HostStatus check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename,
- const char *host, unsigned int bits,
- BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n,
- BIGNUM *ke, BIGNUM *kn);
+HostStatus check_host_in_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
+ BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *ke, BIGNUM *kn);
/* Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry
could not be appended. */
int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
- unsigned int bits, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n);
+ BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n);
/* Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer. */
-int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(unsigned int bits, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n);
+int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n);
/* Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off. Returns the
passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered.
int
try_agent_authentication()
{
- int status, type, bits;
+ int status, type;
char *comment;
AuthenticationConnection *auth;
unsigned char response[16];
challenge = BN_new();
/* Loop through identities served by the agent. */
- for (status = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, &bits, e, n, &comment);
+ for (status = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, e, n, &comment);
status;
- status = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, &bits, e, n, &comment))
+ status = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, &comment))
{
int plen, clen;
debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
/* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */
- if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, bits, e, n, challenge,
+ if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, e, n, challenge,
session_id, 1, response))
{
/* The agent failed to authenticate this identifier although it
SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
/* Compute the session id. */
- compute_session_id(session_id, check_bytes,
- BN_num_bits(host_key->n), host_key->n,
- BN_num_bits(public_key->n), public_key->n);
+ compute_session_id(session_id, check_bytes, host_key->n, public_key->n);
/* Check if the host key is present in the user\'s list of known hosts
or in the systemwide list. */
- host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.user_hostfile,
- host, BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
+ host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, host,
host_key->e, host_key->n,
file_key->e, file_key->n);
if (host_status == HOST_NEW)
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.system_hostfile, host,
- BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
host_key->e, host_key->n,
file_key->e, file_key->n);
/* Force accepting of the host key for localhost and 127.0.0.1.
ip_key->n = BN_new();
ip_key->e = BN_new();
ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, ip,
- BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
host_key->e, host_key->n,
ip_key->e, ip_key->n);
if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.system_hostfile, ip,
- BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
host_key->e, host_key->n,
ip_key->e, ip_key->n);
if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
if (options.check_host_ip) {
if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
if (!add_host_to_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, ip,
- BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
host_key->e, host_key->n))
- log("Failed to add the host ip to the list of known hosts (%.30s).",
- options.user_hostfile);
+ log("Failed to add the host key for IP address '%.30s' to the list of known hosts (%.30s).",
+ ip, options.user_hostfile);
else
- log("Warning: Permanently added host ip '%.30s' to the list of known hosts.", ip);
+ log("Warning: Permanently added host key for IP address '%.30s' to the list of known hosts.",
+ ip);
} else if (ip_status != HOST_OK)
- log("Warning: the host key differ from the key of the ip address '%.30s' differs", ip);
+ log("Warning: the host key for '%.200s' differs from the key for the IP address '%.30s'",
+ host, ip);
}
break;
/* If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the local
known_hosts file. */
if (!add_host_to_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, hostp,
- BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
host_key->e, host_key->n))
log("Failed to add the host to the list of known hosts (%.500s).",
options.user_hostfile);
case HOST_CHANGED:
if (options.check_host_ip) {
if (host_ip_differ) {
+ char *msg;
+ if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
+ msg = "is unknown";
+ else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
+ msg = "is unchanged";
+ else
+ msg = "has a different value";
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("The host key for %s has changed,", host);
- error("but the key for the according IP address %s has", ip);
- error("a different status. This could either mean that DNS");
- error("SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
+ error("and the key for the according IP address %s", ip);
+ error("%s. This could either mean that", msg);
+ error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
error("and its host key have changed at the same time");
}
}
debug("Sent encrypted session key.");
/* Set the encryption key. */
- packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH,
- options.cipher, 1);
+ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher);
/* We will no longer need the session key here. Destroy any extra copies. */
memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
/* Compute session id for this session. */
compute_session_id(session_id, check_bytes,
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n),
sensitive_data.host_key->n,
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n),
sensitive_data.private_key->n);
/* Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
/* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be
encrypted. */
- packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH,
- cipher_type, 0);
+ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
/* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
do_authloop(struct passwd *pw)
{
int authentication_failures = 0;
- unsigned int client_host_key_bits;
+ unsigned int bits;
BIGNUM *client_host_key_e, *client_host_key_n;
BIGNUM *n;
char *client_user = NULL, *password = NULL;
/* Get the client host key. */
client_host_key_e = BN_new();
client_host_key_n = BN_new();
- client_host_key_bits = packet_get_int();
+ bits = packet_get_int();
packet_get_bignum(client_host_key_e, &elen);
packet_get_bignum(client_host_key_n, &nlen);
+
+ if (bits != BN_num_bits(client_host_key_n))
+ error("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
+ "actual %d, announced %s", BN_num_bits(client_host_key_n), bits);
packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen) + 4 + elen + nlen, type);
- authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(pw, client_user, client_host_key_bits,
+ authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(pw, client_user,
client_host_key_e, client_host_key_n);
log("Rhosts authentication %s for %.100s, remote %.100s.",
authenticated ? "accepted" : "failed",
andersk / openssh.git / commitdiff
