]> andersk Git - openssh.git/commitdiff
Oops.. missed theses in the merge.
authormouring <mouring>
Fri, 19 Jan 2001 04:29:23 +0000 (04:29 +0000)
committermouring <mouring>
Fri, 19 Jan 2001 04:29:23 +0000 (04:29 +0000)
auth-skey.c [deleted file]
auth2-skey.c [deleted file]

diff --git a/auth-skey.c b/auth-skey.c
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 7088b79..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.9 2000/10/19 16:41:13 deraadt Exp $");
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-/* from %OpenBSD: skeylogin.c,v 1.32 1999/08/16 14:46:56 millert Exp % */
-
-/*
- * try skey authentication,
- * return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if skey is not available
- */
-
-int
-auth_skey_password(struct passwd * pw, const char *password)
-{
-       if (strncasecmp(password, "s/key", 5) == 0) {
-               char *skeyinfo = skey_keyinfo(pw->pw_name);
-               if (skeyinfo == NULL) {
-                       debug("generating fake skeyinfo for %.100s.",
-                           pw->pw_name);
-                       skeyinfo = skey_fake_keyinfo(pw->pw_name);
-               }
-               if (skeyinfo != NULL)
-                       packet_send_debug("%s", skeyinfo);
-               /* Try again. */
-               return 0;
-       } else if (skey_haskey(pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
-                  skey_passcheck(pw->pw_name, (char *) password) != -1) {
-               /* Authentication succeeded. */
-               return 1;
-       }
-       /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
-       return -1;
-}
-
-/* from %OpenBSD: skeylogin.c,v 1.32 1999/08/16 14:46:56 millert Exp % */
-
-#define ROUND(x)   (((x)[0] << 24) + (((x)[1]) << 16) + (((x)[2]) << 8) + \
-                   ((x)[3]))
-
-/*
- * hash_collapse()
- */
-static u_int32_t
-hash_collapse(s)
-       u_char *s;
-{
-       int len, target;
-       u_int32_t i;
-       
-       if ((strlen(s) % sizeof(u_int32_t)) == 0)
-               target = strlen(s);    /* Multiple of 4 */
-       else
-               target = strlen(s) - (strlen(s) % sizeof(u_int32_t));
-
-       for (i = 0, len = 0; len < target; len += 4)
-               i ^= ROUND(s + len);
-
-       return i;
-}
-
-char *
-skey_fake_keyinfo(char *username)
-{
-       int i;
-       u_int ptr;
-       u_char hseed[SKEY_MAX_SEED_LEN], flg = 1, *up;
-       char pbuf[SKEY_MAX_PW_LEN+1];
-       static char skeyprompt[SKEY_MAX_CHALLENGE+1];
-       char *secret = NULL;
-       size_t secretlen = 0;
-       SHA_CTX ctx;
-       char *p, *u;
-
-       /*
-        * Base first 4 chars of seed on hostname.
-        * Add some filler for short hostnames if necessary.
-        */
-       if (gethostname(pbuf, sizeof(pbuf)) == -1)
-               *(p = pbuf) = '.';
-       else
-               for (p = pbuf; *p && isalnum(*p); p++)
-                       if (isalpha(*p) && isupper(*p))
-                               *p = tolower(*p);
-       if (*p && pbuf - p < 4)
-               (void)strncpy(p, "asjd", 4 - (pbuf - p));
-       pbuf[4] = '\0';
-
-       /* Hash the username if possible */
-       up = malloc(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-       if (up != NULL) {
-               struct stat sb;
-               time_t t;
-               int fd;
-
-               SHA1_Init(&ctx);
-               SHA1_Update(&ctx, username, strlen(username));
-               SHA1_Final(up, &ctx);
-
-               /* Collapse the hash */
-               ptr = hash_collapse(up);
-               memset(up, 0, strlen(up));
-
-               /* See if the random file's there, else use ctime */
-               if ((fd = open(_SKEY_RAND_FILE_PATH_, O_RDONLY)) != -1
-                   && fstat(fd, &sb) == 0 &&
-                   sb.st_size > (off_t)SKEY_MAX_SEED_LEN &&
-                   lseek(fd, ptr % (sb.st_size - SKEY_MAX_SEED_LEN),
-                   SEEK_SET) != -1 && read(fd, hseed,
-                   SKEY_MAX_SEED_LEN) == SKEY_MAX_SEED_LEN) {
-                       close(fd);
-                       fd = -1;
-                       secret = hseed;
-                       secretlen = SKEY_MAX_SEED_LEN;
-                       flg = 0;
-               } else if (!stat(_PATH_MEM, &sb) || !stat("/", &sb)) {
-                       t = sb.st_ctime;
-                       secret = ctime(&t);
-                       secretlen = strlen(secret);
-                       flg = 0;
-               }
-               if (fd != -1)
-                       close(fd);
-       }
-
-       /* Put that in your pipe and smoke it */
-       if (flg == 0) {
-               /* Hash secret value with username */
-               SHA1_Init(&ctx);
-               SHA1_Update(&ctx, secret, secretlen);
-               SHA1_Update(&ctx, username, strlen(username));
-               SHA1_Final(up, &ctx);
-               
-               /* Zero out */
-               memset(secret, 0, secretlen);
-
-               /* Now hash the hash */
-               SHA1_Init(&ctx);
-               SHA1_Update(&ctx, up, strlen(up));
-               SHA1_Final(up, &ctx);
-               
-               ptr = hash_collapse(up + 4);
-               
-               for (i = 4; i < 9; i++) {
-                       pbuf[i] = (ptr % 10) + '0';
-                       ptr /= 10;
-               }
-               pbuf[i] = '\0';
-
-               /* Sequence number */
-               ptr = ((up[2] + up[3]) % 99) + 1;
-
-               memset(up, 0, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); /* SHA1 specific */
-               free(up);
-
-               (void)snprintf(skeyprompt, sizeof skeyprompt,
-                             "otp-%.*s %d %.*s",
-                             SKEY_MAX_HASHNAME_LEN,
-                             skey_get_algorithm(),
-                             ptr, SKEY_MAX_SEED_LEN,
-                             pbuf);
-       } else {
-               /* Base last 8 chars of seed on username */
-               u = username;
-               i = 8;
-               p = &pbuf[4];
-               do {
-                       if (*u == 0) {
-                               /* Pad remainder with zeros */
-                               while (--i >= 0)
-                                       *p++ = '0';
-                               break;
-                       }
-
-                       *p++ = (*u++ % 10) + '0';
-               } while (--i != 0);
-               pbuf[12] = '\0';
-
-               (void)snprintf(skeyprompt, sizeof skeyprompt,
-                             "otp-%.*s %d %.*s",
-                             SKEY_MAX_HASHNAME_LEN,
-                             skey_get_algorithm(),
-                             99, SKEY_MAX_SEED_LEN, pbuf);
-       }
-       return skeyprompt;
-}
-
-#endif /* SKEY */
diff --git a/auth2-skey.c b/auth2-skey.c
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index dbf24f6..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-skey.c,v 1.2 2000/12/19 23:17:55 markus Exp $");
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-
-void   send_userauth_into_request(Authctxt *authctxt, int echo);
-void   input_userauth_info_response(int type, int plen, void *ctxt);
-
-/*
- * try skey authentication, always return -1 (= postponed) since we have to
- * wait for the s/key response.
- */
-int
-auth2_skey(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-       send_userauth_into_request(authctxt, 0);
-       dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, &input_userauth_info_response);
-       return -1;
-}
-
-void
-send_userauth_into_request(Authctxt *authctxt, int echo)
-{
-       int retval = -1;
-       struct skey skey;
-       char challenge[SKEY_MAX_CHALLENGE];
-       char *fake;
-
-       if (authctxt->user == NULL)
-               fatal("send_userauth_into_request: internal error: no user");
-
-       /* get skey challenge */
-       if (authctxt->valid)
-               retval = skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge);
-
-       if (retval == -1) {
-               fake = skey_fake_keyinfo(authctxt->user);
-               strlcpy(challenge, fake, sizeof challenge);
-       }
-       /* send our info request */
-       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
-       packet_put_cstring("S/Key Authentication");     /* Name */
-       packet_put_cstring(challenge);                  /* Instruction */
-       packet_put_cstring("");                         /* Language */
-       packet_put_int(1);                              /* Number of prompts */
-       packet_put_cstring(echo ?
-                "Response [Echo]: ": "Response: ");    /* Prompt */
-       packet_put_char(echo);                          /* Echo */
-       packet_send();
-       packet_write_wait();
-       memset(challenge, 'c', sizeof challenge);
-}
-
-void
-input_userauth_info_response(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
-{
-       Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-       int authenticated = 0;
-       u_int nresp, rlen;
-       char *resp, *method;
-
-       if (authctxt == NULL)
-               fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authentication context");
-
-       if (authctxt->attempt++ >= AUTH_FAIL_MAX)
-               packet_disconnect("too many failed userauth_requests");
-
-       nresp = packet_get_int();
-       if (nresp == 1) {
-               /* we only support s/key and assume s/key for nresp == 1 */
-               method = "s/key";
-               resp = packet_get_string(&rlen);
-               packet_done();
-               if (strlen(resp) == 0) {
-                       /*
-                        * if we received a null response, resend prompt with
-                        * echo enabled
-                        */
-                       authenticated = -1;
-                       userauth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method);
-                       send_userauth_into_request(authctxt, 1);
-               } else {
-                       /* verify skey response */
-                       if (authctxt->valid &&
-                           skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
-                           skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, resp) != -1) {
-                               authenticated = 1;
-                       } else {
-                               authenticated = 0;
-                       }
-                       memset(resp, 'r', rlen);
-                       /* unregister callback */
-                       dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
-                       userauth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method);
-                       userauth_reply(authctxt, authenticated);
-               }
-               xfree(resp);
-       }
-}
-
-#endif /* SKEY */
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