2 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
3 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
5 * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
6 * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
7 * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
8 * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
9 * authentication agent connections.
11 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
12 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
13 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
14 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
15 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
17 * SSH2 implementation:
18 * Privilege Separation:
20 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
21 * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
32 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
33 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
34 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
35 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
36 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
37 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
38 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
39 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
40 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
41 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
45 RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.254 2002/06/30 21:54:16 deraadt Exp $");
47 #include <openssl/dh.h>
48 #include <openssl/bn.h>
49 #include <openssl/md5.h>
50 #include <openssl/rand.h>
51 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
52 #include <sys/security.h>
73 #include "myproposal.h"
75 #include "pathnames.h"
83 #include "monitor_mm.h"
85 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
86 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
91 int allow_severity = LOG_INFO;
92 int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
99 #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
100 extern char *__progname;
105 /* Server configuration options. */
106 ServerOptions options;
108 /* Name of the server configuration file. */
109 char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
112 * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
113 * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6.
116 int IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
118 int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
122 * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
123 * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
124 * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
125 * the first connection.
129 /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
132 /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
135 /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
136 int no_daemon_flag = 0;
138 /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
141 /* Saved arguments to main(). */
146 * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
149 #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
150 int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
151 int num_listen_socks = 0;
154 * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
155 * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
157 char *client_version_string = NULL;
158 char *server_version_string = NULL;
160 /* for rekeying XXX fixme */
164 * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
165 * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
166 * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
167 * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
168 * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
169 * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
172 Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
173 Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
174 Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
177 u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
181 * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
182 * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
184 static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
186 /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
187 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
188 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
190 /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
191 u_char session_id[16];
194 u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
195 int session_id2_len = 0;
197 /* record remote hostname or ip */
198 u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
200 /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
201 int *startup_pipes = NULL;
202 int startup_pipe; /* in child */
204 /* variables used for privilege separation */
205 extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
206 extern int use_privsep;
208 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
209 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
210 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
212 static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
213 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
216 * Close all listening sockets
219 close_listen_socks(void)
223 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
224 close(listen_socks[i]);
225 num_listen_socks = -1;
229 close_startup_pipes(void)
234 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
235 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
236 close(startup_pipes[i]);
240 * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
241 * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
245 sighup_handler(int sig)
247 int save_errno = errno;
250 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
255 * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
256 * Restarts the server.
261 log("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
262 close_listen_socks();
263 close_startup_pipes();
264 execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
265 log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
271 * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
274 sigterm_handler(int sig)
276 received_sigterm = sig;
280 * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
281 * reap any zombies left by exited children.
284 main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
286 int save_errno = errno;
290 while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
291 (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
294 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
299 * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
302 grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
304 /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
306 /* Close the connection. */
309 /* Log error and exit. */
310 fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s.", get_remote_ipaddr());
314 * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
315 * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
316 * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
317 * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
321 generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
326 verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
327 sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
328 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
329 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
330 sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
331 options.server_key_bits);
332 verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
334 for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
337 sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
344 key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
346 int save_errno = errno;
348 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
354 sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
357 int remote_major, remote_minor;
360 char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
361 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
363 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
364 (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
365 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
367 } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
368 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
369 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
371 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
372 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
374 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
375 server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
377 if (client_version_string == NULL) {
378 /* Send our protocol version identification. */
379 if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string,
380 strlen(server_version_string))
381 != strlen(server_version_string)) {
382 log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
386 /* Read other sides version identification. */
387 memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
388 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
389 if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
390 log("Did not receive identification string from %s",
391 get_remote_ipaddr());
394 if (buf[i] == '\r') {
396 /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
398 strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
402 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
407 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
408 client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
412 * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
413 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
415 if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
416 &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
417 s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
418 (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
421 log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
422 client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
425 debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
426 remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
428 compat_datafellows(remote_version);
430 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
431 log("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
432 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
437 switch (remote_major) {
439 if (remote_minor == 99) {
440 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
446 if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
450 if (remote_minor < 3) {
451 packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
452 "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
453 } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
454 /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
459 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
468 chop(server_version_string);
469 debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
472 s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
473 (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
476 log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
478 server_version_string, client_version_string);
483 /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
485 destroy_sensitive_data(void)
489 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
490 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
491 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
493 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
494 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
495 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
496 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
499 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
500 memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
503 /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
505 demote_sensitive_data(void)
510 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
511 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
512 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
513 sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
516 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
517 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
518 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
519 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
520 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
521 if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
522 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
526 /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
530 privsep_preauth_child(void)
537 /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
538 privsep_challenge_enable();
540 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
541 rnd[i] = arc4random();
542 RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
544 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
545 demote_sensitive_data();
547 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
548 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
550 memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
553 /* Change our root directory*/
554 if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
555 fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
557 if (chdir("/") == -1)
558 fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
560 /* Drop our privileges */
561 debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
564 /* XXX not ready, to heavy after chroot */
565 do_setusercontext(pw);
567 gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
568 if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
569 fatal("setgid failed for %u", pw->pw_gid );
570 if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
571 fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
572 permanently_set_uid(pw);
577 privsep_preauth(void)
579 Authctxt *authctxt = NULL;
583 /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
584 pmonitor = monitor_init();
585 /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
586 pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
590 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
591 } else if (pid != 0) {
592 debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
594 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
595 authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(pmonitor);
596 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
599 monitor_sync(pmonitor);
601 /* Wait for the child's exit status */
602 while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
609 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
611 /* Demote the child */
612 if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
613 privsep_preauth_child();
614 setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
620 privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
622 extern Authctxt *x_authctxt;
624 /* XXX - Remote port forwarding */
625 x_authctxt = authctxt;
627 #ifdef BROKEN_FD_PASSING
630 if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
632 /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
633 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
638 /* Authentication complete */
640 if (startup_pipe != -1) {
645 /* New socket pair */
646 monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
648 pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
649 if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
650 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
651 else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
652 debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
653 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
654 monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
660 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
662 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
663 demote_sensitive_data();
665 /* Drop privileges */
666 do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
668 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
669 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
673 list_hostkey_types(void)
680 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
681 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
687 if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
688 buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
689 p = key_ssh_name(key);
690 buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
694 buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
695 p = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
697 debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", p);
702 get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
706 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
707 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
708 if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
715 get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
717 if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
719 return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
723 get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
727 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
728 if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
735 * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
736 * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
737 * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
738 * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
741 drop_connection(int startups)
745 if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
747 if (startups >= options.max_startups)
749 if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
752 p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
753 p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
754 p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin);
755 p += options.max_startups_rate;
757 r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX;
759 debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r);
760 return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
766 fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
767 fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
768 fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
769 fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE);
770 fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n");
771 fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n");
772 fprintf(stderr, " -D Do not fork into daemon mode\n");
773 fprintf(stderr, " -t Only test configuration file and keys\n");
774 fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n");
775 fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n");
776 fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n");
777 fprintf(stderr, " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 600)\n");
778 fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n");
779 fprintf(stderr, " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n",
780 _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE);
781 fprintf(stderr, " -u len Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n");
782 fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only\n");
783 fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only\n");
784 fprintf(stderr, " -o option Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.\n");
789 * Main program for the daemon.
792 main(int ac, char **av)
796 int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
800 struct sockaddr_storage from;
801 const char *remote_ip;
804 struct linger linger;
806 char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
807 int listen_sock, maxfd;
812 int ret, key_used = 0;
814 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
815 (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
817 __progname = get_progname(av[0]);
824 /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
825 initialize_server_options(&options);
827 /* Parse command-line arguments. */
828 while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:o:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) {
837 config_file_name = optarg;
840 if (0 == debug_flag) {
842 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
843 } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
846 fprintf(stderr, "Too high debugging level.\n");
863 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
866 options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg);
869 options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
870 if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
871 fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
874 options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
875 if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) {
876 fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
881 if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
882 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
887 if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
888 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
893 if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
894 fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
897 options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
900 client_version_string = optarg;
901 /* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */
908 utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
909 if (utmp_len < 0 || utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN)
913 if (process_server_config_line(&options, optarg,
914 "command-line", 0) != 0)
923 SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
924 channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
927 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
928 * key (unless started from inetd)
931 options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
932 SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
933 options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
934 SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
938 /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now!
939 * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
946 /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */
947 read_server_config(&options, config_file_name);
949 /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
950 fill_default_server_options(&options);
952 /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
954 fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
958 debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION);
960 /* load private host keys */
961 sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files*sizeof(Key*));
962 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
963 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
964 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
965 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
966 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
967 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
969 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
970 key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
971 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
973 error("Could not load host key: %s",
974 options.host_key_files[i]);
975 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
980 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
981 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
985 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
988 debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
991 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
992 log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
993 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
995 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
996 log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
997 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
999 if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
1000 log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
1004 /* Check certain values for sanity. */
1005 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
1006 if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
1007 options.server_key_bits > 32768) {
1008 fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
1012 * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
1013 * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
1014 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
1016 if (options.server_key_bits >
1017 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
1018 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
1019 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1020 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1021 options.server_key_bits =
1022 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1023 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
1024 debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
1025 options.server_key_bits);
1033 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
1034 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
1036 if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
1037 (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
1038 fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
1039 _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1042 if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
1043 (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
1044 (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
1046 if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
1048 fatal("Bad owner or mode for %s",
1049 _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1052 /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
1057 * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
1058 * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
1059 * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
1060 * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
1061 * module which might be used).
1063 if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
1064 debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1066 /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
1067 if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
1069 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1072 * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
1073 * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
1076 if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
1079 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1080 if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
1081 fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1083 /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
1085 fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
1087 (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
1090 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1092 /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
1093 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1095 /* Initialize the random number generator. */
1098 /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
1099 unmounted if desired. */
1102 /* ignore SIGPIPE */
1103 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
1105 /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
1108 s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */
1114 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
1115 * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if
1116 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
1118 debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
1119 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
1120 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1122 for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
1123 if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
1125 if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
1126 fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
1127 "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
1128 if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
1129 ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
1130 NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
1131 error("getnameinfo failed");
1134 /* Create socket for listening. */
1135 listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
1136 if (listen_sock < 0) {
1137 /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
1138 verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1141 if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
1142 error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
1147 * Set socket options. We try to make the port
1148 * reusable and have it close as fast as possible
1149 * without waiting in unnecessary wait states on
1152 setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
1155 linger.l_linger = 5;
1156 setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER,
1157 &linger, sizeof(linger));
1159 debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
1161 /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
1162 if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
1164 error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
1165 strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
1169 listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
1172 /* Start listening on the port. */
1173 log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
1174 if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0)
1175 fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1178 freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
1180 if (!num_listen_socks)
1181 fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
1183 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
1184 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1187 * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs
1190 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
1192 signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
1193 signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
1195 /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
1196 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
1198 /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
1201 * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
1202 * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to
1203 * do this before the bind above because the bind will
1204 * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
1205 * overwrite any old pid in the file.
1207 f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
1209 fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
1214 /* setup fd set for listen */
1217 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1218 if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
1219 maxfd = listen_socks[i];
1220 /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
1221 startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int));
1222 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1223 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1226 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
1227 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
1230 if (received_sighup)
1234 fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
1235 fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
1236 memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
1238 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1239 FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
1240 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1241 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
1242 FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
1244 /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
1245 ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1246 if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
1247 error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1248 if (received_sigterm) {
1249 log("Received signal %d; terminating.",
1250 (int) received_sigterm);
1251 close_listen_socks();
1252 unlink(options.pid_file);
1255 if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
1256 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1263 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1264 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
1265 FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
1267 * the read end of the pipe is ready
1268 * if the child has closed the pipe
1269 * after successful authentication
1270 * or if the child has died
1272 close(startup_pipes[i]);
1273 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1276 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
1277 if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
1279 fromlen = sizeof(from);
1280 newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from,
1283 if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
1284 error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1287 if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) {
1288 error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
1292 if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
1293 debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
1297 if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
1302 for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
1303 if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
1304 startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
1305 if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
1306 maxfd = startup_p[0];
1312 * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
1313 * we are in debugging mode.
1317 * In debugging mode. Close the listening
1318 * socket, and start processing the
1319 * connection without forking.
1321 debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
1322 close_listen_socks();
1330 * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
1331 * the child process the connection. The
1332 * parent continues listening.
1334 if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
1336 * Child. Close the listening and max_startup
1337 * sockets. Start using the accepted socket.
1338 * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
1339 * changed). We break out of the loop to handle
1342 startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
1343 close_startup_pipes();
1344 close_listen_socks();
1347 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1352 /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
1354 error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1356 debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
1358 close(startup_p[1]);
1360 /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
1361 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
1363 /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
1364 signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
1365 alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
1371 /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
1374 /* child process check (or debug mode) */
1375 if (num_listen_socks < 0)
1380 /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
1383 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
1384 * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
1385 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
1388 /* XXX: this breaks Solaris */
1389 if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
1390 error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1394 * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
1395 * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
1396 * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
1399 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
1400 signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
1401 signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
1402 signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
1403 signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
1404 signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
1407 * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to
1408 * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the
1409 * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing.
1411 /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */
1413 linger.l_linger = 5;
1414 setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &linger, sizeof(linger));
1416 /* Set keepalives if requested. */
1417 if (options.keepalives &&
1418 setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on,
1420 error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1423 * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
1426 packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
1428 remote_port = get_remote_port();
1429 remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
1432 /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
1434 struct request_info req;
1436 request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
1439 if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
1440 debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
1443 fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
1446 #endif /* LIBWRAP */
1448 /* Log the connection. */
1449 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
1452 * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
1453 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
1454 * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
1455 * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
1456 * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
1457 * are about to discover the bug.
1459 signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
1461 alarm(options.login_grace_time);
1463 sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
1465 * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
1466 * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged
1467 * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
1468 * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these
1469 * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
1471 if (options.rhosts_authentication &&
1472 (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED ||
1473 remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2)) {
1474 debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, "
1475 "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port);
1476 options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
1478 #if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5)
1479 if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() &&
1480 options.kerberos_authentication) {
1481 debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4.");
1482 options.kerberos_authentication = 0;
1484 #endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */
1486 /* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */
1493 packet_set_nonblocking();
1496 if ((authctxt = privsep_preauth()) != NULL)
1499 /* perform the key exchange */
1500 /* authenticate user and start session */
1503 authctxt = do_authentication2();
1506 authctxt = do_authentication();
1509 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
1510 * the current keystate and exits
1513 mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
1519 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
1520 * file descriptor passing.
1523 privsep_postauth(authctxt);
1524 /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
1526 destroy_sensitive_data();
1529 /* Perform session preparation. */
1530 do_authenticated(authctxt);
1532 /* The connection has been terminated. */
1533 verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
1537 #endif /* USE_PAM */
1548 * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
1549 * (key with larger modulus first).
1552 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
1556 if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
1557 /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
1558 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
1559 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1560 fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1561 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1562 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1563 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1564 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1566 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1567 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
1569 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1570 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
1573 /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
1574 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
1575 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1576 fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1577 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1578 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1579 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1580 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1582 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1583 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
1585 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1586 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
1599 BIGNUM *session_key_int;
1600 u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
1602 u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
1606 * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
1607 * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
1608 * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
1609 * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
1610 * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
1611 * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
1612 * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
1614 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
1617 cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
1622 * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
1623 * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
1626 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
1627 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1628 packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
1630 /* Store our public server RSA key. */
1631 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
1632 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
1633 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
1635 /* Store our public host RSA key. */
1636 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1637 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
1638 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
1640 /* Put protocol flags. */
1641 packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
1643 /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
1644 packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
1646 /* Declare supported authentication types. */
1648 if (options.rhosts_authentication)
1649 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS;
1650 if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
1651 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
1652 if (options.rsa_authentication)
1653 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
1654 #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
1655 if (options.kerberos_authentication)
1656 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS;
1658 #if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
1659 if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing)
1660 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT;
1663 if (options.afs_token_passing)
1664 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN;
1666 if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
1667 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
1668 if (options.password_authentication)
1669 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
1670 packet_put_int(auth_mask);
1672 /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
1674 packet_write_wait();
1676 debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
1677 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1678 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1680 /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
1681 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
1683 /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
1684 cipher_type = packet_get_char();
1686 if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
1687 packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
1689 /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
1690 sent earlier with the public key packet. */
1691 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1692 if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
1693 packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
1695 debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
1697 /* Get the encrypted integer. */
1698 if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
1699 fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
1700 packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
1702 protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
1703 packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
1706 /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
1707 rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int));
1710 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
1711 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
1712 * key is in the highest bits.
1715 BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
1716 len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1717 if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
1718 error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
1719 "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
1720 get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
1723 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1724 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
1725 session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
1727 compute_session_id(session_id, cookie,
1728 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
1729 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
1731 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
1734 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1735 session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
1739 int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1740 u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
1743 log("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
1744 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
1746 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1747 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1748 MD5_Final(session_key, &md);
1750 MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16);
1751 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1752 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1753 MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
1754 memset(buf, 0, bytes);
1756 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1757 session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
1759 /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
1760 destroy_sensitive_data();
1763 mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
1765 /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
1766 BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
1768 /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
1769 packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
1771 /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
1772 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1774 debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
1776 /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
1777 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
1779 packet_write_wait();
1783 * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
1790 if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
1791 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1792 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
1794 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1795 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
1796 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
1797 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
1799 if (options.macs != NULL) {
1800 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1801 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
1803 if (!options.compression) {
1804 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
1805 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
1807 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
1809 /* start key exchange */
1810 kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
1812 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
1813 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
1814 kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
1815 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1819 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
1821 session_id2 = kex->session_id;
1822 session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
1825 /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
1826 packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
1827 packet_put_cstring("markus");
1829 packet_write_wait();