2 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
3 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
5 * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
6 * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
7 * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
8 * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
9 * authentication agent connections.
11 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
12 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
13 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
14 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
15 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
17 * SSH2 implementation:
18 * Privilege Separation:
20 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
21 * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
32 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
33 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
34 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
35 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
36 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
37 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
38 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
39 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
40 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
41 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
45 RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.277 2003/09/19 11:33:09 markus Exp $");
47 #include <openssl/dh.h>
48 #include <openssl/bn.h>
49 #include <openssl/md5.h>
50 #include <openssl/rand.h>
51 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
52 #include <sys/security.h>
73 #include "myproposal.h"
75 #include "pathnames.h"
83 #include "monitor_mm.h"
85 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
86 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
91 int allow_severity = LOG_INFO;
92 int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
99 #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
100 extern char *__progname;
105 /* Server configuration options. */
106 ServerOptions options;
108 /* Name of the server configuration file. */
109 char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
112 * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
113 * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6.
115 int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
118 * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
119 * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
120 * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
121 * the first connection.
125 /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
128 /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
131 /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
132 int no_daemon_flag = 0;
134 /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
137 /* Saved arguments to main(). */
142 * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
145 #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
146 int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
147 int num_listen_socks = 0;
150 * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
151 * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
153 char *client_version_string = NULL;
154 char *server_version_string = NULL;
156 /* for rekeying XXX fixme */
160 * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
161 * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
162 * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
163 * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
164 * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
165 * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
168 Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
169 Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
170 Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
173 u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
177 * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
178 * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
180 static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
182 /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
183 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
184 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
186 /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
187 u_char session_id[16];
190 u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
191 u_int session_id2_len = 0;
193 /* record remote hostname or ip */
194 u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
196 /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
197 int *startup_pipes = NULL;
198 int startup_pipe; /* in child */
200 /* variables used for privilege separation */
202 struct monitor *pmonitor;
204 /* message to be displayed after login */
207 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
208 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
209 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
211 static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
212 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
215 * Close all listening sockets
218 close_listen_socks(void)
222 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
223 close(listen_socks[i]);
224 num_listen_socks = -1;
228 close_startup_pipes(void)
233 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
234 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
235 close(startup_pipes[i]);
239 * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
240 * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
244 sighup_handler(int sig)
246 int save_errno = errno;
249 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
254 * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
255 * Restarts the server.
260 logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
261 close_listen_socks();
262 close_startup_pipes();
263 execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
264 logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
270 * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
273 sigterm_handler(int sig)
275 received_sigterm = sig;
279 * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
280 * reap any zombies left by exited children.
283 main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
285 int save_errno = errno;
289 while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
290 (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
293 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
298 * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
301 grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
303 /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
305 /* Log error and exit. */
306 fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
310 * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
311 * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
312 * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
313 * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
317 generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
322 verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
323 sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
324 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
325 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
326 sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
327 options.server_key_bits);
328 verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
330 for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
333 sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
340 key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
342 int save_errno = errno;
344 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
350 sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
353 int remote_major, remote_minor;
356 char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
357 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
359 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
360 (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
361 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
363 } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
364 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
365 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
367 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
368 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
370 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
371 server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
373 /* Send our protocol version identification. */
374 if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
375 strlen(server_version_string))
376 != strlen(server_version_string)) {
377 logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
381 /* Read other sides version identification. */
382 memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
383 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
384 if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
385 logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
386 get_remote_ipaddr());
389 if (buf[i] == '\r') {
391 /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
393 strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
397 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
402 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
403 client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
406 * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
407 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
409 if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
410 &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
411 s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
412 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
415 logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
416 client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
419 debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
420 remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
422 compat_datafellows(remote_version);
424 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) {
425 logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
426 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
430 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
431 logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
432 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
437 switch (remote_major) {
439 if (remote_minor == 99) {
440 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
446 if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
450 if (remote_minor < 3) {
451 packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
452 "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
453 } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
454 /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
459 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
468 chop(server_version_string);
469 debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
472 s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
473 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
476 logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
478 server_version_string, client_version_string);
483 /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
485 destroy_sensitive_data(void)
489 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
490 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
491 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
493 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
494 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
495 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
496 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
499 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
500 memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
503 /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
505 demote_sensitive_data(void)
510 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
511 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
512 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
513 sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
516 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
517 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
518 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
519 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
520 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
521 if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
522 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
526 /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
530 privsep_preauth_child(void)
537 /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
538 privsep_challenge_enable();
540 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
541 rnd[i] = arc4random();
542 RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
544 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
545 demote_sensitive_data();
547 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
548 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
550 memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
553 /* Change our root directory */
554 if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
555 fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
557 if (chdir("/") == -1)
558 fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
560 /* Drop our privileges */
561 debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
564 /* XXX not ready, to heavy after chroot */
565 do_setusercontext(pw);
567 gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
568 if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
569 fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
570 permanently_set_uid(pw);
575 privsep_preauth(void)
577 Authctxt *authctxt = NULL;
581 /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
582 pmonitor = monitor_init();
583 /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
584 pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
588 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
589 } else if (pid != 0) {
590 debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
592 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
593 authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(pmonitor);
594 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
597 monitor_sync(pmonitor);
599 /* Wait for the child's exit status */
600 while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
607 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
609 /* Demote the child */
610 if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
611 privsep_preauth_child();
612 setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
618 privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
620 extern Authctxt *x_authctxt;
622 /* XXX - Remote port forwarding */
623 x_authctxt = authctxt;
625 #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
628 if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
630 /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
631 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
636 /* Authentication complete */
638 if (startup_pipe != -1) {
643 /* New socket pair */
644 monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
646 pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
647 if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
648 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
649 else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
650 debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
651 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
652 monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
658 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
660 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
661 demote_sensitive_data();
663 /* Drop privileges */
664 do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
666 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
667 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
671 list_hostkey_types(void)
678 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
679 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
685 if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
686 buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
687 p = key_ssh_name(key);
688 buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
692 buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
693 p = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
695 debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", p);
700 get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
704 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
705 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
706 if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
713 get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
715 if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
717 return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
721 get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
725 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
726 if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
733 * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
734 * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
735 * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
736 * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
739 drop_connection(int startups)
743 if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
745 if (startups >= options.max_startups)
747 if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
750 p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
751 p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
752 p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin);
753 p += options.max_startups_rate;
755 r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX;
757 debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r);
758 return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
764 fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
765 fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
766 fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
767 fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE);
768 fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n");
769 fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n");
770 fprintf(stderr, " -D Do not fork into daemon mode\n");
771 fprintf(stderr, " -t Only test configuration file and keys\n");
772 fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n");
773 fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n");
774 fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n");
775 fprintf(stderr, " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 600)\n");
776 fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n");
777 fprintf(stderr, " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n",
778 _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE);
779 fprintf(stderr, " -u len Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n");
780 fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only\n");
781 fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only\n");
782 fprintf(stderr, " -o option Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.\n");
787 * Main program for the daemon.
790 main(int ac, char **av)
794 int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
798 struct sockaddr_storage from;
799 const char *remote_ip;
803 char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
804 int listen_sock, maxfd;
809 int ret, key_used = 0;
811 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
812 (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
814 __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
817 /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
819 saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1));
820 for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
821 saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
822 saved_argv[i] = NULL;
824 #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
825 /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
826 compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
830 /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
831 initialize_server_options(&options);
833 /* Parse command-line arguments. */
834 while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) {
843 config_file_name = optarg;
846 if (debug_flag == 0) {
848 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
849 } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
865 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
868 options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg);
871 options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
872 if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
873 fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
876 options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
877 if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) {
878 fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
883 if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
884 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
889 if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
890 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
895 if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
896 fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
899 options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
905 utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
906 if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
907 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
912 if (process_server_config_line(&options, optarg,
913 "command-line", 0) != 0)
922 SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
923 channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
926 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
927 * key (unless started from inetd)
930 options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
931 SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
932 options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
933 SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
934 log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
937 /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now!
938 * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
945 /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */
946 read_server_config(&options, config_file_name);
948 /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
949 fill_default_server_options(&options);
951 /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
953 fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
957 debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION);
959 /* load private host keys */
960 sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
962 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
963 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
964 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
965 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
966 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
967 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
969 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
970 key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
971 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
973 error("Could not load host key: %s",
974 options.host_key_files[i]);
975 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
980 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
981 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
985 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
988 debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
991 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
992 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
993 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
995 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
996 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
997 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
999 if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
1000 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
1004 /* Check certain values for sanity. */
1005 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
1006 if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
1007 options.server_key_bits > 32768) {
1008 fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
1012 * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
1013 * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
1014 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
1016 if (options.server_key_bits >
1017 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
1018 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
1019 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1020 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1021 options.server_key_bits =
1022 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1023 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
1024 debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
1025 options.server_key_bits);
1033 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
1034 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
1036 if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
1037 (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
1038 fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
1039 _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1042 if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
1043 (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
1044 (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
1046 if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
1048 fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
1049 "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1052 /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
1057 * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
1058 * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
1059 * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
1060 * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
1061 * module which might be used).
1063 if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
1064 debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1066 /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
1067 if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
1069 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1072 * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
1073 * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
1076 if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
1079 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1080 if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
1081 fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1083 /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
1085 fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
1087 (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
1090 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1092 /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
1093 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1095 /* Initialize the random number generator. */
1098 /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
1099 unmounted if desired. */
1102 /* ignore SIGPIPE */
1103 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
1105 /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
1108 s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */
1114 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
1115 * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if
1116 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
1118 debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
1119 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
1120 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1122 for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
1123 if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
1125 if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
1126 fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
1127 "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
1128 if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
1129 ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
1130 NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
1131 error("getnameinfo failed");
1134 /* Create socket for listening. */
1135 listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
1137 if (listen_sock < 0) {
1138 /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
1139 verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1142 if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
1143 error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
1148 * Set socket options.
1149 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
1151 if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
1152 &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1153 error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
1155 debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
1157 /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
1158 if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
1160 error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
1161 strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
1165 listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
1168 /* Start listening on the port. */
1169 logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
1170 if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0)
1171 fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1174 freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
1176 if (!num_listen_socks)
1177 fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
1179 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
1180 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1183 * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs
1186 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
1188 signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
1189 signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
1191 /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
1192 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
1194 /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
1197 * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
1198 * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to
1199 * do this before the bind above because the bind will
1200 * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
1201 * overwrite any old pid in the file.
1203 f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
1205 error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
1206 options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
1208 fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
1213 /* setup fd set for listen */
1216 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1217 if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
1218 maxfd = listen_socks[i];
1219 /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
1220 startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int));
1221 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1222 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1225 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
1226 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
1229 if (received_sighup)
1233 fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
1234 fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
1235 memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
1237 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1238 FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
1239 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1240 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
1241 FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
1243 /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
1244 ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1245 if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
1246 error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1247 if (received_sigterm) {
1248 logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
1249 (int) received_sigterm);
1250 close_listen_socks();
1251 unlink(options.pid_file);
1254 if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
1255 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1262 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1263 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
1264 FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
1266 * the read end of the pipe is ready
1267 * if the child has closed the pipe
1268 * after successful authentication
1269 * or if the child has died
1271 close(startup_pipes[i]);
1272 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1275 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
1276 if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
1278 fromlen = sizeof(from);
1279 newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from,
1282 if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
1283 error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1286 if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) {
1287 error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
1291 if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
1292 debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
1296 if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
1301 for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
1302 if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
1303 startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
1304 if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
1305 maxfd = startup_p[0];
1311 * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
1312 * we are in debugging mode.
1316 * In debugging mode. Close the listening
1317 * socket, and start processing the
1318 * connection without forking.
1320 debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
1321 close_listen_socks();
1329 * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
1330 * the child process the connection. The
1331 * parent continues listening.
1333 if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
1335 * Child. Close the listening and max_startup
1336 * sockets. Start using the accepted socket.
1337 * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
1338 * changed). We break out of the loop to handle
1341 startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
1342 close_startup_pipes();
1343 close_listen_socks();
1346 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1351 /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
1353 error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1355 debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
1357 close(startup_p[1]);
1359 /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
1360 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
1362 /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
1363 signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
1364 alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
1370 /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
1373 /* child process check (or debug mode) */
1374 if (num_listen_socks < 0)
1379 /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
1382 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
1383 * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
1384 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
1386 #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
1388 * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
1389 * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
1390 * controlling tty" errors.
1392 if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
1393 error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1397 * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
1398 * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
1399 * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
1402 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
1403 signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
1404 signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
1405 signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
1406 signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
1407 signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
1409 /* Set keepalives if requested. */
1410 if (options.keepalives &&
1411 setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on,
1413 error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1416 * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
1419 packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
1421 remote_port = get_remote_port();
1422 remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
1425 /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
1427 struct request_info req;
1429 request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
1432 if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
1433 debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
1436 fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
1439 #endif /* LIBWRAP */
1441 /* Log the connection. */
1442 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
1445 * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
1446 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
1447 * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
1448 * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
1449 * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
1450 * are about to discover the bug.
1452 signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
1454 alarm(options.login_grace_time);
1456 sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
1458 packet_set_nonblocking();
1460 /* prepare buffers to collect authentication messages */
1461 buffer_init(&loginmsg);
1464 if ((authctxt = privsep_preauth()) != NULL)
1467 /* perform the key exchange */
1468 /* authenticate user and start session */
1471 authctxt = do_authentication2();
1474 authctxt = do_authentication();
1477 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
1478 * the current keystate and exits
1481 mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
1487 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
1488 * file descriptor passing.
1491 privsep_postauth(authctxt);
1492 /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
1494 destroy_sensitive_data();
1497 /* Perform session preparation. */
1498 do_authenticated(authctxt);
1500 /* The connection has been terminated. */
1501 verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
1504 if (options.use_pam)
1506 #endif /* USE_PAM */
1517 * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
1518 * (key with larger modulus first).
1521 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
1525 if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
1526 /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
1527 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
1528 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1529 fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1530 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1531 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1532 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1533 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1535 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1536 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
1538 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1539 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
1542 /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
1543 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
1544 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1545 fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1546 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1547 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1548 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1549 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1551 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1552 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
1554 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1555 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
1568 BIGNUM *session_key_int;
1569 u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
1571 u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
1575 * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
1576 * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
1577 * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
1578 * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
1579 * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
1580 * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
1581 * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
1583 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
1586 cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
1591 * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
1592 * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
1595 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
1596 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1597 packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
1599 /* Store our public server RSA key. */
1600 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
1601 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
1602 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
1604 /* Store our public host RSA key. */
1605 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1606 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
1607 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
1609 /* Put protocol flags. */
1610 packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
1612 /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
1613 packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
1615 /* Declare supported authentication types. */
1617 if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
1618 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
1619 if (options.rsa_authentication)
1620 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
1621 if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
1622 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
1623 if (options.password_authentication)
1624 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
1625 packet_put_int(auth_mask);
1627 /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
1629 packet_write_wait();
1631 debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
1632 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1633 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1635 /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
1636 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
1638 /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
1639 cipher_type = packet_get_char();
1641 if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
1642 packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
1644 /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
1645 sent earlier with the public key packet. */
1646 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1647 if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
1648 packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
1650 debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
1652 /* Get the encrypted integer. */
1653 if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
1654 fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
1655 packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
1657 protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
1658 packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
1661 /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
1662 rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int));
1665 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
1666 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
1667 * key is in the highest bits.
1670 BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
1671 len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1672 if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
1673 error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
1674 "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
1675 get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
1678 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1679 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
1680 session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
1682 compute_session_id(session_id, cookie,
1683 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
1684 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
1686 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
1689 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1690 session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
1694 int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1695 u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
1698 logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
1699 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
1701 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1702 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1703 MD5_Final(session_key, &md);
1705 MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16);
1706 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1707 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1708 MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
1709 memset(buf, 0, bytes);
1711 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1712 session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
1714 /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
1715 destroy_sensitive_data();
1718 mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
1720 /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
1721 BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
1723 /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
1724 packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
1726 /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
1727 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1729 debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
1731 /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
1732 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
1734 packet_write_wait();
1738 * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
1745 if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
1746 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1747 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
1749 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1750 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
1751 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
1752 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
1754 if (options.macs != NULL) {
1755 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1756 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
1758 if (!options.compression) {
1759 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
1760 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
1762 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
1764 /* start key exchange */
1765 kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
1766 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1767 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1769 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
1770 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
1771 kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
1772 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1776 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
1778 session_id2 = kex->session_id;
1779 session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
1782 /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
1783 packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
1784 packet_put_cstring("markus");
1786 packet_write_wait();