+20070817
+ - (dtucker) [sshd.8] Many Linux variants use a single "!" to denote locked
+ accounts and that's what the code looks for, so make man page and code
+ agree. Pointed out by Roumen Petrov.
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Group the parts describing random options and PAM
+ implementations together which is hopefully more coherent.
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] the pid file is sshd.pid not ssh.pid.
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Give PAM its own heading.
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Link to tcpwrappers.
+
+20070816
+ - (dtucker) [session.c] Call PAM cleanup functions for unauthenticated
+ connections too. Based on a patch from Sandro Wefel, with & ok djm@
+
+20070815
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/08/15 08:14:46
+ [clientloop.c]
+ do NOT fall back to the trused x11 cookie if generation of an untrusted
+ cookie fails; from Jan Pechanec, via security-alert at sun.com;
+ ok dtucker
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/08/15 08:16:49
+ [version.h]
+ openssh 4.7
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/08/15 12:13:41
+ [ssh_config.5]
+ tun device forwarding now honours ExitOnForwardFailure; ok markus@
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c] Remove debug from signal handler.
+ ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
+ contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version.
+
+20070813
+ - (dtucker) [session.c] Bug #1339: ensure that pam_setcred() is always
+ called with PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED at least once, which resolves a problem
+ with pam_dhkeys. Patch from David Leonard, ok djm@
+
+20070810
+ - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] Use sigdie here too. ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1343: Set DISABLE_FD_PASSING for QNX6. From
+ Matt Kraai, ok djm@
+
+20070809
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/port-aix.c] Comment typo.
+ - (dtucker) [README.platform] Document the interaction between PermitRootLogin
+ and the AIX native login restrictions.
+ - (dtucker) [defines.h] Remove _PATH_{CSHELL,SHELLS} which aren't
+ used anywhere and are a potential source of warnings.
+
+20070808
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - ray@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/07/12 05:48:05
+ [key.c]
+ Delint: remove some unreachable statements, from Bret Lambert.
+ OK markus@ and dtucker@.
+ - sobrado@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/08/06 19:16:06
+ [scp.1 scp.c]
+ the ellipsis is not an optional argument; while here, sync the usage
+ and synopsis of commands
+ lots of good ideas by jmc@
+ ok jmc@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/08/07 07:32:53
+ [clientloop.c clientloop.h ssh.c]
+ bz#1232: ensure that any specified LocalCommand is executed after the
+ tunnel device is opened. Also, make failures to open a tunnel device
+ fatal when ExitOnForwardFailure is active.
+ Reported by h.goebel AT goebel-consult.de; ok dtucker markus reyk deraadt
+
+20070724
+ - (tim) [openssh.xml.in] make FMRI match what package scripts use.
+ - (tim) [openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c] Bug 1345: fix open() call.
+ Report/patch by David.Leonard AT quest.com (and Bernhard Simon)
+ - (tim) [buildpkg.sh.in openssh.xml.in] Allow more flexibility where smf(5)
+ - (tim) [buildpkg.sh.in] s|$FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}|$FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}|
+
+20070628
+ - (djm) bz#1325: Fix SELinux in permissive mode where it would
+ incorrectly fatal() on errors. patch from cjwatson AT debian.org;
+ ok dtucker
+
+20070625
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/13 00:21:27
+ [scp.c]
+ don't ftruncate() non-regular files; bz#1236 reported by wood AT
+ xmission.com; ok dtucker@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/14 21:43:25
+ [ssh.c]
+ handle EINTR when waiting for mux exit status properly
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/14 22:48:05
+ [ssh.c]
+ when waiting for the multiplex exit status, read until the master end
+ writes an entire int of data *and* closes the client_fd; fixes mux
+ regression spotted by dtucker, ok dtucker@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/19 02:04:43
+ [atomicio.c]
+ if the fd passed to atomicio/atomiciov() is non blocking, then poll() to
+ avoid a spin if it is not yet ready for reading/writing; ok dtucker@
+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/25 08:20:03
+ [channels.c]
+ Correct test for window updates every three packets; prevents sending
+ window updates for every single packet. ok markus@
+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/25 12:02:27
+ [atomicio.c]
+ Include <poll.h> like the man page says rather than <sys/poll.h>. ok djm@
+ - (dtucker) [atomicio.c] Test for EWOULDBLOCK in atomiciov to match
+ atomicio.
+ - (dtucker) [atomicio.c configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.{c,h} openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]
+ Add an implementation of poll() built on top of select(2). Code from
+ OpenNTPD with changes suggested by djm. ok djm@
+
+20070614
+ - (dtucker) [cipher-ctr.c umac.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Move the
+ USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL compat goop to openssl-compat.h so it can be
+ shared with umac.c. Allows building with OpenSSL 0.9.5 again including
+ umac support. With tim@ djm@, ok djm.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Merge USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+ sections. Fixes builds with early OpenSSL 0.9.6 versions.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Remove redundant definition
+ of USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL since the <0.9.6 test is covered by the
+ subsequent <0.9.7 test.
+
+20070612
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/11 09:14:00
+ [channels.h]
+ increase default channel windows; ok djm
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/12 07:41:00
+ [ssh-add.1]
+ better document ssh-add's -d option (delete identies from agent), bz#1224
+ new text based on some provided by andrewmc-debian AT celt.dias.ie;
+ ok dtucker@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/12 08:20:00
+ [ssh-gss.h gss-serv.c gss-genr.c]
+ relocate server-only GSSAPI code from libssh to server; bz #1225
+ patch from simon AT sxw.org.uk; ok markus@ dtucker@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/12 08:24:20
+ [scp.c]
+ make scp try to skip FIFOs rather than blocking when nothing is listening.
+ depends on the platform supporting sane O_NONBLOCK semantics for open
+ on FIFOs (apparently POSIX does not mandate this), which OpenBSD does.
+ bz #856; report by cjwatson AT debian.org; ok markus@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/12 11:11:08
+ [ssh.c]
+ fix slave exit value when a control master goes away without passing the
+ full exit status by ensuring that the slave reads a full int. bz#1261
+ reported by frekko AT gmail.com; ok markus@ dtucker@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/12 11:15:17
+ [ssh.c ssh.1]
+ Add "-K" flag for ssh to set GSSAPIAuthentication=yes and
+ GSSAPIDelegateCredentials=yes. This is symmetric with -k (disable GSSAPI)
+ and is useful for hosts with /home on Kerberised NFS; bz #1312
+ patch from Markus.Kuhn AT cl.cam.ac.uk; ok dtucker@ markus@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/12 11:45:27
+ [ssh.c]
+ improved exit message from multiplex slave sessions; bz #1262
+ reported by alexandre.nunes AT gmail.com; ok dtucker@
+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/12 11:56:15
+ [gss-genr.c]
+ Pass GSS OID to gss_display_status to provide better information in
+ error messages. Patch from Simon Wilkinson via bz 1220. ok djm@
+ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/12 13:41:03
+ [ssh-add.1]
+ identies -> identities;
+ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/12 13:43:55
+ [ssh.1]
+ add -K to SYNOPSIS;
+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/12 13:54:28
+ [scp.c]
+ Encode filename with strnvis if the name contains a newline (which can't
+ be represented in the scp protocol), from bz #891. ok markus@
+
+20070611
+ - (djm) Bugzilla #1306: silence spurious error messages from hang-on-exit
+ fix; tested by dtucker@ and jochen.kirn AT gmail.com
+ - pvalchev@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/07 19:37:34
+ [kex.h mac.c mac.h monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c ssh.1]
+ [ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
+ Add a new MAC algorithm for data integrity, UMAC-64 (not default yet,
+ must specify umac-64@openssh.com). Provides about 20% end-to-end speedup
+ compared to hmac-md5. Represents a different approach to message
+ authentication to that of HMAC that may be beneficial if HMAC based on
+ one of its underlying hash algorithms is found to be vulnerable to a
+ new attack. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4418.txt
+ in conjunction with and OK djm@
+ - pvalchev@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/08 04:40:40
+ [ssh_config]
+ Add a "MACs" line after "Ciphers" with the default MAC algorithms,
+ to ease people who want to tweak both (eg. for performance reasons).
+ ok deraadt@ djm@ dtucker@
+ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/08 07:43:46
+ [ssh_config.5]
+ put the MAC list into a display, like we do for ciphers,
+ since groff has trouble handling wide lines;
+ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/08 07:48:09
+ [sshd_config.5]
+ oops, here too: put the MAC list into a display, like we do for
+ ciphers, since groff has trouble with wide lines;
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/11 08:04:44
+ [channels.c]
+ send 'window adjust' messages every tree packets and do not wait
+ until 50% of the window is consumed. ok djm dtucker
+ - (djm) [configure.ac umac.c] If platform doesn't provide swap32(3), then
+ fallback to provided bit-swizzing functions
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] According to the spec the "remainder"
+ argument to nanosleep may be NULL. Currently this never happens in OpenSSH,
+ but check anyway in case this changes or the code gets used elsewhere.
+ - (dtucker) [includes.h] Bug #1243: HAVE_PATHS -> HAVE_PATHS_H. Should
+ prevent warnings about redefinitions of various things in paths.h.
+ Spotted by cartmanltd at hotmail.com.
+
+20070605
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/05/22 10:18:52
+ [sshd.c]
+ zap double include; from p_nowaczyk AT o2.pl
+ (not required in -portable, Id sync only)
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/05/30 05:58:13
+ [kex.c]
+ tidy: KNF, ARGSUSED and u_int
+ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/05/31 19:20:16
+ [scp.1 ssh_config.5 sftp-server.8 ssh-agent.1 sshd_config.5 sftp.1
+ ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-add.1 sshd.8 ssh.1 ssh-keysign.8]
+ convert to new .Dd format;
+ (We will need to teach mdoc2man.awk to understand this too.)
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/05/31 23:34:29
+ [packet.c]
+ gc unreachable code; spotted by Tavis Ormandy
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/02 09:04:58
+ [bufbn.c]
+ memory leak on error path; from arnaud.lacombe.1 AT ulaval.ca
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/06/05 06:52:37
+ [kex.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c mac.h kex.h mac.c]
+ Preserve MAC ctx between packets, saving 2xhash calls per-packet.
+ Yields around a 12-16% end-to-end speedup for arcfour256/hmac-md5
+ patch from markus@ tested dtucker@ and myself, ok markus@ and me (I'm
+ committing at his request)
+ - (dtucker) [mdoc2man.awk] Teach it to deal with $Mdocdate tags that
+ OpenBSD's cvs now adds.
+ - (dtucker) [mdoc2man.awk] Remove trailing "$" from Mdocdate regex so
+ mindrot's cvs doesn't expand it on us.
+ - (dtucker) [mdoc2man.awk] Add support for %R references, used for RFCs.
+
+20070520
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/04/14 22:01:58
+ [auth2.c]
+ remove unused macro; from Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/04/18 01:12:43
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ cast "%llu" format spec to (unsigned long long); do not assume a
+ u_int64_t arg is the same as 'unsigned long long'.
+ from Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
+ ok markus@ 'Yes, that looks correct' millert@
+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/04/23 10:15:39
+ [servconf.c]
+ Remove debug() left over from development. ok deraadt@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/05/17 07:50:31
+ [log.c]
+ save and restore errno when logging; ok deraadt@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/05/17 07:55:29
+ [sftp-server.c]
+ bz#1286 stop reading and processing commands when input or output buffer
+ is nearly full, otherwise sftp-server would happily try to grow the
+ input/output buffers past the maximum supported by the buffer API and
+ promptly fatal()
+ based on patch from Thue Janus Kristensen; feedback & ok dtucker@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/05/17 20:48:13
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ fall back to gethostname() when the outgoing connection is not
+ on a socket, such as is the case when ProxyCommand is used.
+ Gives hostbased auth an opportunity to work; bz#616, report
+ and feedback stuart AT kaloram.com; ok markus@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/05/17 20:52:13
+ [monitor.c]
+ pass received SIGINT from monitor to postauth child so it can clean
+ up properly. bz#1196, patch from senthilkumar_sen AT hotpop.com;
+ ok markus@
+ - jolan@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/05/17 23:53:41
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ djm owes me a vb and a tism cd for breaking ssh compilation
+ - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] malloc+memset -> calloc. Patch from
+ ldv at altlinux.org.
+ - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] Return empty string if fgets fails in
+ sshpam_tty_conv. Patch from ldv at altlinux.org.
+
+20070509
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Bug #1287: Add missing test for ucred.h.
+
+20070429
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Include unistd.h and sys/types.h
+ for select(2) prototype.
+ - (dtucker) [auth-shadow.c loginrec.c] Include time.h for time(2) prototype.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c] Bug #1299: Use the
+ platform's _res if it has one. Should fix problem of DNSSEC record lookups
+ on NetBSD as reported by Curt Sampson.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/xmmap.c] Include stdlib.h for mkstemp prototype.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Have configure check for MAXSYMLINKS
+ so we don't get redefinition warnings.
+ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/xmmap.c] Include stdlib.h for mkstemp prototype.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Prevent warnings about __attribute__
+ __nonnull__ for versions of GCC that don't support it.
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Have configure check for offsetof
+ to prevent redefinition warnings.
+
+20070406
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Update the systems that have PAM as standard. Link
+ to OpenPAM too.
+ - (dtucker) [INSTALL] prngd lives at sourceforge these days.
+
+20070326
+ - (tim) [auth.c configure.ac defines.h session.c openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
+ openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c] Rework libiaf test/defines
+ to account for IRIX having libiaf but not set_id(). Patch with & ok dtucker@
+
+20070325
+ - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] Replace single-purpose LIBSELINUX,
+ LIBWRAP and LIBPAM variables in Makefile with the general-purpose
+ SSHDLIBS. "I like" djm@
+
+20070321
+ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/03/09 05:20:06
+ [servconf.c sshd.c]
+ Move C/R -> kbdint special case to after the defaults have been
+ loaded, which makes ChallengeResponse default to yes again. This
+ was broken by the Match changes and not fixed properly subsequently.
+ Found by okan at demirmen.com, ok djm@ "please do it" deraadt@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/03/19 01:01:29
+ [sshd_config]
+ Disable the legacy SSH protocol 1 for new installations via
+ a configuration override. In the future, we will change the
+ server's default itself so users who need the legacy protocol
+ will need to turn it on explicitly
+ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/03/19 12:16:42
+ [ssh-agent.c]
+ Remove the signal handler that checks if the agent's parent process
+ has gone away, instead check when the select loop returns. Record when
+ the next key will expire when scanning for expired keys. Set the select
+ timeout to whichever of these two things happens next. With djm@, with &
+ ok deraadt@ markus@
+ - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/03/20 03:56:12
+ [readconf.c clientloop.c]
+ remove some bogus *p tests from charles longeau
+ ok deraadt millert
+ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/03/20 15:57:15
+ [sshd.8]
+ - let synopsis and description agree for -f
+ - sort FILES
+ - +.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ from Igor Sobrado
+ - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c] Bug #1287: Use
+ getpeerucred to implement getpeereid (currently only Solaris 10 and up).
+ Patch by Jan.Pechanec at Sun.
+ - (dtucker) [regress/agent-getpeereid.sh] Do peereid test if we have
+ HAVE_GETPEERUCRED too. Also from Jan Pechanec.
+
+20070313
+ - (dtucker) [entropy.c scard-opensc.c ssh-rand-helper.c] Bug #1294: include
+ string.h to prevent warnings, from vapier at gentoo.org.
+ - (dtucker) [LICENCE] Add Daniel Walsh as a copyright holder for the
+ selinux bits in -portable.
+ - (dtucker) [cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c] The OpenSSL 0.9.8e problem in
+ bug #1291 also affects Protocol 1 3des. While at it, use compat-openssl.h
+ in cipher-bf1.c. Patch from Juan Gallego.
+ - (dtucker) [README.platform] Info about blibpath on AIX.
+
20070306
- (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/03/01 16:19:33
The remaining items are optional.
-OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your system
-supports it. PAM is standard on Redhat and Debian Linux, Solaris and
-HP-UX 11.
-
NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
OpenSSL to use it. OpenSSH relies on OpenSSL's direct support of
-/dev/random. If you don't you will have to rely on ssh-rand-helper, which
-is inferior to a good kernel-based solution.
+/dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd. If you don't have
+any of these you will have to rely on ssh-rand-helper, which is inferior
+to a good kernel-based solution or prngd.
+
+PRNGD:
+
+If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
+Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
+
+http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
+
+EGD:
+
+The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is supported if you have a system which
+lacks /dev/random and don't want to use OpenSSH's internal entropy collection.
+
+http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
PAM:
-http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
+
+OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
+system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
+HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD.
+
+Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
+
+Solaris PAM: http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
+Linux PAM: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
+OpenPAM: http://www.openpam.org/
If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
libraries and headers.
http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
-PRNGD:
-
-If your system lacks Kernel based random collection, the use of Lutz
-Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
-
-http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html
-
-EGD:
+TCP Wrappers:
-The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is supported if you have a system which
-lacks /dev/random and don't want to use OpenSSH's internal entropy collection.
+If you wish to use the TCP wrappers functionality you will need at least
+tcpd.h and libwrap.a, either in the standard include and library paths,
+or in the directory specified by --with-tcp-wrappers. Version 7.6 is
+known to work.
-http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
+http://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html
S/Key Libraries:
If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.61 to rebuild
the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf". Earlier
-version may also work but this is not guaranteed.
+versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
need the S/Key libraries and header files installed for this to work.
--with-tcp-wrappers will enable TCP Wrappers (/etc/hosts.allow|deny)
-support. You will need libwrap.a and tcpd.h installed.
+support.
--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does
--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
---with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the ssh.pid file is
+--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
created.
--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
Darren Tucker
Sun Microsystems
The SCO Group
+ Daniel Walsh
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
LIBS=@LIBS@
-LIBSELINUX=@LIBSELINUX@
SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
-LIBPAM=@LIBPAM@
-LIBWRAP=@LIBWRAP@
AR=@AR@
AWK=@AWK@
RANLIB=@RANLIB@
atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
- entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o
+ entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBWRAP) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.6 for the release notes.
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.7 for the release notes.
- A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5
IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4
+If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system
+locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to
+define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg
+
+blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \
+ --with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware
+
+If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled
+by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the
+loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the
+"rlogin" attribute set. This check is not done for the root account,
+instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used.
+
+
Cygwin
------
To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages:
-/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.23 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.25 2007/06/25 12:02:27 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include "atomicio.h"
char *s = _s;
size_t pos = 0;
ssize_t res;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
+ pfd.fd = fd;
+ pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
while (n > pos) {
res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
switch (res) {
case -1:
#ifdef EWOULDBLOCK
- if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
#else
- if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+ if (errno == EINTR)
#endif
continue;
+ if (errno == EAGAIN) {
+ (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+ continue;
+ }
return 0;
case 0:
errno = EPIPE;
size_t pos = 0, rem;
ssize_t res;
struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
if (iovcnt > IOV_MAX) {
errno = EINVAL;
/* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */
memcpy(iov, _iov, iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov));
+ pfd.fd = fd;
+ pfd.events = f == readv ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) {
res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
switch (res) {
case -1:
- if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+#ifdef EWOULDBLOCK
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+#else
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+#endif
continue;
+ if (errno == EAGAIN) {
+ (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+ continue;
+ }
return 0;
case 0:
errno = EPIPE;
WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM)
return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */
if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status))
- fatal("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly");
+ sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly");
if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0)
- fatal("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
+ sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
}
/* ARGSUSED */
return (NULL);
}
- ctxt = xmalloc(sizeof *ctxt);
- memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
+ ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
/* Start the authentication thread */
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
break;
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
- fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin);
+ if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL)
+ input[0] = '\0';
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL)
goto fail;
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
- if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
- memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
#include <shadow.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (spw != NULL)
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else
passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
-#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
#else
passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
#endif
if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
locked = 1;
#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
free(passwd);
-#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
if (locked) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
pw->pw_name);
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.114 2007/03/01 10:28:02 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.115 2007/04/14 22:01:58 stevesk Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
}
}
-#define DELIM ","
-
static char *
authmethods_get(void)
{
-/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.5 2007/02/14 14:32:00 stevesk Exp $*/
+/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.6 2007/06/02 09:04:58 djm Exp $*/
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
return (-1);
}
if (len > 8 * 1024) {
- error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", len);
+ error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d",
+ len);
xfree(bin);
return (-1);
}
if (BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value) == NULL) {
error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
+ xfree(bin);
return (-1);
}
xfree(bin);
OPENSSHD=opensshd.init
OPENSSH_MANIFEST=openssh.xml
OPENSSH_FMRI=svc:/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}:default
+SMF_METHOD_DIR=/lib/svc/method/site
+SMF_MANIFEST_DIR=/var/svc/manifest/site
PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=@PATH_GROUPADD_PROG@
PATH_USERADD_PROG=@PATH_USERADD_PROG@
# For Solaris' SMF, /lib/svc/method/site is the preferred place
# for start/stop scripts that aren't supplied with the OS, and
# similarly /var/svc/manifest/site for manifests.
- mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/lib/svc/method/site
- mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/var/svc/manifest/site
+ mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}
+ mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}
- cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/lib/svc/method/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
- chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/lib/svc/method/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+ cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+ chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
- cat ${OPENSSH_MANIFEST} | sed "s|__SYSVINIT_NAME__|${SYSVINIT_NAME}|" \
- > $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/var/svc/manifest/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
- chmod 644 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/var/svc/manifest/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
+ cat ${OPENSSH_MANIFEST} | \
+ sed -e "s|__SYSVINIT_NAME__|${SYSVINIT_NAME}|" \
+ -e "s|__SMF_METHOD_DIR__|${SMF_METHOD_DIR}|" \
+ > $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
+ chmod 644 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
else
mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d
[ "${PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN}" = no ] && \
perl -p -i -e "s/#PermitRootLogin yes/PermitRootLogin no/" \
- $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+ $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
[ "${X11_FORWARDING}" = yes ] && \
perl -p -i -e "s/#X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/" \
- $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+ $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
# fix PrintMotd
perl -p -i -e "s/#PrintMotd yes/PrintMotd no/" \
- $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+ $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
# We don't want to overwrite config files on multiple installs
-mv $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/ssh_config $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/ssh_config.default
-mv $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config.default
-[ -f $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/ssh_prng_cmds ] && \
-mv $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/ssh_prng_cmds $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/ssh_prng_cmds.default
+mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_config $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_config.default
+mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config.default
+[ -f $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_prng_cmds ] && \
+mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_prng_cmds $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_prng_cmds.default
# local tweeks here
[ -s "${POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES}" ] && . ${POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES}
svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI
fi
# NOTE, The manifest disables sshd by default.
- svccfg import ${TEST_DIR}/var/svc/manifest/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
+ svccfg import ${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
else
if [ "\${USE_SYM_LINKS}" = yes ]
then
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.268 2007/01/03 03:01:40 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.270 2007/06/25 08:20:03 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
- int len;
+ int len, force;
- if (c->rfd != -1 &&
- (c->detach_close || FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) {
+ force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+ if (c->rfd != -1 && (force || FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) {
errno = 0;
len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR ||
- (errno == EAGAIN && !(c->isatty && c->detach_close))))
+ if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || (errno == EAGAIN && !force)))
return 1;
#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
if (len <= 0) {
{
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
!(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
- c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2 &&
+ ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
+ c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
+ c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
c->local_consumed > 0) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.88 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.89 2007/06/11 09:14:00 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */
#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
-#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT)
#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
-#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT)
#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024)
#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT)
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906000L
-#define SSH_OLD_EVP
-#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
/*
* This is used by SSH1:
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906000L
-#define SSH_OLD_EVP
-#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
/*
* SSH1 uses a variation on Blowfish, all bytes must be swapped before
/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
-#include "rijndael.h"
-#define AES_KEY rijndael_ctx
-#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
-#define AES_encrypt(a, b, c) rijndael_encrypt(c, a, b)
-#define AES_set_encrypt_key(a, b, c) rijndael_set_key(c, (char *)a, b, 1)
-#else
+#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#endif
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.178 2007/02/20 10:25:14 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.181 2007/08/15 08:14:46 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
generated = 1;
}
}
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
- "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
- xauth_path,
- generated ? "-f " : "" ,
- generated ? xauthfile : "",
- display);
- debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
- f = popen(cmd, "r");
- if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
- sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
- got_data = 1;
- if (f)
- pclose(f);
+
+ /*
+ * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was
+ * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step
+ * above.
+ */
+ if (trusted || generated) {
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ xauth_path,
+ generated ? "-f " : "" ,
+ generated ? xauthfile : "",
+ display);
+ debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+ f = popen(cmd, "r");
+ if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
+ sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
+ got_data = 1;
+ if (f)
+ pclose(f);
+ } else
+ error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
+ "xauth key data not generated");
}
if (do_unlink) {
cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO);
if (s == NULL)
goto out;
- while (*s && isspace(*s))
+ while (isspace(*s))
s++;
if (*s == '-')
s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */
goto out;
}
- s++;
- while (*s && isspace(*s))
- s++;
+ while (isspace(*++s))
+ ;
if (delete) {
cancel_port = 0;
return c;
}
+int
+client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ error("Tunnel forwarding is not support for protocol 1");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode);
+
+ /* Open local tunnel device */
+ if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode)) == -1) {
+ error("Tunnel device open failed.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+ c->datagram = 1;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+ if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
+ channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
+ sys_tun_outfilter);
+#endif
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
+ packet_put_cstring("tun@openssh.com");
+ packet_put_int(c->self);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
+ packet_put_int(tun_mode);
+ packet_put_int(remote_tun);
+ packet_send();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* XXXX move to generic input handler */
static void
client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.17 2007/08/07 07:32:53 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
void client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
int, Buffer *, char **, dispatch_fn *);
+int client_request_tun_fwd(int, int, int);
/* Multiplexing protocol version */
#define SSHMUX_VER 1
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wuninitialized"
GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
case $GCC_VER in
- 1.*) ;;
- 2.8* | 2.9*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wsign-compare" ;;
- 2.*) ;;
+ 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
+ 2.8* | 2.9*)
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wsign-compare"
+ no_attrib_nonnull=1
+ ;;
+ 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
3.*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wsign-compare" ;;
4.*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wsign-compare -Wno-pointer-sign" ;;
*) ;;
fi
fi
+if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__, 1, [Have attribute nonnull])
+fi
+
AC_ARG_WITH(rpath,
[ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths],
[
netgroup.h \
pam/pam_appl.h \
paths.h \
+ poll.h \
pty.h \
readpassphrase.h \
rpc/types.h \
time.h \
tmpdir.h \
ttyent.h \
+ ucred.h \
unistd.h \
usersec.h \
util.h \
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
AC_DEFINE(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-nto-qnx6*)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
+ ;;
+ esac
;;
*-*-ultrix*)
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi
- LIBWRAP="-lwrap"
- LIBS="$LIBWRAP $LIBS"
+ LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for libwrap)
AC_TRY_LINK(
[
AC_DEFINE(LIBWRAP, 1,
[Define if you want
TCP Wrappers support])
- AC_SUBST(LIBWRAP)
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
TCPW_MSG="yes"
],
[
getnameinfo \
getopt \
getpeereid \
+ getpeerucred \
_getpty \
getrlimit \
getttyent \
ogetaddrinfo \
openlog_r \
openpty \
+ poll \
prctl \
pstat \
readpassphrase \
strtonum \
strtoll \
strtoul \
+ swap32 \
sysconf \
tcgetpgrp \
truncate \
#include <unistd.h>
])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS(MAXSYMLINKS, , , [
+#include <sys/param.h>
+ ])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS(offsetof, , , [
+#include <stddef.h>
+ ])
+
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setresuid, [
dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this
AC_MSG_CHECKING(if setresuid seems to work)
# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
NO_PEERCHECK=""
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" ; then
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt])
AC_TRY_COMPILE(
[#include <sys/types.h>
# Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(SHA256_Update EVP_sha256)
-AC_CHECK_LIB(iaf, ia_openinfo)
+saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+AC_CHECK_LIB(iaf, ia_openinfo, [
+ LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(set_id, [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"])
+])
+LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
### Configure cryptographic random number support
PAM_MSG="yes"
- LIBPAM="-lpam"
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1,
[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
# libdl already in LIBS
;;
*)
- LIBPAM="$LIBPAM -ldl"
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
;;
esac
fi
- AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
fi
]
)
[#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
])
+AC_MSG_CHECKING(if struct __res_state _res is an extern)
+AC_LINK_IFELSE([
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+extern struct __res_state _res;
+int main() { return 0; }
+ ],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE__RES_EXTERN, 1,
+ [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern])
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ]
+)
+
# Check whether user wants SELinux support
SELINUX_MSG="no"
LIBSELINUX=""
AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
[ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support],
[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ save_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX,1,[Define if you want SELinux support.])
SELINUX_MSG="yes"
AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires selinux.h header))
AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, setexeccon, [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" ],
AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library))
- save_LIBS="$LIBS"
- LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level)
LIBS="$save_LIBS"
fi ]
)
-AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
KRB5_MSG="no"
echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
-echo " Libraries: ${LIBWRAP} ${LIBPAM} ${LIBS}"
+echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
+if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+fi
echo ""
fi
if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
- echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not "
- echo "appear to support either the getpeereid() API nor the "
- echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to "
- echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to "
- echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious "
- echo "user can connect to your agent. "
+ echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
+ echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
+ echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
+ echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
+ echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
+ echo "user can connect to your agent."
echo ""
fi
#old cvs stuff. please update before use. may be deprecated.
%define use_stable 1
%if %{use_stable}
- %define version 4.6p1
+ %define version 4.7p1
%define cvs %{nil}
%define release 1
%else
-%define ver 4.6p1
+%define ver 4.7p1
%define rel 1
# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
Name: openssh
-Version: 4.6p1
+Version: 4.7p1
URL: http://www.openssh.com/
Release: 1
Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
# endif
#endif
-#ifndef MAXSYMLINKS
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0
# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL
# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh"
#endif
-#ifndef _PATH_CSHELL
-# define _PATH_CSHELL "/bin/csh"
-#endif
-#ifndef _PATH_SHELLS
-# define _PATH_SHELLS "/etc/shells"
-#endif
#ifdef USER_PATH
# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH
# define __bounded__(x, y, z)
#endif
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__)
+# define __nonnull__(x)
+#endif
+
/* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this macro in the system headers */
#ifdef MISSING_HOWMANY
# define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
(struct cmsghdr *)NULL)
#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */
-#ifndef offsetof
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0
# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
#endif
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBIAF
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+# define USE_LIBIAF
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
#endif
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.17 2006/08/29 12:02:30 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.19 2007/06/12 11:56:15 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
/* The GSSAPI error */
do {
gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->major,
- GSS_C_GSS_CODE, GSS_C_NULL_OID, &ctx, &msg);
+ GSS_C_GSS_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length);
buffer_put_char(&b, '\n');
/* The mechanism specific error */
do {
gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->minor,
- GSS_C_MECH_CODE, GSS_C_NULL_OID, &ctx, &msg);
+ GSS_C_MECH_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length);
buffer_put_char(&b, '\n');
return (ctx->major);
}
-/* Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
- * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
- */
-
-/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
-{
- OM_uint32 status;
- char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- gss_OID_set oidset;
-
- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-
- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (-1);
- }
-
- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (ctx->major);
-}
-
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
{
buffer_put_cstring(b, context);
}
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
-{
- if (*ctx)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
- return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
-}
-
int
ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
{
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.20 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.21 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
&gssapi_null_mech,
};
+
+/*
+ * Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
+ * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
+ */
+
+/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */
+/* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */
+static OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
+{
+ OM_uint32 status;
+ char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+{
+ if (*ctx)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
+}
+
/* Unprivileged */
void
ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
# include <libc.h>
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.77 2007/01/21 01:41:54 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.79 2007/06/05 06:52:37 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
kex_buf2prop(Buffer *raw, int *first_kex_follows)
{
Buffer b;
- int i;
+ u_int i;
char **proposal;
proposal = xcalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *));
*first_kex_follows = i;
debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: first_kex_follows %d ", i);
i = buffer_get_int(&b);
- debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: reserved %d ", i);
+ debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: reserved %u ", i);
buffer_free(&b);
return proposal;
}
xfree(proposal);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
- fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s", client, server);
+ fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
+ client, server);
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
enc->name = name;
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
- fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s", client, server);
- if (mac_init(mac, name) < 0)
+ fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
+ client, server);
+ if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
/* truncate the key */
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
{
k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (k->name == NULL)
- fatal("no kex alg");
+ fatal("Unable to negotiate a key exchange method");
if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DH1) == 0) {
k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1;
k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
newkeys = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys));
kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
- ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+ ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
+ (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.44 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.46 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
#include <signal.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
#define KEX_DH14 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
struct Mac {
char *name;
int enabled;
- const EVP_MD *md;
u_int mac_len;
u_char *key;
u_int key_len;
+ int type;
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+ HMAC_CTX evp_ctx;
+ struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx;
};
struct Comp {
int type;
-/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.68 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.69 2007/07/12 05:48:05 ray Exp $ */
/*
* read_bignum():
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
default:
fatal("key_equal: bad key type %d", a->type);
- break;
}
- return 0;
}
u_char*
-/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.39 2006/08/18 09:13:25 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.40 2007/05/17 07:50:31 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
#include <string.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
# include <vis.h>
#endif
char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
char *txt = NULL;
int pri = LOG_INFO;
+ int saved_errno = errno;
if (level > log_level)
return;
closelog();
#endif
}
+ errno = saved_errno;
}
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.12 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.14 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
#include "mac.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "umac.h"
+
+#define SSH_EVP 1 /* OpenSSL EVP-based MAC */
+#define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
+
struct {
char *name;
+ int type;
const EVP_MD * (*mdfunc)(void);
int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */
+ int key_len; /* just for UMAC */
+ int len; /* just for UMAC */
} macs[] = {
- { "hmac-sha1", EVP_sha1, 0, },
- { "hmac-sha1-96", EVP_sha1, 96 },
- { "hmac-md5", EVP_md5, 0 },
- { "hmac-md5-96", EVP_md5, 96 },
- { "hmac-ripemd160", EVP_ripemd160, 0 },
- { "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com", EVP_ripemd160, 0 },
- { NULL, NULL, 0 }
+ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 },
+ { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, -1, -1 },
+ { "hmac-md5", SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, -1, -1 },
+ { "hmac-md5-96", SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 96, -1, -1 },
+ { "hmac-ripemd160", SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, -1, -1 },
+ { "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com", SSH_EVP, EVP_ripemd160, 0, -1, -1 },
+ { "umac-64@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, NULL, 0, 128, 64 },
+ { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 }
};
+static void
+mac_setup_by_id(Mac *mac, int which)
+{
+ int evp_len;
+ mac->type = macs[which].type;
+ if (mac->type == SSH_EVP) {
+ mac->evp_md = (*macs[which].mdfunc)();
+ if ((evp_len = EVP_MD_size(mac->evp_md)) <= 0)
+ fatal("mac %s len %d", mac->name, evp_len);
+ mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = (u_int)evp_len;
+ } else {
+ mac->mac_len = macs[which].len / 8;
+ mac->key_len = macs[which].key_len / 8;
+ mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ if (macs[which].truncatebits != 0)
+ mac->mac_len = macs[which].truncatebits / 8;
+}
+
int
-mac_init(Mac *mac, char *name)
+mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
{
- int i, evp_len;
+ int i;
for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) {
if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) {
- if (mac != NULL) {
- mac->md = (*macs[i].mdfunc)();
- if ((evp_len = EVP_MD_size(mac->md)) <= 0)
- fatal("mac %s len %d", name, evp_len);
- mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = (u_int)evp_len;
- if (macs[i].truncatebits != 0)
- mac->mac_len = macs[i].truncatebits/8;
- }
- debug2("mac_init: found %s", name);
+ if (mac != NULL)
+ mac_setup_by_id(mac, i);
+ debug2("mac_setup: found %s", name);
return (0);
}
}
- debug2("mac_init: unknown %s", name);
+ debug2("mac_setup: unknown %s", name);
return (-1);
}
+int
+mac_init(Mac *mac)
+{
+ if (mac->key == NULL)
+ fatal("mac_init: no key");
+ switch (mac->type) {
+ case SSH_EVP:
+ if (mac->evp_md == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ HMAC_Init(&mac->evp_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len, mac->evp_md);
+ return 0;
+ case SSH_UMAC:
+ mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key);
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
u_char *
mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen)
{
- HMAC_CTX c;
static u_char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- u_char b[4];
+ u_char b[4], nonce[8];
- if (mac->key == NULL)
- fatal("mac_compute: no key");
if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(m))
- fatal("mac_compute: mac too long");
- HMAC_Init(&c, mac->key, mac->key_len, mac->md);
- put_u32(b, seqno);
- HMAC_Update(&c, b, sizeof(b));
- HMAC_Update(&c, data, datalen);
- HMAC_Final(&c, m, NULL);
- HMAC_cleanup(&c);
+ fatal("mac_compute: mac too long %u %lu",
+ mac->mac_len, sizeof(m));
+
+ switch (mac->type) {
+ case SSH_EVP:
+ put_u32(b, seqno);
+ /* reset HMAC context */
+ HMAC_Init(&mac->evp_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ HMAC_Update(&mac->evp_ctx, b, sizeof(b));
+ HMAC_Update(&mac->evp_ctx, data, datalen);
+ HMAC_Final(&mac->evp_ctx, m, NULL);
+ break;
+ case SSH_UMAC:
+ put_u64(nonce, seqno);
+ umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
+ umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, m, nonce);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("mac_compute: unknown MAC type");
+ }
return (m);
}
+void
+mac_clear(Mac *mac)
+{
+ if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) {
+ if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
+ umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
+ } else if (mac->evp_md != NULL)
+ HMAC_cleanup(&mac->evp_ctx);
+ mac->evp_md = NULL;
+ mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+}
+
/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
#define MAC_SEP ","
int
maclist = cp = xstrdup(names);
for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) {
- if (mac_init(NULL, p) < 0) {
+ if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) {
debug("bad mac %s [%s]", p, names);
xfree(maclist);
return (0);
-/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.4 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.6 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
int mac_valid(const char *);
-int mac_init(Mac *, char *);
+int mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
+int mac_init(Mac *);
u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
+void mac_clear(Mac *);
#!/usr/bin/awk
#
+# $Id$
+#
# Version history:
+# v4+ Adapted for OpenSSH Portable (see cvs Id and history)
# v3, I put the program under a proper license
# Dan Nelson <dnelson@allantgroup.com> added .An, .Aq and fixed a typo
# v2, fixed to work on GNU awk --posix and MacOS X
nospace=0
}
if(match(words[w],"^Dd$")) {
+ if(match(words[w+1],"^\\$Mdocdate:")) {
+ w++;
+ if(match(words[w+4],"^\\$$")) {
+ words[w+4] = ""
+ }
+ }
date=wtail()
next
} else if(match(words[w],"^Dt$")) {
refissue=""
refdate=""
refopt=""
+ refreport=""
reference=1
next
} else if(match(words[w],"^Re$")) {
}
if(nrefauthors>1)
add(" and ")
- add(refauthors[0] ", \\fI" reftitle "\\fP")
+ if(nrefauthors>0)
+ add(refauthors[0] ", ")
+ add("\\fI" reftitle "\\fP")
if(length(refissue))
add(", " refissue)
+ if(length(refreport)) {
+ add(", " refreport)
+ }
if(length(refdate))
add(", " refdate)
if(length(refopt))
if(match(words[w],"^%N$")) { refissue=wtail() }
if(match(words[w],"^%D$")) { refdate=wtail() }
if(match(words[w],"^%O$")) { refopt=wtail() }
+ if(match(words[w],"^%R$")) { refreport=wtail() }
} else if(match(words[w],"^Nm$")) {
if(synopsis) {
add(".br")
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.90 2007/02/19 10:45:58 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.91 2007/05/17 20:52:13 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+ signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
if (compat20) {
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.55 2007/02/19 10:45:58 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.57 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
/* Mac structure */
mac->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (mac->name == NULL || mac_init(mac, mac->name) == -1)
- fatal("%s: can not init mac %s", __func__, mac->name);
+ if (mac->name == NULL || mac_setup(mac, mac->name) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: can not setup mac %s", __func__, mac->name);
mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
mac->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
if (len > mac->key_len)
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.21 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.22 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \
- "hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160," \
+ "hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160," \
"hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o vis.o
-COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
+COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
char *login = NULL;
struct jtab jtab;
- debug("received signal %d",sig);
-
if ((jid = waitjob(&jtab)) == -1 ||
(login = uid2nam(jtab.j_uid)) == NULL)
return;
return (0);
}
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETPEERUCRED)
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UCRED_H
+# include <ucred.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
+{
+ ucred_t *ucred = NULL;
+
+ if (getpeerucred(s, &ucred) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ if ((*euid = ucred_geteuid(ucred)) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ if ((*gid = ucred_getrgid(ucred)) == -1)
+ return (-1);
+
+ ucred_free(ucred);
+
+ return (0);
+}
#else
int
getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
tremain.tv_sec = 0;
tremain.tv_usec = 0;
}
- TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem)
+ if (rem != NULL)
+ TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem)
return(rc);
}
--- /dev/null
+/* $Id$ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005, 2007 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_POLL) && defined(HAVE_SELECT)
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bsd-poll.h"
+
+/*
+ * A minimal implementation of poll(2), built on top of select(2).
+ *
+ * Only supports POLLIN and POLLOUT flags in pfd.events, and POLLIN, POLLOUT
+ * and POLLERR flags in revents.
+ *
+ * Supports pfd.fd = -1 meaning "unused" although it's not standard.
+ */
+
+int
+poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout)
+{
+ nfds_t i;
+ int saved_errno, ret, fd, maxfd = 0;
+ fd_set *readfds = NULL, *writefds = NULL, *exceptfds = NULL;
+ size_t nmemb;
+ struct timeval tv, *tvp = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+ if (fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ maxfd = MAX(maxfd, fds[i].fd);
+ }
+
+ nmemb = howmany(maxfd + 1 , NFDBITS);
+ if ((readfds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL ||
+ (writefds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL ||
+ (exceptfds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL) {
+ saved_errno = ENOMEM;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* populate event bit vectors for the events we're interested in */
+ for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+ fd = fds[i].fd;
+ if (fd == -1)
+ continue;
+ if (fds[i].events & POLLIN) {
+ FD_SET(fd, readfds);
+ FD_SET(fd, exceptfds);
+ }
+ if (fds[i].events & POLLOUT) {
+ FD_SET(fd, writefds);
+ FD_SET(fd, exceptfds);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* poll timeout is msec, select is timeval (sec + usec) */
+ if (timeout >= 0) {
+ tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000;
+ tv.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
+ tvp = &tv;
+ }
+
+ ret = select(maxfd + 1, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+
+ /* scan through select results and set poll() flags */
+ for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+ fd = fds[i].fd;
+ fds[i].revents = 0;
+ if (fd == -1)
+ continue;
+ if (FD_ISSET(fd, readfds)) {
+ fds[i].revents |= POLLIN;
+ }
+ if (FD_ISSET(fd, writefds)) {
+ fds[i].revents |= POLLOUT;
+ }
+ if (FD_ISSET(fd, exceptfds)) {
+ fds[i].revents |= POLLERR;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (readfds != NULL)
+ free(readfds);
+ if (writefds != NULL)
+ free(writefds);
+ if (exceptfds != NULL)
+ free(exceptfds);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: poll.h,v 1.11 2003/12/10 23:10:08 millert Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/poll.h */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_POLL) && !defined(HAVE_POLL_H)
+#ifndef _COMPAT_POLL_H_
+#define _COMPAT_POLL_H_
+
+typedef struct pollfd {
+ int fd;
+ short events;
+ short revents;
+} pollfd_t;
+
+typedef unsigned int nfds_t;
+
+#define POLLIN 0x0001
+#define POLLOUT 0x0004
+#define POLLERR 0x0008
+#if 0
+/* the following are currently not implemented */
+#define POLLPRI 0x0002
+#define POLLHUP 0x0010
+#define POLLNVAL 0x0020
+#define POLLRDNORM 0x0040
+#define POLLNORM POLLRDNORM
+#define POLLWRNORM POLLOUT
+#define POLLRDBAND 0x0080
+#define POLLWRBAND 0x0100
+#endif
+
+#define INFTIM (-1) /* not standard */
+
+int poll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, int);
+#endif /* !_COMPAT_POLL_H_ */
+#endif /* !HAVE_POLL_H */
#endif
#define _THREAD_PRIVATE(a,b,c) (c)
-/* to avoid conflicts where a platform already has _res */
-#ifdef _res
-# undef _res
-#endif
-#define _res _compat_res
-
+#ifndef HAVE__RES_EXTERN
struct __res_state _res;
+#endif
/* Necessary functions and macros */
/* Home grown routines */
#include "bsd-misc.h"
#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
+#include "bsd-poll.h"
#ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID
int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *);
#endif
#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+# include "rijndael.h"
+# define AES_KEY rijndael_ctx
+# define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+# define AES_encrypt(a, b, c) rijndael_encrypt(c, a, b)
+# define AES_set_encrypt_key(a, b, c) rijndael_set_key(c, (char *)a, b, 1)
# define EVP_aes_128_cbc evp_rijndael
# define EVP_aes_192_cbc evp_rijndael
# define EVP_aes_256_cbc evp_rijndael
/*
* Don't perform checks for root account (PermitRootLogin controls
- * logins via * ssh) or if running as non-root user (since
+ * logins via ssh) or if running as non-root user (since
* loginrestrictions will always fail due to insufficient privilege).
*/
if (pw->pw_uid == 0 || geteuid() != 0) {
case 0:
error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
"context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+ break;
default:
fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
"context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
case 0:
error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
"context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+ break;
default:
fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
"for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
result = (strcmp(xcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0);
-#if !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
if (authctxt->valid)
free(pw_password);
#endif
functions that call shadow_pw() will need to free
*/
-#if !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
char *
get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw)
{
else
fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file");
}
-#endif /* !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF */
#include "includes.h"
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
char * get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw);
#endif
char buf[512];
for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++)
- if ((fds[i] = open("/dev/null", "r")) == -1)
+ if ((fds[i] = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
exit(0); /* can't test */
max = i - 1;
pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp;
# endif
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
return(get_iaf_password(pw));
#endif
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
-void *xmmap(size_t size)
+void *
+xmmap(size_t size)
{
#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
void *address;
<service_bundle type='manifest' name='OpenSSH server'>
<service
- name='site/openssh'
+ name='site/__SYSVINIT_NAME__'
type='service'
version='1'>
<exec_method
name='start'
type='method'
- exec='/lib/svc/method/site/__SYSVINIT_NAME__ start'
+ exec='__SMF_METHOD_DIR__/__SYSVINIT_NAME__ start'
timeout_seconds='60'>
<method_context/>
</exec_method>
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.145 2006/09/19 21:14:08 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.148 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
- memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
+ mac_clear(mac);
xfree(enc->name);
xfree(enc->iv);
xfree(enc->key);
enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
- if (mac->md != NULL)
+ if (mac_init(mac) == 0)
mac->enabled = 1;
DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
enc->iv, enc->block_size, crypt_type);
/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
/* memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
- memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); */
+ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
+ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); */
if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
(comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && after_authentication)) &&
comp->enabled == 0) {
logit("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s",
get_remote_ipaddr(), msg);
cleanup_exit(255);
- xfree(msg);
break;
default:
if (type)
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.161 2007/01/21 01:45:35 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.162 2007/03/20 03:56:12 tedu Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec);
/* skip leading spaces */
- while (*cp && isspace(*cp))
+ while (isspace(*cp))
cp++;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
ASOCK=${OBJ}/agent
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistant
-if grep "#undef.*HAVE_GETPEEREID" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1
+if grep "#undef.*HAVE_GETPEEREID" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+ grep "#undef.*HAVE_GETPEERUCRED" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null && \
+ grep "#undef.*HAVE_SO_PEERCRED" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null
then
echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
exit 0
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <opensc/opensc.h>
#include <opensc/pkcs15.h>
.\"
.\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.40 2006/07/18 07:56:28 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.42 2007/08/06 19:16:06 sobrado Exp $
.\"
-.Dd September 25, 1999
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 8 2007 $
.Dt SCP 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Ar host1 No :
.Oc Ns Ar file1
.Sm on
-.Op Ar ...
+.Ar ...
.Sm off
.Oo
.Op Ar user No @
-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.156 2007/01/22 13:06:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.160 2007/08/06 19:16:06 sobrado Exp $ */
/*
* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
+#include <vis.h>
+#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
off_t i, amt, statbytes;
size_t result;
int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
- char *last, *name, buf[2048];
+ char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[MAXPATHLEN];
int len;
for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
len = strlen(name);
while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
name[--len] = '\0';
+ if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0)
+ goto syserr;
if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) {
- run_err("%s: skipping, filename contains a newline",
- name);
- goto next;
+ strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL);
+ name = encname;
}
- if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
- goto syserr;
if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
goto next;
}
+ unset_nonblock(fd);
switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFREG:
break;
wrerr = YES;
wrerrno = errno;
}
- if (wrerr == NO && ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) {
+ if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) &&
+ ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) {
run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
wrerr = DISPLAYED;
}
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"usage: scp [-1246BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
" [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n"
- " [[user@]host1:]file1 [...] [[user@]host2:]file2\n");
+ " [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n");
exit(1);
}
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.170 2007/03/01 10:28:02 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.172 2007/04/23 10:15:39 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
"%.100s' at line %d", host, arg, line);
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
- debug("address '%s' arg '%s'", address, arg);
if (!address) {
result = 0;
continue;
if (bad_options > 0)
fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
filename, bad_options);
-
- /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
- if (options->challenge_response_authentication == 1)
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
}
# ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_session();
- do_pam_setcred(0);
+ do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
}
# endif /* USE_PAM */
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
*/
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_session();
- do_pam_setcred(0);
+ do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
}
# endif /* USE_PAM */
# if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
# ifdef _AIX
aix_usrinfo(pw);
# endif /* _AIX */
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
if (set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) {
exit(1);
}
-#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
permanently_set_uid(pw);
#endif
return;
called = 1;
- if (authctxt == NULL || !authctxt->authenticated)
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
return;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ sshpam_cleanup();
+ sshpam_thread_cleanup();
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+ return;
+
#ifdef KRB5
if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
authctxt->krb5_ctx)
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam) {
- sshpam_cleanup();
- sshpam_thread_cleanup();
- }
-#endif
-
/* remove agent socket */
auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.11 2006/07/06 10:47:57 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.12 2007/05/31 19:20:16 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd August 30, 2000
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 5 2007 $
.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.71 2007/01/03 07:22:36 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.73 2007/05/17 07:55:29 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu",
emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
handle_to_name(handle),
- handle_bytes_read(handle), handle_bytes_write(handle));
+ (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle),
+ (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle));
} else {
logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"",
emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
a = get_attrib();
debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
- logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, a->size);
+ logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
+ name, (unsigned long long)a->size);
ret = truncate(name, a->size);
if (ret == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
char *name = handle_to_name(handle);
if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
- logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, a->size);
+ logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
+ name, (unsigned long long)a->size);
ret = ftruncate(fd, a->size);
if (ret == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
int in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
ssize_t len, olen, set_size;
SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
- char *cp;
+ char *cp, buf[4*4096];
extern char *optarg;
extern char *__progname;
memset(rset, 0, set_size);
memset(wset, 0, set_size);
- FD_SET(in, rset);
+ /*
+ * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
+ * the worst-case length packet it can generate,
+ * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
+ */
+ if (buffer_check_alloc(&iqueue, sizeof(buf)) &&
+ buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH))
+ FD_SET(in, rset);
+
olen = buffer_len(&oqueue);
if (olen > 0)
FD_SET(out, wset);
/* copy stdin to iqueue */
if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) {
- char buf[4*4096];
len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
if (len == 0) {
debug("read eof");
buffer_consume(&oqueue, len);
}
}
- /* process requests from client */
- process();
+
+ /*
+ * Process requests from client if we can fit the results
+ * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
+ * and let the output queue drain.
+ */
+ if (buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH))
+ process();
}
}
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.63 2006/01/20 00:14:55 dtucker Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.64 2007/05/31 19:20:16 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd February 4, 2001
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 5 2007 $
.Dt SFTP 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.43 2005/04/21 06:17:50 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.46 2007/06/12 13:41:03 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" -*- nroff -*-
.\"
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd September 25, 1999
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2007 $
.Dt SSH-ADD 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.It Fl D
Deletes all identities from the agent.
.It Fl d
-Instead of adding the identity, removes the identity from the agent.
+Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
+If
+.Nm
+has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities will
+be removed.
+Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to
+public key files and matching keys will be removed from the agent.
+If no public key is found at a given path,
+.Nm
+will append
+.Pa .pub
+and retry.
.It Fl e Ar reader
Remove key in smartcard
.Ar reader .
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.44 2006/07/18 08:03:09 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.45 2007/05/31 19:20:16 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd September 25, 1999
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 5 2007 $
.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.154 2007/02/28 00:55:30 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.155 2007/03/19 12:16:42 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
pid_t parent_pid = -1;
+u_int parent_alive_interval = 0;
/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
char socket_name[MAXPATHLEN];
buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS);
}
-static void
+/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
+static u_int
reaper(void)
{
- u_int now = time(NULL);
+ u_int deadline = 0, now = time(NULL);
Identity *id, *nxt;
int version;
Idtab *tab;
tab = idtab_lookup(version);
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
- if (id->death != 0 && now >= id->death) {
+ if (id->death == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (now >= id->death) {
debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
tab->nentries--;
- }
+ } else
+ deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
+ MIN(deadline, id->death);
}
}
+ if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return (deadline - now);
}
static void
}
static int
-prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp)
+prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp,
+ struct timeval **tvpp)
{
- u_int i, sz;
+ u_int i, sz, deadline;
int n = 0;
+ static struct timeval tv;
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
switch (sockets[i].type) {
break;
}
}
+ deadline = reaper();
+ if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
+ deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval :
+ MIN(deadline, parent_alive_interval);
+ if (deadline == 0) {
+ *tvpp = NULL;
+ } else {
+ tv.tv_sec = deadline;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ *tvpp = &tv;
+ }
return (1);
}
_exit(2);
}
-/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
-check_parent_exists(int sig)
+check_parent_exists(void)
{
- int save_errno = errno;
-
if (parent_pid != -1 && kill(parent_pid, 0) < 0) {
/* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
- cleanup_handler(sig); /* safe */
+ cleanup_socket();
+ _exit(2);
}
- mysignal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists);
- alarm(10);
- errno = save_errno;
}
static void
extern char *optarg;
pid_t pid;
char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
- struct timeval tv;
+ struct timeval *tvp = NULL;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
skip:
new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
- if (ac > 0) {
- mysignal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists);
- alarm(10);
- }
+ if (ac > 0)
+ parent_alive_interval = 10;
idtab_init();
if (!d_flag)
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
nalloc = 0;
while (1) {
- tv.tv_sec = 10;
- tv.tv_usec = 0;
- prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc);
- result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, &tv);
+ prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
+ result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
saved_errno = errno;
- reaper(); /* remove expired keys */
+ if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
+ check_parent_exists();
+ (void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */
if (result < 0) {
if (saved_errno == EINTR)
continue;
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.9 2006/08/18 14:40:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
ssh_gssapi_mech *ssh_gssapi_get_ctype(Gssctxt *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
-OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
/* In the server */
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.74 2007/01/12 20:20:41 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.75 2007/05/31 19:20:16 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" -*- nroff -*-
.\"
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd September 25, 1999
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 5 2007 $
.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.22 2006/09/25 04:55:38 ray Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.23 2007/05/31 19:20:16 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
.\"
.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
.\"
-.Dd January 1, 1996
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 5 2007 $
.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.8 2006/02/24 20:22:16 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.9 2007/05/31 19:20:16 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd May 24, 2002
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 5 2007 $
.Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.266 2006/12/11 21:25:46 markus Exp $
-.Dd September 25, 1999
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.270 2007/06/12 13:43:55 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2007 $
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh
-.Op Fl 1246AaCfgkMNnqsTtVvXxY
+.Op Fl 1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxY
.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
.Oo Fl D\ \&
.Fl i
options (and multiple identities specified in
configuration files).
+.It Fl K
+Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI
+credentials to the server.
.It Fl k
Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
.It Fl L Xo
but protocol 2 is preferred since
it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality
(the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour)
-and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-ripemd160).
+and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, hmac-ripemd160).
Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the
integrity of the connection.
.Pp
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.295 2007/01/03 03:01:40 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.301 2007/08/07 07:32:53 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
-"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfgkMNnqsTtVvXxY] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
+"usage: ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxY] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n"
" [-D [bind_address:]port] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile]\n"
" [-i identity_file] [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport]\n"
" [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
again:
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
- "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvxACD:F:I:L:MNO:PR:S:TVw:XY")) != -1) {
+ "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvxACD:F:I:KL:MNO:PR:S:TVw:XY")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '1':
options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
case 'k':
options.gss_deleg_creds = 0;
break;
+ case 'K':
+ options.gss_authentication = 1;
+ options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
+ break;
case 'i':
if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
"forwarding.");
}
}
+
+ /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */
+ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
+ if (client_request_tun_fwd(options.tun_open,
+ options.tun_local, options.tun_remote) == -1) {
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+ else
+ error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+ }
+ }
}
static void
packet_send();
}
- if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
- Channel *c;
- int fd;
-
- debug("Requesting tun.");
- if ((fd = tun_open(options.tun_local,
- options.tun_open)) >= 0) {
- c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
- CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
- 0, "tun", 1);
- c->datagram = 1;
-#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
- if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
- channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
- sys_tun_outfilter);
-#endif
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
- packet_put_cstring("tun@openssh.com");
- packet_put_int(c->self);
- packet_put_int(c->local_window_max);
- packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
- packet_put_int(options.tun_open);
- packet_put_int(options.tun_remote);
- packet_send();
- }
- }
-
client_session2_setup(id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"),
NULL, fileno(stdin), &command, environ, &ssh_subsystem_reply);
/* XXX should be pre-session */
ssh_init_forwarding();
- ssh_control_listener();
if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN))
id = ssh_session2_open();
options.permit_local_command)
ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
+ /* Start listening for multiplex clients */
+ ssh_control_listener();
+
/* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */
if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
control_client(const char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un addr;
- int i, r, fd, sock, exitval, num_env, addr_len;
+ int i, r, fd, sock, exitval[2], num_env, addr_len;
Buffer m;
char *term;
extern char **environ;
if (tty_flag)
enter_raw_mode();
- /* Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd */
- exitval = 0;
- for (;!control_client_terminate;) {
- r = read(sock, &exitval, sizeof(exitval));
+ /*
+ * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
+ * Before it does, it is expected to write this process' exit
+ * value (one int). This process must read the value and wait for
+ * the closure of the client_fd; if this one closes early, the
+ * multiplex master will terminate early too (possibly losing data).
+ */
+ exitval[0] = 0;
+ for (i = 0; !control_client_terminate && i < (int)sizeof(exitval);) {
+ r = read(sock, (char *)exitval + i, sizeof(exitval) - i);
if (r == 0) {
debug2("Received EOF from master");
break;
}
- if (r > 0)
- debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval);
- if (r == -1 && errno != EINTR)
+ if (r == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR)
+ continue;
fatal("%s: read %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ i += r;
}
- if (control_client_terminate)
- debug2("Exiting on signal %d", control_client_terminate);
-
close(sock);
-
leave_raw_mode();
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(int))
+ fatal("%s: master returned too much data (%d > %lu)",
+ __func__, i, sizeof(int));
+ if (control_client_terminate) {
+ debug2("Exiting on signal %d", control_client_terminate);
+ exitval[0] = 255;
+ } else if (i < (int)sizeof(int)) {
+ debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly");
+ exitval[0] = 255;
+ } else
+ debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval[0]);
if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
- fprintf(stderr, "Connection to master closed.\r\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host);
- exit(exitval);
+ exit(exitval[0]);
}
-# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.22 2006/05/29 12:56:33 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.23 2007/06/08 04:40:40 pvalchev Exp $
# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See
# ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for
# Protocol 2,1
# Cipher 3des
# Ciphers aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc
+# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160
# EscapeChar ~
# Tunnel no
# TunnelDevice any:any
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.98 2007/01/10 13:23:22 jmc Exp $
-.Dd September 25, 1999
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.102 2007/08/15 12:13:41 stevesk Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 15 2007 $
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
Specifies whether
.Xr ssh 1
should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested
-dynamic, local, and remote port forwardings.
+dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings.
The argument must be
.Dq yes
or
for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
The default is:
-.Dq hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 .
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,
+hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
+.Ed
.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines.
In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.162 2006/08/30 00:06:51 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.164 2007/05/17 23:53:41 jolan Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
Sensitive *sensitive = authctxt->sensitive;
Buffer b;
u_char *signature, *blob;
- char *chost, *pkalg, *p;
+ char *chost, *pkalg, *p, myname[NI_MAXHOST];
const char *service;
u_int blen, slen;
int ok, i, len, found = 0;
return 0;
}
/* figure out a name for the client host */
- p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in());
+ p = NULL;
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
+ p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in());
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) {
+ verbose("userauth_hostbased: gethostname: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ } else
+ p = xstrdup(myname);
+ }
if (p == NULL) {
error("userauth_hostbased: cannot get local ipaddr/name");
key_free(private);
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.234 2006/08/21 08:15:57 dtucker Exp $
-.Dd September 25, 1999
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.237 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 16 2007 $
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm
(OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for
.Xr ssh 1 .
-Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh, and
-provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
+Together these programs replace
+.Xr rlogin 1
+and
+.Xr rsh 1 ,
+and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
over an insecure network.
.Pp
.Nm
When this option is specified,
.Nm
will send the output to the standard error instead of the system log.
-.It Fl f Ar configuration_file
+.It Fl f Ar config_file
Specifies the name of the configuration file.
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config .
to use from those offered by the server.
Additionally, session integrity is provided
through a cryptographic message authentication code
-(hmac-sha1 or hmac-md5).
+(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64 or hmac-ripemd160).
.Pp
Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
The client tries to authenticate itself using
a leading
.Ql \&*LOCKED\&*
on FreeBSD and a leading
-.Ql \&!!
-on Linux). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
+.Ql \&!
+on most Linuxes).
+If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
should be set to something other than these values (eg
.Ql NP
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
-.It /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-Systemwide list of known host keys.
-This file should be prepared by the
-system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
-organization.
-The format of this file is described above.
-This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
-should be world-readable.
-.Pp
.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files are created using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+Systemwide list of known host keys.
+This file should be prepared by the
+system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
+organization.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+should be world-readable.
+.Pp
.It /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for
.Nm sshd .
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr chroot 2 ,
.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
.Xr login.conf 5 ,
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.349 2007/02/21 11:00:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.351 2007/05/22 10:18:52 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
+ /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+
/* set default channel AF */
channel_set_af(options.address_family);
-# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.74 2006/07/19 13:07:10 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.75 2007/03/19 01:01:29 djm Exp $
# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See
# sshd_config(5) for more information.
# default value.
#Port 22
-#Protocol 2,1
#AddressFamily any
#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
#ListenAddress ::
+# Disable legacy (protocol version 1) support in the server for new
+# installations. In future the default will change to require explicit
+# activation of protocol 1
+Protocol 2
+
# HostKey for protocol version 1
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
# HostKeys for protocol version 2
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.74 2007/03/01 16:19:33 jmc Exp $
-.Dd September 25, 1999
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.77 2007/06/08 07:48:09 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 11 2007 $
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
The default is:
-.Dq hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 .
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,
+hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
+.Ed
.It Cm Match
Introduces a conditional block.
If all of the criteria on the
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.1 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
+ *
+ * Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18
+ *
+ * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
+ * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
+ * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
+ * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
+ * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
+ * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
+ * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
+ * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
+ *
+ * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)
+ *
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
+ *
+ * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
+ *
+ * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
+ * aligned
+ *
+ * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
+ * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
+ * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
+ * zeroed.
+ *
+ * 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
+ * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
+ * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
+ * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU
+ * Public lisence at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
+ * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is
+ * the third.
+ *
+ * 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes
+ * produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why.
+ *
+ /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 8 /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16 */
+/* #define FORCE_C_ONLY 1 ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd */
+/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */
+/* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */
+/* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */
+/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable auhthenticated encrytion */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "umac.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Primitive Data Types --- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The following assumptions may need change on your system */
+typedef u_int8_t UINT8; /* 1 byte */
+typedef u_int16_t UINT16; /* 2 byte */
+typedef u_int32_t UINT32; /* 4 byte */
+typedef u_int64_t UINT64; /* 8 bytes */
+typedef unsigned int UWORD; /* Register */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#define UMAC_KEY_LEN 16 /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */
+
+/* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner. */
+/* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must */
+/* be set true if the host computer is little-endian. */
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1
+#else
+#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b)))
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if HAVE_SWAP32
+#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) (swap32(*(UINT32 *)(p)))
+#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) (*(UINT32 *)(p) = swap32(v))
+#else /* HAVE_SWAP32 */
+
+static UINT32 LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(void *ptr)
+{
+ UINT32 temp = *(UINT32 *)ptr;
+ temp = (temp >> 24) | ((temp & 0x00FF0000) >> 8 )
+ | ((temp & 0x0000FF00) << 8 ) | (temp << 24);
+ return (UINT32)temp;
+}
+
+static void STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(void *ptr, UINT32 x)
+{
+ UINT32 i = (UINT32)x;
+ *(UINT32 *)ptr = (i >> 24) | ((i & 0x00FF0000) >> 8 )
+ | ((i & 0x0000FF00) << 8 ) | (i << 24);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_SWAP32 */
+
+/* The following definitions use the above reversal-primitives to do the right
+ * thing on endian specific load and stores.
+ */
+
+#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(ptr) (*(UINT32 *)(ptr))
+#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(ptr,x) STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(ptr,x)
+#else
+#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(ptr) LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(ptr)
+#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(ptr,x) (*(UINT32 *)(ptr) = (UINT32)(x))
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */
+#define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16
+
+/* OpenSSL's AES */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+# include <openssl/aes.h>
+#endif
+typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1];
+#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \
+ AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key)
+#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \
+ AES_set_encrypt_key((u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key)
+
+/* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter
+ * mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes
+ * an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of
+ * 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'buffer_ptr'. Each distinct
+ * 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream.
+ */
+static void kdf(void *buffer_ptr, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes)
+{
+ UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0};
+ UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+ UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)buffer_ptr;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Setup the initial value */
+ in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx;
+ in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1;
+
+ while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) {
+ aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
+ memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN);
+ in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i;
+ nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+ dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+ }
+ if (nbytes) {
+ aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
+ memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom
+ * function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and
+ * xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce.
+ * This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* Previous AES output is saved */
+ UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* The AES input making above cache */
+ aes_int_key prf_key; /* Expanded AES key for PDF */
+} pdf_ctx;
+
+static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+{
+ UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN];
+
+ kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN);
+ aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key);
+
+ /* Initialize pdf and cache */
+ memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce));
+ aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
+}
+
+static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
+{
+ /* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes
+ * of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st
+ * element, then we may have the result in the cache already.
+ */
+
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 3
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 1
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 0
+#endif
+
+ UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4];
+#if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0
+ int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK;
+#endif
+ *(UINT32 *)tmp_nonce_lo = ((UINT32 *)nonce)[1];
+ tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */
+
+ if ( (((UINT32 *)tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) ||
+ (((UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) )
+ {
+ ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((UINT32 *)nonce)[0];
+ ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)tmp_nonce_lo)[0];
+ aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
+ }
+
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+ *((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+ *((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
+ ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
+ ((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
+ ((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1];
+#endif
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper
+ * and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website.
+ * The interface to this implementation has two
+ * versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed
+ * in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second
+ * allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the
+ * muliple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as
+ * many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the
+ * hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output.
+ * Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine
+ * must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to
+ * the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is
+ * optimized and should be prefered whenever the multiple-buffer interface
+ * is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's
+ * responsability to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.
+ *
+ * The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and
+ * must be called once, before any other PDF routine.
+ */
+
+ /* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They
+ * expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines
+ * produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call,
+ * allowing the parallel implementation of the streams.
+ */
+
+#define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied */
+#define L1_KEY_LEN 1024 /* Internal key bytes */
+#define L1_KEY_SHIFT 16 /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */
+#define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY 32 /* pad message to boundary multiple */
+#define ALLOC_BOUNDARY 16 /* Keep buffers aligned to this */
+#define HASH_BUF_BYTES 64 /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple */
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */
+ UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incomming data buffer */
+ int next_data_empty; /* Bookeeping variable for data buffer. */
+ int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorperated. */
+ UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */
+} nh_ctx;
+
+
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and
+* then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp",
+* "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32). Key
+* is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup.
+*/
+{
+ UINT64 h;
+ UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+ UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+ UINT32 *d = (UINT32 *)dp;
+ UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+ UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7;
+
+ h = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+ do {
+ d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+ d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+ d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+ d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+ k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+ k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+ h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+ h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+ h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+ h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+
+ d += 8;
+ k += 8;
+ } while (--c);
+ *((UINT64 *)hp) = h;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call.
+ */
+{
+ UINT64 h1,h2;
+ UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+ UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+ UINT32 *d = (UINT32 *)dp;
+ UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+ UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+ k8,k9,k10,k11;
+
+ h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+ h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+ k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+ do {
+ d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+ d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+ d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+ d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+ k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+ k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+ h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+ h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+ h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+ h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+
+ k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+
+ d += 8;
+ k += 8;
+ } while (--c);
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
+*/
+{
+ UINT64 h1,h2,h3;
+ UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+ UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+ UINT32 *d = (UINT32 *)dp;
+ UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+ UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+ k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15;
+
+ h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+ h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+ h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
+ k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+ k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+ do {
+ d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+ d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+ d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+ d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+ k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+ k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+ h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+ h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+ h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+ h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+ h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+ h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+ h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+ h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
+
+ k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+ k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
+
+ d += 8;
+ k += 8;
+ } while (--c);
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
+*/
+{
+ UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4;
+ UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+ UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+ UINT32 *d = (UINT32 *)dp;
+ UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+ UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+ k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15,
+ k16,k17,k18,k19;
+
+ h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+ h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+ h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
+ h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3);
+ k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+ k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+ do {
+ d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+ d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+ d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+ d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+ k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+ k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
+ k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19);
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+ h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+ h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
+ h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+ h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+ h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
+ h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+ h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+ h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
+ h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6));
+
+ h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+ h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+ h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
+ h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7));
+
+ k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+ k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
+ k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19;
+
+ d += 8;
+ k += 8;
+ } while (--c);
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
+ ((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+#endif /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
+/* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes
+ * as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a
+ * multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset
+ * appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already.
+ */
+{
+ UINT8 *key;
+
+ key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed;
+ nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes)
+/* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to */
+/* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing. */
+{
+ UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw;
+ if (bpw == 4) {
+ UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
+ do {
+ *p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
+ p++;
+ } while (--iters);
+ } else if (bpw == 8) {
+ UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
+ UINT32 t;
+ do {
+ t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1);
+ p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
+ p[0] = t;
+ p += 2;
+ } while (--iters);
+ }
+}
+#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z))
+#else
+#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0) /* Do nothing */
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc)
+/* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */
+{
+ hc->bytes_hashed = 0;
+ hc->next_data_empty = 0;
+ hc->state[0] = 0;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+ hc->state[1] = 0;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+ hc->state[2] = 0;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ hc->state[3] = 0;
+#endif
+
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+/* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing. */
+{
+ kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
+ endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
+ nh_reset(hc);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
+/* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an */
+/* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES. */
+{
+ UINT32 i,j;
+
+ j = hc->next_data_empty;
+ if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
+ if (j) {
+ i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j;
+ memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i);
+ nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES);
+ nbytes -= i;
+ buf += i;
+ hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES;
+ }
+ if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
+ i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1);
+ nh_transform(hc, buf, i);
+ nbytes -= i;
+ buf += i;
+ hc->bytes_hashed += i;
+ }
+ j = 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes);
+ hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes)
+{
+/* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */
+ if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
+ while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) {
+ *p = 0;
+ nbytes--;
+ p++;
+ }
+ while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
+ *(UWORD *)p = 0;
+ nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD);
+ p += sizeof(UWORD);
+ }
+ }
+ while (nbytes) {
+ *p = 0;
+ nbytes--;
+ p++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result)
+/* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration
+ * into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any
+ * bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the
+ * NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number
+ * of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result".
+ * If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated.
+ */
+{
+ int nh_len, nbits;
+
+ if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) {
+ nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) &
+ ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+ zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty,
+ nh_len - hc->next_data_empty);
+ nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
+ hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty;
+ } else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) {
+ nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY;
+ zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY);
+ nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
+ }
+
+ nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3);
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits;
+#endif
+ nh_reset(hc);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len,
+ UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result)
+/* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent.
+ * Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is
+ * well aligned
+ */
+{
+ UINT32 nbits;
+
+ /* Initialize the hash state */
+ nbits = (unpadded_len << 3);
+
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits;
+#endif
+
+ nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first
+ * hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer
+ * unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial-
+ * layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output.
+ *
+ * UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data
+ * buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the
+ * UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary.
+ * When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls
+ * uhash_final() which
+ * calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation
+ * the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine,
+ * uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and
+ * uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be
+ * used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary.
+ *
+ * The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and
+ * must be called once, before any other UHASH routine.
+ */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Primes and masks */
+#define p36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull) /* 2^36 - 5 */
+#define p64 ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull) /* 2^64 - 59 */
+#define m36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull) /* The low 36 of 64 bits */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+typedef struct uhash_ctx {
+ nh_ctx hash; /* Hash context for L1 NH hash */
+ UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS]; /* p64 poly keys */
+ UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS]; /* poly hash result */
+ UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4]; /* Inner-product keys */
+ UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS]; /* Inner-product translation */
+ UINT32 msg_len; /* Total length of data passed */
+ /* to uhash */
+} uhash_ctx;
+typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one
+ * word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64
+ * require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit
+ * the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to
+ * be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation
+ * patches any errant values.
+ */
+
+static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data)
+{
+ UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32),
+ key_lo = (UINT32)key,
+ cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32),
+ cur_lo = (UINT32)cur,
+ x_lo,
+ x_hi;
+ UINT64 X,T,res;
+
+ X = MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo);
+ x_lo = (UINT32)X;
+ x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32);
+
+ res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo);
+
+ T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32);
+ res += T;
+ if (res < T)
+ res += 59;
+
+ res += data;
+ if (res < data)
+ res += 59;
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+
+/* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this
+ * implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle
+ * the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to
+ * 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24
+ * bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB).
+ */
+static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[])
+{
+ int i;
+ UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+ if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) {
+ hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+ hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1);
+ hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+ hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59));
+ } else {
+ hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+ hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash
+ * produces a result not neccesarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
+ * product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and
+ * multiplies each with a 36 bit key.
+ */
+
+static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data)
+{
+ t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48);
+ t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32);
+ t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16);
+ t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data);
+
+ return t;
+}
+
+static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t)
+{
+/* Divisionless modular reduction */
+ UINT64 ret;
+
+ ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36);
+ if (ret >= p36)
+ ret -= p36;
+
+ /* return least significant 32 bits */
+ return (UINT32)(ret);
+}
+
+
+/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
+ * the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the
+ * NH output.
+ */
+static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res)
+{
+ UINT64 t;
+ UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res;
+
+ t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]);
+ STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]);
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+ t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]);
+ STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]);
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+ t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]);
+ STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]);
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]);
+ STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
+ * the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the
+ * polyhash output.
+ */
+static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res)
+{
+ int i;
+ UINT64 t;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+ /* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */
+ if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64)
+ ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64;
+ t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]);
+ STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i,
+ ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Reset uhash context for next hash session */
+static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc)
+{
+ nh_reset(&pc->hash);
+ pc->msg_len = 0;
+ pc->poly_accum[0] = 1;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+ pc->poly_accum[1] = 1;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+ pc->poly_accum[2] = 1;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+ pc->poly_accum[3] = 1;
+#endif
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context,
+ * initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner-
+ * product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native
+ * loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation.
+ */
+static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+{
+ int i;
+ UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)];
+
+ /* Zero the entire uhash context */
+ memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx));
+
+ /* Initialize the L1 hash */
+ nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key);
+
+ /* Setup L2 hash variables */
+ kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */
+ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+ /* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not
+ * used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a
+ * little-endian computer.
+ */
+ memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8);
+ endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8);
+ /* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */
+ ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu;
+ ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1; /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */
+ }
+
+ /* Setup L3-1 hash variables */
+ kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */
+ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++)
+ memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64),
+ 4*sizeof(UINT64));
+ endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64),
+ sizeof(ahc->ip_keys));
+ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++)
+ ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36; /* Bring into Z_p36 */
+
+ /* Setup L3-2 hash variables */
+ /* Fill buffer with index 4 key */
+ kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
+ endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32),
+ STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[])
+{
+/* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */
+ uhash_ctx_t ctx;
+ u_char bytes_to_add;
+ aes_int_key prf_key;
+
+ ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+ bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
+ ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1));
+ ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
+ *((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add;
+ }
+ aes_key_setup(key,prf_key);
+ uhash_init(ctx, prf_key);
+ }
+ return (ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx)
+{
+/* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */
+ u_char bytes_to_sub;
+
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+ bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1);
+ ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub);
+ }
+ free(ctx);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *input, long len)
+/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and
+ * hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output.
+ */
+{
+ UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining;
+ UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)];
+
+ if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+ nh_update(&ctx->hash, (UINT8 *)input, len);
+ ctx->msg_len += len;
+ } else {
+
+ bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN;
+ if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN)
+ bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN;
+
+ if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+
+ /* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function */
+ /* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */
+ /* bytes to complete the current nh_block. */
+ if (bytes_hashed) {
+ bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed);
+ nh_update(&ctx->hash, (UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining);
+ nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+ ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining;
+ poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+ len -= bytes_remaining;
+ input += bytes_remaining;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */
+ while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+ nh(&ctx->hash, (UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN,
+ L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
+ ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN;
+ len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
+ input += L1_KEY_LEN;
+ poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */
+ if (len) {
+ nh_update(&ctx->hash, (UINT8 *)input, len);
+ ctx->msg_len += len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res)
+/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
+{
+ UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)];
+
+ if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) {
+ if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) {
+ nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+ poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+ }
+ ip_long(ctx, res);
+ } else {
+ nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+ ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res);
+ }
+ uhash_reset(ctx);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res)
+/* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */
+/* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed. */
+{
+ UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)];
+ UINT32 nh_len;
+ int extra_zeroes_needed;
+
+ /* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip
+ * the polyhash.
+ */
+ if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+ if (len == 0) /* If zero length messages will not */
+ nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; /* be seen, comment out this case */
+ else
+ nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+ extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
+ zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
+ nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
+ ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res);
+ } else {
+ /* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH
+ * output to poly_hash().
+ */
+ do {
+ nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
+ poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+ len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
+ msg += L1_KEY_LEN;
+ } while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN);
+ if (len) {
+ nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+ extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
+ zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
+ nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
+ poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+ }
+
+ ip_long(ahc, res);
+ }
+
+ uhash_reset(ahc);
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where
+ * the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer,
+ * and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a
+ * time. The all-at-once is more optimaized than the sequential version and
+ * should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required.
+ */
+struct umac_ctx {
+ uhash_ctx hash; /* Hash function for message compression */
+ pdf_ctx pdf; /* PDF for hashed output */
+ void *free_ptr; /* Address to free this struct via */
+} umac_ctx;
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
+/* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication. */
+{
+ uhash_reset(&ctx->hash);
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
+/* Deallocate the ctx structure */
+{
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY)
+ ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr;
+ free(ctx);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+struct umac_ctx *umac_new(u_char key[])
+/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables,
+ * generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary.
+ */
+{
+ struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx;
+ size_t bytes_to_add;
+ aes_int_key prf_key;
+
+ octx = ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+ bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
+ ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1));
+ ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
+ }
+ ctx->free_ptr = octx;
+ aes_key_setup(key,prf_key);
+ pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key);
+ uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key);
+ }
+
+ return (ctx);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], u_char nonce[8])
+/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
+{
+ uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag);
+ pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, long len)
+/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and */
+/* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */
+/* output buffer is full. */
+{
+ uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input,
+ long len, u_char tag[],
+ u_char nonce[8])
+/* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final(). */
+{
+ uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag);
+ pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
+
+ return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.h,v 1.1 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * umac.h -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
+ *
+ * Version 0.93a of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 14
+ *
+ * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
+ * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
+ * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Ted Krovetz
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
+ * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
+ * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
+ * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
+ * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
+ * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
+ *
+ * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)
+ *
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
+ *
+ * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
+ *
+ * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
+ * aligned
+ *
+ * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
+ * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
+ * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
+ * zeroed.
+ *
+ * 4) Two free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
+ * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
+ * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
+ * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.h.
+ * Brian Gladman's version is distributed with GNU Public lisence
+ * and can be found at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
+ * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version.
+ *
+ /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
+#ifndef HEADER_UMAC_H
+#define HEADER_UMAC_H
+
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+ extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+struct umac_ctx *umac_new(u_char key[]);
+/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables,
+ * generate subkeys from key.
+ */
+
+#if 0
+int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
+/* Reset a umac_ctx to begin authenicating a new message */
+#endif
+
+int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, long len);
+/* Incorporate len bytes pointed to by input into context ctx */
+
+int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], u_char nonce[8]);
+/* Incorporate any pending data and the ctr value, and return tag.
+ * This function returns error code if ctr < 0.
+ */
+
+int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
+/* Deallocate the context structure */
+
+#if 0
+int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input,
+ long len, u_char tag[],
+ u_char nonce[8]);
+/* All-in-one implementation of the functions Reset, Update and Final */
+#endif
+
+/* uhash.h */
+
+
+#if 0
+typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
+ /* The uhash_ctx structure is defined by the implementation of the */
+ /* UHASH functions. */
+
+uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[16]);
+ /* Dynamically allocate a uhash_ctx struct and generate subkeys using */
+ /* the kdf and kdf_key passed in. If kdf_key_len is 0 then RC6 is */
+ /* used to generate key with a fixed key. If kdf_key_len > 0 but kdf */
+ /* is NULL then the first 16 bytes pointed at by kdf_key is used as a */
+ /* key for an RC6 based KDF. */
+
+int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx);
+
+int uhash_set_params(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+ void *params);
+
+int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t ctx);
+
+int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+ u_char *input,
+ long len);
+
+int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+ u_char ouput[]);
+
+int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+ u_char *input,
+ long len,
+ u_char output[]);
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+ }
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HEADER_UMAC_H */
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.49 2007/03/06 10:13:14 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.50 2007/08/15 08:16:49 markus Exp $ */
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_4.6"
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_4.7"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
andersk / gssapi-openssh.git / commitdiff
