RAND_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-rand-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
RANLIB=@RANLIB@
INSTALL=@INSTALL@
PERL=@PERL@
+SED=@SED@
ENT=@ENT@
XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER@
INSTALL_GSISSH=@INSTALL_GSISSH@
-@NO_SFTP@SFTP_PROGS=sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
-
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT} $(SFTP_PROGS)
-
-LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dh.o dispatch.o fatal.o mac.o msg.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o log.o match.o misc.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o rijndael.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o scard.o scard-opensc.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o monitor_wrap.o monitor_fdpass.o kexgss.o gss-genr.o
-
-SSHOBJS= ssh.o sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o sshtty.o readconf.o clientloop.o
-
-SSHDOBJS= sshd.o auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o auth-rhosts.o auth-options.o auth-krb4.o auth-krb5.o auth-pam.o auth2-pam.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o auth-sia.o sshpty.o sshlogin.o loginrec.o servconf.o serverloop.o md5crypt.o session.o groupaccess.o auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o monitor_mm.o monitor.o auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT} sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+
+LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o \
+ cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o \
+ hostfile.o log.o match.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o readpass.o \
+ rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o atomicio.o \
+ key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+ rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o kexgex.o \
+ kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o \
+ kexgss.o kexgssc.o gss-genr.o \
+ entropy.o
+
+SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o
+
+SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
+ sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o uidswap.o \
+ auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
+ auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
+ auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+ monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o monitor_fdpass.o \
+ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
+ auth-krb5.o auth-krb4.o \
+ kexgsss.o auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o \
+ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth2-pam.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o
MANPAGES = scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-rand-helper.8.out ssh-keysign.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
MANPAGES_IN = scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-keysign.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
PATHSUBS = \
- -D/etc/ssh/ssh_prng_cmds=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds \
- -D/etc/ssh/ssh_config=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config \
- -D/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts \
- -D/etc/ssh/sshd_config=$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config \
- -D/usr/libexec=$(libexecdir) \
- -D/etc/shosts.equiv=$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv \
- -D/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key \
- -D/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key \
- -D/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key=$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key \
- -D/var/run/sshd.pid=$(piddir)/sshd.pid \
- -D/etc/ssh/moduli=$(sysconfdir)/moduli \
- -D/etc/ssh/sshrc=$(sysconfdir)/sshrc \
- -D/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth=$(XAUTH_PATH) \
- -D/var/empty=$(PRIVSEP_PATH) \
- -D/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin=@user_path@
-
-FIXPATHSCMD = $(PERL) $(srcdir)/fixpaths $(PATHSUBS)
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_prng_cmds|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_prng_cmds|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
+ -e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
+ -e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
+ -e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \
+ -e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \
+ -e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g'
+
+FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS)
all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBWRAP) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBS)
-scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o
- $(LD) -o $@ scp.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o
$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-int.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o
- $(LD) -o $@ sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-int.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-int.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-int.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT}: $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-rand-helper.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-rand-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
(umask 022 ; $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH))
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s scp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-add $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-agent $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-keygen $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-keyscan $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s sshd $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd
if test ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER)" ; then \
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-rand-helper $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-rand-helper ; \
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-rand-helper $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-rand-helper ; \
fi
- $(INSTALL) -m 4711 -s ssh-keysign $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)
- @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s sftp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp
- @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s sftp-server $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
if [ ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER)" ]; then \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-rand-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-rand-helper.8 ; \
fi
- @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
- @NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
configuration. PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt does not function with
privsep.
+On Compaq Tru64 Unix, only the pre-authentication part of privsep is
+supported. Post-authentication privsep is disabled automatically (so
+you won't see the additional process mentioned below).
+
Note that for a normal interactive login with a shell, enabling privsep
will require 1 additional process per login session.
/* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */
#undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+/* Silly mkstemp() */
+#undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP
+
+/* Setproctitle emulation */
+#undef SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY
+#undef SETPROCTITLE_PS_PADDING
+
+/* Some systems put this outside of libc */
+#undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP
+
+/* Pushing STREAMS modules incorrectly acquires a controlling TTY */
+#undef STREAMS_PUSH_ACQUIRES_CTTY
+
@BOTTOM@
/* ******************* Shouldn't need to edit below this line ************** */
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.9 2002/09/09 06:48:06 itojun Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.10 2002/11/21 23:03:51 deraadt Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
if (problem)
goto err;
- problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL ,
+ problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
if (problem)
goto err;
do_pam_set_conv(&conv);
- /* deny if no user. */
- if (pw == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_NO_PASSWD)
- return 0;
- if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
- return 0;
-
__pampasswd = password;
pamstate = INITIAL_LOGIN;
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.45 2002/09/20 18:41:29 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.46 2002/11/04 10:07:53 markus Exp $");
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
char *loginmsg;
#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
- !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+ !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
struct spwd *spw;
+ time_t today;
+#endif
/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
return 0;
+#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
+ !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
- spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
- if (spw != NULL) {
- time_t today = time(NULL) / DAY;
+ if ((spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL) {
+ today = time(NULL) / DAY;
debug3("allowed_user: today %d sp_expire %d sp_lstchg %d"
" sp_max %d", (int)today, (int)spw->sp_expire,
(int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max);
return 0;
}
}
-#else
- /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
- if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
- return 0;
#endif
/*
}
#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
- if (loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &loginmsg) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Don't check loginrestrictions() for root account (use
+ * PermitRootLogin to control logins via ssh), or if running as
+ * non-root user (since loginrestrictions will always fail).
+ */
+ if ((pw->pw_uid != 0) && (geteuid() == 0) &&
+ loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &loginmsg) != 0) {
+ int loginrestrict_errno = errno;
+
if (loginmsg && *loginmsg) {
/* Remove embedded newlines (if any) */
char *p;
}
/* Remove trailing newline */
*--p = '\0';
- log("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, loginmsg);
+ log("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name,
+ loginmsg);
}
- return 0;
+ /* Don't fail if /etc/nologin set */
+ if (!(loginrestrict_errno == EPERM &&
+ stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0))
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
char *cp;
+ int comparehome = 0;
struct stat st;
if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) == NULL) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", pw->pw_dir,
- strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
+ if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
+ comparehome = 1;
/* check the open file to avoid races */
if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
}
/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
- if (strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
+ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
buf);
break;
if (pw == NULL) {
log("Illegal user %.100s from %.100s",
user, get_remote_ipaddr());
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ loginfailed(user,
+ get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping),
+ "ssh");
+#endif
return (NULL);
}
if (!allowed_user(pw))
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.44 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.47 2003/02/06 21:22:42 markus Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
snprintf(info, sizeof(info),
" tktuser %.100s",
client_user);
-
+
/* Send response to client */
packet_start(
SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE");
if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) {
char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- debug("got response '%s'", response);
packet_check_eom();
authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
memset(response, 'r', dlen);
}
#else
/* Special handling for root */
- if (!use_privsep &&
- authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type)))
authenticated = 0;
#endif
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.95 2002/08/22 21:33:58 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.96 2003/02/06 21:22:43 markus Exp $");
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
authctxt->user);
/* Special handling for root */
- if (!use_privsep &&
- authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(method))
authenticated = 0;
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.34 2002/09/23 20:46:27 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.35 2002/11/26 02:38:54 stevesk Exp $");
#include "packet.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/* Get IP address of client. */
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *) &from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
fatal_cleanup();
}
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
from4->sin_family = AF_INET;
+ fromlen = sizeof(*from4);
memcpy(&from4->sin_addr, &addr, sizeof(addr));
from4->sin_port = port;
}
}
#endif
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
}
/*
- * Returns the remote IP-address of socket as a string. The returned
- * string must be freed.
+ * Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string.
+ * The returned string must be freed.
*/
static char *
get_socket_address(int socket, int remote, int flags)
< 0)
return NULL;
}
+
+ /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
+ if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
/* Get the address in ascii. */
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
NULL, 0, flags) != 0) {
- error("get_socket_ipaddr: getnameinfo %d failed", flags);
+ error("get_socket_address: getnameinfo %d failed", flags);
return NULL;
}
return xstrdup(ntop);
return 0;
}
} else {
- if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
fatal_cleanup();
}
}
+
+ /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
/* Return port number. */
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0)
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.61 2002/07/12 15:50:17 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.62 2002/11/21 22:45:31 markus Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
cipher->name);
klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp);
if (klen > 0 && keylen != klen) {
- debug("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)", klen, keylen);
+ debug2("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)", klen, keylen);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0)
fatal("cipher_init: set keylen failed (%d -> %d)",
klen, keylen);
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.65 2002/09/27 10:42:09 mickey Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.66 2003/04/01 10:31:26 markus Exp $");
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
{ "*MindTerm*", 0 },
{ "2.1.0*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
- SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE },
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
+ SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
{ "2.1 *", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
- SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE },
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|
+ SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
{ "2.0.13*,"
"2.0.14*,"
"2.0.15*,"
SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
SSH_BUG_PKOK|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|
SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
- SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN },
+ SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
{ "2.0.11*,"
"2.0.12*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK|
SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
- SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN },
+ SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
{ "2.0.*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD|
SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK|
SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE|
- SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY|SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN },
+ SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY|SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|
+ SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
{ "2.2.0*,"
"2.3.0*", SSH_BUG_HMAC|SSH_BUG_DEBUG|
- SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 },
- { "2.3.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 },
+ SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
+ { "2.3.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|
+ SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
{ "2.4", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, /* Van Dyke */
- { "2.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
+ { "2.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX },
{ "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
{ "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
{ "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.33 2002/09/27 10:42:09 mickey Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.34 2003/04/01 10:31:26 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000
#define SSH_BUG_K5USER 0x00400000
#define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00800000
+#define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX 0x01000000
#define SSH_OLD_GSSAPI 0x10000000
#define SSH_BUG_GSS_EMPTYUSER 0x20000000
AC_PROG_INSTALL
AC_PATH_PROG(AR, ar)
AC_PATH_PROGS(PERL, perl5 perl)
+AC_PATH_PROG(SED, sed)
AC_SUBST(PERL)
AC_PATH_PROG(ENT, ent)
AC_SUBST(ENT)
dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
+ AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY,PS_USE_CLOBBER_ARGV)
+ AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_PS_PADDING, '\0')
;;
*-*-cygwin*)
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textmode.o"
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CYGWIN)
AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
- AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
+ AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY,PS_USE_PSTAT)
LIBS="$LIBS -lsec -lsecpw"
AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***]))
disable_ptmx_check=yes
AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
- AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
+ AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY,PS_USE_PSTAT)
LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***]))
;;
AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
- AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
+ AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY,PS_USE_PSTAT)
LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***]))
;;
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
AC_DEFINE(DONT_TRY_OTHER_AF)
AC_DEFINE(PAM_TTY_KLUDGE)
+ AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_STRATEGY,PS_USE_CLOBBER_ARGV)
+ AC_DEFINE(SETPROCTITLE_PS_PADDING, '\0')
inet6_default_4in6=yes
;;
mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM)
AC_DEFINE(PAM_TTY_KLUDGE)
+ AC_DEFINE(STREAMS_PUSH_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x)
do_sco3_extra_lib_check=yes
;;
*-*-sco3.2v5*)
+ if test -z "$GCC"; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
+ fi
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/local/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
MANTYPE=man
;;
*-*-unicosmk*)
- no_libsocket=1
- no_libnsl=1
AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
MANTYPE=cat
;;
*-*-unicos*)
- no_libsocket=1
- no_libnsl=1
AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
AC_DEFINE(NO_SSH_LASTLOG)
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LOGIN)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
fi
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
;;
*-*-nto-qnx)
# Checks for header files.
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bstring.h crypt.h endian.h floatingpoint.h \
- getopt.h glob.h ia.h lastlog.h limits.h login.h \
+ getopt.h glob.h ia.h lastlog.h libgen.h limits.h login.h \
login_cap.h maillock.h netdb.h netgroup.h \
netinet/in_systm.h paths.h pty.h readpassphrase.h \
rpc/types.h security/pam_appl.h shadow.h stddef.h stdint.h \
strings.h sys/bitypes.h sys/bsdtty.h sys/cdefs.h \
- sys/mman.h sys/select.h sys/stat.h \
- sys/stropts.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/time.h \
+ sys/mman.h sys/pstat.h sys/select.h sys/stat.h \
+ sys/stropts.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/time.h sys/timers.h \
sys/un.h time.h tmpdir.h ttyent.h usersec.h \
util.h utime.h utmp.h utmpx.h)
]
)
-dnl Checks for library functions.
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random b64_ntop bcopy bindresvport_sa \
- clock fchmod fchown freeaddrinfo futimes gai_strerror \
- getaddrinfo getcwd getgrouplist getnameinfo getopt getpeereid\
- getrlimit getrusage getttyent glob inet_aton inet_ntoa \
- inet_ntop innetgr login_getcapbool md5_crypt memmove \
- mkdtemp mmap ngetaddrinfo openpty ogetaddrinfo readpassphrase \
- realpath recvmsg rresvport_af sendmsg setdtablesize setegid \
- setenv seteuid setgroups setlogin setproctitle setresgid setreuid \
- setrlimit setsid setpcred setvbuf sigaction sigvec snprintf \
- socketpair strerror strlcat strlcpy strmode strsep sysconf tcgetpgrp \
- truncate utimes vhangup vsnprintf waitpid __b64_ntop _getpty)
+dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(\
+ arc4random __b64_ntop b64_ntop __b64_pton b64_pton basename bcopy \
+ bindresvport_sa clock fchmod fchown freeaddrinfo futimes \
+ gai_strerror getaddrinfo getcwd getgrouplist getnameinfo getopt \
+ getpeereid _getpty getrlimit getrusage getttyent glob inet_aton \
+ inet_ntoa inet_ntop innetgr login_getcapbool md5_crypt memmove \
+ mkdtemp mmap ngetaddrinfo nsleep ogetaddrinfo openpty pstat \
+ readpassphrase realpath recvmsg rresvport_af sendmsg setdtablesize \
+ setegid setenv seteuid setgroups setlogin setpcred setproctitle \
+ setresgid setreuid setrlimit setsid setvbuf sigaction sigvec \
+ snprintf socketpair strerror strlcat strlcpy strmode strnvis \
+ sysconf tcgetpgrp truncate utimes vhangup vsnprintf waitpid \
+)
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(nanosleep, rt posix4, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NANOSLEEP))
+
+dnl Make sure strsep prototype is defined before defining HAVE_STRSEP
+AC_CHECK_DECL(strsep, [AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strsep)])
dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(dirname, [AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h)] ,[
)
fi
+dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp])
+AC_TRY_RUN(
+ [
+#include <stdlib.h>
+main() { char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
+if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
+ exit(1);
+unlink(template); exit(0);
+}
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
+ ]
+)
+fi
+
AC_FUNC_GETPGRP
# Check for PAM libs
have_struct_timeval=1
fi
-# If we don't have int64_t then we can't compile sftp-server. So don't
-# even attempt to do it.
+AC_CHECK_TYPES(struct timespec)
+
+# We need int64_t or else certian parts of the compile will fail.
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" -a \
"x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" -a \
"x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
- NO_SFTP='#'
+ echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install"
+ echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
+ echo ""
+ exit 1;
else
dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
AC_TRY_RUN(
], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) ]
)
fi
-AC_SUBST(NO_SFTP)
dnl Checks for structure members
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(ut_host, utmp.h, HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP)
]
)
+STRIP_OPT=-s
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(strip,
+ [ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ STRIP_OPT=
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+AC_SUBST(STRIP_OPT)
+
if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
AC_SUBST(XAUTH_PATH)
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
-# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */
+# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
+# else
+# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+# endif
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
echo ""
fi
-if test ! -z "$NO_SFTP"; then
- echo "sftp-server will be disabled. Your compiler does not "
- echo "support 64bit integers."
- echo ""
-fi
-
if test ! -z "$RAND_HELPER_CMDHASH" ; then
echo "WARNING: you are using the builtin random number collection "
echo "service. Please read WARNING.RNG and request that your OS "
Directions:
+(optional) create config.local in your build dir
./configure [options]
-cd contrib/aix; ./buildbff.sh
+contrib/aix/buildbff.sh
+The file config.local or the environment is read to set the following options
+(default first):
+PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=[no|yes]
+X11_FORWARDING=[no|yes]
+AIX_SRC=[no|yes]
Acknowledgements:
and for comparison with the output from this script, however no code
from lppbuild is included and it is not required for operation.
+SRC support based on examples provided by Sandor Sklar and Maarten Kreuger.
+
Other notes:
appropriate). It seems to work, though......
If there are any patches to this that have not yet been integrated they
-may be found at http://www.zip.com.au/~dtucker/openssh/ or
-http://home.usf.advantra.com.au/~dtucker/openssh/.
+may be found at http://www.zip.com.au/~dtucker/openssh/.
Disclaimer:
#
# Tunable configuration settings
-# create a "config.local" in your build directory to override these.
+# create a "config.local" in your build directory or set
+# environment variables to override these.
#
-PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=no
-X11_FORWARDING=no
+[ -z "$PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN" ] || PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=no
+[ -z "$X11_FORWARDING" ] || X11_FORWARDING=no
+[ -z "$AIX_SRC" ] || AIX_SRC=no
umask 022
For the full text of the license, see /usr/lpp/openssh/LICENCE
EOD
+#
+# openssh.size file allows filesystem expansion as required
+# generate list of directories containing files
+# then calculate disk usage for each directory and store in openssh.size
+#
+files=`find . -type f -print`
+dirs=`for file in $files; do dirname $file; done | sort -u`
+for dir in $dirs
+do
+ du $dir
+done > ../openssh.size
+
#
# Create postinstall script
#
fi
echo
-# Add to system startup if required
-if grep $sbindir/sshd /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null
+# Set startup command depending on SRC support
+if [ "$AIX_SRC" = "yes" ]
+then
+ echo Creating SRC sshd subsystem.
+ rmssys -s sshd 2>&1 >/dev/null
+ mkssys -s sshd -p "$sbindir/sshd" -a '-D' -u 0 -S -n 15 -f 9 -R -G tcpip
+ startupcmd="start $sbindir/sshd \\\"\\\$src_running\\\""
+ oldstartcmd="$sbindir/sshd"
+else
+ startupcmd="$sbindir/sshd"
+ oldstartcmd="start $sbindir/sshd \\\"$src_running\\\""
+fi
+
+# If migrating to or from SRC, change previous startup command
+# otherwise add to rc.tcpip
+if egrep "^\$oldstartcmd" /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null
then
- echo "sshd found in rc.tcpip, not adding."
+ if sed "s|^\$oldstartcmd|\$startupcmd|g" /etc/rc.tcpip >/etc/rc.tcpip.new
+ then
+ chmod 0755 /etc/rc.tcpip.new
+ mv /etc/rc.tcpip /etc/rc.tcpip.old && \
+ mv /etc/rc.tcpip.new /etc/rc.tcpip
+ else
+ echo "Updating /etc/rc.tcpip failed, please check."
+ fi
else
- echo >>/etc/rc.tcpip
- echo "echo Starting sshd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip
- echo "$sbindir/sshd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip
+ # Add to system startup if required
+ if grep "^\$startupcmd" /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null
+ then
+ echo "sshd found in rc.tcpip, not adding."
+ else
+ echo "Adding sshd to rc.tcpip"
+ echo >>/etc/rc.tcpip
+ echo "# Start sshd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip
+ echo "\$startupcmd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip
+ fi
fi
EOF
echo Creating liblpp.a
(
cd ..
- for i in openssh.al openssh.copyright openssh.inventory openssh.post_i LICENCE README*
+ for i in openssh.al openssh.copyright openssh.inventory openssh.post_i openssh.size LICENCE README*
do
ar -r liblpp.a $i
rm $i
#
# inventory.sh
#
-# Originall written by Ben Lindstrom, modified by Darren Tucker to use perl
+# Originally written by Ben Lindstrom, modified by Darren Tucker to use perl
#
-# This will produced and AIX package inventory file, which looks like:
+# This will produce an AIX package inventory file, which looks like:
#
# /usr/local/bin:
# class=apply,inventory,openssh
* you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
*/
+#define GRAB_TRIES 16
+#define GRAB_WAIT 250 /* milliseconds */
+
/*
* Compile with:
*
- * cc `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+ * cc -Wall `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
* gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
* `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0`
*
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <X11/Xlib.h>
#include <gtk/gtk.h>
#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
{
const char *failed;
char *passphrase, *local;
- char **messages;
- int result, i, grab_server, grab_pointer;
- GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *label;
+ int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+ GtkWidget *dialog, *entry;
GdkGrabStatus status;
grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
+ grab_tries = 0;
dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(NULL, 0,
GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION,
/* Grab focus */
gtk_widget_show_now(dialog);
- if (grab_server) {
- gdk_x11_grab_server();
- }
if (grab_pointer) {
- status = gdk_pointer_grab((GTK_WIDGET(dialog))->window, TRUE,
- 0, NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
- if (status != GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS) {
- failed = "mouse";
- goto nograb;
+ for(;;) {
+ status = gdk_pointer_grab(
+ (GTK_WIDGET(dialog))->window, TRUE, 0, NULL,
+ NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+ if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
+ break;
+ usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
+ if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
+ failed = "mouse";
+ goto nograb;
+ }
}
}
- status = gdk_keyboard_grab((GTK_WIDGET(dialog))->window, FALSE,
- GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
- if (status != GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS) {
- failed = "keyboard";
- goto nograbkb;
+ for(;;) {
+ status = gdk_keyboard_grab((GTK_WIDGET(dialog))->window,
+ FALSE, GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+ if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
+ break;
+ usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
+ if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
+ failed = "keyboard";
+ goto nograbkb;
+ }
}
+ if (grab_server) {
+ gdk_x11_grab_server();
+ }
+
result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
/* Ungrab */
} while (0)
#endif
+#ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC
+#define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) { \
+ (ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec; \
+ (ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000; \
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL
+#define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) { \
+ (tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec; \
+ (tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000; \
+}
+#endif
+
#ifndef __P
# define __P(x) x
#endif
# include <tmpdir.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
+# include <libutil.h> /* Openpty on FreeBSD at least */
+#endif
+
#include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
#include "defines.h"
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.49 2002/09/09 14:54:14 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.51 2003/02/12 09:33:04 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "rsa.h"
-#include "ssh-dss.h"
-#include "ssh-rsa.h"
#include "uuencode.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "bufaux.h"
case KEY_DSA:
space = strchr(cp, ' ');
if (space == NULL) {
- debug3("key_read: no space");
+ debug3("key_read: missing whitespace");
return -1;
}
*space = '\0';
type = key_type_from_name(cp);
*space = ' ';
if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- debug3("key_read: no key found");
+ debug3("key_read: missing keytype");
return -1;
}
cp = space+1;
-/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.19 2002/03/18 17:23:31 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.20 2003/02/12 09:33:04 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
int key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
int key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int ssh_dss_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+int ssh_dss_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int ssh_rsa_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+int ssh_rsa_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+
#endif
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.24 2002/07/19 15:43:33 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.25 2003/01/11 18:29:43 markus Exp $");
#include "log.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
next_cu = cu->next;
xfree(cu);
}
+ fatal_cleanups = NULL;
}
/* Cleanup and exit */
} else {
vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args);
}
+ /* Escape magic chars in output. */
+ strnvis(fmtbuf, msgbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), VIS_OCTAL);
+
if (log_on_stderr) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%d: %s\r\n", getpid(), msgbuf);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\r\n", fmtbuf);
} else {
openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
- syslog(pri, "%.500s", msgbuf);
+ syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
closelog();
}
}
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.29 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.36 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
u_int numprompts;
u_int *echo_on;
char **prompts;
- int res;
+ u_int success;
- res = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
- &prompts, &echo_on);
+ success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
+ &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, res);
- if (res != -1)
+ buffer_put_int(m, success);
+ if (success)
buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
- debug3("%s: sending challenge res: %d", __func__, res);
+ debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
- if (res != -1) {
+ if (success) {
xfree(name);
xfree(infotxt);
xfree(prompts);
{
struct skey skey;
char challenge[1024];
- int res;
+ u_int success;
- res = skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge);
+ success = skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, res);
- if (res != -1)
+ buffer_put_int(m, success);
+ if (success)
buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
- debug3("%s: sending challenge res: %d", __func__, res);
+ debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
return (0);
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
break;
}
- key_free(key);
}
+ if (key != NULL)
+ key_free(key);
/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
monitor_reset_key_state();
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+ buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
mm_append_debug(m);
}
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+ buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
/* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
monitor_reset_key_state();
key_blob = blob;
key_bloblen = blen;
key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
- key_free(key);
}
+ if (key != NULL)
+ key_free(key);
mm_append_debug(m);
mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
+
+ xfree(blob);
+ key_free(key);
return (0);
}
fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
+ xfree(blob);
key_free(key);
xfree(response);
(memcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->server = 1;
kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
void *
mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
{
- size_t len = size * ncount;
+ size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
void *address;
if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.19 2002/09/26 11:38:43 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.24 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include "dh.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "bufaux.h"
#include "packet.h"
Buffer m;
u_char *blob;
u_int len;
- int allowed = 0;
+ int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ /* fake forced command */
+ auth_clear_options();
+ have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
+
/* Send potential debug messages */
mm_send_debug(&m);
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Buffer m;
- int res;
+ u_int success;
char *challenge;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY,
&m);
- res = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if (res == -1) {
+ success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
return (-1);
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Buffer m;
- int len, res;
+ int len;
+ u_int success;
char *p, *challenge;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY,
&m);
- res = buffer_get_int(&m);
- if (res == -1) {
+ success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
return (-1);
Key *key;
u_char *blob;
u_int blen;
- int allowed = 0;
+ int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ /* fake forced command */
+ auth_clear_options();
+ have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
+
if (allowed && rkey != NULL) {
blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen);
if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
xfree(p);
}
buffer_free(&m);
- return (success);
+ return (success);
}
#endif
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.4 2002/07/01 16:15:25 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.5 2002/12/19 00:07:02 djm Exp $");
#include "buffer.h"
#include "getput.h"
-/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.1 2002/05/23 19:24:30 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.2 2002/12/19 00:07:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
{
struct ucred cred;
- size_t len = sizeof(cred);
+ socklen_t len = sizeof(cred);
if (getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, &len) < 0)
return (-1);
int setgroups(size_t size, const gid_t *list);
#endif
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
+struct timespec {
+ time_t tv_sec;
+ long tv_nsec;
+};
+#endif
+int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem);
+#endif
#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint)
-static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: getopt.c,v 1.2 1996/08/19 08:33:32 tholo Exp $";
+static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: getopt.c,v 1.4 2002/12/08 22:57:14 millert Exp $";
#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */
#include <stdio.h>
static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */
char *oli; /* option letter list index */
+ if (ostr == NULL)
+ return (-1);
+
if (BSDoptreset || !*place) { /* update scanning pointer */
BSDoptreset = 0;
if (BSDoptind >= nargc || *(place = nargv[BSDoptind]) != '-') {
*/
#ifdef _AIX
+
+/* AIX 4.2.x doesn't have nanosleep but does have nsleep which is equivalent */
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+# define nanosleep(a,b) nsleep(a,b)
+#endif
+
+/* For struct timespec on AIX 4.2.x */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
+# include <sys/timers.h>
+#endif
+
void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw);
#endif /* _AIX */
-/* $OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.6 2002/06/11 22:09:52 provos Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.7 2002/10/17 21:51:54 art Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \
else \
RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \
- RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(elm, field)); \
} else \
(head)->rbh_root = (tmp); \
RB_LEFT(tmp, field) = (elm); \
RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp); \
RB_AUGMENT(tmp); \
+ if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field))) \
+ RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field)); \
} while (0)
#define RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, elm, tmp, field) do { \
RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \
else \
RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \
- RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(elm, field)); \
} else \
(head)->rbh_root = (tmp); \
RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (elm); \
RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp); \
RB_AUGMENT(tmp); \
+ if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field))) \
+ RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field)); \
} while (0)
/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.97 2002/07/04 08:12:15 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.104 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
CipherContext *cc;
int encrypt;
- debug("newkeys: mode %d", mode);
+ debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
cc = &send_context;
encrypt = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
}
if (newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
- debug("newkeys: rekeying");
+ debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
cipher_cleanup(cc);
enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
cp = buffer_ptr(&input);
len = GET_32BIT(cp);
if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
- packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %d.", len);
+ packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", len);
padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
/* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
packet_length = GET_32BIT(cp);
if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > 256 * 1024) {
buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
- packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %d.", packet_length);
+ packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", packet_length);
}
- DBG(debug("input: packet len %d", packet_length+4));
+ DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", packet_length+4));
buffer_consume(&input, block_size);
}
/* we have a partial packet of block_size bytes */
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
+ /* Display the error locally */
+ log("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
+
/* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait for it to get sent. */
if (compat20) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
/* Close the connection. */
packet_close();
- /* Display the error locally and exit. */
- log("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf);
fatal_cleanup();
}
return buffer_len(&output) < 128 * 1024;
}
+static void
+packet_set_tos(int interactive)
+{
+ int tos = interactive ? IPTOS_LOWDELAY : IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
+
+ if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket() ||
+ !packet_connection_is_ipv4())
+ return;
+ if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos,
+ sizeof(tos)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
+ tos, strerror(errno));
+}
+
/* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */
void
packet_set_interactive(int interactive)
{
static int called = 0;
-#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
- int lowdelay = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
- int throughput = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
-#endif
if (called)
return;
/* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
- return;
- /*
- * IPTOS_LOWDELAY and IPTOS_THROUGHPUT are IPv4 only
- */
- if (interactive) {
- /*
- * Set IP options for an interactive connection. Use
- * IPTOS_LOWDELAY and TCP_NODELAY.
- */
-#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
- if (packet_connection_is_ipv4()) {
- if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
- &lowdelay, sizeof(lowdelay)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt IPTOS_LOWDELAY: %.100s",
- strerror(errno));
- }
-#endif
+ if (interactive)
set_nodelay(connection_in);
- } else if (packet_connection_is_ipv4()) {
- /*
- * Set IP options for a non-interactive connection. Use
- * IPTOS_THROUGHPUT.
- */
#if defined(IP_TOS) && !defined(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
- if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &throughput,
- sizeof(throughput)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt IPTOS_THROUGHPUT: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ packet_set_tos(interactive);
#endif
- }
+
}
/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.35 2002/06/19 18:01:00 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.37 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.100 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.104 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oSmartcardDevice,
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ oEnableSSHKeysign,
oDeprecated
} OpCodes;
{ "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
{ "smartcarddevice", oSmartcardDevice },
{ "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
+ { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
{ "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost },
{ NULL, oBadOption }
};
* Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This
* only sets those values that have not already been set.
*/
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
int
process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
char *line, const char *filename, int linenum,
int *activep)
{
- char buf[256], *s, *string, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg;
+ char buf[256], *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg;
int opcode, *intptr, value;
+ size_t len;
u_short fwd_port, fwd_host_port;
char sfwd_host_port[6];
case oProxyCommand:
charptr = &options->proxy_command;
- string = xstrdup("");
- while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
- string = xrealloc(string, strlen(string) + strlen(arg) + 2);
- strcat(string, " ");
- strcat(string, arg);
- }
+ len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
- *charptr = string;
- else
- xfree(string);
+ *charptr = xstrdup(s + len);
return 0;
case oPort:
*intptr = value;
break;
+ case oEnableSSHKeysign:
+ intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case oDeprecated:
debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
options->preferred_authentications = NULL;
options->bind_address = NULL;
options->smartcard_device = NULL;
+ options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1;
options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1;
}
clear_forwardings(options);
if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1)
options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0;
+ if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1)
+ options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0;
/* options->proxy_command should not be set by default */
/* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
/* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.43 2002/06/08 05:17:01 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.46 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
int num_remote_forwards;
Forward remote_forwards[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
int clear_forwardings;
+
+ int enable_ssh_keysign;
int no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
} Options;
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.115 2002/09/04 18:52:42 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.116 2003/02/21 09:05:53 markus Exp $");
#if defined(KRB4)
#include <krb.h>
char line[1024];
FILE *f;
+ debug2("read_server_config: filename %s", filename);
f = fopen(filename, "r");
if (!f) {
perror(filename);
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.150 2002/09/16 19:55:33 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.154 2003/03/05 22:33:43 markus Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
void
do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
+ setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+
/*
* Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
* authentication.
record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name,
get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from);
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
}
#endif
* the address be 0.0.0.0.
*/
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
(struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
{
char buf[256];
u_int i, envsize;
- char **env;
+ char **env, *laddr;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
/* Initialize the environment. */
/* Set basic environment. */
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+#ifdef _AIX
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
+#endif
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port());
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
+ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(),
- get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()), get_local_port());
+ get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), laddr, get_local_port());
+ xfree(laddr);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
/* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
if (debug_flag) {
fprintf(stderr,
- "Running %.500s add "
- "%.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
+ "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
+ options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
}
options.xauth_location);
f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
+ fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
+ s->auth_display);
fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stderr);
fclose(f);
+ fflush(NULL);
exit(254);
}
}
void
do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
{
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (is_winnt) {
-#else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+ {
+
#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
setpcred(pw->pw_name);
#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
permanently_set_uid(pw);
#endif
}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ if (is_winnt)
+#endif
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
}
*/
if (!options.use_login) {
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
- session_setup_sia(pw->pw_name, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
+ session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
do_motd();
#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
* legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
+ * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
+ */
+ env = do_setup_env(s, shell);
+
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
#endif
- env = do_setup_env(s, shell);
-
/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
if (options.use_login)
hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
{
static char buf[1024];
int i;
+ char *cp;
+
buf[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
+
+ if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) {
+ cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/');
+ cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1;
+ } else
+ cp = s->tty + 5;
+
if (buf[0] != '\0')
strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
- strlcat(buf, strrchr(s->tty, '/') + 1, sizeof buf);
+ strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf);
}
}
if (buf[0] == '\0')
#include "includes.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.105 2002/10/01 20:34:12 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.108 2003/03/13 11:44:50 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include "authfd.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "readpass.h"
+#include "misc.h"
#ifdef SMARTCARD
#include "scard.h"
Key *key;
char *comment;
u_int death;
+ u_int confirm;
} Identity;
typedef struct {
char *__progname;
#endif
+/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */
+static int lifetime = 0;
+
static void
close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
{
return (NULL);
}
+/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
+static int
+confirm_key(Identity *id)
+{
+ char *p, prompt[1024];
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Allow use of key %s?\n"
+ "Key fingerprint %s.", id->comment, p);
+ xfree(p);
+ p = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Accept empty responses and responses consisting
+ * of the word "yes" as affirmative.
+ */
+ if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' || strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ xfree(p);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
static void
process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
goto failure;
id = lookup_identity(key, 1);
- if (id != NULL) {
+ if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0)) {
Key *private = id->key;
/* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) <= 0)
key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
if (key != NULL) {
Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, 2);
- if (id != NULL)
+ if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0))
ok = key_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, data, dlen);
}
key_free(key);
process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
{
Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
- int type, success = 0, death = 0;
+ int type, success = 0, death = 0, confirm = 0;
char *type_name, *comment;
Key *k = NULL;
}
break;
}
+ /* enable blinding */
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+ error("process_add_identity: RSA_blinding_on failed");
+ key_free(k);
+ goto send;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
comment = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
if (k == NULL) {
xfree(comment);
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
death = time(NULL) + buffer_get_int(&e->request);
break;
+ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
+ confirm = 1;
+ break;
default:
break;
}
}
+ if (lifetime && !death)
+ death = time(NULL) + lifetime;
if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
Identity *id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
id->comment = comment;
id->death = death;
+ id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
/* Increment the number of identities. */
tab->nentries++;
id->key = k;
id->comment = xstrdup("smartcard key");
id->death = 0;
+ id->confirm = 0;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
tab->nentries++;
success = 1;
fprintf(stderr, " -k Kill the current agent.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -d Debug mode.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a socket Bind agent socket to given name.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -t life Default identity lifetime (seconds).\n");
exit(1);
}
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
- int sock, c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0, ch, nalloc;
+ int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
+ int sock, fd, ch, nalloc;
char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
init_rng();
seed_rng();
- while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksa:")) != -1) {
+ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksa:t:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'c':
if (s_flag)
case 'a':
agentsocket = optarg;
break;
+ case 't':
+ if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
+ usage();
+ }
+ break;
default:
usage();
}
}
(void)chdir("/");
- close(0);
- close(1);
- close(2);
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+ /* XXX might close listen socket */
+ (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+ (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
+ if (fd > 2)
+ close(fd);
+ }
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
/* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
+++ /dev/null
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.h,v 1.5 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#ifndef DSA_H
-#define DSA_H
-
-int ssh_dss_sign(Key *, u_char **, int *, u_char *, int);
-int ssh_dss_verify(Key *, u_char *, int, u_char *, int);
-
-#endif
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.3 2002/07/03 14:21:05 markus Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.6 2003/03/28 10:11:43 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.Pp
.Nm
is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the
-the global client configuration file
+global client configuration file
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
by setting
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+.Cm EnableSSHKeysign
to
.Dq yes .
.Pp
is enabled.
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
-generate the digital signature. They
-should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+generate the digital signature.
+They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
accessible to others.
Since they are readable only by root,
.Nm
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.7 2002/07/03 14:21:05 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.10 2003/03/13 11:42:19 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
initialize_options(&options);
(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, "", &options);
fill_default_options(&options);
- if (options.hostbased_authentication != 1)
- fatal("Hostbased authentication not enabled in %s",
+ if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1)
+ fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s",
_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE);
if (key_fd[0] == -1 && key_fd[1] == -1)
keys[i] = key_load_private_pem(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL, NULL);
close(key_fd[i]);
- if (keys[i] != NULL && keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA) {
- if (RSA_blinding_on(keys[i]->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
- error("RSA_blinding_on failed");
- key_free(keys[i]);
- keys[i] = NULL;
- }
- }
if (keys[i] != NULL)
found = 1;
}
case 0:
/* timer expired */
error_abort = 1;
+ kill(pid, SIGINT);
break;
case 1:
/* command input */
debug("writing PRNG seed to file %.100s", filename);
- RAND_bytes(seed, sizeof(seed));
+ if (RAND_bytes(seed, sizeof(seed)) <= 0)
+ fatal("PRNG seed extration failed");
/* Don't care if the seed doesn't exist */
prng_check_seedfile(filename);
if (!RAND_status())
fatal("Not enough entropy in RNG");
- RAND_bytes(buf, bytes);
+ if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
+ fatal("Couldn't extract entropy from PRNG");
if (output_hex) {
for(ret = 0; ret < bytes; ret++)
+++ /dev/null
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.h,v 1.5 2001/06/26 17:27:25 markus Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#ifndef SSH_RSA_H
-#define SSH_RSA_H
-
-int ssh_rsa_sign(Key *, u_char **, int *, u_char *, int);
-int ssh_rsa_verify(Key *, u_char *, int, u_char *, int);
-
-#endif
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.167 2002/09/27 15:46:21 stevesk Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.168 2003/03/28 10:11:43 jmc Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Op Ar command
.Pp
.Nm ssh
+.Bk -words
.Op Fl afgknqstvxACNTX1246
.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
.Sm on
.Xc
.Oc
+.Ek
+.Bk -words
.Oo Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Ar port :
.Op Fl D Ar port
.Ar hostname | user@hostname
.Op Ar command
+.Ek
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
.Fl A
and
.Fl a
-options described later) and
+options described later) and
the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent
is automatically forwarded to the remote side.
.Pp
Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
.Pp
-Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
-ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's
-Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded
-connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
+Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
+can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
.It Fl b Ar bind_address
client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
that do not support the
.Ar 3des
-cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic
-weaknesses.
+cipher.
+Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses.
.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec
Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of ciphers can
be specified in order of preference.
Enables X11 forwarding.
This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
.Pp
-X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability
-to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X
-authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the
-forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform
-activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the user's X authorization database)
+can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
.It Fl C
Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
data for forwarded X11 and TCP/IP connections).
on the local side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
-remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 protocol is supported, and
+remote machine.
+Currently the SOCKS4 protocol is supported, and
.Nm
will act as a SOCKS4 server.
Only root can forward privileged ports.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.186 2002/09/19 01:58:18 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.190 2003/02/06 09:27:29 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
av += optind;
if (ac > 0 && !host && **av != '-') {
- if (strchr(*av, '@')) {
+ if (strrchr(*av, '@')) {
p = xstrdup(*av);
- cp = strchr(p, '@');
+ cp = strrchr(p, '@');
if (cp == NULL || cp == p)
usage();
options.user = p;
host = ++cp;
} else
host = *av;
- ac--, av++;
- if (ac > 0) {
- optind = 0;
- optreset = 1;
+ if (ac > 1) {
+ optind = optreset = 1;
goto again;
}
+ ac--, av++;
}
/* Check that we got a host name. */
if (options.hostname != NULL)
host = options.hostname;
+ if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
+ strcmp(options.proxy_command, "none") == 0)
+ options.proxy_command = NULL;
+
/* Disable rhosts authentication if not running as root. */
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/* Ignore uid if running under Windows */
int interactive = 0;
struct termios tio;
- debug("ssh_session2_setup: id %d", id);
+ debug2("ssh_session2_setup: id %d", id);
if (tty_flag) {
struct winsize ws;
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.5 2002/08/29 22:54:10 stevesk Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.7 2003/03/28 10:11:43 jmc Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
that do not support the
.Ar 3des
-cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic
-weaknesses.
+cipher.
+Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses.
The default is
.Dq 3des .
.It Cm Ciphers
.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
Specifies that all local, remote and dynamic port forwardings
specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
-cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the
+cleared.
+This option is primarily useful when used from the
.Nm ssh
command line to clear port forwardings set in
configuration files, and is automatically set by
Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the local machine be forwarded
over the secure channel, and the application
protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
-remote machine. The argument must be a port number.
+remote machine.
+The argument must be a port number.
Currently the SOCKS4 protocol is supported, and
.Nm ssh
will act as a SOCKS4 server.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
-additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only
-the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
.It Cm EscapeChar
Sets the escape character (default:
.Ql ~ ) .
The default is
.Dq no .
.Pp
-Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
-ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's
-Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded
-connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
+Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
+can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
.It Cm ForwardX11
The default is
.Dq no .
.Pp
-X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability
-to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X
-authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the
-forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform
-activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the user's X authorization database)
+can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
.It Cm GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
forwarded ports.
By default,
.Nm ssh
-binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. This
-prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
+binds local port forwardings to the loopback address.
+This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
.Cm GatewayPorts
can be used to specify that
.Nm ssh
.Nm ssh .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2 and DEBUG3.
-The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2
-and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+The default is INFO.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
.It Cm MACs
Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
in order of preference.
Host key management will be done using the
HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by
the user).
+Setting the command to
+.Dq none
+disables this option entirely.
Note that
.Cm CheckHostIP
is not available for connects with a proxy command.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.107 2002/07/01 19:48:46 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.114 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
canonhost = xstrdup(get_canonical_hostname(1));
resolve_localhost(&canonhost);
- gss = ssh_gssapi_mechanisms(0,canonhost);
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_mechanisms(canonhost);
xfree(canonhost);
canonhost=NULL;
if (gss) {
/* start key exchange */
kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+#endif
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
- debug("done: ssh_kex2.");
}
/*
if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
- debug("send SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST");
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth");
packet_send();
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST sent");
packet_write_wait();
type = packet_read();
- if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
- fatal("denied SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT: %d", type);
- }
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)
+ fatal("Server denied authentication request: %d", type);
if (packet_remaining() > 0) {
char *reply = packet_get_string(NULL);
- debug("service_accept: %s", reply);
+ debug2("service_accept: %s", reply);
xfree(reply);
} else {
- debug("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
+ debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
}
packet_check_eom();
- debug("got SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT");
+ debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received");
if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL)
options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get();
if (authctxt.agent != NULL)
ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt.agent);
- debug("ssh-userauth2 successful: method %s", authctxt.method->name);
+ debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
}
void
userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
if (partial != 0)
log("Authenticated with partial success.");
- debug("authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
+ debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
clear_auth_state(authctxt);
userauth(authctxt, authlist);
}
packet_check_eom();
- debug("input_userauth_pk_ok: pkalg %s blen %u lastkey %p hint %d",
+ debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u lastkey %p hint %d",
pkalg, blen, authctxt->last_key, authctxt->last_key_hint);
do {
if (k == NULL) {
debug2("userauth_pubkey_agent: no more keys");
} else {
- debug("userauth_pubkey_agent: testing agent key %s", comment);
+ debug("Offering agent key: %s", comment);
xfree(comment);
ret = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, k, agent_sign_cb, -1);
if (ret == 0)
key = options.identity_keys[idx];
filename = options.identity_files[idx];
if (key == NULL) {
- debug("try privkey: %s", filename);
+ debug("Trying private key: %s", filename);
key = load_identity_file(filename);
if (key != NULL) {
sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, key,
key_free(key);
}
} else if (key->type != KEY_RSA1) {
- debug("try pubkey: %s", filename);
+ debug("Offering public key: %s", filename);
sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, key,
identity_sign_cb, idx);
}
pid_t pid;
int to[2], from[2], status, version = 2;
- debug("ssh_keysign called");
+ debug2("ssh_keysign called");
if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) {
error("ssh_keysign: no installed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
}
if (!found) {
- debug("userauth_hostbased: no more client hostkeys");
+ debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication.");
return 0;
}
if (key_to_blob(private, &blob, &blen) == 0) {
strlcpy(chost, p, len);
strlcat(chost, ".", len);
debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s", chost);
+ xfree(p);
service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" :
authctxt->service;
static Authmethod *
authmethod_get(char *authlist)
{
-
char *name = NULL;
u_int next;
for (;;) {
if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) {
- debug("no more auth methods to try");
+ debug("No more authentication methods to try.");
current = NULL;
return NULL;
}
if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL &&
authmethod_is_enabled(current)) {
debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name);
- debug("next auth method to try is %s", name);
+ debug("Next authentication method: %s", name);
return current;
}
}
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.193 2002/09/24 20:59:44 todd Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.194 2003/01/31 21:54:40 jmc Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm sshd
+.Bk -words
.Op Fl deiqtD46
.Op Fl b Ar bits
.Op Fl f Ar config_file
.Op Fl o Ar option
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl u Ar len
+.Ek
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
(SSH Daemon) is the daemon program for
.Nm
supports both SSH protocol version 1 and 2 simultaneously.
.Nm
-works as follows.
+works as follows:
.Pp
.Ss SSH protocol version 1
.Pp
This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and
is never stored on disk.
.Pp
-Whenever a client connects the daemon responds with its public
+Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
host and server keys.
The client compares the
RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
.Nm rshd ,
.Nm rlogind ,
and
-.Xr rexecd
+.Nm rexecd
are disabled (thus completely disabling
.Xr rlogin
and
log, and does not put itself in the background.
The server also will not fork and will only process one connection.
This option is only intended for debugging for the server.
-Multiple -d options increase the debugging level.
+Multiple
+.Fl d
+options increase the debugging level.
Maximum is 3.
.It Fl e
When this option is specified,
.It Fl i
Specifies that
.Nm
-is being run from inetd.
+is being run from
+.Xr inetd 8 .
.Nm
is normally not run
from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can
.Pa utmp
file.
.Fl u0
-is also be used to prevent
+may also be used to prevent
.Nm
from making DNS requests unless the authentication
mechanism or configuration requires it.
The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored.
The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty;
otherwise it is run without a tty.
-If a 8-bit clean channel is required,
+If an 8-bit clean channel is required,
one must not request a pty or should specify
.Cm no-pty .
A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
permitopen="10.2.1.55:80",permitopen="10.2.1.56:25" 1024 33 23.\|.\|.\|2323
.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
The
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
and
.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
should be world-readable, and
.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
-can but need not be world-readable.
+can, but need not be, world-readable.
.It Pa /etc/nologin
If this file exists,
.Nm
This file contains host-username pairs, separated by a space, one per
line.
The given user on the corresponding host is permitted to log in
-without password.
+without a password.
The same file is used by rlogind and rshd.
The file must
be writable only by the user; it is recommended that it not be
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option.
.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc
-If this file exists, it is run with /bin/sh after reading the
+If this file exists, it is run with
+.Pa /bin/sh
+after reading the
environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
instead.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.260 2002/09/27 10:42:09 mickey Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.263 2003/02/16 17:09:57 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
int startup_pipe; /* in child */
/* variables used for privilege separation */
-extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
-extern int use_privsep;
+int use_privsep;
+struct monitor *pmonitor;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
__progname = get_progname(av[0]);
init_rng();
- /* Save argv. */
+ /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
saved_argv = av;
+ saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * ac);
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+ /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+ compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+#endif
/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
initialize_server_options(&options);
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
- !inetd_flag);
+ log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
#ifdef _UNICOS
/* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now!
#else
if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
#endif
- fatal("Bad owner or mode for %s",
- _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+ fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
+ "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
}
/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
* setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
* want the child to be able to affect the parent.
*/
-#if 0
- /* XXX: this breaks Solaris */
+#if !defined(STREAMS_PUSH_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+ /*
+ * If setsid is called on Solaris, sshd will acquire the controlling
+ * terminal while pushing STREAMS modules. This will prevent the
+ * shell from acquiring it later.
+ */
if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#endif
orig= NULL;
if (options.gss_keyex)
- gss = ssh_gssapi_mechanisms(1,NULL);
+ gss = ssh_server_gssapi_mechanisms();
else
gss = NULL;
/* start key exchange */
kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+#endif
kex->server = 1;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.13 2002/09/16 20:12:11 stevesk Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.15 2003/03/28 10:11:43 jmc Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.It Cm AllowUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
by spaces.
-If specified, login is allowed only for users names that
+If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
match one of the patterns.
.Ql \&*
and
forwarded for the client.
By default,
.Nm sshd
-binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. This
-prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
+binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address.
+This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
.Cm GatewayPorts
can be used to specify that
.Nm sshd
will listen on the address and all prior
.Cm Port
options specified. The default is to listen on all local
-addresses. Multiple
+addresses.
+Multiple
.Cm ListenAddress
options are permitted. Additionally, any
.Cm Port
.Nm sshd .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2 and DEBUG3.
-The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2
-and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
-Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users
-and is not recommended.
+The default is INFO.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
.It Cm MACs
Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
.Xr login 1
does not know how to handle
.Xr xauth 1
-cookies. If
+cookies.
+If
.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
is specified, it will be disabled after authentication.
.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether
.Nm sshd
separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
-to deal with incoming network traffic. After successful authentication,
-another process will be created that has the privilege of the authenticated
-user. The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
+to deal with incoming network traffic.
+After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
+the privilege of the authenticated user.
+The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.
The default is
.Dq yes .
Specifies whether
.Nm sshd
should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to
-the wildcard address. By default,
+the wildcard address.
+By default,
.Nm sshd
binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
hostname part of the
andersk / gssapi-openssh.git / commitdiff
