kexgssc.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
- sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
+ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
+ roaming_common.o
SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
gss-serv-gsi.o \
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o
+ audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ roaming_common.o
MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-rand-helper.8.out ssh-keysign.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-keysign.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
scard-install:
- (cd scard && $(MAKE) DESTDIR=$(DESTDIR) install)
+ (cd scard && env DESTDIR=$(DESTDIR) $(MAKE) DESTDIR=$(DESTDIR) install)
install-files: scard-install
$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
+Linux
+-----
+
+Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include
+headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main
+binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a
+missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent
+development packages. On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel,
+zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be
+libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev.
+
+
Solaris
-------
If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
return;
debug("PAM: cleanup");
pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
- if (sshpam_cred_established) {
- debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
- pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
- sshpam_cred_established = 0;
- }
if (sshpam_session_open) {
debug("PAM: closing session");
pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
sshpam_session_open = 0;
}
+ if (sshpam_cred_established) {
+ debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
+ pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+ sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+ }
sshpam_authenticated = 0;
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
}
#endif /* _UNICOS */
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (authenticated &&
- !check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD,
- authctxt->pw)) {
- packet_disconnect("Authentication rejected for uid %d.",
- authctxt->pw == NULL ? -1 : authctxt->pw->pw_uid);
- authenticated = 0;
- }
-#else
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
/* Special handling for root */
if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
xfree(devs);
xfree(lang);
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw) == 0)
- authenticated = 0;
-#endif
return authenticated;
}
{
none_enabled = 0;
packet_check_eom();
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw) == 0)
- return (0);
-#endif
if (options.password_authentication)
return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, "")));
return (0);
logit("password change not supported");
else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)) == 1)
authenticated = 1;
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw) == 0)
- authenticated = 0;
-#endif
memset(password, 0, len);
xfree(password);
return authenticated;
key_free(key);
xfree(pkalg);
xfree(pkblob);
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw) == 0)
- authenticated = 0;
-#endif
return authenticated;
}
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.120 2008/11/04 08:22:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.121 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.64 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.65 2009/05/27 06:31:25 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
#include "misc.h"
static void check_ip_options(int, char *);
+static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL;
+static int cached_port = -1;
/*
* Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket. The
return get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
}
+void
+clear_cached_addr(void)
+{
+ if (canonical_host_ip != NULL) {
+ xfree(canonical_host_ip);
+ canonical_host_ip = NULL;
+ }
+ cached_port = -1;
+}
+
/*
* Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
* string must not be freed.
const char *
get_remote_ipaddr(void)
{
- static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL;
-
/* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) {
if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
int
get_remote_port(void)
{
- static int port = -1;
-
/* Cache to avoid getpeername() on a dead connection */
- if (port == -1)
- port = get_port(0);
+ if (cached_port == -1)
+ cached_port = get_port(0);
- return port;
+ return cached_port;
}
int
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.10 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.11 2009/05/27 06:31:25 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
int get_remote_port(void);
int get_local_port(void);
int get_sock_port(int, int);
-
+void clear_cached_addr(void);
void resolve_localhost(char **host);
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.295 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.296 2009/05/25 06:48:00 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
}
return -1;
}
+#ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') {
if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 &&
!(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
packet_send();
}
}
+#endif
buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
if (compat20 && len > 0) {
c->local_consumed += len;
int id;
/* Reset keepalive timeout */
- keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
id = packet_get_int();
packet_check_eom();
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.209 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.213 2009/07/05 19:28:33 stevesk Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
xfree(gc);
}
- keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
}
static void
server_alive_check(void)
{
- if (++keep_alive_timeouts > options.server_alive_count_max) {
+ if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) {
logit("Timeout, server not responding.");
cleanup_exit(255);
}
static void
client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset)
{
- int len;
- char buf[8192];
+ int len, cont = 0;
+ char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
/*
* Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
*/
if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
/* Read as much as possible. */
- len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (len == 0) {
+ len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont);
+ if (len == 0 && cont == 0) {
/*
* Received EOF. The remote host has closed the
* connection.
client_process_input(fd_set *readset)
{
int len;
- char buf[8192];
+ char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
/* Read input from stdin. */
if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) {
/* Stop watching for window change. */
signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
+ if (compat20) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT);
+ packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION);
+ packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user");
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ }
+
channel_free_all();
if (have_pty)
sys/cdefs.h \
sys/dir.h \
sys/mman.h \
- sys/mount.h \
sys/ndir.h \
sys/poll.h \
sys/prctl.h \
#include <sys/types.h>
])
+# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/mount.h, [], [], [
+#include <sys/param.h>
+])
+
# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
SIA_MSG="no"
SPC_MSG="no"
AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES, 1, [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW, 1,
[Define if you want to disable shadow passwords])
- AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN, 1,
- [Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting])
AC_DEFINE(NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS, 1,
[Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system])
AC_DEFINE(NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT, 1,
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING, 1,
[Define if your platform needs to skip post auth
file descriptor passing])
+ AC_DEFINE(SSH_IOBUFSZ, 65536, [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size])
;;
*-*-dgux*)
- AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
+ AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN, 1,
+ [Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting])
AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
after setsid()])
AC_DEFINE(PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME, 1, [must supply username to passwd
in case the name is longer than 8 chars])
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON, 1, [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang])
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
fi ]
)
+AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***]))
AC_CHECK_LIB(z, deflate, ,
[
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
)
]
)
-AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***]))
AC_ARG_WITH(zlib-version-check,
[ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check],
LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
fi
CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], ,
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***]))
AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC(RAND_add, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL),
[
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***])
]
)
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+int main(void) { if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) exit(0); }
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID, 1,
+ [Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void])
+ ]
+)
+
# Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL,
# because the system crypt() is more featureful.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then
#endif
])
-AC_CHECK_TYPES(in_addr_t,,,
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t],,,
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>])
file descriptor passing])
fi
-AC_MSG_CHECKING(if f_fsid has val members)
+AC_MSG_CHECKING(if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type)
AC_TRY_COMPILE([
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+], [struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0;],
+[ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+[ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if fsid_t has member val)
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>],
-[struct fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0;],
+ [fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0;],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
- AC_DEFINE(FSID_HAS_VAL, 1, f_fsid has members) ],
- [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ]
-)
+ AC_DEFINE(FSID_HAS_VAL, 1, fsid_t has member val) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ])
+
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if f_fsid has member __val)
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>],
+ [fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0;],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_DEFINE(FSID_HAS___VAL, 1, fsid_t has member __val) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ])
+])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(res_query, resolv)
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(dn_expand, resolv)
AC_MSG_CHECKING(if res_query will link)
- AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC(res_query, AC_MSG_RESULT(yes),
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([
+#include "confdefs.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+int main()
+{
+ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ return 0;
+}
+ ],
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes),
[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for res_query in -lresolv)
AC_LINK_IFELSE([
+#include "confdefs.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
int main()
{
return 0;
}
],
- [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
- AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
[LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
])
AC_DEFINE(KRB5, 1, [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support])
KRB5_MSG="yes"
- AC_MSG_CHECKING(for krb5-config)
- if test -x $KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config ; then
- KRB5CONF=$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config
- AC_MSG_RESULT($KRB5CONF)
+ AC_PATH_PROG([KRB5CONF],[krb5-config],
+ [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config],
+ [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH])
+ if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for gssapi support)
if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
)
else
- AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether we are using Heimdal)
# Rename config files; postinstall script will copy them if necessary
-for cfgfile in ssh_config sshd_config ssh_prng_cmds
+for cfgfile in ssh_config sshd_config
do
mv $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/$cfgfile $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/$cfgfile.default
done
+# AIX 5.3 and newer have /dev/random and don't create ssh_prng_cmds
+if [ -f $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/ssh_prng_cmds ]
+then
+ mv FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/ssh_prng_cmds \
+ $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/ssh_prng_cmds.default
+fi
+
#
# Generate lpp control files.
# working dir is $FAKE_ROOT but files are generated in dir above
#ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
typedef u_int32_t in_addr_t;
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
+typedef u_int16_t in_port_t;
+#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
+#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL)
+#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
+ ((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
+ ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
#else
# define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f))
#endif
#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
#endif
+#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
+#endif
+
#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.19 2007/06/12 11:56:15 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && \
- defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0
+ defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \
+ !defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
# include <glob.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.80 2008/09/06 12:24:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.81 2009/05/27 06:34:36 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
-#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
-
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
# if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
# define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.46 2007/06/07 19:37:34 pvalchev Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.47 2009/05/27 06:34:36 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
+
#define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
#define KEX_DH14 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
-/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.9 2006/11/06 21:25:28 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.10 2009/06/21 07:37:15 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
}
/* sign H */
- PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen));
+ if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash,
+ hashlen)) < 0)
+ fatal("kexdh_server: key_sign failed");
/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.11 2009/01/01 21:17:36 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.12 2009/06/21 07:37:15 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
}
/* sign H */
- PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen));
+ if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash,
+ hashlen)) < 0)
+ fatal("kexgex_server: key_sign failed");
/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.101 2009/02/12 03:26:22 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.104 2009/06/12 20:43:22 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "jpake.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
extern z_stream incoming_stream;
extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
extern u_char session_id[];
-extern Buffer input, output;
extern Buffer auth_debug;
extern int auth_debug_init;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
u_int ilen;
u_char *output;
u_int olen;
+ u_int64_t sent_bytes;
+ u_int64_t recv_bytes;
} child_state;
/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
/* Network I/O buffers */
/* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
- buffer_clear(&input);
- buffer_append(&input, child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
+ buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
+ buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
xfree(child_state.input);
- buffer_clear(&output);
- buffer_append(&output, child_state.output, child_state.olen);
+ buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
+ buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
+ child_state.olen);
memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
xfree(child_state.output);
+
+ /* Roaming */
+ if (compat20)
+ roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
}
static Kex *
child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
+ /* Roaming */
+ if (compat20) {
+ child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ }
+
buffer_free(&m);
}
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.16 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.64 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.68 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
#include "jpake.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
/* Imports */
extern int compat20;
-extern Newkeys *newkeys[];
extern z_stream incoming_stream;
extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
-extern Buffer input, output;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
extern ServerOptions options;
Enc *enc;
Mac *mac;
Comp *comp;
- Newkeys *newkey = newkeys[mode];
+ Newkeys *newkey = (Newkeys *)packet_get_newkeys(mode);
debug3("%s: converting %p", __func__, newkey);
void
mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
{
- Buffer m;
+ Buffer m, *input, *output;
u_char *blob, *p;
u_int bloblen, plen;
u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
}
debug3("%s: Sending new keys: %p %p",
- __func__, newkeys[MODE_OUT], newkeys[MODE_IN]);
+ __func__, packet_get_newkeys(MODE_OUT),
+ packet_get_newkeys(MODE_IN));
/* Keys from Kex */
if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen))
buffer_put_string(&m, &incoming_stream, sizeof(incoming_stream));
/* Network I/O buffers */
- buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&input), buffer_len(&input));
- buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&output), buffer_len(&output));
+ input = (Buffer *)packet_get_input();
+ output = (Buffer *)packet_get_output();
+ buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(input), buffer_len(input));
+ buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(output), buffer_len(output));
+
+ /* Roaming */
+ if (compat20) {
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, get_sent_bytes());
+ buffer_put_int64(&m, get_recv_bytes());
+ }
mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
}
void
-mm_jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *grp,
+mm_jpake_step1(struct modp_group *grp,
u_char **id, u_int *id_len,
BIGNUM **priv1, BIGNUM **priv2, BIGNUM **g_priv1, BIGNUM **g_priv2,
u_char **priv1_proof, u_int *priv1_proof_len,
}
void
-mm_jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
+mm_jpake_step2(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s,
BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2, BIGNUM *mypriv2,
const u_char *theirid, u_int theirid_len,
const u_char *myid, u_int myid_len,
}
void
-mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
+mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *grp, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *step2_val,
BIGNUM *mypriv2, BIGNUM *mypub1, BIGNUM *mypub2,
BIGNUM *theirpub1, BIGNUM *theirpub2,
const u_char *my_id, u_int my_id_len,
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.21 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.22 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
/* jpake */
-struct jpake_group;
+struct modp_group;
void mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(struct Authctxt *, BIGNUM **, char **, char **);
-void mm_jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
+void mm_jpake_step1(struct modp_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **,
u_char **, u_int *, u_char **, u_int *);
-void mm_jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *,
+void mm_jpake_step2(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *,
BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
-void mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+void mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct modp_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
/* ************** */
-#define ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE 1024*64
+#define ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE 0xffff
struct dns_query {
char *name;
#include "port-aix.h"
+static char *lastlogin_msg = NULL;
+
# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
static char old_registry[REGISTRY_SIZE] = "";
# endif
Buffer *loginmsg)
{
char *msg = NULL;
- static int msg_done = 0;
int success = 0;
aix_setauthdb(user);
if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) {
success = 1;
- if (msg != NULL && loginmsg != NULL && !msg_done) {
+ if (msg != NULL) {
debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg);
- buffer_append(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
- xfree(msg);
- msg_done = 1;
+ if (lastlogin_msg == NULL)
+ lastlogin_msg = msg;
}
}
aix_restoreauthdb();
return (success);
}
+char *
+sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *user, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char *msg = lastlogin_msg;
+
+ lastlogin_msg = NULL;
+ return msg;
+}
+
# ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
/*
* record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
# include <sys/timers.h>
#endif
+/* for setpcred and friends */
+#ifdef HAVE_USERSEC_H
+# include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
/*
* According to the setauthdb man page, AIX password registries must be 15
* chars or less plus terminating NUL.
int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *, Buffer *);
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN 1
int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, const char *, Buffer *);
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+char *sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *, uid_t);
# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
#endif
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.160 2009/02/13 11:50:21 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.166 2009/06/27 09:29:06 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
#include "canohost.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
#define DBG(x) x
#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
-/*
- * This variable contains the file descriptors used for communicating with
- * the other side. connection_in is used for reading; connection_out for
- * writing. These can be the same descriptor, in which case it is assumed to
- * be a socket.
- */
-static int connection_in = -1;
-static int connection_out = -1;
+struct packet_state {
+ u_int32_t seqnr;
+ u_int32_t packets;
+ u_int64_t blocks;
+ u_int64_t bytes;
+};
-/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
-static u_int remote_protocol_flags = 0;
+struct packet {
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
+ u_char type;
+ Buffer payload;
+};
-/* Encryption context for receiving data. This is only used for decryption. */
-static CipherContext receive_context;
+struct session_state {
+ /*
+ * This variable contains the file descriptors used for
+ * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for
+ * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same
+ * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
+ */
+ int connection_in;
+ int connection_out;
-/* Encryption context for sending data. This is only used for encryption. */
-static CipherContext send_context;
+ /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
+ u_int remote_protocol_flags;
-/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
-Buffer input;
+ /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */
+ CipherContext receive_context;
-/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
-Buffer output;
+ /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */
+ CipherContext send_context;
-/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
-static Buffer outgoing_packet;
+ /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
+ Buffer input;
-/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
-static Buffer incoming_packet;
+ /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
+ Buffer output;
-/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
-static Buffer compression_buffer;
-static int compression_buffer_ready = 0;
+ /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
+ Buffer outgoing_packet;
-/* Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is enabled. */
-static int packet_compression = 0;
+ /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
+ Buffer incoming_packet;
-/* default maximum packet size */
-u_int max_packet_size = 32768;
+ /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
+ Buffer compression_buffer;
+ int compression_buffer_ready;
-/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
-static int initialized = 0;
+ /*
+ * Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is
+ * enabled.
+ */
+ int packet_compression;
-/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
-static int interactive_mode = 0;
+ /* default maximum packet size */
+ u_int max_packet_size;
-/* Set to true if we are the server side. */
-static int server_side = 0;
+ /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
+ int initialized;
-/* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
-static int after_authentication = 0;
+ /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
+ int interactive_mode;
-int keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+ /* Set to true if we are the server side. */
+ int server_side;
-/* Set to the maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
-static int packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+ /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
+ int after_authentication;
-/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
-Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
-static struct packet_state {
- u_int32_t seqnr;
- u_int32_t packets;
- u_int64_t blocks;
- u_int64_t bytes;
-} p_read, p_send;
+ int keep_alive_timeouts;
-static u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out;
-static u_int32_t rekey_limit;
+ /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
+ int packet_timeout_ms;
-/* Session key for protocol v1 */
-static u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
-static u_int ssh1_keylen;
+ /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
+ Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+ struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
-/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
-static u_char extra_pad = 0;
+ u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out;
+ u_int32_t rekey_limit;
-/* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
-static u_int packet_discard = 0;
-static Mac *packet_discard_mac = NULL;
+ /* Session key for protocol v1 */
+ u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+ u_int ssh1_keylen;
-struct packet {
- TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
- u_char type;
- Buffer payload;
+ /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
+ u_char extra_pad;
+
+ /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
+ u_int packet_discard;
+ Mac *packet_discard_mac;
+
+ /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
+ u_int packlen;
+
+ /* Used in packet_send2 */
+ int rekeying;
+
+ /* Used in packet_set_interactive */
+ int set_interactive_called;
+
+ /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
+ int set_maxsize_called;
+
+ TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
};
-TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
+
+static struct session_state *active_state, *backup_state;
+
+static struct session_state *
+alloc_session_state(void)
+{
+ struct session_state *s = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*s));
+
+ s->connection_in = -1;
+ s->connection_out = -1;
+ s->max_packet_size = 32768;
+ s->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+ return s;
+}
/*
* Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until
if (none == NULL)
fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'");
- connection_in = fd_in;
- connection_out = fd_out;
- cipher_init(&send_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
+ if (active_state == NULL)
+ active_state = alloc_session_state();
+ active_state->connection_in = fd_in;
+ active_state->connection_out = fd_out;
+ cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
- cipher_init(&receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
+ cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
- newkeys[MODE_IN] = newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
- if (!initialized) {
- initialized = 1;
- buffer_init(&input);
- buffer_init(&output);
- buffer_init(&outgoing_packet);
- buffer_init(&incoming_packet);
- TAILQ_INIT(&outgoing);
- p_send.packets = p_read.packets = 0;
+ active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+ if (!active_state->initialized) {
+ active_state->initialized = 1;
+ buffer_init(&active_state->input);
+ buffer_init(&active_state->output);
+ buffer_init(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_init(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+ TAILQ_INIT(&active_state->outgoing);
+ active_state->p_send.packets = active_state->p_read.packets = 0;
}
}
packet_set_timeout(int timeout, int count)
{
if (timeout == 0 || count == 0) {
- packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+ active_state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
return;
}
if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
- packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
+ active_state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
else
- packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
+ active_state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
}
static void
packet_stop_discard(void)
{
- if (packet_discard_mac) {
+ if (active_state->packet_discard_mac) {
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
- while (buffer_len(&incoming_packet) < PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
- buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buf, sizeof(buf));
- (void) mac_compute(packet_discard_mac,
- p_read.seqnr,
- buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
+ while (buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet) <
+ PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+ buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet, buf,
+ sizeof(buf));
+ (void) mac_compute(active_state->packet_discard_mac,
+ active_state->p_read.seqnr,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
}
logit("Finished discarding for %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher))
packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt");
if (packet_length != PACKET_MAX_SIZE && mac && mac->enabled)
- packet_discard_mac = mac;
- if (buffer_len(&input) >= discard)
+ active_state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
+ if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) >= discard)
packet_stop_discard();
- packet_discard = discard - buffer_len(&input);
+ active_state->packet_discard = discard -
+ buffer_len(&active_state->input);
}
/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
- if (connection_in == connection_out)
+ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out)
return 1;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0)
+ if (getpeername(active_state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+ &fromlen) < 0)
return 0;
tolen = sizeof(to);
memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
- if (getpeername(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0)
+ if (getpeername(active_state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+ &tolen) < 0)
return 0;
if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
return 0;
CipherContext *cc;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- cc = &send_context;
+ cc = &active_state->send_context;
else
- cc = &receive_context;
+ cc = &active_state->receive_context;
cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len);
}
CipherContext *cc;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- cc = &send_context;
+ cc = &active_state->send_context;
else
- cc = &receive_context;
+ cc = &active_state->receive_context;
return (cipher_get_keycontext(cc, dat));
}
CipherContext *cc;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- cc = &send_context;
+ cc = &active_state->send_context;
else
- cc = &receive_context;
+ cc = &active_state->receive_context;
cipher_set_keycontext(cc, dat);
}
CipherContext *cc;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- cc = &send_context;
+ cc = &active_state->send_context;
else
- cc = &receive_context;
+ cc = &active_state->receive_context;
return (cipher_get_keyiv_len(cc));
}
CipherContext *cc;
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
- cc = &send_context;
+ cc = &active_state->send_context;
else
- cc = &receive_context;
+ cc = &active_state->receive_context;
cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat);
}
int
packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void)
{
- return (cipher_get_number(receive_context.cipher));
+ return (cipher_get_number(active_state->receive_context.cipher));
}
void
{
struct packet_state *state;
- state = (mode == MODE_IN) ? &p_read : &p_send;
+ state = (mode == MODE_IN) ?
+ &active_state->p_read : &active_state->p_send;
if (seqnr)
*seqnr = state->seqnr;
if (blocks)
{
struct packet_state *state;
- state = (mode == MODE_IN) ? &p_read : &p_send;
+ state = (mode == MODE_IN) ?
+ &active_state->p_read : &active_state->p_send;
state->seqnr = seqnr;
state->blocks = blocks;
state->packets = packets;
socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
- if (getsockname(connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0)
+ if (getsockname(active_state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+ &tolen) < 0)
return 0;
if (to.ss_family == AF_INET)
return 1;
packet_set_nonblocking(void)
{
/* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
- set_nonblock(connection_in);
+ set_nonblock(active_state->connection_in);
- if (connection_out != connection_in)
- set_nonblock(connection_out);
+ if (active_state->connection_out != active_state->connection_in)
+ set_nonblock(active_state->connection_out);
}
/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
int
packet_get_connection_in(void)
{
- return connection_in;
+ return active_state->connection_in;
}
/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
int
packet_get_connection_out(void)
{
- return connection_out;
+ return active_state->connection_out;
}
/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
void
packet_close(void)
{
- if (!initialized)
+ if (!active_state->initialized)
return;
- initialized = 0;
- if (connection_in == connection_out) {
- shutdown(connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
- close(connection_out);
+ active_state->initialized = 0;
+ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
+ shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
} else {
- close(connection_in);
- close(connection_out);
+ close(active_state->connection_in);
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
}
- buffer_free(&input);
- buffer_free(&output);
- buffer_free(&outgoing_packet);
- buffer_free(&incoming_packet);
- if (compression_buffer_ready) {
- buffer_free(&compression_buffer);
+ buffer_free(&active_state->input);
+ buffer_free(&active_state->output);
+ buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_free(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+ if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready) {
+ buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
buffer_compress_uninit();
}
- cipher_cleanup(&send_context);
- cipher_cleanup(&receive_context);
+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
}
/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
void
packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags)
{
- remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
+ active_state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
}
/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
u_int
packet_get_protocol_flags(void)
{
- return remote_protocol_flags;
+ return active_state->remote_protocol_flags;
}
/*
static void
packet_init_compression(void)
{
- if (compression_buffer_ready == 1)
+ if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready == 1)
return;
- compression_buffer_ready = 1;
- buffer_init(&compression_buffer);
+ active_state->compression_buffer_ready = 1;
+ buffer_init(&active_state->compression_buffer);
}
void
packet_start_compression(int level)
{
- if (packet_compression && !compat20)
+ if (active_state->packet_compression && !compat20)
fatal("Compression already enabled.");
- packet_compression = 1;
+ active_state->packet_compression = 1;
packet_init_compression();
buffer_compress_init_send(level);
buffer_compress_init_recv();
fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too small: %d", keylen);
if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH)
fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too big: %d", keylen);
- memcpy(ssh1_key, key, keylen);
- ssh1_keylen = keylen;
- cipher_init(&send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
- cipher_init(&receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
+ memcpy(active_state->ssh1_key, key, keylen);
+ active_state->ssh1_keylen = keylen;
+ cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
+ 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
+ cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
+ 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
}
u_int
packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *key)
{
if (key == NULL)
- return (ssh1_keylen);
- memcpy(key, ssh1_key, ssh1_keylen);
- return (ssh1_keylen);
+ return (active_state->ssh1_keylen);
+ memcpy(key, active_state->ssh1_key, active_state->ssh1_keylen);
+ return (active_state->ssh1_keylen);
}
/* Start constructing a packet to send. */
len = compat20 ? 6 : 9;
memset(buf, 0, len - 1);
buf[len - 1] = type;
- buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
- buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
}
/* Append payload. */
{
char ch = value;
- buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
}
void
packet_put_int(u_int value)
{
- buffer_put_int(&outgoing_packet, value);
+ buffer_put_int(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
+}
+
+void
+packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value)
+{
+ buffer_put_int64(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
}
void
packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len)
{
- buffer_put_string(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+ buffer_put_string(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
}
void
packet_put_cstring(const char *str)
{
- buffer_put_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&active_state->outgoing_packet, str);
}
void
packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
{
- buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
}
void
packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
{
- buffer_put_bignum(&outgoing_packet, value);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
}
void
packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
{
- buffer_put_bignum2(&outgoing_packet, value);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
}
/*
* If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing
* packet.
*/
- if (packet_compression) {
- buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
+ if (active_state->packet_compression) {
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
/* Skip padding. */
- buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8);
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 8);
/* padding */
- buffer_append(&compression_buffer, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8);
- buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer);
- buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
- buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
- buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+ buffer_append(&active_state->compression_buffer,
+ "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8);
+ buffer_compress(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+ &active_state->compression_buffer);
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
}
/* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */
- len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
+ len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8;
/* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */
padding = 8 - len % 8;
- if (!send_context.plaintext) {
- cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+ if (!active_state->send_context.plaintext) {
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rnd = arc4random();
rnd >>= 8;
}
}
- buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8 - padding);
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding);
/* Add check bytes. */
- checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
- buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+ checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+ buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
put_u32(buf, checksum);
- buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: ");
- buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_dump(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
#endif
/* Append to output. */
put_u32(buf, len);
- buffer_append(&output, buf, 4);
- cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
- cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
- buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+ buffer_append(&active_state->output, buf, 4);
+ cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output,
+ buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+ cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, cp,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+ buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
- buffer_dump(&output);
+ buffer_dump(&active_state->output);
#endif
- p_send.packets++;
- p_send.bytes += len + buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
- buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
+ active_state->p_send.packets++;
+ active_state->p_send.bytes += len +
+ buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
/*
* Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won't be
debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
- cc = &send_context;
+ cc = &active_state->send_context;
crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
- p_send.packets = p_send.blocks = 0;
- max_blocks = &max_blocks_out;
+ active_state->p_send.packets = active_state->p_send.blocks = 0;
+ max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_out;
} else {
- cc = &receive_context;
+ cc = &active_state->receive_context;
crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
- p_read.packets = p_read.blocks = 0;
- max_blocks = &max_blocks_in;
+ active_state->p_read.packets = active_state->p_read.blocks = 0;
+ max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_in;
}
- if (newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
+ if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
cipher_cleanup(cc);
- enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
- mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
- comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+ mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+ comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
mac_clear(mac);
xfree(enc->name);
xfree(enc->iv);
xfree(mac->name);
xfree(mac->key);
xfree(comp->name);
- xfree(newkeys[mode]);
+ xfree(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
}
- newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
- if (newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+ active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
+ if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode);
- enc = &newkeys[mode]->enc;
- mac = &newkeys[mode]->mac;
- comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+ mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+ comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (mac_init(mac) == 0)
mac->enabled = 1;
DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); */
if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
- (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && after_authentication)) &&
- comp->enabled == 0) {
+ (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
+ active_state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
packet_init_compression();
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
buffer_compress_init_send(6);
*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
else
*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
- if (rekey_limit)
- *max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks, rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
+ if (active_state->rekey_limit)
+ *max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks,
+ active_state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
}
/*
* Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
* with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
*/
- after_authentication = 1;
+ active_state->after_authentication = 1;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
/* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
- if (newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+ if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
continue;
- comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
packet_init_compression();
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
Comp *comp = NULL;
int block_size;
- if (newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
- enc = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
- mac = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
- comp = &newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
+ if (active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
+ enc = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
+ mac = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
+ comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
}
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
- cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
type = cp[5];
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "plain: ");
- buffer_dump(&outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_dump(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
#endif
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
- len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
+ len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
/* skip header, compress only payload */
- buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 5);
- buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
- buffer_compress(&outgoing_packet, &compression_buffer);
- buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
- buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5);
- buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
- buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 5);
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+ buffer_compress(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+ &active_state->compression_buffer);
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %d", len,
- buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)));
+ buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet)));
}
/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
- len = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet);
+ len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
/*
* calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
if (padlen < 4)
padlen += block_size;
- if (extra_pad) {
+ if (active_state->extra_pad) {
/* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */
- extra_pad = roundup(extra_pad, block_size);
- pad = extra_pad - ((len + padlen) % extra_pad);
+ active_state->extra_pad =
+ roundup(active_state->extra_pad, block_size);
+ pad = active_state->extra_pad -
+ ((len + padlen) % active_state->extra_pad);
debug3("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
- pad, len, padlen, extra_pad);
+ pad, len, padlen, active_state->extra_pad);
padlen += pad;
- extra_pad = 0;
+ active_state->extra_pad = 0;
}
- cp = buffer_append_space(&outgoing_packet, padlen);
- if (enc && !send_context.plaintext) {
+ cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->outgoing_packet, padlen);
+ if (enc && !active_state->send_context.plaintext) {
/* random padding */
for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
memset(cp, 0, padlen);
}
/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
- packet_length = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) - 4;
- cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+ packet_length = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet) - 4;
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
put_u32(cp, packet_length);
cp[4] = padlen;
DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d)", packet_length+4, padlen));
/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
- macbuf = mac_compute(mac, p_send.seqnr,
- buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
- buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
- DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", p_send.seqnr));
+ macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_send.seqnr,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+ buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+ DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", active_state->p_send.seqnr));
}
/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
- cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
- cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
- buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
+ cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output,
+ buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
+ cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, cp,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet),
+ buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet));
/* append unencrypted MAC */
if (mac && mac->enabled)
- buffer_append(&output, macbuf, mac->mac_len);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len);
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
- buffer_dump(&output);
+ buffer_dump(&active_state->output);
#endif
/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
- if (++p_send.seqnr == 0)
+ if (++active_state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
- if (++p_send.packets == 0)
+ if (++active_state->p_send.packets == 0)
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
fatal("XXX too many packets with same key");
- p_send.blocks += (packet_length + 4) / block_size;
- p_send.bytes += packet_length + 4;
- buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
+ active_state->p_send.blocks += (packet_length + 4) / block_size;
+ active_state->p_send.bytes += packet_length + 4;
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
- else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && server_side)
+ else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && active_state->server_side)
packet_enable_delayed_compress();
return(packet_length);
}
static int
packet_send2(void)
{
- static int packet_length = 0;
- static int rekeying = 0;
+ static int packet_length = 0;
struct packet *p;
u_char type, *cp;
- cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
type = cp[5];
/* during rekeying we can only send key exchange messages */
- if (rekeying) {
+ if (active_state->rekeying) {
if (!((type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN) &&
(type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX))) {
debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
p = xmalloc(sizeof(*p));
p->type = type;
- memcpy(&p->payload, &outgoing_packet, sizeof(Buffer));
- buffer_init(&outgoing_packet);
- TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&outgoing, p, next);
+ memcpy(&p->payload, &active_state->outgoing_packet,
+ sizeof(Buffer));
+ buffer_init(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&active_state->outgoing, p, next);
return(sizeof(Buffer));
}
}
/* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
- rekeying = 1;
+ active_state->rekeying = 1;
packet_length = packet_send2_wrapped();
/* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
- rekeying = 0;
- while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&outgoing))) {
+ active_state->rekeying = 0;
+ while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&active_state->outgoing))) {
type = p->type;
debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
- buffer_free(&outgoing_packet);
- memcpy(&outgoing_packet, &p->payload,
+ buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
+ memcpy(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &p->payload,
sizeof(Buffer));
- TAILQ_REMOVE(&outgoing, p, next);
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&active_state->outgoing, p, next);
xfree(p);
packet_length += packet_send2_wrapped();
}
int
packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
- int type, len, ret, ms_remain;
+ int type, len, ret, ms_remain, cont;
fd_set *setp;
char buf[8192];
struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
- setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS),
- sizeof(fd_mask));
+ setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_in + 1,
+ NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
/* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */
packet_write_wait();
* Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
* buffer, and try again.
*/
- memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) *
- sizeof(fd_mask));
- FD_SET(connection_in, setp);
+ memset(setp, 0, howmany(active_state->connection_in + 1,
+ NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
+ FD_SET(active_state->connection_in, setp);
- if (packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
- ms_remain = packet_timeout_ms;
+ if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+ ms_remain = active_state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
for (;;) {
- if (packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
+ if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
}
- if ((ret = select(connection_in + 1, setp, NULL,
- NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
+ if ((ret = select(active_state->connection_in + 1, setp,
+ NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
- if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
+ if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
break;
- if (packet_timeout_ms == -1)
+ if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/* Read data from the socket. */
- len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ do {
+ cont = 0;
+ len = roaming_read(active_state->connection_in, buf,
+ sizeof(buf), &cont);
+ } while (len == 0 && cont);
if (len == 0) {
logit("Connection closed by %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
cleanup_exit(255);
u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
/* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
- if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + 8)
+ if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4 + 8)
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
/* Get length of incoming packet. */
- cp = buffer_ptr(&input);
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->input);
len = get_u32(cp);
if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", len);
padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
/* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
- if (buffer_len(&input) < 4 + padded_len)
+ if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4 + padded_len)
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
/* The entire packet is in buffer. */
/* Consume packet length. */
- buffer_consume(&input, 4);
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->input, 4);
/*
* Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
* (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
* Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
*/
- if (!receive_context.plaintext) {
- switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len)) {
+ if (!active_state->receive_context.plaintext) {
+ switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
+ padded_len)) {
case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
"network attack detected");
}
/* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
- buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
- cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, padded_len);
- cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len);
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+ cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, padded_len);
+ cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), padded_len);
- buffer_consume(&input, padded_len);
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->input, padded_len);
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
- buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
+ buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
#endif
/* Compute packet checksum. */
- checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
- buffer_len(&incoming_packet) - 4);
+ checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
+ buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet) - 4);
/* Skip padding. */
- buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8);
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8);
/* Test check bytes. */
- if (len != buffer_len(&incoming_packet))
+ if (len != buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet))
packet_disconnect("packet_read_poll1: len %d != buffer_len %d.",
- len, buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
+ len, buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
- cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + len - 4;
+ cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet) + len - 4;
stored_checksum = get_u32(cp);
if (checksum != stored_checksum)
packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input.");
- buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, 4);
-
- if (packet_compression) {
- buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
- buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer);
- buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
- buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
- buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+ buffer_consume_end(&active_state->incoming_packet, 4);
+
+ if (active_state->packet_compression) {
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+ buffer_uncompress(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+ &active_state->compression_buffer);
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
}
- p_read.packets++;
- p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
- type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet);
+ active_state->p_read.packets++;
+ active_state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
+ type = buffer_get_char(&active_state->incoming_packet);
if (type < SSH_MSG_MIN || type > SSH_MSG_MAX)
packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", type);
return type;
static int
packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
- static u_int packet_length = 0;
u_int padlen, need;
u_char *macbuf, *cp, type;
u_int maclen, block_size;
Mac *mac = NULL;
Comp *comp = NULL;
- if (packet_discard)
+ if (active_state->packet_discard)
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
- if (newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
- enc = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
- mac = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
- comp = &newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
+ if (active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
+ enc = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
+ mac = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
+ comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
}
maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
- if (packet_length == 0) {
+ if (active_state->packlen == 0) {
/*
* check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
* decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
*/
- if (buffer_len(&input) < block_size)
+ if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < block_size)
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
- buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
- cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, block_size);
- cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input),
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+ cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet,
block_size);
- cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
- packet_length = get_u32(cp);
- if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
+ cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), block_size);
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+ active_state->packlen = get_u32(cp);
+ if (active_state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
+ active_state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
- buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
+ buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
#endif
- logit("Bad packet length %u.", packet_length);
- packet_start_discard(enc, mac, packet_length,
+ logit("Bad packet length %u.", active_state->packlen);
+ packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
}
- DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", packet_length+4));
- buffer_consume(&input, block_size);
+ DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", active_state->packlen+4));
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->input, block_size);
}
/* we have a partial packet of block_size bytes */
- need = 4 + packet_length - block_size;
+ need = 4 + active_state->packlen - block_size;
DBG(debug("partial packet %d, need %d, maclen %d", block_size,
need, maclen));
if (need % block_size != 0) {
logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
need, block_size, need % block_size);
- packet_start_discard(enc, mac, packet_length,
+ packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
}
* check if the entire packet has been received and
* decrypt into incoming_packet
*/
- if (buffer_len(&input) < need + maclen)
+ if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < need + maclen)
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
- buffer_dump(&input);
+ buffer_dump(&active_state->input);
#endif
- cp = buffer_append_space(&incoming_packet, need);
- cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input), need);
- buffer_consume(&input, need);
+ cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, need);
+ cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, cp,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), need);
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->input, need);
/*
* compute MAC over seqnr and packet,
* increment sequence number for incoming packet
*/
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
- macbuf = mac_compute(mac, p_read.seqnr,
- buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
- buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
- if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&input), mac->mac_len) != 0) {
+ macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
+ buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
+ if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
+ mac->mac_len) != 0) {
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
fatal("internal error need %d", need);
- packet_start_discard(enc, mac, packet_length,
+ packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
}
- DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", p_read.seqnr));
- buffer_consume(&input, mac->mac_len);
+ DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", active_state->p_read.seqnr));
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->input, mac->mac_len);
}
/* XXX now it's safe to use fatal/packet_disconnect */
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
- *seqnr_p = p_read.seqnr;
- if (++p_read.seqnr == 0)
+ *seqnr_p = active_state->p_read.seqnr;
+ if (++active_state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
- if (++p_read.packets == 0)
+ if (++active_state->p_read.packets == 0)
if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
fatal("XXX too many packets with same key");
- p_read.blocks += (packet_length + 4) / block_size;
- p_read.bytes += packet_length + 4;
+ active_state->p_read.blocks += (active_state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
+ active_state->p_read.bytes += active_state->packlen + 4;
/* get padlen */
- cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
+ cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
padlen = cp[4];
DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
if (padlen < 4)
packet_disconnect("Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen);
/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
- buffer_consume(&incoming_packet, 4 + 1);
- buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, padlen);
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1);
+ buffer_consume_end(&active_state->incoming_packet, padlen);
- DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d", buffer_len(&incoming_packet)));
+ DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d",
+ buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)));
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
- buffer_clear(&compression_buffer);
- buffer_uncompress(&incoming_packet, &compression_buffer);
- buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
- buffer_append(&incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&compression_buffer),
- buffer_len(&compression_buffer));
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer);
+ buffer_uncompress(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+ &active_state->compression_buffer);
+ buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer),
+ buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer));
DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d",
- buffer_len(&incoming_packet)));
+ buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)));
}
/*
* get packet type, implies consume.
* return length of payload (without type field)
*/
- type = buffer_get_char(&incoming_packet);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&active_state->incoming_packet);
if (type < SSH2_MSG_MIN || type >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN)
packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", type);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
- else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !server_side)
+ else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS &&
+ !active_state->server_side)
packet_enable_delayed_compress();
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", type);
- buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
+ buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet);
#endif
/* reset for next packet */
- packet_length = 0;
+ active_state->packlen = 0;
return type;
}
if (compat20) {
type = packet_read_poll2(seqnr_p);
if (type) {
- keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+ active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
}
switch (type) {
void
packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len)
{
- if (packet_discard) {
- keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
- if (len >= packet_discard)
+ if (active_state->packet_discard) {
+ active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
+ if (len >= active_state->packet_discard)
packet_stop_discard();
- packet_discard -= len;
+ active_state->packet_discard -= len;
return;
}
- buffer_append(&input, buf, len);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
}
/* Returns a character from the packet. */
{
char ch;
- buffer_get(&incoming_packet, &ch, 1);
+ buffer_get(&active_state->incoming_packet, &ch, 1);
return (u_char) ch;
}
u_int
packet_get_int(void)
{
- return buffer_get_int(&incoming_packet);
+ return buffer_get_int(&active_state->incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/* Returns an 64 bit integer from the packet data. */
+
+u_int64_t
+packet_get_int64(void)
+{
+ return buffer_get_int64(&active_state->incoming_packet);
}
/*
void
packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
{
- buffer_get_bignum(&incoming_packet, value);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&active_state->incoming_packet, value);
}
void
packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
{
- buffer_get_bignum2(&incoming_packet, value);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&active_state->incoming_packet, value);
}
void *
packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr)
{
- u_int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
+ u_int bytes = buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet);
if (length_ptr != NULL)
*length_ptr = bytes;
- return buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
+ return buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
}
int
packet_remaining(void)
{
- return buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
+ return buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet);
}
/*
void *
packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr)
{
- return buffer_get_string(&incoming_packet, length_ptr);
+ return buffer_get_string(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
}
void *
packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr)
{
- return buffer_get_string_ptr(&incoming_packet, length_ptr);
+ return buffer_get_string_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
}
/*
packet_write_poll(void)
{
int len = 0;
- len = buffer_len(&output);
+ int cont;
+
+ len = buffer_len(&active_state->output);
if (len > 0) {
- len = write(connection_out, buffer_ptr(&output), len);
+ cont = 0;
+ len = roaming_write(active_state->connection_out,
+ buffer_ptr(&active_state->output), len, &cont);
if (len == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
return (0);
fatal("Write failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
- if (len == 0)
+ if (len == 0 && !cont)
fatal("Write connection closed");
- buffer_consume(&output, len);
+ buffer_consume(&active_state->output, len);
}
return(len);
}
-
/*
* Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
* written.
struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
u_int bytes_sent = 0;
- setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS),
- sizeof(fd_mask));
+ setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1,
+ NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
bytes_sent += packet_write_poll();
while (packet_have_data_to_write()) {
- memset(setp, 0, howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
- sizeof(fd_mask));
- FD_SET(connection_out, setp);
+ memset(setp, 0, howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1,
+ NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
+ FD_SET(active_state->connection_out, setp);
- if (packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
- ms_remain = packet_timeout_ms;
+ if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+ ms_remain = active_state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
for (;;) {
- if (packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
+ if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
}
- if ((ret = select(connection_out + 1, NULL, setp,
- NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
+ if ((ret = select(active_state->connection_out + 1,
+ NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
- if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
+ if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
break;
- if (packet_timeout_ms == -1)
+ if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
int
packet_have_data_to_write(void)
{
- return buffer_len(&output) != 0;
+ return buffer_len(&active_state->output) != 0;
}
/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
int
packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void)
{
- if (interactive_mode)
- return buffer_len(&output) < 16384;
+ if (active_state->interactive_mode)
+ return buffer_len(&active_state->output) < 16384;
else
- return buffer_len(&output) < 128 * 1024;
+ return buffer_len(&active_state->output) < 128 * 1024;
}
-
static void
packet_set_tos(int interactive)
{
if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket() ||
!packet_connection_is_ipv4())
return;
- if (setsockopt(connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos,
+ if (setsockopt(active_state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos,
sizeof(tos)) < 0)
error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
tos, strerror(errno));
void
packet_set_interactive(int interactive)
{
- static int called = 0;
-
- if (called)
+ if (active_state->set_interactive_called)
return;
- called = 1;
+ active_state->set_interactive_called = 1;
/* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
- interactive_mode = interactive;
+ active_state->interactive_mode = interactive;
/* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
return;
- set_nodelay(connection_in);
+ set_nodelay(active_state->connection_in);
packet_set_tos(interactive);
}
int
packet_is_interactive(void)
{
- return interactive_mode;
+ return active_state->interactive_mode;
}
int
packet_set_maxsize(u_int s)
{
- static int called = 0;
-
- if (called) {
+ if (active_state->set_maxsize_called) {
logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
- max_packet_size, s);
+ active_state->max_packet_size, s);
return -1;
}
if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
return -1;
}
- called = 1;
+ active_state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
- max_packet_size = s;
+ active_state->max_packet_size = s;
return s;
}
+int
+packet_inc_alive_timeouts(void)
+{
+ return ++active_state->keep_alive_timeouts;
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_alive_timeouts(int ka)
+{
+ active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
+}
+
+u_int
+packet_get_maxsize(void)
+{
+ return active_state->max_packet_size;
+}
+
/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
void
packet_add_padding(u_char pad)
{
- extra_pad = pad;
+ active_state->extra_pad = pad;
}
/*
return 1;
}
return
- (p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
- (p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
- (max_blocks_out && (p_send.blocks > max_blocks_out)) ||
- (max_blocks_in && (p_read.blocks > max_blocks_in));
+ (active_state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
+ (active_state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
+ (active_state->max_blocks_out &&
+ (active_state->p_send.blocks > active_state->max_blocks_out)) ||
+ (active_state->max_blocks_in &&
+ (active_state->p_read.blocks > active_state->max_blocks_in));
}
void
packet_set_rekey_limit(u_int32_t bytes)
{
- rekey_limit = bytes;
+ active_state->rekey_limit = bytes;
}
void
packet_set_server(void)
{
- server_side = 1;
+ active_state->server_side = 1;
}
void
packet_set_authenticated(void)
{
- after_authentication = 1;
+ active_state->after_authentication = 1;
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_input(void)
+{
+ return (void *)&active_state->input;
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_output(void)
+{
+ return (void *)&active_state->output;
+}
+
+void *
+packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
+{
+ return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
+ * resuming a suspended connection.
+ */
+void
+packet_backup_state(void)
+{
+ struct session_state *tmp;
+
+ close(active_state->connection_in);
+ active_state->connection_in = -1;
+ close(active_state->connection_out);
+ active_state->connection_out = -1;
+ if (backup_state)
+ tmp = backup_state;
+ else
+ tmp = alloc_session_state();
+ backup_state = active_state;
+ active_state = tmp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Swap in the old state when resuming a connecion.
+ */
+void
+packet_restore_state(void)
+{
+ struct session_state *tmp;
+ void *buf;
+ u_int len;
+
+ tmp = backup_state;
+ backup_state = active_state;
+ active_state = tmp;
+ active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
+ backup_state->connection_in = -1;
+ active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
+ backup_state->connection_out = -1;
+ len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
+ if (len > 0) {
+ buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
+ buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len);
+ buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
+ add_recv_bytes(len);
+ }
}
int
packet_authentication_state(void)
{
- return(after_authentication);
+ return(active_state->after_authentication);
}
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.49 2008/07/10 18:08:11 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.52 2009/06/27 09:29:06 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
void packet_start(u_char);
void packet_put_char(int ch);
void packet_put_int(u_int value);
+void packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value);
void packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
void packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
void packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len);
u_int packet_get_char(void);
u_int packet_get_int(void);
+u_int64_t packet_get_int64(void);
void packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
void packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
void *packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr);
void packet_set_state(int, u_int32_t, u_int64_t, u_int32_t, u_int64_t);
int packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void);
void packet_set_iv(int, u_char *);
+void *packet_get_newkeys(int);
int packet_write_poll(void);
int packet_write_wait(void);
void tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *);
void tty_parse_modes(int, int *);
-extern u_int max_packet_size;
-extern int keep_alive_timeouts;
+void packet_set_alive_timeouts(int);
+int packet_inc_alive_timeouts(void);
int packet_set_maxsize(u_int);
-#define packet_get_maxsize() max_packet_size
+u_int packet_get_maxsize(void);
/* don't allow remaining bytes after the end of the message */
#define packet_check_eom() \
int packet_need_rekeying(void);
void packet_set_rekey_limit(u_int32_t);
+void packet_backup_state(void);
+void packet_restore_state(void);
+
+void *packet_get_input(void);
+void *packet_get_output(void);
+
#endif /* PACKET_H */
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.176 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.177 2009/06/27 09:35:06 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
- oVisualHostKey, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+ oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
oNoneEnabled, oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, oNoneSwitch, oHPNDisabled,
oHPNBufferSize,
oDeprecated, oUnsupported
{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
+ { "useroaming", oUseRoaming },
#ifdef JPAKE
{ "zeroknowledgepasswordauthentication",
oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication },
intptr = &options->visual_host_key;
goto parse_flag;
+ case oUseRoaming:
+ intptr = &options->use_roaming;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case oDeprecated:
debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
options->tun_remote = -1;
options->local_command = NULL;
options->permit_local_command = -1;
+ options->use_roaming = -1;
options->visual_host_key = -1;
options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
options->none_switch = -1;
options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
options->permit_local_command = 0;
+ if (options->use_roaming == -1)
+ options->use_roaming = 1;
if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
options->visual_host_key = 0;
if (options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication == -1)
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.78 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.79 2009/06/27 09:35:06 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
int permit_local_command;
int visual_host_key;
+ int use_roaming;
+
} Options;
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0
if (out_buf_size > 0)
buf_append(buf, ret);
}
- debug3("Wrote %ld bytes for a total of %llu", (long)ret,
- (unsigned long long)write_bytes);
return ret;
}
-/* $OpenBSD: schnorr.c,v 1.2 2009/02/18 04:31:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: schnorr.c,v 1.3 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "jpake.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
/* #define SCHNORR_DEBUG */ /* Privacy-violating debugging */
/* #define SCHNORR_MAIN */ /* Include main() selftest */
-/* XXX */
-/* Parametise signature hash? (sha256, sha1, etc.) */
-/* Signature format - include type name, hash type, group params? */
-
#ifndef SCHNORR_DEBUG
# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN(a)
# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF(a)
#else
-# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN(a) jpake_debug3_bn a
-# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF(a) jpake_debug3_buf a
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN(a) debug3_bn a
+# define SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF(a) debug3_buf a
#endif /* SCHNORR_DEBUG */
/*
* Calculate hash component of Schnorr signature H(g || g^v || g^x || id)
- * using SHA1. Returns signature as bignum or NULL on error.
+ * using the hash function defined by "evp_md". Returns signature as
+ * bignum or NULL on error.
*/
static BIGNUM *
schnorr_hash(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *g,
- const BIGNUM *g_v, const BIGNUM *g_x,
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *g_v, const BIGNUM *g_x,
const u_char *id, u_int idlen)
{
u_char *digest;
u_int digest_len;
BIGNUM *h;
- EVP_MD_CTX evp_md_ctx;
Buffer b;
int success = -1;
}
buffer_init(&b);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&evp_md_ctx);
/* h = H(g || p || q || g^v || g^x || id) */
buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g);
SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
"%s: hashblob", __func__));
- if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), (const EVP_MD *)EVP_sha256(),
+ if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), evp_md,
&digest, &digest_len) != 0) {
error("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
goto out;
SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((h, "%s: h = ", __func__));
out:
buffer_free(&b);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&evp_md_ctx);
bzero(digest, digest_len);
xfree(digest);
digest_len = 0;
/*
* Generate Schnorr signature to prove knowledge of private value 'x' used
* in public exponent g^x, under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'
+ * using the hash function "evp_md".
* 'idlen' bytes from 'id' will be included in the signature hash as an anti-
* replay salt.
- * On success, 0 is returned and *siglen bytes of signature are returned in
- * *sig (caller to free). Returns -1 on failure.
+ *
+ * On success, 0 is returned. The signature values are returned as *e_p
+ * (g^v mod p) and *r_p (v - xh mod q). The caller must free these values.
+ * On failure, -1 is returned.
*/
int
schnorr_sign(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
- const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
- u_char **sig, u_int *siglen)
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x,
+ const u_char *id, u_int idlen, BIGNUM **r_p, BIGNUM **e_p)
{
int success = -1;
- Buffer b;
BIGNUM *h, *tmp, *v, *g_v, *r;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: g_v = ", __func__));
/* h = H(g || g^v || g^x || id) */
- if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_v, g_x,
+ if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, evp_md, g_v, g_x,
id, idlen)) == NULL) {
error("%s: schnorr_hash failed", __func__);
goto out;
error("%s: BN_mod_mul (r = v - tmp)", __func__);
goto out;
}
+ SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: e = ", __func__));
SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((r, "%s: r = ", __func__));
- /* Signature is (g_v, r) */
+ *e_p = g_v;
+ *r_p = r;
+
+ success = 0;
+ out:
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (h != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(h);
+ if (v != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(v);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate Schnorr signature to prove knowledge of private value 'x' used
+ * in public exponent g^x, under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'
+ * using a SHA256 hash.
+ * 'idlen' bytes from 'id' will be included in the signature hash as an anti-
+ * replay salt.
+ * On success, 0 is returned and *siglen bytes of signature are returned in
+ * *sig (caller to free). Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+schnorr_sign_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+ const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+ u_char **sig, u_int *siglen)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ BIGNUM *r, *e;
+
+ if (schnorr_sign(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, EVP_sha256(),
+ x, g_x, id, idlen, &r, &e) != 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Signature is (e, r) */
buffer_init(&b);
/* XXX sigtype-hash as string? */
- buffer_put_bignum2(&b, g_v);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, e);
buffer_put_bignum2(&b, r);
*siglen = buffer_len(&b);
*sig = xmalloc(*siglen);
SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
"%s: sigblob", __func__));
buffer_free(&b);
- success = 0;
- out:
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- if (h != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(h);
- if (v != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(v);
+
BN_clear_free(r);
- BN_clear_free(g_v);
- BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ BN_clear_free(e);
- return success;
+ return 0;
}
/*
- * Verify Schnorr signature 'sig' of length 'siglen' against public exponent
- * g_x (g^x) under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g'.
+ * Verify Schnorr signature { r (v - xh mod q), e (g^v mod p) } against
+ * public exponent g_x (g^x) under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and
+ * 'grp_g' using hash "evp_md".
* Signature hash will be salted with 'idlen' bytes from 'id'.
* Returns -1 on failure, 0 on incorrect signature or 1 on matching signature.
*/
int
schnorr_verify(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q, const BIGNUM *grp_g,
- const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
- const u_char *sig, u_int siglen)
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md, const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+ const BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *e)
{
int success = -1;
- Buffer b;
- BIGNUM *g_v, *h, *r, *g_xh, *g_r, *expected;
+ BIGNUM *h, *g_xh, *g_r, *expected;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
- u_int rlen;
SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_x, "%s: g_x = ", __func__));
return -1;
}
- g_v = h = r = g_xh = g_r = expected = NULL;
+ h = g_xh = g_r = expected = NULL;
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: BN_CTX_new", __func__);
goto out;
}
- if ((g_v = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (g_xh = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ if ((g_xh = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(g_r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(expected = BN_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
goto out;
}
- /* Extract g^v and r from signature blob */
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, sig, siglen);
- SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
- "%s: sigblob", __func__));
- buffer_get_bignum2(&b, g_v);
- buffer_get_bignum2(&b, r);
- rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- buffer_free(&b);
- if (rlen != 0) {
- error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
- goto out;
- }
- buffer_free(&b);
- SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((g_v, "%s: g_v = ", __func__));
+ SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((e, "%s: e = ", __func__));
SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((r, "%s: r = ", __func__));
/* h = H(g || g^v || g^x || id) */
- if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_v, g_x,
+ if ((h = schnorr_hash(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, evp_md, e, g_x,
id, idlen)) == NULL) {
error("%s: schnorr_hash failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
SCHNORR_DEBUG_BN((expected, "%s: expected = ", __func__));
- /* Check g_v == expected */
- success = BN_cmp(expected, g_v) == 0;
+ /* Check e == expected */
+ success = BN_cmp(expected, e) == 0;
out:
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (h != NULL)
BN_clear_free(h);
- BN_clear_free(g_v);
- BN_clear_free(r);
BN_clear_free(g_xh);
BN_clear_free(g_r);
BN_clear_free(expected);
return success;
}
+/*
+ * Verify Schnorr signature 'sig' of length 'siglen' against public exponent
+ * g_x (g^x) under group defined by 'grp_p', 'grp_q' and 'grp_g' using a
+ * SHA256 hash.
+ * Signature hash will be salted with 'idlen' bytes from 'id'.
+ * Returns -1 on failure, 0 on incorrect signature or 1 on matching signature.
+ */
+int
+schnorr_verify_buf(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
+ const BIGNUM *grp_g,
+ const BIGNUM *g_x, const u_char *id, u_int idlen,
+ const u_char *sig, u_int siglen)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ int ret = -1;
+ u_int rlen;
+ BIGNUM *r, *e;
+
+ e = r = NULL;
+ if ((e = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (r = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract g^v and r from signature blob */
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, sig, siglen);
+ SCHNORR_DEBUG_BUF((buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b),
+ "%s: sigblob", __func__));
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&b, e);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&b, r);
+ rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ if (rlen != 0) {
+ error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, EVP_sha256(),
+ g_x, id, idlen, r, e);
+ out:
+ BN_clear_free(e);
+ BN_clear_free(r);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Helper functions */
+
+/*
+ * Generate uniformly distributed random number in range (1, high).
+ * Return number on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+BIGNUM *
+bn_rand_range_gt_one(const BIGNUM *high)
+{
+ BIGNUM *r, *tmp;
+ int success = -1;
+
+ if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_set_word(tmp, 2) != 1) {
+ error("%s: BN_set_word(tmp, 2)", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_sub(tmp, high, tmp) == -1) {
+ error("%s: BN_sub failed (tmp = high - 2)", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_rand_range(r, tmp) == -1) {
+ error("%s: BN_rand_range failed", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_set_word(tmp, 2) != 1) {
+ error("%s: BN_set_word(tmp, 2)", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_add(r, r, tmp) == -1) {
+ error("%s: BN_add failed (r = r + 2)", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ success = 0;
+ out:
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
+ if (success == 0)
+ return r;
+ BN_clear_free(r);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hash contents of buffer 'b' with hash 'md'. Returns 0 on success,
+ * with digest via 'digestp' (caller to free) and length via 'lenp'.
+ * Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+hash_buffer(const u_char *buf, u_int len, const EVP_MD *md,
+ u_char **digestp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ u_int digest_len;
+ EVP_MD_CTX evp_md_ctx;
+ int success = -1;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&evp_md_ctx);
+
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&evp_md_ctx, md, NULL) != 1) {
+ error("%s: EVP_DigestInit_ex", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&evp_md_ctx, buf, len) != 1) {
+ error("%s: EVP_DigestUpdate", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&evp_md_ctx, digest, &digest_len) != 1) {
+ error("%s: EVP_DigestFinal_ex", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *digestp = xmalloc(digest_len);
+ *lenp = digest_len;
+ memcpy(*digestp, digest, *lenp);
+ success = 0;
+ out:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&evp_md_ctx);
+ bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ digest_len = 0;
+ return success;
+}
+
+/* print formatted string followed by bignum */
+void
+debug3_bn(const BIGNUM *n, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char *out, *h;
+ va_list args;
+
+ out = NULL;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (out == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+
+ if (n == NULL)
+ debug3("%s(null)", out);
+ else {
+ h = BN_bn2hex(n);
+ debug3("%s0x%s", out, h);
+ free(h);
+ }
+ free(out);
+}
+
+/* print formatted string followed by buffer contents in hex */
+void
+debug3_buf(const u_char *buf, u_int len, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char *out, h[65];
+ u_int i, j;
+ va_list args;
+
+ out = NULL;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vasprintf(&out, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (out == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+
+ debug3("%s length %u%s", out, len, buf == NULL ? " (null)" : "");
+ free(out);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ *h = '\0';
+ for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ snprintf(h + j, sizeof(h) - j, "%02x", buf[i]);
+ j += 2;
+ if (j >= sizeof(h) - 1 || i == len - 1) {
+ debug3(" %s", h);
+ *h = '\0';
+ j = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a MODP group from hex strings p (which must be a safe
+ * prime) and g, automatically calculating subgroup q as (p / 2)
+ */
+struct modp_group *
+modp_group_from_g_and_safe_p(const char *grp_g, const char *grp_p)
+{
+ struct modp_group *ret;
+
+ ret = xmalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ ret->p = ret->q = ret->g = NULL;
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&ret->p, grp_p) == 0 ||
+ BN_hex2bn(&ret->g, grp_g) == 0)
+ fatal("%s: BN_hex2bn", __func__);
+ /* Subgroup order is p/2 (p is a safe prime) */
+ if ((ret->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+ if (BN_rshift1(ret->q, ret->p) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: BN_rshift1", __func__);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+modp_group_free(struct modp_group *grp)
+{
+ if (grp->g != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(grp->g);
+ if (grp->p != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(grp->p);
+ if (grp->q != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(grp->q);
+ bzero(grp, sizeof(*grp));
+ xfree(grp);
+}
+
+/* main() function for self-test */
+
#ifdef SCHNORR_MAIN
static void
schnorr_selftest_one(const BIGNUM *grp_p, const BIGNUM *grp_q,
if (BN_mod_exp(g_x, grp_g, x, grp_p, bn_ctx) == -1)
fatal("%s: g_x", __func__);
- if (schnorr_sign(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, x, g_x, "junk", 4, &sig, &siglen))
+ if (schnorr_sign_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, x, g_x, "junk", 4,
+ &sig, &siglen))
fatal("%s: schnorr_sign", __func__);
- if (schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
+ if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
sig, siglen) != 1)
fatal("%s: verify fail", __func__);
- if (schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "JUNK", 4,
+ if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "JUNK", 4,
sig, siglen) != 0)
fatal("%s: verify should have failed (bad ID)", __func__);
sig[4] ^= 1;
- if (schnorr_verify(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
+ if (schnorr_verify_buf(grp_p, grp_q, grp_g, g_x, "junk", 4,
sig, siglen) != 0)
fatal("%s: verify should have failed (bit error)", __func__);
xfree(sig);
schnorr_selftest(void)
{
BIGNUM *x;
- struct jpake_group *grp;
+ struct modp_group *grp;
u_int i;
char *hh;
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.194 2009/01/22 10:02:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.195 2009/04/14 21:10:54 jj Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+ { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
#ifdef KRB5
{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
/*
* Copy any supported values that are set.
*
- * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the the string or
+ * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
* array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
* do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
*/
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.157 2009/02/12 03:16:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.159 2009/05/28 16:50:16 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
int channel_id;
/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
- if (++keep_alive_timeouts > options.client_alive_count_max) {
+ if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.client_alive_count_max) {
logit("Timeout, client not responding.");
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
- len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ int cont = 0;
+ len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont);
if (len == 0) {
+ if (cont)
+ return;
verbose("Connection closed by %.100s",
get_remote_ipaddr());
connection_closed = 1;
* even if this was generated by something other than
* the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives.
*/
- keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0);
}
static void
no_port_forwarding_flag ||
(!want_reply && listen_port == 0)
#ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT
- || (listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && pw->pw_uid != 0)
+ || (listen_port != 0 && listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED &&
+ pw->pw_uid != 0)
#endif
) {
success = 0;
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.245 2009/01/22 09:46:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.246 2009/04/17 19:23:06 stevesk Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
#endif /* _UNICOS */
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (is_winnt)
- cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+ cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
#endif
s->pid = pid;
* Do common processing for the child, such as execing
* the command.
*/
- do_child(s, command);
- /* NOTREACHED */
+ do_child(s, command);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
default:
break;
}
signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
#endif /* _UNICOS */
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (is_winnt)
- cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+ cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
#endif
s->pid = pid;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
u_int i, envsize;
char **env, *laddr;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
-#ifndef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
char *path = NULL;
#endif
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
{
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
- if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, (char **)NULL) == -1)
- fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
-#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
# ifdef __bsdi__
setpgid(0, 0);
free(chroot_path);
}
+#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
+ if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, (char **)NULL) == -1)
+ fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
#endif
}
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (is_winnt)
-#endif
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
int i;
char *p, *args;
- setproctitle("%s@internal-sftp-server", s->pw->pw_name);
+ setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.159 2008/06/28 14:05:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.161 2009/03/23 19:38:04 tobias Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
pid_t pid;
char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
struct timeval *tvp = NULL;
+ size_t len;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
shell = getenv("SHELL");
- if (shell != NULL &&
- strncmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
+ if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
+ strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
c_flag = 1;
}
if (k_flag) {
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.282 2009/02/12 03:44:25 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 12 2009 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.283 2009/03/19 15:15:09 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 19 2009 $
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Ar cipher_spec
is a comma-separated list of ciphers
listed in order of preference.
-The supported ciphers are:
-3des-cbc,
-aes128-cbc,
-aes192-cbc,
-aes256-cbc,
-aes128-ctr,
-aes192-ctr,
-aes256-ctr,
-arcfour128,
-arcfour256,
-arcfour,
-blowfish-cbc,
-and
-cast128-cbc.
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
-arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
-aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
-.Ed
+See the
+.Cm Ciphers
+keyword for more information.
.It Fl D Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.324 2009/02/12 03:00:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.326 2009/07/02 02:11:47 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <ctype.h>
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
- int i, opt, exit_status, use_syslog;
- char *p, *cp, *line, buf[256];
+ int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog;
+ char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[MAXPATHLEN];
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw;
int dummy, timeout_ms;
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
host = NULL;
use_syslog = 0;
+ argv0 = av[0];
again:
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
* Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
* actually goes to stderr.
*/
- log_init(av[0],
+ log_init(argv0,
options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
* options.
*/
#ifdef GSSAPI
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s.gssapi", pw->pw_dir,
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.gssapi", pw->pw_dir,
_PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
- (void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
+ if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+ (void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
#ifdef GSI
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s.gsi", pw->pw_dir,
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.gsi", pw->pw_dir,
_PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
- (void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
+ if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+ (void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
#endif
#if defined(KRB5)
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s.krb", pw->pw_dir,
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s.krb", pw->pw_dir,
_PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
- (void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
+ if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+ (void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
#endif
#endif
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir,
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
_PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
- (void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
+ if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+ (void)read_config_file(buf, host, &options, 1);
/* Read systemwide configuration file after use config. */
(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, host,
channel_set_af(options.address_family);
/* reinit */
- log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
+ log_init(argv0, options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
seed_rng();
* Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh
* directory if it doesn't already exist.
*/
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s%s%.100s", pw->pw_dir,
+ r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0)
if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf);
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.212 2008/10/14 18:11:33 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.214 2009/05/28 16:50:16 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "dns.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
#include "version.h"
char *client_version_string = NULL;
* Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own
* identification string.
*/
-static void
+void
ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
{
char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */
}
}
- len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
+ len = roaming_atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE)
fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1,
SSH_RELEASE, compat20 ? "\r\n" : "\n");
- if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
+ if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf))
+ != strlen(buf))
fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
chop(client_version_string);
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.170 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.171 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
#include "msg.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "schnorr.h"
#include "jpake.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.247 2008/10/03 13:08:12 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 3 2008 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.248 2009/03/26 08:38:39 sobrado Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 26 2009 $
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or
addresses, a
.Cm from
-stanza may match IP addressess using CIDR address/masklen notation.
+stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation.
.Pp
The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key
authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.366 2009/01/22 10:02:34 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.367 2009/05/28 16:50:16 andreas Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
#include "version.h"
#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
/* Send our protocol version identification. */
- if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
+ if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
strlen(server_version_string))
!= strlen(server_version_string)) {
logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
/* Read other sides version identification. */
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
- if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
+ if (roaming_atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
get_remote_ipaddr());
cleanup_exit(255);
static void
privsep_preauth_child(void)
{
- u_int32_t rnd[256];
+ u_int32_t rnd[256];
gid_t gidset[1];
/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.102 2009/02/22 23:59:25 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 22 2009 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.106 2009/04/21 15:13:17 stevesk Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: April 21 2009 $
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
This option is only available for protocol version 2.
By default, no banner is displayed.
.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed.
-All authentication styles from
-.Xr login.conf 5
-are supported.
+Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+PAM or though authentication styles supported in
+.Xr login.conf 5 )
The default is
.Dq yes .
.It Cm ChrootDirectory
to after authentication.
This path, and all its components, must be root-owned directories that are
not writable by any other user or group.
+After the chroot,
+.Xr sshd 8
+changes the working directory to the user's home directory.
.Pp
The path may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime once
the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
The
.Cm ChrootDirectory
must contain the necessary files and directories to support the
-users' session.
+user's session.
For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically
.Xr sh 1 ,
and basic
For file transfer sessions using
.Dq sftp ,
no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the
-in-process sftp server is used (see
-.Cm Subsystem
+in-process sftp server is used,
+though sessions which use logging do require
+.Pa /dev/log
+inside the chroot directory (see
+.Xr sftp-server 8
for details).
.Pp
The default is not to
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.55 2009/02/23 00:06:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.56 2009/06/30 14:54:40 markus Exp $ */
#ifdef GSI
#define GSI_VERSION " GSI"
#define MGLUE_VERSION ""
#endif
-#define NCSA_VERSION " GLOBUS_GSSAPI_20090928"
+#define NCSA_VERSION " GLOBUS_GSSAPI_20091001"
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_5.2"
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_5.3"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
#define SSH_HPN "-hpn13v6"
andersk / gssapi-openssh.git / commitdiff
