]> andersk Git - gssapi-openssh.git/commitdiff
no longer included in OpenSSH distribution
authorjbasney <jbasney>
Tue, 29 Jun 2004 18:30:40 +0000 (18:30 +0000)
committerjbasney <jbasney>
Tue, 29 Jun 2004 18:30:40 +0000 (18:30 +0000)
openssh/auth-krb4.c [deleted file]
openssh/regress/copy.1 [deleted file]
openssh/regress/copy.2 [deleted file]

diff --git a/openssh/auth-krb4.c b/openssh/auth-krb4.c
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index b28df46..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,368 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.29 2003/02/21 10:34:48 mpech Exp $");
-
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-
-#ifdef AFS
-#include "radix.h"
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KRB4
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-static int
-krb4_init(void *context)
-{
-       static int cleanup_registered = 0;
-       Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
-       const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
-       struct stat st;
-       int fd;
-
-       if (!authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
-               /* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
-               authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-#ifdef AFS
-               if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
-                       tkt_root = "/ticket/";
-#endif /* AFS */
-               snprintf(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%ld",
-                   tkt_root, authctxt->pw->pw_uid, (long)getpid());
-               krb_set_tkt_string(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
-       }
-       /* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
-       if (!cleanup_registered) {
-               fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
-               cleanup_registered = 1;
-       }
-       /* Try to create our ticket file. */
-       if ((fd = mkstemp(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file)) != -1) {
-               close(fd);
-               return (1);
-       }
-       /* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */
-       if (lstat(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, &st) != -1) {
-               if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) &&
-                   st.st_uid == authctxt->pw->pw_uid)
-                       return (1);
-       }
-       /* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving ticket for inspection. */
-       log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
-
-       fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
-       cleanup_registered = 0;
-
-       xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
-       authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
-
-       return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * try krb4 authentication,
- * return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available
- */
-int
-auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-{
-       AUTH_DAT adata;
-       KTEXT_ST tkt;
-       struct hostent *hp;
-       struct passwd *pw;
-       char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN], phost[INST_SZ], realm[REALM_SZ];
-       u_int32_t faddr;
-       int r;
-
-       if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
-               return (0);
-
-       /*
-        * Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
-        * users and only if Kerberos is installed.
-        */
-       if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) {
-               /* Set up our ticket file. */
-               if (!krb4_init(authctxt)) {
-                       log("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!",
-                           pw->pw_name);
-                       goto failure;
-               }
-               /* Try to get TGT using our password. */
-               r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "", realm,
-                   "krbtgt", realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *)password);
-               if (r != INTK_OK) {
-                       debug("Kerberos v4 password authentication for %s "
-                           "failed: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
-                       goto failure;
-               }
-               /* Successful authentication. */
-               chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
-
-               /*
-                * Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
-                * "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
-                * to a bogus Kerberos server.
-                */
-               gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
-               strlcpy(phost, (char *)krb_get_phost(localhost),
-                   sizeof(phost));
-               r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
-
-               if (r == KSUCCESS) {
-                       if ((hp = gethostbyname(localhost)) == NULL) {
-                               log("Couldn't get local host address!");
-                               goto failure;
-                       }
-                       memmove((void *)&faddr, (void *)hp->h_addr,
-                           sizeof(faddr));
-
-                       /* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
-                       r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
-                           faddr, &adata, "");
-                       if (r == RD_AP_UNDEC) {
-                               /*
-                                * Probably didn't have a srvtab on
-                                * localhost. Disallow login.
-                                */
-                               log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
-                                   "no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s",
-                                   pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
-                               goto failure;
-                       } else if (r != KSUCCESS) {
-                               log("Kerberos v4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
-                                   KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]);
-                               goto failure;
-                       }
-               } else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) {
-                       /*
-                        * Disallow login if no rcmd service exists, and
-                        * log the error.
-                        */
-                       log("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
-                           "not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name,
-                           krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
-                       goto failure;
-               } else {
-                       /*
-                        * TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed!
-                        */
-                       debug("WARNING: Kerberos v4 TGT possibly spoofed "
-                           "for %s: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
-                       goto failure;
-               }
-               /* Authentication succeeded. */
-               return (1);
-       } else
-               /* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
-               debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
-
- failure:
-       krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
-
-       if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
-               return (0);
-
-       /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
-       return (-1);
-}
-
-void
-krb4_cleanup_proc(void *context)
-{
-       Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
-       debug("krb4_cleanup_proc called");
-       if (authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
-               (void) dest_tkt();
-               xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
-               authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
-       }
-}
-
-int
-auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client, KTEXT reply)
-{
-       AUTH_DAT adat = {0};
-       Key_schedule schedule;
-       struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
-       char instance[INST_SZ];
-       socklen_t slen;
-       u_int cksum;
-       int r, s;
-
-       s = packet_get_connection_in();
-
-       slen = sizeof(local);
-       memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
-       if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
-               debug("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-       slen = sizeof(foreign);
-       memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
-       if (getpeername(s, (struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) {
-               debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-               fatal_cleanup();
-       }
-       instance[0] = '*';
-       instance[1] = 0;
-
-       /* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */
-       if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance,
-           0, &adat, ""))) {
-               debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]);
-               return (0);
-       }
-       des_key_sched((des_cblock *) adat.session, schedule);
-
-       *client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ);
-       (void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname,
-           *adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm);
-
-       /* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */
-       if (kuserok(&adat, authctxt->user) != KSUCCESS) {
-               log("Kerberos v4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to "
-                   "account %s", *client, authctxt->user);
-               xfree(*client);
-               *client = NULL;
-               return (0);
-       }
-       /* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the
-          session key. */
-       cksum = adat.checksum + 1;
-       cksum = htonl(cksum);
-
-       /* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an
-          empty message, admitting our failure. */
-       if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply->dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
-           schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) {
-               debug("Kerberos v4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
-               reply->dat[0] = 0;
-               reply->length = 0;
-       } else
-               reply->length = r;
-
-       /* Clear session key. */
-       memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(adat.session));
-       return (1);
-}
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
-#ifdef AFS
-int
-auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *string)
-{
-       CREDENTIALS creds;
-       struct passwd *pw;
-
-       if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
-               goto failure;
-
-       temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-       if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) {
-               log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos v4 TGT");
-               goto failure;
-       }
-       if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
-               strlcpy(creds.service, "krbtgt", sizeof creds.service);
-
-       if (strcmp(creds.service, "krbtgt")) {
-               log("Kerberos v4 TGT (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s",
-                   creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst,
-                   creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
-               goto failure;
-       }
-       if (!krb4_init(authctxt))
-               goto failure;
-
-       if (in_tkt(creds.pname, creds.pinst) != KSUCCESS)
-               goto failure;
-
-       if (save_credentials(creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm,
-           creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno, &creds.ticket_st,
-           creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) {
-               debug("Kerberos v4 TGT refused: couldn't save credentials");
-               goto failure;
-       }
-       /* Successful authentication, passed all checks. */
-       chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
-
-       debug("Kerberos v4 TGT accepted (%s%s%s@%s)",
-           creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm);
-       memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-
-       restore_uid();
-
-       return (1);
-
- failure:
-       krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
-       memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-       restore_uid();
-
-       return (0);
-}
-
-int
-auth_afs_token(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *token_string)
-{
-       CREDENTIALS creds;
-       struct passwd *pw;
-       uid_t uid;
-
-       if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
-               return (0);
-
-       if (!radix_to_creds(token_string, &creds)) {
-               log("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
-               return (0);
-       }
-       if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
-               strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
-
-       if (strncmp(creds.pname, "AFS ID ", 7) == 0)
-               uid = atoi(creds.pname + 7);
-       else
-               uid = pw->pw_uid;
-
-       if (kafs_settoken(creds.realm, uid, &creds)) {
-               log("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s",
-                   creds.pname, creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
-               memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-               return (0);
-       }
-       debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s)", creds.pname, creds.realm);
-       memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-
-       return (1);
-}
-#endif /* AFS */
diff --git a/openssh/regress/copy.1 b/openssh/regress/copy.1
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index 92d4d20..0000000
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diff --git a/openssh/regress/copy.2 b/openssh/regress/copy.2
deleted file mode 100755 (executable)
index 92d4d20..0000000
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