CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
LIBS=@LIBS@
+LIBSELINUX=@LIBSELINUX@
+SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
LIBPAM=@LIBPAM@
LIBWRAP=@LIBWRAP@
TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT} sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
-LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o \
+LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
- log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
+ log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o \
atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
gss-serv-gsi.o \
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- audit.o audit-bsm.o
+ audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o
MANPAGES = scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-rand-helper.8.out ssh-keysign.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
MANPAGES_IN = scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-keysign.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
- -e 's|/etc/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
+ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
-e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \
-e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \
-e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g'
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBWRAP) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBWRAP) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
distclean: regressclean
rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
- rm -f *.out core opensshd.init
- rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status ssh_prng_cmds survey.sh *~
+ rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml
+ rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status ssh_prng_cmds
+ rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~
rm -rf autom4te.cache
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
(cd scard && $(MAKE) distclean)
EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
$@
+compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT)
+ (cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE))
+
regressclean:
if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \
(cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \
openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel.
+Darwin and MacOS X
+------------------
+Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based
+virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver
+has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X.
+
+Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and
+MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode
+using a third party driver. More information is available at:
+ http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
+
+
Solaris
-------
If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
*/
#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906000L)
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.19 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.16 2005/11/21 09:42:10 dtucker Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#ifdef KRB5
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <krb5.h>
extern ServerOptions options;
/* Based on $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des Exp $ */
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id$");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef USE_PAM
#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
# define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM */
#endif
+/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
+#else
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
fatal("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
-pthread_exit(void *value __unused)
+pthread_exit(void *value)
{
_exit(0);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
static int
-pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr __unused,
+pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
{
pid_t pid;
return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
static int
-pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value __unused)
+pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
{
int status;
/* Import environment from subprocess */
num_env = buffer_get_int(b);
- sshpam_env = xmalloc((num_env + 1) * sizeof(*sshpam_env));
+ if (num_env > 1024)
+ fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024",
+ __func__, num_env);
+ sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env));
debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env);
for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++)
sshpam_env[i] = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
- if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
- memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
buffer_init(&buffer);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
u_int i;
const char *pam_user;
const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
+ char *tz = getenv("TZ");
pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
(sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
+
environ[0] = NULL;
+ if (tz != NULL)
+ if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1)
+ error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
setproctitle("%s [pam]",
goto auth_fail;
if (compat20) {
- if (!do_pam_account())
+ if (!do_pam_account()) {
+ sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
goto auth_fail;
+ }
if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle,
PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
buffer_put_cstring(&buffer,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
- ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer);
+ if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, &buffer);
+ else
+ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer);
buffer_free(&buffer);
pthread_exit(NULL);
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
- if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
- memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
int socks[2];
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
- /* Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled */
- if (!options.use_pam)
+ /*
+ * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account
+ * has previously failed.
+ */
+ if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0)
return NULL;
/* Initialize PAM */
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
*num = 1;
len = plen + mlen + 1;
- **prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, len);
+ **prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len);
strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
plen += mlen;
**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
/* accumulate messages */
len = plen + mlen + 2;
- **prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, len);
+ **prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len);
strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
plen += mlen;
strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
plen++;
xfree(msg);
break;
+ case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+ sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
- debug3("PAM: PAM_AUTH_ERR");
+ debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type));
if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) {
*info = **prompts;
**prompts = NULL;
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+ xfree(msg);
return 0;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
- if ((reply = malloc(n * sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+ if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
- memset(reply, 0, n * sizeof(*reply));
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id$");
#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
#include <shadow.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.75 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.60 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
#include <shadow.h>
#endif
-
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
#include <libgen.h>
#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "misc.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "loginrec.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int use_privsep;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
/* Debugging messages */
Buffer auth_debug;
void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
char *authmsg;
+ if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
+ return;
+
/* Raise logging level */
if (authenticated == 1 ||
!authctxt->valid ||
strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
+# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ if (authenticated)
+ sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
+ get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
+# endif
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
- ssh_audit_event_t event;
-
- debug3("audit failed auth attempt, method %s euid %d",
- method, (int)geteuid());
- /*
- * Because the auth loop is used in both monitor and slave,
- * we must be careful to send each event only once and with
- * enough privs to write the event.
- */
- event = audit_classify_auth(method);
- switch(event) {
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
- if (geteuid() == 0)
- audit_event(event);
- break;
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
- /*
- * This is required to handle the case where privsep
- * is enabled but it's root logging in, since
- * use_privsep won't be cleared until after a
- * successful login.
- */
- if (geteuid() == 0)
- audit_event(event);
- else
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(event));
- break;
- default:
- error("unknown authentication audit event %d", event);
- }
- }
+ if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
+ audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
#endif
}
switch (options.permit_root_login) {
case PERMIT_YES:
return 1;
- break;
case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
return 1;
static char *
expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
{
- char *file, *ret;
+ char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
+ int i;
file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
if (*file == '/')
return (file);
- ret = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
- strlcat(ret, "/", MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
- strlcat(ret, file, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN)
+ i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
+ if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
-
xfree(file);
- return (ret);
+ return (xstrdup(ret));
}
char *
#endif
struct passwd *pw;
+ parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
+ get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr());
+
pw = getpwnam(user);
if (pw == NULL) {
logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1;
fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1;
+ fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw->pw_uid;
+ fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
fake.pw_class = "";
#endif
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.51 2005/06/06 11:20:36 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.58 2006/08/18 09:15:20 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
#ifndef AUTH_H
#define AUTH_H
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
+#include <signal.h>
+
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
struct Authctxt {
- int success;
+ sig_atomic_t success;
+ int authenticated; /* authenticated and alarms cancelled */
int postponed; /* authentication needs another step */
int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */
int attempt;
+/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.70 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.62 2005/07/16 01:35:24 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "buffer.h"
{
int i;
- for(i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
+ for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
return (buf);
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
{
return (authenticated);
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
{
return (authenticated);
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
{
return (authenticated);
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
{
return (-1);
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
{
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.12 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "packet.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
}
if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
+ if (ctxt != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
xfree(doid);
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
return (0);
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.11 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.6 2004/01/19 21:25:15 markus Exp $");
-#include "ssh2.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "auth.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.2 2002/05/31 11:35:15 markus Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "servconf.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.13 2006/08/05 07:52:52 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.7 2004/05/11 19:01:43 deraadt Exp $");
-#include "auth.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
/* import */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.9 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.5 2003/12/31 00:24:50 dtucker Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.9 2004/12/11 01:48:56 dtucker Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "auth.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "misc.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.113 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.107 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
-#include "ssh2.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt);
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
xfree(service);
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
+/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.31 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.23 2005/03/14 11:46:56 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
+#define BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK 0x100000
+#define BUFFER_MAX_LEN 0xa00000
+#define BUFFER_ALLOCSZ 0x008000
+
+/* this value for BUFFER_MAX_HPN_LEN is */
+/* still undersized for the faster networks */
+/* it might make sense to have yet another */
+/* MAX_LEN for 10+GB networks. Something closer to */
+/* 128MB or 192MB -cjr*/
+#define BUFFER_MAX_HPN_LEN 0x2000000 /*32MB*/
+
/* Initializes the buffer structure. */
void
memcpy(p, data, len);
}
+static int
+buffer_compact(Buffer *buffer)
+{
+ /*
+ * If the buffer is quite empty, but all data is at the end, move the
+ * data to the beginning.
+ */
+ if (buffer->offset > MIN(buffer->alloc, BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)) {
+ memmove(buffer->buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset,
+ buffer->end - buffer->offset);
+ buffer->end -= buffer->offset;
+ buffer->offset = 0;
+ return (1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
/*
* Appends space to the buffer, expanding the buffer if necessary. This does
* not actually copy the data into the buffer, but instead returns a pointer
buffer->end += len;
return p;
}
- /*
- * If the buffer is quite empty, but all data is at the end, move the
- * data to the beginning and retry.
- */
- if (buffer->offset > MIN(buffer->alloc, BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)) {
- memmove(buffer->buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset,
- buffer->end - buffer->offset);
- buffer->end -= buffer->offset;
- buffer->offset = 0;
+
+ /* Compact data back to the start of the buffer if necessary */
+ if (buffer_compact(buffer))
goto restart;
- }
- /* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */
- newlen = buffer->alloc + len + 32768;
+ /* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */
+ newlen = roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ);
if (newlen > BUFFER_MAX_HPN_LEN)
fatal("buffer_append_space: alloc %u not supported",
newlen);
- buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, newlen);
+ buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, 1, newlen);
buffer->alloc = newlen;
goto restart;
/* NOTREACHED */
}
+/*
+ * Check whether an allocation of 'len' will fit in the buffer
+ * This must follow the same math as buffer_append_space
+ */
+int
+buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
+{
+ if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) {
+ buffer->offset = 0;
+ buffer->end = 0;
+ }
+ restart:
+ if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc)
+ return (1);
+ if (buffer_compact(buffer))
+ goto restart;
+ if (roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ) <= BUFFER_MAX_LEN)
+ return (1);
+ return (0);
+}
+
/* Returns the number of bytes of data in the buffer. */
u_int
-/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.13 2005/03/14 11:46:56 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.16 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
u_int end; /* Offset of last byte containing data. */
} Buffer;
-#define BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK 0x100000 /*1MB*/
-#define BUFFER_MAX_LEN 0xa00000 /*10MB*/
-
-/* this value for BUFFER_MAX_HPN_LEN is */
-/* still undersized for the faster networks */
-/* it might make sense to have yet another */
-/* MAX_LEN for 10+GB networks. Something closer to */
-/* 128MB or 192MB -cjr*/
-#define BUFFER_MAX_HPN_LEN 0x2000000 /*32MB*/
-
void buffer_init(Buffer *);
void buffer_clear(Buffer *);
void buffer_free(Buffer *);
void buffer_append(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
void *buffer_append_space(Buffer *, u_int);
+int buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *, u_int);
+
void buffer_get(Buffer *, void *, u_int);
void buffer_consume(Buffer *, u_int);
int buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
int buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *, u_int);
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+void buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+void buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+void buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+void buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+
+u_short buffer_get_short(Buffer *);
+void buffer_put_short(Buffer *, u_short);
+
+u_int buffer_get_int(Buffer *);
+void buffer_put_int(Buffer *, u_int);
+
+u_int64_t buffer_get_int64(Buffer *);
+void buffer_put_int64(Buffer *, u_int64_t);
+
+int buffer_get_char(Buffer *);
+void buffer_put_char(Buffer *, int);
+
+void *buffer_get_string(Buffer *, u_int *);
+void buffer_put_string(Buffer *, const void *, u_int);
+void buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *, const char *);
+
+#define buffer_skip_string(b) \
+ do { u_int l = buffer_get_int(b); buffer_consume(b, l); } while (0)
+
+int buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+int buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+int buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *);
+int buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *);
+int buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *, Buffer *);
+int buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *, Buffer *);
+int buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *, Buffer *);
+void *buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
+int buffer_get_char_ret(char *, Buffer *);
+
#endif /* BUFFER_H */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.61 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.48 2005/12/28 22:46:06 stevesk Exp $");
-#include "packet.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "canohost.h"
cleanup_exit(255);
}
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
+ check_ip_options(sock, ntop);
+
ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
fatal("get_remote_hostname: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed");
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
- check_ip_options(sock, ntop);
-
if (!use_dns)
return xstrdup(ntop);
*/
for (i = 0; name[i]; i++)
if (isupper(name[i]))
- name[i] = tolower(name[i]);
+ name[i] = (char)tolower(name[i]);
/*
* Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
* address actually is an address of this host. This is
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
- "failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name);
+ "[%s] failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name, ntop);
return xstrdup(ntop);
}
/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.8 2001/06/26 17:27:23 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.9 2006/03/25 22:22:42 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.266 2006/08/29 10:40:18 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.232 2006/01/30 12:22:22 reyk Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-
/* -- channel core */
u_short listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port number. */
} ForwardPermission;
-/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect. */
+/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */
static ForwardPermission permitted_opens[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
-/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array. */
+/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */
+static ForwardPermission permitted_adm_opens[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
+
+/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by the user. */
static int num_permitted_opens = 0;
+
+/* Number of permitted host/port pair in the array permitted by the admin. */
+static int num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
+
/*
* If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on the server
* on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do
* Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us;
* we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data.
*/
-static char *x11_fake_data = NULL;
+static u_char *x11_fake_data = NULL;
static u_int x11_fake_data_len;
if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
- switch(c->type) {
+ switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING:
return (c);
- break;
}
logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type);
return (NULL);
* Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or
* when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd
*/
-
static void
channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
int extusage, int nonblock)
* Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause
* remote_name to be freed.
*/
-
Channel *
channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
/* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */
if (channels_alloc == 0) {
channels_alloc = 10;
- channels = xmalloc(channels_alloc * sizeof(Channel *));
+ channels = xcalloc(channels_alloc, sizeof(Channel *));
for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
channels[i] = NULL;
}
if (channels_alloc > 10000)
fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d "
"too big.", channels_alloc);
- channels = xrealloc(channels,
- (channels_alloc + 10) * sizeof(Channel *));
+ channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc + 10,
+ sizeof(Channel *));
channels_alloc += 10;
debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc);
for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++)
channels[i] = NULL;
}
/* Initialize and return new channel. */
- c = channels[found] = xmalloc(sizeof(Channel));
- memset(c, 0, sizeof(Channel));
+ c = channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel));
buffer_init(&c->input);
buffer_init(&c->output);
buffer_init(&c->extended);
}
/* Close all channel fd/socket. */
-
static void
channel_close_fds(Channel *c)
{
}
/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */
-
void
channel_free(Channel *c)
{
* Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file
* descriptors after a fork.
*/
-
void
channel_close_all(void)
{
/*
* Stop listening to channels.
*/
-
void
channel_stop_listening(void)
{
* Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or
* more channel is overfull.
*/
-
int
channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void)
{
}
/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */
-
int
channel_still_open(void)
{
}
/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */
-
int
channel_find_open(void)
{
* suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for
* newlines.
*/
-
char *
channel_open_message(void)
{
packet_put_cstring(service);
packet_put_char(wantconfirm);
}
+
void
channel_register_confirm(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, void *ctx)
{
c->confirm = fn;
c->confirm_ctx = ctx;
}
+
void
channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
{
c->detach_user = fn;
c->detach_close = do_close;
}
+
void
channel_cancel_cleanup(int id)
{
c->detach_user = NULL;
c->detach_close = 0;
}
+
void
channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
channel_outfilter_fn *ofn)
* 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which
* have events pending.
*/
-typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset);
+typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset);
chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE];
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
-channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
-channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self);
FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
}
static void
-channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize())
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
}
-int channel_tcpwinsz () {
- u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0;
- socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz);
- int ret = -1;
- if(!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
- return(131072);
- ret = getsockopt(packet_get_connection_in(),
- SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz);
- if ((ret == 0) && tcpwinsz > BUFFER_MAX_HPN_LEN)
- tcpwinsz = BUFFER_MAX_HPN_LEN;
- debug2("tcpwinsz: %d for connection: %d", tcpwinsz, packet_get_connection_in());
- return(tcpwinsz);
-}
-
static void
-channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize();
- /* check buffer limits */
- if (!c->tcpwinsz)
- c->tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz();
- if (c->dynamic_window > 0)
- c->tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz();
-
- limit = MIN(limit, 2 * c->tcpwinsz);
-
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
limit > 0 &&
- buffer_len(&c->input) < limit)
+ buffer_len(&c->input) < limit &&
+ buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF))
FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
FD_SET(c->ctl_fd, readset);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
-channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) {
packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE);
}
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
-channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0)
chan_mark_dead(c);
}
static void
-channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
}
static void
-channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output);
}
/* try to decode a socks4 header */
+/* ARGSUSED */
static int
-channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char *p, *host;
u_int len, have, i, found;
s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */
s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */
- buffer_append(&c->output, (char *)&s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp));
+ buffer_append(&c->output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp));
return 1;
}
#define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01
#define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00
+/* ARGSUSED */
static int
-channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
struct {
u_int8_t version;
} s5_req, s5_rsp;
u_int16_t dest_port;
u_char *p, dest_addr[255+1];
- u_int have, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
+ u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
p = buffer_ptr(&c->input);
return 0;
/* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */
for (found = 0, i = 2 ; i < nmethods + 2; i++) {
- if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH ) {
+ if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) {
found = 1;
break;
}
debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self);
if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1)
return 0; /* need more */
- memcpy((char *)&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
+ memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
if (s5_req.version != 0x05 ||
s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT ||
s5_req.reserved != 0x00) {
debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp);
return -1;
}
- if (have < 4 + addrlen + 2)
+ need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2;
+ if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
+ need++;
+ if (have < need)
return 0;
buffer_consume(&c->input, sizeof(s5_req));
if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
((struct in_addr *)&dest_addr)->s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
- buffer_append(&c->output, (char *)&s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp));
- buffer_append(&c->output, (char *)&dest_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
- buffer_append(&c->output, (char *)&dest_port, sizeof(dest_port));
+ buffer_append(&c->output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp));
+ buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port));
return 1;
}
/* dynamic port forwarding */
static void
-channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
u_char *p;
u_int have;
}
/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
-channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr addr;
/*
* This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
*/
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
-channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr addr;
* This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from
* clients.
*/
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
-channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
int newsock;
}
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
-channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int err = 0;
socklen_t sz = sizeof(err);
}
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
static int
-channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
int len;
if (c->rfd != -1 &&
FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)) {
+ errno = 0;
len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
return 1;
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+ if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) ||
+ (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d",
c->self, c->rfd, len);
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
}
return 1;
}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
static int
-channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
struct termios tio;
u_char *data = NULL, *buf;
}
return 1;
}
+
static int
-channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
int len;
}
return 1;
}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
static int
-channel_handle_ctl(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_handle_ctl(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char buf[16];
int len;
}
return 1;
}
+
static int
channel_check_window(Channel *c)
{
}
static void
-channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->delayed)
return;
channel_check_window(c);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
static void
-channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int len;
}
static void
-channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
static int did_init = 0;
u_int i;
channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
{
- u_int n, sz;
+ u_int n, sz, nfdset;
n = MAX(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd);
- sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS);
+ /* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */
+ if (nfdset && SIZE_T_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask))
+ fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n);
+ sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask);
+
/* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */
if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
- *readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, sz);
- *writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, sz);
+ *readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+ *writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
*nallocp = sz;
}
*maxfdp = n;
* events pending.
*/
void
-channel_after_select(fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
+channel_after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset);
}
/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */
-
void
channel_output_poll(void)
{
/* -- protocol input */
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
xfree(data);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
xfree(data);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
}
/* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
chan_rcvd_oclose(c);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
channel_free(c);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
return "unknown reason";
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
channel_free(c);
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
c->remote_window += adjust;
}
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
* the secure channel to host:port from local side.
*/
-void
+int
channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect)
{
success = 1;
break;
case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
- logit("Warning: Server denied remote port forwarding.");
break;
default:
/* Unknown packet */
permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = listen_port;
num_permitted_opens++;
}
+ return (success ? 0 : -1);
}
/*
/*
* This is called after receiving CHANNEL_FORWARDING_REQUEST. This initates
* listening for the port, and sends back a success reply (or disconnect
- * message if there was an error). This never returns if there was an error.
+ * message if there was an error).
*/
-
-void
+int
channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, int gateway_ports,
int hpn_disabled, int hpn_buffer_size)
{
u_short port, host_port;
+ int success = 0;
char *hostname;
/* Get arguments from the packet. */
#endif
/* Initiate forwarding */
- channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(NULL, port, hostname,
+ success = channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(NULL, port, hostname,
host_port, gateway_ports, hpn_disabled, hpn_buffer_size);
/* Free the argument string. */
xfree(hostname);
+
+ return (success ? 0 : -1);
}
/*
channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
{
if (num_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
- fatal("channel_request_remote_forwarding: too many forwards");
+ fatal("channel_add_permitted_opens: too many forwards");
debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host);
all_opens_permitted = 0;
}
+int
+channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
+{
+ if (num_adm_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
+ fatal("channel_add_adm_permitted_opens: too many forwards");
+ debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
+
+ permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect
+ = xstrdup(host);
+ permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
+ return ++num_adm_permitted_opens;
+}
+
void
channel_clear_permitted_opens(void)
{
if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL)
xfree(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
num_permitted_opens = 0;
-
}
+void
+channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
+ if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL)
+ xfree(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect);
+ num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
+}
/* return socket to remote host, port */
static int
int
channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_short port)
{
- int i, permit;
+ int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
permit = all_opens_permitted;
if (!permit) {
permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect == port &&
strcmp(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, host) == 0)
permit = 1;
+ }
+ if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) {
+ permit_adm = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
+ if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
+ permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect == port &&
+ strcmp(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect, host)
+ == 0)
+ permit_adm = 1;
}
- if (!permit) {
+
+ if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, "
"but the request was denied.", host, port);
return -1;
if (ioctl(channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
continue;
channel_request_start(i, "window-change", 0);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
packet_send();
}
}
}
/* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
- *chanids = xmalloc(sizeof(**chanids) * (num_socks + 1));
+ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
sock = socks[n];
if (hpn_disabled)
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
snprintf(addr.sun_path, sizeof addr.sun_path, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
return sock;
close(sock);
error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
int
x11_connect_display(void)
{
- int display_number, sock = 0;
+ u_int display_number;
const char *display;
char buf[1024], *cp;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- int gaierr;
+ int gaierr, sock = 0;
/* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
display[0] == ':') {
/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
- if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%d", &display_number) != 1) {
+ if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
display);
return -1;
}
*cp = 0;
/* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the display number. */
- if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%d", &display_number) != 1) {
+ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
display);
return -1;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", 6000 + display_number);
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
/* Connect it to the display. */
if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- debug2("connect %.100s port %d: %.100s", buf,
+ debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
if (!ai) {
- error("connect %.100s port %d: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number,
+ error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
* with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE.
*/
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
}
/* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */
+/* ARGSUSED */
void
deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
return;
}
- cp = disp;
- if (disp)
- cp = strchr(disp, ':');
+ cp = strchr(disp, ':');
if (cp)
cp = strchr(cp, '.');
if (cp)
- screen_number = atoi(cp + 1);
+ screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL);
else
screen_number = 0;
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.83 2005/12/30 15:56:37 reyk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.88 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
#ifndef CHANNEL_H
#define CHANNEL_H
-#include "buffer.h"
-
/* Definitions for channel types. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */
void channel_set_af(int af);
void channel_permit_all_opens(void);
void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int);
+int channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *, int);
void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
-void channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int, int, int);
+void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void);
+int channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int, int, int);
int channel_connect_to(const char *, u_short);
int channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short);
-void channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short,
+int channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short,
const char *, u_short);
int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short,
const char *, u_short, int, int, int);
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.6 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.2 2003/12/22 20:29:55 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
*/
#include "includes.h"
+
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-RCSID("$Id$");
+#include <string.h>
#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-aes.c,v 1.2 2003/11/26 21:44:29 djm Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
#include "rijndael.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-bf1.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-bf1.c,v 1.1 2003/05/15 03:08:29 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.6 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "log.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.81 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.77 2005/07/16 01:35:24 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "cipher.h"
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: cleanup.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
+
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cleanup.c,v 1.1 2003/09/23 20:17:11 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "log.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.175 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.149 2005/12/30 15:56:37 reyk Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "readconf.h"
static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
/* Common data for the client loop code. */
-static int quit_pending; /* Set to non-zero to quit the client loop. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
static int escape_char; /* Escape character. */
static int escape_pending; /* Last character was the escape character */
static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */
* Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a
* flag indicating that the window has changed.
*/
-
+/*ARGSUSED */
static void
window_change_handler(int sig)
{
* Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These
* signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
*/
-
+/*ARGSUSED */
static void
signal_handler(int sig)
{
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
return;
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
packet_send();
}
}
}
static void
-client_process_net_input(fd_set * readset)
+client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset)
{
int len;
char buf[8192];
}
static void
-client_process_control(fd_set * readset)
+client_process_control(fd_set *readset)
{
Buffer m;
Channel *c;
return;
}
- cctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*cctx));
- memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
+ cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
cctx->want_tty = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_TTY) != 0;
cctx->want_subsys = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_SUBSYS) != 0;
cctx->want_x_fwd = (flags & SSHMUX_FLAG_X11_FWD) != 0;
env_len = MIN(env_len, 4096);
debug3("%s: receiving %d env vars", __func__, env_len);
if (env_len != 0) {
- cctx->env = xmalloc(sizeof(*cctx->env) * (env_len + 1));
+ cctx->env = xcalloc(env_len + 1, sizeof(*cctx->env));
for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++)
cctx->env[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
cctx->env[i] = NULL;
debug2("%s: accepted tty %d, subsys %d, cmd %s", __func__,
cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, cmd);
+ xfree(cmd);
/* Gather fds from client */
new_fd[0] = mm_receive_fd(client_fd);
if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') {
logit("Commands:");
- logit(" -Lport:host:hostport Request local forward");
- logit(" -Rport:host:hostport Request remote forward");
- logit(" -KRhostport Cancel remote forward");
+ logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
+ "Request local forward");
+ logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
+ "Request remote forward");
+ logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port "
+ "Cancel remote forward");
if (!options.permit_local_command)
goto out;
- logit(" !args Execute local command");
+ logit(" !args "
+ "Execute local command");
goto out;
}
goto out;
}
} else {
- channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
+ if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host,
- fwd.connect_port);
+ fwd.connect_port) < 0) {
+ logit("Port forwarding failed.");
+ goto out;
+ }
}
logit("Forwarding port.");
}
static void
-client_process_input(fd_set * readset)
+client_process_input(fd_set *readset)
{
int len;
char buf[8192];
}
static void
-client_process_output(fd_set * writeset)
+client_process_output(fd_set *writeset)
{
int len;
char buf[100];
channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 0);
packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : "");
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
tio = get_saved_tio();
tty_make_modes(-1, tiop != NULL ? tiop : &tio);
packet_send();
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.14 2005/07/04 00:58:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:42 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
+#include <termios.h>
+
/* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
int client_loop(int, int, int);
void client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int,
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.76 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.71 2005/03/01 10:09:52 djm Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "match.h"
-/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.39 2005/03/01 10:09:52 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.40 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
]
)
+# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
+SIA_MSG="no"
+SPC_MSG="no"
+
# Check for some target-specific stuff
case "$host" in
*-*-aix*)
+ # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
+ # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
+ # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
+ # It also throws errors about null macro argments, but these are
+ # not fatal.
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if compiler allows macro redefinitions)
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#define testmacro foo
+#define testmacro bar
+int main(void) { exit(0); }
+ ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ LD="`echo $LD | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+ ]
+ )
+
AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)])
if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
fi
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
- for tryflags in -blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, ;do
+ if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
+ flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
+ else
+ flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
+ fi
+ for tryflags in $flags ;do
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
AC_TRY_LINK([], [], [blibflags=$tryflags])
[#include <usersec.h>]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setauthdb)
+ AC_CHECK_DECL(F_CLOSEM,
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM, 1, [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]),
+ [],
+ [ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h> ]
+ )
check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_REALPATH, 1, [Define if you have a broken realpath.])
AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID, 1,
supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
AC_DEFINE(SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID, 1,
[AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this])
+ AC_DEFINE(PTY_ZEROREAD, 1, [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd])
;;
*-*-cygwin*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
fi],
[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
)
+ AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_FREEBSD, 1, [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
+ AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF, 1,
+ [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+ ;;
+*-*-dragonfly*)
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
;;
*-*-hpux*)
# first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__, 1, [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel])
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__, 1, [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded])
AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD, 1, [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way])
+ AC_DEFINE(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND, 1,
+ [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler])
;;
*-*-solaris*)
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY, 1,
[Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY
after setsid()])
+ AC_DEFINE(PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME, 1, [must supply username to passwd
+ in case the name is longer than 8 chars])
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
fi
+ AC_ARG_WITH(solaris-contracts,
+ [ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)],
+ [
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(contract, ct_tmpl_activate,
+ [ AC_DEFINE(USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS, 1,
+ [Define if you have Solaris process contracts])
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcontract"
+ AC_SUBST(SSHDLIBS)
+ SPC_MSG="yes" ], )
+ ],
+ )
;;
*-*-sunos4*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
;;
# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
*-*-sysv4.2*)
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Dva_list=_VA_LIST"
AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
TEST_SHELL=/u95/bin/sh
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_LIBIAF, 1,
[ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet])
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX)
;;
*) AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*LK*")
;;
system's login() call])
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_FD_PASSING)
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
+ SIA_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR, "Nologin",
AC_DEFINE(MISSING_HOWMANY, 1, [Define on *nto-qnx systems])
AC_DEFINE(MISSING_FD_MASK, 1, [Define on *nto-qnx systems])
AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+ AC_DEFINE(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+ enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
;;
*-*-ultrix*)
AC_CHECK_HEADERS( \
bstring.h \
crypt.h \
+ crypto/sha2.h \
dirent.h \
endian.h \
features.h \
+ fcntl.h \
floatingpoint.h \
getopt.h \
glob.h \
iaf.h \
limits.h \
login.h \
- login_cap.h \
maillock.h \
ndir.h \
+ net/if_tun.h \
netdb.h \
netgroup.h \
pam/pam_appl.h \
readpassphrase.h \
rpc/types.h \
security/pam_appl.h \
+ sha2.h \
shadow.h \
stddef.h \
stdint.h \
#endif
])
+# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(login_cap.h, [], [], [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+])
+
# Checks for libraries.
AC_CHECK_FUNC(yp_match, , AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, yp_match))
AC_CHECK_FUNC(setsockopt, , AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, setsockopt))
# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
AC_MSG_CHECKING(for gl_matchc field in glob_t)
-AC_EGREP_CPP(FOUNDIT,
- [
- #include <glob.h>
- int main(void){glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;}
- ],
+AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <glob.h> ],
+ [glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;],
[
AC_DEFINE(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC, 1,
[Define if your system glob() function has
]
)
+AC_CHECK_DECLS(GLOB_NOMATCH, , , [#include <glob.h>])
+
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bsm/audit.h, [],
- [AC_MSG_ERROR(BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found)])
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR(BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found)],
+ [
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+ ]
+)
AC_CHECK_LIB(bsm, getaudit, [],
[AC_MSG_ERROR(BSM enabled and required library not found)])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getaudit, [],
AC_CHECK_DECLS(h_errno, , ,[#include <netdb.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS(SHUT_RD, , ,
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+ ])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS(O_NONBLOCK, , ,
+ [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+ ])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS(writev, , , [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+ ])
+
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setresuid, [
dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this
AC_MSG_CHECKING(if setresuid seems to work)
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
],
+ [
AC_MSG_RESULT(cross-compiling, assuming no)
]
)
AC_FUNC_GETPGRP
-# Check for PAM libs
-PAM_MSG="no"
-AC_ARG_WITH(pam,
- [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ],
- [
- if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
- if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
- test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
- fi
-
- AC_CHECK_LIB(dl, dlopen, , )
- AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_set_item, , AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing]))
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_getenvlist)
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_putenv)
-
- PAM_MSG="yes"
-
- AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1,
- [Define if you want to enable PAM support])
- if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
- LIBPAM="-lpam -ldl"
- else
- LIBPAM="-lpam"
- fi
- AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
- fi
- ]
-)
-
-# Check for older PAM
-if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
- # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
- AC_TRY_COMPILE(
- [
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
-#include <security/pam_appl.h>
-#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
-#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
-#endif
- ],
- [(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)],
- [
- AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OLD_PAM, 1,
- [Define if you have an old version of PAM
- which takes only one argument to pam_strerror])
- AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
- PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
- ]
- )
-fi
-
# Search for OpenSSL
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
]
)
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+int main(void) { SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); }
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl])
+ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+int main(void) { SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); }
+ ]])],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+ ]
+ )
+ ]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH(ssl-engine,
+ [ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ],
+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for OpenSSL ENGINE support)
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [ #include <openssl/engine.h>],
+ [
+int main(void){ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();ENGINE_register_all_complete();}
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE, 1,
+ [Enable OpenSSL engine support])
+ ],
+ [ AC_MSG_ERROR(OpenSSL ENGINE support not found)]
+ )
+ fi ]
+)
+
# Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support])
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt")
fi
+# Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(SHA256_Update EVP_sha256)
+
AC_CHECK_LIB(iaf, ia_openinfo)
### Configure cryptographic random number support
]
)
+# Check for PAM libs
+PAM_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(pam,
+ [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
+ test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
+ fi
+
+ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(dl, dlopen, , )
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_set_item, , AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing]))
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_getenvlist)
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_putenv)
+ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+ PAM_MSG="yes"
+
+ LIBPAM="-lpam"
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1,
+ [Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+
+ if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
+ case "$LIBS" in
+ *-ldl*)
+ # libdl already in LIBS
+ ;;
+ *)
+ LIBPAM="$LIBPAM -ldl"
+ ;;
+ esac
+ fi
+ AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+
+# Check for older PAM
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+ # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+ ],
+ [(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)],
+ [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OLD_PAM, 1,
+ [Define if you have an old version of PAM
+ which takes only one argument to pam_strerror])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
+ ]
+ )
+fi
# Do we want to force the use of the rand helper?
AC_ARG_WITH(rand-helper,
#define __USE_ISOC99
#include <limits.h>
#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
+#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
+
+/*
+ * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
+ * we do this the hard way.
+ */
+static int
+fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
+
+ if (n < 0)
+ if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
+ return -1;
+ for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
+ l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
+ n /= 10;
+ }
+ do {
+ if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ } while (i != 0);
+ if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
int main(void) {
FILE *f;
long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
/* Sanity check */
if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
- || llmax - 1 > llmax) {
+ || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
+ || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
exit(2);
}
- if (fprintf(f ,"%lld %lld", llmin, llmax) < 0)
+ if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
exit(3);
-
+ if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
+ exit(4);
+ if (fclose(f) < 0)
+ exit(5);
exit(0);
}
]])],
llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
- # snprintf on some Tru64s doesn't understand "%lld"
- case "$host" in
- alpha-dec-osf*)
- if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x8" &&
- test "x$llong_max" = "xld"; then
- llong_min="-9223372036854775808"
- llong_max="9223372036854775807"
- fi
- ;;
- esac
-
AC_MSG_RESULT($llong_max)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LLONG_MAX, [${llong_max}LL],
[max value of long long calculated by configure])
LIBOPENSC_CFLAGS=`$OPENSC_CONFIG --cflags`
LIBOPENSC_LIBS=`$OPENSC_CONFIG --libs`
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $LIBOPENSC_CFLAGS"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $LIBOPENSC_LIBS"
+ LIBS="$LIBS $LIBOPENSC_LIBS"
AC_DEFINE(SMARTCARD)
AC_DEFINE(USE_OPENSC, 1,
[Define if you want smartcard support
[#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
])
+# Check whether user wants SELinux support
+SELINUX_MSG="no"
+LIBSELINUX=""
+AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+ [ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support],
+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX,1,[Define if you want SELinux support.])
+ SELINUX_MSG="yes"
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
+ AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires selinux.h header))
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, setexeccon, [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" ],
+ AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library))
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level)
+ fi ]
+)
+AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
+
# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
KRB5_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos5,
AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
fi
-dnl remove pam and dl because they are in $LIBPAM
-if test "$PAM_MSG" = yes ; then
- LIBS=`echo $LIBS | sed 's/-lpam //'`
-fi
-if test "$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" = yes ; then
- LIBS=`echo $LIBS | sed 's/-ldl //'`
-fi
-
dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
dnl Add now.
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
AC_EXEEXT
-AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openbsd-compat/Makefile \
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \
+ openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \
scard/Makefile ssh_prng_cmds survey.sh])
AC_OUTPUT
fi
echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
+echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
startdir=`pwd`
+perl -v >/dev/null || (echo perl required; exit 1)
+
# Path to inventory.sh: same place as buildbff.sh
if echo $0 | egrep '^/'
then
done
echo
-# Create PrivSep user if PrivSep not disabled in config
-echo Creating PrivSep prereqs if required.
-if egrep '^[ \t]*UsePrivilegeSeparation[ \t]+no' $sysconfdir/sshd_config >/dev/null
+# Create PrivilegeSeparation user and group if not present
+echo Checking for PrivilegeSeparation user and group.
+if cut -f1 -d: /etc/group | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null
then
- echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation disabled in config, not creating PrivSep user,"
- echo "group or chroot directory."
+ echo "PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
else
- echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation enabled in config (or defaulting to on)."
-
- # create group if required
- if cut -f1 -d: /etc/group | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null
- then
- echo "PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
- else
- echo "Creating PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER."
- mkgroup -A $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
- fi
+ echo "Creating PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER."
+ mkgroup -A $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+fi
- # Create user if required
- if lsuser "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" >/dev/null
- then
- echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
- else
- echo "Creating PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER."
- mkuser gecos='SSHD PrivSep User' login=false rlogin=false account_locked=true pgrp=$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
- fi
+# Create user if required
+if lsuser "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" >/dev/null
+then
+ echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
+else
+ echo "Creating PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER."
+ mkuser gecos='SSHD PrivSep User' login=false rlogin=false account_locked=true pgrp=$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+fi
+if egrep '^[ \t]*UsePrivilegeSeparation[ \t]+no' $sysconfdir/sshd_config >/dev/null
+then
+ echo UsePrivilegeSeparation not enabled, privsep directory not required.
+else
# create chroot directory if required
if [ -d $PRIVSEP_PATH ]
then
/* Constants */
-#ifndef SHUT_RDWR
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0
enum
{
SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */
#endif
#endif
-#ifndef O_NONBLOCK /* Non Blocking Open */
-# define O_NONBLOCK 00004
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0
+# define O_NONBLOCK 00004 /* Non Blocking Open */
#endif
#ifndef S_ISDIR
#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001)
#endif
-#ifndef __unused
-#define __unused
-#endif
-
/* Types */
/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
/* (or die trying) */
-
#ifndef HAVE_U_INT
typedef unsigned int u_int;
#endif
# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
#endif
+/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */
+/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */
+#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
+# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
+# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */
+# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
+# define BIG_ENDIAN 4321
+# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */
+# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+# define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+# define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */
+
/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO))
# define optarg BSDoptarg
#endif
-/* In older versions of libpam, pam_strerror takes a single argument */
-#ifdef HAVE_OLD_PAM
-# define PAM_STRERROR(a,b) pam_strerror((b))
-#else
-# define PAM_STRERROR(a,b) pam_strerror((a),(b))
-#endif
-
-#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
-# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
-#else
-# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
-#endif
-
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
#endif
# undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \
+ defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND)
+# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+#endif
+
#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
#endif /* defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) */
#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
+# include <unistd.h>
# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
#endif
# undef HAVE_MMAP
#endif
-/* some system headers on HP-UX define YES/NO */
-#ifdef YES
-# undef YES
-#endif
-#ifdef NO
-# undef NO
+#ifndef IOV_MAX
+# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX)
+# define IOV_MAX _XOPEN_IOV_MAX
+# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX)
+# define IOV_MAX DEF_IOV_MAX
+# else
+# define IOV_MAX 16
+# endif
#endif
#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.16 2005/10/17 14:13:35 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.23 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.16 2005/10/17 14:13:35 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "key.h"
*digest = (u_char *) xmalloc(*digest_len);
memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len);
} else {
- *digest = xstrdup("");
+ *digest = (u_char *)xstrdup("");
}
success = 1;
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.6 2005/10/17 14:13:35 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.10 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
-#include "includes.h"
-
#ifndef DNS_H
#define DNS_H
+/* $OpenBSD: fatal.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: fatal.c,v 1.2 2003/09/23 20:17:11 markus Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "log.h"
fatal(const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
+
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * Macros for storing and retrieving data in msb first and lsb first order.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: getput.h,v 1.7 2001/01/10 22:56:22 markus Exp $"); */
-
-#ifndef GETPUT_H
-#define GETPUT_H
-
-/*------------ macros for storing/extracting msb first words -------------*/
-
-#define GET_64BIT(cp) (((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[0] << 56) | \
- ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[1] << 48) | \
- ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[2] << 40) | \
- ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[3] << 32) | \
- ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[4] << 24) | \
- ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[5] << 16) | \
- ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[6] << 8) | \
- ((u_int64_t)(u_char)(cp)[7]))
-
-#define GET_32BIT(cp) (((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[0] << 24) | \
- ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[1] << 16) | \
- ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
- ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[3]))
-
-#define GET_16BIT(cp) (((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[0] << 8) | \
- ((u_long)(u_char)(cp)[1]))
-
-#define PUT_64BIT(cp, value) do { \
- (cp)[0] = (value) >> 56; \
- (cp)[1] = (value) >> 48; \
- (cp)[2] = (value) >> 40; \
- (cp)[3] = (value) >> 32; \
- (cp)[4] = (value) >> 24; \
- (cp)[5] = (value) >> 16; \
- (cp)[6] = (value) >> 8; \
- (cp)[7] = (value); } while (0)
-
-#define PUT_32BIT(cp, value) do { \
- (cp)[0] = (value) >> 24; \
- (cp)[1] = (value) >> 16; \
- (cp)[2] = (value) >> 8; \
- (cp)[3] = (value); } while (0)
-
-#define PUT_16BIT(cp, value) do { \
- (cp)[0] = (value) >> 8; \
- (cp)[1] = (value); } while (0)
-
-#endif /* GETPUT_H */
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.6 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.17 2006/08/29 12:02:30 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2005 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
char deroid[2];
const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
for (i=0;gss_enc2oid[i].encoded!=NULL;i++)
oidpos = 0;
for (i = 0;i < gss_supported->count;i++) {
if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
- (*check)(&(gss_supported->elements[i]), data)) {
+ (*check)(&gssctxt, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), data)) {
deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
mechs = NULL;
}
+ if (gssctxt) {
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt);
+ }
+
return (mechs);
}
void
ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt)
{
- debug("%s", ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL));
+ char *s;
+
+ s = ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL);
+ debug("%s", s);
+ xfree(s);
}
char *
void
ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
{
- *ctx = xmalloc(sizeof (Gssctxt));
- (*ctx)->major = 0;
- (*ctx)->minor = 0;
+ *ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof (Gssctxt));
(*ctx)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
(*ctx)->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
(*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
{
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
char *xhost;
+ char *val;
/* Make a copy of the host name, in case it was returned by a
* previous call to gethostbyname(). */
* this for us themselves */
resolve_localhost(&xhost);
- gssbuf.length = sizeof("host@") + strlen(xhost);
- gssbuf.value = xmalloc(gssbuf.length);
- snprintf(gssbuf.value, gssbuf.length, "host@%s", xhost);
+ xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", xhost);
+ gssbuf.value = val;
+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
if ((ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor,
&gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name)))
gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN))
+ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
return (-1);
+ }
- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname)))
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
return (ctx->major);
+ }
if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
}
int
-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(gss_OID oid, void *host) {
- Gssctxt * ctx = NULL;
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+{
gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 major, minor;
-
- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, oid);
- ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, host);
- major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, NULL);
- gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token);
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+ gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
+
+ /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+ (memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0))
+ return 0; /* false */
+
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
+ NULL);
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token);
+ if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context,
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ }
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
}
#ifdef GSSAPI
#ifdef GSI
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.4 2005/10/13 19:08:08 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
#ifdef GSSAPI
#ifdef KRB5
-#include "auth.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.13 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.20 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "bufaux.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "getput.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "misc.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
/* Unprivileged */
int
-ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(gss_OID oid, void *data) {
- Gssctxt * ctx = NULL;
+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *data) {
int res;
- res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(ctx, oid)));
+ if (!res)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
return (res);
}
&supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset);
i++;
}
+
+ gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported);
}
* second without.
*/
- oidl = GET_16BIT(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */
+ oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */
oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */
/*
if (ename->length < offset+4)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- name->length = GET_32BIT(tok+offset);
+ name->length = get_u32(tok+offset);
offset += 4;
if (ename->length < offset+name->length)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1);
- memcpy(name->value, tok+offset,name->length);
+ memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length);
((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
{
if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
/* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", gssapi_client.store.filename);
+ debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
+ gssapi_client.store.filename);
unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
}
}
-/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.22 2006/01/01 08:59:27 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.54 2006/07/22 20:48:23 stevesk Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
#ifndef INCLUDES_H
#define INCLUDES_H
-#define RCSID(msg) \
-static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
-
#include "config.h"
#define _GNU_SOURCE /* activate extra prototypes for glibc */
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h> /* For O_NONBLOCK */
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <grp.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h> /* For CMSG_* */
#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
# include <limits.h> /* For PATH_MAX */
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_H
-# include <getopt.h>
-#endif
#ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H
# include <bstring.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
- defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC)
+ defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && \
+ defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0
# include <glob.h>
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
-# include <netgroup.h>
-#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
# include <endian.h>
#endif
# include <maillock.h> /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
-# include <libc.h>
+# include <libc.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS
+# include <paths.h>
#endif
-#include <unistd.h> /* For STDIN_FILENO, etc */
-#include <termios.h> /* Struct winsize */
/*
*-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively
# include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
-# ifdef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
-# include <sys/time.h>
-# endif
# include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
-# include <paths.h> /* For _PATH_XXX */
-#endif
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h> /* For timersub */
-#endif
-#include <sys/resource.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
# include <sys/bsdtty.h>
#endif
-#include <sys/param.h> /* For MAXPATHLEN and roundup() */
-#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
-# include <sys/un.h> /* For sockaddr_un */
-#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
+#include <termios.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
# include <sys/bitypes.h> /* For u_intXX_t */
#endif
#include <sys/ptms.h> /* for grantpt() and friends */
#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h> /* For typedefs */
-#include <netinet/in.h> /* For IPv6 macros */
-#include <netinet/ip.h> /* For IPTOS macros */
-#include <netinet/tcp.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
-# include <netdb.h>
-#endif
#ifdef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
# include <rpc/types.h> /* For INADDR_LOOPBACK */
#endif
#include "defines.h"
-#include "version.h"
+#include "platform.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.76 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.65 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include "ssh2.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "match.h"
#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+# if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+# define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+# else
+extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void);
+# endif
+#endif
+
/* prototype */
static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *);
static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *);
int i;
char **proposal;
- proposal = xmalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX * sizeof(char *));
+ proposal = xcalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *));
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(raw), buffer_len(raw));
{
Kex *kex;
- kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex));
- memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex));
+ kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
buffer_init(&kex->peer);
buffer_init(&kex->my);
kex_prop2buf(&kex->my, proposal);
enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
}
+
static void
choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
{
mac->key = NULL;
mac->enabled = 0;
}
+
static void
choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
{
}
comp->name = name;
}
+
static void
choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)-1) == 0) {
k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ } else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA256) == 0) {
+ k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
+ k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
#endif
} else
fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
/* Algorithm Negotiation */
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
- newkeys = xmalloc(sizeof(*newkeys));
- memset(newkeys, 0, sizeof(*newkeys));
+ newkeys = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys));
kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
if ((mdsz = EVP_MD_size(kex->evp_md)) <= 0)
fatal("bad kex md size %d", mdsz);
- digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
+ digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
current_keys[mode] = kex->newkeys[mode];
kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
- ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+ ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
+ (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
current_keys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
current_keys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
current_keys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.38 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.44 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
#ifndef KEX_H
#define KEX_H
+#include <signal.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "key.h"
#define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
#define KEX_DH14 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
+#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
#define COMP_NONE 0
#define COMP_ZLIB 1
KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
KEX_MAX
};
int kex_type;
Buffer my;
Buffer peer;
- int done;
+ sig_atomic_t done;
int flags;
const EVP_MD *evp_md;
#ifdef GSSAPI
BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
void
kexgex_hash(const EVP_MD *, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
- int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
+ int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
void
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.9 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.3 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "packet.h"
if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
- /* DH paramter f, server public DH key */
+ /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.3 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
void
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.9 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.3 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "packet.h"
if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
- /* DH paramter f, server public DH key */
+ /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */
if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.8 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.2 2005/11/04 05:15:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "compat.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
void
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "packet.h"
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.67 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* read_bignum():
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
+
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.58 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "uuencode.h"
#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "log.h"
Key *
Key *k;
RSA *rsa;
DSA *dsa;
- k = xmalloc(sizeof(*k));
+ k = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k));
k->type = type;
- k->flags = 0;
k->dsa = NULL;
k->rsa = NULL;
switch (k->type) {
void
key_free(Key *k)
{
+ if (k == NULL)
+ fatal("key_free: key is NULL");
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
- break;
case KEY_DSA:
return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
- break;
default:
fatal("key_equal: bad key type %d", a->type);
break;
break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
return retval;
- break;
default:
fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: bad key type %d", k->type);
break;
char *retval;
u_int i;
- retval = xmalloc(dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
- retval[0] = '\0';
+ retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
char hex[4];
snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]);
char *retval;
rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
- retval = xmalloc(sizeof(char) * (rounds*6));
+ retval = xcalloc((rounds * 6), sizeof(char));
retval[j++] = 'x';
for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
return "RSA1";
- break;
case KEY_RSA:
return "RSA";
- break;
case KEY_DSA:
return "DSA";
- break;
}
return "unknown";
}
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
return "ssh-rsa";
- break;
case KEY_DSA:
return "ssh-dss";
- break;
}
return "ssh-unknown";
}
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
- break;
case KEY_DSA:
return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
- break;
}
return 0;
}
rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
{
RSA *private;
+
private = RSA_generate_key(bits, 35, NULL, NULL);
if (private == NULL)
fatal("rsa_generate_private_key: key generation failed.");
dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
{
DSA *private = DSA_generate_parameters(bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
if (private == NULL)
fatal("dsa_generate_private_key: DSA_generate_parameters failed");
if (!DSA_generate_key(private))
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
- break;
case KEY_RSA:
return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
- break;
default:
error("key_sign: invalid key type %d", key->type);
return -1;
- break;
}
}
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
- break;
case KEY_RSA:
return ssh_rsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
- break;
default:
error("key_verify: invalid key type %d", key->type);
return -1;
- break;
}
}
{
Key *pk;
- pk = xmalloc(sizeof(*pk));
+ pk = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*pk));
pk->type = k->type;
pk->flags = k->flags;
pk->dsa = NULL;
-/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.23 2003/11/10 16:23:41 jakob Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.26 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.39 2006/08/18 09:13:25 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.29 2003/09/23 20:17:11 markus Exp $");
-#include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H)
# include <vis.h>
#endif
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
static int log_on_stderr = 1;
static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
va_end(args);
}
+void
+sigdie(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+#ifdef DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+#endif
+ _exit(1);
+}
+
+
/* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */
void
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.64 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.42 2006/01/31 10:19:02 djm Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#endif
#ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
#include <net/if.h>
#endif
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
/* remove newline at end of string */
char *
/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+#define QUOTE "\""
/* Characters considered as quotations. */
#define QUOTES "'\""
return (old);
}
- *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE "=");
+ *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE QUOTE "=");
if (*s == NULL)
return (old);
+ if (*s[0] == '\"') {
+ memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */
+ /* Find matching quote */
+ if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) {
+ return (NULL); /* no matching quote */
+ } else {
+ *s[0] = '\0';
+ return (old);
+ }
+ }
+
/* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */
if (*s[0] == '=')
wspace = 1;
*s[0] = '\0';
+ /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace)
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
struct passwd *
pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
{
- struct passwd *copy = xmalloc(sizeof(*copy));
+ struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy));
- memset(copy, 0, sizeof(*copy));
copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos);
switch (*endp++) {
case '\0':
endp--;
+ break;
case 's':
case 'S':
break;
return total;
}
+/*
+ * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+ char *hoststr;
+
+ if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)
+ return(xstrdup(host));
+ if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) < 0)
+ fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
+ debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr);
+ return hoststr;
+}
+
/*
* Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports.
* Argument may be modified (for termination).
} else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
nalloc *= 2;
- args->list = xrealloc(args->list, nalloc * sizeof(char *));
+ args->list = xrealloc(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
args->nalloc = nalloc;
args->list[args->num++] = cp;
args->list[args->num] = NULL;
}
char *
-tohex(const u_char *d, u_int l)
+tohex(const void *vp, size_t l)
{
+ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
char b[3], *r;
- u_int i, hl;
+ size_t i, hl;
+
+ if (l > 65536)
+ return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536");
hl = l * 2 + 1;
- r = xmalloc(hl);
- *r = '\0';
+ r = xcalloc(1, hl);
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
- snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", d[i]);
+ snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]);
strlcat(r, b, hl);
}
return (r);
}
+u_int64_t
+get_u64(const void *vp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+ u_int64_t v;
+
+ v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8;
+ v |= (u_int64_t)p[7];
+
+ return (v);
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+get_u32(const void *vp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+ u_int32_t v;
+
+ v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24;
+ v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16;
+ v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8;
+ v |= (u_int32_t)p[3];
+
+ return (v);
+}
+
+u_int16_t
+get_u16(const void *vp)
+{
+ const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+ u_int16_t v;
+
+ v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8;
+ v |= (u_int16_t)p[1];
+
+ return (v);
+}
+
+void
+put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v)
+{
+ u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+ p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff;
+ p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff;
+ p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff;
+ p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff;
+ p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+ p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+ p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+ p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
+{
+ u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+ p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+ p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+ p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+ p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+
+void
+put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
+{
+ u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+ p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+ p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
-/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.12 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.18 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1994 Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
* Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson <wsimpson@greendragon.com>
*/
#include "includes.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
/*
* File output defines
*/
largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
}
- TinySieve = calloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
- if (TinySieve == NULL) {
- error("Insufficient memory for tiny sieve: need %u bytes",
- tinywords << SHIFT_BYTE);
- exit(1);
- }
+ TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD;
- SmallSieve = calloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
- if (SmallSieve == NULL) {
- error("Insufficient memory for small sieve: need %u bytes",
- smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE);
- xfree(TinySieve);
- exit(1);
- }
+ SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD;
/*
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.88 2006/08/12 20:46:46 miod Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.64 2005/10/13 22:24:31 stevesk Exp $");
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef SKEY
#include <skey.h>
#endif
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "dh.h"
#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
#include "servconf.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "misc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
#endif
#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
#define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
#define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
+#define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
#define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
#endif
#ifdef SKEY
{MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
{MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
{MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
{MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
#endif
#ifdef SKEY
{MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
while (!authenticated) {
+ auth_method = "unknown";
authenticated = monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent);
if (authenticated) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
#endif
}
- if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
+ if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
if (!authenticated)
if (!authctxt->valid)
fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+ if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
+ fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
__func__, authctxt->user);
keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
- if (datlen != 20)
+ /*
+ * Supported KEX types will only return SHA1 (20 byte) or
+ * SHA256 (32 byte) hashes
+ */
+ if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32)
fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
if (options.use_pam)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, 1);
-#endif
return (0);
}
xfree(prompts);
if (echo_on != NULL)
xfree(echo_on);
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
return (0);
}
sshpam_authok = NULL;
num = buffer_get_int(m);
if (num > 0) {
- resp = xmalloc(num * sizeof(char *));
+ resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
buffer_clear(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
}
#endif
case MM_USERKEY:
allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+ auth_method = "publickey";
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
+ auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
+ auth_method = "rsa";
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
key_blobtype = type;
hostbased_cuser = cuser;
hostbased_chost = chost;
+ } else {
+ /* Log failed attempt */
+ auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+ xfree(blob);
+ xfree(cuser);
+ xfree(chost);
}
debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
fromlen = sizeof(from);
if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
{
debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
s->used = 0;
/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+ debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
return (0);
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ auth_method = "rsa";
if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
void *blob;
u_int bloblen;
- kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex));
- memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex));
+ kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len) ||
kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
#endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
kex->server = 1;
kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
struct monitor *mon;
int pair[2];
- mon = xmalloc(sizeof(*mon));
+ mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
- mon->m_pid = 0;
monitor_socketpair(pair);
mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.13 2003/11/17 11:06:07 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.14 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.12 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.6 2004/08/13 02:51:48 djm Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
#include "log.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.h,v 1.2 2002/03/26 03:24:01 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.h,v 1.3 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_mm.c,v 1.9 2004/05/11 19:01:43 deraadt Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
#include <sys/mman.h>
#endif
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
-#include "ssh.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "monitor_mm.h"
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.h,v 1.2 2002/03/26 03:24:01 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.h,v 1.4 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
#ifndef _MM_H_
#define _MM_H_
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
struct mm_share {
RB_ENTRY(mm_share) next;
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.54 2006/08/12 20:46:46 miod Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.40 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "dh.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "zlib.h"
#endif
#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "getput.h"
+#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
-#include "auth.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-
/* Imports */
extern int compat20;
extern Newkeys *newkeys[];
debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
- PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
+ put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
- msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+ msg_len = get_u32(buf);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
buffer_clear(m);
}
int
-mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen)
+mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
{
Buffer m;
char *p, *msg;
*name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
*info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
*num = buffer_get_int(&m);
- *prompts = xmalloc((*num + 1) * sizeof(char *));
- *echo_on = xmalloc((*num + 1) * sizeof(u_int));
+ if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+ fatal("%s: recieved %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
+ __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
+ *prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
+ *echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
(*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
(*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m);
*name = xstrdup("");
*infotxt = xstrdup("");
*numprompts = 1;
- *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char *));
- *echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int));
+ *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+ *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
}
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Buffer m;
- int len;
u_int success;
- char *p, *challenge;
+ char *challenge;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
- len = strlen(challenge) + strlen(SKEY_PROMPT) + 1;
- p = xmalloc(len);
- strlcpy(p, challenge, len);
- strlcat(p, SKEY_PROMPT, len);
- (*prompts)[0] = p;
+ xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
xfree(challenge);
return (0);
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.14 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.20 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
#define _MM_WRAP_H_
-#include "key.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
extern int use_privsep;
#define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
struct monitor;
struct mm_master;
-struct passwd;
struct Authctxt;
int mm_is_monitor(void);
BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
struct Session;
void mm_terminate(void);
-int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, int);
+int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
/* SSHv1 interfaces */
void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *, void *);
void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *);
-#endif /* _MM_H_ */
+#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.15 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
+
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.8 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "buffer.h"
-#include "getput.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "msg.h"
+#include "misc.h"
int
ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, Buffer *m)
debug3("ssh_msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
- PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
+ put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
error("ssh_msg_send: write");
error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header");
return (-1);
}
- msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+ msg_len = get_u32(buf);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
return (-1);
-/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.3 2003/11/17 09:45:39 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.4 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.18 2005/07/25 11:59:39 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.21 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+/* Old OpenSSL doesn't support what we need for DHGEX-sha256 */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#else
+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
+ "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#endif
+
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG "ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
char *
basename(const char *path)
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id$");
-
#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
#if defined(SO_PEERCRED)
int
getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
#include "includes.h"
#if !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
# include <sys/stropts.h>
#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
#ifndef O_NOCTTY
#define O_NOCTTY 0
#endif
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id$");
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host,
#define _FAKE_RFC2553_H
#include "includes.h"
-#include "sys/types.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
/*
* First, socket and INET6 related definitions
#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO) && !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
# undef _THREAD_PRIVATE
#endif
#define _THREAD_PRIVATE(a,b,c) (c)
+
+/* to avoid conflicts where a platform already has _res */
+#ifdef _res
+# undef _res
+#endif
+#define _res _compat_res
+
struct __res_state _res;
/* Necessary functions and macros */
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
#ifdef _AIX
+#include <errno.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
#include <uinfo.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+# include <login.h>
+# include <userpw.h>
+# if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG)
+# include <sys/audit.h>
+# endif
+# include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
#include "port-aix.h"
# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
Buffer *loginmsg)
{
char *msg = NULL;
+ static int msg_done = 0;
int success = 0;
aix_setauthdb(user);
if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) {
success = 1;
- if (msg != NULL) {
+ if (msg != NULL && loginmsg != NULL && !msg_done) {
debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg);
buffer_append(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
xfree(msg);
+ msg_done = 1;
}
}
aix_restoreauthdb();
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
# include <sys/socket.h>
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-# include <unistd.h> /* for seteuid() */
-#endif
-
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
-# include <login.h>
-# include <userpw.h>
-# if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG)
-# undef T_NULL
-# include <sys/audit.h>
-# endif
-# include <usersec.h>
-#endif
#include "buffer.h"
defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \
defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
# include <proj.h>
#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
# ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
# include <crypt.h>
# endif
#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
#include <sys/mman.h>
#endif
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
void *xmmap(size_t size)
{
+#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
void *address;
-#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
# ifdef MAP_ANON
address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED,
-1, (off_t)0);
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.145 2006/09/19 21:14:08 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.120 2005/10/30 08:52:17 djm Exp $");
-
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "crc32.h"
-#include "getput.h"
-
#include "compress.h"
#include "deattack.h"
#include "channels.h"
-
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-
#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
return (cipher_get_keyiv_len(cc));
}
+
void
packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
{
cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat);
}
+
int
packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void)
{
buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
}
+
void
packet_put_int(u_int value)
{
buffer_put_int(&outgoing_packet, value);
}
+
void
packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len)
{
buffer_put_string(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
}
+
void
packet_put_cstring(const char *str)
{
buffer_put_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str);
}
+
void
packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
{
buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
}
+
void
packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
{
buffer_put_bignum(&outgoing_packet, value);
}
+
void
packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
{
/* Add check bytes. */
checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
- PUT_32BIT(buf, checksum);
+ put_u32(buf, checksum);
buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
#endif
/* Append to output. */
- PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
+ put_u32(buf, len);
buffer_append(&output, buf, 4);
cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
/*
* Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
- * This happans on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
+ * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
* and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
*/
static void
*/
after_authentication = 1;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
+ if (newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+ continue;
comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
packet_init_compression();
/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
packet_length = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) - 4;
cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
- PUT_32BIT(cp, packet_length);
+ put_u32(cp, packet_length);
cp[4] = padlen;
DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d)", packet_length+4, padlen));
buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
/* append unencrypted MAC */
if (mac && mac->enabled)
- buffer_append(&output, (char *)macbuf, mac->mac_len);
+ buffer_append(&output, macbuf, mac->mac_len);
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
buffer_dump(&output);
char buf[8192];
DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
- setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS) *
+ setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS),
sizeof(fd_mask));
/* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
/* Get length of incoming packet. */
cp = buffer_ptr(&input);
- len = GET_32BIT(cp);
+ len = get_u32(cp);
if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", len);
padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
* (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
* Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
*/
- if (!receive_context.plaintext &&
- detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len, NULL) == DEATTACK_DETECTED)
- packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: network attack detected");
+ if (!receive_context.plaintext) {
+ switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len)) {
+ case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
+ packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
+ "network attack detected");
+ case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
+ packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
+ "service detected");
+ }
+ }
/* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
buffer_clear(&incoming_packet);
len, buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + len - 4;
- stored_checksum = GET_32BIT(cp);
+ stored_checksum = get_u32(cp);
if (checksum != stored_checksum)
packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input.");
buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, 4);
cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input),
block_size);
cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
- packet_length = GET_32BIT(cp);
+ packet_length = get_u32(cp);
if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > 256 * 1024) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
break;
default:
return type;
- break;
}
} else {
type = packet_read_poll1();
if (type)
DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
return type;
- break;
}
}
}
{
fd_set *setp;
- setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
+ setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS),
sizeof(fd_mask));
packet_write_poll();
while (packet_have_data_to_write()) {
/* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
return;
- if (interactive)
- set_nodelay(connection_in);
+ set_nodelay(connection_in);
packet_set_tos(interactive);
}
for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rnd = arc4random();
- packet_put_char(rnd & 0xff);
+ packet_put_char((u_char)rnd & 0xff);
rnd >>= 8;
}
}
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.43 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.45 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
#ifndef PACKET_H
#define PACKET_H
+#include <termios.h>
+
#include <openssl/bn.h>
void
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.37 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.24 2005/06/07 13:25:23 jaredy Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
len = 0;
if (len >= file_len + 1)
len = file_len;
- for (i = len; i < file_len; i++ )
+ for (i = len; i < file_len; i++)
buf[i] = ' ';
buf[file_len] = '\0';
}
last_update = now;
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
update_progress_meter(int ignore)
{
atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sig_winch(int sig)
{
-/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.1 2003/01/10 08:19:07 fgsch Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.2 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved.
*
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.159 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.145 2005/12/08 18:34:11 reyk Exp $");
-#include "ssh.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
typedef enum {
oBadOption,
oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oGatewayPorts,
+ oExitOnForwardFailure,
oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication,
oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
+ { "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure },
{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
{ "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort },
int *activep)
{
char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2, fwdarg[256];
- int opcode, *intptr, value, value2;
+ int opcode, *intptr, value, value2, scale;
+ long long orig, val64;
size_t len;
Forward fwd;
s = line;
/* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
- keyword = strdelim(&s);
+ if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
/* Ignore leading whitespace. */
if (*keyword == '\0')
keyword = strdelim(&s);
intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
goto parse_flag;
+ case oExitOnForwardFailure:
+ intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case oUsePrivilegedPort:
intptr = &options->use_privileged_port;
goto parse_flag;
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
- value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 10);
+ orig = val64 = strtoll(arg, &endofnumber, 10);
if (arg == endofnumber)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum);
switch (toupper(*endofnumber)) {
+ case '\0':
+ scale = 1;
+ break;
case 'K':
- value *= 1<<10;
+ scale = 1<<10;
break;
case 'M':
- value *= 1<<20;
+ scale = 1<<20;
break;
case 'G':
- value *= 1<<30;
+ scale = 1<<30;
break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid RekeyLimit suffix",
+ filename, linenum);
}
+ val64 *= scale;
+ /* detect integer wrap and too-large limits */
+ if ((val64 / scale) != orig || val64 > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (val64 < 16)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
+ filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
- *intptr = value;
+ *intptr = (int)val64;
break;
case oIdentityFile:
options->forward_agent = -1;
options->forward_x11 = -1;
options->forward_x11_trusted = -1;
+ options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1;
options->xauth_location = NULL;
options->gateway_ports = -1;
options->use_privileged_port = -1;
options->forward_x11 = 0;
if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
+ if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
+ options->exit_on_forward_failure = 0;
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.68 2005/12/06 22:38:27 reyk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.71 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
#ifndef READCONF_H
#define READCONF_H
-#include "key.h"
-
/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
typedef struct {
int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */
int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */
int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */
+ int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */
int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
int use_privileged_port; /* Don't use privileged port if false. */
#include "includes.h"
#if defined(SMARTCARD) && defined(USE_OPENSC)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
#include <opensc/opensc.h>
#include <opensc/pkcs15.h>
}
key_count = r;
}
- keys = xmalloc(sizeof(Key *) * (key_count*2+1));
+ if (key_count > 1024)
+ fatal("Too many keys (%u), expected <= 1024", key_count);
+ keys = xcalloc(key_count * 2 + 1, sizeof(Key *));
for (i = 0; i < key_count; i++) {
sc_pkcs15_object_t *tmp_obj = NULL;
cert_id = ((sc_pkcs15_cert_info_t *)(certs[i]->data))->id;
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.155 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.130 2006/01/31 10:35:43 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
extern char *__progname;
+int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout);
+
void bwlimit(int);
/* Struct for addargs */
*/
int
-do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc)
+do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
{
int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2];
* Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get
* descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below.
*/
- pipe(reserved);
+ if (pipe(reserved) < 0)
+ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
if (pipe(pin) < 0)
BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int);
void lostconn(int);
-void nospace(void);
int okname(char *);
void run_err(const char *,...);
void verifydir(char *);
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- int ch, fflag, tflag, status;
+ int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n;
double speed;
- char *targ, *endp;
+ char *targ, *endp, **newargv;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
+ /* Copy argv, because we modify it */
+ newargv = xcalloc(MAX(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv));
+ for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
+ newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]);
+ argv = newargv;
+
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
void
toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv)
{
- int i, len;
char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser, *arg;
arglist alist;
+ int i;
memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
alist.list = NULL;
errs = 1;
} else { /* local to remote */
if (remin == -1) {
- len = strlen(targ) + CMDNEEDS + 20;
- bp = xmalloc(len);
- (void) snprintf(bp, len, "%s -t %s", cmd, targ);
+ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s", cmd, targ);
host = cleanhostname(thost);
if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin,
- &remout, argc) < 0)
+ &remout) < 0)
exit(1);
if (response() < 0)
exit(1);
source(1, argv + i);
}
}
+ xfree(arg);
}
void
tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
{
- int i, len;
char *bp, *host, *src, *suser;
arglist alist;
+ int i;
memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
alist.list = NULL;
suser = pwd->pw_name;
}
host = cleanhostname(host);
- len = strlen(src) + CMDNEEDS + 20;
- bp = xmalloc(len);
- (void) snprintf(bp, len, "%s -f %s", cmd, src);
- if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout, argc) < 0) {
+ xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s", cmd, src);
+ if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) {
(void) xfree(bp);
++errs;
continue;
BUF *bp;
off_t i;
size_t j, count;
- int amt, exists, first, mask, mode, ofd, omode;
+ int amt, exists, first, ofd;
+ mode_t mode, omode, mask;
off_t size, statbytes;
int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[16384];
va_list ap;
++errs;
- if (fp == NULL && !(fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))
- return;
- (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
- (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- (void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
- (void) fflush(fp);
+ if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) {
+ (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
+ (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ (void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
+ (void) fflush(fp);
+ }
if (!iamremote) {
va_start(ap, fmt);
if (bp->buf == NULL)
bp->buf = xmalloc(size);
else
- bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, size);
+ bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, 1, size);
memset(bp->buf, 0, size);
bp->cnt = size;
return (bp);
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.165 2006/08/14 12:40:25 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.146 2005/12/08 18:34:11 reyk Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "servconf.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
/* Use of privilege separation or not */
extern int use_privsep;
+extern Buffer cfg;
/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
options->authorized_keys_file2 = NULL;
options->num_accept_env = 0;
options->permit_tun = -1;
- options->none_enabled = -1;
- options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
+ options->num_permitted_opens = -1;
+ options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
+
+ options->none_enabled = -1;
+ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
options->hpn_disabled = -1;
options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
-
- /* Needs to be accessable in many places */
- use_privsep = -1;
}
void
sGssKeyEx,
sGsiAllowLimitedProxy,
sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sNoneEnabled, sTcpRcvBufPoll,
+ sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
+ sNoneEnabled, sTcpRcvBufPoll,
sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize,
sDeprecated, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
+#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+
/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
static struct {
const char *name;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
+ u_int flags;
} keywords[] = {
/* Portable-specific options */
#ifdef USE_PAM
- { "usepam", sUsePAM },
+ { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
- { "usepam", sUnsupported },
+ { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
- { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated },
+ { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
/* Standard Options */
- { "port", sPort },
- { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile },
- { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile }, /* alias */
- { "pidfile", sPidFile },
- { "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits },
- { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime },
- { "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime },
- { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin },
- { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility },
- { "loglevel", sLogLevel },
- { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated },
- { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication },
- { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication },
- { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly },
- { "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication },
- { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication },
- { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
+ { "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+ { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
#ifdef KRB5
- { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication },
- { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd },
- { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup },
+ { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef USE_AFS
- { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken },
+ { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
- { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported },
+ { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
#else
- { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported },
- { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported },
- { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported },
- { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported },
+ { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
- { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported },
- { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported },
+ { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef GSSAPI
- { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication },
- { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds },
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef GSI
- { "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sGsiAllowLimitedProxy },
+ { "gsiallowlimitedproxy", sGsiAllowLimitedProxy, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
#else
- { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported },
- { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported },
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
#ifdef SESSION_HOOKS
- { "allowsessionhooks", sAllowSessionHooks },
- { "sessionhookstartupcmd", sSessionHookStartupCmd },
- { "sessionhookshutdowncmd", sSessionHookShutdownCmd },
+ { "allowsessionhooks", sAllowSessionHooks, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "sessionhookstartupcmd", sSessionHookStartupCmd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "sessionhookshutdowncmd", sSessionHookShutdownCmd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
- { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication },
- { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
- { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication },
- { "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
- { "checkmail", sDeprecated },
- { "listenaddress", sListenAddress },
- { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily },
- { "printmotd", sPrintMotd },
- { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog },
- { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts },
- { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts },
- { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding },
- { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset },
- { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost },
- { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation },
- { "strictmodes", sStrictModes },
- { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd },
- { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment },
- { "uselogin", sUseLogin },
- { "compression", sCompression },
- { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive },
- { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete alias */
- { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding },
- { "allowusers", sAllowUsers },
- { "denyusers", sDenyUsers },
- { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups },
- { "denygroups", sDenyGroups },
- { "ciphers", sCiphers },
- { "macs", sMacs },
- { "protocol", sProtocol },
- { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts },
- { "subsystem", sSubsystem },
- { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups },
- { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries },
- { "banner", sBanner },
- { "usedns", sUseDNS },
- { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated },
- { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated },
- { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval },
- { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax },
- { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile },
- { "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2 },
- { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation},
- { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv },
- { "noneenabled", sNoneEnabled },
- { "hpndisabled", sHPNDisabled },
- { "hpnbuffersize", sHPNBufferSize },
- { "tcprcvbufpoll", sTcpRcvBufPoll },
- { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel },
- { NULL, sBadOption }
+ { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+ { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */
+ { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "protocol", sProtocol, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
/*
static ServerOpCodes
parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
- int linenum)
+ int linenum, u_int *flags)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
- if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0){
- debug ("TOKEN IS %s", keywords[i].name);
- return keywords[i].opcode;}
+ if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
+ *flags = keywords[i].flags;
+ return keywords[i].opcode;
+ }
+
error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
filename, linenum, cp);
return sBadOption;
options->listen_addrs = aitop;
}
+/*
+ * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice.
+ *
+ * The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the
+ * directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a
+ * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are
+ * checked for syntax only.
+ *
+ * The second time is after a connection has been established but before
+ * authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives
+ * are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a
+ * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives
+ * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any
+ * options set are copied into the main server config.
+ *
+ * Potential additions/improvements:
+ * - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg Protocol, Ciphers.
+ *
+ * - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg:
+ * Match Address 192.168.0.*
+ * Tag trusted
+ * Match Group wheel
+ * Tag trusted
+ * Match Tag trusted
+ * AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ * GatewayPorts clientspecified
+ * [...]
+ *
+ * - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive
+ * Match Group shell
+ * PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip
+ */
+
+static int
+match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user)
+{
+ int result = 0;
+ u_int ngrps = 0;
+ char *arg, *p, *cp, *grplist[MAX_MATCH_GROUPS];
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ /*
+ * Even if we do not have a user yet, we still need to check for
+ * valid syntax.
+ */
+ arg = cp = xstrdup(grps);
+ while ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")) != NULL && *p != '\0') {
+ if (ngrps >= MAX_MATCH_GROUPS) {
+ error("line %d: too many groups in Match Group", line);
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ grplist[ngrps++] = p;
+ }
+
+ if (user == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
+ debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
+ "not exist", line, user);
+ } else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
+ debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
+ "at line %d", user, line);
+ } else if (ga_match(grplist, ngrps) != 1) {
+ debug("user %.100s does not match group %.100s at line %d",
+ user, arg, line);
+ } else {
+ debug("user %.100s matched group %.100s at line %d", user,
+ arg, line);
+ result = 1;
+ }
+out:
+ ga_free();
+ xfree(arg);
+ return result;
+}
+
+static int
+match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, const char *user, const char *host,
+ const char *address)
+{
+ int result = 1;
+ char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (user == NULL)
+ debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp);
+ else
+ debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s", cp,
+ user ? user : "(null)", host ? host : "(null)",
+ address ? address : "(null)");
+
+ while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
+ error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ len = strlen(arg);
+ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
+ if (!user) {
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (match_pattern_list(user, arg, len, 0) != 1)
+ result = 0;
+ else
+ debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
+ "line %d", user, arg, line);
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
+ switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, user)) {
+ case -1:
+ return -1;
+ case 0:
+ result = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
+ if (!host) {
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (match_hostname(host, arg, len) != 1)
+ result = 0;
+ else
+ debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
+ "%.100s' at line %d", host, arg, line);
+ } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
+ debug("address '%s' arg '%s'", address, arg);
+ if (!address) {
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (match_hostname(address, arg, len) != 1)
+ result = 0;
+ else
+ debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address "
+ "%.100s' at line %d", address, arg, line);
+ } else {
+ error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (user != NULL)
+ debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+ *condition = cp;
+ return result;
+}
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
int
process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- const char *filename, int linenum)
+ const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, const char *user,
+ const char *host, const char *address)
{
char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
- int *intptr, value, n;
+ int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, n;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_short port;
- u_int i;
+ u_int i, flags = 0;
+ size_t len;
cp = line;
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
/* Ignore leading whitespace */
if (*arg == '\0')
arg = strdelim(&cp);
return 0;
intptr = NULL;
charptr = NULL;
- opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum);
+ opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags);
+
+ if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
+ cmdline = 1;
+ activep = &cmdline;
+ }
+ if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
+ debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
+ if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
+ if (user == NULL) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed "
+ "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg);
+ } else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */
+ while (arg)
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
switch (opcode) {
/* Portable-specific options */
fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.",
filename, linenum);
value = atoi(arg);
- if (*intptr == -1)
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
- if (*charptr == NULL) {
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
/* increase optional counter */
if (intptr != NULL)
else
fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
- if (*intptr == -1)
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sDenyUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
- fatal( "%s line %d: too many deny users.",
+ fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.",
filename, linenum);
options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
xstrdup(arg);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep) {
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ break;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
filename, linenum);
options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
+
+ /* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */
+ p = xstrdup(arg);
+ len = strlen(p) + 1;
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+ len += 1 + strlen(arg);
+ p = xrealloc(p, 1, len);
+ strlcat(p, " ", len);
+ strlcat(p, arg, len);
+ }
+ options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p;
options->num_subsystems++;
break;
*/
case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
case sAuthorizedKeysFile2:
- charptr = (opcode == sAuthorizedKeysFile ) ?
+ charptr = (opcode == sAuthorizedKeysFile) ?
&options->authorized_keys_file :
&options->authorized_keys_file2;
goto parse_filename;
if (options->num_accept_env >= MAX_ACCEPT_ENV)
fatal("%s line %d: too many allow env.",
filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep)
+ break;
options->accept_env[options->num_accept_env++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
*intptr = value;
break;
+ case sMatch:
+ if (cmdline)
+ fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+ "option");
+ value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, user, host, address);
+ if (value < 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
+ linenum);
+ *activep = value;
+ break;
+
+ case sPermitOpen:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
+ if (*activep) {
+ channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
+ options->num_permitted_opens = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) {
+ p = hpdelim(&arg);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen",
+ filename, linenum);
+ p = cleanhostname(p);
+ if (arg == NULL || (port = a2port(arg)) == 0)
+ fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in "
+ "PermitOpen", filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && options->num_permitted_opens == -1) {
+ channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens();
+ options->num_permitted_opens =
+ channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(p, port);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case sForceCommand:
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+ linenum);
+ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+ if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL)
+ options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
+ return 0;
+
case sDeprecated:
logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
}
void
-parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf)
+parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *user,
+ const char *host, const char *address)
+{
+ ServerOptions mo;
+
+ initialize_server_options(&mo);
+ parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", &cfg, user, host, address);
+ copy_set_server_options(options, &mo);
+}
+
+/* Copy any (supported) values that are set */
+void
+copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src)
+{
+ if (src->allow_tcp_forwarding != -1)
+ dst->allow_tcp_forwarding = src->allow_tcp_forwarding;
+ if (src->gateway_ports != -1)
+ dst->gateway_ports = src->gateway_ports;
+ if (src->adm_forced_command != NULL) {
+ if (dst->adm_forced_command != NULL)
+ xfree(dst->adm_forced_command);
+ dst->adm_forced_command = src->adm_forced_command;
+ }
+ if (src->x11_display_offset != -1)
+ dst->x11_display_offset = src->x11_display_offset;
+ if (src->x11_forwarding != -1)
+ dst->x11_forwarding = src->x11_forwarding;
+ if (src->x11_use_localhost != -1)
+ dst->x11_use_localhost = src->x11_use_localhost;
+}
+
+void
+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf,
+ const char *user, const char *host, const char *address)
{
- int linenum, bad_options = 0;
+ int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
debug2("%s: config %s len %d", __func__, filename, buffer_len(conf));
obuf = cbuf = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(conf));
+ active = user ? 0 : 1;
linenum = 1;
while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
- linenum++) != 0)
+ linenum++, &active, user, host, address) != 0)
bad_options++;
}
xfree(obuf);
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.72 2005/12/06 22:38:27 reyk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.79 2006/08/14 12:40:25 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
#ifndef SERVCONF_H
#define SERVCONF_H
-#include "buffer.h"
-
#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */
#define MAX_ALLOW_USERS 256 /* Max # users on allow list. */
#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */
#define MAX_HOSTKEYS 256 /* Max # hostkeys. */
#define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV 256 /* Max # of env vars. */
+#define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS 256 /* Max # of groups for Match. */
/* permit_root_login */
#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1
u_int num_subsystems;
char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+ char *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
u_int num_accept_env;
char *accept_env[MAX_ACCEPT_ENV];
char *authorized_keys_file; /* File containing public keys */
char *authorized_keys_file2;
+ char *adm_forced_command;
+
int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
int none_enabled; /* enable NONE cipher switch */
int tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* poll tcp rcv window in autotuning kernels*/
int hpn_buffer_size; /* set the hpn buffer size - default 3MB */
int permit_tun;
+
+ int num_permitted_opens;
} ServerOptions;
void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
-int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int);
+int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
+ int *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
void load_server_config(const char *, Buffer *);
-void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, Buffer *);
+void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, Buffer *,
+ const char *, const char *, const char *);
+void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *,
+ const char *);
+void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *);
#endif /* SERVCONF_H */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.144 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.124 2005/12/13 15:03:02 reyk Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "misc.h"
-#include "kex.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
debug2("notify_done: reading");
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
- debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
child_terminated = 1;
#ifndef _UNICOS
mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
errno = save_errno;
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
* in buffers and processed later.
*/
static void
-process_input(fd_set * readset)
+process_input(fd_set *readset)
{
int len;
char buf[16384];
/* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */
if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) {
+ errno = 0;
len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) {
/* do nothing */
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
} else if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+ } else if ((!isatty(fdout) && len <= 0) ||
+ (isatty(fdout) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
fdout_eof = 1;
} else {
buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len);
}
/* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */
if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) {
+ errno = 0;
len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) {
/* do nothing */
+#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
} else if (len <= 0) {
+#else
+ } else if ((!isatty(fderr) && len <= 0) ||
+ (isatty(fderr) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
+#endif
fderr_eof = 1;
} else {
buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len);
* Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
*/
static void
-process_output(fd_set * writeset)
+process_output(fd_set *writeset)
{
struct termios tio;
u_char *data;
sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
if (child_terminated) {
+ debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
(pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
if (pid > 0)
static void
server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
- int row = packet_get_int();
- int col = packet_get_int();
- int xpixel = packet_get_int();
- int ypixel = packet_get_int();
+ u_int row = packet_get_int();
+ u_int col = packet_get_int();
+ u_int xpixel = packet_get_int();
+ u_int ypixel = packet_get_int();
debug("Window change received.");
packet_check_eom();
tun = packet_get_int();
if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
- if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
+ if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
goto done;
tun = forced_tun_device;
}
success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(cancel_address,
cancel_port);
+ xfree(cancel_address);
}
if (want_reply) {
packet_start(success ?
}
xfree(rtype);
}
+
static void
server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.219 2006/08/29 10:40:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.191 2005/12/24 02:27:41 djm Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include <kafs.h>
#endif
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-
/* func */
Session *session_new(void);
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
- if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0)
+ if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0)
packet_disconnect("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
break;
}
debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request.");
- channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0, options.gateway_ports,
- options.hpn_disabled,
- options.hpn_buffer_size);
+ if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0,
+ options.gateway_ports,
+ options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size) < 0) {
+ debug("Port forwarding failed.");
+ break;
+ }
success = 1;
break;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
void
do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
{
- if (forced_command) {
+ if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+ original_command = command;
+ command = options.adm_forced_command;
+ debug("Forced command (config) '%.900s'", command);
+ } else if (forced_command) {
original_command = command;
command = forced_command;
- debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command);
+ debug("Forced command (key option) '%.900s'", command);
}
#if defined(SESSION_HOOKS)
if (envsize >= 1000)
fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
envsize += 50;
- env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize * sizeof(char *));
+ env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
*envsizep = envsize;
}
/* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
{
char buf[256];
u_int i, envsize;
- char **env, *laddr, *path = NULL;
+ char **env, *laddr;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+#ifndef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ char *path = NULL;
+#endif
/* Initialize the environment. */
envsize = 100;
- env = xmalloc(envsize * sizeof(char *));
+ env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
env[0] = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
#endif
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+#endif
}
static void
do_rc_files(s, shell);
/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
if (options.use_login) {
launch_login(pw, hostname);
struct stat st;
u_int len;
int success = 0;
- char *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
+ char *prog, *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
u_int i;
packet_check_eom();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
if (strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
- cmd = options.subsystem_command[i];
- if (stat(cmd, &st) < 0) {
- error("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", cmd,
+ prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
+ cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
+ if (stat(prog, &st) < 0) {
+ error("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", prog,
strerror(errno));
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
- s->env = xrealloc(s->env, sizeof(*s->env) *
- (s->num_env + 1));
+ s->env = xrealloc(s->env, s->num_env + 1,
+ sizeof(*s->env));
s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
s->num_env++;
/*
* Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
- * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
+ * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
* by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds.
*/
channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
if (s->auth_proto)
xfree(s->auth_proto);
s->used = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
- xfree(s->env[i].name);
- xfree(s->env[i].val);
- }
- if (s->env != NULL)
+ if (s->env != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
+ xfree(s->env[i].name);
+ xfree(s->env[i].val);
+ }
xfree(s->env);
+ }
session_proctitle(s);
}
return;
called = 1;
- if (authctxt == NULL)
+ if (authctxt == NULL || !authctxt->authenticated)
return;
#ifdef KRB5
if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
-/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.25 2005/07/17 06:49:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.29 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
struct passwd *pw;
Authctxt *authctxt;
pid_t pid;
+
/* tty */
char *term;
int ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
u_int row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
char tty[TTYSZ];
+
/* X11 */
u_int display_number;
char *display;
char *auth_proto;
char *auth_data;
int single_connection;
+
/* proto 2 */
int chanid;
int *x11_chanids;
struct {
char *name;
char *val;
- } *env;
+ } *env;
};
void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.92 2006/09/19 05:52:23 otto Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.70 2006/01/31 10:19:02 djm Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
#include <histedit.h>
#else
typedef void EditLine;
#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
-#include "buffer.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sftp.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
#include "sftp-client.h"
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
if (!WIFEXITED(status))
- error("Shell exited abormally");
+ error("Shell exited abnormally");
else if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
return(0);
- return(sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR);
+ return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode));
}
static int
return(0);
if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
return(0);
- return(a->perm & S_IFDIR);
+ return(S_ISDIR(a->perm));
}
static int
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
/* If directory specified, append filename */
+ xfree(tmp);
if (is_dir(dst)) {
if (infer_path(g.gl_pathv[0], &tmp)) {
err = 1;
out:
xfree(abs_src);
- if (abs_dst)
- xfree(abs_dst);
globfree(&g);
return(err);
}
if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &pwd, 1) != 0) {
xfree(dir);
xfree(pwd);
+ xfree(conn);
return (-1);
}
} else {
err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &pwd, 1);
xfree(dir);
xfree(pwd);
+ xfree(conn);
return (err);
}
xfree(dir);
break;
}
xfree(pwd);
+ xfree(conn);
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
if (el != NULL)
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
args.list = NULL;
- addargs(&args, ssh_program);
+ addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no");
addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.152 2006/08/04 20:46:05 stevesk Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.124 2005/10/30 08:52:18 djm Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "getput.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "compat.h"
pid_t parent_pid = -1;
/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
-char socket_name[1024];
-char socket_dir[1024];
+char socket_name[MAXPATHLEN];
+char socket_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
/* locking */
int locked = 0;
Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, 2);
if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0))
ok = key_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, data, dlen);
+ key_free(key);
}
- key_free(key);
buffer_init(&msg);
if (ok == 0) {
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE);
if (buffer_len(&e->input) < 5)
return; /* Incomplete message. */
cp = buffer_ptr(&e->input);
- msg_len = GET_32BIT(cp);
+ msg_len = get_u32(cp);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
close_socket(e);
return;
}
old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
- if (sockets)
- sockets = xrealloc(sockets, new_alloc * sizeof(sockets[0]));
- else
- sockets = xmalloc(new_alloc * sizeof(sockets[0]));
+ sockets = xrealloc(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) {
slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
sock = accept(sockets[i].fd,
- (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, &slen);
+ (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
if (sock < 0) {
error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s",
strerror(errno));
_exit(i);
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
cleanup_handler(int sig)
{
_exit(2);
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
check_parent_exists(int sig)
{
main(int ac, char **av)
{
int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
- int sock, fd, ch;
+ int sock, fd, ch;
u_int nalloc;
char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
shell = getenv("SHELL");
- if (shell != NULL && strncmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
+ if (shell != NULL &&
+ strncmp(shell + strlen(shell) - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
c_flag = 1;
}
if (k_flag) {
+ const char *errstr = NULL;
+
pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
if (pidstr == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
exit(1);
}
- pid = atoi(pidstr);
- if (pid < 1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID\n",
- SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr);
+ pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
+ SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
exit(1);
}
if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, socket_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
prev_mask = umask(0177);
- if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+ if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind");
*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
umask(prev_mask);
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.5 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.9 2006/08/18 14:40:34 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "buffer.h"
-
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
#include <gssapi.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
int ssh_gssapi_localname(char **name);
-typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(gss_OID, void *);
+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host);
char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, void *);
-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(gss_OID, void *);
gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int *);
-int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(gss_OID, void *);
+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.73 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.57 2005/10/30 04:01:03 djm Exp $");
-
+
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
extern char *__progname;
fd_set *read_wait;
-size_t read_wait_size;
+size_t read_wait_nfdset;
int ncon;
int nonfatal_fatal = 0;
jmp_buf kexjmp;
lb->stream = stdin;
}
- if (!(lb->buf = malloc(lb->size = LINEBUF_SIZE))) {
+ if (!(lb->buf = malloc((lb->size = LINEBUF_SIZE)))) {
if (errfun)
(*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n", lb->filename);
xfree(lb);
c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
c->c_kex->verify_host_key = hostjump;
if (!(j = setjmp(kexjmp))) {
keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c));
confree(s);
return;
- break;
default:
fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status);
break;
} else
seltime.tv_sec = seltime.tv_usec = 0;
- r = xmalloc(read_wait_size);
- memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_size);
- e = xmalloc(read_wait_size);
- memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_size);
+ r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+ e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+ memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
+ memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname);
if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
fdlim_set(maxfd);
- fdcon = xmalloc(maxfd * sizeof(con));
- memset(fdcon, 0, maxfd * sizeof(con));
+ fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
- read_wait_size = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
- read_wait = xmalloc(read_wait_size);
- memset(read_wait, 0, read_wait_size);
+ read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
+ read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
if (fopt_count) {
Linebuf *lb;
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.7 2003/06/10 09:12:11 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.8 2006/02/24 20:22:16 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-keysign
-.Nd ssh helper program for hostbased authentication
+.Nd ssh helper program for host-based authentication
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
.Sh DESCRIPTION
is used by
.Xr ssh 1
to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature
-required during hostbased authentication with SSH protocol version 2.
+required during host-based authentication with SSH protocol version 2.
.Pp
.Nm
is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the
.Xr ssh 1
and
.Xr sshd 8
-for more information about hostbased authentication.
+for more information about host-based authentication.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
accessible to others.
Since they are readable only by root,
.Nm
-must be set-uid root if hostbased authentication is used.
+must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.29 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
+
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.19 2005/09/13 23:40:07 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "misc.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "canohost.h"
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
- /* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) */
+ /* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */
p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- if (len != 20)
+ if (len != 20 && len != 32)
fail++;
xfree(p);
{
Buffer b;
Options options;
- Key *keys[2], *key;
+ Key *keys[2], *key = NULL;
struct passwd *pw;
int key_fd[2], i, found, version = 2, fd;
u_char *signature, *data;
#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
-RCSID("$Id$");
-
/* Number of bytes we write out */
#define OUTPUT_SEED_SIZE 48
/* Try to ensure that the parent directory is there */
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
- mkdir(filename, 0700);
+ if (mkdir(filename, 0700) < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
+ fatal("mkdir %.200s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%.512s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
SSH_PRNG_SEED_FILE);
}
num_cmds = 64;
- entcmd = xmalloc(num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
- memset(entcmd, '\0', num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
+ entcmd = xcalloc(num_cmds, sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
/* Read in file */
cur_cmd = linenum = 0;
*/
if (cur_cmd == num_cmds) {
num_cmds *= 2;
- entcmd = xrealloc(entcmd, num_cmds *
+ entcmd = xrealloc(entcmd, num_cmds,
sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
}
}
memset(&entcmd[cur_cmd], '\0', sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
/* trim to size */
- entropy_cmds = xrealloc(entcmd, (cur_cmd + 1) *
+ entropy_cmds = xrealloc(entcmd, (cur_cmd + 1),
sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));
debug("Loaded %d entropy commands from %.100s", cur_cmd,
cmdfilename);
+ fclose(f);
return cur_cmd < MIN_ENTROPY_SOURCES ? -1 : 0;
}
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.253 2006/01/30 13:37:49 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.263 2006/07/11 18:50:48 markus Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Oc
.Op Fl S Ar ctl_path
.Bk -words
-.Op Fl w Ar tunnel : Ns Ar tunnel
+.Oo Fl w Ar local_tun Ns
+.Op : Ns Ar remote_tun Oc
.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar hostname
.Op Ar command
.Ek
.It ControlPath
.It DynamicForward
.It EscapeChar
+.It ExitOnForwardFailure
.It ForwardAgent
.It ForwardX11
.It ForwardX11Trusted
Force pseudo-tty allocation.
This can be used to execute arbitrary
screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
-e.g., when implementing menu services.
+e.g. when implementing menu services.
Multiple
.Fl t
options force tty allocation, even if
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
-.It Fl w Ar tunnel : Ns Ar tunnel
-Requests a
+.It Fl w Xo
+.Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
+.Xc
+Requests
+tunnel
+device forwarding with the specified
.Xr tun 4
-device on the client
-(first
-.Ar tunnel
-arg)
-and server
-(second
-.Ar tunnel
-arg).
+devices between the client
+.Pq Ar local_tun
+and the server
+.Pq Ar remote_tun .
+.Pp
The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
.Dq any ,
which uses the next available tunnel device.
+If
+.Ar remote_tun
+is not specified, it defaults to
+.Dq any .
See also the
.Cm Tunnel
-directive in
+and
+.Cm TunnelDevice
+directives in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+If the
+.Cm Tunnel
+directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is
+.Dq point-to-point .
.It Fl X
Enables X11 forwarding.
This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
integrity of the connection.
.Pp
The methods available for authentication are:
+GSSAPI-based authentication,
host-based authentication,
public key authentication,
challenge-response authentication,
options (see above).
It also allows the cancellation of existing remote port-forwardings
using
-.Fl KR Ar hostport .
+.Sm off
+.Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
+.Sm on
.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
allows the user to execute a local command if the
.Ic PermitLocalCommand
The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for
host.example.com:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
-$ ssh-keygen -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub -r host.example.com.
-$ ssh-keygen -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub -r host.example.com.
+$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
.Ed
.Pp
The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.
file (see below) and the
.Cm PermitRootLogin
server option.
-The following entry would permit connections on the first
+The following entry would permit connections on
.Xr tun 4
-device from user
+device 1 from user
.Dq jane
-and on the second device from user
+and on tun device 2 from user
.Dq john ,
if
.Cm PermitRootLogin
.Dq forced-commands-only :
.Bd -literal -offset 2n
tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
-tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... john
+tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
.Ed
.Pp
Since a SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead,
this variable is not set.
.It Ev TZ
This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it
-was set when the daemon was started (i.e., the daemon passes the value
+was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value
on to new connections).
.It Ev USER
Set to the name of the user logging in.
.Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
-.%A T. Ylonen
-.%A T. Kivinen
-.%A M. Saarinen
-.%A T. Rinne
-.%A S. Lehtinen
-.%T "SSH Protocol Architecture"
-.%N draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-12.txt
-.%D January 2002
-.%O work in progress material
+.%R RFC 4250
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4251
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4252
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4253
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4254
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4255
+.%T "Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4256
+.%T "Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4335
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4344
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4345
+.%T "Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4419
+.%T "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol"
+.%D 2006
.Re
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.293 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.257 2005/12/20 04:41:07 dtucker Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "version.h"
#ifdef SMARTCARD
#include "scard.h"
" [-i identity_file] [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport]\n"
" [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
" [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path]\n"
-" [-w tunnel:tunnel] [user@]hostname [command]\n"
+" [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command]\n"
);
exit(255);
}
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
host = NULL;
-again:
+ again:
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
"1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvxACD:F:I:L:MNO:PR:S:TVw:XY")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
for (p = options.host_key_alias; *p; p++)
if (isupper(*p))
- *p = tolower(*p);
+ *p = (char)tolower(*p);
}
/* Get default port if port has not been set. */
options.control_path = NULL;
if (options.control_path != NULL) {
+ char thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+ if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+ fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", options.port);
cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path,
original_real_uid);
options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, "p", buf, "h", host,
- "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+ "r", options.user, "l", thishost, (char *)NULL);
xfree(cp);
}
if (mux_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
options.hostbased_authentication) {
sensitive_data.nkeys = 3;
- sensitive_data.keys = xmalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys *
+ sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
sizeof(Key));
PRIV_START;
sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
- _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
- _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
PRIV_END;
if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 &&
options.gateway_ports, options.hpn_disabled,
options.hpn_buffer_size);
}
+ if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
if (i > 0 && success == 0)
error("Could not request local forwarding.");
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
- channel_request_remote_forwarding(
+ if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
- options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
+ options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port) < 0) {
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
+ else
+ logit("Warning: Could not request remote "
+ "forwarding.");
+ }
}
}
/* Store window size in the packet. */
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel);
/* Store tty modes in the packet. */
tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL);
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)
- logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for listen "
- "port %d", options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port);
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
+ if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed for "
+ "listen port %d",
+ options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port);
+ else
+ logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for "
+ "listen port %d",
+ options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port);
+ }
}
static void
fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
old_umask = umask(0177);
- if (bind(control_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+ if (bind(control_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
control_fd = -1;
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EADDRINUSE)
fatal("ControlSocket %s already exists",
static void
load_public_identity_files(void)
{
- char *filename;
+ char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
int i = 0;
Key *public;
+ struct passwd *pw;
#ifdef SMARTCARD
Key **keys;
if (options.smartcard_device != NULL &&
options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
- (keys = sc_get_keys(options.smartcard_device, NULL)) != NULL ) {
+ (keys = sc_get_keys(options.smartcard_device, NULL)) != NULL) {
int count = 0;
for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) {
count++;
xfree(keys);
}
#endif /* SMARTCARD */
+ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed");
+ if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+ fatal("load_public_identity_files: gethostname: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
for (; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
- filename = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i],
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i],
original_real_uid);
+ filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir,
+ "u", pw->pw_name, "l", thishost, "h", host,
+ "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+ xfree(cp);
public = key_load_public(filename, NULL);
debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
public ? public->type : -1);
static int
env_permitted(char *env)
{
- int i;
+ int i, ret;
char name[1024], *cp;
- strlcpy(name, env, sizeof(name));
- if ((cp = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL)
+ if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env)
return (0);
-
- *cp = '\0';
+ ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env);
+ if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name))
+ fatal("env_permitted: name '%.100s...' too long", env);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++)
if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i]))
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
if (mux_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN) {
fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
strerror(errno));
}
if (errno == ENOENT)
- debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
+ debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
else {
- error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+ error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
strerror(errno));
}
- close(sock);
- return;
- }
-
- if (stdin_null_flag) {
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(fd);
- }
+ close(sock);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ }
term = getenv("TERM");
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh1.h,v 1.5 2004/10/20 11:48:53 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh1.h,v 1.6 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.76 2006/01/20 11:21:45 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.97 2006/07/27 08:00:50 jmc Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
.El
.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
obtains configuration data from the following sources in
the following order:
+.Pp
.Bl -enum -offset indent -compact
.It
command-line options
Empty lines and lines starting with
.Ql #
are comments.
-.Pp
Otherwise a line is of the format
.Dq keyword arguments .
Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or
the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace
when specifying configuration options using the
.Nm ssh ,
-.Nm scp
+.Nm scp ,
and
.Nm sftp
.Fl o
option.
+Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+.Pq \&"
+in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
.Pp
The possible
keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
.Cm Host
keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
given after the keyword.
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-can be used as wildcards in the
-patterns.
A single
-.Ql \&*
+.Ql *
as a pattern can be used to provide global
defaults for all hosts.
The host is the
.Ar hostname
-argument given on the command line (i.e., the name is not converted to
+argument given on the command line (i.e. the name is not converted to
a canonicalized host name before matching).
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+for more information on patterns.
.It Cm AddressFamily
Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
Valid arguments are
.Dq any ,
.Dq inet
-(use IPv4 only) or
+(use IPv4 only), or
.Dq inet6
(use IPv6 only).
.It Cm BatchMode
is set to
.Dq yes .
.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-Specifies whether to use challenge response authentication.
+Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Dq yes
or
.It Cm CheckHostIP
If this flag is set to
.Dq yes ,
-ssh will additionally check the host IP address in the
+.Xr ssh 1
+will additionally check the host IP address in the
.Pa known_hosts
file.
This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing.
are supported.
.Ar des
is only supported in the
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations
that do not support the
.Ar 3des
.Dq blowfish-cbc ,
and
.Dq cast128-cbc .
-The default is
-.Bd -literal
- ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
- arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
- aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
.Ed
.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-Specifies that all local, remote and dynamic port forwardings
+Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
cleared.
This option is primarily useful when used from the
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
command line to clear port forwardings set in
configuration files, and is automatically set by
.Xr scp 1
This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
The default is 1.
.It Cm ConnectTimeout
-Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the ssh
-server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
+Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
+SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable,
not when it refuses the connection.
.It Cm ControlMaster
Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection.
When set to
-.Dq yes
-.Nm ssh
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the
.Cm ControlPath
argument.
.Pp
Setting this to
.Dq ask
-will cause
-.Nm ssh
+will cause ssh
to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using the
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
program before they are accepted (see
for details).
If the
.Cm ControlPath
-can not be opened,
-.Nm ssh
-will continue without connecting to a master instance.
+cannot be opened,
+ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance.
.Pp
X11 and
.Xr ssh-agent 1
.Dq none
to disable connection sharing.
In the path,
+.Ql %l
+will be substituted by the local host name,
.Ql %h
will be substituted by the target host name,
.Ql %p
-the port and
+the port, and
.Ql %r
by the remote login username.
It is recommended that any
.Cm ControlPath
used for opportunistic connection sharing include
-all three of these escape sequences.
+at least %h, %p, and %r.
This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
.It Cm DynamicForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.Pp
Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
will act as a SOCKS server.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
to disable the escape
character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary
data).
+.It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh 1
+should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested
+dynamic, local, and remote port forwardings.
+The argument must be
+.Dq yes
+or
+.Dq no .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
.It Cm ForwardAgent
Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
will be forwarded to the remote machine.
option is also enabled.
.It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
If this option is set to
-.Dq yes
-then remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
+.Dq yes ,
+remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
.Pp
If this option is set to
-.Dq no
-then remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
+.Dq no ,
+remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
clients.
Furthermore, the
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
forwarded ports.
By default,
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
binds local port forwardings to the loopback address.
This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
.Cm GatewayPorts
-can be used to specify that
-.Nm ssh
+can be used to specify that ssh
should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address,
thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
The argument must be
key exchange.
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
Indicates that
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
These hashed names may be used normally by
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
and
-.Nm sshd ,
+.Xr sshd 8 ,
but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
be disclosed.
The default is
.Dq no .
-Note that hashing of names and addresses will not be retrospectively applied
-to existing known hosts files, but these may be manually hashed using
+Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
+will not be converted automatically,
+but may be manually hashed using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
real host name when looking up or saving the host key
in the host key database files.
-This option is useful for tunneling ssh connections
+This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections
or for multiple servers running on a single host.
.It Cm HostName
Specifies the real host name to log into.
This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
-Default is the name given on the command line.
+The default is the name given on the command line.
Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
.Cm HostName
specifications).
.It Cm IdentitiesOnly
Specifies that
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
should only use the authentication identity files configured in the
.Nm
files,
-even if the
-.Nm ssh-agent
+even if
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
offers more identities.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Dq yes
or
.Dq no .
-This option is intended for situations where
-.Nm ssh-agent
+This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent
offers many different identities.
The default is
.Dq no .
for protocol version 2.
Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
will be used for authentication.
+.Pp
The file name may use the tilde
-syntax to refer to a user's home directory.
+syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following
+escape characters:
+.Ql %d
+(local user's home directory),
+.Ql %u
+(local user name),
+.Ql %l
+(local host name),
+.Ql %h
+(remote host name) or
+.Ql %r
+(remote user name).
+.Pp
It is possible to have
multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these
identities will be tried in sequence.
Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication.
Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
The default is to use the server specified list.
+The methods available vary depending on what the server supports.
+For an OpenSSH server,
+it may be zero or more of:
+.Dq bsdauth ,
+.Dq pam ,
+and
+.Dq skey .
.It Cm LocalCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
connecting to the server.
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.It Cm LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
-.Nm ssh .
+.Xr ssh 1 .
The possible values are:
-QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2 and DEBUG3.
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-The default is
+The default is:
.Dq hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 .
.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines.
.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
-Default is 3.
+The default is 3.
.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether to use password authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Dq no .
.It Cm Port
Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
-Default is 22.
+The default is 22.
.It Cm PreferredAuthentications
Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2
authentication methods.
over another method (e.g.\&
.Cm password )
The default for this option is:
-.Dq publickey,gssapi-keyex,external-keyx,gssapi-with-mic,gssapi,password,keyboard-interactive .
+.Do gssapi-keyex ,
+external-keyx,
+gssapi-with-mic,
+hostbased,
+publickey,
+keyboard-interactive,
+password
+.Dc .
.It Cm Protocol
Specifies the protocol versions
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
should support in order of preference.
The possible values are
-.Dq 1
+.Sq 1
and
-.Dq 2 .
+.Sq 2 .
Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
The default is
.Dq 2,1 .
-This means that
-.Nm ssh
+This means that ssh
tries version 2 and falls back to version 1
if version 2 is not available.
.It Cm ProxyCommand
.Sq G
to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
The default is between
-.Dq 1G
+.Sq 1G
and
-.Dq 4G ,
+.Sq 4G ,
depending on the cipher.
This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
.It Cm RemoteForward
The default is
.Dq no .
This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
to be setuid root.
.It Cm RSAAuthentication
Specifies whether to try RSA authentication.
Specifies what variables from the local
.Xr environ 7
should be sent to the server.
-Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2, the
-server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
+Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
+The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
accept these environment variables.
Refer to
.Cm AcceptEnv
in
.Xr sshd_config 5
for how to configure the server.
-Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&? .
+Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters.
Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
across multiple
.Cm SendEnv
directives.
The default is not to send any environment variables.
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+for more information on patterns.
.It Cm ServerAliveCountMax
Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
sent without
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
receiving any messages back from the server.
If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent,
-.Nm ssh
-will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
+ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very
different from
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
The default value is 3.
If, for example,
.Cm ServerAliveInterval
-(see below) is set to 15, and
+(see below) is set to 15 and
.Cm ServerAliveCountMax
-is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive ssh
-will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
+is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
+ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
.It Cm ServerAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
from the server,
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
will send a message through the encrypted
channel to request a response from the server.
The default
.It Cm SmartcardDevice
Specifies which smartcard device to use.
The argument to this keyword is the device
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
should use to communicate with a smartcard used for storing the user's
private RSA key.
By default, no device is specified and smartcard support is not activated.
.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
If this flag is set to
.Dq yes ,
-.Nm ssh
+.Xr ssh 1
will never automatically add host keys to the
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks,
-however, can be annoying when the
+though it can be annoying when the
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-file is poorly maintained, or connections to new hosts are
+file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are
frequently made.
This option forces the user to manually
add all new hosts.
If this flag is set to
.Dq no ,
-.Nm ssh
-will automatically add new host keys to the
+ssh will automatically add new host keys to the
user known hosts files.
If this flag is set to
.Dq ask ,
new host keys
will be added to the user known host files only after the user
has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
-.Nm ssh
-will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
+ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
The host keys of
known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
The argument must be
.Dq yes ,
-.Dq no
+.Dq no ,
or
.Dq ask .
The default is
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
.Dq no .
.It Cm Tunnel
-Request starting
+Request
.Xr tun 4
device forwarding between the client and the server.
-This option also allows requesting layer 2 (ethernet)
-instead of layer 3 (point-to-point) tunneling from the server.
The argument must be
.Dq yes ,
-.Dq point-to-point ,
+.Dq point-to-point
+(layer 3),
.Dq ethernet
+(layer 2),
or
.Dq no .
+Specifying
+.Dq yes
+requests the default tunnel mode, which is
+.Dq point-to-point .
The default is
.Dq no .
.It Cm TunnelDevice
-Force a specified
+Specifies the
.Xr tun 4
-device on the client.
-Without this option, the next available device will be used.
+devices to open on the client
+.Pq Ar local_tun
+and the server
+.Pq Ar remote_tun .
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun .
+.Sm on
+The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+.Dq any ,
+which uses the next available tunnel device.
+If
+.Ar remote_tun
+is not specified, it defaults to
+.Dq any .
+The default is
+.Dq any:any .
.It Cm UsePrivilegedPort
Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections.
The argument must be
The default is
.Dq no .
If set to
-.Dq yes
-.Nm ssh
+.Dq yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
must be setuid root.
Note that this option must be set to
.Dq yes
option.
The argument must be
.Dq yes ,
-.Dq no
+.Dq no ,
or
.Dq ask .
The default is
.Dq no .
Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.Pp
+See also
+.Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+in
+.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Cm XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the
.Xr xauth 1
The default is
.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
.El
+.Sh PATTERNS
+A
+.Em pattern
+consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters,
+.Sq *
+(a wildcard that matches zero or more characters),
+or
+.Sq ?\&
+(a wildcard that matches exactly one character).
+For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the
+.Dq .co.uk
+set of domains,
+the following pattern could be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl Host *.co.uk
+.Pp
+The following pattern
+would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range:
+.Pp
+.Dl Host 192.168.0.?
+.Pp
+A
+.Em pattern-list
+is a comma-separated list of patterns.
+Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated
+by preceding them with an exclamation mark
+.Pq Sq !\& .
+For example,
+to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organisation
+except from the
+.Dq dialup
+pool,
+the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&"
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file.
The format of this file is described above.
-This file is used by the
-.Nm ssh
-client.
+This file is used by the SSH client.
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.199 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.171 2005/12/06 22:38:27 reyk Exp $");
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
-#include "ssh.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "dns.h"
+#include "version.h"
char *client_version_string = NULL;
char *server_version_string = NULL;
int pin[2], pout[2];
pid_t pid;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- size_t len;
/* Convert the port number into a string. */
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port);
* Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms
* (e.g. Solaris)
*/
- len = strlen(proxy_command) + 6;
- tmp = xmalloc(len);
- strlcpy(tmp, "exec ", len);
- strlcat(tmp, proxy_command, len);
+ xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
command_string = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host,
"p", strport, (char *)NULL);
xfree(tmp);
char *argv[10];
/* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
- seteuid(original_real_uid);
- setuid(original_real_uid);
+ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
close(pin[1]);
fd_set *fdset;
struct timeval tv;
socklen_t optlen;
- int fdsetsz, optval, rc, result = -1;
+ int optval, rc, result = -1;
if (timeout <= 0)
return (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen));
if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
return (-1);
- fdsetsz = howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
- fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
-
- memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
+ fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS),
+ sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(sockfd, fdset);
tv.tv_sec = timeout;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
fatal("%s: %.100s: %s", __progname, host,
gai_strerror(gaierr));
- /*
- * Try to connect several times. On some machines, the first time
- * will sometimes fail. In general socket code appears to behave
- * quite magically on many machines.
- */
- for (attempt = 0; ;) {
+ for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
if (attempt > 0)
debug("Trying again...");
- /* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
- sequence until the connection succeeds. */
+ /*
+ * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
+ * sequence until the connection succeeds.
+ */
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
} else {
debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
- /*
- * Close the failed socket; there appear to
- * be some problems when reusing a socket for
- * which connect() has already returned an
- * error.
- */
close(sock);
+ sock = -1;
}
}
- if (ai)
+ if (sock != -1)
break; /* Successful connection. */
- attempt++;
- if (attempt >= connection_attempts)
- break;
/* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
sleep(1);
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
- if (attempt >= connection_attempts) {
+ if (sock == -1) {
error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
host, strport, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
- u_int i;
+ u_int i, n;
/* Read other side's version identification. */
- for (;;) {
+ for (n = 0;;) {
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
size_t len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
buf[i + 1] = 0;
break;
}
+ if (++n > 65536)
+ fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: No banner received");
}
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
* check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
* is not valid. the user_hostfile will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
*/
+#define RDRW 0
+#define RDONLY 1
+#define ROQUIET 2
static int
-check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
- int readonly, const char *user_hostfile, const char *system_hostfile)
+check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ Key *host_key, int readonly, const char *user_hostfile,
+ const char *system_hostfile)
{
Key *file_key;
const char *type = key_type(host_key);
- char *ip = NULL;
+ char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp;
HostStatus host_status;
HostStatus ip_status;
if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, salen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed");
- ip = xstrdup(ntop);
+ ip = put_host_port(ntop, port);
} else {
ip = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy command>");
}
* Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
* command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
*/
- if (options.check_host_ip &&
- (local || strcmp(host, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
+ if (options.check_host_ip && (local ||
+ strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
options.check_host_ip = 0;
/*
- * Allow the user to record the key under a different name. This is
- * useful for ssh tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run
- * multiple sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
+ * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
+ * differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh
+ * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
+ * sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
*/
if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
- host = options.host_key_alias;
+ host = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", host);
+ } else {
+ host = put_host_port(hostname, port);
}
/*
}
break;
case HOST_NEW:
+ if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
+ port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
+ debug("checking without port identifier");
+ if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key, 2,
+ user_hostfile, system_hostfile) == 0) {
+ debug("found matching key w/out port");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
if (readonly)
goto fail;
/* The host is new. */
"list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
break;
case HOST_CHANGED:
+ if (readonly == ROQUIET)
+ goto fail;
if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
char *key_msg;
if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
/*
* If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
* the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
- * agent forwarding.
+ * forwarding.
*/
if (options.password_authentication) {
error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
options.num_local_forwards =
options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
}
+ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
+ error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+ }
/*
* XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
* This could be done by converting the host key to an
}
xfree(ip);
+ xfree(host);
return 0;
fail:
xfree(ip);
+ xfree(host);
return -1;
}
/* return ok if the key can be found in an old keyfile */
if (stat(options.system_hostfile2, &st) == 0 ||
stat(options.user_hostfile2, &st) == 0) {
- if (check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key, /*readonly*/ 1,
- options.user_hostfile2, options.system_hostfile2) == 0)
+ if (check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key,
+ RDONLY, options.user_hostfile2,
+ options.system_hostfile2) == 0)
return 0;
}
- return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key, /*readonly*/ 0,
- options.user_hostfile, options.system_hostfile);
+ return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key,
+ RDRW, options.user_hostfile, options.system_hostfile);
}
/*
host = xstrdup(orighost);
for (cp = host; *cp; cp++)
if (isupper(*cp))
- *cp = tolower(*cp);
+ *cp = (char)tolower(*cp);
/* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
ssh_exchange_identification();
ssh_kex(host, hostaddr);
ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
}
+ xfree(local_user);
}
void
return;
}
size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32);
- padded = xmalloc(size);
- memset(padded, 0, size);
+ padded = xcalloc(1, size);
strlcpy(padded, password, size);
packet_put_string(padded, size);
memset(padded, 0, size);
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.69 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.62 2005/10/30 08:52:18 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "readconf.h"
-#include "key.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "misc.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
/* Session id for the current session. */
BIGNUM *challenge;
Key *public, *private;
char buf[300], *passphrase, *comment, *authfile;
- int i, type, quit;
+ int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit;
public = options.identity_keys[idx];
authfile = options.identity_files[idx];
if (public->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT)
private = public;
else
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL);
- if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode) {
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL,
+ &perm_ok);
+ if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode && perm_ok) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment);
for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
- authfile, passphrase, NULL);
+ authfile, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
quit = 0;
} else {
debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
xfree(comment);
if (private == NULL) {
- if (!options.batch_mode)
+ if (!options.batch_mode && perm_ok)
error("Bad passphrase.");
/* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.162 2006/08/30 00:06:51 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.143 2005/10/14 02:17:59 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
- }
-
+ }
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
#endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
debug3("input_userauth_banner");
msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
- if (options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+ if (options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
xfree(msg);
xfree(lang);
/* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
- if (gssctxt)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt);
- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&gssctxt);
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(gssctxt, &gss_supported->elements[mech]);
-
/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
- ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gss_supported->elements[mech],
- gss_host) &&
- !GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(gssctxt,
- gss_host))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host)) {
ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
} else {
mech++;
{
Key *private;
char prompt[300], *passphrase;
- int quit, i;
+ int perm_ok, quit, i;
struct stat st;
if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
debug3("no such identity: %s", filename);
return NULL;
}
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL);
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL, &perm_ok);
+ if (!perm_ok)
+ return NULL;
if (private == NULL) {
if (options.batch_mode)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename,
- passphrase, NULL);
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC,
+ filename, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
quit = 0;
} else {
debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1)
continue;
options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
- id = xmalloc(sizeof(*id));
- memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
id->key = key;
id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
}
}
if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
- id = xmalloc(sizeof(*id));
- memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
id->key = key;
id->filename = comment;
id->ac = ac;
return -1;
}
if (pid == 0) {
- seteuid(getuid());
- setuid(getuid());
+ permanently_drop_suid(getuid());
close(from[0]);
if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
if (p == NULL) {
error("userauth_hostbased: cannot get local ipaddr/name");
key_free(private);
+ xfree(blob);
return 0;
}
len = strlen(p) + 2;
- chost = xmalloc(len);
- strlcpy(chost, p, len);
- strlcat(chost, ".", len);
+ xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", p);
debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s", chost);
xfree(p);
error("key_sign failed");
xfree(chost);
xfree(pkalg);
+ xfree(blob);
return 0;
}
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
xfree(signature);
xfree(chost);
xfree(pkalg);
+ xfree(blob);
packet_send();
return 1;
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.215 2006/02/01 09:11:41 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.234 2006/08/21 08:15:57 dtucker Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Nm
rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
.Dv SIGHUP ,
-by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.,
+by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\&
.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd .
.Pp
The options are as follows:
from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can
respond to the client, and this may take tens of seconds.
Clients would have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time.
-However, with small key sizes (e.g., 512) using
+However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512) using
.Nm
from inetd may
be feasible.
.Ql \&*NP\&*
).
.Pp
-System security is not improved unless
-.Nm rshd ,
-.Nm rlogind ,
-and
-.Nm rexecd
-are disabled (thus completely disabling
-.Xr rlogin
-and
-.Xr rsh
-into the machine).
-.Sh COMMAND EXECUTION AND DATA FORWARDING
If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for
preparing the session is entered.
At this time the client may request
forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent
connection over the secure channel.
.Pp
-Finally, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
+After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
The sides then enter session mode.
In this mode, either side may send
data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or
.Dq rc
files are given the X11
authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
+See
+.Sx SSHRC ,
+below.
.It
Runs user's shell or command.
.El
+.Sh SSHRC
+If the file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+exists,
+.Xr sh 1
+runs it after reading the
+environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
+It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
+instead.
+If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
+its standard input (and
+.Ev DISPLAY
+in its environment).
+The script must call
+.Xr xauth 1
+because
+.Nm
+will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
+.Pp
+The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
+which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
+accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
+.Pp
+This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
+something similar to:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
+ if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
+ # X11UseLocalhost=yes
+ echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
+ cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
+ else
+ # X11UseLocalhost=no
+ echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
+ fi | xauth -q -
+fi
+.Ed
+.Pp
+If this file does not exist,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+is run, and if that
+does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
-.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-is the default file that lists the public keys that are
-permitted for RSA authentication in protocol version 1
-and for public key authentication (PubkeyAuthentication)
-in protocol version 2.
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
-may be used to specify an alternative file.
-.Pp
+specifies the file containing public keys for
+public key authentication;
+if none is specified, the default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys .
Each line of the file contains one
key (empty lines and lines starting with a
.Ql #
are ignored as
comments).
-Each RSA public key consists of the following fields, separated by
-spaces: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
-Each protocol version 2 public key consists of:
-options, keytype, base64 encoded key, comment.
-The options field
-is optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts
+Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
+options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.
+Protocol 2 public key consist of:
+options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
+The options field is optional;
+its presence is determined by whether the line starts
with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number).
-The bits, exponent, modulus and comment fields give the RSA key for
+The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for
protocol version 1; the
comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
user to identify the key).
keys up to 16 kilobits.
You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
.Pa identity.pub ,
-.Pa id_dsa.pub
+.Pa id_dsa.pub ,
or the
.Pa id_rsa.pub
file and edit it.
The following option specifications are supported (note
that option keywords are case-insensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Cm from="pattern-list"
-Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, the canonical name
-of the remote host must be present in the comma-separated list of
-patterns
-.Pf ( Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-serve as wildcards).
-The list may also contain
-patterns negated by prefixing them with
-.Ql \&! ;
-if the canonical host name matches a negated pattern, the key is not accepted.
-The purpose
-of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication
-by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but
-the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
-permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
-This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
-servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
-just the key).
.It Cm command="command"
Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
authentication.
An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11
forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited.
+The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+environment variable.
Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
.It Cm environment="NAME=value"
Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
This option is automatically disabled if
.Cm UseLogin
is enabled.
+.It Cm from="pattern-list"
+Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, the canonical name
+of the remote host must be present in the comma-separated list of
+patterns.
+The purpose
+of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication
+by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but
+the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
+permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
+This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
+servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
+just the key).
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
+Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
+authentication.
.It Cm no-port-forwarding
Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
-This might be used, e.g., in connection with the
+This might be used, e.g. in connection with the
.Cm command
option.
+.It Cm no-pty
+Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
.It Cm no-X11-forwarding
Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
-.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
-Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
-authentication.
-.It Cm no-pty
-Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
.It Cm permitopen="host:port"
Limit local
.Li ``ssh -L''
Without this option, the next available device will be used if
the client requests a tunnel.
.El
-.Ss Examples
-1024 33 12121...312314325 ylo@foo.bar
.Pp
-from="*.niksula.hut.fi,!pc.niksula.hut.fi" 1024 35 23...2334 ylo@niksula
-.Pp
-command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding 1024 33 23...2323 backup.hut.fi
-.Pp
-permitopen="10.2.1.55:80",permitopen="10.2.1.56:25" 1024 33 23...2323
-.Pp
-tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== reyk@openbsd.org
+An example authorized_keys file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net
+from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
+AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net
+command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss
+AAAAC3...51R== example.net
+permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss
+AAAAB5...21S==
+tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
+jane@example.net
+.Ed
.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
The
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
The global file should
be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
-maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host
+maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host,
its key is added to the per-user file.
.Pp
Each line in these files contains the following fields: hostnames,
The fields are separated by spaces.
.Pp
Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns
-.Pf ( Ql \&*
+.Pf ( Ql *
and
.Ql \&?
act as
to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
pattern on the line.
+A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within
+.Ql \&[
+and
+.Ql \&]
+brackets then followed by
+.Ql \&:
+and a non-standard port number.
.Pp
Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names
and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.
negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
.Pp
Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they
-can be obtained, e.g., from
+can be obtained, for example, from
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub .
The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
.Pp
or by taking
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
and adding the host names at the front.
-.Ss Examples
-.Bd -literal
-closenet,...,130.233.208.41 1024 37 159...93 closenet.hut.fi
-cvs.openbsd.org,199.185.137.3 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
-.Ed
-.Bd -literal
+.Pp
+An example ssh_known_hosts file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
+cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
# A hashed hostname
|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
AAAA1234.....=
.Ed
.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
-Contains configuration data for
-.Nm sshd .
-The file format and configuration options are described in
-.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-These three files contain the private parts of the host keys.
-These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
-accessible to others.
-Note that
-.Nm
-does not start if this file is group/world-accessible.
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
-These three files contain the public parts of the host keys.
-These files should be world-readable but writable only by
-root.
-Their contents should match the respective private parts.
-These files are not
-really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
-the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
-These files are created using
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.It Pa /etc/moduli
-Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
-The file format is described in
-.Xr moduli 5 .
-.It Pa /var/empty
-.Xr chroot 2
-directory used by
-.Nm
-during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
-The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
-and not group or world-writable.
-.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
-Contains the process ID of the
-.Nm
-listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
-concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
-started last).
-The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-Lists the public keys (RSA or DSA) that can be used to log into the user's account.
-This file must be readable by root (which may on some machines imply
-it being world-readable if the user's home directory resides on an NFS
-volume).
-It is recommended that it not be accessible by others.
-The format of this file is described above.
-Users will place the contents of their
-.Pa identity.pub ,
-.Pa id_dsa.pub
-and/or
-.Pa id_rsa.pub
-files into this file, as described in
-.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.It Pa "/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts", "~/.ssh/known_hosts"
-These files are consulted when using rhosts with RSA host
-authentication or protocol version 2 hostbased authentication
-to check the public key of the host.
-The key must be listed in one of these files to be accepted.
-The client uses the same files
-to verify that it is connecting to the correct remote host.
-These files should be writable only by root/the owner.
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
-should be world-readable, and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-can, but need not be, world-readable.
-.It Pa /etc/motd
-See
-.Xr motd 5 .
-.It Pa ~/.hushlogin
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It ~/.hushlogin
This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
.Pa /etc/motd ,
if
are enabled.
It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
.Cm Banner .
-.It Pa /etc/nologin
-If this file exists,
+.Pp
+.It ~/.rhosts
+This file is used for host-based authentication (see
+.Xr ssh 1
+for more information).
+On some machines this file may need to be
+world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
+because
.Nm
-refuses to let anyone except root log in.
-The contents of the file
-are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
-refused.
-The file should be world-readable.
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny
-Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
-Further details are described in
-.Xr hosts_access 5 .
-.It Pa ~/.rhosts
-This file is used during
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-and
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
-and contains host-username pairs, separated by a space, one per
-line.
-The given user on the corresponding host is permitted to log in
-without a password.
-The same file is used by rlogind and rshd.
-The file must
-be writable only by the user; it is recommended that it not be
+reads it as root.
+Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
+and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
+The recommended
+permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.
.Pp
-It is also possible to use netgroups in the file.
-Either host or user
-name may be of the form +@groupname to specify all hosts or all users
-in the group.
-.It Pa ~/.shosts
-For ssh,
-this file is exactly the same as for
-.Pa .rhosts .
-However, this file is
-not used by rlogin and rshd, so using this permits access using SSH only.
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
-This file is used during
-.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
-and
-.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
-authentication.
-In the simplest form, this file contains host names, one per line.
-Users on
-those hosts are permitted to log in without a password, provided they
-have the same user name on both machines.
-The host name may also be
-followed by a user name; such users are permitted to log in as
-.Em any
-user on this machine (except root).
-Additionally, the syntax
-.Dq +@group
-can be used to specify netgroups.
-Negated entries start with
-.Ql \&- .
-.Pp
-If the client host/user is successfully matched in this file, login is
-automatically permitted provided the client and server user names are the
-same.
-Additionally, successful client host key authentication is required.
-This file must be writable only by root; it is recommended
-that it be world-readable.
-.Pp
-.Sy "Warning: It is almost never a good idea to use user names in"
-.Pa hosts.equiv .
-Beware that it really means that the named user(s) can log in as
-.Em anybody ,
-which includes bin, daemon, adm, and other accounts that own critical
-binaries and directories.
-Using a user name practically grants the user root access.
-The only valid use for user names that I can think
-of is in negative entries.
-.Pp
-Note that this warning also applies to rsh/rlogin.
-.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
-This is processed exactly as
-.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv .
-However, this file may be useful in environments that want to run both
-rsh/rlogin and ssh.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+.It ~/.shosts
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa .rhosts ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in as this user.
+The format of this file is described above.
+The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
+permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+If this file, the
+.Pa ~/.ssh
+directory, or the user's home directory are writable
+by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized
+users.
+In this case,
+.Nm
+will not allow it to be used unless the
+.Cm StrictModes
+option has been set to
+.Dq no .
+The recommended permissions can be set by executing
+.Dq chmod go-w ~/ ~/.ssh ~/.ssh/authorized_keys .
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/environment
This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
.Ql # ) ,
controlled via the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option.
-.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-If this file exists, it is run with
-.Pa /bin/sh
-after reading the
-environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
-It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
-instead.
-If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
-its standard input (and
-.Ev DISPLAY
-in its environment).
-The script must call
-.Xr xauth 1
-because
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
+that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+can, but need not be, world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It ~/.ssh/rc
+Contains initialization routines to be run before
+the user's home directory becomes accessible.
+This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+readable by anyone else.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/hosts.allow
+.It /etc/hosts.deny
+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
+Further details are described in
+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/hosts.equiv
+This file is for host-based authentication (see
+.Xr ssh 1 ) .
+It should only be writable by root.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/moduli
+Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
+The file format is described in
+.Xr moduli 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/motd
+See
+.Xr motd 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/nologin
+If this file exists,
.Nm
-will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
+refuses to let anyone except root log in.
+The contents of the file
+are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
+refused.
+The file should be world-readable.
.Pp
-The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
-which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
-accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
+.It /etc/shosts.equiv
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa hosts.equiv ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+Systemwide list of known host keys.
+This file should be prepared by the
+system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
+organization.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+should be world-readable.
.Pp
-This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
-something similar to:
-.Bd -literal
-if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
- if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
- # X11UseLocalhost=yes
- echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
- cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
- else
- # X11UseLocalhost=no
- echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
- fi | xauth -q -
-fi
-.Ed
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These three files contain the private parts of the host keys.
+These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+accessible to others.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
.Pp
-If this file does not exist,
-.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
-is run, and if that
-does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+.It /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+These three files contain the public parts of the host keys.
+These files should be world-readable but writable only by
+root.
+Their contents should match the respective private parts.
+These files are not
+really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
+the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
+These files are created using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.Pp
-This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
-readable by anyone else.
-.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
-Like
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
-This can be used to specify
+.It /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+Contains configuration data for
+.Nm sshd .
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.It /etc/ssh/sshrc
+Similar to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc ,
+it can be used to specify
machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It /var/empty
+.Xr chroot 2
+directory used by
+.Nm
+during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
+The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
+and not group or world-writable.
+.Pp
+.It /var/run/sshd.pid
+Contains the process ID of the
+.Nm
+listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
+concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+started last).
+The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
.Xr inetd 8 ,
.Xr sftp-server 8
-.Rs
-.%A T. Ylonen
-.%A T. Kivinen
-.%A M. Saarinen
-.%A T. Rinne
-.%A S. Lehtinen
-.%T "SSH Protocol Architecture"
-.%N draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-12.txt
-.%D January 2002
-.%O work in progress material
-.Re
-.Rs
-.%A M. Friedl
-.%A N. Provos
-.%A W. A. Simpson
-.%T "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the SSH Transport Layer Protocol"
-.%N draft-ietf-secsh-dh-group-exchange-02.txt
-.%D January 2002
-.%O work in progress material
-.Re
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
for privilege separation.
+.Sh CAVEATS
+System security is not improved unless
+.Nm rshd ,
+.Nm rlogind ,
+and
+.Nm rexecd
+are disabled (thus completely disabling
+.Xr rlogin
+and
+.Xr rsh
+into the machine).
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.347 2006/08/18 09:15:20 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.318 2005/12/24 02:27:41 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <prot.h>
#endif
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "cipher.h"
-#include "kex.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "kex.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "monitor_mm.h"
#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "version.h"
#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
int startup_pipe; /* in child */
/* variables used for privilege separation */
-int use_privsep;
+int use_privsep = -1;
struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
/* global authentication context */
Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
+/* sshd_config buffer */
+Buffer cfg;
+
/* message to be displayed after login */
Buffer loginmsg;
+/* Unprivileged user */
+struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
* the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
* the server key).
*/
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sighup_handler(int sig)
{
/*
* Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
*/
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
* SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
* reap any zombies left by exited children.
*/
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
/*
* Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
*/
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
{
- /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
-
if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
/* Log error and exit. */
- fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
}
/*
arc4random_stir();
}
+/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
{
{
u_int32_t rnd[256];
gid_t gidset[1];
- struct passwd *pw;
int i;
/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
- if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
- fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
- memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
- endpwent();
-
/* Change our root directory */
if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* Drop our privileges */
- debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
- (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+ debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
+ (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
#if 0
/* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
- do_setusercontext(pw);
+ do_setusercontext(privsep_pw);
#else
- gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
+ gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- permanently_set_uid(pw);
+ permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
#endif
}
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
+/* Accept a connection from inetd */
+static void
+server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ if (rexeced_flag) {
+ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+ *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ if (!debug_flag) {
+ startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ }
+ } else {
+ *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+ }
+ /*
+ * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
+ * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
+ * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
+ */
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+ dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+ dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ if (fd > STDOUT_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Listen for TCP connections
+ */
+static void
+server_listen(void)
+{
+ int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
+ struct addrinfo *ai;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+ for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+ continue;
+ if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
+ fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
+ "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
+ if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+ error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+ (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
+ strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Create socket for listening. */
+ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+ ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (listen_sock < 0) {
+ /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
+ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
+ close(listen_sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Set socket options.
+ * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
+ */
+ if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
+ &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+ error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
+
+ /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
+ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+ strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
+ close(listen_sock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
+ num_listen_socks++;
+
+ /* Start listening on the port. */
+ if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
+ fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
+ ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+ logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
+
+ if (!num_listen_socks)
+ fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
+}
+
+/*
+ * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
+ * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
+ */
+static void
+server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
+{
+ fd_set *fdset;
+ int i, j, ret, maxfd;
+ int key_used = 0, startups = 0;
+ int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ /* setup fd set for accept */
+ fdset = NULL;
+ maxfd = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+ if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
+ maxfd = listen_socks[i];
+ /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
+ startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
+ * the daemon is killed with a signal.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (received_sighup)
+ sighup_restart();
+ if (fdset != NULL)
+ xfree(fdset);
+ fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS),
+ sizeof(fd_mask));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+ FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+ FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
+
+ /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
+ ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
+ error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (received_sigterm) {
+ logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ (int) received_sigterm);
+ close_listen_socks();
+ unlink(options.pid_file);
+ exit(255);
+ }
+ if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
+ generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+ key_used = 0;
+ key_do_regen = 0;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+ if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
+ FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
+ /*
+ * the read end of the pipe is ready
+ * if the child has closed the pipe
+ * after successful authentication
+ * or if the child has died
+ */
+ close(startup_pipes[i]);
+ startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+ startups--;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
+ if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
+ continue;
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
+ if (*newsock < 0) {
+ if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
+ error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) {
+ close(*newsock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
+ debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
+ close(*newsock);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
+ close(*newsock);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
+ SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
+ error("reexec socketpair: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(*newsock);
+ close(startup_p[0]);
+ close(startup_p[1]);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
+ if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
+ startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
+ if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
+ maxfd = startup_p[0];
+ startups++;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
+ * we are in debugging mode.
+ */
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ /*
+ * In debugging mode. Close the listening
+ * socket, and start processing the
+ * connection without forking.
+ */
+ debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
+ close_listen_socks();
+ *sock_in = *newsock;
+ *sock_out = *newsock;
+ close(startup_p[0]);
+ close(startup_p[1]);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ pid = getpid();
+ if (rexec_flag) {
+ send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
+ &cfg);
+ close(config_s[0]);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
+ * the child process the connection. The
+ * parent continues listening.
+ */
+ platform_pre_fork();
+ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Child. Close the listening and
+ * max_startup sockets. Start using
+ * the accepted socket. Reinitialize
+ * logging (since our pid has changed).
+ * We break out of the loop to handle
+ * the connection.
+ */
+ platform_post_fork_child();
+ startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
+ close_startup_pipes();
+ close_listen_socks();
+ *sock_in = *newsock;
+ *sock_out = *newsock;
+ log_init(__progname,
+ options.log_level,
+ options.log_facility,
+ log_stderr);
+ if (rexec_flag)
+ close(config_s[0]);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
+ platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
+ if (pid < 0)
+ error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ else
+ debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
+
+ close(startup_p[1]);
+
+ if (rexec_flag) {
+ send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
+ close(config_s[0]);
+ close(config_s[1]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Mark that the key has been used (it
+ * was "given" to the child).
+ */
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
+ key_used == 0) {
+ /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
+ signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
+ alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
+ key_used = 1;
+ }
+
+ close(*newsock);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that our random state differs
+ * from that of the child
+ */
+ arc4random_stir();
+ }
+
+ /* child process check (or debug mode) */
+ if (num_listen_socks < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+
/*
* Main program for the daemon.
*/
{
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
- int opt, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
+ int opt, i, on = 1;
int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
- pid_t pid;
- socklen_t fromlen;
- fd_set *fdset;
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
const char *remote_ip;
int remote_port;
- FILE *f;
- struct addrinfo *ai;
- char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
char *line;
- int listen_sock, maxfd;
- int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
- int startups = 0;
+ int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
Key *key;
Authctxt *authctxt;
- int ret, key_used = 0;
- Buffer cfg;
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
rexec_argc = ac;
- saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1));
+ saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_argv[i] = NULL;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
case 'b':
- options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg);
+ options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256,
+ 32768, NULL);
break;
case 'p':
options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
test_flag = 1;
break;
case 'u':
- utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
+ utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, MAXHOSTNAMELEN+1, NULL);
if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
exit(1);
case 'o':
line = xstrdup(optarg);
if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
- "command-line", 0) != 0)
+ "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
exit(1);
xfree(line);
break;
else
load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
- parse_server_config(&options,
- rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, &cfg);
-
- if (!rexec_flag)
- buffer_free(&cfg);
+ parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
+ &cfg, NULL, NULL, NULL);
seed_rng();
debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
+ /* Store privilege separation user for later use */
+ if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+ memset(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
+ privsep_pw->pw_passwd = "*";
+ privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
+ endpwent();
+
/* load private host keys */
- sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
+ sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(Key *));
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
}
if (use_privsep) {
- struct passwd *pw;
struct stat st;
- if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
- fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
if (rexec_flag) {
- rexec_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(char *) * (rexec_argc + 2));
+ rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) {
debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
/* ignore SIGPIPE */
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
- /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
+ /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
if (inetd_flag) {
- int fd;
+ server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
- startup_pipe = -1;
- if (rexeced_flag) {
- close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
- sock_in = sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- if (!debug_flag) {
- startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- }
- } else {
- sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
- sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
- }
- /*
- * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
- * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
- * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
- */
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
- dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
- dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
- if (fd > STDOUT_FILENO)
- close(fd);
- }
- debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
generate_ephemeral_server_key();
} else {
- for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
- continue;
- if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
- fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
- "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
- if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
- ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
- error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
- (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
- strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
- /* Create socket for listening. */
- listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
- ai->ai_protocol);
- if (listen_sock < 0) {
- /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
- verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
- if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
- close(listen_sock);
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * Set socket options.
- * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
- */
- if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
- &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
- error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
-
- /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
- if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- if (!ai->ai_next)
- error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
- strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
- close(listen_sock);
- continue;
- }
- listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
- num_listen_socks++;
-
- /* Start listening on the port. */
- logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
- if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
- fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
- }
- freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
-
- if (!num_listen_socks)
- fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
+ server_listen();
if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
generate_ephemeral_server_key();
- /*
- * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs
- * listen_sock.
- */
signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
-
+ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
- /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
- signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
-
- /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
+ /*
+ * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
+ * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
+ */
if (!debug_flag) {
- /*
- * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
- * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to
- * do this before the bind above because the bind will
- * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
- * overwrite any old pid in the file.
- */
- f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
+ FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
+
if (f == NULL) {
error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
}
}
- /* setup fd set for listen */
- fdset = NULL;
- maxfd = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
- if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
- maxfd = listen_socks[i];
- /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
- startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int));
- for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
- startup_pipes[i] = -1;
-
- /*
- * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
- * the daemon is killed with a signal.
- */
- for (;;) {
- if (received_sighup)
- sighup_restart();
- if (fdset != NULL)
- xfree(fdset);
- fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
- fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
- memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
- FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
- for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
- if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
- FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
-
- /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
- ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
- error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (received_sigterm) {
- logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- (int) received_sigterm);
- close_listen_socks();
- unlink(options.pid_file);
- exit(255);
- }
- if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
- generate_ephemeral_server_key();
- key_used = 0;
- key_do_regen = 0;
- }
- if (ret < 0)
- continue;
-
- for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
- if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
- FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
- /*
- * the read end of the pipe is ready
- * if the child has closed the pipe
- * after successful authentication
- * or if the child has died
- */
- close(startup_pipes[i]);
- startup_pipes[i] = -1;
- startups--;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
- if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
- continue;
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from,
- &fromlen);
- if (newsock < 0) {
- if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
- error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- continue;
- }
- if (unset_nonblock(newsock) == -1) {
- close(newsock);
- continue;
- }
- if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
- debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
- close(newsock);
- continue;
- }
- if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
- close(newsock);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
- SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
- error("reexec socketpair: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(newsock);
- close(startup_p[0]);
- close(startup_p[1]);
- continue;
- }
-
- for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
- if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
- startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
- if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
- maxfd = startup_p[0];
- startups++;
- break;
- }
-
- /*
- * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
- * we are in debugging mode.
- */
- if (debug_flag) {
- /*
- * In debugging mode. Close the listening
- * socket, and start processing the
- * connection without forking.
- */
- debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
- close_listen_socks();
- sock_in = newsock;
- sock_out = newsock;
- close(startup_p[0]);
- close(startup_p[1]);
- startup_pipe = -1;
- pid = getpid();
- if (rexec_flag) {
- send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
- &cfg);
- close(config_s[0]);
- }
- break;
- } else {
- /*
- * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
- * the child process the connection. The
- * parent continues listening.
- */
- if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
- /*
- * Child. Close the listening and max_startup
- * sockets. Start using the accepted socket.
- * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
- * changed). We break out of the loop to handle
- * the connection.
- */
- startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
- close_startup_pipes();
- close_listen_socks();
- sock_in = newsock;
- sock_out = newsock;
- log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- if (rexec_flag)
- close(config_s[0]);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
- if (pid < 0)
- error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- else
- debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
-
- close(startup_p[1]);
-
- if (rexec_flag) {
- send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
- close(config_s[0]);
- close(config_s[1]);
- }
-
- /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
- key_used == 0) {
- /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
- signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
- alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
- key_used = 1;
- }
-
- arc4random_stir();
-
- /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
- close(newsock);
- }
- /* child process check (or debug mode) */
- if (num_listen_socks < 0)
- break;
- }
+ /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+ server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ &newsock, config_s);
}
/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
* We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of
* get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked.
*/
- remote_ip = get_canonical_hostname(0);
+ (void) get_canonical_hostname(0);
+ /*
+ * The rest of the code depends on the fact that
+ * get_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
+ * the socket goes away.
+ */
+ remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
packet_set_nonblocking();
/* allocate authentication context */
- authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
- memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
*/
alarm(0);
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ authctxt->authenticated = 1;
if (startup_pipe != -1) {
close(startup_pipe);
startup_pipe = -1;
{
int rsafail = 0;
- if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
+ if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
/* Server key has bigger modulus. */
if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("do_connection: %s: "
+ "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
get_remote_ipaddr(),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
} else {
/* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) +
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ fatal("do_connection: %s: "
+ "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
get_remote_ipaddr(),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
}
-
+
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
/* start key exchange */
kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
-# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.73 2005/12/06 22:38:28 reyk Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.74 2006/07/19 13:07:10 dtucker Exp $
# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See
# sshd_config(5) for more information.
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication mechanism.
-# Depending on your PAM configuration, this may bypass the setting of
-# PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, and
-# "PermitRootLogin without-password". If you just want the PAM account and
-# session checks to run without PAM authentication, then enable this but set
-# ChallengeResponseAuthentication=no
+# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and
+# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration,
+# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
+# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
+# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
#UsePAM no
#AllowTcpForwarding yes
#MaxStartups 10
#PermitTunnel no
-# override default of no subsystems
-Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
-
-# no default banner path
-#Banner /some/path
-
# the following are HPN related configuration options
# tcp receive buffer polling. enable in autotuning kernels
#TcpRcvBufPoll no
# buffer size for hpn to non-hn connections
#HPNBufferSize 2048
+# end of HPN options
+
+# no default banner path
+#Banner /some/path
+
+# override default of no subsystems
+Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
+# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+#Match User anoncvs
+# X11Forwarding no
+# AllowTcpForwarding no
+# ForceCommand cvs server
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.48 2006/01/02 17:09:49 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.70 2006/08/21 08:14:01 dtucker Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
.El
.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
reads configuration data from
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
(or the file specified with
Lines starting with
.Ql #
and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
+Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+.Pq \&"
+in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
.Pp
The possible
keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
for how to configure the client.
Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
-.Ql \&*
+.Ql *
and
.Ql \&? .
Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
The default is not to accept any environment variables.
.It Cm AddressFamily
Specifies which address family should be used by
-.Nm sshd .
+.Xr sshd 8 .
Valid arguments are
.Dq any ,
.Dq inet
-(use IPv4 only) or
+(use IPv4 only), or
.Dq inet6
(use IPv6 only).
The default is
by spaces.
If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-can be used as
-wildcards in the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all groups.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
The default is
by spaces.
If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
match one of the patterns.
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-can be used as
-wildcards in the patterns.
Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all users.
If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
users from particular hosts.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
for user authentication.
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
-set-up.
+setup.
The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
-%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated and
+%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
%u is replaced by the username of that user.
After expansion,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
This option is only available for protocol version 2.
By default, no banner is displayed.
.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-Specifies whether challenge response authentication is allowed.
+Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed.
All authentication styles from
.Xr login.conf 5
are supported.
.Dq blowfish-cbc ,
and
.Dq cast128-cbc .
-The default is
-.Bd -literal
- ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
- arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
- aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
.Ed
.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be
sent without
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
receiving any messages back from the client.
If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent,
-.Nm sshd
-will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
+sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very
different from
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
.Cm ClientAliveInterval
(see below) is set to 15, and
.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-is left at the default, unresponsive ssh clients
+is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
from the client,
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
will send a message through the encrypted
channel to request a response from the client.
The default
by spaces.
Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary
group list matches one of the patterns.
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-can be used as
-wildcards in the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all groups.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
.It Cm DenyUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
by spaces.
Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
-.Ql \&*
-and
-.Ql \&?
-can be used as wildcards in the patterns.
Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all users.
If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
users from particular hosts.
+The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+and finally
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm ForceCommand
+Forces the execution of the command specified by
+.Cm ForceCommand ,
+ignoring any command supplied by the client.
+The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option.
+This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution.
+It is most useful inside a
+.Cm Match
+block.
+The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+environment variable.
.It Cm GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
forwarded for the client.
By default,
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address.
This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
.Cm GatewayPorts
-can be used to specify that
-.Nm sshd
+can be used to specify that sshd
should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus
allowing other hosts to connect.
The argument may be
.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
-(hostbased authentication).
+(host-based authentication).
This option is similar to
.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
and applies to protocol version 2 only.
The default is
.Dq no .
+.It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
+Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse
+name lookup when matching the name in the
+.Pa ~/.shosts ,
+.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
+and
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+files during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+A setting of
+.Dq yes
+means that
+.Xr sshd 8
+uses the name supplied by the client rather than
+attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
.It Cm HostKey
Specifies a file containing a private host key
used by SSH.
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
for protocol version 2.
Note that
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible.
It is possible to have multiple host key files.
.Dq rsa1
.Dq yes .
.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
should ignore the user's
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
during
will be validated through the Kerberos KDC.
To use this option, the server needs a
Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
-Default is
+The default is
.Dq no .
.It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken
If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire
an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
-Default is
+The default is
.Dq no .
.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd
-If set then if password authentication through Kerberos fails then
+If password authentication through Kerberos fails then
the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
such as
.Pa /etc/passwd .
-Default is
+The default is
.Dq yes .
.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
file on logout.
-Default is
+The default is
.Dq yes .
.It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval
In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated
The default is 3600 (seconds).
.It Cm ListenAddress
Specifies the local addresses
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
should listen on.
The following forms may be used:
.Pp
If
.Ar port
is not specified,
-.Nm sshd
-will listen on the address and all prior
+sshd will listen on the address and all prior
.Cm Port
options specified.
The default is to listen on all local addresses.
options are permitted.
Additionally, any
.Cm Port
-options must precede this option for non port qualified addresses.
+options must precede this option for non-port qualified addresses.
.It Cm LoginGraceTime
The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
successfully logged in.
The default is 120 seconds.
.It Cm LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
-.Nm sshd .
+.Xr sshd 8 .
The possible values are:
-QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2 and DEBUG3.
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2
for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-The default is
+The default is:
.Dq hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 .
+.It Cm Match
+Introduces a conditional block.
+If all of the criteria on the
+.Cm Match
+line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those
+set in the global section of the config file, until either another
+.Cm Match
+line or the end of the file.
+The arguments to
+.Cm Match
+are one or more criteria-pattern pairs.
+The available criteria are
+.Cm User ,
+.Cm Group ,
+.Cm Host ,
+and
+.Cm Address .
+Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
+.Cm Match
+keyword.
+Available keywords are
+.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
+.Cm ForceCommand ,
+.Cm GatewayPorts ,
+.Cm PermitOpen ,
+.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
+.Cm X11Forwarding ,
+and
+.Cm X11UseLocalHost .
.It Cm MaxAuthTries
Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per
connection.
The default is 6.
.It Cm MaxStartups
Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the
-.Nm sshd
-daemon.
+SSH daemon.
Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
.Cm LoginGraceTime
expires for a connection.
Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
the three colon separated values
.Dq start:rate:full
-(e.g., "10:30:60").
-.Nm sshd
+(e.g. "10:30:60").
+.Xr sshd 8
will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
.Dq rate/100
(30%)
server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
The default is
.Dq no .
+.It Cm PermitOpen
+Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted.
+The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar host : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar IPv4_addr : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
+An argument of
+.Dq any
+can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
+By default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
.It Cm PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether root can log in using
.Xr ssh 1 .
The argument must be
.Dq yes ,
.Dq without-password ,
-.Dq forced-commands-only
+.Dq forced-commands-only ,
or
.Dq no .
The default is
.Dq yes .
.Pp
If this option is set to
-.Dq without-password
+.Dq without-password ,
password authentication is disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to
-.Dq forced-commands-only
+.Dq forced-commands-only ,
root login with public key authentication will be allowed,
but only if the
.Ar command
All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to
-.Dq no
+.Dq no ,
root is not allowed to log in.
.It Cm PermitTunnel
Specifies whether
device forwarding is allowed.
The argument must be
.Dq yes ,
-.Dq point-to-point ,
+.Dq point-to-point
+(layer 3),
.Dq ethernet
-or
+(layer 2), or
.Dq no .
+Specifying
+.Dq yes
+permits both
+.Dq point-to-point
+and
+.Dq ethernet .
The default is
.Dq no .
.It Cm PermitUserEnvironment
options in
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
are processed by
-.Nm sshd .
+.Xr sshd 8 .
The default is
.Dq no .
Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access
.Ev LD_PRELOAD .
.It Cm PidFile
Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the
-.Nm sshd
-daemon.
+SSH daemon.
The default is
.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .
.It Cm Port
Specifies the port number that
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
listens on.
The default is 22.
Multiple options of this type are permitted.
.Cm ListenAddress .
.It Cm PrintLastLog
Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs
in interactively.
The default is
.Dq yes .
.It Cm PrintMotd
Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
should print
.Pa /etc/motd
when a user logs in interactively.
.Dq yes .
.It Cm Protocol
Specifies the protocol versions
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
supports.
The possible values are
-.Dq 1
+.Sq 1
and
-.Dq 2 .
+.Sq 2 .
Multiple versions must be comma-separated.
The default is
.Dq 2,1 .
The minimum value is 512, and the default is 768.
.It Cm StrictModes
Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
should check file modes and ownership of the
user's files and home directory before accepting login.
This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their
The default is
.Dq yes .
.It Cm Subsystem
-Configures an external subsystem (e.g., file transfer daemon).
-Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command to execute upon subsystem
-request.
+Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
+Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments)
+to execute upon subsystem request.
The command
.Xr sftp-server 8
implements the
Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
.It Cm SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
-.Nm sshd .
+.Xr sshd 8 .
The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
.Dq no .
.It Cm UseDNS
Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
should look up the remote host name and check that
the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
very same IP address.
.Dq yes
this will enable PAM authentication using
.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
-and PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types.
+and
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
+authentication types.
.Pp
Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent
role to password authentication, you should disable either
.Dq no .
.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
to deal with incoming network traffic.
After successful authentication, another process will be created that has
.Dq yes .
.It Cm X11DisplayOffset
Specifies the first display number available for
-.Nm sshd Ns 's
+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
X11 forwarding.
-This prevents
-.Nm sshd
-from interfering with real X11 servers.
+This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
The default is 10.
.It Cm X11Forwarding
Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
.Pp
When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to
the server and to client displays if the
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
.Cm X11UseLocalhost
-below), however this is not the default.
+below), though this is not the default.
Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
verification and substitution occur on the client side.
The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
-display server may be exposed to attack when the ssh client requests
+display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests
forwarding (see the warnings for
.Cm ForwardX11
in
is enabled.
.It Cm X11UseLocalhost
Specifies whether
-.Nm sshd
+.Xr sshd 8
should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to
the wildcard address.
By default,
-.Nm sshd
-binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
+sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
hostname part of the
.Ev DISPLAY
environment variable to
The default is
.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
.El
-.Ss Time Formats
-.Nm sshd
+.Sh TIME FORMATS
+.Xr sshd 8
command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
.Sm off
is one of the following:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
-.It Cm <none>
+.It Aq Cm none
seconds
.It Cm s | Cm S
seconds
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for
-.Nm sshd .
+.Xr sshd 8 .
This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
(though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
.El
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.46 2006/02/01 11:27:22 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.47 2006/08/30 00:14:37 djm Exp $ */
#ifdef GSI
#define GSI_VERSION " GSI"
#define MGLUE_VERSION ""
#endif
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_4.3"
+#define SSH_HPN "-hpn12"
+#define NCSA_VERSION " NCSA_GSSAPI_20060928"
-#define SSH_PORTABLE "p2"
-#define SSH_HPN "-hpn12"
-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN \
- " NCSA_GSSAPI_20060726" \
- GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION MGLUE_VERSION
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_4.4"
+
+#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE \
+ SSH_HPN NCSA_VERSION GSI_VERSION KRB5_VERSION MGLUE_VERSION
andersk / gssapi-openssh.git / commitdiff
