canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-acss.o cipher-aes.o \
cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \
compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
- log.o match.o moduli.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o \
- readpass.o rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o \
+ log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
+ readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o \
atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
$(PERL) $(srcdir)/fixprogs ssh_prng_cmds $(ENT); \
fi
-# fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "modulo"
+# fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o"
moduli:
echo
Privsep requires operating system support for file descriptor passing.
Compression will be disabled on systems without a working mmap MAP_ANON.
-PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on AIX, HP-UX
-(including Trusted Mode), Linux and Solaris.
+PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on AIX, FreeBSD,
+HP-UX (including Trusted Mode), Linux, NetBSD and Solaris.
On Cygwin, Tru64 Unix, OpenServer, and Unicos only the pre-authentication
part of privsep is supported. Post-authentication privsep is disabled
/* Define if you are on NeXT */
#undef HAVE_NEXT
-/* Define if you are on NEWS-OS */
-#undef HAVE_NEWS4
-
/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
#undef USE_PAM
/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c */
#undef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
-/* Define if have krb5_init_ets */
-#undef KRB5_INIT_ETS
-
/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
#undef DISABLE_UTMP
/* decryption sbox */
static unsigned char sboxdec[] = {
- 0x33, 0x73, 0x3b, 0x26, 0x63, 0x23, 0x6b, 0x76,
- 0x3e, 0x7e, 0x36, 0x2b, 0x6e, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x7b,
- 0xd3, 0x93, 0xdb, 0x06, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4b, 0x96,
- 0xde, 0x9e, 0xd6, 0x0b, 0x4e, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x9b,
- 0x57, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x82, 0xc7, 0x87, 0xcf, 0x12,
- 0x5a, 0x1a, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x8a, 0xc2, 0x1f,
- 0xd9, 0x99, 0xd1, 0x00, 0x49, 0x09, 0x41, 0x90,
- 0xd8, 0x98, 0xd0, 0x01, 0x48, 0x08, 0x40, 0x91,
- 0x3d, 0x7d, 0x35, 0x24, 0x6d, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x74,
- 0x3c, 0x7c, 0x34, 0x25, 0x6c, 0x2c, 0x64, 0x75,
- 0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd5, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x0d, 0x45, 0x94,
- 0xdc, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0x05, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0x44, 0x95,
- 0x59, 0x19, 0x51, 0x80, 0xc9, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x10,
- 0x58, 0x18, 0x50, 0x81, 0xc8, 0x88, 0xc0, 0x11,
- 0xd7, 0x97, 0xdf, 0x02, 0x47, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x92,
- 0xda, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x0f, 0x4a, 0x0a, 0x42, 0x9f,
- 0x53, 0x13, 0x5b, 0x86, 0xc3, 0x83, 0xcb, 0x16,
- 0x5e, 0x1e, 0x56, 0x8b, 0xce, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0x1b,
- 0xb3, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf6,
- 0xbe, 0xfe, 0xb6, 0xab, 0xee, 0xae, 0xe6, 0xfb,
- 0x37, 0x77, 0x3f, 0x22, 0x67, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x72,
- 0x3a, 0x7a, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x6a, 0x2a, 0x62, 0x7f,
- 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0xe9, 0xa9, 0xe1, 0xf0,
- 0xb8, 0xf8, 0xb0, 0xa1, 0xe8, 0xa8, 0xe0, 0xf1,
- 0x5d, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x84, 0xcd, 0x8d, 0xc5, 0x14,
- 0x5c, 0x1c, 0x54, 0x85, 0xcc, 0x8c, 0xc4, 0x15,
- 0xbd, 0xfd, 0xb5, 0xa4, 0xed, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf4,
- 0xbc, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0xec, 0xac, 0xe4, 0xf5,
- 0x39, 0x79, 0x31, 0x20, 0x69, 0x29, 0x61, 0x70,
- 0x38, 0x78, 0x30, 0x21, 0x68, 0x28, 0x60, 0x71,
- 0xb7, 0xf7, 0xbf, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xa7, 0xef, 0xf2,
+ 0x33, 0x73, 0x3b, 0x26, 0x63, 0x23, 0x6b, 0x76,
+ 0x3e, 0x7e, 0x36, 0x2b, 0x6e, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x7b,
+ 0xd3, 0x93, 0xdb, 0x06, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4b, 0x96,
+ 0xde, 0x9e, 0xd6, 0x0b, 0x4e, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x9b,
+ 0x57, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x82, 0xc7, 0x87, 0xcf, 0x12,
+ 0x5a, 0x1a, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x8a, 0xc2, 0x1f,
+ 0xd9, 0x99, 0xd1, 0x00, 0x49, 0x09, 0x41, 0x90,
+ 0xd8, 0x98, 0xd0, 0x01, 0x48, 0x08, 0x40, 0x91,
+ 0x3d, 0x7d, 0x35, 0x24, 0x6d, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x74,
+ 0x3c, 0x7c, 0x34, 0x25, 0x6c, 0x2c, 0x64, 0x75,
+ 0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd5, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x0d, 0x45, 0x94,
+ 0xdc, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0x05, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0x44, 0x95,
+ 0x59, 0x19, 0x51, 0x80, 0xc9, 0x89, 0xc1, 0x10,
+ 0x58, 0x18, 0x50, 0x81, 0xc8, 0x88, 0xc0, 0x11,
+ 0xd7, 0x97, 0xdf, 0x02, 0x47, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x92,
+ 0xda, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x0f, 0x4a, 0x0a, 0x42, 0x9f,
+ 0x53, 0x13, 0x5b, 0x86, 0xc3, 0x83, 0xcb, 0x16,
+ 0x5e, 0x1e, 0x56, 0x8b, 0xce, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0x1b,
+ 0xb3, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf6,
+ 0xbe, 0xfe, 0xb6, 0xab, 0xee, 0xae, 0xe6, 0xfb,
+ 0x37, 0x77, 0x3f, 0x22, 0x67, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x72,
+ 0x3a, 0x7a, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x6a, 0x2a, 0x62, 0x7f,
+ 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb1, 0xa0, 0xe9, 0xa9, 0xe1, 0xf0,
+ 0xb8, 0xf8, 0xb0, 0xa1, 0xe8, 0xa8, 0xe0, 0xf1,
+ 0x5d, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x84, 0xcd, 0x8d, 0xc5, 0x14,
+ 0x5c, 0x1c, 0x54, 0x85, 0xcc, 0x8c, 0xc4, 0x15,
+ 0xbd, 0xfd, 0xb5, 0xa4, 0xed, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf4,
+ 0xbc, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xa5, 0xec, 0xac, 0xe4, 0xf5,
+ 0x39, 0x79, 0x31, 0x20, 0x69, 0x29, 0x61, 0x70,
+ 0x38, 0x78, 0x30, 0x21, 0x68, 0x28, 0x60, 0x71,
+ 0xb7, 0xf7, 0xbf, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xa7, 0xef, 0xf2,
0xba, 0xfa, 0xb2, 0xaf, 0xea, 0xaa, 0xe2, 0xff
};
};
static unsigned char reverse[] = {
- 0x00, 0x80, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xa0, 0x60, 0xe0,
- 0x10, 0x90, 0x50, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xb0, 0x70, 0xf0,
- 0x08, 0x88, 0x48, 0xc8, 0x28, 0xa8, 0x68, 0xe8,
- 0x18, 0x98, 0x58, 0xd8, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x78, 0xf8,
- 0x04, 0x84, 0x44, 0xc4, 0x24, 0xa4, 0x64, 0xe4,
- 0x14, 0x94, 0x54, 0xd4, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xf4,
- 0x0c, 0x8c, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x6c, 0xec,
- 0x1c, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0x3c, 0xbc, 0x7c, 0xfc,
- 0x02, 0x82, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x22, 0xa2, 0x62, 0xe2,
- 0x12, 0x92, 0x52, 0xd2, 0x32, 0xb2, 0x72, 0xf2,
- 0x0a, 0x8a, 0x4a, 0xca, 0x2a, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0xea,
- 0x1a, 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xda, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xfa,
- 0x06, 0x86, 0x46, 0xc6, 0x26, 0xa6, 0x66, 0xe6,
- 0x16, 0x96, 0x56, 0xd6, 0x36, 0xb6, 0x76, 0xf6,
- 0x0e, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0xce, 0x2e, 0xae, 0x6e, 0xee,
- 0x1e, 0x9e, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0xfe,
- 0x01, 0x81, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x21, 0xa1, 0x61, 0xe1,
- 0x11, 0x91, 0x51, 0xd1, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x71, 0xf1,
- 0x09, 0x89, 0x49, 0xc9, 0x29, 0xa9, 0x69, 0xe9,
- 0x19, 0x99, 0x59, 0xd9, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x79, 0xf9,
- 0x05, 0x85, 0x45, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x65, 0xe5,
- 0x15, 0x95, 0x55, 0xd5, 0x35, 0xb5, 0x75, 0xf5,
- 0x0d, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x6d, 0xed,
- 0x1d, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0xdd, 0x3d, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0xfd,
- 0x03, 0x83, 0x43, 0xc3, 0x23, 0xa3, 0x63, 0xe3,
- 0x13, 0x93, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x33, 0xb3, 0x73, 0xf3,
- 0x0b, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x2b, 0xab, 0x6b, 0xeb,
- 0x1b, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0xdb, 0x3b, 0xbb, 0x7b, 0xfb,
- 0x07, 0x87, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x27, 0xa7, 0x67, 0xe7,
- 0x17, 0x97, 0x57, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x77, 0xf7,
- 0x0f, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0xcf, 0x2f, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xef,
- 0x1f, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0xdf, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x7f, 0xff
+ 0x00, 0x80, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xa0, 0x60, 0xe0,
+ 0x10, 0x90, 0x50, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xb0, 0x70, 0xf0,
+ 0x08, 0x88, 0x48, 0xc8, 0x28, 0xa8, 0x68, 0xe8,
+ 0x18, 0x98, 0x58, 0xd8, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x78, 0xf8,
+ 0x04, 0x84, 0x44, 0xc4, 0x24, 0xa4, 0x64, 0xe4,
+ 0x14, 0x94, 0x54, 0xd4, 0x34, 0xb4, 0x74, 0xf4,
+ 0x0c, 0x8c, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x6c, 0xec,
+ 0x1c, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0x3c, 0xbc, 0x7c, 0xfc,
+ 0x02, 0x82, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x22, 0xa2, 0x62, 0xe2,
+ 0x12, 0x92, 0x52, 0xd2, 0x32, 0xb2, 0x72, 0xf2,
+ 0x0a, 0x8a, 0x4a, 0xca, 0x2a, 0xaa, 0x6a, 0xea,
+ 0x1a, 0x9a, 0x5a, 0xda, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xfa,
+ 0x06, 0x86, 0x46, 0xc6, 0x26, 0xa6, 0x66, 0xe6,
+ 0x16, 0x96, 0x56, 0xd6, 0x36, 0xb6, 0x76, 0xf6,
+ 0x0e, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0xce, 0x2e, 0xae, 0x6e, 0xee,
+ 0x1e, 0x9e, 0x5e, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbe, 0x7e, 0xfe,
+ 0x01, 0x81, 0x41, 0xc1, 0x21, 0xa1, 0x61, 0xe1,
+ 0x11, 0x91, 0x51, 0xd1, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x71, 0xf1,
+ 0x09, 0x89, 0x49, 0xc9, 0x29, 0xa9, 0x69, 0xe9,
+ 0x19, 0x99, 0x59, 0xd9, 0x39, 0xb9, 0x79, 0xf9,
+ 0x05, 0x85, 0x45, 0xc5, 0x25, 0xa5, 0x65, 0xe5,
+ 0x15, 0x95, 0x55, 0xd5, 0x35, 0xb5, 0x75, 0xf5,
+ 0x0d, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0xad, 0x6d, 0xed,
+ 0x1d, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0xdd, 0x3d, 0xbd, 0x7d, 0xfd,
+ 0x03, 0x83, 0x43, 0xc3, 0x23, 0xa3, 0x63, 0xe3,
+ 0x13, 0x93, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x33, 0xb3, 0x73, 0xf3,
+ 0x0b, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x2b, 0xab, 0x6b, 0xeb,
+ 0x1b, 0x9b, 0x5b, 0xdb, 0x3b, 0xbb, 0x7b, 0xfb,
+ 0x07, 0x87, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x27, 0xa7, 0x67, 0xe7,
+ 0x17, 0x97, 0x57, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x77, 0xf7,
+ 0x0f, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0xcf, 0x2f, 0xaf, 0x6f, 0xef,
+ 0x1f, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0xdf, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x7f, 0xff
};
/*
problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx);
if (problem)
return (problem);
-#ifdef KRB5_INIT_ETS
- krb5_init_ets(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
-#endif
}
return (0);
}
#ifndef HEIMDAL
krb5_creds creds;
krb5_principal server;
- char ccname[40];
- int tmpfd;
- mode_t old_umask;
#endif
krb5_error_code problem;
krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
goto out;
}
- snprintf(ccname,sizeof(ccname),"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXX",geteuid());
-
- old_umask = umask(0177);
- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- umask(old_umask);
- if (tmpfd == -1) {
- logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
- problem = errno;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
- logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
- close(tmpfd);
- problem = errno;
- goto out;
- }
- close(tmpfd);
-
- problem = krb5_cc_resolve(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccname, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+ problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
if (problem)
goto out;
}
}
+#ifndef HEIMDAL
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+ int tmpfd, ret;
+ char ccname[40];
+ mode_t old_umask;
+
+ ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+ "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+ if (ret == -1 || ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ return ENOMEM;
+
+ old_umask = umask(0177);
+ tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ umask(old_umask);
+ if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return errno;
+ }
+
+ if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+ logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(tmpfd);
+ return errno;
+ }
+ close(tmpfd);
+
+ return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+}
+#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
#endif /* KRB5 */
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
#endif
+/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, AIX */
+#else
+# define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM */
+#endif
+
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "buffer.h"
static int sshpam_thread_status = -1;
static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig;
-static void
+static void
sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL)
return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */
if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG)
- <= 0) {
+ <= 0) {
/* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */
kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM);
if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, 0)
void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
{
pid_t pid;
+ struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg;
sshpam_thread_status = -1;
switch ((pid = fork())) {
error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
case 0:
+ close(ctx->pam_psock);
+ ctx->pam_psock = -1;
thread_start(arg);
_exit(1);
default:
*thread = pid;
+ close(ctx->pam_csock);
+ ctx->pam_csock = -1;
sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
return (0);
}
* Conversation function for authentication thread.
*/
static int
-sshpam_thread_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
Buffer buffer;
char **env_from_pam;
u_int i;
const char *pam_user;
+ const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
- pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (void **)&pam_user);
+ pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
+ (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
environ[0] = NULL;
if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
}
static int
-sshpam_null_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
static int
-sshpam_store_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct pam_response *reply;
{
extern char *__progname;
const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
+ const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
/* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
- PAM_USER, (void **)&pam_user);
+ PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
return (0);
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
buffer_init(&buffer);
if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
- options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
+ options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
else
buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
-
+
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
sshpam_account_status = 0;
return (sshpam_account_status);
}
static int
-sshpam_tty_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
* display.
*/
static int
-sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, struct pam_message **msg,
+sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct pam_response *reply;
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
- fail:
+ fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
xfree(reply[i].resp);
* information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
*/
if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+ options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
sshpam_password = badpw;
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
authctxt->user);
- return 1;
+ return 1;
} else {
debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
#if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
if (iscomsec()) {
struct pr_passwd *pr;
-
+
pr = getprpwnam((char *)user);
/* Test for Trusted Mode expiry disabled */
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.58 2005/03/14 11:44:42 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.60 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
struct stat st;
const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
char *shell;
- int i;
+ u_int i;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#endif
/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (spw != NULL)
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+ passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
+#else
passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
#else
passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
#endif
if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
locked = 1;
#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+ free(passwd);
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
if (locked) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
pw->pw_name);
*
* This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
*/
-char *
-expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
+static char *
+expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
{
- Buffer buffer;
- char *file;
- const char *cp;
+ char *file, *ret;
- /*
- * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate
- * substitutions to the given file name.
- */
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) {
- if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
- buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1);
- cp++;
- continue;
- }
- if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
- buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
- cp++;
- continue;
- }
- if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
- buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
- strlen(pw->pw_name));
- cp++;
- continue;
- }
- buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1);
- }
- buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
+ file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
/*
* Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
* compatible and prepend the '%h/'
*/
- file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer);
- if (*cp != '/')
- snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp);
- else
- strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN);
+ if (*file == '/')
+ return (file);
+
+ ret = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+ if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
+ strlcat(ret, "/", MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
+ strlcat(ret, file, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN)
+ fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return file;
+ xfree(file);
+ return (ret);
}
char *
authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
{
- return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
+ return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
}
char *
authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
{
- return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
+ return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
}
/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.50 2004/05/23 23:59:53 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.51 2005/06/06 11:20:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *);
void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
-char *expand_filename(const char *, struct passwd *);
char *authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *);
char *authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *);
#define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s"
#define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+#include <krb5.h>
+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+#endif
#endif
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.59 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.62 2005/07/16 01:35:24 djm Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
-/*
- * convert ssh auth msg type into description
- */
+static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+
+static char *client_user = NULL; /* Used to fill in remote user for PAM */
+
+struct AuthMethod1 {
+ int type;
+ char *name;
+ int *enabled;
+ int (*method)(Authctxt *, char *, size_t);
+};
+
+const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = {
+ {
+ SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password",
+ &options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa",
+ &options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa",
+ &options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response",
+ &options.challenge_response_authentication,
+ auth1_process_tis_challenge
+ },
+ {
+ SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response",
+ &options.challenge_response_authentication,
+ auth1_process_tis_response
+ },
+ { -1, NULL, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+static const struct AuthMethod1
+*lookup_authmethod1(int type)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for(i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++)
+ if (auth1_methods[i].type == type)
+ return (&(auth1_methods[i]));
+
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
static char *
get_authname(int type)
{
- static char buf[1024];
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
- return "password";
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA:
- return "rsa";
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
- return "rhosts-rsa";
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
- return "rhosts";
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
- return "challenge-response";
+ const struct AuthMethod1 *a;
+ static char buf[64];
+
+ if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL)
+ return (a->name);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
+ return (buf);
+}
+
+static int
+auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ char *password;
+ u_int dlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was
+ * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
+ * not visible to an outside observer.
+ */
+ password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ /* Try authentication with the password. */
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
+
+ memset(password, 0, dlen);
+ xfree(password);
+
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+static int
+auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ BIGNUM *n;
+
+ /* RSA authentication requested. */
+ if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
+ packet_get_bignum(n);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
+ BN_clear_free(n);
+
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+static int
+auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+ int keybits, authenticated = 0;
+ u_int bits;
+ Key *client_host_key;
+ u_int ulen;
+
+ /*
+ * Get client user name. Note that we just have to
+ * trust the client; root on the client machine can
+ * claim to be any user.
+ */
+ client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
+
+ /* Get the client host key. */
+ client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ bits = packet_get_int();
+ packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
+
+ keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n);
+ if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) {
+ verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
+ "actual %d, announced %d",
+ BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
}
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
- return buf;
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
+ client_host_key);
+ key_free(client_host_key);
+
+ snprintf(info, infolen, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
+
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+static int
+auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+ char *challenge;
+
+ if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
+ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
+ packet_put_cstring(challenge);
+ xfree(challenge);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+static int
+auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt, char *info, size_t infolen)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ char *response;
+ u_int dlen;
+
+ response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
+ memset(response, 'r', dlen);
+ xfree(response);
+
+ return (authenticated);
}
/*
do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
int authenticated = 0;
- u_int bits;
- Key *client_host_key;
- BIGNUM *n;
- char *client_user, *password;
char info[1024];
- u_int dlen;
- u_int ulen;
- int prev, type = 0;
+ int prev = 0, type = 0;
+ const struct AuthMethod1 *meth;
debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
- client_user = NULL;
-
for (;;) {
/* default to fail */
authenticated = 0;
type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE)
abandon_challenge_response(authctxt);
- /* Process the packet. */
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
- if (!options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
- verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled.");
- break;
- }
- /*
- * Get client user name. Note that we just have to
- * trust the client; root on the client machine can
- * claim to be any user.
- */
- client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
-
- /* Get the client host key. */
- client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
- bits = packet_get_int();
- packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e);
- packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n);
-
- if (bits != BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n))
- verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
- "actual %d, announced %d",
- BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user,
- client_host_key);
- key_free(client_host_key);
-
- snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA:
- if (!options.rsa_authentication) {
- verbose("RSA authentication disabled.");
- break;
- }
- /* RSA authentication requested. */
- if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed");
- packet_get_bignum(n);
- packet_check_eom();
- authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n);
- BN_clear_free(n);
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
- if (!options.password_authentication) {
- verbose("Password authentication disabled.");
- break;
- }
- /*
- * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was
- * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
- * not visible to an outside observer.
- */
- password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
- /* Try authentication with the password. */
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password));
-
- memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
- xfree(password);
- break;
-
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
- debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS");
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) {
- char *challenge = get_challenge(authctxt);
- if (challenge != NULL) {
- debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
- packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
- packet_put_cstring(challenge);
- xfree(challenge);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- continue;
- }
- }
- break;
- case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
- debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE");
- if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) {
- char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- packet_check_eom();
- authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
- memset(response, 'r', dlen);
- xfree(response);
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- /*
- * Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure
- * returned) during authentication.
- */
- logit("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type);
- break;
+ if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) {
+ logit("Unknown message during authentication: "
+ "type %d", type);
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ if (!*(meth->enabled)) {
+ verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name);
+ goto skip;
}
+
+ authenticated = meth->method(authctxt, info, sizeof(info));
+ if (authenticated == -1)
+ continue; /* "postponed" */
+
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
if (authctxt->as) {
auth_close(authctxt->as);
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (authenticated &&
- !check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD,
+ !check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD,
authctxt->pw)) {
packet_disconnect("Authentication rejected for uid %d.",
authctxt->pw == NULL ? -1 : authctxt->pw->pw_uid);
#else
/* Special handling for root */
if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) {
- authenticated = 0;
+ !auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) {
+ authenticated = 0;
# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
# endif
size_t len;
error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
- "configuration", authctxt->user);
+ "configuration", authctxt->user);
len = buffer_len(&loginmsg);
buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg);
}
#endif
+ skip:
/* Log before sending the reply */
auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info);
/*
* If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
- * the server. (Unless you are running Windows)
+ * the server.
*/
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw &&
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.8 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.10 2005/07/17 07:17:54 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
int present;
OM_uint32 ms;
u_int len;
- char *doid = NULL;
+ u_char *doid = NULL;
/* authctxt->valid may be 0 if we haven't yet determined
username from gssapi context. */
present = 0;
doid = packet_get_string(&len);
- if (len > 2 &&
- doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
- doid[1] == len - 2) {
+ if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
+ doid[1] == len - 2) {
goid.elements = doid + 2;
goid.length = len - 2;
gss_test_oid_set_member(&ms, &goid, supported,
packet_write_wait();
}
fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
- "configuration", authctxt->user);
+ "configuration", authctxt->user);
}
}
#endif
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.42 2005/02/18 03:05:53 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.44 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
#include "packet.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
u_char options[200];
char text[sizeof(options) * 3 + 1];
socklen_t option_size;
- int i, ipproto;
+ u_int i;
+ int ipproto;
struct protoent *ip;
if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL)
struct in_addr inaddr;
u_int16_t port;
- if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
+ if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
!IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr))
return;
} else {
if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(255);
+ return -1;
}
}
#define EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_SUBKEY 0xff07
static int
-acss_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+acss_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
acss_setkey(&data(ctx)->ks,key,enc,ACSS_DATA);
}
static int
-acss_ciph(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+acss_ciph(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
unsigned int inl)
{
acss(&data(ctx)->ks,inl,in,out);
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.5 2004/12/22 02:13:19 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.6 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
}
if (key != NULL)
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &c->aes_ctx);
+ &c->aes_ctx);
if (iv != NULL)
memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
return (1);
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.73 2005/01/23 10:18:12 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.77 2005/07/16 01:35:24 djm Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906000L
-#define SSH_OLD_EVP
-#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(e) ((e)->app_data)
-#endif
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void);
-extern void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int);
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE)
-# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
-extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_acss(void);
-# define EVP_acss evp_acss
-# define EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE xxx /* used below */
-# else
-# define EVP_acss NULL /* Don't try to support ACSS on older OpenSSL */
-# endif /* (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906000L) */
-#endif /* !defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE) */
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
int number; /* for ssh1 only */
u_int block_size;
u_int key_len;
+ u_int discard_len;
const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
} ciphers[] = {
- { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, EVP_enc_null },
- { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, EVP_des_cbc },
- { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, evp_ssh1_3des },
- { "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, evp_ssh1_bf },
-
- { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
- { "blowfish-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, EVP_bf_cbc },
- { "cast128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, EVP_cast5_cbc },
- { "arcfour", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, EVP_rc4 },
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
- { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, evp_rijndael },
- { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, evp_rijndael },
- { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, evp_rijndael },
+ { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
+ { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, EVP_des_cbc },
+ { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, evp_ssh1_3des },
+ { "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, evp_ssh1_bf },
+
+ { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+ { "blowfish-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, EVP_bf_cbc },
+ { "cast128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, EVP_cast5_cbc },
+ { "arcfour", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, EVP_rc4 },
+ { "arcfour128", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 1536, EVP_rc4 },
+ { "arcfour256", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 1536, EVP_rc4 },
+ { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
+ { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
+ { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
- SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, evp_rijndael },
-#else
- { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
- { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
- { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
- { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
- SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00905000L
- { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, evp_aes_128_ctr },
- { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, evp_aes_128_ctr },
- { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+ { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+ { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr },
+#ifdef USE_CIPHER_ACSS
+ { "acss@openssh.org", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, 0, EVP_acss },
#endif
-#if defined(EVP_CTRL_SET_ACSS_MODE)
- { "acss@openssh.org", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 5, EVP_acss },
-#endif
- { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, NULL }
+ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
};
/*--*/
EVP_CIPHER *type;
#else
const EVP_CIPHER *type;
-#endif
int klen;
+#endif
+ u_char *junk, *discard;
if (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) {
if (dowarn) {
fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit failed for %s",
cipher->name);
klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp);
- if (klen > 0 && keylen != klen) {
+ if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
debug2("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)", klen, keylen);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0)
fatal("cipher_init: set keylen failed (%d -> %d)",
fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit: set key failed for %s",
cipher->name);
#endif
+
+ if (cipher->discard_len > 0) {
+ junk = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len);
+ discard = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len);
+ if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk,
+ cipher->discard_len) == 0)
+ fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed during discard");
+ memset(discard, 0, cipher->discard_len);
+ xfree(junk);
+ xfree(discard);
+ }
}
void
{
if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
fatal("cipher_encrypt: bad plaintext length %d", len);
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
- EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest, (u_char *)src, len);
-#else
if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0)
fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed");
-#endif
}
void
cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc)
{
-#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp);
-#else
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp) == 0)
error("cipher_cleanup: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup failed");
-#endif
}
/*
case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
- if (evplen == 0)
+ if (evplen <= 0)
return;
- if (evplen != len)
+ if ((u_int)evplen != len)
fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__,
evplen, len);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-AC_INIT(OpenSSH, Portable)
+AC_INIT(OpenSSH, Portable, openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org)
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h)
AC_SUBST(LD)
AC_C_INLINE
+
+AC_CHECK_DECL(LLONG_MAX, have_llong_max=1, , [#include <limits.h>])
+
if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wno-uninitialized"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wuninitialized"
+ GCC_VER=`$CC --version`
+ case $GCC_VER in
+ 1.*) ;;
+ 2.8* | 2.9*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wsign-compare" ;;
+ 2.*) ;;
+ *) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wsign-compare" ;;
+ esac
+
+ if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
+ # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
+ unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
+ AC_CHECK_DECL(LLONG_MAX,
+ [have_llong_max=1],
+ [CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"],
+ [#include <limits.h>]
+ )
+ fi
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Why is this so damn hard? */
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+# undef __GNUC__
+#endif
+#define __USE_ISOC99
+#include <limits.h>
+#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
+int main(void) {
+ FILE *f;
+ long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
+
+ if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
+ exit(1);
+
+#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
+ llmin = LLONG_MIN;
+ llmax = LLONG_MAX;
+#else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
+ /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
+ for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
+ llmax = i;
+ llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */
+#endif
+
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
+ || llmax - 1 > llmax) {
+ fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
+ exit(2);
+ }
+
+ if (fprintf(f ,"%lld %lld", llmin, llmax) < 0)
+ exit(3);
+
+ exit(0);
+}
+ ]])],
+ [
+ llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
+ llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
+ AC_MSG_RESULT($llong_max)
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LLONG_MAX, [${llong_max}LL],
+ [max value of long long calculated by configure])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long])
+ AC_MSG_RESULT($llong_min)
+ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LLONG_MIN, [${llong_min}LL],
+ [min value of long long calculated by configure])
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(not found)
+ ],
+ [
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
+ ]
+ )
fi
AC_ARG_WITH(rpath,
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(BIND_8_COMPAT, 1)
;;
-*-*-hpux10.26)
- if test -z "$GCC"; then
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
- fi
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
- IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
- AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
- AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
- AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT)
- AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
- AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*")
- AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
- LIBS="$LIBS -lsec -lsecpw"
- AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***]))
- disable_ptmx_check=yes
- ;;
-*-*-hpux10*)
- if test -z "$GCC"; then
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
- fi
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
- IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
- AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
- AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT)
- AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
- AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*")
- AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
- LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
- AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***]))
- ;;
-*-*-hpux11*)
+*-*-hpux*)
+ # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
- AC_DEFINE(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE)
AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT)
AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
- AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
AC_DEFINE(LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING, "*")
AC_DEFINE(SPT_TYPE,SPT_PSTAT)
- AC_DEFINE(USE_BTMP, 1, [Use btmp to log bad logins])
- check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
- check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
- AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***]))
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(xnet, t_error, ,
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***]))
+
+ # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-hpux10*)
+ if test -z "$GCC"; then
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
+ fi
+ ;;
+ *-*-hpux11*)
+ AC_DEFINE(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE)
+ AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_UTMP)
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_BTMP, 1, [Use btmp to log bad logins])
+ check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
+ check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-hpux10.26)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+ disable_ptmx_check=yes
+ LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
+ ;;
+ esac
;;
*-*-irix5*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
esac
;;
mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
- AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NEWS4)
+ AC_DEFINE(NEED_SETPRGP, [], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
SONY=1
;;
*-*-netbsd*)
AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
;;
+*-*-openbsd*)
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__, 1, [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel])
+ ;;
*-*-solaris*)
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
need_dash_r=1
;;
# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
*-*-sysv5*)
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+ AC_DEFINE(UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS, 1, [Support passwords > 8 chars])
AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
AC_DEFINE(SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID)
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
AC_DEFINE(PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME, 1, [must supply username to passwd])
+ case "$host" in
+ *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x
+ TEST_SHELL=/u95/bin/sh
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_LIBIAF, 1, [ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet])
+ ;;
+ esac
;;
*-*-sysv*)
;;
AC_DEFINE(MISSING_HOWMANY)
AC_DEFINE(MISSING_FD_MASK)
;;
+
+*-*-ultrix*)
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETGROUPS, [], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1])
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_MMAP, [], [Ultrix mmap can't map files])
+ AC_DEFINE(NEED_SETPRGP, [], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H, 1, [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix])
+ ;;
+
+*-*-lynxos)
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
+ AC_DEFINE(MISSING_HOWMANY)
+ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETVBUF, 1, [LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation])
+ ;;
esac
# Allow user to specify flags
fi
]
)
+AC_ARG_WITH(Werror,
+ [ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror],
+ [
+ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
+ werror_flags="-Werror"
+ if "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+ werror_flags="$withval"
+ fi
+ fi
+ ]
+)
AC_MSG_CHECKING(compiler and flags for sanity)
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ]
)
-# Checks for header files.
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bstring.h crypt.h dirent.h endian.h features.h \
- floatingpoint.h getopt.h glob.h ia.h lastlog.h limits.h login.h \
- login_cap.h maillock.h ndir.h netdb.h netgroup.h \
- netinet/in_systm.h pam/pam_appl.h paths.h pty.h readpassphrase.h \
- rpc/types.h security/pam_appl.h shadow.h stddef.h stdint.h \
- strings.h sys/dir.h sys/strtio.h sys/audit.h sys/bitypes.h \
- sys/bsdtty.h sys/cdefs.h sys/mman.h sys/ndir.h sys/prctl.h \
- sys/pstat.h sys/select.h sys/stat.h sys/stream.h \
- sys/stropts.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/time.h sys/timers.h sys/un.h \
- time.h tmpdir.h ttyent.h usersec.h util.h utime.h utmp.h utmpx.h vis.h)
+dnl Checks for header files.
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS( \
+ bstring.h \
+ crypt.h \
+ dirent.h \
+ endian.h \
+ features.h \
+ floatingpoint.h \
+ getopt.h \
+ glob.h \
+ ia.h \
+ iaf.h \
+ lastlog.h \
+ limits.h \
+ login.h \
+ login_cap.h \
+ maillock.h \
+ ndir.h \
+ netdb.h \
+ netgroup.h \
+ netinet/in_systm.h \
+ pam/pam_appl.h \
+ paths.h \
+ pty.h \
+ readpassphrase.h \
+ rpc/types.h \
+ security/pam_appl.h \
+ shadow.h \
+ stddef.h \
+ stdint.h \
+ string.h \
+ strings.h \
+ sys/audit.h \
+ sys/bitypes.h \
+ sys/bsdtty.h \
+ sys/cdefs.h \
+ sys/dir.h \
+ sys/mman.h \
+ sys/ndir.h \
+ sys/prctl.h \
+ sys/pstat.h \
+ sys/select.h \
+ sys/stat.h \
+ sys/stream.h \
+ sys/stropts.h \
+ sys/strtio.h \
+ sys/sysmacros.h \
+ sys/time.h \
+ sys/timers.h \
+ sys/un.h \
+ time.h \
+ tmpdir.h \
+ ttyent.h \
+ unistd.h \
+ usersec.h \
+ util.h \
+ utime.h \
+ utmp.h \
+ utmpx.h \
+ vis.h \
+)
# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/ptms.h, [], [], [
if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
exit(0);
- /* 1.2.1.2 and up are OK */
- if (v >= 1020102)
+ /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
+ if (v >= 1020300)
exit(0);
exit(2);
vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
"./configure --without-zlib-version-check".
-If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.1.2 or greater.
+If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.])
else
AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems])
[ AC_MSG_ERROR(libedit not found) ],
[ -lcurses ]
)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if libedit version is compatible)
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <histedit.h>
+int main(void)
+{
+ int i = H_SETSIZE;
+ el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ exit(0);
+}
+ ]])],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+ [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ AC_MSG_ERROR(libedit version is not compatible) ]
+ )
fi ]
)
AC_MSG_RESULT(debug)
AC_DEFINE(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS, [], Use audit debugging module)
;;
+ no)
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+ ;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval])
;;
)
dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS(\
- arc4random __b64_ntop b64_ntop __b64_pton b64_pton bcopy \
- bindresvport_sa clock closefrom dirfd fchdir fchmod fchown \
- freeaddrinfo futimes getaddrinfo getcwd getgrouplist getnameinfo \
- getopt getpeereid _getpty getrlimit getttyent glob inet_aton \
- inet_ntoa inet_ntop innetgr login_getcapbool md5_crypt memmove \
- mkdtemp mmap ngetaddrinfo nsleep ogetaddrinfo openlog_r openpty \
- pstat prctl readpassphrase realpath recvmsg rresvport_af sendmsg \
- setdtablesize setegid setenv seteuid setgroups setlogin setpcred \
- setproctitle setregid setreuid setrlimit \
- setsid setvbuf sigaction sigvec snprintf socketpair strerror \
- strlcat strlcpy strmode strnvis strtoul sysconf tcgetpgrp \
- truncate unsetenv updwtmpx utimes vhangup vsnprintf waitpid \
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS( \
+ arc4random \
+ b64_ntop \
+ __b64_ntop \
+ b64_pton \
+ __b64_pton \
+ bcopy \
+ bindresvport_sa \
+ clock \
+ closefrom \
+ dirfd \
+ fchmod \
+ fchown \
+ freeaddrinfo \
+ futimes \
+ getaddrinfo \
+ getcwd \
+ getgrouplist \
+ getnameinfo \
+ getopt \
+ getpeereid \
+ _getpty \
+ getrlimit \
+ getttyent \
+ glob \
+ inet_aton \
+ inet_ntoa \
+ inet_ntop \
+ innetgr \
+ login_getcapbool \
+ md5_crypt \
+ memmove \
+ mkdtemp \
+ mmap \
+ ngetaddrinfo \
+ nsleep \
+ ogetaddrinfo \
+ openlog_r \
+ openpty \
+ prctl \
+ pstat \
+ readpassphrase \
+ realpath \
+ recvmsg \
+ rresvport_af \
+ sendmsg \
+ setdtablesize \
+ setegid \
+ setenv \
+ seteuid \
+ setgroups \
+ setlogin \
+ setpcred \
+ setproctitle \
+ setregid \
+ setreuid \
+ setrlimit \
+ setsid \
+ setvbuf \
+ sigaction \
+ sigvec \
+ snprintf \
+ socketpair \
+ strdup \
+ strerror \
+ strlcat \
+ strlcpy \
+ strmode \
+ strnvis \
+ strtonum \
+ strtoll \
+ strtoul \
+ sysconf \
+ tcgetpgrp \
+ truncate \
+ unsetenv \
+ updwtmpx \
+ utimes \
+ vhangup \
+ vsnprintf \
+ waitpid \
)
# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(nanosleep, rt posix4, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NANOSLEEP))
dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them.
-AC_CHECK_DECL(strsep, [AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strsep)])
AC_CHECK_DECL(getrusage, [AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getrusage)])
+AC_CHECK_DECL(strsep,
+ [AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strsep)],
+ [],
+ [
+#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
+# include <string.h>
+#endif
+ ])
dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro
AC_CHECK_DECL(tcsendbreak,
AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt")
fi
+AC_CHECK_LIB(iaf, ia_openinfo)
### Configure cryptographic random number support
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(_getshort _getlong)
+ AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , ,
+ [#include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <arpa/nameser.h>])
AC_CHECK_MEMBER(HEADER.ad,
[AC_DEFINE(HAVE_HEADER_AD)],,
[#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(k_hasafs, kafs, AC_DEFINE(USE_AFS))
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS(krb5_init_ets, $K5LIBS, AC_DEFINE(KRB5_INIT_ETS))
]
)
LIBS=`echo $LIBS | sed 's/-ldl //'`
fi
+dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
+dnl Add now.
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
+
AC_EXEEXT
AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openbsd-compat/Makefile \
scard/Makefile ssh_prng_cmds survey.sh])
sshd account required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
OTHER account required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
-# Session Management
+# Password Management
sshd password required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
OTHER password required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
-# Password Management
+# Session Management
sshd session required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
OTHER session required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
# ifdef PATH_MAX
# define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
# else /* PATH_MAX */
-# define MAXPATHLEN 64 /* Should be safe */
+# define MAXPATHLEN 64
+/* realpath uses a fixed buffer of size MAXPATHLEN, so force use of ours */
+# ifndef BROKEN_REALPATH
+# define BROKEN_REALPATH 1
+# endif /* BROKEN_REALPATH */
# endif /* PATH_MAX */
#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
+#ifndef PATH_MAX
+# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAXSYMLINKS
+# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
+#endif
+
#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
# define STDIN_FILENO 0
#endif
# define __dead __attribute__((noreturn))
#endif
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__)
+# define __sentinel__
+#endif
+
/* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this macro in the system headers */
#ifdef MISSING_HOWMANY
# define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
# define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000
#endif
+#if defined(__Lynx__)
+ /*
+ * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since
+ * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions.
+ */
+# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
+# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES)
+ /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */
+ int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
+ int mkstemp (char *);
+ char *crypt (const char *, const char *);
+ int seteuid (uid_t);
+ int setegid (gid_t);
+ char *mkdtemp (char *);
+ int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t);
+ int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#endif
/*
* Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+#endif
+
/* HP-UX 11.11 */
#ifdef BTMP_FILE
# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
/** end of login recorder definitions */
+#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
+# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b)))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP)
+# undef HAVE_MMAP
+#endif
+
#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.10 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.12 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
#include "uuencode.h"
extern char *__progname;
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.10 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.12 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
#ifndef LWRES
static const char *errset_text[] = {
return success;
}
+/*
+ * Check if hostname is numerical.
+ * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static int
+is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+ if (getaddrinfo(hostname, "0", &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
/*
* Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS.
verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
const Key *hostkey, int *flags)
{
- int counter;
+ u_int counter;
int result;
struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
if (hostkey == NULL)
fatal("No key to look up!");
+ if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) {
+ debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
if (result) {
u_char *rdata_digest;
u_int rdata_digest_len;
- int i;
+ u_int i;
int success = 0;
if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type,
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.3 2003/11/21 11:57:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.4 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
}
char *
-ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt,
- OM_uint32 *major_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status)
+ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status,
+ OM_uint32 *minor_status)
{
OM_uint32 lmin;
gss_buffer_desc msg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
logit("Cannot initialize krb5 context");
return 0;
}
-#ifdef KRB5_INIT_ETS
- krb5_init_ets(krb_context);
-#endif
return 1;
}
return;
}
#else
- {
- int tmpfd;
- char ccname[40];
- mode_t old_umask;
-
- snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXX", geteuid());
-
- old_umask = umask(0177);
- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- umask(old_umask);
- if (tmpfd == -1) {
- logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
- problem = errno;
- return;
- }
- if (fchmod(tmpfd, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
- logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno));
- close(tmpfd);
- problem = errno;
- return;
- }
- close(tmpfd);
- if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, ccname, &ccache))) {
- logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
- krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
- return;
- }
+ if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
+ logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s",
+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+ return;
}
#endif /* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
-/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.5 2003/11/17 11:06:07 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.8 2005/08/30 22:08:05 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
static OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
{
- char *tok;
+ u_char *tok;
OM_uint32 offset;
OM_uint32 oidl;
*/
if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl ||
ename->length < oidl+6 ||
- !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx,tok+6,oidl))
+ !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx,tok+6,oidl))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
offset = oidl+6;
debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
gssapi_client.store.envval);
child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar,
- gssapi_client.store.envval);
+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
}
}
int
ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
{
+ OM_uint32 lmin;
+
if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
debug("No suitable client data");
}
#endif
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
- return ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user));
+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+ return 1;
+ else {
+ /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+ gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
+ memset(&gssapi_client, 0, sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+ return 0;
+ }
else
debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
return (0);
-/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.18 2004/06/13 15:03:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.19 2005/05/19 02:42:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
#define INCLUDES_H
#define RCSID(msg) \
-static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
+static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg }
#include "config.h"
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
# include <ia.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_IAF_H
+# include <iaf.h>
+#endif
+
#ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
# include <tmpdir.h>
#endif
# include <kafs.h>
#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H)
+# include <sys/syslog.h>
+#endif
+
/*
* On HP-UX 11.11, shadow.h and prot.h provide conflicting declarations
* of getspnam when _INCLUDE__STDC__ is defined, so we unset it here.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.60 2004/06/21 17:36:31 avsm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.64 2005/07/25 11:59:39 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
static void
kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
- int i;
+ u_int i;
buffer_clear(b);
/*
static void
kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
{
- int i;
+ u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
xfree(proposal[i]);
{
u_int32_t rnd = 0;
u_char *cookie;
- int i;
+ u_int i;
if (kex == NULL) {
error("kex_send_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey");
kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
char *ptr;
- int dlen;
- int i;
+ u_int i, dlen;
Kex *kex = (Kex *)ctxt;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
- if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
- comp->type = 1;
+ if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
+ comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
- comp->type = 0;
+ comp->type = COMP_NONE;
} else {
fatal("unsupported comp %s", name);
}
char **my, **peer;
char **cprop, **sprop;
int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
- int mode;
- int ctos; /* direction: if true client-to-server */
- int need;
+ u_int mode, ctos, need;
int first_kex_follows, type;
my = kex_buf2prop(&kex->my, NULL);
/* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) &&
- !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) {
+ !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) {
type = packet_read();
debug2("skipping next packet (type %u)", type);
}
}
static u_char *
-derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, int need, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
+derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
{
Buffer b;
const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
EVP_MD_CTX md;
char c = id;
- int have;
+ u_int have;
int mdsz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
- u_char *digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
+ u_char *digest;
+
+ if (mdsz < 0)
+ fatal("derive_key: mdsz < 0");
+ digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz));
buffer_init(&b);
buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, BIGNUM *shared_secret)
{
u_char *keys[NKEYS];
- int i, mode, ctos;
+ u_int i, mode, ctos;
for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++)
keys[i] = derive_key(kex, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, shared_secret);
EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
len = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus);
- if (len < (512 / 8) || len > sizeof(nbuf))
+ if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf))
fatal("%s: bad host modulus (len %d)", __func__, len);
BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, nbuf);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, nbuf, len);
len = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus);
- if (len < (512 / 8) || len > sizeof(nbuf))
+ if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf))
fatal("%s: bad server modulus (len %d)", __func__, len);
BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, nbuf);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, nbuf, len);
void
dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
{
- int i;
+ u_int i;
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
for (i = 0; i< len; i++) {
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.35 2004/06/13 12:53:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.37 2005/07/25 11:59:39 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
#define KEX_DH14 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
#define KEX_DHGEX "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
+#define COMP_NONE 0
+#define COMP_ZLIB 1
+#define COMP_DELAYED 2
+
enum kex_init_proposals {
PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS,
PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS,
char *name;
int enabled;
const EVP_MD *md;
- int mac_len;
+ u_int mac_len;
u_char *key;
- int key_len;
+ u_int key_len;
};
struct Comp {
int type;
u_char *session_id;
u_int session_id_len;
Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
- int we_need;
+ u_int we_need;
int server;
char *name;
int hostkey_type;
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.57 2004/10/29 23:57:05 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.58 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len)
{
char *retval;
- int i;
+ u_int i;
retval = xmalloc(dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1);
retval[0] = '\0';
} else if(match(words[w],"^Dt$")) {
id=wtail()
next
+ } else if(match(words[w],"^Ox$")) {
+ add("OpenBSD")
+ skip=1
} else if(match(words[w],"^Os$")) {
add(".TH " id " \"" date "\" \"" wtail() "\"")
} else if(match(words[w],"^Sh$")) {
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.29 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.34 2005/07/08 09:26:18 dtucker Exp $");
#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
args->list[args->num] = NULL;
}
+/*
+ * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
+ * Warning: this calls getpw*.
+ */
+char *
+tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
+{
+ const char *path;
+ char user[128], ret[MAXPATHLEN];
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ u_int len, slash;
+
+ if (*filename != '~')
+ return (xstrdup(filename));
+ filename++;
+
+ path = strchr(filename, '/');
+ if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */
+ slash = path - filename;
+ if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1)
+ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long");
+ memcpy(user, filename, slash);
+ user[slash] = '\0';
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
+ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user);
+ } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */
+ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %d", uid);
+
+ if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, sizeof(ret)) >= sizeof(ret))
+ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+
+ /* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */
+ len = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
+ if ((len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/') &&
+ strlcat(ret, "/", sizeof(ret)) >= sizeof(ret))
+ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+
+ /* Skip leading '/' from specified path */
+ if (path != NULL)
+ filename = path + 1;
+ if (strlcat(ret, filename, sizeof(ret)) >= sizeof(ret))
+ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
+
+ return (xstrdup(ret));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be
+ * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must
+ * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory
+ * allocated by xmalloc.
+ */
+char *
+percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
+{
+#define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16
+ struct {
+ const char *key;
+ const char *repl;
+ } keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS];
+ u_int num_keys, i, j;
+ char buf[4096];
+ va_list ap;
+
+ /* Gather keys */
+ va_start(ap, string);
+ for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
+ keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
+ break;
+ keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
+ if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL)
+ fatal("percent_expand: NULL replacement");
+ }
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (num_keys >= EXPAND_MAX_KEYS)
+ fatal("percent_expand: too many keys");
+
+ /* Expand string */
+ *buf = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) {
+ if (*string != '%') {
+ append:
+ buf[i++] = *string;
+ if (i >= sizeof(buf))
+ fatal("percent_expand: string too long");
+ buf[i] = '\0';
+ continue;
+ }
+ string++;
+ if (*string == '%')
+ goto append;
+ for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) {
+ if (strchr(keys[j].key, *string) != NULL) {
+ i = strlcat(buf, keys[j].repl, sizeof(buf));
+ if (i >= sizeof(buf))
+ fatal("percent_expand: string too long");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (j >= num_keys)
+ fatal("percent_expand: unknown key %%%c", *string);
+ }
+ return (xstrdup(buf));
+#undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS
+}
+
/*
* Read an entire line from a public key file into a static buffer, discarding
* lines that exceed the buffer size. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
}
return -1;
}
+
+char *
+tohex(const u_char *d, u_int l)
+{
+ char b[3], *r;
+ u_int i, hl;
+
+ hl = l * 2 + 1;
+ r = xmalloc(hl);
+ *r = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+ snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", d[i]);
+ strlcat(r, b, hl);
+ }
+ return (r);
+}
+
-/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.10 2005/01/17 03:25:46 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.12 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1994 Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
* Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson <wsimpson@greendragon.com>
#define TINY_NUMBER (1UL<<16)
/* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */
-#define TEST_MAXIMUM (1UL<<16)
-#define TEST_MINIMUM (QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1)
-/* real TEST_MINIMUM (1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */
-#define TEST_POWER (3) /* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */
+#define TEST_MAXIMUM (1UL<<16)
+#define TEST_MINIMUM (QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1)
+/* real TEST_MINIMUM (1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */
+#define TEST_POWER (3) /* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */
/* bit operations on 32-bit words */
-#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31)))
-#define BIT_SET(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31)))
-#define BIT_TEST(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_SET(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_TEST(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31)))
/*
* Prime testing defines
*/
/* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */
-#define TRIAL_MINIMUM (4)
+#define TRIAL_MINIMUM (4)
/*
* Sieving data (XXX - move to struct)
static u_int32_t largebits, largememory; /* megabytes */
static BIGNUM *largebase;
-int gen_candidates(FILE *, int, int, BIGNUM *);
+int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t);
/*
* The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30).
*/
int
-gen_candidates(FILE *out, int memory, int power, BIGNUM *start)
+gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start)
{
BIGNUM *q;
u_int32_t j, r, s, t;
u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
time_t time_start, time_stop;
- int i, ret = 0;
+ u_int32_t i;
+ int ret = 0;
largememory = memory;
if (memory != 0 &&
- (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) {
+ (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) {
error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)",
LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
return (-1);
* fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped.
*/
for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3;
- smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER);
- smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) {
+ smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER);
+ smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) {
for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
* due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check
* the proposed bit size.
*/
- if (BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) {
+ if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) {
debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size);
continue;
}
mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
char *name, *info, **prompts;
- u_int num, *echo_on;
- int i, ret;
+ u_int i, num, *echo_on;
+ int ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
char **resp;
- u_int num;
- int i, ret;
+ u_int i, num;
+ int ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.39 2004/07/17 05:31:41 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.40 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
- fatal("%s: write", __func__);
+ fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
- fatal("%s: write", __func__);
+ fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
{
u_char buf[4];
u_int msg_len;
- ssize_t res;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- res = atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (res != sizeof(buf)) {
- if (res == 0)
+ if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE)
cleanup_exit(255);
- fatal("%s: read: %ld", __func__, (long)res);
+ fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
- res = atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len);
- if (res != msg_len)
- fatal("%s: read: %ld != msg_len", __func__, (long)res);
+ if (atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len)
+ fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
Buffer m;
- int i, ret;
+ u_int i;
+ int ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
{
Buffer m;
- int i, ret;
+ u_int i;
+ int ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * This file contains various auxiliary functions related to multiple
- * precision integers.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: mpaux.c,v 1.16 2001/02/08 19:30:52 itojun Exp $");
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include "getput.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
-#include "mpaux.h"
-
-void
-compute_session_id(u_char session_id[16],
- u_char cookie[8],
- BIGNUM* host_key_n,
- BIGNUM* session_key_n)
-{
- u_int host_key_bytes = BN_num_bytes(host_key_n);
- u_int session_key_bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_n);
- u_int bytes = host_key_bytes + session_key_bytes;
- u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
- MD5_CTX md;
-
- BN_bn2bin(host_key_n, buf);
- BN_bn2bin(session_key_n, buf + host_key_bytes);
- MD5_Init(&md);
- MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
- MD5_Update(&md, cookie, 8);
- MD5_Final(session_id, &md);
- memset(buf, 0, bytes);
- xfree(buf);
-}
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- * This file contains various auxiliary functions related to multiple
- * precision integers.
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: mpaux.h,v 1.11 2001/06/26 17:27:24 markus Exp $"); */
-
-#ifndef MPAUX_H
-#define MPAUX_H
-
-void compute_session_id(u_char[16], u_char[8], BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
-
-#endif /* MPAUX_H */
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.7 2003/11/17 09:45:39 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.8 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
#include "buffer.h"
#include "getput.h"
ssh_msg_recv(int fd, Buffer *m)
{
u_char buf[4];
- ssize_t res;
u_int msg_len;
debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering");
- res = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (res != sizeof(buf)) {
- if (res != 0)
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header %ld", (long)res);
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+ if (errno != EPIPE)
+ error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header");
return (-1);
}
msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
}
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
- res = atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len);
- if (res != msg_len) {
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: %ld != msg_len", (long)res);
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
+ error("ssh_msg_recv: read: %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
#endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */
#ifndef EAI_NODATA
-# define EAI_NODATA 1
-# define EAI_MEMORY 2
-# define EAI_NONAME 3
-# define EAI_SYSTEM 4
+# define EAI_NODATA (INT_MAX - 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_MEMORY
+# define EAI_MEMORY (INT_MAX - 2)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_NONAME
+# define EAI_NONAME (INT_MAX - 3)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_SYSTEM
+# define EAI_SYSTEM (INT_MAX - 4)
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
GETSHORT(u, msgp);
return (u);
}
+#elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT) && (HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT == 0)
+u_int16_t _getshort(register const u_char *);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE__GETLONG
GETLONG(u, msgp);
return (u);
}
+#elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETLONG) && (HAVE_DECL__GETLONG == 0)
+u_int32_t _getlong(register const u_char *);
#endif
int
/*
*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004,2005 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
# endif
/*
- * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and other stuff is stored -
+ * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and other stuff is stored -
* a few applications actually use this and die if it's not set
*
* NOTE: TTY= should be set, but since no one uses it and it's hard to
* acquire due to privsep code. We will just drop support.
*/
-
-
void
aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw)
{
len = sizeof("LOGNAME= NAME= ") + (2 * strlen(pw->pw_name));
cp = xmalloc(len);
- i = snprintf(cp, len, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%c", pw->pw_name, '\0',
+ i = snprintf(cp, len, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%c", pw->pw_name, '\0',
pw->pw_name, '\0');
if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1)
fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s", strerror(errno));
int
sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *ctxt, const char *password)
{
- char *authmsg = NULL, *msg, *name = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
+ char *authmsg = NULL, *msg = NULL, *name = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
int authsuccess = 0, expired, reenter, result;
do {
result = authenticate((char *)name, (char *)password, &reenter,
&authmsg);
aix_remove_embedded_newlines(authmsg);
- debug3("AIX/authenticate result %d, msg %.100s", result,
+ debug3("AIX/authenticate result %d, authmsg %.100s", result,
authmsg);
} while (reenter);
if (result == 0) {
authsuccess = 1;
- /*
+ /*
* Record successful login. We don't have a pty yet, so just
* label the line as "ssh"
*/
sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm,
Buffer *loginmsg)
{
- char *msg;
+ char *msg = NULL;
int success = 0;
aix_setauthdb(user);
/*
*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
/* These should be in the system headers but are not. */
int usrinfo(int, char *, int);
-#if (HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB) && (HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB == 0)
int setauthdb(const char *, char *);
#endif
/* these may or may not be in the headers depending on the version */
-#if (HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE) && (HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE == 0)
int authenticate(char *, char *, int *, char **);
#endif
-#if (HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED == 0)
int loginfailed(char *, char *, char *);
#endif
-#if (HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS == 0)
int loginrestrictions(char *, int, char *, char **);
#endif
-#if (HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS == 0)
int loginsuccess(char *, char *, char *, char **);
#endif
-#if (HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED == 0)
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED) && (HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED == 0)
int passwdexpired(char *, char **);
#endif
if (spw != NULL)
pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp;
# endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+ return(get_iaf_password(pw));
+#endif
+
# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
struct passwd_adjunct *spw;
if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.116 2004/10/20 11:48:53 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.119 2005/07/28 17:36:22 markus Exp $");
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
static int interactive_mode = 0;
+/* Set to true if we are the server side. */
+static int server_side = 0;
+
+/* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
+static int after_authentication = 0;
+
/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
static struct packet_state {
/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
/* memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); */
- if (comp->type != 0 && comp->enabled == 0) {
+ if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
+ (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && after_authentication)) &&
+ comp->enabled == 0) {
packet_init_compression();
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
buffer_compress_init_send(6);
*max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks, rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
}
+/*
+ * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
+ * This happans on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
+ * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
+ */
+static void
+packet_enable_delayed_compress(void)
+{
+ Comp *comp = NULL;
+ int mode;
+
+ /*
+ * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
+ * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
+ */
+ after_authentication = 1;
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
+ if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
+ packet_init_compression();
+ if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+ buffer_compress_init_send(6);
+ else
+ buffer_compress_init_recv();
+ comp->enabled = 1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
*/
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
+ else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && server_side)
+ packet_enable_delayed_compress();
}
static void
static u_int packet_length = 0;
u_int padlen, need;
u_char *macbuf, *cp, type;
- int maclen, block_size;
+ u_int maclen, block_size;
Enc *enc = NULL;
Mac *mac = NULL;
Comp *comp = NULL;
packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", type);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
+ else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !server_side)
+ packet_enable_delayed_compress();
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", type);
buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
}
void *
-packet_get_raw(int *length_ptr)
+packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr)
{
- int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
+ u_int bytes = buffer_len(&incoming_packet);
if (length_ptr != NULL)
*length_ptr = bytes;
{
rekey_limit = bytes;
}
+
+void
+packet_set_server(void)
+{
+ server_side = 1;
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_authenticated(void)
+{
+ after_authentication = 1;
+}
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.41 2004/05/11 19:01:43 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.43 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
void packet_start_compression(int);
void packet_set_interactive(int);
int packet_is_interactive(void);
+void packet_set_server(void);
+void packet_set_authenticated(void);
void packet_start(u_char);
void packet_put_char(int ch);
u_int packet_get_int(void);
void packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
void packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
-void *packet_get_raw(int *length_ptr);
+void *packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr);
void *packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr);
void packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
void packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.22 2004/07/11 17:48:47 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.24 2005/06/07 13:25:23 jaredy Exp $");
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
static void format_size(char *, int, off_t);
static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t);
+/* window resizing */
+static void sig_winch(int);
+static void setscreensize(void);
+
/* updates the progressmeter to reflect the current state of the transfer */
void refresh_progress_meter(void);
static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */
static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */
static int win_size; /* terminal window size */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */
/* units for format_size */
static const char unit[] = " KMGT";
len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", file);
if (len < 0)
len = 0;
+ if (len >= file_len + 1)
+ len = file_len;
for (i = len; i < file_len; i++ )
buf[i] = ' ';
buf[file_len] = '\0';
save_errno = errno;
+ if (win_resized) {
+ setscreensize();
+ win_resized = 0;
+ }
if (can_output())
refresh_progress_meter();
void
start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
{
- struct winsize winsize;
-
start = last_update = time(NULL);
file = f;
end_pos = filesize;
stalled = 0;
bytes_per_second = 0;
- if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 &&
- winsize.ws_col != 0) {
- if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE)
- win_size = MAX_WINSIZE;
- else
- win_size = winsize.ws_col;
- } else
- win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE;
- win_size += 1; /* trailing \0 */
-
+ setscreensize();
if (can_output())
refresh_progress_meter();
signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
+ signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
}
atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
}
+
+static void
+sig_winch(int sig)
+{
+ win_resized = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+setscreensize(void)
+{
+ struct winsize winsize;
+
+ if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 &&
+ winsize.ws_col != 0) {
+ if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE)
+ win_size = MAX_WINSIZE;
+ else
+ win_size = winsize.ws_col;
+ } else
+ win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE;
+ win_size += 1; /* trailing \0 */
+}
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.139 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.143 2005/07/30 02:03:47 djm Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
fwd.listen_host = cleanhostname(fwd.listen_host);
} else {
fwd.listen_port = a2port(fwd.listen_host);
- fwd.listen_host = "";
+ fwd.listen_host = NULL;
}
if (fwd.listen_port == 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
case oAddressFamily:
arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing address family.",
+ filename, linenum);
intptr = &options->address_family;
if (strcasecmp(arg, "inet") == 0)
value = AF_INET;
case oControlMaster:
intptr = &options->control_master;
- goto parse_yesnoask;
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlMaster argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ value = 0; /* To avoid compiler warning... */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
+ value = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
+ value = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "auto") == 0)
+ value = SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "ask") == 0)
+ value = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "autoask") == 0)
+ value = SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK;
+ else
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlMaster argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
case oHashKnownHosts:
intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
/* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
- filename, linenum, arg);
+ filename, linenum, arg);
}
return 0;
}
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.66 2005/03/01 10:40:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.67 2005/06/08 11:25:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
int hash_known_hosts;
} Options;
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4
void initialize_options(Options *);
void fill_default_options(Options *);
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.140 2005/03/10 22:01:05 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.144 2005/08/06 10:03:12 dtucker Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
if (options->use_login == -1)
options->use_login = 0;
if (options->compression == -1)
- options->compression = 1;
+ options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_tcp_forwarding = 1;
if (options->gateway_ports == -1)
static void
add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
{
- int i;
+ u_int i;
if (options->num_ports == 0)
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
const char *filename, int linenum)
{
char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
- int *intptr, value, i, n;
+ int *intptr, value, n;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_short port;
+ u_int i;
cp = line;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
filename, linenum);
+ /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
+ if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
+ && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
+ add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0);
+ break;
+ }
p = hpdelim(&arg);
if (p == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
case sAddressFamily:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing address family.",
+ filename, linenum);
intptr = &options->address_family;
if (options->listen_addrs != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: address family must be specified before "
case sCompression:
intptr = &options->compression;
- goto parse_flag;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no/delayed "
+ "argument.", filename, linenum);
+ value = 0; /* silence compiler */
+ if (strcmp(arg, "delayed") == 0)
+ value = COMP_DELAYED;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+ value = COMP_ZLIB;
+ else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+ value = COMP_NONE;
+ else
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no/delayed "
+ "argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
case sGatewayPorts:
intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.181 2004/12/23 17:35:48 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.186 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "session.h"
+#include "kex.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
static void
display_loginmsg(void)
{
- if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
- printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
- buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
- }
+ if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) {
+ buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1);
+ printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg));
+ buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ }
}
void
compression_level);
break;
}
- if (!options.compression) {
+ if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
debug2("compression disabled");
break;
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
-void copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
+void
+copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
{
char *var_name, *var_val;
int i;
# ifdef _AIX
aix_usrinfo(pw);
# endif /* _AIX */
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+ if (set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) {
+ exit(1);
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
permanently_set_uid(pw);
#endif
*/
if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
- (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
+ (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
char cell[64];
debug("Getting AFS token");
s->ttyfd = -1;
s->used = 1;
s->self = i;
+ s->x11_chanids = NULL;
debug("session_new: session %d", i);
return s;
}
return NULL;
}
+static Session *
+session_by_x11_channel(int id)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+
+ if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
+ continue;
+ for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
+ if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
+ debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
+ "channel %d", s->self, id);
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static Session *
session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
{
u_int len;
int success = 0;
char *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
- int i;
+ u_int i;
packet_check_eom();
logit("subsystem request for %.100s", subsys);
{
int success;
+ if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
+ error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
+ "x11 fowarding already active", s->self);
+ return 0;
+ }
s->single_connection = packet_get_char();
s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL);
s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL);
return "SIG@openssh.com";
}
+static void
+session_close_x11(int id)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) {
+ debug("session_close_x11: x11 channel %d missing", id);
+ } else {
+ /* Detach X11 listener */
+ debug("session_close_x11: detach x11 channel %d", id);
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+ chan_mark_dead(c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+session_close_single_x11(int id, void *arg)
+{
+ Session *s;
+ u_int i;
+
+ debug3("session_close_single_x11: channel %d", id);
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(id);
+ if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
+ fatal("session_close_single_x11: no x11 channel %d", id);
+ for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ debug("session_close_single_x11: session %d: "
+ "closing channel %d", s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+ /*
+ * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
+ * close all of its siblings.
+ */
+ if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
+ session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]);
+ }
+ xfree(s->x11_chanids);
+ s->x11_chanids = NULL;
+ if (s->display) {
+ xfree(s->display);
+ s->display = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->auth_proto) {
+ xfree(s->auth_proto);
+ s->auth_proto = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->auth_data) {
+ xfree(s->auth_data);
+ s->auth_data = NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->auth_display) {
+ xfree(s->auth_display);
+ s->auth_display = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
static void
session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
{
Channel *c;
+ u_int i;
if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL)
fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d",
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
chan_write_failed(c);
s->chanid = -1;
+
+ /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
+ if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]);
+ s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
+ }
+ }
}
void
session_close(Session *s)
{
- int i;
+ u_int i;
debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
xfree(s->term);
if (s->display)
xfree(s->display);
+ if (s->x11_chanids)
+ xfree(s->x11_chanids);
if (s->auth_display)
xfree(s->auth_display);
if (s->auth_data)
session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg)
{
Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
+
if (s == NULL) {
debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id);
return;
struct stat st;
char display[512], auth_display[512];
char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ u_int i;
if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
}
if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset,
options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
- &s->display_number) == -1) {
+ &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
return 0;
}
+ for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ channel_register_cleanup(s->x11_chanids[i],
+ session_close_single_x11);
+ }
/* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0)
-/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.23 2004/07/17 05:31:41 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.25 2005/07/17 06:49:04 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
int single_connection;
/* proto 2 */
int chanid;
+ int *x11_chanids;
int is_subsystem;
- int num_env;
+ u_int num_env;
struct {
char *name;
char *val;
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.52 2005/03/01 15:47:14 jmc Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.55 2005/06/17 02:44:33 djm Exp $");
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
static char *
Linebuf_getline(Linebuf * lb)
{
- int n = 0;
+ size_t n = 0;
void *p;
lb->lineno++;
static void
congreet(int s)
{
- int remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0, n = 0;
+ int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0;
char buf[256], *cp;
char remote_version[sizeof buf];
size_t bufsiz;
*cp = '\n';
cp++;
}
- if (n < 0) {
- if (errno != ECONNREFUSED)
- error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
- conrecycle(s);
- return;
- }
if (n == 0) {
- error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
+ switch (errno) {
+ case EPIPE:
+ error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
+ break;
+ case ECONNREFUSED:
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
conrecycle(s);
return;
}
n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2,
c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
- if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != n) {
+ if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) {
+ error("snprintf: buffer too small");
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) {
error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
confree(s);
return;
conread(int s)
{
con *c = &fdcon[s];
- int n;
+ size_t n;
if (c->c_status == CS_CON) {
congreet(s);
return;
}
n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off);
- if (n < 0) {
+ if (n == 0) {
error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
confree(s);
return;
unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path)
{
int fd, addr_len, rval, errors;
- char msg[2];
+ u_char msg[2];
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr;
if (socket_path != NULL &&
strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path))
fatal("Random pool path is too long");
- if (len > 255)
- fatal("Too many bytes to read from PRNGD");
+ if (len <= 0 || len > 255)
+ fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len);
memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
goto done;
}
- if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != len) {
+ if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) {
if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
close(fd);
errors++;
debug3("Time elapsed: %d msec", msec_elapsed);
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
- error("Couldn't wait for child '%s' completion: %s",
- src->cmdstring, strerror(errno));
+ error("Couldn't wait for child '%s' completion: %s",
+ src->cmdstring, strerror(errno));
return 0.0;
}
save_errno = errno;
unlink(tmpseed);
fatal("problem renaming PRNG seedfile from %.100s "
- "to %.100s (%.100s)", tmpseed, filename,
+ "to %.100s (%.100s)", tmpseed, filename,
strerror(save_errno));
}
}
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.205 2005/03/07 23:41:54 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.209 2005/07/06 09:33:05 dtucker Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
on the remote machine, and the user names are
the same on both sides, or if the files
-.Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+.Pa ~/.rhosts
or
-.Pa $HOME/.shosts
+.Pa ~/.shosts
exist in the user's home directory on the
remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client
machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
host key (see
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
in the
.Sx FILES
section), only then is login permitted.
spoofing, DNS spoofing and routing spoofing.
[Note to the administrator:
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
-.Pa $HOME/.rhosts ,
+.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
disabled if security is desired.]
.Pp
The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
.Pp
The file
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in.
When the user logs in, the
.Nm
The user creates his/her RSA key pair by running
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
This stores the private key in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
and stores the public key in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
in the user's home directory.
The user should then copy the
.Pa identity.pub
to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
in his/her home directory on the remote machine (the
.Pa authorized_keys
file corresponds to the conventional
-.Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+.Pa ~/.rhosts
file, and has one key
per line, though the lines can be very long).
After this, the user can log in without giving the password.
The public key method is similar to RSA authentication described
in the previous section and allows the RSA or DSA algorithm to be used:
The client uses his private key,
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
or
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
to sign the session identifier and sends the result to the server.
The server checks whether the matching public key is listed in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
and grants access if both the key is found and the signature is correct.
The session identifier is derived from a shared Diffie-Hellman value
and is only known to the client and the server.
automatically maintains and checks a database containing
identifications for all hosts it has ever been used with.
Host keys are stored in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
in the user's home directory.
Additionally, the file
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
.It Fl a
Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
.It Fl b Ar bind_address
-Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple
-interfaces or aliased addresses.
+Use
+.Ar bind_address
+on the local machine as the source address
+of the connection.
+Only useful on systems with more than one address.
.It Fl C
Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
data for forwarded X11 and TCP/IP connections).
.Dq aes128-ctr ,
.Dq aes192-ctr ,
.Dq aes256-ctr ,
+.Dq arcfour128 ,
+.Dq arcfour256 ,
.Dq arcfour ,
.Dq blowfish-cbc ,
and
.Dq cast128-cbc .
The default is
.Bd -literal
- ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,
- aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc''
+ ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+ arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+ aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
.Ed
.It Fl D Ar port
Specifies a local
.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
will be ignored.
The default for the per-user configuration file is
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/config .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/config .
.It Fl f
Requests
.Nm
Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for
RSA or DSA authentication is read.
The default is
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
for protocol version 2.
Identity files may also be specified on
a per-host basis in the configuration file.
Additionally,
.Nm
reads
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
and adds lines of the format
.Dq VARNAME=value
to the environment if the file exists and if users are allowed to
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Records host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not
in
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts .
See
.Xr sshd 8 .
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the authentication identity of the user.
They are for protocol 1 RSA, protocol 2 DSA, and protocol 2 RSA, respectively.
These files
It is possible to specify a passphrase when
generating the key; the passphrase will be used to encrypt the
sensitive part of this file using 3DES.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub, $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub, ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub, ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the public key for authentication (public part of the
identity file in human-readable form).
The contents of the
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity.pub
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
file should be added to the file
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
on all machines
where the user wishes to log in using protocol version 1 RSA authentication.
The contents of the
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
file should be added to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
on all machines
where the user wishes to log in using protocol version 2 DSA/RSA authentication.
These files are not
These files are
never used automatically and are not necessary; they are only provided for
the convenience of the user.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/config
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file.
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in as this user.
The format of this file is described in the
.Xr sshd 8
By default
.Nm
is not setuid root.
-.It Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+.It Pa ~/.rhosts
This file is used in
.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
and
If the server machine does not have the client's host key in
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts ,
it can be stored in
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
The easiest way to do this is to
connect back to the client from the server machine using ssh; this
will automatically add the host key to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
-.It Pa $HOME/.shosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.It Pa ~/.shosts
This file is used exactly the same way as
.Pa .rhosts .
The purpose for
See the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page for more information.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
Commands in this file are executed by
.Nm
when the user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is
See the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page for more information.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
Contains additional definitions for environment variables, see section
.Sx ENVIRONMENT
above.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.234 2005/03/10 22:01:06 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.249 2005/07/30 01:26:16 djm Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
int control_fd = -1;
/* Multiplexing control command */
-static u_int mux_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
+static u_int mux_command = 0;
/* Only used in control client mode */
volatile sig_atomic_t control_client_terminate = 0;
int dummy;
extern int optind, optreset;
extern char *optarg;
+ struct servent *sp;
Forward fwd;
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
}
break;
case 'M':
- options.control_master =
- (options.control_master >= 1) ? 2 : 1;
+ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES)
+ options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
+ else
+ options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
break;
case 'p':
options.port = a2port(optarg);
fwd.listen_host = cleanhostname(fwd.listen_host);
} else {
fwd.listen_port = a2port(fwd.listen_host);
- fwd.listen_host = "";
+ fwd.listen_host = NULL;
}
if (fwd.listen_port == 0) {
if (no_tty_flag)
tty_flag = 0;
/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)) && !force_tty_flag) {
+ if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) && !force_tty_flag) {
if (tty_flag)
logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a terminal.");
tty_flag = 0;
*p = tolower(*p);
}
+ /* Get default port if port has not been set. */
+ if (options.port == 0) {
+ sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
+ options.port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+ }
+
if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
strcmp(options.proxy_command, "none") == 0)
options.proxy_command = NULL;
+ if (options.control_path != NULL &&
+ strcmp(options.control_path, "none") == 0)
+ options.control_path = NULL;
if (options.control_path != NULL) {
- options.control_path = tilde_expand_filename(
- options.control_path, original_real_uid);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", options.port);
+ cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path,
+ original_real_uid);
+ options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, "p", buf, "h", host,
+ "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
+ xfree(cp);
}
- if (options.control_path != NULL && options.control_master == 0)
- control_client(options.control_path); /* This doesn't return */
+ if (mux_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
+ fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
+ if (options.control_path != NULL)
+ control_client(options.control_path);
/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
return exit_status;
}
-#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
-
-static void
-x11_get_proto(char **_proto, char **_data)
-{
- char cmd[1024];
- char line[512];
- char xdisplay[512];
- static char proto[512], data[512];
- FILE *f;
- int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
- char *display, *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
- struct stat st;
-
- xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
- *_proto = proto;
- *_data = data;
- proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
-
- if (!options.xauth_location ||
- (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
- debug("No xauth program.");
- } else {
- if ((display = getenv("DISPLAY")) == NULL) {
- debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
- return;
- }
- /*
- * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
- * not match an authorization entry. For this we
- * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
- * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
- * is not perfect.
- */
- if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
- snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
- display + 10);
- display = xdisplay;
- }
- if (options.forward_x11_trusted == 0) {
- xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- strlcpy(xauthdir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
- if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
- do_unlink = 1;
- snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
- xauthdir);
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
- "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
- " untrusted timeout 1200 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
- options.xauth_location, xauthfile, display);
- debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
- if (system(cmd) == 0)
- generated = 1;
- }
- }
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
- "%s %s%s list %s . 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
- options.xauth_location,
- generated ? "-f " : "" ,
- generated ? xauthfile : "",
- display);
- debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
- f = popen(cmd, "r");
- if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
- sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
- got_data = 1;
- if (f)
- pclose(f);
- }
-
- if (do_unlink) {
- unlink(xauthfile);
- rmdir(xauthdir);
- }
- if (xauthdir)
- xfree(xauthdir);
- if (xauthfile)
- xfree(xauthfile);
-
- /*
- * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
- * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
- * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11
- * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
- * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
- * for the local connection.
- */
- if (!got_data) {
- u_int32_t rnd = 0;
-
- logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
- "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
- strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
- rnd & 0xff);
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
- }
-}
-
static void
ssh_init_forwarding(void)
{
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
"local address %.200s:%d",
- (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
- (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
+ (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
+ (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
int have_tty = 0;
struct winsize ws;
char *cp;
+ const char *display;
/* Enable compression if requested. */
if (options.compression) {
packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty request response.");
}
/* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
- if (options.forward_x11 && getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) {
+ display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+ if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
- x11_get_proto(&proto, &data);
+ client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+ options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, proto, data);
+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, display, proto, data);
/* Read response from the server. */
type = packet_read();
mode_t old_umask;
int addr_len;
- if (options.control_path == NULL || options.control_master <= 0)
+ if (options.control_path == NULL ||
+ options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO)
return;
+ debug("setting up multiplex master socket");
+
memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
{
extern char **environ;
-
+ const char *display;
int interactive = tty_flag;
- if (options.forward_x11 && getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) {
+
+ display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+ if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
- x11_get_proto(&proto, &data);
+ client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+ options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, proto, data);
+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data);
interactive = 1;
/* XXX wait for reply */
}
extern char **environ;
u_int flags;
- if (stdin_null_flag) {
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
- if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
- if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(fd);
+ if (mux_command == 0)
+ mux_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
+
+ switch (options.control_master) {
+ case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO:
+ case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK:
+ debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master");
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return;
}
memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1)
- fatal("Couldn't connect to %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+ if (mux_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN) {
+ fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (errno == ENOENT)
+ debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
+ else {
+ error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ close(sock);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(fd);
+ }
- if ((term = getenv("TERM")) == NULL)
- term = "";
+ term = getenv("TERM");
flags = 0;
if (tty_flag)
flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_TTY;
if (subsystem_flag)
flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_SUBSYS;
+ if (options.forward_x11)
+ flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_X11_FWD;
+ if (options.forward_agent)
+ flags |= SSHMUX_FLAG_AGENT_FWD;
buffer_init(&m);
/* Send our command to server */
buffer_put_int(&m, mux_command);
buffer_put_int(&m, flags);
- if (ssh_msg_send(sock, /* version */1, &m) == -1)
+ if (ssh_msg_send(sock, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1)
fatal("%s: msg_send", __func__);
buffer_clear(&m);
/* Get authorisation status and PID of controlee */
if (ssh_msg_recv(sock, &m) == -1)
fatal("%s: msg_recv", __func__);
- if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 1)
+ if (buffer_get_char(&m) != SSHMUX_VER)
fatal("%s: wrong version", __func__);
if (buffer_get_int(&m) != 1)
fatal("Connection to master denied");
}
/* SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, term);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, term ? term : "");
buffer_append(&command, "\0", 1);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(&command));
}
}
- if (ssh_msg_send(sock, /* version */1, &m) == -1)
+ if (ssh_msg_send(sock, SSHMUX_VER, &m) == -1)
fatal("%s: msg_send", __func__);
mm_send_fd(sock, STDIN_FILENO);
buffer_clear(&m);
if (ssh_msg_recv(sock, &m) == -1)
fatal("%s: msg_recv", __func__);
- if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 1)
+ if (buffer_get_char(&m) != SSHMUX_VER)
fatal("%s: wrong version", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.49 2005/03/16 11:10:38 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.61 2005/07/08 12:53:10 jmc Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/config
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
.El
.Sh DESCRIPTION
command-line options
.It
user's configuration file
-.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config
+.Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
.It
GSSAPI configuration file
.Pq Pa $HOME/.ssh/config.gssapi
The default is
.Dq no .
.It Cm BindAddress
-Specify the interface to transmit from on machines with multiple
-interfaces or aliased addresses.
+Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of
+the connection.
+Only useful on systems with more than one address.
Note that this option does not work if
.Cm UsePrivilegedPort
is set to
.Dq aes128-ctr ,
.Dq aes192-ctr ,
.Dq aes256-ctr ,
+.Dq arcfour128 ,
+.Dq arcfour256 ,
.Dq arcfour ,
.Dq blowfish-cbc ,
and
.Dq cast128-cbc .
The default is
.Bd -literal
- ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,
- aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc''
+ ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+ arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+ aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
.Ed
.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
Specifies that all local, remote and dynamic port forwardings
program before they are accepted (see
.Xr ssh-add 1
for details).
+If the
+.Cm ControlPath
+can not be opened,
+.Nm ssh
+will continue without connecting to a master instance.
+.Pp
+X11 and
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the
+display and agent fowarded will be the one belonging to the master
+connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
+.Pp
+Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a
+master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already
+exist.
+These options are:
+.Dq auto
+and
+.Dq autoask .
+The latter requires confirmation like the
+.Dq ask
+option.
.It Cm ControlPath
-Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing.
-See
+Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described
+in the
.Cm ControlMaster
-above.
+section above or the string
+.Dq none
+to disable connection sharing.
+In the path,
+.Ql %h
+will be substituted by the target host name,
+.Ql %p
+the port and
+.Ql %r
+by the remote login username.
+It is recommended that any
+.Cm ControlPath
+used for opportunistic connection sharing include
+all three of these escape sequences.
+This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
.It Cm DynamicForward
Specifies that a TCP/IP port on the local machine be forwarded
over the secure channel, and the application
Indicates that
.Nm ssh
should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
These hashed names may be used normally by
.Nm ssh
and
Specifies a file from which the user's RSA or DSA authentication identity
is read.
The default is
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
for protocol version 2.
Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
will be used for authentication.
.Cm CheckHostIP
is not available for connects with a proxy command.
.Pp
+This directive is useful in conjunction with
+.Xr nc 1
+and its proxy support.
+For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at
+192.0.2.0:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
+.Ed
.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Dq yes ,
.Nm ssh
will never automatically add host keys to the
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks,
however, can be annoying when the
.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile
Specifies a file to use for the user
host key database instead of
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
.It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource
records.
.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/config
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file.
The format of this file is described above.
This file is used by the
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.60 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.61 2005/06/17 02:44:33 djm Exp $");
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
/* Compute the response. */
/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
- if (len <= 0 || len > sizeof(buf))
+ if (len <= 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(buf))
packet_disconnect(
"respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len);
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.138 2004/06/13 12:53:24 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.142 2005/08/30 22:08:05 djm Exp $");
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
if (options.compression) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib,none";
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none";
} else {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib";
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib";
}
if (options.macs != NULL) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: "
- "type %d", type);
+ "type %d", type);
}
void
{
Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL;
- static int mech = 0;
+ static u_int mech = 0;
OM_uint32 min;
int ok = 0;
}
}
- if (!ok) return 0;
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
OM_uint32 status, ms, flags;
Buffer b;
/* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
- &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
+ &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
xfree(recv_tok.value);
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.206 2005/03/01 14:59:49 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.208 2005/06/08 03:50:00 djm Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
works as follows:
.Ss SSH protocol version 1
Each host has a host-specific RSA key
-(normally 1024 bits) used to identify the host.
+(normally 2048 bits) used to identify the host.
Additionally, when
the daemon starts, it generates a server RSA key (normally 768 bits).
This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and
prints last login time and
.Pa /etc/motd
(unless prevented in the configuration file or by
-.Pa $HOME/.hushlogin ;
+.Pa ~/.hushlogin ;
see the
.Sx FILES
section).
Sets up basic environment.
.It
Reads the file
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment.
See the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
Changes to user's home directory.
.It
If
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
exists, runs it; else if
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
exists, runs
Runs user's shell or command.
.El
.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
is the default file that lists the public keys that are
permitted for RSA authentication in protocol version 1
and for public key authentication (PubkeyAuthentication)
The
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
The global file should
be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (RSA or DSA) that can be used to log into the user's account.
This file must be readable by root (which may on some machines imply
it being world-readable if the user's home directory resides on an NFS
.Pa id_rsa.pub
files into this file, as described in
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
-.It Pa "/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts", "$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts"
+.It Pa "/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts", "~/.ssh/known_hosts"
These files are consulted when using rhosts with RSA host
authentication or protocol version 2 hostbased authentication
to check the public key of the host.
These files should be writable only by root/the owner.
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
should be world-readable, and
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
can, but need not be, world-readable.
.It Pa /etc/motd
See
.Xr motd 5 .
-.It Pa $HOME/.hushlogin
+.It Pa ~/.hushlogin
This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
.Pa /etc/motd ,
if
Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
Further details are described in
.Xr hosts_access 5 .
-.It Pa $HOME/.rhosts
+.It Pa ~/.rhosts
This file is used during
.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
and
Either host or user
name may be of the form +@groupname to specify all hosts or all users
in the group.
-.It Pa $HOME/.shosts
+.It Pa ~/.shosts
For ssh,
this file is exactly the same as for
.Pa .rhosts .
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv .
However, this file may be useful in environments that want to run both
rsh/rlogin and ssh.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/environment
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
.Ql # ) ,
controlled via the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option.
-.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
If this file exists, it is run with
.Pa /bin/sh
after reading the
readable by anyone else.
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
Like
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/rc .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
This can be used to specify
machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.308 2005/02/08 22:24:57 dtucker Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.312 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
static void
sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
{
- int i, mismatch;
+ u_int i;
+ int mismatch;
int remote_major, remote_minor;
int major, minor;
char *s;
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+ /*
+ * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
+ * this information is not part of the key state.
+ */
+ packet_set_authenticated();
}
static char *
/*
* Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
* root's environment
- */
+ */
if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
- /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
- if (options.tcp_keep_alive &&
- setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on,
- sizeof(on)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
/*
* Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
* not have a key.
*/
packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
+ packet_set_server();
- remote_port = get_remote_port();
+ /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
+ setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
+ debug("get_remote_port failed");
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
if (!rsafail) {
BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
- if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
+ if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
"session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
}
- if (!options.compression) {
+ if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
}
+
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
#ifdef GSSAPI
-# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.70 2004/12/23 23:11:00 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.72 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $
# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See
# sshd_config(5) for more information.
#ServerKeyBits 768
# Logging
-#obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
+# obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
#SyslogFacility AUTH
#LogLevel INFO
#UseLogin no
#UsePrivilegeSeparation yes
#PermitUserEnvironment no
-#Compression yes
+#Compression delayed
#ClientAliveInterval 0
#ClientAliveCountMax 3
#UseDNS yes
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.40 2005/03/18 17:05:00 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.44 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $
.Dd September 25, 1999
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Dq aes128-ctr ,
.Dq aes192-ctr ,
.Dq aes256-ctr ,
+.Dq arcfour128 ,
+.Dq arcfour256 ,
.Dq arcfour ,
.Dq blowfish-cbc ,
and
.Dq cast128-cbc .
The default is
.Bd -literal
- ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,
- aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
+ ``aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+ arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+ aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr''
.Ed
-.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
-Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
-from the client,
-.Nm sshd
-will send a message through the encrypted
-channel to request a response from the client.
-The default
-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
-This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
Sets the number of client alive messages (see above) which may be
sent without
.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
is left at the default, unresponsive ssh clients
will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
+Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+from the client,
+.Nm sshd
+will send a message through the encrypted
+channel to request a response from the client.
+The default
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
+This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
.It Cm Compression
-Specifies whether compression is allowed.
+Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until
+the user has authenticated successfully.
The argument must be
-.Dq yes
+.Dq yes ,
+.Dq delayed ,
or
.Dq no .
The default is
-.Dq yes .
+.Dq delayed .
.It Cm DenyGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
by spaces.
Specifies whether
.Nm sshd
should ignore the user's
-.Pa $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
during
.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication
or
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: tildexpand.c,v 1.12 2001/08/11 22:51:27 jakob Exp $");
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "tildexpand.h"
-
-/*
- * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
- * Warning: this calls getpw*.
- */
-char *
-tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t my_uid)
-{
- const char *cp;
- u_int userlen;
- char *expanded;
- struct passwd *pw;
- char user[100];
- int len;
-
- /* Return immediately if no tilde. */
- if (filename[0] != '~')
- return xstrdup(filename);
-
- /* Skip the tilde. */
- filename++;
-
- /* Find where the username ends. */
- cp = strchr(filename, '/');
- if (cp)
- userlen = cp - filename; /* Something after username. */
- else
- userlen = strlen(filename); /* Nothing after username. */
- if (userlen == 0)
- pw = getpwuid(my_uid); /* Own home directory. */
- else {
- /* Tilde refers to someone elses home directory. */
- if (userlen > sizeof(user) - 1)
- fatal("User name after tilde too long.");
- memcpy(user, filename, userlen);
- user[userlen] = 0;
- pw = getpwnam(user);
- }
- if (!pw)
- fatal("Unknown user %100s.", user);
-
- /* If referring to someones home directory, return it now. */
- if (!cp) {
- /* Only home directory specified */
- return xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
- }
- /* Build a path combining the specified directory and path. */
- len = strlen(pw->pw_dir) + strlen(cp + 1) + 2;
- if (len > MAXPATHLEN)
- fatal("Home directory too long (%d > %d", len-1, MAXPATHLEN-1);
- expanded = xmalloc(len);
- snprintf(expanded, len, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", cp + 1);
- return expanded;
-}
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.44 2005/03/16 21:17:39 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.45 2005/08/31 09:28:42 markus Exp $ */
#ifdef GSI
#define GSI_VERSION " GSI"
#define MGLUE_VERSION ""
#endif
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_4.1"
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_4.2"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE \
andersk / gssapi-openssh.git / commitdiff
