2 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
3 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
5 * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
6 * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
7 * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
8 * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
9 * authentication agent connections.
11 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
12 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
13 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
14 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
15 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
17 * SSH2 implementation:
18 * Privilege Separation:
20 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
21 * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
32 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
33 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
34 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
35 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
36 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
37 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
38 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
39 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
40 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
41 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
45 RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.312 2005/07/25 11:59:40 markus Exp $");
47 #include <openssl/dh.h>
48 #include <openssl/bn.h>
49 #include <openssl/md5.h>
50 #include <openssl/rand.h>
51 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
52 #include <sys/security.h>
73 #include "myproposal.h"
75 #include "pathnames.h"
84 #include "monitor_mm.h"
86 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
87 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
92 int allow_severity = LOG_INFO;
93 int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
101 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
102 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
103 #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
104 #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
106 extern char *__progname;
108 /* Server configuration options. */
109 ServerOptions options;
111 /* Name of the server configuration file. */
112 char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
115 * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
116 * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
117 * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
118 * the first connection.
122 /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
125 /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
128 /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
129 int no_daemon_flag = 0;
131 /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
134 /* Saved arguments to main(). */
139 int rexeced_flag = 0;
145 * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
148 #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
149 int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
150 int num_listen_socks = 0;
153 * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
154 * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
156 char *client_version_string = NULL;
157 char *server_version_string = NULL;
159 /* for rekeying XXX fixme */
163 * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
164 * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
165 * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
166 * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
167 * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
168 * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
171 Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
172 Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
173 Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
176 u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
180 * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
181 * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
183 static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
185 /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
186 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
187 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
189 /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
190 u_char session_id[16];
193 u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
194 u_int session_id2_len = 0;
196 /* record remote hostname or ip */
197 u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
199 /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
200 int *startup_pipes = NULL;
201 int startup_pipe; /* in child */
203 /* variables used for privilege separation */
205 struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
207 /* global authentication context */
208 Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
210 /* message to be displayed after login */
213 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
214 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
215 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
217 static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
218 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
221 * Close all listening sockets
224 close_listen_socks(void)
228 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
229 close(listen_socks[i]);
230 num_listen_socks = -1;
234 close_startup_pipes(void)
239 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
240 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
241 close(startup_pipes[i]);
245 * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
246 * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
250 sighup_handler(int sig)
252 int save_errno = errno;
255 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
260 * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
261 * Restarts the server.
266 logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
267 close_listen_socks();
268 close_startup_pipes();
269 execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
270 logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
276 * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
279 sigterm_handler(int sig)
281 received_sigterm = sig;
285 * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
286 * reap any zombies left by exited children.
289 main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
291 int save_errno = errno;
295 while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
296 (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
299 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
304 * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
307 grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
309 /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
311 if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
312 kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
314 /* Log error and exit. */
315 fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
319 * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
320 * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
321 * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
322 * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
326 generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
331 verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
332 sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
333 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
334 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
335 sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
336 options.server_key_bits);
337 verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
339 for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
342 sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
349 key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
351 int save_errno = errno;
353 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
359 sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
363 int remote_major, remote_minor;
366 char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
367 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
369 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
370 (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
371 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
373 } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
374 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
375 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
377 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
378 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
380 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
381 server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
383 /* Send our protocol version identification. */
384 if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
385 strlen(server_version_string))
386 != strlen(server_version_string)) {
387 logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
391 /* Read other sides version identification. */
392 memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
393 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
394 if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
395 logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
396 get_remote_ipaddr());
399 if (buf[i] == '\r') {
401 /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
403 strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
407 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
412 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
413 client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
416 * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
417 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
419 if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
420 &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
421 s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
422 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
425 logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
426 client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
429 debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
430 remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
432 compat_datafellows(remote_version);
434 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) {
435 logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
436 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
440 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
441 logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
442 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
447 switch (remote_major) {
449 if (remote_minor == 99) {
450 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
456 if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
460 if (remote_minor < 3) {
461 packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
462 "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
463 } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
464 /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
469 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
478 chop(server_version_string);
479 debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
482 s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
483 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
486 logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
488 server_version_string, client_version_string);
493 /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
495 destroy_sensitive_data(void)
499 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
500 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
501 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
503 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
504 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
505 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
506 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
509 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
510 memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
513 /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
515 demote_sensitive_data(void)
520 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
521 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
522 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
523 sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
526 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
527 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
528 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
529 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
530 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
531 if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
532 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
536 /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
540 privsep_preauth_child(void)
547 /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
548 privsep_challenge_enable();
550 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
551 rnd[i] = arc4random();
552 RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
554 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
555 demote_sensitive_data();
557 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
558 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
560 memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
563 /* Change our root directory */
564 if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
565 fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
567 if (chdir("/") == -1)
568 fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
570 /* Drop our privileges */
571 debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
574 /* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
575 do_setusercontext(pw);
577 gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
578 if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
579 fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
580 permanently_set_uid(pw);
585 privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
590 /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
591 pmonitor = monitor_init();
592 /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
593 pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
597 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
598 } else if (pid != 0) {
599 debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
601 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
602 pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
603 monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
604 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
607 monitor_sync(pmonitor);
609 /* Wait for the child's exit status */
610 while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
617 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
619 /* Demote the child */
620 if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
621 privsep_preauth_child();
622 setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
628 privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
630 #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
633 if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
635 /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
636 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
641 /* Authentication complete */
643 if (startup_pipe != -1) {
648 /* New socket pair */
649 monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
651 pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
652 if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
653 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
654 else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
655 debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
656 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
657 buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
658 monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
664 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
666 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
667 demote_sensitive_data();
669 /* Drop privileges */
670 do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
672 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
673 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
676 * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
677 * this information is not part of the key state.
679 packet_set_authenticated();
683 list_hostkey_types(void)
691 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
692 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
698 if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
699 buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
700 p = key_ssh_name(key);
701 buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
705 buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
706 ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
708 debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret);
713 get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
717 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
718 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
719 if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
726 get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
728 if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
730 return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
734 get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
738 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
739 if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
746 * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
747 * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
748 * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
749 * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
752 drop_connection(int startups)
756 if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
758 if (startups >= options.max_startups)
760 if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
763 p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
764 p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
765 p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
766 p += options.max_startups_rate;
767 r = arc4random() % 100;
769 debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
770 return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
776 fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
777 SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
779 "usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
780 " [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
786 send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
790 debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__, fd,
794 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
795 * string configuration
796 * u_int ephemeral_key_follows
797 * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
805 buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf));
807 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
808 sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
809 buffer_put_int(&m, 1);
810 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
811 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
812 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
813 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
814 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
815 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
817 buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
819 if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1)
820 fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
824 debug3("%s: done", __func__);
828 recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
834 debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
838 if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1)
839 fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
840 if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
841 fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
843 cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
845 buffer_append(conf, cp, len + 1);
848 if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
849 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
850 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
851 sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
852 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
853 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
854 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
855 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
856 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
857 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
858 rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
859 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa);
863 debug3("%s: done", __func__);
867 * Main program for the daemon.
870 main(int ac, char **av)
874 int opt, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
875 int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
879 struct sockaddr_storage from;
880 const char *remote_ip;
884 char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
886 int listen_sock, maxfd;
887 int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
891 int ret, key_used = 0;
894 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
895 (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
897 __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
900 /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
903 saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1));
904 for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
905 saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
906 saved_argv[i] = NULL;
908 #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
909 /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
910 compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
914 if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
915 debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
917 /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
918 initialize_server_options(&options);
920 /* Parse command-line arguments. */
921 while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqrtQR46")) != -1) {
924 options.address_family = AF_INET;
927 options.address_family = AF_INET6;
930 config_file_name = optarg;
933 if (debug_flag == 0) {
935 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
936 } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
959 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
962 options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg);
965 options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
966 if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
967 fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
970 options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
971 if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) {
972 fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
977 if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
978 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
983 if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
984 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
989 if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
990 fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
993 options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
999 utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
1000 if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
1001 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
1006 line = xstrdup(optarg);
1007 if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
1008 "command-line", 0) != 0)
1018 if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
1020 if (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))
1021 fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
1023 closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
1025 closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
1027 SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
1030 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
1031 * key (unless started from inetd)
1033 log_init(__progname,
1034 options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
1035 SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
1036 options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
1037 SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
1038 log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
1041 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
1042 * root's environment
1044 if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
1045 unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
1048 /* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
1049 * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
1056 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
1057 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
1058 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
1059 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
1061 /* Fetch our configuration */
1064 recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg);
1066 load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
1068 parse_server_config(&options,
1069 rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, &cfg);
1074 /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
1075 fill_default_server_options(&options);
1077 /* set default channel AF */
1078 channel_set_af(options.address_family);
1080 /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
1082 fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
1086 debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
1088 /* load private host keys */
1089 sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
1091 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
1092 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
1094 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
1095 key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
1096 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
1098 error("Could not load host key: %s",
1099 options.host_key_files[i]);
1100 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
1103 switch (key->type) {
1105 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
1106 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
1110 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
1113 debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
1116 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
1117 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
1118 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
1120 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
1121 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
1122 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
1124 if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
1125 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
1129 /* Check certain values for sanity. */
1130 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
1131 if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
1132 options.server_key_bits > 32768) {
1133 fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
1137 * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
1138 * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
1139 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
1141 if (options.server_key_bits >
1142 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
1143 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
1144 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1145 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1146 options.server_key_bits =
1147 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1148 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
1149 debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
1150 options.server_key_bits);
1158 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
1159 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
1161 if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
1162 (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
1163 fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
1164 _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1167 if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
1168 (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
1169 (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
1171 if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
1173 fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
1174 "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1177 /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
1182 * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
1183 * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
1184 * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
1185 * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
1186 * module which might be used).
1188 if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
1189 debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1192 rexec_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(char *) * (rexec_argc + 2));
1193 for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) {
1194 debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
1195 rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
1197 rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
1198 rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
1201 /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
1202 if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
1204 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1207 * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
1208 * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
1211 if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
1214 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1215 if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
1216 fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1218 /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
1220 fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
1222 (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
1225 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1227 /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
1228 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1230 /* Initialize the random number generator. */
1233 /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
1234 unmounted if desired. */
1237 /* ignore SIGPIPE */
1238 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
1240 /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
1246 close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
1247 sock_in = sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
1249 startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1250 close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1253 sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
1254 sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
1257 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
1258 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
1259 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
1261 if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
1262 dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
1263 dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
1264 if (fd > STDOUT_FILENO)
1267 debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
1268 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
1269 sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
1270 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1272 for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
1273 if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
1275 if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
1276 fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
1277 "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
1278 if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
1279 ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
1280 NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
1281 error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
1282 (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
1286 /* Create socket for listening. */
1287 listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
1289 if (listen_sock < 0) {
1290 /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
1291 verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1294 if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
1299 * Set socket options.
1300 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
1302 if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
1303 &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1304 error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
1306 debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
1308 /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
1309 if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
1311 error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
1312 strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
1316 listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
1319 /* Start listening on the port. */
1320 logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
1321 if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
1322 fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1325 freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
1327 if (!num_listen_socks)
1328 fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
1330 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
1331 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1334 * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs
1337 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
1339 signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
1340 signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
1342 /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
1343 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
1345 /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
1348 * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
1349 * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to
1350 * do this before the bind above because the bind will
1351 * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
1352 * overwrite any old pid in the file.
1354 f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
1356 error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
1357 options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
1359 fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
1364 /* setup fd set for listen */
1367 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1368 if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
1369 maxfd = listen_socks[i];
1370 /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
1371 startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int));
1372 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1373 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1376 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
1377 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
1380 if (received_sighup)
1384 fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
1385 fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
1386 memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
1388 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1389 FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
1390 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1391 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
1392 FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
1394 /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
1395 ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1396 if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
1397 error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1398 if (received_sigterm) {
1399 logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
1400 (int) received_sigterm);
1401 close_listen_socks();
1402 unlink(options.pid_file);
1405 if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
1406 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1413 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1414 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
1415 FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
1417 * the read end of the pipe is ready
1418 * if the child has closed the pipe
1419 * after successful authentication
1420 * or if the child has died
1422 close(startup_pipes[i]);
1423 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1426 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
1427 if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
1429 fromlen = sizeof(from);
1430 newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from,
1433 if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
1434 error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1437 if (unset_nonblock(newsock) == -1) {
1441 if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
1442 debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
1446 if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
1451 if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
1452 SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
1453 error("reexec socketpair: %s",
1456 close(startup_p[0]);
1457 close(startup_p[1]);
1461 for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
1462 if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
1463 startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
1464 if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
1465 maxfd = startup_p[0];
1471 * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
1472 * we are in debugging mode.
1476 * In debugging mode. Close the listening
1477 * socket, and start processing the
1478 * connection without forking.
1480 debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
1481 close_listen_socks();
1484 close(startup_p[0]);
1485 close(startup_p[1]);
1489 send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
1496 * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
1497 * the child process the connection. The
1498 * parent continues listening.
1500 if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
1502 * Child. Close the listening and max_startup
1503 * sockets. Start using the accepted socket.
1504 * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
1505 * changed). We break out of the loop to handle
1508 startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
1509 close_startup_pipes();
1510 close_listen_socks();
1513 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1520 /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
1522 error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1524 debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
1526 close(startup_p[1]);
1529 send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
1534 /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
1535 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
1537 /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
1538 signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
1539 alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
1545 /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
1548 /* child process check (or debug mode) */
1549 if (num_listen_socks < 0)
1554 /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
1555 setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
1558 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
1559 * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
1560 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
1562 #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
1564 * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
1565 * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
1566 * controlling tty" errors.
1568 if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
1569 error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1575 debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
1576 sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
1577 dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
1578 dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
1579 if (startup_pipe == -1)
1580 close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1582 dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1584 dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
1586 if (startup_pipe != -1)
1587 close(startup_pipe);
1589 execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
1591 /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
1592 error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
1593 recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
1594 log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
1595 options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1598 startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
1600 close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
1601 newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
1602 if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
1603 dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
1604 dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
1605 if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
1608 debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
1609 sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
1613 * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
1614 * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
1615 * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
1618 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
1619 signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
1620 signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
1621 signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
1622 signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
1623 signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
1626 * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
1629 packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
1630 packet_set_server();
1632 /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
1633 if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
1634 setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
1635 error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1637 if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
1638 debug("get_remote_port failed");
1641 remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
1643 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1644 audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
1647 /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
1648 if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1649 struct request_info req;
1651 request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
1654 if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
1655 debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
1658 fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
1661 #endif /* LIBWRAP */
1663 /* Log the connection. */
1664 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
1667 * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
1668 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
1669 * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
1670 * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
1671 * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
1672 * are about to discover the bug.
1674 signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
1676 alarm(options.login_grace_time);
1678 sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
1680 packet_set_nonblocking();
1682 /* allocate authentication context */
1683 authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
1684 memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
1686 authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
1688 /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
1689 the_authctxt = authctxt;
1691 /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
1692 buffer_init(&loginmsg);
1695 if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
1698 /* perform the key exchange */
1699 /* authenticate user and start session */
1702 do_authentication2(authctxt);
1705 do_authentication(authctxt);
1708 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
1709 * the current keystate and exits
1712 mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
1717 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1718 audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
1722 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
1723 * file descriptor passing.
1726 privsep_postauth(authctxt);
1727 /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
1729 destroy_sensitive_data();
1732 /* Start session. */
1733 do_authenticated(authctxt);
1735 /* The connection has been terminated. */
1736 verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
1739 if (options.use_pam)
1741 #endif /* USE_PAM */
1743 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1744 PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
1756 * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
1757 * (key with larger modulus first).
1760 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
1764 if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
1765 /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
1766 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
1767 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1768 fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1769 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1770 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1771 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1772 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1774 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1775 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
1777 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1778 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
1781 /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
1782 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
1783 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1784 fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1785 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1786 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1787 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1788 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1790 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1791 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
1793 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1794 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
1807 BIGNUM *session_key_int;
1808 u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
1810 u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
1814 * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
1815 * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
1816 * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
1817 * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
1818 * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
1819 * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
1820 * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
1822 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
1825 cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
1830 * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
1831 * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
1834 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
1835 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1836 packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
1838 /* Store our public server RSA key. */
1839 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
1840 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
1841 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
1843 /* Store our public host RSA key. */
1844 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1845 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
1846 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
1848 /* Put protocol flags. */
1849 packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
1851 /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
1852 packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
1854 /* Declare supported authentication types. */
1856 if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
1857 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
1858 if (options.rsa_authentication)
1859 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
1860 if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
1861 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
1862 if (options.password_authentication)
1863 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
1864 packet_put_int(auth_mask);
1866 /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
1868 packet_write_wait();
1870 debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
1871 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1872 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1874 /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
1875 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
1877 /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
1878 cipher_type = packet_get_char();
1880 if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
1881 packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
1883 /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
1884 sent earlier with the public key packet. */
1885 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1886 if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
1887 packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
1889 debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
1891 /* Get the encrypted integer. */
1892 if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
1893 fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
1894 packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
1896 protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
1897 packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
1900 /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
1901 rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int));
1904 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
1905 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
1906 * key is in the highest bits.
1909 BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
1910 len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1911 if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
1912 error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
1913 "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
1914 get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
1917 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1918 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
1919 session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
1921 derive_ssh1_session_id(
1922 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
1923 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
1924 cookie, session_id);
1926 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
1929 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1930 session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
1934 int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1935 u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
1938 logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
1939 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
1941 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1942 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1943 MD5_Final(session_key, &md);
1945 MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16);
1946 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1947 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1948 MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
1949 memset(buf, 0, bytes);
1951 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1952 session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
1954 /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
1955 destroy_sensitive_data();
1958 mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
1960 /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
1961 BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
1963 /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
1964 packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
1966 /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
1967 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1969 debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
1971 /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
1972 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
1974 packet_write_wait();
1978 * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
1985 if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
1986 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1987 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
1989 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1990 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
1991 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
1992 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
1994 if (options.macs != NULL) {
1995 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1996 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
1998 if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
1999 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
2000 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
2001 } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
2002 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
2003 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
2006 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
2008 /* start key exchange */
2009 kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
2010 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
2011 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
2012 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
2014 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
2015 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
2016 kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
2017 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
2021 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
2023 session_id2 = kex->session_id;
2024 session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
2027 /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
2028 packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2029 packet_put_cstring("markus");
2031 packet_write_wait();
2036 /* server specific fatal cleanup */
2041 do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
2042 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
2043 /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
2044 if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
2045 audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);