]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
3c0ef626 | 1 | /* |
2 | * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> | |
3 | * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland | |
4 | * All rights reserved | |
5 | * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, | |
6 | * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards | |
7 | * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted | |
8 | * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and | |
9 | * authentication agent connections. | |
10 | * | |
11 | * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software | |
12 | * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this | |
13 | * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is | |
14 | * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be | |
15 | * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". | |
16 | * | |
17 | * SSH2 implementation: | |
510132b6 | 18 | * Privilege Separation: |
3c0ef626 | 19 | * |
510132b6 | 20 | * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. |
21 | * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. | |
3c0ef626 | 22 | * |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * | |
32 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR | |
33 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES | |
34 | * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. | |
35 | * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, | |
36 | * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
37 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, | |
38 | * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY | |
39 | * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT | |
40 | * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF | |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
42 | */ | |
43 | ||
44 | #include "includes.h" | |
510132b6 | 45 | RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.242 2002/05/15 15:47:49 mouring Exp $"); |
3c0ef626 | 46 | |
47 | #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
48 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
1e608e42 | 49 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
510132b6 | 50 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
51 | #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE | |
52 | #include <sys/security.h> | |
53 | #include <prot.h> | |
54 | #endif | |
3c0ef626 | 55 | |
56 | #include "ssh.h" | |
57 | #include "ssh1.h" | |
58 | #include "ssh2.h" | |
59 | #include "xmalloc.h" | |
60 | #include "rsa.h" | |
61 | #include "sshpty.h" | |
62 | #include "packet.h" | |
63 | #include "mpaux.h" | |
64 | #include "log.h" | |
65 | #include "servconf.h" | |
66 | #include "uidswap.h" | |
67 | #include "compat.h" | |
68 | #include "buffer.h" | |
69 | #include "cipher.h" | |
70 | #include "kex.h" | |
71 | #include "key.h" | |
72 | #include "dh.h" | |
73 | #include "myproposal.h" | |
74 | #include "authfile.h" | |
75 | #include "pathnames.h" | |
76 | #include "atomicio.h" | |
77 | #include "canohost.h" | |
78 | #include "auth.h" | |
79 | #include "misc.h" | |
80 | #include "dispatch.h" | |
81 | #include "channels.h" | |
510132b6 | 82 | #include "session.h" |
83 | #include "monitor_mm.h" | |
84 | #include "monitor.h" | |
85 | #include "monitor_wrap.h" | |
86 | #include "monitor_fdpass.h" | |
3c0ef626 | 87 | |
5598e598 | 88 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
89 | #include "ssh-gss.h" | |
90 | #endif | |
91 | ||
0b582e46 | 92 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
93 | #include <openssl/md5.h> | |
94 | #include "bufaux.h" | |
95 | #endif /* GSSAPI */ | |
0b582e46 | 96 | |
3c0ef626 | 97 | #ifdef LIBWRAP |
98 | #include <tcpd.h> | |
99 | #include <syslog.h> | |
100 | int allow_severity = LOG_INFO; | |
101 | int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; | |
102 | #endif /* LIBWRAP */ | |
103 | ||
104 | #ifndef O_NOCTTY | |
105 | #define O_NOCTTY 0 | |
106 | #endif | |
107 | ||
108 | #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME | |
109 | extern char *__progname; | |
110 | #else | |
111 | char *__progname; | |
112 | #endif | |
113 | ||
114 | /* Server configuration options. */ | |
115 | ServerOptions options; | |
116 | ||
117 | /* Name of the server configuration file. */ | |
118 | char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; | |
119 | ||
120 | /* | |
121 | * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. | |
122 | * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. | |
123 | */ | |
124 | #ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT | |
125 | int IPv4or6 = AF_INET; | |
126 | #else | |
127 | int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; | |
128 | #endif | |
129 | ||
130 | /* | |
131 | * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug | |
132 | * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system | |
133 | * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing | |
134 | * the first connection. | |
135 | */ | |
136 | int debug_flag = 0; | |
137 | ||
138 | /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */ | |
139 | int test_flag = 0; | |
140 | ||
141 | /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ | |
142 | int inetd_flag = 0; | |
143 | ||
144 | /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ | |
145 | int no_daemon_flag = 0; | |
146 | ||
147 | /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ | |
148 | int log_stderr = 0; | |
149 | ||
150 | /* Saved arguments to main(). */ | |
151 | char **saved_argv; | |
152 | int saved_argc; | |
153 | ||
154 | /* | |
155 | * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP | |
156 | * signal handler. | |
157 | */ | |
158 | #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 | |
159 | int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; | |
160 | int num_listen_socks = 0; | |
161 | ||
162 | /* | |
163 | * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, | |
164 | * sshd will skip the version-number exchange | |
165 | */ | |
166 | char *client_version_string = NULL; | |
167 | char *server_version_string = NULL; | |
168 | ||
169 | /* for rekeying XXX fixme */ | |
170 | Kex *xxx_kex; | |
171 | ||
172 | /* | |
173 | * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this | |
174 | * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so | |
175 | * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some | |
176 | * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) | |
177 | * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is | |
178 | * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. | |
179 | */ | |
180 | struct { | |
181 | Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */ | |
182 | Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */ | |
183 | Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ | |
184 | int have_ssh1_key; | |
185 | int have_ssh2_key; | |
186 | u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; | |
187 | } sensitive_data; | |
188 | ||
189 | /* | |
190 | * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated. | |
191 | * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated. | |
192 | */ | |
1e608e42 | 193 | static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0; |
3c0ef626 | 194 | |
195 | /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ | |
1e608e42 | 196 | static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; |
197 | static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; | |
3c0ef626 | 198 | |
199 | /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ | |
200 | u_char session_id[16]; | |
201 | ||
202 | /* same for ssh2 */ | |
203 | u_char *session_id2 = NULL; | |
204 | int session_id2_len = 0; | |
205 | ||
206 | /* record remote hostname or ip */ | |
207 | u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN; | |
208 | ||
1e608e42 | 209 | /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ |
210 | int *startup_pipes = NULL; | |
211 | int startup_pipe; /* in child */ | |
212 | ||
510132b6 | 213 | /* variables used for privilege separation */ |
214 | extern struct monitor *pmonitor; | |
215 | extern int use_privsep; | |
216 | ||
3c0ef626 | 217 | /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ |
218 | void destroy_sensitive_data(void); | |
510132b6 | 219 | void demote_sensitive_data(void); |
3c0ef626 | 220 | |
221 | static void do_ssh1_kex(void); | |
222 | static void do_ssh2_kex(void); | |
223 | ||
224 | /* | |
225 | * Close all listening sockets | |
226 | */ | |
227 | static void | |
228 | close_listen_socks(void) | |
229 | { | |
230 | int i; | |
231 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) | |
232 | close(listen_socks[i]); | |
233 | num_listen_socks = -1; | |
234 | } | |
235 | ||
1e608e42 | 236 | static void |
237 | close_startup_pipes(void) | |
238 | { | |
239 | int i; | |
240 | if (startup_pipes) | |
241 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
242 | if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) | |
243 | close(startup_pipes[i]); | |
244 | } | |
245 | ||
3c0ef626 | 246 | /* |
247 | * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; | |
248 | * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate | |
249 | * the server key). | |
250 | */ | |
251 | static void | |
252 | sighup_handler(int sig) | |
253 | { | |
1e608e42 | 254 | int save_errno = errno; |
255 | ||
3c0ef626 | 256 | received_sighup = 1; |
257 | signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); | |
1e608e42 | 258 | errno = save_errno; |
3c0ef626 | 259 | } |
260 | ||
261 | /* | |
262 | * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. | |
263 | * Restarts the server. | |
264 | */ | |
265 | static void | |
266 | sighup_restart(void) | |
267 | { | |
268 | log("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); | |
269 | close_listen_socks(); | |
1e608e42 | 270 | close_startup_pipes(); |
3c0ef626 | 271 | execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); |
272 | log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); | |
273 | exit(1); | |
274 | } | |
275 | ||
276 | /* | |
277 | * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. | |
278 | */ | |
279 | static void | |
280 | sigterm_handler(int sig) | |
281 | { | |
282 | received_sigterm = sig; | |
283 | } | |
284 | ||
285 | /* | |
286 | * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then | |
287 | * reap any zombies left by exited children. | |
288 | */ | |
289 | static void | |
290 | main_sigchld_handler(int sig) | |
291 | { | |
510132b6 | 292 | pid_t pid; |
3c0ef626 | 293 | int save_errno = errno; |
294 | int status; | |
295 | ||
510132b6 | 296 | while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || |
297 | (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) | |
3c0ef626 | 298 | ; |
299 | ||
300 | signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); | |
301 | errno = save_errno; | |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
304 | /* | |
305 | * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. | |
306 | */ | |
307 | static void | |
308 | grace_alarm_handler(int sig) | |
309 | { | |
310 | /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */ | |
311 | ||
312 | /* Close the connection. */ | |
313 | packet_close(); | |
314 | ||
315 | /* Log error and exit. */ | |
316 | fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s.", get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
317 | } | |
318 | ||
319 | /* | |
320 | * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this | |
321 | * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not | |
322 | * do anything with the private key or random state before forking. | |
323 | * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution | |
324 | * problems. | |
325 | */ | |
326 | static void | |
327 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) | |
328 | { | |
329 | u_int32_t rand = 0; | |
330 | int i; | |
331 | ||
332 | verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", | |
333 | sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); | |
334 | if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) | |
335 | key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); | |
336 | sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1, | |
337 | options.server_key_bits); | |
338 | verbose("RSA key generation complete."); | |
339 | ||
340 | for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { | |
341 | if (i % 4 == 0) | |
342 | rand = arc4random(); | |
343 | sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; | |
344 | rand >>= 8; | |
345 | } | |
346 | arc4random_stir(); | |
347 | } | |
348 | ||
349 | static void | |
350 | key_regeneration_alarm(int sig) | |
351 | { | |
352 | int save_errno = errno; | |
353 | signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); | |
354 | errno = save_errno; | |
355 | key_do_regen = 1; | |
356 | } | |
357 | ||
358 | static void | |
359 | sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) | |
360 | { | |
361 | int i, mismatch; | |
362 | int remote_major, remote_minor; | |
363 | int major, minor; | |
364 | char *s; | |
365 | char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ | |
366 | char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ | |
367 | ||
368 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && | |
369 | (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) { | |
370 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; | |
371 | minor = 99; | |
372 | } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { | |
373 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; | |
374 | minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; | |
375 | } else { | |
376 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; | |
377 | minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; | |
378 | } | |
379 | snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION); | |
380 | server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); | |
381 | ||
382 | if (client_version_string == NULL) { | |
383 | /* Send our protocol version identification. */ | |
384 | if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string)) | |
385 | != strlen(server_version_string)) { | |
386 | log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
387 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
388 | } | |
389 | ||
390 | /* Read other side's version identification. */ | |
391 | memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); | |
392 | for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { | |
393 | if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { | |
394 | log("Did not receive identification string from %s", | |
395 | get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
396 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
397 | } | |
398 | if (buf[i] == '\r') { | |
399 | buf[i] = 0; | |
400 | /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ | |
401 | if (i == 12 && | |
402 | strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) | |
403 | break; | |
404 | continue; | |
405 | } | |
406 | if (buf[i] == '\n') { | |
407 | buf[i] = 0; | |
408 | break; | |
409 | } | |
410 | } | |
411 | buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; | |
412 | client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); | |
413 | } | |
414 | ||
415 | /* | |
416 | * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept | |
417 | * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. | |
418 | */ | |
419 | if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", | |
420 | &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { | |
421 | s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; | |
422 | (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); | |
423 | close(sock_in); | |
424 | close(sock_out); | |
425 | log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s", | |
426 | client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
427 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
428 | } | |
429 | debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", | |
1e608e42 | 430 | remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); |
3c0ef626 | 431 | |
432 | compat_datafellows(remote_version); | |
433 | ||
434 | if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) { | |
435 | log("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.", | |
436 | get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); | |
437 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
438 | } | |
439 | ||
440 | mismatch = 0; | |
1e608e42 | 441 | switch (remote_major) { |
3c0ef626 | 442 | case 1: |
443 | if (remote_minor == 99) { | |
444 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) | |
445 | enable_compat20(); | |
446 | else | |
447 | mismatch = 1; | |
448 | break; | |
449 | } | |
450 | if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { | |
451 | mismatch = 1; | |
452 | break; | |
453 | } | |
454 | if (remote_minor < 3) { | |
455 | packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and " | |
456 | "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version."); | |
457 | } else if (remote_minor == 3) { | |
458 | /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */ | |
459 | enable_compat13(); | |
460 | } | |
461 | break; | |
462 | case 2: | |
463 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { | |
464 | enable_compat20(); | |
465 | break; | |
466 | } | |
467 | /* FALLTHROUGH */ | |
468 | default: | |
469 | mismatch = 1; | |
470 | break; | |
471 | } | |
472 | chop(server_version_string); | |
473 | debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); | |
474 | ||
475 | if (mismatch) { | |
476 | s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; | |
477 | (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); | |
478 | close(sock_in); | |
479 | close(sock_out); | |
480 | log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s", | |
481 | get_remote_ipaddr(), | |
482 | server_version_string, client_version_string); | |
483 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
484 | } | |
485 | } | |
486 | ||
487 | ||
488 | /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ | |
489 | void | |
490 | destroy_sensitive_data(void) | |
491 | { | |
492 | int i; | |
493 | ||
494 | if (sensitive_data.server_key) { | |
495 | key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); | |
496 | sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; | |
497 | } | |
1e608e42 | 498 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { |
3c0ef626 | 499 | if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { |
500 | key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); | |
501 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; | |
502 | } | |
503 | } | |
504 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; | |
505 | memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); | |
506 | } | |
507 | ||
510132b6 | 508 | /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ |
509 | void | |
510 | demote_sensitive_data(void) | |
511 | { | |
512 | Key *tmp; | |
513 | int i; | |
514 | ||
515 | if (sensitive_data.server_key) { | |
516 | tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key); | |
517 | key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); | |
518 | sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; | |
519 | } | |
520 | ||
521 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { | |
522 | if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { | |
523 | tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); | |
524 | key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); | |
525 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; | |
526 | if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) | |
527 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; | |
528 | } | |
529 | } | |
530 | ||
531 | /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */ | |
532 | } | |
533 | ||
534 | static void | |
535 | privsep_preauth_child(void) | |
536 | { | |
537 | u_int32_t rand[256]; | |
538 | int i; | |
539 | struct passwd *pw; | |
540 | ||
541 | /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ | |
542 | privsep_challenge_enable(); | |
543 | ||
544 | for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) | |
545 | rand[i] = arc4random(); | |
546 | RAND_seed(rand, sizeof(rand)); | |
547 | ||
548 | /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ | |
549 | demote_sensitive_data(); | |
550 | ||
551 | if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) | |
552 | fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", | |
553 | SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); | |
554 | memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd)); | |
555 | endpwent(); | |
556 | ||
557 | /* Change our root directory*/ | |
558 | if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) | |
559 | fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, | |
560 | strerror(errno)); | |
561 | if (chdir("/") == -1) | |
562 | fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); | |
563 | ||
564 | /* Drop our privileges */ | |
565 | debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, | |
566 | (u_int)pw->pw_gid); | |
567 | do_setusercontext(pw); | |
568 | } | |
569 | ||
570 | static Authctxt* | |
571 | privsep_preauth(void) | |
572 | { | |
573 | Authctxt *authctxt = NULL; | |
574 | int status; | |
575 | pid_t pid; | |
576 | ||
577 | /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ | |
578 | pmonitor = monitor_init(); | |
579 | /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ | |
580 | pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex; | |
581 | ||
582 | pid = fork(); | |
583 | if (pid == -1) { | |
584 | fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); | |
585 | } else if (pid != 0) { | |
586 | debug2("Network child is on pid %d", pid); | |
587 | ||
588 | close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); | |
589 | authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(pmonitor); | |
590 | close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); | |
591 | ||
592 | /* Sync memory */ | |
593 | monitor_sync(pmonitor); | |
594 | ||
595 | /* Wait for the child's exit status */ | |
596 | while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) | |
597 | if (errno != EINTR) | |
598 | break; | |
599 | return (authctxt); | |
600 | } else { | |
601 | /* child */ | |
602 | ||
603 | close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); | |
604 | ||
605 | /* Demote the child */ | |
606 | if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) | |
607 | privsep_preauth_child(); | |
608 | setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); | |
609 | } | |
610 | return (NULL); | |
611 | } | |
612 | ||
613 | static void | |
614 | privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) | |
615 | { | |
616 | extern Authctxt *x_authctxt; | |
617 | ||
618 | /* XXX - Remote port forwarding */ | |
619 | x_authctxt = authctxt; | |
620 | ||
621 | if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) { | |
622 | /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */ | |
623 | monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); | |
624 | use_privsep = 0; | |
625 | return; | |
626 | } | |
627 | ||
628 | /* Authentication complete */ | |
629 | alarm(0); | |
630 | if (startup_pipe != -1) { | |
631 | close(startup_pipe); | |
632 | startup_pipe = -1; | |
633 | } | |
634 | ||
635 | /* New socket pair */ | |
636 | monitor_reinit(pmonitor); | |
637 | ||
638 | pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); | |
639 | if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) | |
640 | fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); | |
641 | else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { | |
642 | debug2("User child is on pid %d", pmonitor->m_pid); | |
643 | close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); | |
644 | monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); | |
645 | ||
646 | /* NEVERREACHED */ | |
647 | exit(0); | |
648 | } | |
649 | ||
650 | close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); | |
651 | ||
652 | /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ | |
653 | demote_sensitive_data(); | |
654 | ||
655 | /* Drop privileges */ | |
656 | do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); | |
657 | ||
658 | /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ | |
659 | monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); | |
660 | } | |
661 | ||
3c0ef626 | 662 | static char * |
663 | list_hostkey_types(void) | |
664 | { | |
1e608e42 | 665 | Buffer b; |
666 | char *p; | |
3c0ef626 | 667 | int i; |
1e608e42 | 668 | |
669 | buffer_init(&b); | |
670 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { | |
3c0ef626 | 671 | Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; |
672 | if (key == NULL) | |
673 | continue; | |
1e608e42 | 674 | switch (key->type) { |
3c0ef626 | 675 | case KEY_RSA: |
676 | case KEY_DSA: | |
1e608e42 | 677 | if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) |
678 | buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); | |
679 | p = key_ssh_name(key); | |
680 | buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); | |
3c0ef626 | 681 | break; |
682 | } | |
683 | } | |
1e608e42 | 684 | buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); |
685 | p = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); | |
686 | buffer_free(&b); | |
687 | debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", p); | |
688 | return p; | |
3c0ef626 | 689 | } |
690 | ||
510132b6 | 691 | Key * |
3c0ef626 | 692 | get_hostkey_by_type(int type) |
693 | { | |
694 | int i; | |
1e608e42 | 695 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { |
3c0ef626 | 696 | Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; |
697 | if (key != NULL && key->type == type) | |
698 | return key; | |
699 | } | |
700 | return NULL; | |
701 | } | |
702 | ||
510132b6 | 703 | Key * |
704 | get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) | |
705 | { | |
706 | if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) | |
707 | return (NULL); | |
708 | return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); | |
709 | } | |
710 | ||
711 | int | |
712 | get_hostkey_index(Key *key) | |
713 | { | |
714 | int i; | |
715 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { | |
716 | if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) | |
717 | return (i); | |
718 | } | |
719 | return (-1); | |
720 | } | |
721 | ||
3c0ef626 | 722 | /* |
723 | * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. | |
724 | * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability | |
725 | * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until | |
726 | * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups | |
727 | */ | |
728 | static int | |
729 | drop_connection(int startups) | |
730 | { | |
731 | double p, r; | |
732 | ||
733 | if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) | |
734 | return 0; | |
735 | if (startups >= options.max_startups) | |
736 | return 1; | |
737 | if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) | |
738 | return 1; | |
739 | ||
740 | p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; | |
741 | p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; | |
742 | p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin); | |
743 | p += options.max_startups_rate; | |
744 | p /= 100.0; | |
745 | r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX; | |
746 | ||
747 | debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r); | |
748 | return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; | |
749 | } | |
750 | ||
1e608e42 | 751 | static void |
752 | usage(void) | |
753 | { | |
754 | fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION); | |
755 | fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname); | |
756 | fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); | |
757 | fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE); | |
758 | fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n"); | |
759 | fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n"); | |
760 | fprintf(stderr, " -D Do not fork into daemon mode\n"); | |
761 | fprintf(stderr, " -t Only test configuration file and keys\n"); | |
762 | fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n"); | |
763 | fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n"); | |
764 | fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n"); | |
765 | fprintf(stderr, " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 600)\n"); | |
766 | fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n"); | |
767 | fprintf(stderr, " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n", | |
768 | _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE); | |
769 | fprintf(stderr, " -u len Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n"); | |
770 | fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only\n"); | |
771 | fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only\n"); | |
772 | fprintf(stderr, " -o option Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.\n"); | |
773 | exit(1); | |
774 | } | |
3c0ef626 | 775 | |
776 | /* | |
777 | * Main program for the daemon. | |
778 | */ | |
779 | int | |
780 | main(int ac, char **av) | |
781 | { | |
782 | extern char *optarg; | |
783 | extern int optind; | |
784 | int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1; | |
785 | pid_t pid; | |
786 | socklen_t fromlen; | |
787 | fd_set *fdset; | |
788 | struct sockaddr_storage from; | |
789 | const char *remote_ip; | |
790 | int remote_port; | |
791 | FILE *f; | |
792 | struct linger linger; | |
793 | struct addrinfo *ai; | |
794 | char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; | |
795 | int listen_sock, maxfd; | |
796 | int startup_p[2]; | |
797 | int startups = 0; | |
510132b6 | 798 | Authctxt *authctxt; |
3c0ef626 | 799 | Key *key; |
800 | int ret, key_used = 0; | |
801 | ||
510132b6 | 802 | #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE |
803 | (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); | |
804 | #endif | |
3c0ef626 | 805 | __progname = get_progname(av[0]); |
806 | init_rng(); | |
807 | ||
808 | /* Save argv. */ | |
809 | saved_argc = ac; | |
810 | saved_argv = av; | |
811 | ||
812 | /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ | |
813 | initialize_server_options(&options); | |
814 | ||
815 | /* Parse command-line arguments. */ | |
1e608e42 | 816 | while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:o:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) { |
3c0ef626 | 817 | switch (opt) { |
818 | case '4': | |
819 | IPv4or6 = AF_INET; | |
820 | break; | |
821 | case '6': | |
822 | IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; | |
823 | break; | |
824 | case 'f': | |
825 | config_file_name = optarg; | |
826 | break; | |
827 | case 'd': | |
828 | if (0 == debug_flag) { | |
829 | debug_flag = 1; | |
830 | options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; | |
831 | } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { | |
832 | options.log_level++; | |
833 | } else { | |
834 | fprintf(stderr, "Too high debugging level.\n"); | |
835 | exit(1); | |
836 | } | |
837 | break; | |
838 | case 'D': | |
839 | no_daemon_flag = 1; | |
840 | break; | |
841 | case 'e': | |
842 | log_stderr = 1; | |
843 | break; | |
844 | case 'i': | |
845 | inetd_flag = 1; | |
846 | break; | |
847 | case 'Q': | |
848 | /* ignored */ | |
849 | break; | |
850 | case 'q': | |
851 | options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; | |
852 | break; | |
853 | case 'b': | |
854 | options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg); | |
855 | break; | |
856 | case 'p': | |
857 | options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; | |
858 | if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { | |
859 | fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); | |
860 | exit(1); | |
861 | } | |
862 | options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); | |
863 | if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) { | |
864 | fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); | |
865 | exit(1); | |
866 | } | |
867 | break; | |
868 | case 'g': | |
869 | if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { | |
870 | fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); | |
871 | exit(1); | |
872 | } | |
873 | break; | |
874 | case 'k': | |
875 | if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { | |
876 | fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n"); | |
877 | exit(1); | |
878 | } | |
879 | break; | |
880 | case 'h': | |
881 | if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) { | |
882 | fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n"); | |
883 | exit(1); | |
884 | } | |
885 | options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg; | |
886 | break; | |
887 | case 'V': | |
888 | client_version_string = optarg; | |
889 | /* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */ | |
890 | inetd_flag = 1; | |
891 | break; | |
892 | case 't': | |
893 | test_flag = 1; | |
894 | break; | |
895 | case 'u': | |
896 | utmp_len = atoi(optarg); | |
897 | break; | |
1e608e42 | 898 | case 'o': |
899 | if (process_server_config_line(&options, optarg, | |
900 | "command-line", 0) != 0) | |
901 | exit(1); | |
902 | break; | |
3c0ef626 | 903 | case '?': |
904 | default: | |
1e608e42 | 905 | usage(); |
906 | break; | |
3c0ef626 | 907 | } |
908 | } | |
909 | SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); | |
910 | channel_set_af(IPv4or6); | |
911 | ||
912 | /* | |
913 | * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host | |
914 | * key (unless started from inetd) | |
915 | */ | |
916 | log_init(__progname, | |
1e608e42 | 917 | options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? |
918 | SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, | |
919 | options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? | |
920 | SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, | |
3c0ef626 | 921 | !inetd_flag); |
922 | ||
923 | #ifdef _CRAY | |
924 | /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now! | |
925 | * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems! | |
926 | */ | |
927 | drop_cray_privs(); | |
928 | #endif | |
929 | ||
930 | seed_rng(); | |
931 | ||
932 | /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */ | |
933 | read_server_config(&options, config_file_name); | |
934 | ||
935 | /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ | |
936 | fill_default_server_options(&options); | |
937 | ||
938 | /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ | |
939 | if (optind < ac) { | |
940 | fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); | |
941 | exit(1); | |
942 | } | |
943 | ||
944 | debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION); | |
945 | ||
946 | /* load private host keys */ | |
947 | sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files*sizeof(Key*)); | |
1e608e42 | 948 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) |
3c0ef626 | 949 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; |
950 | sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; | |
951 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; | |
952 | sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; | |
953 | sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; | |
954 | ||
1e608e42 | 955 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { |
3c0ef626 | 956 | key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL); |
957 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; | |
958 | if (key == NULL) { | |
959 | error("Could not load host key: %s", | |
960 | options.host_key_files[i]); | |
961 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; | |
962 | continue; | |
963 | } | |
1e608e42 | 964 | switch (key->type) { |
3c0ef626 | 965 | case KEY_RSA1: |
966 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key; | |
967 | sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1; | |
968 | break; | |
969 | case KEY_RSA: | |
970 | case KEY_DSA: | |
971 | sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; | |
972 | break; | |
973 | } | |
974 | debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type, | |
975 | key_type(key)); | |
976 | } | |
977 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { | |
978 | log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); | |
979 | options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; | |
980 | } | |
5598e598 | 981 | #ifndef GSSAPI |
982 | /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ | |
3c0ef626 | 983 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { |
984 | log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); | |
985 | options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; | |
986 | } | |
5598e598 | 987 | #endif |
3c0ef626 | 988 | if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { |
989 | log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); | |
990 | exit(1); | |
991 | } | |
992 | ||
993 | /* Check certain values for sanity. */ | |
994 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { | |
995 | if (options.server_key_bits < 512 || | |
996 | options.server_key_bits > 32768) { | |
997 | fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n"); | |
998 | exit(1); | |
999 | } | |
1000 | /* | |
1001 | * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This | |
1002 | * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I | |
1003 | * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels | |
1004 | */ | |
1005 | if (options.server_key_bits > | |
1006 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && | |
1007 | options.server_key_bits < | |
1008 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { | |
1009 | options.server_key_bits = | |
1010 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED; | |
1011 | debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.", | |
1012 | options.server_key_bits); | |
1013 | } | |
1014 | } | |
1015 | ||
1016 | /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ | |
1017 | if (test_flag) | |
1018 | exit(0); | |
1019 | ||
0b582e46 | 1020 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
c7221eee | 1021 | ssh_gssapi_clean_env(); |
0b582e46 | 1022 | #endif /* GSSAPI */ |
0b582e46 | 1023 | |
510132b6 | 1024 | #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN |
1025 | /* | |
1026 | * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This | |
1027 | * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the | |
1028 | * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM | |
1029 | * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every | |
1030 | * module which might be used). | |
1031 | */ | |
1032 | if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) | |
1033 | debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); | |
1034 | #endif /* !HAVE_CYGWIN */ | |
3c0ef626 | 1035 | |
1036 | /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ | |
1037 | if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag) | |
1038 | log_stderr = 1; | |
1039 | log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); | |
1040 | ||
1041 | /* | |
1042 | * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect | |
1043 | * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process | |
1044 | * exits. | |
1045 | */ | |
1046 | if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) { | |
1047 | #ifdef TIOCNOTTY | |
1048 | int fd; | |
1049 | #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ | |
1050 | if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) | |
1051 | fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); | |
1052 | ||
1053 | /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ | |
1054 | #ifdef TIOCNOTTY | |
1055 | fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); | |
1056 | if (fd >= 0) { | |
1057 | (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); | |
1058 | close(fd); | |
1059 | } | |
1060 | #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ | |
1061 | } | |
1062 | /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ | |
1063 | log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); | |
1064 | ||
1065 | /* Initialize the random number generator. */ | |
1066 | arc4random_stir(); | |
1067 | ||
1068 | /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be | |
1069 | unmounted if desired. */ | |
1070 | chdir("/"); | |
1e608e42 | 1071 | |
3c0ef626 | 1072 | /* ignore SIGPIPE */ |
1073 | signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); | |
1074 | ||
1075 | /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */ | |
1076 | if (inetd_flag) { | |
1077 | int s1; | |
1078 | s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */ | |
1079 | dup(s1); | |
1080 | sock_in = dup(0); | |
1081 | sock_out = dup(1); | |
1082 | startup_pipe = -1; | |
1083 | /* | |
1084 | * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 | |
1085 | * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if | |
1086 | * ttyfd happens to be one of those. | |
1087 | */ | |
1088 | debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out); | |
1089 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) | |
1090 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | |
1091 | } else { | |
1092 | for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { | |
1093 | if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) | |
1094 | continue; | |
1095 | if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) | |
1096 | fatal("Too many listen sockets. " | |
1097 | "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); | |
1098 | if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, | |
1099 | ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), | |
1100 | NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { | |
1101 | error("getnameinfo failed"); | |
1102 | continue; | |
1103 | } | |
1104 | /* Create socket for listening. */ | |
1105 | listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); | |
1106 | if (listen_sock < 0) { | |
1107 | /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ | |
1108 | verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1109 | continue; | |
1110 | } | |
1111 | if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) { | |
1112 | error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); | |
1113 | close(listen_sock); | |
1114 | continue; | |
1115 | } | |
1116 | /* | |
1117 | * Set socket options. We try to make the port | |
1118 | * reusable and have it close as fast as possible | |
1119 | * without waiting in unnecessary wait states on | |
1120 | * close. | |
1121 | */ | |
1122 | setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, | |
1e608e42 | 1123 | &on, sizeof(on)); |
3c0ef626 | 1124 | linger.l_onoff = 1; |
1125 | linger.l_linger = 5; | |
1126 | setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, | |
1e608e42 | 1127 | &linger, sizeof(linger)); |
3c0ef626 | 1128 | |
1129 | debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); | |
1130 | ||
1131 | /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ | |
1132 | if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { | |
1133 | if (!ai->ai_next) | |
1134 | error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", | |
1135 | strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); | |
1136 | close(listen_sock); | |
1137 | continue; | |
1138 | } | |
1139 | listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; | |
1140 | num_listen_socks++; | |
1141 | ||
1142 | /* Start listening on the port. */ | |
1143 | log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); | |
1144 | if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0) | |
1145 | fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1146 | ||
1147 | } | |
1148 | freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs); | |
1149 | ||
1150 | if (!num_listen_socks) | |
1151 | fatal("Cannot bind any address."); | |
1152 | ||
1153 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) | |
1154 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | |
1155 | ||
1156 | /* | |
1157 | * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs | |
1158 | * listen_sock. | |
1159 | */ | |
1160 | signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); | |
1161 | ||
1162 | signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); | |
1163 | signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); | |
1164 | ||
1165 | /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */ | |
1166 | signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); | |
1167 | ||
1168 | /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */ | |
1169 | if (!debug_flag) { | |
1170 | /* | |
1171 | * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it | |
1172 | * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to | |
1173 | * do this before the bind above because the bind will | |
1174 | * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will | |
1175 | * overwrite any old pid in the file. | |
1176 | */ | |
1177 | f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb"); | |
1178 | if (f) { | |
1179 | fprintf(f, "%u\n", (u_int) getpid()); | |
1180 | fclose(f); | |
1181 | } | |
1182 | } | |
1183 | ||
1184 | /* setup fd set for listen */ | |
1185 | fdset = NULL; | |
1186 | maxfd = 0; | |
1187 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) | |
1188 | if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) | |
1189 | maxfd = listen_socks[i]; | |
1190 | /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ | |
1191 | startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int)); | |
1192 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
1193 | startup_pipes[i] = -1; | |
1194 | ||
1195 | /* | |
1196 | * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or | |
1197 | * the daemon is killed with a signal. | |
1198 | */ | |
1199 | for (;;) { | |
1200 | if (received_sighup) | |
1201 | sighup_restart(); | |
1202 | if (fdset != NULL) | |
1203 | xfree(fdset); | |
1204 | fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); | |
1205 | fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz); | |
1206 | memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz); | |
1207 | ||
1208 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) | |
1209 | FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); | |
1210 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
1211 | if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) | |
1212 | FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); | |
1213 | ||
1214 | /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ | |
1215 | ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
1216 | if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) | |
1217 | error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1218 | if (received_sigterm) { | |
1219 | log("Received signal %d; terminating.", | |
1e608e42 | 1220 | (int) received_sigterm); |
3c0ef626 | 1221 | close_listen_socks(); |
1222 | unlink(options.pid_file); | |
1223 | exit(255); | |
1224 | } | |
1225 | if (key_used && key_do_regen) { | |
1226 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | |
1227 | key_used = 0; | |
1228 | key_do_regen = 0; | |
1229 | } | |
1230 | if (ret < 0) | |
1231 | continue; | |
1232 | ||
1233 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
1234 | if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && | |
1235 | FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { | |
1236 | /* | |
1237 | * the read end of the pipe is ready | |
1238 | * if the child has closed the pipe | |
1239 | * after successful authentication | |
1240 | * or if the child has died | |
1241 | */ | |
1242 | close(startup_pipes[i]); | |
1243 | startup_pipes[i] = -1; | |
1244 | startups--; | |
1245 | } | |
1246 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { | |
1247 | if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) | |
1248 | continue; | |
1249 | fromlen = sizeof(from); | |
1250 | newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, | |
1251 | &fromlen); | |
1252 | if (newsock < 0) { | |
1253 | if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) | |
1254 | error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1255 | continue; | |
1256 | } | |
1257 | if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) { | |
1258 | error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); | |
1e608e42 | 1259 | close(newsock); |
3c0ef626 | 1260 | continue; |
1261 | } | |
1262 | if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { | |
1263 | debug("drop connection #%d", startups); | |
1264 | close(newsock); | |
1265 | continue; | |
1266 | } | |
1267 | if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { | |
1268 | close(newsock); | |
1269 | continue; | |
1270 | } | |
1271 | ||
1272 | for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) | |
1273 | if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { | |
1274 | startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; | |
1275 | if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) | |
1276 | maxfd = startup_p[0]; | |
1277 | startups++; | |
1278 | break; | |
1279 | } | |
1280 | ||
1281 | /* | |
1282 | * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless | |
1283 | * we are in debugging mode. | |
1284 | */ | |
1285 | if (debug_flag) { | |
1286 | /* | |
1287 | * In debugging mode. Close the listening | |
1288 | * socket, and start processing the | |
1289 | * connection without forking. | |
1290 | */ | |
1291 | debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); | |
1292 | close_listen_socks(); | |
1293 | sock_in = newsock; | |
1294 | sock_out = newsock; | |
1295 | startup_pipe = -1; | |
1296 | pid = getpid(); | |
1297 | break; | |
1298 | } else { | |
1299 | /* | |
1300 | * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have | |
1301 | * the child process the connection. The | |
1302 | * parent continues listening. | |
1303 | */ | |
1304 | if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { | |
1305 | /* | |
1306 | * Child. Close the listening and max_startup | |
1307 | * sockets. Start using the accepted socket. | |
1308 | * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has | |
1309 | * changed). We break out of the loop to handle | |
1310 | * the connection. | |
1311 | */ | |
1312 | startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; | |
1e608e42 | 1313 | close_startup_pipes(); |
3c0ef626 | 1314 | close_listen_socks(); |
1315 | sock_in = newsock; | |
1316 | sock_out = newsock; | |
1317 | log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); | |
1318 | break; | |
1319 | } | |
1320 | } | |
1321 | ||
1322 | /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ | |
1323 | if (pid < 0) | |
1324 | error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1325 | else | |
1326 | debug("Forked child %d.", pid); | |
1327 | ||
1328 | close(startup_p[1]); | |
1329 | ||
1330 | /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */ | |
1331 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && | |
1332 | key_used == 0) { | |
1333 | /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */ | |
1334 | signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); | |
1335 | alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); | |
1336 | key_used = 1; | |
1337 | } | |
1338 | ||
1339 | arc4random_stir(); | |
1340 | ||
1341 | /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */ | |
1342 | close(newsock); | |
1343 | } | |
1344 | /* child process check (or debug mode) */ | |
1345 | if (num_listen_socks < 0) | |
1346 | break; | |
1347 | } | |
1348 | } | |
1349 | ||
1350 | /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ | |
1351 | ||
510132b6 | 1352 | /* |
1353 | * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD | |
1354 | * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't | |
1355 | * want the child to be able to affect the parent. | |
1356 | */ | |
1357 | #if 0 | |
1358 | /* XXX: this breaks Solaris */ | |
1359 | if (setsid() < 0) | |
1360 | error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1361 | #endif | |
1362 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1363 | /* |
1364 | * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the | |
1365 | * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We | |
1366 | * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. | |
1367 | */ | |
1368 | alarm(0); | |
1369 | signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); | |
1370 | signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); | |
1371 | signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); | |
1372 | signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); | |
1373 | signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); | |
1374 | signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); | |
1375 | ||
1376 | /* | |
1377 | * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to | |
1378 | * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the | |
1379 | * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing. | |
1380 | */ | |
1381 | /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ | |
1382 | linger.l_onoff = 1; | |
1383 | linger.l_linger = 5; | |
1e608e42 | 1384 | setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &linger, sizeof(linger)); |
3c0ef626 | 1385 | |
1386 | /* Set keepalives if requested. */ | |
1387 | if (options.keepalives && | |
1e608e42 | 1388 | setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, |
3c0ef626 | 1389 | sizeof(on)) < 0) |
1390 | error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1391 | ||
1392 | /* | |
1393 | * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do | |
1394 | * not have a key. | |
1395 | */ | |
1396 | packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); | |
1397 | ||
1398 | remote_port = get_remote_port(); | |
1399 | remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); | |
1400 | ||
1401 | #ifdef LIBWRAP | |
1402 | /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ | |
1403 | { | |
1404 | struct request_info req; | |
1405 | ||
1406 | request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0); | |
1407 | fromhost(&req); | |
1408 | ||
1409 | if (!hosts_access(&req)) { | |
1410 | debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper"); | |
1411 | refuse(&req); | |
1412 | /* NOTREACHED */ | |
1413 | fatal("libwrap refuse returns"); | |
1414 | } | |
1415 | } | |
1416 | #endif /* LIBWRAP */ | |
1417 | ||
1418 | /* Log the connection. */ | |
1419 | verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); | |
1420 | ||
1421 | /* | |
1422 | * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side | |
1423 | * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is | |
1424 | * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero | |
1425 | * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging | |
1426 | * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you | |
1427 | * are about to discover the bug. | |
1428 | */ | |
1429 | signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); | |
1430 | if (!debug_flag) | |
1431 | alarm(options.login_grace_time); | |
1432 | ||
1433 | sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); | |
1434 | /* | |
1435 | * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port. | |
1436 | * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged | |
1437 | * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local | |
1438 | * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these | |
1439 | * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust. | |
1440 | */ | |
1e608e42 | 1441 | if (options.rhosts_authentication && |
1442 | (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED || | |
1443 | remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2)) { | |
3c0ef626 | 1444 | debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, " |
1445 | "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port); | |
1446 | options.rhosts_authentication = 0; | |
1447 | } | |
1448 | #if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5) | |
1449 | if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() && | |
1450 | options.kerberos_authentication) { | |
1451 | debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4."); | |
1452 | options.kerberos_authentication = 0; | |
1453 | } | |
1454 | #endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */ | |
1455 | #ifdef AFS | |
1456 | /* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */ | |
1457 | if (k_hasafs()) { | |
1458 | k_setpag(); | |
1459 | k_unlog(); | |
1460 | } | |
1461 | #endif /* AFS */ | |
1462 | ||
1463 | packet_set_nonblocking(); | |
1464 | ||
510132b6 | 1465 | if (use_privsep) |
1466 | if ((authctxt = privsep_preauth()) != NULL) | |
1467 | goto authenticated; | |
1468 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1469 | /* perform the key exchange */ |
1470 | /* authenticate user and start session */ | |
1471 | if (compat20) { | |
1472 | do_ssh2_kex(); | |
510132b6 | 1473 | authctxt = do_authentication2(); |
3c0ef626 | 1474 | } else { |
1475 | do_ssh1_kex(); | |
510132b6 | 1476 | authctxt = do_authentication(); |
1477 | } | |
1478 | /* | |
1479 | * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers | |
1480 | * the current keystate and exits | |
1481 | */ | |
1482 | if (use_privsep) { | |
1483 | mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); | |
1484 | exit(0); | |
3c0ef626 | 1485 | } |
510132b6 | 1486 | |
1487 | authenticated: | |
1488 | /* | |
1489 | * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare | |
1490 | * file descriptor passing. | |
1491 | */ | |
1492 | if (use_privsep) { | |
1493 | privsep_postauth(authctxt); | |
1494 | /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ | |
1495 | if (!compat20) | |
1496 | destroy_sensitive_data(); | |
1497 | } | |
1498 | ||
1499 | /* Perform session preparation. */ | |
1500 | do_authenticated(authctxt); | |
1501 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1502 | /* The connection has been terminated. */ |
1503 | verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip); | |
1504 | ||
1505 | #ifdef USE_PAM | |
1506 | finish_pam(); | |
1507 | #endif /* USE_PAM */ | |
1508 | ||
1509 | packet_close(); | |
510132b6 | 1510 | |
1511 | if (use_privsep) | |
1512 | mm_terminate(); | |
1513 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1514 | exit(0); |
1515 | } | |
1516 | ||
510132b6 | 1517 | /* |
1518 | * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key | |
1519 | * (key with larger modulus first). | |
1520 | */ | |
1521 | int | |
1522 | ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int) | |
1523 | { | |
1524 | int rsafail = 0; | |
1525 | ||
1526 | if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) { | |
1527 | /* Server key has bigger modulus. */ | |
1528 | if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) < | |
1529 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { | |
1530 | fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", | |
1531 | get_remote_ipaddr(), | |
1532 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), | |
1533 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), | |
1534 | SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); | |
1535 | } | |
1536 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1537 | sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0) | |
1538 | rsafail++; | |
1539 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1540 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0) | |
1541 | rsafail++; | |
1542 | } else { | |
1543 | /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */ | |
1544 | if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) < | |
1545 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { | |
1546 | fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", | |
1547 | get_remote_ipaddr(), | |
1548 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), | |
1549 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), | |
1550 | SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); | |
1551 | } | |
1552 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1553 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0) | |
1554 | rsafail++; | |
1555 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1556 | sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0) | |
1557 | rsafail++; | |
1558 | } | |
1559 | return (rsafail); | |
1560 | } | |
3c0ef626 | 1561 | /* |
1562 | * SSH1 key exchange | |
1563 | */ | |
1564 | static void | |
1565 | do_ssh1_kex(void) | |
1566 | { | |
1567 | int i, len; | |
3c0ef626 | 1568 | int rsafail = 0; |
1569 | BIGNUM *session_key_int; | |
1570 | u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; | |
1571 | u_char cookie[8]; | |
1572 | u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; | |
1573 | u_int32_t rand = 0; | |
1574 | ||
1575 | /* | |
1576 | * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user | |
1577 | * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip | |
1578 | * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody | |
1579 | * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local | |
1580 | * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random | |
1581 | * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one | |
1582 | * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. | |
1583 | */ | |
1584 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { | |
1585 | if (i % 4 == 0) | |
1586 | rand = arc4random(); | |
1587 | cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; | |
1588 | rand >>= 8; | |
1589 | } | |
1590 | ||
1591 | /* | |
1592 | * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random | |
1593 | * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP | |
1594 | * spoofing. | |
1595 | */ | |
1596 | packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1597 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) | |
1598 | packet_put_char(cookie[i]); | |
1599 | ||
1600 | /* Store our public server RSA key. */ | |
1601 | packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)); | |
1602 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); | |
1603 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); | |
1604 | ||
1605 | /* Store our public host RSA key. */ | |
1606 | packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); | |
1607 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e); | |
1608 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n); | |
1609 | ||
1610 | /* Put protocol flags. */ | |
1611 | packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); | |
1612 | ||
1613 | /* Declare which ciphers we support. */ | |
1614 | packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0)); | |
1615 | ||
1616 | /* Declare supported authentication types. */ | |
1617 | auth_mask = 0; | |
1618 | if (options.rhosts_authentication) | |
1619 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS; | |
1620 | if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) | |
1621 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA; | |
1622 | if (options.rsa_authentication) | |
1623 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA; | |
1624 | #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) | |
1625 | if (options.kerberos_authentication) | |
1626 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS; | |
1627 | #endif | |
1628 | #if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) | |
1629 | if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing) | |
1630 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT; | |
1631 | #endif | |
1632 | #ifdef AFS | |
1633 | if (options.afs_token_passing) | |
1634 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN; | |
1635 | #endif | |
1636 | if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) | |
1637 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS; | |
0b582e46 | 1638 | |
0b582e46 | 1639 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
1640 | if (options.gss_authentication) | |
1641 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_GSSAPI; | |
1642 | #endif | |
0b582e46 | 1643 | |
3c0ef626 | 1644 | if (options.password_authentication) |
1645 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD; | |
1646 | packet_put_int(auth_mask); | |
1647 | ||
1648 | /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */ | |
1649 | packet_send(); | |
1650 | packet_write_wait(); | |
1651 | ||
1652 | debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.", | |
1653 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), | |
1654 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); | |
1655 | ||
1656 | /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */ | |
1e608e42 | 1657 | packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); |
3c0ef626 | 1658 | |
1659 | /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */ | |
1660 | cipher_type = packet_get_char(); | |
1661 | ||
1662 | if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type))) | |
1663 | packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher."); | |
1664 | ||
1665 | /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we | |
1666 | sent earlier with the public key packet. */ | |
1667 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) | |
1668 | if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) | |
1669 | packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); | |
1670 | ||
1671 | debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); | |
1672 | ||
1673 | /* Get the encrypted integer. */ | |
1e608e42 | 1674 | if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL) |
1675 | fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed"); | |
1676 | packet_get_bignum(session_key_int); | |
3c0ef626 | 1677 | |
1678 | protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); | |
1679 | packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags); | |
1e608e42 | 1680 | packet_check_eom(); |
3c0ef626 | 1681 | |
510132b6 | 1682 | /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */ |
1683 | rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int)); | |
1684 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1685 | /* |
1686 | * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the | |
1687 | * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the | |
1688 | * key is in the highest bits. | |
1689 | */ | |
1690 | if (!rsafail) { | |
1691 | BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); | |
1692 | len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); | |
1693 | if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) { | |
1694 | error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: " | |
1695 | "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", | |
1696 | get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key)); | |
1697 | rsafail++; | |
1698 | } else { | |
1699 | memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); | |
1700 | BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, | |
1701 | session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len); | |
1702 | ||
1703 | compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, | |
1704 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n, | |
1705 | sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); | |
1706 | /* | |
1707 | * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the | |
1708 | * session id. | |
1709 | */ | |
1710 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) | |
1711 | session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; | |
1712 | } | |
1713 | } | |
1714 | if (rsafail) { | |
1715 | int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); | |
1e608e42 | 1716 | u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes); |
3c0ef626 | 1717 | MD5_CTX md; |
1718 | ||
1719 | log("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key"); | |
1720 | BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf); | |
1721 | MD5_Init(&md); | |
1722 | MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); | |
1723 | MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); | |
1724 | MD5_Final(session_key, &md); | |
1725 | MD5_Init(&md); | |
1726 | MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16); | |
1727 | MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); | |
1728 | MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); | |
1729 | MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md); | |
1730 | memset(buf, 0, bytes); | |
1731 | xfree(buf); | |
1732 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) | |
1733 | session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; | |
1734 | } | |
0b582e46 | 1735 | |
0b582e46 | 1736 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
1737 | /* | |
1738 | * Before we destroy the host and server keys, hash them so we can | |
1739 | * send the hash over to the client via a secure channel so that it | |
1740 | * can verify them. | |
1741 | */ | |
1742 | { | |
1743 | MD5_CTX md5context; | |
1744 | Buffer buf; | |
1745 | unsigned char *data; | |
1746 | unsigned int data_len; | |
c3f0c567 | 1747 | extern unsigned char ssh1_key_digest[]; /* in gss-serv.c */ |
0b582e46 | 1748 | |
1749 | ||
1750 | debug("Calculating MD5 hash of server and host keys..."); | |
1751 | ||
1752 | /* Write all the keys to a temporary buffer */ | |
1753 | buffer_init(&buf); | |
1754 | ||
1755 | /* Server key */ | |
1756 | buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); | |
1757 | buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); | |
1758 | ||
1759 | /* Host key */ | |
1760 | buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e); | |
1761 | buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n); | |
1762 | ||
1763 | /* Get the resulting data */ | |
1764 | data = (unsigned char *) buffer_ptr(&buf); | |
1765 | data_len = buffer_len(&buf); | |
1766 | ||
1767 | /* And hash it */ | |
1768 | MD5_Init(&md5context); | |
1769 | MD5_Update(&md5context, data, data_len); | |
c3f0c567 | 1770 | MD5_Final(ssh1_key_digest, &md5context); |
0b582e46 | 1771 | |
1772 | /* Clean up */ | |
1773 | buffer_clear(&buf); | |
1774 | buffer_free(&buf); | |
1775 | } | |
1776 | #endif /* GSSAPI */ | |
0b582e46 | 1777 | |
510132b6 | 1778 | /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ |
3c0ef626 | 1779 | destroy_sensitive_data(); |
1780 | ||
510132b6 | 1781 | if (use_privsep) |
1782 | mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); | |
1783 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1784 | /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */ |
1785 | BN_clear_free(session_key_int); | |
1786 | ||
1787 | /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */ | |
1788 | packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type); | |
1789 | ||
1790 | /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */ | |
1791 | memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); | |
1792 | ||
1793 | debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); | |
1794 | ||
1795 | /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ | |
1796 | packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); | |
1797 | packet_send(); | |
1798 | packet_write_wait(); | |
1799 | } | |
1800 | ||
1801 | /* | |
1802 | * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 | |
1803 | */ | |
1804 | static void | |
1805 | do_ssh2_kex(void) | |
1806 | { | |
1807 | Kex *kex; | |
1808 | ||
1809 | if (options.ciphers != NULL) { | |
1810 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = | |
1811 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; | |
1812 | } | |
1813 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = | |
1814 | compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); | |
1815 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = | |
1816 | compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); | |
1817 | ||
1818 | if (options.macs != NULL) { | |
1819 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = | |
1820 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; | |
1821 | } | |
1822 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); | |
1823 | ||
5598e598 | 1824 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
1825 | { | |
1826 | char *orig; | |
1827 | char *gss = NULL; | |
1828 | char *newstr = NULL; | |
1829 | orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; | |
1830 | ||
1831 | /* If we don't have a host key, then all of the algorithms | |
1832 | * currently in myproposal are useless */ | |
1833 | if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])==0) | |
1834 | orig= NULL; | |
1835 | ||
1836 | if (options.gss_keyex) | |
1837 | gss = ssh_gssapi_mechanisms(1,NULL); | |
1838 | else | |
1839 | gss = NULL; | |
1840 | ||
1841 | if (gss && orig) { | |
1842 | int len = strlen(orig) + strlen(gss) +2; | |
1843 | newstr=xmalloc(len); | |
1844 | snprintf(newstr,len,"%s,%s",gss,orig); | |
1845 | } else if (gss) { | |
1846 | newstr=gss; | |
1847 | } else if (orig) { | |
1848 | newstr=orig; | |
1849 | } | |
1850 | /* If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've also got the 'null' | |
1851 | host key algorithm, but we're not allowed to advertise it, unless | |
1852 | its the only host key algorithm we're supporting */ | |
1853 | if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) { | |
1854 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]="null"; | |
1855 | } | |
1856 | if (newstr) | |
1857 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]=newstr; | |
1858 | else | |
1859 | fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); | |
1860 | } | |
1861 | #endif | |
1862 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1863 | /* start key exchange */ |
1864 | kex = kex_setup(myproposal); | |
1865 | kex->server = 1; | |
1866 | kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; | |
1867 | kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; | |
1868 | kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type; | |
510132b6 | 1869 | kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; |
3c0ef626 | 1870 | |
1871 | xxx_kex = kex; | |
1872 | ||
1873 | dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); | |
1874 | ||
1875 | session_id2 = kex->session_id; | |
1876 | session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; | |
1877 | ||
1878 | #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH | |
1879 | /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ | |
1880 | packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); | |
1881 | packet_put_cstring("markus"); | |
1882 | packet_send(); | |
1883 | packet_write_wait(); | |
1884 | #endif | |
1885 | debug("KEX done"); | |
1886 | } |