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3c0ef626 | 1 | /* |
2 | * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> | |
3 | * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland | |
4 | * All rights reserved | |
5 | * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, | |
6 | * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards | |
7 | * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted | |
8 | * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and | |
9 | * authentication agent connections. | |
10 | * | |
11 | * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software | |
12 | * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this | |
13 | * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is | |
14 | * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be | |
15 | * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". | |
16 | * | |
17 | * SSH2 implementation: | |
2980ea68 | 18 | * Privilege Separation: |
3c0ef626 | 19 | * |
2980ea68 | 20 | * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. |
21 | * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. | |
3c0ef626 | 22 | * |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * | |
32 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR | |
33 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES | |
34 | * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. | |
35 | * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, | |
36 | * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
37 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, | |
38 | * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY | |
39 | * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT | |
40 | * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF | |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
42 | */ | |
43 | ||
44 | #include "includes.h" | |
2980ea68 | 45 | RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.242 2002/05/15 15:47:49 mouring Exp $"); |
3c0ef626 | 46 | |
47 | #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
48 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
1e608e42 | 49 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
2980ea68 | 50 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
51 | #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE | |
52 | #include <sys/security.h> | |
53 | #include <prot.h> | |
54 | #endif | |
3c0ef626 | 55 | |
56 | #include "ssh.h" | |
57 | #include "ssh1.h" | |
58 | #include "ssh2.h" | |
59 | #include "xmalloc.h" | |
60 | #include "rsa.h" | |
61 | #include "sshpty.h" | |
62 | #include "packet.h" | |
63 | #include "mpaux.h" | |
64 | #include "log.h" | |
65 | #include "servconf.h" | |
66 | #include "uidswap.h" | |
67 | #include "compat.h" | |
68 | #include "buffer.h" | |
69 | #include "cipher.h" | |
70 | #include "kex.h" | |
71 | #include "key.h" | |
72 | #include "dh.h" | |
73 | #include "myproposal.h" | |
74 | #include "authfile.h" | |
75 | #include "pathnames.h" | |
76 | #include "atomicio.h" | |
77 | #include "canohost.h" | |
78 | #include "auth.h" | |
79 | #include "misc.h" | |
80 | #include "dispatch.h" | |
81 | #include "channels.h" | |
2980ea68 | 82 | #include "session.h" |
83 | #include "monitor_mm.h" | |
84 | #include "monitor.h" | |
85 | #include "monitor_wrap.h" | |
86 | #include "monitor_fdpass.h" | |
3c0ef626 | 87 | |
5598e598 | 88 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
89 | #include "ssh-gss.h" | |
90 | #endif | |
91 | ||
0b582e46 | 92 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
93 | #include <openssl/md5.h> | |
94 | #include "bufaux.h" | |
95 | #endif /* GSSAPI */ | |
0b582e46 | 96 | |
3c0ef626 | 97 | #ifdef LIBWRAP |
98 | #include <tcpd.h> | |
99 | #include <syslog.h> | |
100 | int allow_severity = LOG_INFO; | |
101 | int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; | |
102 | #endif /* LIBWRAP */ | |
103 | ||
104 | #ifndef O_NOCTTY | |
105 | #define O_NOCTTY 0 | |
106 | #endif | |
107 | ||
108 | #ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME | |
109 | extern char *__progname; | |
110 | #else | |
111 | char *__progname; | |
112 | #endif | |
113 | ||
114 | /* Server configuration options. */ | |
115 | ServerOptions options; | |
116 | ||
117 | /* Name of the server configuration file. */ | |
ae43c103 | 118 | char *config_file_name; |
3c0ef626 | 119 | |
120 | /* | |
121 | * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. | |
122 | * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. | |
123 | */ | |
124 | #ifdef IPV4_DEFAULT | |
125 | int IPv4or6 = AF_INET; | |
126 | #else | |
127 | int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; | |
128 | #endif | |
129 | ||
130 | /* | |
131 | * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug | |
132 | * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system | |
133 | * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing | |
134 | * the first connection. | |
135 | */ | |
136 | int debug_flag = 0; | |
137 | ||
138 | /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */ | |
139 | int test_flag = 0; | |
140 | ||
141 | /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ | |
142 | int inetd_flag = 0; | |
143 | ||
144 | /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ | |
145 | int no_daemon_flag = 0; | |
146 | ||
147 | /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ | |
148 | int log_stderr = 0; | |
149 | ||
150 | /* Saved arguments to main(). */ | |
151 | char **saved_argv; | |
152 | int saved_argc; | |
153 | ||
154 | /* | |
155 | * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP | |
156 | * signal handler. | |
157 | */ | |
158 | #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 | |
159 | int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; | |
160 | int num_listen_socks = 0; | |
161 | ||
162 | /* | |
163 | * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, | |
164 | * sshd will skip the version-number exchange | |
165 | */ | |
166 | char *client_version_string = NULL; | |
167 | char *server_version_string = NULL; | |
168 | ||
169 | /* for rekeying XXX fixme */ | |
170 | Kex *xxx_kex; | |
171 | ||
172 | /* | |
173 | * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this | |
174 | * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so | |
175 | * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some | |
176 | * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) | |
177 | * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is | |
178 | * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. | |
179 | */ | |
180 | struct { | |
181 | Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */ | |
182 | Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */ | |
183 | Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ | |
184 | int have_ssh1_key; | |
185 | int have_ssh2_key; | |
186 | u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; | |
187 | } sensitive_data; | |
188 | ||
189 | /* | |
190 | * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated. | |
191 | * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated. | |
192 | */ | |
1e608e42 | 193 | static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0; |
3c0ef626 | 194 | |
195 | /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ | |
1e608e42 | 196 | static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; |
197 | static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; | |
3c0ef626 | 198 | |
199 | /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ | |
200 | u_char session_id[16]; | |
201 | ||
202 | /* same for ssh2 */ | |
203 | u_char *session_id2 = NULL; | |
204 | int session_id2_len = 0; | |
205 | ||
206 | /* record remote hostname or ip */ | |
207 | u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN; | |
208 | ||
1e608e42 | 209 | /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ |
210 | int *startup_pipes = NULL; | |
211 | int startup_pipe; /* in child */ | |
212 | ||
2980ea68 | 213 | /* variables used for privilege separation */ |
214 | extern struct monitor *pmonitor; | |
215 | extern int use_privsep; | |
216 | ||
3c0ef626 | 217 | /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ |
218 | void destroy_sensitive_data(void); | |
2980ea68 | 219 | void demote_sensitive_data(void); |
3c0ef626 | 220 | |
221 | static void do_ssh1_kex(void); | |
222 | static void do_ssh2_kex(void); | |
223 | ||
224 | /* | |
225 | * Close all listening sockets | |
226 | */ | |
227 | static void | |
228 | close_listen_socks(void) | |
229 | { | |
230 | int i; | |
231 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) | |
232 | close(listen_socks[i]); | |
233 | num_listen_socks = -1; | |
234 | } | |
235 | ||
1e608e42 | 236 | static void |
237 | close_startup_pipes(void) | |
238 | { | |
239 | int i; | |
240 | if (startup_pipes) | |
241 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
242 | if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) | |
243 | close(startup_pipes[i]); | |
244 | } | |
245 | ||
3c0ef626 | 246 | /* |
247 | * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; | |
248 | * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate | |
249 | * the server key). | |
250 | */ | |
251 | static void | |
252 | sighup_handler(int sig) | |
253 | { | |
1e608e42 | 254 | int save_errno = errno; |
255 | ||
3c0ef626 | 256 | received_sighup = 1; |
257 | signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); | |
1e608e42 | 258 | errno = save_errno; |
3c0ef626 | 259 | } |
260 | ||
261 | /* | |
262 | * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. | |
263 | * Restarts the server. | |
264 | */ | |
265 | static void | |
266 | sighup_restart(void) | |
267 | { | |
268 | log("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); | |
269 | close_listen_socks(); | |
1e608e42 | 270 | close_startup_pipes(); |
3c0ef626 | 271 | execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); |
272 | log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); | |
273 | exit(1); | |
274 | } | |
275 | ||
276 | /* | |
277 | * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. | |
278 | */ | |
279 | static void | |
280 | sigterm_handler(int sig) | |
281 | { | |
282 | received_sigterm = sig; | |
283 | } | |
284 | ||
285 | /* | |
286 | * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then | |
287 | * reap any zombies left by exited children. | |
288 | */ | |
289 | static void | |
290 | main_sigchld_handler(int sig) | |
291 | { | |
2980ea68 | 292 | pid_t pid; |
3c0ef626 | 293 | int save_errno = errno; |
294 | int status; | |
295 | ||
2980ea68 | 296 | while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || |
297 | (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) | |
3c0ef626 | 298 | ; |
299 | ||
300 | signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); | |
301 | errno = save_errno; | |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
304 | /* | |
305 | * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. | |
306 | */ | |
307 | static void | |
308 | grace_alarm_handler(int sig) | |
309 | { | |
310 | /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */ | |
311 | ||
312 | /* Close the connection. */ | |
313 | packet_close(); | |
314 | ||
315 | /* Log error and exit. */ | |
316 | fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s.", get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
317 | } | |
318 | ||
319 | /* | |
320 | * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this | |
321 | * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not | |
322 | * do anything with the private key or random state before forking. | |
323 | * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution | |
324 | * problems. | |
325 | */ | |
326 | static void | |
327 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) | |
328 | { | |
329 | u_int32_t rand = 0; | |
330 | int i; | |
331 | ||
332 | verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", | |
333 | sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); | |
334 | if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) | |
335 | key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); | |
336 | sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1, | |
337 | options.server_key_bits); | |
338 | verbose("RSA key generation complete."); | |
339 | ||
340 | for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { | |
341 | if (i % 4 == 0) | |
342 | rand = arc4random(); | |
343 | sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; | |
344 | rand >>= 8; | |
345 | } | |
346 | arc4random_stir(); | |
347 | } | |
348 | ||
349 | static void | |
350 | key_regeneration_alarm(int sig) | |
351 | { | |
352 | int save_errno = errno; | |
353 | signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); | |
354 | errno = save_errno; | |
355 | key_do_regen = 1; | |
356 | } | |
357 | ||
358 | static void | |
359 | sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) | |
360 | { | |
361 | int i, mismatch; | |
362 | int remote_major, remote_minor; | |
363 | int major, minor; | |
364 | char *s; | |
365 | char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ | |
366 | char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ | |
367 | ||
368 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && | |
369 | (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) { | |
370 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; | |
371 | minor = 99; | |
372 | } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { | |
373 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; | |
374 | minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; | |
375 | } else { | |
376 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; | |
377 | minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; | |
378 | } | |
379 | snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION); | |
380 | server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); | |
381 | ||
382 | if (client_version_string == NULL) { | |
383 | /* Send our protocol version identification. */ | |
384 | if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string)) | |
385 | != strlen(server_version_string)) { | |
386 | log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
387 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
388 | } | |
389 | ||
390 | /* Read other side's version identification. */ | |
391 | memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); | |
392 | for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { | |
393 | if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { | |
394 | log("Did not receive identification string from %s", | |
395 | get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
396 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
397 | } | |
398 | if (buf[i] == '\r') { | |
399 | buf[i] = 0; | |
400 | /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ | |
401 | if (i == 12 && | |
402 | strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) | |
403 | break; | |
404 | continue; | |
405 | } | |
406 | if (buf[i] == '\n') { | |
407 | buf[i] = 0; | |
408 | break; | |
409 | } | |
410 | } | |
411 | buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; | |
412 | client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); | |
413 | } | |
414 | ||
415 | /* | |
416 | * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept | |
417 | * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. | |
418 | */ | |
419 | if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", | |
420 | &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { | |
421 | s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; | |
422 | (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); | |
423 | close(sock_in); | |
424 | close(sock_out); | |
425 | log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s", | |
426 | client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr()); | |
427 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
428 | } | |
429 | debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", | |
1e608e42 | 430 | remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); |
3c0ef626 | 431 | |
432 | compat_datafellows(remote_version); | |
433 | ||
434 | if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) { | |
435 | log("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.", | |
436 | get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); | |
437 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
438 | } | |
439 | ||
440 | mismatch = 0; | |
1e608e42 | 441 | switch (remote_major) { |
3c0ef626 | 442 | case 1: |
443 | if (remote_minor == 99) { | |
444 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) | |
445 | enable_compat20(); | |
446 | else | |
447 | mismatch = 1; | |
448 | break; | |
449 | } | |
450 | if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { | |
451 | mismatch = 1; | |
452 | break; | |
453 | } | |
454 | if (remote_minor < 3) { | |
455 | packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and " | |
456 | "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version."); | |
457 | } else if (remote_minor == 3) { | |
458 | /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */ | |
459 | enable_compat13(); | |
460 | } | |
461 | break; | |
462 | case 2: | |
463 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { | |
464 | enable_compat20(); | |
465 | break; | |
466 | } | |
467 | /* FALLTHROUGH */ | |
468 | default: | |
469 | mismatch = 1; | |
470 | break; | |
471 | } | |
472 | chop(server_version_string); | |
473 | debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); | |
474 | ||
475 | if (mismatch) { | |
476 | s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; | |
477 | (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); | |
478 | close(sock_in); | |
479 | close(sock_out); | |
480 | log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s", | |
481 | get_remote_ipaddr(), | |
482 | server_version_string, client_version_string); | |
483 | fatal_cleanup(); | |
484 | } | |
485 | } | |
486 | ||
487 | ||
488 | /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ | |
489 | void | |
490 | destroy_sensitive_data(void) | |
491 | { | |
492 | int i; | |
493 | ||
494 | if (sensitive_data.server_key) { | |
495 | key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); | |
496 | sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; | |
497 | } | |
1e608e42 | 498 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { |
3c0ef626 | 499 | if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { |
500 | key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); | |
501 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; | |
502 | } | |
503 | } | |
504 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; | |
505 | memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); | |
506 | } | |
507 | ||
2980ea68 | 508 | /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ |
509 | void | |
510 | demote_sensitive_data(void) | |
511 | { | |
512 | Key *tmp; | |
513 | int i; | |
514 | ||
515 | if (sensitive_data.server_key) { | |
516 | tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key); | |
517 | key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); | |
518 | sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; | |
519 | } | |
520 | ||
521 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { | |
522 | if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { | |
523 | tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); | |
524 | key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); | |
525 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; | |
526 | if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) | |
527 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; | |
528 | } | |
529 | } | |
530 | ||
531 | /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */ | |
532 | } | |
533 | ||
534 | static void | |
535 | privsep_preauth_child(void) | |
536 | { | |
537 | u_int32_t rand[256]; | |
538 | int i; | |
539 | struct passwd *pw; | |
540 | ||
541 | /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ | |
542 | privsep_challenge_enable(); | |
543 | ||
544 | for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) | |
545 | rand[i] = arc4random(); | |
546 | RAND_seed(rand, sizeof(rand)); | |
547 | ||
548 | /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ | |
549 | demote_sensitive_data(); | |
550 | ||
551 | if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) | |
552 | fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", | |
553 | SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); | |
554 | memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd)); | |
555 | endpwent(); | |
556 | ||
557 | /* Change our root directory*/ | |
558 | if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) | |
559 | fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, | |
560 | strerror(errno)); | |
561 | if (chdir("/") == -1) | |
562 | fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); | |
563 | ||
564 | /* Drop our privileges */ | |
565 | debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, | |
566 | (u_int)pw->pw_gid); | |
567 | do_setusercontext(pw); | |
568 | } | |
569 | ||
570 | static Authctxt* | |
571 | privsep_preauth(void) | |
572 | { | |
573 | Authctxt *authctxt = NULL; | |
574 | int status; | |
575 | pid_t pid; | |
576 | ||
577 | /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ | |
578 | pmonitor = monitor_init(); | |
579 | /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ | |
580 | pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex; | |
581 | ||
582 | pid = fork(); | |
583 | if (pid == -1) { | |
584 | fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); | |
585 | } else if (pid != 0) { | |
586 | debug2("Network child is on pid %d", pid); | |
587 | ||
588 | close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); | |
589 | authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(pmonitor); | |
590 | close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); | |
591 | ||
592 | /* Sync memory */ | |
593 | monitor_sync(pmonitor); | |
594 | ||
595 | /* Wait for the child's exit status */ | |
596 | while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) | |
597 | if (errno != EINTR) | |
598 | break; | |
599 | return (authctxt); | |
600 | } else { | |
601 | /* child */ | |
602 | ||
603 | close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); | |
604 | ||
605 | /* Demote the child */ | |
606 | if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) | |
607 | privsep_preauth_child(); | |
608 | setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); | |
609 | } | |
610 | return (NULL); | |
611 | } | |
612 | ||
613 | static void | |
614 | privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) | |
615 | { | |
616 | extern Authctxt *x_authctxt; | |
617 | ||
618 | /* XXX - Remote port forwarding */ | |
619 | x_authctxt = authctxt; | |
620 | ||
621 | if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) { | |
622 | /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */ | |
623 | monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); | |
624 | use_privsep = 0; | |
625 | return; | |
626 | } | |
627 | ||
628 | /* Authentication complete */ | |
629 | alarm(0); | |
630 | if (startup_pipe != -1) { | |
631 | close(startup_pipe); | |
632 | startup_pipe = -1; | |
633 | } | |
634 | ||
635 | /* New socket pair */ | |
636 | monitor_reinit(pmonitor); | |
637 | ||
638 | pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); | |
639 | if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) | |
640 | fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); | |
641 | else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { | |
642 | debug2("User child is on pid %d", pmonitor->m_pid); | |
643 | close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); | |
644 | monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); | |
645 | ||
646 | /* NEVERREACHED */ | |
647 | exit(0); | |
648 | } | |
649 | ||
650 | close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); | |
651 | ||
652 | /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ | |
653 | demote_sensitive_data(); | |
654 | ||
655 | /* Drop privileges */ | |
656 | do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); | |
657 | ||
658 | /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ | |
659 | monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); | |
660 | } | |
661 | ||
3c0ef626 | 662 | static char * |
663 | list_hostkey_types(void) | |
664 | { | |
1e608e42 | 665 | Buffer b; |
666 | char *p; | |
3c0ef626 | 667 | int i; |
1e608e42 | 668 | |
669 | buffer_init(&b); | |
670 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { | |
3c0ef626 | 671 | Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; |
672 | if (key == NULL) | |
673 | continue; | |
1e608e42 | 674 | switch (key->type) { |
3c0ef626 | 675 | case KEY_RSA: |
676 | case KEY_DSA: | |
1e608e42 | 677 | if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) |
678 | buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); | |
679 | p = key_ssh_name(key); | |
680 | buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); | |
3c0ef626 | 681 | break; |
682 | } | |
683 | } | |
1e608e42 | 684 | buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); |
685 | p = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); | |
686 | buffer_free(&b); | |
687 | debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", p); | |
688 | return p; | |
3c0ef626 | 689 | } |
690 | ||
2980ea68 | 691 | Key * |
3c0ef626 | 692 | get_hostkey_by_type(int type) |
693 | { | |
694 | int i; | |
1e608e42 | 695 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { |
3c0ef626 | 696 | Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; |
697 | if (key != NULL && key->type == type) | |
698 | return key; | |
699 | } | |
700 | return NULL; | |
701 | } | |
702 | ||
2980ea68 | 703 | Key * |
704 | get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) | |
705 | { | |
706 | if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) | |
707 | return (NULL); | |
708 | return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); | |
709 | } | |
710 | ||
711 | int | |
712 | get_hostkey_index(Key *key) | |
713 | { | |
714 | int i; | |
715 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { | |
716 | if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) | |
717 | return (i); | |
718 | } | |
719 | return (-1); | |
720 | } | |
721 | ||
3c0ef626 | 722 | /* |
723 | * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. | |
724 | * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability | |
725 | * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until | |
726 | * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups | |
727 | */ | |
728 | static int | |
729 | drop_connection(int startups) | |
730 | { | |
731 | double p, r; | |
732 | ||
733 | if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) | |
734 | return 0; | |
735 | if (startups >= options.max_startups) | |
736 | return 1; | |
737 | if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) | |
738 | return 1; | |
739 | ||
740 | p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; | |
741 | p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; | |
742 | p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin); | |
743 | p += options.max_startups_rate; | |
744 | p /= 100.0; | |
745 | r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX; | |
746 | ||
747 | debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r); | |
748 | return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; | |
749 | } | |
750 | ||
1e608e42 | 751 | static void |
752 | usage(void) | |
753 | { | |
754 | fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION); | |
755 | fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname); | |
756 | fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); | |
757 | fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE); | |
758 | fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n"); | |
759 | fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n"); | |
760 | fprintf(stderr, " -D Do not fork into daemon mode\n"); | |
761 | fprintf(stderr, " -t Only test configuration file and keys\n"); | |
762 | fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n"); | |
763 | fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n"); | |
764 | fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n"); | |
765 | fprintf(stderr, " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 600)\n"); | |
766 | fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n"); | |
767 | fprintf(stderr, " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n", | |
768 | _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE); | |
769 | fprintf(stderr, " -u len Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n"); | |
770 | fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only\n"); | |
771 | fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only\n"); | |
772 | fprintf(stderr, " -o option Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.\n"); | |
773 | exit(1); | |
774 | } | |
3c0ef626 | 775 | |
776 | /* | |
777 | * Main program for the daemon. | |
778 | */ | |
779 | int | |
780 | main(int ac, char **av) | |
781 | { | |
782 | extern char *optarg; | |
783 | extern int optind; | |
784 | int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1; | |
785 | pid_t pid; | |
786 | socklen_t fromlen; | |
787 | fd_set *fdset; | |
788 | struct sockaddr_storage from; | |
789 | const char *remote_ip; | |
790 | int remote_port; | |
791 | FILE *f; | |
792 | struct linger linger; | |
793 | struct addrinfo *ai; | |
794 | char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; | |
795 | int listen_sock, maxfd; | |
796 | int startup_p[2]; | |
797 | int startups = 0; | |
2980ea68 | 798 | Authctxt *authctxt; |
3c0ef626 | 799 | Key *key; |
800 | int ret, key_used = 0; | |
801 | ||
2980ea68 | 802 | #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE |
803 | (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); | |
804 | #endif | |
3c0ef626 | 805 | __progname = get_progname(av[0]); |
ae43c103 | 806 | init_pathnames(); |
807 | config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; | |
3c0ef626 | 808 | init_rng(); |
809 | ||
810 | /* Save argv. */ | |
811 | saved_argc = ac; | |
812 | saved_argv = av; | |
813 | ||
814 | /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ | |
815 | initialize_server_options(&options); | |
816 | ||
817 | /* Parse command-line arguments. */ | |
1e608e42 | 818 | while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:o:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) { |
3c0ef626 | 819 | switch (opt) { |
820 | case '4': | |
821 | IPv4or6 = AF_INET; | |
822 | break; | |
823 | case '6': | |
824 | IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; | |
825 | break; | |
826 | case 'f': | |
827 | config_file_name = optarg; | |
828 | break; | |
829 | case 'd': | |
830 | if (0 == debug_flag) { | |
831 | debug_flag = 1; | |
832 | options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; | |
833 | } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { | |
834 | options.log_level++; | |
835 | } else { | |
836 | fprintf(stderr, "Too high debugging level.\n"); | |
837 | exit(1); | |
838 | } | |
839 | break; | |
840 | case 'D': | |
841 | no_daemon_flag = 1; | |
842 | break; | |
843 | case 'e': | |
844 | log_stderr = 1; | |
845 | break; | |
846 | case 'i': | |
847 | inetd_flag = 1; | |
848 | break; | |
849 | case 'Q': | |
850 | /* ignored */ | |
851 | break; | |
852 | case 'q': | |
853 | options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; | |
854 | break; | |
855 | case 'b': | |
856 | options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg); | |
857 | break; | |
858 | case 'p': | |
859 | options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; | |
860 | if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { | |
861 | fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); | |
862 | exit(1); | |
863 | } | |
864 | options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); | |
865 | if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) { | |
866 | fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); | |
867 | exit(1); | |
868 | } | |
869 | break; | |
870 | case 'g': | |
871 | if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { | |
872 | fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); | |
873 | exit(1); | |
874 | } | |
875 | break; | |
876 | case 'k': | |
877 | if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { | |
878 | fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n"); | |
879 | exit(1); | |
880 | } | |
881 | break; | |
882 | case 'h': | |
883 | if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) { | |
884 | fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n"); | |
885 | exit(1); | |
886 | } | |
887 | options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg; | |
888 | break; | |
889 | case 'V': | |
890 | client_version_string = optarg; | |
891 | /* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */ | |
892 | inetd_flag = 1; | |
893 | break; | |
894 | case 't': | |
895 | test_flag = 1; | |
896 | break; | |
897 | case 'u': | |
898 | utmp_len = atoi(optarg); | |
899 | break; | |
1e608e42 | 900 | case 'o': |
901 | if (process_server_config_line(&options, optarg, | |
902 | "command-line", 0) != 0) | |
903 | exit(1); | |
904 | break; | |
3c0ef626 | 905 | case '?': |
906 | default: | |
1e608e42 | 907 | usage(); |
908 | break; | |
3c0ef626 | 909 | } |
910 | } | |
911 | SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); | |
912 | channel_set_af(IPv4or6); | |
913 | ||
914 | /* | |
915 | * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host | |
916 | * key (unless started from inetd) | |
917 | */ | |
918 | log_init(__progname, | |
1e608e42 | 919 | options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? |
920 | SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, | |
921 | options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? | |
922 | SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, | |
3c0ef626 | 923 | !inetd_flag); |
924 | ||
925 | #ifdef _CRAY | |
926 | /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now! | |
927 | * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems! | |
928 | */ | |
929 | drop_cray_privs(); | |
930 | #endif | |
931 | ||
932 | seed_rng(); | |
933 | ||
934 | /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */ | |
935 | read_server_config(&options, config_file_name); | |
936 | ||
937 | /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ | |
938 | fill_default_server_options(&options); | |
939 | ||
940 | /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ | |
941 | if (optind < ac) { | |
942 | fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); | |
943 | exit(1); | |
944 | } | |
945 | ||
946 | debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION); | |
947 | ||
948 | /* load private host keys */ | |
949 | sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files*sizeof(Key*)); | |
1e608e42 | 950 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) |
3c0ef626 | 951 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; |
952 | sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; | |
953 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; | |
954 | sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; | |
955 | sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; | |
956 | ||
1e608e42 | 957 | for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { |
3c0ef626 | 958 | key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL); |
959 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; | |
960 | if (key == NULL) { | |
961 | error("Could not load host key: %s", | |
962 | options.host_key_files[i]); | |
963 | sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; | |
964 | continue; | |
965 | } | |
1e608e42 | 966 | switch (key->type) { |
3c0ef626 | 967 | case KEY_RSA1: |
968 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key; | |
969 | sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1; | |
970 | break; | |
971 | case KEY_RSA: | |
972 | case KEY_DSA: | |
973 | sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; | |
974 | break; | |
975 | } | |
976 | debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type, | |
977 | key_type(key)); | |
978 | } | |
979 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { | |
980 | log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); | |
981 | options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; | |
982 | } | |
5598e598 | 983 | #ifndef GSSAPI |
984 | /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ | |
3c0ef626 | 985 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { |
986 | log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); | |
987 | options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; | |
988 | } | |
5598e598 | 989 | #endif |
3c0ef626 | 990 | if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { |
991 | log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); | |
992 | exit(1); | |
993 | } | |
994 | ||
995 | /* Check certain values for sanity. */ | |
996 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { | |
997 | if (options.server_key_bits < 512 || | |
998 | options.server_key_bits > 32768) { | |
999 | fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n"); | |
1000 | exit(1); | |
1001 | } | |
1002 | /* | |
1003 | * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This | |
1004 | * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I | |
1005 | * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels | |
1006 | */ | |
1007 | if (options.server_key_bits > | |
1008 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && | |
1009 | options.server_key_bits < | |
1010 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { | |
1011 | options.server_key_bits = | |
1012 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED; | |
1013 | debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.", | |
1014 | options.server_key_bits); | |
1015 | } | |
1016 | } | |
1017 | ||
1018 | /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ | |
1019 | if (test_flag) | |
1020 | exit(0); | |
1021 | ||
0b582e46 | 1022 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
c7221eee | 1023 | ssh_gssapi_clean_env(); |
0b582e46 | 1024 | #endif /* GSSAPI */ |
0b582e46 | 1025 | |
2980ea68 | 1026 | #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN |
1027 | /* | |
1028 | * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This | |
1029 | * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the | |
1030 | * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM | |
1031 | * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every | |
1032 | * module which might be used). | |
1033 | */ | |
1034 | if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) | |
1035 | debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); | |
1036 | #endif /* !HAVE_CYGWIN */ | |
3c0ef626 | 1037 | |
1038 | /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ | |
1039 | if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag) | |
1040 | log_stderr = 1; | |
1041 | log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); | |
1042 | ||
1043 | /* | |
1044 | * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect | |
1045 | * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process | |
1046 | * exits. | |
1047 | */ | |
1048 | if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) { | |
1049 | #ifdef TIOCNOTTY | |
1050 | int fd; | |
1051 | #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ | |
1052 | if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) | |
1053 | fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); | |
1054 | ||
1055 | /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ | |
1056 | #ifdef TIOCNOTTY | |
1057 | fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); | |
1058 | if (fd >= 0) { | |
1059 | (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); | |
1060 | close(fd); | |
1061 | } | |
1062 | #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ | |
1063 | } | |
1064 | /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ | |
1065 | log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); | |
1066 | ||
1067 | /* Initialize the random number generator. */ | |
1068 | arc4random_stir(); | |
1069 | ||
1070 | /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be | |
1071 | unmounted if desired. */ | |
1072 | chdir("/"); | |
1e608e42 | 1073 | |
3c0ef626 | 1074 | /* ignore SIGPIPE */ |
1075 | signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); | |
1076 | ||
1077 | /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */ | |
1078 | if (inetd_flag) { | |
1079 | int s1; | |
1080 | s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */ | |
1081 | dup(s1); | |
1082 | sock_in = dup(0); | |
1083 | sock_out = dup(1); | |
1084 | startup_pipe = -1; | |
1085 | /* | |
1086 | * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 | |
1087 | * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if | |
1088 | * ttyfd happens to be one of those. | |
1089 | */ | |
1090 | debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out); | |
1091 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) | |
1092 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | |
1093 | } else { | |
1094 | for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { | |
1095 | if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) | |
1096 | continue; | |
1097 | if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) | |
1098 | fatal("Too many listen sockets. " | |
1099 | "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); | |
1100 | if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, | |
1101 | ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), | |
1102 | NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { | |
1103 | error("getnameinfo failed"); | |
1104 | continue; | |
1105 | } | |
1106 | /* Create socket for listening. */ | |
1107 | listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); | |
1108 | if (listen_sock < 0) { | |
1109 | /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ | |
1110 | verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1111 | continue; | |
1112 | } | |
1113 | if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) { | |
1114 | error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); | |
1115 | close(listen_sock); | |
1116 | continue; | |
1117 | } | |
1118 | /* | |
1119 | * Set socket options. We try to make the port | |
1120 | * reusable and have it close as fast as possible | |
1121 | * without waiting in unnecessary wait states on | |
1122 | * close. | |
1123 | */ | |
1124 | setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, | |
1e608e42 | 1125 | &on, sizeof(on)); |
3c0ef626 | 1126 | linger.l_onoff = 1; |
1127 | linger.l_linger = 5; | |
1128 | setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, | |
1e608e42 | 1129 | &linger, sizeof(linger)); |
3c0ef626 | 1130 | |
1131 | debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); | |
1132 | ||
1133 | /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ | |
1134 | if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { | |
1135 | if (!ai->ai_next) | |
1136 | error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", | |
1137 | strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); | |
1138 | close(listen_sock); | |
1139 | continue; | |
1140 | } | |
1141 | listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; | |
1142 | num_listen_socks++; | |
1143 | ||
1144 | /* Start listening on the port. */ | |
1145 | log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); | |
1146 | if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0) | |
1147 | fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1148 | ||
1149 | } | |
1150 | freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs); | |
1151 | ||
1152 | if (!num_listen_socks) | |
1153 | fatal("Cannot bind any address."); | |
1154 | ||
1155 | if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) | |
1156 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | |
1157 | ||
1158 | /* | |
1159 | * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs | |
1160 | * listen_sock. | |
1161 | */ | |
1162 | signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); | |
1163 | ||
1164 | signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); | |
1165 | signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); | |
1166 | ||
1167 | /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */ | |
1168 | signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); | |
1169 | ||
1170 | /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */ | |
1171 | if (!debug_flag) { | |
1172 | /* | |
1173 | * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it | |
1174 | * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to | |
1175 | * do this before the bind above because the bind will | |
1176 | * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will | |
1177 | * overwrite any old pid in the file. | |
1178 | */ | |
1179 | f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb"); | |
1180 | if (f) { | |
1181 | fprintf(f, "%u\n", (u_int) getpid()); | |
1182 | fclose(f); | |
1183 | } | |
1184 | } | |
1185 | ||
1186 | /* setup fd set for listen */ | |
1187 | fdset = NULL; | |
1188 | maxfd = 0; | |
1189 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) | |
1190 | if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) | |
1191 | maxfd = listen_socks[i]; | |
1192 | /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ | |
1193 | startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int)); | |
1194 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
1195 | startup_pipes[i] = -1; | |
1196 | ||
1197 | /* | |
1198 | * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or | |
1199 | * the daemon is killed with a signal. | |
1200 | */ | |
1201 | for (;;) { | |
1202 | if (received_sighup) | |
1203 | sighup_restart(); | |
1204 | if (fdset != NULL) | |
1205 | xfree(fdset); | |
1206 | fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); | |
1207 | fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz); | |
1208 | memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz); | |
1209 | ||
1210 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) | |
1211 | FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); | |
1212 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
1213 | if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) | |
1214 | FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); | |
1215 | ||
1216 | /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ | |
1217 | ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
1218 | if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) | |
1219 | error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1220 | if (received_sigterm) { | |
1221 | log("Received signal %d; terminating.", | |
1e608e42 | 1222 | (int) received_sigterm); |
3c0ef626 | 1223 | close_listen_socks(); |
1224 | unlink(options.pid_file); | |
1225 | exit(255); | |
1226 | } | |
1227 | if (key_used && key_do_regen) { | |
1228 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | |
1229 | key_used = 0; | |
1230 | key_do_regen = 0; | |
1231 | } | |
1232 | if (ret < 0) | |
1233 | continue; | |
1234 | ||
1235 | for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) | |
1236 | if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && | |
1237 | FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { | |
1238 | /* | |
1239 | * the read end of the pipe is ready | |
1240 | * if the child has closed the pipe | |
1241 | * after successful authentication | |
1242 | * or if the child has died | |
1243 | */ | |
1244 | close(startup_pipes[i]); | |
1245 | startup_pipes[i] = -1; | |
1246 | startups--; | |
1247 | } | |
1248 | for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { | |
1249 | if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) | |
1250 | continue; | |
1251 | fromlen = sizeof(from); | |
1252 | newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, | |
1253 | &fromlen); | |
1254 | if (newsock < 0) { | |
1255 | if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) | |
1256 | error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1257 | continue; | |
1258 | } | |
1259 | if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) { | |
1260 | error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno)); | |
1e608e42 | 1261 | close(newsock); |
3c0ef626 | 1262 | continue; |
1263 | } | |
1264 | if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { | |
1265 | debug("drop connection #%d", startups); | |
1266 | close(newsock); | |
1267 | continue; | |
1268 | } | |
1269 | if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { | |
1270 | close(newsock); | |
1271 | continue; | |
1272 | } | |
1273 | ||
1274 | for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) | |
1275 | if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { | |
1276 | startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; | |
1277 | if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) | |
1278 | maxfd = startup_p[0]; | |
1279 | startups++; | |
1280 | break; | |
1281 | } | |
1282 | ||
1283 | /* | |
1284 | * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless | |
1285 | * we are in debugging mode. | |
1286 | */ | |
1287 | if (debug_flag) { | |
1288 | /* | |
1289 | * In debugging mode. Close the listening | |
1290 | * socket, and start processing the | |
1291 | * connection without forking. | |
1292 | */ | |
1293 | debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); | |
1294 | close_listen_socks(); | |
1295 | sock_in = newsock; | |
1296 | sock_out = newsock; | |
1297 | startup_pipe = -1; | |
1298 | pid = getpid(); | |
1299 | break; | |
1300 | } else { | |
1301 | /* | |
1302 | * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have | |
1303 | * the child process the connection. The | |
1304 | * parent continues listening. | |
1305 | */ | |
1306 | if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { | |
1307 | /* | |
1308 | * Child. Close the listening and max_startup | |
1309 | * sockets. Start using the accepted socket. | |
1310 | * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has | |
1311 | * changed). We break out of the loop to handle | |
1312 | * the connection. | |
1313 | */ | |
1314 | startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; | |
1e608e42 | 1315 | close_startup_pipes(); |
3c0ef626 | 1316 | close_listen_socks(); |
1317 | sock_in = newsock; | |
1318 | sock_out = newsock; | |
1319 | log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); | |
1320 | break; | |
1321 | } | |
1322 | } | |
1323 | ||
1324 | /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ | |
1325 | if (pid < 0) | |
1326 | error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1327 | else | |
1328 | debug("Forked child %d.", pid); | |
1329 | ||
1330 | close(startup_p[1]); | |
1331 | ||
1332 | /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */ | |
1333 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && | |
1334 | key_used == 0) { | |
1335 | /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */ | |
1336 | signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); | |
1337 | alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); | |
1338 | key_used = 1; | |
1339 | } | |
1340 | ||
1341 | arc4random_stir(); | |
1342 | ||
1343 | /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */ | |
1344 | close(newsock); | |
1345 | } | |
1346 | /* child process check (or debug mode) */ | |
1347 | if (num_listen_socks < 0) | |
1348 | break; | |
1349 | } | |
1350 | } | |
1351 | ||
1352 | /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ | |
1353 | ||
2980ea68 | 1354 | /* |
1355 | * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD | |
1356 | * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't | |
1357 | * want the child to be able to affect the parent. | |
1358 | */ | |
1359 | #if 0 | |
1360 | /* XXX: this breaks Solaris */ | |
1361 | if (setsid() < 0) | |
1362 | error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1363 | #endif | |
1364 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1365 | /* |
1366 | * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the | |
1367 | * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We | |
1368 | * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. | |
1369 | */ | |
1370 | alarm(0); | |
1371 | signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); | |
1372 | signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); | |
1373 | signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); | |
1374 | signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); | |
1375 | signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); | |
1376 | signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); | |
1377 | ||
1378 | /* | |
1379 | * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to | |
1380 | * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the | |
1381 | * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing. | |
1382 | */ | |
1383 | /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ | |
1384 | linger.l_onoff = 1; | |
1385 | linger.l_linger = 5; | |
1e608e42 | 1386 | setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &linger, sizeof(linger)); |
3c0ef626 | 1387 | |
1388 | /* Set keepalives if requested. */ | |
1389 | if (options.keepalives && | |
1e608e42 | 1390 | setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, |
3c0ef626 | 1391 | sizeof(on)) < 0) |
1392 | error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | |
1393 | ||
1394 | /* | |
1395 | * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do | |
1396 | * not have a key. | |
1397 | */ | |
1398 | packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); | |
1399 | ||
1400 | remote_port = get_remote_port(); | |
1401 | remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); | |
1402 | ||
1403 | #ifdef LIBWRAP | |
1404 | /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ | |
1405 | { | |
1406 | struct request_info req; | |
1407 | ||
1408 | request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0); | |
1409 | fromhost(&req); | |
1410 | ||
1411 | if (!hosts_access(&req)) { | |
1412 | debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper"); | |
1413 | refuse(&req); | |
1414 | /* NOTREACHED */ | |
1415 | fatal("libwrap refuse returns"); | |
1416 | } | |
1417 | } | |
1418 | #endif /* LIBWRAP */ | |
1419 | ||
1420 | /* Log the connection. */ | |
1421 | verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); | |
1422 | ||
1423 | /* | |
1424 | * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side | |
1425 | * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is | |
1426 | * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero | |
1427 | * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging | |
1428 | * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you | |
1429 | * are about to discover the bug. | |
1430 | */ | |
1431 | signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); | |
1432 | if (!debug_flag) | |
1433 | alarm(options.login_grace_time); | |
1434 | ||
1435 | sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); | |
1436 | /* | |
1437 | * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port. | |
1438 | * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged | |
1439 | * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local | |
1440 | * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these | |
1441 | * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust. | |
1442 | */ | |
1e608e42 | 1443 | if (options.rhosts_authentication && |
1444 | (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED || | |
1445 | remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2)) { | |
3c0ef626 | 1446 | debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, " |
1447 | "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port); | |
1448 | options.rhosts_authentication = 0; | |
1449 | } | |
1450 | #if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5) | |
1451 | if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() && | |
1452 | options.kerberos_authentication) { | |
1453 | debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4."); | |
1454 | options.kerberos_authentication = 0; | |
1455 | } | |
1456 | #endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */ | |
1457 | #ifdef AFS | |
1458 | /* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */ | |
1459 | if (k_hasafs()) { | |
1460 | k_setpag(); | |
1461 | k_unlog(); | |
1462 | } | |
1463 | #endif /* AFS */ | |
1464 | ||
1465 | packet_set_nonblocking(); | |
1466 | ||
2980ea68 | 1467 | if (use_privsep) |
1468 | if ((authctxt = privsep_preauth()) != NULL) | |
1469 | goto authenticated; | |
1470 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1471 | /* perform the key exchange */ |
1472 | /* authenticate user and start session */ | |
1473 | if (compat20) { | |
1474 | do_ssh2_kex(); | |
2980ea68 | 1475 | authctxt = do_authentication2(); |
3c0ef626 | 1476 | } else { |
1477 | do_ssh1_kex(); | |
2980ea68 | 1478 | authctxt = do_authentication(); |
1479 | } | |
1480 | /* | |
1481 | * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers | |
1482 | * the current keystate and exits | |
1483 | */ | |
1484 | if (use_privsep) { | |
1485 | mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); | |
1486 | exit(0); | |
3c0ef626 | 1487 | } |
2980ea68 | 1488 | |
1489 | authenticated: | |
1490 | /* | |
1491 | * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare | |
1492 | * file descriptor passing. | |
1493 | */ | |
1494 | if (use_privsep) { | |
1495 | privsep_postauth(authctxt); | |
1496 | /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ | |
1497 | if (!compat20) | |
1498 | destroy_sensitive_data(); | |
1499 | } | |
1500 | ||
1501 | /* Perform session preparation. */ | |
1502 | do_authenticated(authctxt); | |
1503 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1504 | /* The connection has been terminated. */ |
1505 | verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip); | |
1506 | ||
1507 | #ifdef USE_PAM | |
1508 | finish_pam(); | |
1509 | #endif /* USE_PAM */ | |
1510 | ||
1511 | packet_close(); | |
2980ea68 | 1512 | |
1513 | if (use_privsep) | |
1514 | mm_terminate(); | |
1515 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1516 | exit(0); |
1517 | } | |
1518 | ||
2980ea68 | 1519 | /* |
1520 | * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key | |
1521 | * (key with larger modulus first). | |
1522 | */ | |
1523 | int | |
1524 | ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int) | |
1525 | { | |
1526 | int rsafail = 0; | |
1527 | ||
1528 | if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) { | |
1529 | /* Server key has bigger modulus. */ | |
1530 | if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) < | |
1531 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { | |
1532 | fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", | |
1533 | get_remote_ipaddr(), | |
1534 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), | |
1535 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), | |
1536 | SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); | |
1537 | } | |
1538 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1539 | sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0) | |
1540 | rsafail++; | |
1541 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1542 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0) | |
1543 | rsafail++; | |
1544 | } else { | |
1545 | /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */ | |
1546 | if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) < | |
1547 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { | |
1548 | fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", | |
1549 | get_remote_ipaddr(), | |
1550 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), | |
1551 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), | |
1552 | SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); | |
1553 | } | |
1554 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1555 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0) | |
1556 | rsafail++; | |
1557 | if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, | |
1558 | sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0) | |
1559 | rsafail++; | |
1560 | } | |
1561 | return (rsafail); | |
1562 | } | |
3c0ef626 | 1563 | /* |
1564 | * SSH1 key exchange | |
1565 | */ | |
1566 | static void | |
1567 | do_ssh1_kex(void) | |
1568 | { | |
1569 | int i, len; | |
3c0ef626 | 1570 | int rsafail = 0; |
1571 | BIGNUM *session_key_int; | |
1572 | u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; | |
1573 | u_char cookie[8]; | |
1574 | u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; | |
1575 | u_int32_t rand = 0; | |
1576 | ||
1577 | /* | |
1578 | * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user | |
1579 | * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip | |
1580 | * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody | |
1581 | * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local | |
1582 | * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random | |
1583 | * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one | |
1584 | * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. | |
1585 | */ | |
1586 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { | |
1587 | if (i % 4 == 0) | |
1588 | rand = arc4random(); | |
1589 | cookie[i] = rand & 0xff; | |
1590 | rand >>= 8; | |
1591 | } | |
1592 | ||
1593 | /* | |
1594 | * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random | |
1595 | * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP | |
1596 | * spoofing. | |
1597 | */ | |
1598 | packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
1599 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) | |
1600 | packet_put_char(cookie[i]); | |
1601 | ||
1602 | /* Store our public server RSA key. */ | |
1603 | packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)); | |
1604 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); | |
1605 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); | |
1606 | ||
1607 | /* Store our public host RSA key. */ | |
1608 | packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); | |
1609 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e); | |
1610 | packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n); | |
1611 | ||
1612 | /* Put protocol flags. */ | |
1613 | packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); | |
1614 | ||
1615 | /* Declare which ciphers we support. */ | |
1616 | packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0)); | |
1617 | ||
1618 | /* Declare supported authentication types. */ | |
1619 | auth_mask = 0; | |
1620 | if (options.rhosts_authentication) | |
1621 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS; | |
1622 | if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) | |
1623 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA; | |
1624 | if (options.rsa_authentication) | |
1625 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA; | |
1626 | #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) | |
1627 | if (options.kerberos_authentication) | |
1628 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS; | |
1629 | #endif | |
1630 | #if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) | |
1631 | if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing) | |
1632 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT; | |
1633 | #endif | |
1634 | #ifdef AFS | |
1635 | if (options.afs_token_passing) | |
1636 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN; | |
1637 | #endif | |
1638 | if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) | |
1639 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS; | |
0b582e46 | 1640 | |
0b582e46 | 1641 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
1642 | if (options.gss_authentication) | |
1643 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_GSSAPI; | |
1644 | #endif | |
0b582e46 | 1645 | |
3c0ef626 | 1646 | if (options.password_authentication) |
1647 | auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD; | |
1648 | packet_put_int(auth_mask); | |
1649 | ||
1650 | /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */ | |
1651 | packet_send(); | |
1652 | packet_write_wait(); | |
1653 | ||
1654 | debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.", | |
1655 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), | |
1656 | BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); | |
1657 | ||
1658 | /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */ | |
1e608e42 | 1659 | packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); |
3c0ef626 | 1660 | |
1661 | /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */ | |
1662 | cipher_type = packet_get_char(); | |
1663 | ||
1664 | if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type))) | |
1665 | packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher."); | |
1666 | ||
1667 | /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we | |
1668 | sent earlier with the public key packet. */ | |
1669 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) | |
1670 | if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) | |
1671 | packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); | |
1672 | ||
1673 | debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); | |
1674 | ||
1675 | /* Get the encrypted integer. */ | |
1e608e42 | 1676 | if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL) |
1677 | fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed"); | |
1678 | packet_get_bignum(session_key_int); | |
3c0ef626 | 1679 | |
1680 | protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); | |
1681 | packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags); | |
1e608e42 | 1682 | packet_check_eom(); |
3c0ef626 | 1683 | |
2980ea68 | 1684 | /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */ |
1685 | rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int)); | |
1686 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1687 | /* |
1688 | * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the | |
1689 | * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the | |
1690 | * key is in the highest bits. | |
1691 | */ | |
1692 | if (!rsafail) { | |
1693 | BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); | |
1694 | len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); | |
1695 | if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) { | |
1696 | error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: " | |
1697 | "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", | |
1698 | get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key)); | |
1699 | rsafail++; | |
1700 | } else { | |
1701 | memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); | |
1702 | BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, | |
1703 | session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len); | |
1704 | ||
1705 | compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, | |
1706 | sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n, | |
1707 | sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); | |
1708 | /* | |
1709 | * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the | |
1710 | * session id. | |
1711 | */ | |
1712 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) | |
1713 | session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; | |
1714 | } | |
1715 | } | |
1716 | if (rsafail) { | |
1717 | int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); | |
1e608e42 | 1718 | u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes); |
3c0ef626 | 1719 | MD5_CTX md; |
1720 | ||
1721 | log("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key"); | |
1722 | BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf); | |
1723 | MD5_Init(&md); | |
1724 | MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); | |
1725 | MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); | |
1726 | MD5_Final(session_key, &md); | |
1727 | MD5_Init(&md); | |
1728 | MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16); | |
1729 | MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); | |
1730 | MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); | |
1731 | MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md); | |
1732 | memset(buf, 0, bytes); | |
1733 | xfree(buf); | |
1734 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) | |
1735 | session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; | |
1736 | } | |
0b582e46 | 1737 | |
0b582e46 | 1738 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
1739 | /* | |
1740 | * Before we destroy the host and server keys, hash them so we can | |
1741 | * send the hash over to the client via a secure channel so that it | |
1742 | * can verify them. | |
1743 | */ | |
1744 | { | |
1745 | MD5_CTX md5context; | |
1746 | Buffer buf; | |
1747 | unsigned char *data; | |
1748 | unsigned int data_len; | |
c3f0c567 | 1749 | extern unsigned char ssh1_key_digest[]; /* in gss-serv.c */ |
0b582e46 | 1750 | |
1751 | ||
1752 | debug("Calculating MD5 hash of server and host keys..."); | |
1753 | ||
1754 | /* Write all the keys to a temporary buffer */ | |
1755 | buffer_init(&buf); | |
1756 | ||
1757 | /* Server key */ | |
1758 | buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); | |
1759 | buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); | |
1760 | ||
1761 | /* Host key */ | |
1762 | buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e); | |
1763 | buffer_put_bignum(&buf, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n); | |
1764 | ||
1765 | /* Get the resulting data */ | |
1766 | data = (unsigned char *) buffer_ptr(&buf); | |
1767 | data_len = buffer_len(&buf); | |
1768 | ||
1769 | /* And hash it */ | |
1770 | MD5_Init(&md5context); | |
1771 | MD5_Update(&md5context, data, data_len); | |
c3f0c567 | 1772 | MD5_Final(ssh1_key_digest, &md5context); |
0b582e46 | 1773 | |
1774 | /* Clean up */ | |
1775 | buffer_clear(&buf); | |
1776 | buffer_free(&buf); | |
1777 | } | |
1778 | #endif /* GSSAPI */ | |
0b582e46 | 1779 | |
2980ea68 | 1780 | /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ |
3c0ef626 | 1781 | destroy_sensitive_data(); |
1782 | ||
2980ea68 | 1783 | if (use_privsep) |
1784 | mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); | |
1785 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1786 | /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */ |
1787 | BN_clear_free(session_key_int); | |
1788 | ||
1789 | /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */ | |
1790 | packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type); | |
1791 | ||
1792 | /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */ | |
1793 | memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); | |
1794 | ||
1795 | debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); | |
1796 | ||
1797 | /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ | |
1798 | packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); | |
1799 | packet_send(); | |
1800 | packet_write_wait(); | |
1801 | } | |
1802 | ||
1803 | /* | |
1804 | * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 | |
1805 | */ | |
1806 | static void | |
1807 | do_ssh2_kex(void) | |
1808 | { | |
1809 | Kex *kex; | |
1810 | ||
1811 | if (options.ciphers != NULL) { | |
1812 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = | |
1813 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; | |
1814 | } | |
1815 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = | |
1816 | compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); | |
1817 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = | |
1818 | compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); | |
1819 | ||
1820 | if (options.macs != NULL) { | |
1821 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = | |
1822 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; | |
1823 | } | |
1824 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); | |
1825 | ||
5598e598 | 1826 | #ifdef GSSAPI |
1827 | { | |
1828 | char *orig; | |
1829 | char *gss = NULL; | |
1830 | char *newstr = NULL; | |
1831 | orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; | |
1832 | ||
1833 | /* If we don't have a host key, then all of the algorithms | |
1834 | * currently in myproposal are useless */ | |
1835 | if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])==0) | |
1836 | orig= NULL; | |
1837 | ||
1838 | if (options.gss_keyex) | |
1839 | gss = ssh_gssapi_mechanisms(1,NULL); | |
1840 | else | |
1841 | gss = NULL; | |
1842 | ||
1843 | if (gss && orig) { | |
1844 | int len = strlen(orig) + strlen(gss) +2; | |
1845 | newstr=xmalloc(len); | |
1846 | snprintf(newstr,len,"%s,%s",gss,orig); | |
1847 | } else if (gss) { | |
1848 | newstr=gss; | |
1849 | } else if (orig) { | |
1850 | newstr=orig; | |
1851 | } | |
1852 | /* If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've also got the 'null' | |
1853 | host key algorithm, but we're not allowed to advertise it, unless | |
1854 | its the only host key algorithm we're supporting */ | |
1855 | if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) { | |
1856 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]="null"; | |
1857 | } | |
1858 | if (newstr) | |
1859 | myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]=newstr; | |
1860 | else | |
1861 | fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); | |
1862 | } | |
1863 | #endif | |
1864 | ||
3c0ef626 | 1865 | /* start key exchange */ |
1866 | kex = kex_setup(myproposal); | |
1867 | kex->server = 1; | |
1868 | kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; | |
1869 | kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; | |
1870 | kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type; | |
2980ea68 | 1871 | kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; |
3c0ef626 | 1872 | |
1873 | xxx_kex = kex; | |
1874 | ||
1875 | dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); | |
1876 | ||
1877 | session_id2 = kex->session_id; | |
1878 | session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; | |
1879 | ||
1880 | #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH | |
1881 | /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ | |
1882 | packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); | |
1883 | packet_put_cstring("markus"); | |
1884 | packet_send(); | |
1885 | packet_write_wait(); | |
1886 | #endif | |
1887 | debug("KEX done"); | |
1888 | } |