From 2e73a022769fe8381d733b1ad00d8a106708216f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: djm Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2000 00:46:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] - (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23 [ssh.c] accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13 [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c] rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash. do not move to libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it; oneill@cs.sfu.ca - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08 [scp.1 scp.c] -S prog support; tv@debian.org - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07 [scp.c] knf - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33 [log-client.c] shorten - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 12:48:11 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h] support for ~. in ssh2 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40 [crc32.h] proper prototype - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:34:44 [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1] [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile] [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h] add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups. (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:55:52 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c] more ~ support for ssh2 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 16:21:19 [clientloop.c] oops - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53 [session.c] We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process will exit. Only a problem for "UseLogin yes". - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59 [session.c] Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin is present. Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define. - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43 [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c] Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*(). We basically call setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin(). Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class. - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31 [session.c] Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus. --- ChangeLog | 55 ++++++ Makefile.in | 2 +- TODO | 2 + acconfig.h | 7 + auth1.c | 5 +- auth2.c | 5 +- authfd.c | 235 +++++++++++++++-------- authfd.h | 53 +++--- channels.c | 22 ++- channels.h | 14 +- clientloop.c | 340 +++++++++++++++++---------------- configure.in | 41 +++- crc32.c | 4 +- crc32.h | 4 +- deattack.c | 4 +- defines.h | 8 + fingerprint.c | 69 ------- fingerprint.h | 34 ---- key.c | 14 +- log-client.c | 5 +- packet.c | 8 +- scp.1 | 10 + scp.c | 137 ++++++-------- session.c | 120 ++++++++---- ssh-add.1 | 6 +- ssh-add.c | 81 ++++---- ssh-agent.1 | 11 +- ssh-agent.c | 514 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- ssh-keygen.c | 19 +- ssh.c | 28 ++- ssh.h | 10 +- sshconnect1.c | 40 ++-- sshconnect2.c | 78 ++++++-- 33 files changed, 1176 insertions(+), 809 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 fingerprint.c delete mode 100644 fingerprint.h diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 4463cf2b..9d3dd02e 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -3,6 +3,61 @@ Avoids "scp never exits" problem. Reports from Lutz Jaenicke and Tamito KAJIYAMA + - (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23 + [ssh.c] + accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13 + [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c] + rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash. do not move to + libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it; + oneill@cs.sfu.ca + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08 + [scp.1 scp.c] + -S prog support; tv@debian.org + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07 + [scp.c] + knf + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33 + [log-client.c] + shorten + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 12:48:11 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h] + support for ~. in ssh2 + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40 + [crc32.h] + proper prototype + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:34:44 + [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1] + [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile] + [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h] + add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups. + (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:55:52 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c] + more ~ support for ssh2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 16:21:19 + [clientloop.c] + oops + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53 + [session.c] + We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we + close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process + will exit. Only a problem for "UseLogin yes". + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59 + [session.c] + Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its + own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin + is present. Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define. + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43 + [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c] + Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*(). We basically call + setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin(). + Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class. + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31 + [session.c] + Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus. 20000818 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS changes: diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in index ff34c493..4ceef704 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@ TARGETS=ssh sshd ssh-add ssh-keygen ssh-agent scp $(EXTRA_TARGETS) -LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dispatch.o dsa.o fingerprint.o hmac.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o log.o match.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o util.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o +LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dispatch.o dsa.o hmac.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o log.o match.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o util.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o LIBOPENBSD_COMPAT_OBJS=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-base64.o bsd-bindresvport.o bsd-daemon.o bsd-inet_aton.o bsd-inet_ntoa.o bsd-misc.o bsd-mktemp.o bsd-rresvport.o bsd-setenv.o bsd-sigaction.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-strlcat.o bsd-strlcpy.o bsd-strsep.o fake-getaddrinfo.o fake-getnameinfo.o next-posix.o diff --git a/TODO b/TODO index 1d46ae1c..ecfd21e3 100644 --- a/TODO +++ b/TODO @@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ underlying shell. - utmp/wtmp logging does not work on NeXT + +- Complete Tru64 SIA support diff --git a/acconfig.h b/acconfig.h index 601dc16f..eeee4eaf 100644 --- a/acconfig.h +++ b/acconfig.h @@ -6,6 +6,13 @@ @TOP@ +/* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected) */ +/* from environment and PATH */ +#undef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK + +/* Define if your password has a pw_class field */ +#undef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD + /* Define if your socketpair() has bugs */ #undef USE_PIPES diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c index d8f2652e..b043e8a9 100644 --- a/auth1.c +++ b/auth1.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.2 2000/04/29 18:11:52 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.3 2000/08/20 18:42:40 millert Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "rsa.h" @@ -480,6 +480,9 @@ do_authentication() pwcopy.pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); pwcopy.pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; pwcopy.pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; +#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD + pwcopy.pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); +#endif pwcopy.pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); pwcopy.pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); pw = &pwcopy; diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c index 4926ff8a..7769046f 100644 --- a/auth2.c +++ b/auth2.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.12 2000/07/07 03:55:03 todd Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.13 2000/08/20 18:42:40 millert Exp $"); #include #include @@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ auth_set_user(char *u, char *s) copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; +#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD + copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); +#endif copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); authctxt->valid = 1; diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c index a34e111a..d9427d37 100644 --- a/authfd.c +++ b/authfd.c @@ -11,10 +11,13 @@ * * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent. * + * SSH2 implementation, + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.25 2000/08/19 21:34:42 markus Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" @@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $"); #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "kex.h" +#include "dsa.h" /* helper */ int decode_reply(int type); @@ -71,8 +75,7 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket() } int -ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - Buffer *request, Buffer *reply) +ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply) { int l, len; char buf[1024]; @@ -162,7 +165,6 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection() auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth)); auth->fd = sock; - buffer_init(&auth->packet); buffer_init(&auth->identities); auth->howmany = 0; @@ -175,46 +177,57 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection() */ void -ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *ac) +ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth) { - buffer_free(&ac->packet); - buffer_free(&ac->identities); - close(ac->fd); - xfree(ac); + buffer_free(&auth->identities); + close(auth->fd); + xfree(auth); } /* * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent. - * Returns true if an identity is available, 0 otherwise. - * The caller must initialize the integers before the call, and free the - * comment after a successful call (before calling ssh_get_next_identity). */ -int -ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment) +Key * +ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version) { + int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0; Buffer request; - int type; + + switch(version){ + case 1: + code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES; + code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; + break; + case 2: + code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES; + code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; + break; + default: + return NULL; + } /* * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the * identities it can represent. */ buffer_init(&request); - buffer_put_char(&request, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES); + buffer_put_char(&request, code1); buffer_clear(&auth->identities); if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) { buffer_free(&request); - return 0; + return NULL; } buffer_free(&request); /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */ type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities); - if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) + if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) { + return NULL; + } else if (type != code2) { fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type); + } /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */ auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); @@ -223,43 +236,49 @@ ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, auth->howmany); /* Return the first entry (if any). */ - return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, comment); + return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version); } -/* - * Returns the next authentication identity for the agent. Other functions - * can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this - * function. This returns 0 if there are no more identities. The caller - * must free comment after a successful return. - */ - -int -ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment) +Key * +ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version) { unsigned int bits; + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; + Key *key = NULL; /* Return failure if no more entries. */ if (auth->howmany <= 0) - return 0; + return NULL; /* * Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data. */ - bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); - buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, e); - buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, n); - *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); - - if (bits != BN_num_bits(n)) - log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u", - BN_num_bits(n), bits); - + switch(version){ + case 1: + key = key_new(KEY_RSA); + bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); + buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n); + *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); + if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) + log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u", + BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); + break; + case 2: + blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen); + *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); + key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + break; + default: + return NULL; + break; + } /* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */ auth->howmany--; - - return 1; + return key; } /* @@ -272,7 +291,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - BIGNUM* e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge, + Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge, unsigned char session_id[16], unsigned int response_type, unsigned char response[16]) @@ -282,15 +301,17 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int i; int type; - if (response_type == 0) - fatal("Compatibility with ssh protocol version " - "1.0 no longer supported."); - + if (key->type != KEY_RSA) + return 0; + if (response_type == 0) { + log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported."); + return 0; + } buffer_init(&buffer); buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE); - buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(n)); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, e); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, n); + buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n); buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge); buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16); buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type); @@ -318,6 +339,45 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, return success; } +/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */ +int +ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth, + Key *key, + unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp, + unsigned char *data, int datalen) +{ + Buffer msg; + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; + int type; + int ret = -1; + + if (dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) + return -1; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen); + xfree(blob); + + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return -1; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) { + log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key."); + } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { + fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type); + } else { + ret = 0; + *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp); + } + buffer_free(&msg); + return ret; +} + /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ void @@ -358,29 +418,29 @@ ssh_encode_identity_dsa(Buffer *b, DSA *key, const char *comment) int ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment) { - Buffer buffer; + Buffer msg; int type; - buffer_init(&buffer); + buffer_init(&msg); switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: - ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&buffer, key->rsa, comment); + ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&msg, key->rsa, comment); break; case KEY_DSA: - ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&buffer, key->dsa, comment); + ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&msg, key->dsa, comment); break; default: - buffer_free(&buffer); + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; break; } - if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { - buffer_free(&buffer); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } - type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); - buffer_free(&buffer); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } @@ -390,23 +450,35 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment) */ int -ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key) +ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key) { - Buffer buffer; + Buffer msg; int type; - - buffer_init(&buffer); - buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY); - buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->n)); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->e); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->n); - - if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { - buffer_free(&buffer); + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; + + buffer_init(&msg); + + if (key->type == KEY_RSA) { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n); + } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA) { + dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + } else { + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } - type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); - buffer_free(&buffer); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return 0; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } @@ -416,20 +488,23 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key) */ int -ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth) +ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version) { - Buffer buffer; + Buffer msg; int type; + int code = (version==1) ? + SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES : + SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES; - buffer_init(&buffer); - buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES); + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, code); - if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { - buffer_free(&buffer); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } - type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); - buffer_free(&buffer); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h index 14b9bee9..5819b913 100644 --- a/authfd.h +++ b/authfd.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ * */ -/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.9 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $"); */ +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.10 2000/08/19 21:34:43 markus Exp $"); */ #ifndef AUTHFD_H #define AUTHFD_H @@ -35,18 +35,16 @@ #define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12 #define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13 #define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14 -#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE SSH_AGENT_FAILURE -#define SSH2_AGENT_SUCCESS SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17 #define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18 #define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19 typedef struct { int fd; - Buffer packet; Buffer identities; int howmany; } AuthenticationConnection; + /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */ int ssh_get_authentication_socket(); @@ -69,44 +67,48 @@ AuthenticationConnection *ssh_get_authentication_connection(); * Closes the connection to the authentication agent and frees any associated * memory. */ -void ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection * ac); +void ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth); /* - * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent. Returns true - * if an identity is available, 0 otherwise. The caller must initialize the - * integers before the call, and free the comment after a successful call - * (before calling ssh_get_next_identity). + * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent or NULL if + * no identies are available. Caller must free comment and key. + * Note that you cannot mix calls with different versions. */ -int -ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, - BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n, char **comment); +Key *ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version); /* * Returns the next authentication identity for the agent. Other functions * can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this - * function. This returns 0 if there are no more identities. The caller - * must free comment after a successful return. + * function. This returns NULL if there are no more identities. The caller + * must free key and comment after a successful return. */ -int -ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, - BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n, char **comment); +Key *ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version); -/* Requests the agent to decrypt the given challenge. Returns true if - the agent claims it was able to decrypt it. */ +/* + * Requests the agent to decrypt the given challenge. Returns true if the + * agent claims it was able to decrypt it. + */ int -ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection * auth, - BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n, BIGNUM * challenge, +ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, + Key *key, BIGNUM * challenge, unsigned char session_id[16], unsigned int response_type, unsigned char response[16]); +/* Requests the agent to sign data using key */ +int +ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth, + Key *key, + unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp, + unsigned char *data, int datalen); + /* * Adds an identity to the authentication server. This call is not meant to * be used by normal applications. This returns true if the identity was * successfully added. */ int -ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, Key *key, +ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment); /* @@ -114,16 +116,13 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, Key *key, * meant to be used by normal applications. This returns true if the * identity was successfully added. */ -int ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, RSA * key); +int ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key); /* * Removes all identities from the authentication agent. This call is not * meant to be used by normal applications. This returns true if the * operation was successful. */ -int ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection * connection); - -/* Closes the connection to the authentication agent. */ -void ssh_close_authentication(AuthenticationConnection * connection); +int ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version); #endif /* AUTHFD_H */ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c index ea395293..c77f6b96 100644 --- a/channels.c +++ b/channels.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.64 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.66 2000/08/19 21:55:51 markus Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "packet.h" @@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, c->cb_arg = NULL; c->cb_event = 0; c->dettach_user = NULL; + c->input_filter = NULL; debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name); return found; } @@ -665,7 +666,14 @@ channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) } return -1; } - buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); + if(c->input_filter != NULL) { + if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) { + debug("filter stops channel %d", c->self); + chan_read_failed(c); + } + } else { + buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); + } } return 1; } @@ -2309,6 +2317,16 @@ channel_cancel_cleanup(int id) } c->dettach_user = NULL; } +void +channel_register_filter(int id, channel_filter_fn *fn) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { + log("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id); + return; + } + c->input_filter = fn; +} void channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage) diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h index 9629124b..9acdf581 100644 --- a/channels.h +++ b/channels.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.14 2000/06/20 01:39:40 markus Exp $"); */ +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.16 2000/08/19 21:55:51 markus Exp $"); */ #ifndef CHANNELS_H #define CHANNELS_H @@ -21,9 +21,13 @@ * Data structure for channel data. This is iniailized in channel_allocate * and cleared in channel_free. */ +struct Channel; +typedef struct Channel Channel; + typedef void channel_callback_fn(int id, void *arg); +typedef int channel_filter_fn(struct Channel *c, char *buf, int len); -typedef struct Channel { +struct Channel { int type; /* channel type/state */ int self; /* my own channel identifier */ int remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */ @@ -61,7 +65,10 @@ typedef struct Channel { void *cb_arg; int cb_event; channel_callback_fn *dettach_user; -} Channel; + + /* filter */ + channel_filter_fn *input_filter; +}; #define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0 #define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1 @@ -73,6 +80,7 @@ void channel_request(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm); void channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm); void channel_register_callback(int id, int mtype, channel_callback_fn *fn, void *arg); void channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn); +void channel_register_filter(int id, channel_filter_fn *fn); void channel_cancel_cleanup(int id); Channel *channel_lookup(int id); diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c index 67fa36d9..d339e127 100644 --- a/clientloop.c +++ b/clientloop.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.29 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.32 2000/08/19 22:21:19 markus Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.29 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $"); #include "channels.h" #include "dispatch.h" +#include "buffer.h" +#include "bufaux.h" + /* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */ extern int stdin_null_flag; @@ -60,6 +63,8 @@ static int in_raw_mode = 0; static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0; /* Common data for the client loop code. */ +static int quit_pending; /* Set to non-zero to quit the client loop. */ +static int escape_char; /* Escape character. */ static int escape_pending; /* Last character was the escape character */ static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */ static int exit_status; /* Used to store the exit status of the command. */ @@ -67,13 +72,11 @@ static int stdin_eof; /* EOF has been encountered on standard error. */ static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */ static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */ static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */ +static unsigned long stdin_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes; static unsigned int buffer_high;/* Soft max buffer size. */ static int max_fd; /* Maximum file descriptor number in select(). */ static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ -static unsigned long stdin_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes; -static int quit_pending; /* Set to non-zero to quit the client loop. */ -static int escape_char; /* Escape character. */ void client_init_dispatch(void); @@ -379,17 +382,15 @@ client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) } void -client_suspend_self() +client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr) { struct winsize oldws, newws; /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */ - if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) - atomicio(write, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), - buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); - if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) - atomicio(write, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), - buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); + if (buffer_len(bout) > 0) + atomicio(write, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(bout), buffer_len(bout)); + if (buffer_len(berr) > 0) + atomicio(write, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(berr), buffer_len(berr)); leave_raw_mode(); @@ -397,9 +398,9 @@ client_suspend_self() * Free (and clear) the buffer to reduce the amount of data that gets * written to swap. */ - buffer_free(&stdin_buffer); - buffer_free(&stdout_buffer); - buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); + buffer_free(bin); + buffer_free(bout); + buffer_free(berr); /* Save old window size. */ ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &oldws); @@ -416,9 +417,9 @@ client_suspend_self() received_window_change_signal = 1; /* OK, we have been continued by the user. Reinitialize buffers. */ - buffer_init(&stdin_buffer); - buffer_init(&stdout_buffer); - buffer_init(&stderr_buffer); + buffer_init(bin); + buffer_init(bout); + buffer_init(berr); enter_raw_mode(); } @@ -466,12 +467,155 @@ client_process_net_input(fd_set * readset) } } +/* process the characters one by one */ +int +process_escapes(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, char *buf, int len) +{ + char string[1024]; + pid_t pid; + int bytes = 0; + unsigned int i; + unsigned char ch; + char *s; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + /* Get one character at a time. */ + ch = buf[i]; + + if (escape_pending) { + /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ + /* Clear the flag now. */ + escape_pending = 0; + + /* Process the escaped character. */ + switch (ch) { + case '.': + /* Terminate the connection. */ + snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c.\r\n", escape_char); + buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); + /*stderr_bytes += strlen(string); XXX*/ + + quit_pending = 1; + return -1; + + case 'Z' - 64: + /* Suspend the program. */ + /* Print a message to that effect to the user. */ + snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", escape_char); + buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); + /*stderr_bytes += strlen(string); XXX*/ + + /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ + client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr); + + /* We have been continued. */ + continue; + + case '&': + /* XXX does not work yet with proto 2 */ + if (compat20) + continue; + /* + * Detach the program (continue to serve connections, + * but put in background and no more new connections). + */ + if (!stdin_eof) { + /* + * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not always appear + * to be enough. So we try to send an EOF character + * first. + */ + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); + packet_put_string("\004", 1); + packet_send(); + /* Close stdin. */ + stdin_eof = 1; + if (buffer_len(bin) == 0) { + packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); + packet_send(); + } + } + /* Restore tty modes. */ + leave_raw_mode(); + + /* Stop listening for new connections. */ + channel_stop_listening(); + + printf("%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char); + + /* Fork into background. */ + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) { + error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */ + /* The parent just exits. */ + exit(0); + } + /* The child continues serving connections. */ + continue; /*XXX ? */ + + case '?': + snprintf(string, sizeof string, +"%c?\r\n\ +Supported escape sequences:\r\n\ +~. - terminate connection\r\n\ +~^Z - suspend ssh\r\n\ +~# - list forwarded connections\r\n\ +~& - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)\r\n\ +~? - this message\r\n\ +~~ - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n\ +(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after newline.)\r\n", + escape_char); + buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); + continue; + + case '#': + snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c#\r\n", escape_char); + buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); + s = channel_open_message(); + buffer_append(berr, s, strlen(s)); + xfree(s); + continue; + + default: + if (ch != escape_char) { + buffer_put_char(bin, escape_char); + bytes++; + } + /* Escaped characters fall through here */ + break; + } + } else { + /* + * The previous character was not an escape char. Check if this + * is an escape. + */ + if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) { + /* It is. Set the flag and continue to next character. */ + escape_pending = 1; + continue; + } + } + + /* + * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline, + * and append it to the buffer. + */ + last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n'); + buffer_put_char(bin, ch); + bytes++; + } + return bytes; +} + void client_process_input(fd_set * readset) { + int ret; int len; - pid_t pid; - char buf[8192], *s; + char buf[8192]; /* Read input from stdin. */ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) { @@ -513,145 +657,10 @@ client_process_input(fd_set * readset) * Normal, successful read. But we have an escape character * and have to process the characters one by one. */ - unsigned int i; - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - unsigned char ch; - /* Get one character at a time. */ - ch = buf[i]; - - if (escape_pending) { - /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ - /* Clear the flag now. */ - escape_pending = 0; - /* Process the escaped character. */ - switch (ch) { - case '.': - /* Terminate the connection. */ - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%c.\r\n", escape_char); - buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); - stderr_bytes += strlen(buf); - quit_pending = 1; - return; - - case 'Z' - 64: - /* Suspend the program. */ - /* Print a message to that effect to the user. */ - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%c^Z\r\n", escape_char); - buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); - stderr_bytes += strlen(buf); - - /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ - client_suspend_self(); - - /* We have been continued. */ - continue; - - case '&': - /* - * Detach the program (continue to serve connections, - * but put in background and no more new connections). - */ - if (!stdin_eof) { - /* - * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not always appear - * to be enough. So we try to send an EOF character - * first. - */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); - packet_put_string("\004", 1); - packet_send(); - /* Close stdin. */ - stdin_eof = 1; - if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); - packet_send(); - } - } - /* Restore tty modes. */ - leave_raw_mode(); - - /* Stop listening for new connections. */ - channel_stop_listening(); - - printf("%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char); - - /* Fork into background. */ - pid = fork(); - if (pid < 0) { - error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - continue; - } - if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */ - /* The parent just exits. */ - exit(0); - } - /* The child continues serving connections. */ - continue; - - case '?': - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, -"%c?\r\n\ -Supported escape sequences:\r\n\ -~. - terminate connection\r\n\ -~^Z - suspend ssh\r\n\ -~# - list forwarded connections\r\n\ -~& - background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)\r\n\ -~? - this message\r\n\ -~~ - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n\ -(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after newline.)\r\n", - escape_char); - buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); - continue; - - case '#': - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%c#\r\n", escape_char); - buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); - s = channel_open_message(); - buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s)); - xfree(s); - continue; - - default: - if (ch != escape_char) { - /* - * Escape character followed by non-special character. - * Append both to the input buffer. - */ - buf[0] = escape_char; - buf[1] = ch; - buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 2); - stdin_bytes += 2; - continue; - } - /* - * Note that escape character typed twice - * falls through here; the latter gets processed - * as a normal character below. - */ - break; - } - } else { - /* - * The previous character was not an escape char. Check if this - * is an escape. - */ - if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) { - /* It is. Set the flag and continue to next character. */ - escape_pending = 1; - continue; - } - } - - /* - * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline, - * and append it to the buffer. - */ - last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n'); - buf[0] = ch; - buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 1); - stdin_bytes += 1; - continue; - } + ret = process_escapes(&stdin_buffer, &stdout_buffer, &stderr_buffer, buf, len); + if (ret == -1) + return; + stdout_bytes += ret; } } } @@ -722,6 +731,15 @@ client_process_buffered_input_packets() dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending); } +/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */ + +int +simple_escape_filter(Channel *c, char *buf, int len) +{ + /* XXX we assume c->extended is writeable */ + return process_escapes(&c->input, &c->output, &c->extended, buf, len); +} + /* * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the @@ -730,7 +748,7 @@ client_process_buffered_input_packets() */ int -client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg) +client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) { extern Options options; double start_time, total_time; @@ -780,6 +798,9 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg) if (!compat20) client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(); + if (compat20 && escape_char != -1) + channel_register_filter(ssh2_chan_id, simple_escape_filter); + /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ while (!quit_pending) { fd_set readset, writeset; @@ -989,6 +1010,7 @@ client_input_channel_open(int type, int plen) /* XXX move to channels.c */ sock = x11_connect_display(); if (sock >= 0) { +/*XXX MAXPACK */ id = channel_new("x11", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 4*1024, 32*1024, 0, xstrdup("x11")); diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in index f048b000..02287b80 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in @@ -14,6 +14,17 @@ AC_SUBST(PERL) AC_PATH_PROG(ENT, ent) AC_SUBST(ENT) +# Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible +if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK, "$LOGIN_PROGRAM") +else + # Search for login + AC_PATH_PROG(LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK, login) + if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" ; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK, "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK") + fi +fi + if test -z "$LD" ; then LD=$CC fi @@ -225,18 +236,18 @@ if test -z "$no_libnsl" ; then fi # Checks for header files. -AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bstring.h endian.h floatingpoint.h lastlog.h limits.h login.h maillock.h netdb.h netgroup.h netinet/in_systm.h paths.h poll.h pty.h shadow.h security/pam_appl.h sys/bitypes.h sys/bsdtty.h sys/cdefs.h sys/poll.h sys/select.h sys/stat.h sys/stropts.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/time.h sys/ttcompat.h stddef.h time.h ttyent.h usersec.h util.h utmp.h utmpx.h) +AC_CHECK_HEADERS(bstring.h endian.h floatingpoint.h lastlog.h limits.h login.h login_cap.h maillock.h netdb.h netgroup.h netinet/in_systm.h paths.h poll.h pty.h shadow.h security/pam_appl.h sys/bitypes.h sys/bsdtty.h sys/cdefs.h sys/poll.h sys/select.h sys/stat.h sys/stropts.h sys/sysmacros.h sys/time.h sys/ttcompat.h stddef.h time.h ttyent.h usersec.h util.h utmp.h utmpx.h) -# Checks for library functions. -AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random atexit b64_ntop bcopy bindresvport_af clock freeaddrinfo gai_strerror getaddrinfo getnameinfo getrusage getttyent inet_aton inet_ntoa innetgr md5_crypt memmove mkdtemp on_exit openpty rresvport_af setenv seteuid setlogin setproctitle setreuid sigaction sigvec snprintf strerror strlcat strlcpy strsep vsnprintf vhangup _getpty __b64_ntop) -dnl checks for time functions +dnl Checks for library functions. +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random atexit b64_ntop bcopy bindresvport_af clock freeaddrinfo gai_strerror getaddrinfo getnameinfo getrusage getttyent inet_aton inet_ntoa innetgr login_getcapbool md5_crypt memmove mkdtemp on_exit openpty rresvport_af setenv seteuid setlogin setproctitle setreuid sigaction sigvec snprintf strerror strlcat strlcpy strsep vsnprintf vhangup _getpty __b64_ntop) +dnl Checks for time functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS(gettimeofday time) -dnl checks for libutil functions +dnl Checks for libutil functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS(login logout updwtmp logwtmp) -dnl checks for utmp functions +dnl Checks for utmp functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS(entutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent) AC_CHECK_FUNCS(utmpname) -dnl checks for utmpx functions +dnl Checks for utmpx functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS(entutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline pututxline ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setutxent utmpxname) @@ -736,6 +747,22 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) fi +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pw_class field in struct passwd], + ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd, [ + AC_TRY_COMPILE( + [ +#include +#include + ], + [ struct passwd p s; p.pw_class = NULL; ], + [ ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_pw_class_in_struct_passwd" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD) +fi + AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [ AC_TRY_LINK([], diff --git a/crc32.c b/crc32.c index 05a1af7b..eb9b2dcd 100644 --- a/crc32.c +++ b/crc32.c @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: crc32.c,v 1.5 2000/06/20 01:39:40 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: crc32.c,v 1.6 2000/08/19 02:17:12 deraadt Exp $"); #include "crc32.h" @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static unsigned int crc32_tab[] = { /* Return a 32-bit CRC of the contents of the buffer. */ unsigned int -crc32(const unsigned char *s, unsigned int len) +ssh_crc32(const unsigned char *s, unsigned int len) { unsigned int i; unsigned int crc32val; diff --git a/crc32.h b/crc32.h index 45495b42..2c84a801 100644 --- a/crc32.h +++ b/crc32.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ * */ -/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: crc32.h,v 1.6 2000/06/20 01:39:40 markus Exp $"); */ +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: crc32.h,v 1.7 2000/08/19 21:29:40 deraadt Exp $"); */ #ifndef CRC32_H #define CRC32_H @@ -22,6 +22,6 @@ * This computes a 32 bit CRC of the data in the buffer, and returns the CRC. * The polynomial used is 0xedb88320. */ -unsigned int crc32(const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len); +unsigned int ssh_crc32(const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len); #endif /* CRC32_H */ diff --git a/deattack.c b/deattack.c index 7f95eca3..72e7f1e0 100644 --- a/deattack.c +++ b/deattack.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.7 2000/06/20 01:39:41 markus Exp $ + * $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.8 2000/08/19 02:17:12 deraadt Exp $ * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code * * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina. @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ void crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b) { b ^= *a; - *a = crc32((unsigned char *) &b, sizeof(b)); + *a = ssh_crc32((unsigned char *) &b, sizeof(b)); } /* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */ diff --git a/defines.h b/defines.h index cd322f9b..1fe74a92 100644 --- a/defines.h +++ b/defines.h @@ -246,8 +246,16 @@ typedef int mode_t; # endif /* RSH_PATH */ #endif /* _PATH_RSH */ +#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN +# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" +#endif + /* Macros */ +#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H) +# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP +#endif + #ifndef MAX # define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) # define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b)) diff --git a/fingerprint.c b/fingerprint.c deleted file mode 100644 index 801f6a6e..00000000 --- a/fingerprint.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,69 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * This product includes software developed by Markus Friedl. - * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, - * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: fingerprint.c,v 1.7 2000/06/20 01:39:41 markus Exp $"); - -#include "ssh.h" -#include "xmalloc.h" -#include - -#define FPRINT "%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x" - -/* - * Generate key fingerprint in ascii format. - * Based on ideas and code from Bjoern Groenvall - */ -char * -fingerprint(BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n) -{ - static char retval[80]; - MD5_CTX md; - unsigned char d[16]; - unsigned char *buf; - int nlen, elen; - - nlen = BN_num_bytes(n); - elen = BN_num_bytes(e); - - buf = xmalloc(nlen + elen); - - BN_bn2bin(n, buf); - BN_bn2bin(e, buf + nlen); - - MD5_Init(&md); - MD5_Update(&md, buf, nlen + elen); - MD5_Final(d, &md); - snprintf(retval, sizeof(retval), FPRINT, - d[0], d[1], d[2], d[3], d[4], d[5], d[6], d[7], - d[8], d[9], d[10], d[11], d[12], d[13], d[14], d[15]); - memset(buf, 0, nlen + elen); - xfree(buf); - return retval; -} diff --git a/fingerprint.h b/fingerprint.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3d7bcb32..00000000 --- a/fingerprint.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * This product includes software developed by Markus Friedl. - * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, - * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ -/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: fingerprint.h,v 1.4 2000/06/20 01:39:41 markus Exp $"); */ - -#ifndef FINGERPRINT_H -#define FINGERPRINT_H -char *fingerprint(BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n); -#endif diff --git a/key.c b/key.c index 764f1f22..f2ce75e7 100644 --- a/key.c +++ b/key.c @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ #include "dsa.h" #include "uuencode.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.9 2000/06/22 23:55:00 djm Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.10 2000/08/19 21:34:43 markus Exp $"); #define SSH_DSS "ssh-dss" @@ -335,3 +335,15 @@ key_type(Key *k) } return "unknown"; } +unsigned int +key_size(Key *k){ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n); + break; + case KEY_DSA: + return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p); + break; + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/log-client.c b/log-client.c index 7e9fd61e..7615a94f 100644 --- a/log-client.c +++ b/log-client.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: log-client.c,v 1.9 2000/06/20 01:39:42 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: log-client.c,v 1.10 2000/08/19 02:57:33 deraadt Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" @@ -57,6 +57,5 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args) if (level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG) fprintf(stderr, "debug: "); vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args); - fprintf(stderr, "%s", msgbuf); - fprintf(stderr, "\r\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "%s\r\n", msgbuf); } diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c index 56080cbb..8f931107 100644 --- a/packet.c +++ b/packet.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.33 2000/06/20 01:39:43 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.34 2000/08/19 02:17:12 deraadt Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" @@ -479,8 +479,8 @@ packet_send1() buffer_consume(&outgoing_packet, 8 - padding); /* Add check bytes. */ - checksum = crc32((unsigned char *) buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet), - buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)); + checksum = ssh_crc32((unsigned char *) buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet), + buffer_len(&outgoing_packet)); PUT_32BIT(buf, checksum); buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 4); @@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(int *payload_len_ptr) #endif /* Compute packet checksum. */ - checksum = crc32((unsigned char *) buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet), + checksum = ssh_crc32((unsigned char *) buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet), buffer_len(&incoming_packet) - 4); /* Skip padding. */ diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1 index 60466cff..54ca0f4b 100644 --- a/scp.1 +++ b/scp.1 @@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ This option is directly passed to .It Fl p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original file. +.It Fl S +Name of program to use for the encrypted connection. +The program must understand +.Xr ssh 1 +options. .It Fl r Recursively copy entire directories. .It Fl v @@ -98,6 +103,11 @@ because .Fl p is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file in .Xr rcp 1 . +.It Fl S +Name of program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must +understand +.Xr ssh 1 +options. .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c index 02feba9c..d2e4224b 100644 --- a/scp.c +++ b/scp.c @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ */ /* + * Parts from: + * * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * @@ -45,7 +47,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.33 2000/07/13 23:19:31 provos Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.35 2000/08/19 02:50:07 deraadt Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -69,6 +71,7 @@ void progressmeter(int); /* Returns width of the terminal (for progress meter calculations). */ int getttywidth(void); +int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc); /* Time a transfer started. */ static struct timeval start; @@ -111,6 +114,9 @@ char *identity = NULL; /* This is the port to use in contacting the remote site (is non-NULL). */ char *port = NULL; +/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */ +char *ssh_program = SSH_PROGRAM; + /* * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This @@ -118,13 +124,13 @@ char *port = NULL; */ int -do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout) +do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, int argc) { int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2]; if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Executing: host %s, user %s, command %s\n", - host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); + host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); /* * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get @@ -144,7 +150,7 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout) /* For a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ if (fork() == 0) { - char *args[100]; + char *args[100]; /* XXX careful */ unsigned int i; /* Child. */ @@ -156,7 +162,7 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout) close(pout[1]); i = 0; - args[i++] = SSH_PROGRAM; + args[i++] = ssh_program; args[i++] = "-x"; args[i++] = "-oFallBackToRsh no"; if (IPv4) @@ -189,8 +195,8 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout) args[i++] = cmd; args[i++] = NULL; - execvp(SSH_PROGRAM, args); - perror(SSH_PROGRAM); + execvp(ssh_program, args); + perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */ @@ -214,8 +220,6 @@ fatal(const char *fmt,...) exit(255); } -/* This stuff used to be in BSD rcp extern.h. */ - typedef struct { int cnt; char *buf; @@ -231,8 +235,6 @@ int okname(char *); void run_err(const char *,...); void verifydir(char *); -/* Stuff from BSD rcp.c continues. */ - struct passwd *pwd; uid_t userid; int errs, remin, remout; @@ -260,7 +262,7 @@ main(argc, argv) extern int optind; fflag = tflag = 0; - while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfprtvBCc:i:P:q46")) != EOF) + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfprtvBCc:i:P:q46S")) != EOF) switch (ch) { /* User-visible flags. */ case '4': @@ -278,6 +280,10 @@ main(argc, argv) case 'r': iamrecursive = 1; break; + case 'S': + ssh_program = optarg; + break; + /* Server options. */ case 'd': targetshouldbedirectory = 1; @@ -343,8 +349,8 @@ main(argc, argv) remin = remout = -1; /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */ (void) sprintf(cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s", verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", - iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", - targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); + iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", + targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); @@ -401,9 +407,9 @@ toremote(targ, argc, argv) if (*src == 0) src = "."; host = strchr(argv[i], '@'); - len = strlen(SSH_PROGRAM) + strlen(argv[i]) + - strlen(src) + (tuser ? strlen(tuser) : 0) + - strlen(thost) + strlen(targ) + CMDNEEDS + 32; + len = strlen(ssh_program) + strlen(argv[i]) + + strlen(src) + (tuser ? strlen(tuser) : 0) + + strlen(thost) + strlen(targ) + CMDNEEDS + 32; bp = xmalloc(len); if (host) { *host++ = 0; @@ -414,19 +420,19 @@ toremote(targ, argc, argv) else if (!okname(suser)) continue; (void) sprintf(bp, - "%s%s -x -o'FallBackToRsh no' -n -l %s %s %s %s '%s%s%s:%s'", - SSH_PROGRAM, verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", - suser, host, cmd, src, - tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", - thost, targ); + "%s%s -x -o'FallBackToRsh no' -n -l %s %s %s %s '%s%s%s:%s'", + ssh_program, verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", + suser, host, cmd, src, + tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", + thost, targ); } else { host = cleanhostname(argv[i]); (void) sprintf(bp, - "exec %s%s -x -o'FallBackToRsh no' -n %s %s %s '%s%s%s:%s'", - SSH_PROGRAM, verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", - host, cmd, src, - tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", - thost, targ); + "exec %s%s -x -o'FallBackToRsh no' -n %s %s %s '%s%s%s:%s'", + ssh_program, verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", + host, cmd, src, + tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", + thost, targ); } if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Executing: %s\n", bp); @@ -438,8 +444,8 @@ toremote(targ, argc, argv) bp = xmalloc(len); (void) sprintf(bp, "%s -t %s", cmd, targ); host = cleanhostname(thost); - if (do_cmd(host, tuser, - bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) + if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin, + &remout, argc) < 0) exit(1); if (response() < 0) exit(1); @@ -461,11 +467,11 @@ tolocal(argc, argv) for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { if (!(src = colon(argv[i]))) { /* Local to local. */ len = strlen(_PATH_CP) + strlen(argv[i]) + - strlen(argv[argc - 1]) + 20; + strlen(argv[argc - 1]) + 20; bp = xmalloc(len); (void) sprintf(bp, "exec %s%s%s %s %s", _PATH_CP, - iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", - argv[i], argv[argc - 1]); + iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", + argv[i], argv[argc - 1]); if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Executing: %s\n", bp); if (system(bp)) @@ -491,7 +497,7 @@ tolocal(argc, argv) len = strlen(src) + CMDNEEDS + 20; bp = xmalloc(len); (void) sprintf(bp, "%s -f %s", cmd, src); - if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) { + if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout, argc) < 0) { (void) xfree(bp); ++errs; continue; @@ -548,8 +554,8 @@ syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); * versions expecting microseconds. */ (void) sprintf(buf, "T%lu 0 %lu 0\n", - (unsigned long) stb.st_mtime, - (unsigned long) stb.st_atime); + (unsigned long) stb.st_mtime, + (unsigned long) stb.st_atime); (void) atomicio(write, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); if (response() < 0) goto next; @@ -626,8 +632,8 @@ rsource(name, statp) last++; if (pflag) { (void) sprintf(path, "T%lu 0 %lu 0\n", - (unsigned long) statp->st_mtime, - (unsigned long) statp->st_atime); + (unsigned long) statp->st_mtime, + (unsigned long) statp->st_atime); (void) atomicio(write, remout, path, strlen(path)); if (response() < 0) { closedir(dirp); @@ -635,8 +641,7 @@ rsource(name, statp) } } (void) sprintf(path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n", - (unsigned int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), - 0, last); + (unsigned int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last); if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path); (void) atomicio(write, remout, path, strlen(path)); @@ -783,7 +788,7 @@ sink(argc, argv) if (need > cursize) namebuf = xmalloc(need); (void) sprintf(namebuf, "%s%s%s", targ, - *targ ? "/" : "", cp); + *targ ? "/" : "", cp); np = namebuf; } else np = targ; @@ -954,8 +959,9 @@ response() void usage() { - (void) fprintf(stderr, - "usage: scp [-pqrvC46] [-P port] [-c cipher] [-i identity] f1 f2; or:\n scp [options] f1 ... fn directory\n"); + (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: scp " + "[-pqrvC46] [-S ssh] [-P port] [-c cipher] [-i identity] f1 f2; or:\n" + " scp [options] f1 ... fn directory\n"); exit(1); } @@ -984,43 +990,6 @@ run_err(const char *fmt,...) } } -/* Stuff below is from BSD rcp util.c. */ - -/*- - * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 - * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * This product includes software developed by the University of - * California, Berkeley and its contributors. - * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors - * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.33 2000/07/13 23:19:31 provos Exp $ - */ - char * colon(cp) char *cp; @@ -1097,7 +1066,7 @@ allocbuf(bp, fd, blksize) size = blksize; else size = blksize + (stb.st_blksize - blksize % stb.st_blksize) % - stb.st_blksize; + stb.st_blksize; if (bp->cnt >= size) return (bp); if (bp->buf == NULL) @@ -1228,14 +1197,14 @@ progressmeter(int flag) i = remaining / 3600; if (i) snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), - "%2d:", i); + "%2d:", i); else snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), - " "); + " "); i = remaining % 3600; snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), - "%02d:%02d%s", i / 60, i % 60, - (flag != 1) ? " ETA" : " "); + "%02d:%02d%s", i / 60, i % 60, + (flag != 1) ? " ETA" : " "); } atomicio(write, fileno(stdout), buf, strlen(buf)); diff --git a/session.c b/session.c index d65b0698..82096c3a 100644 --- a/session.c +++ b/session.c @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.25 2000/08/17 20:06:34 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.29 2000/08/21 16:23:31 millert Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" @@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.25 2000/08/17 20:06:34 markus Exp $"); # define S_UNOFILE_HARD S_UNOFILE "_hard" #endif +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP +#include +#endif + /* types */ #define TTYSZ 64 @@ -117,6 +121,10 @@ Session sessions[MAX_SESSIONS]; char *aixloginmsg; #endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP +static login_cap_t *lc; +#endif + /* * Remove local Xauthority file. */ @@ -200,6 +208,13 @@ do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw) s = session_new(); s->pw = pw; +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) { + error("unable to get login class"); + return; + } +#endif + /* * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell * or a command. @@ -650,7 +665,11 @@ do_login(Session *s) /* Done if .hushlogin exists. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0) +#else if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) +#endif return; #ifdef USE_PAM @@ -677,7 +696,12 @@ do_login(Session *s) printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, buf); } if (options.print_motd) { +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd", + "/etc/motd"), "r"); +#else f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r"); +#endif if (f) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stdout); @@ -887,10 +911,10 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term, const char *display, const char *auth_proto, const char *auth_data, const char *ttyname) { - const char *shell, *cp = NULL; + const char *shell, *hostname, *cp = NULL; char buf[256]; char cmd[1024]; - FILE *f; + FILE *f = NULL; unsigned int envsize, i; char **env; extern char **environ; @@ -905,24 +929,26 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term, options.use_login = 0; #ifndef USE_PAM /* pam_nologin handles this */ - f = fopen("/etc/nologin", "r"); - if (f) { - /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents and exit. */ - while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) - fputs(buf, stderr); - fclose(f); - if (pw->pw_uid != 0) + if (!options.use_login) { +# ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (!login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) && pw->pw_uid) + f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", _PATH_NOLOGIN, + _PATH_NOLOGIN), "r"); +# else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ + if (pw->pw_uid) + f = fopen(_PATH_NOLOGIN, "r"); +# endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ + if (f) { + /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents and exit. */ + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) + fputs(buf, stderr); + fclose(f); exit(254); + } } #endif /* USE_PAM */ -#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA - /* Set login name in the kernel. */ - if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) - error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); -#endif - - /* Set uid, gid, and groups. */ + /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */ /* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. */ if (!options.use_login) { @@ -943,10 +969,18 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term, } #else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { -#if defined(HAVE_GETUSERATTR) +# ifdef HAVE_GETUSERATTR set_limits_from_userattr(pw->pw_name); -#endif /* defined(HAVE_GETUSERATTR) */ - +# endif /* HAVE_GETUSERATTR */ +# ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, + (LOGIN_SETALL & ~LOGIN_SETPATH)) < 0) { + perror("unable to set user context"); + exit(1); + } +# else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ + if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) + error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("setgid"); exit(1); @@ -957,38 +991,39 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term, exit(1); } endgrent(); - -#ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY +# ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY /* initialize array session */ if (newarraysess() != 0) fatal("Failed to set up new array session: %.100s", strerror(errno)); -#endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */ - -#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT +# endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */ +# ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT /* initialize irix project info */ if ((projid = getdfltprojuser(pw->pw_name)) == -1) { debug("Failed to get project id, using projid 0"); projid = 0; } - if (setprid(projid)) fatal("Failed to initialize project %d for %s: %.100s", (int)projid, pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); -#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ - +# endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ permanently_set_uid(pw->pw_uid); +# endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ } +#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ + if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) fatal("Failed to set uids to %d.", (int) pw->pw_uid); -#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ } /* * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is * legal, and means /bin/sh. */ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); +#endif #ifdef AFS /* Try to get AFS tokens for the local cell. */ @@ -1012,7 +1047,12 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term, child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH")); +#else child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); +#endif snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); @@ -1096,6 +1136,9 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term, for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]); } + /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */ + if (options.use_login) + hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(); /* * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important @@ -1132,9 +1175,14 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term, close(i); /* Change current directory to the user\'s home directory. */ - if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) + if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno)); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0)) + exit(1); +#endif + } /* * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc and @@ -1252,8 +1300,7 @@ do_child(const char *command, struct passwd * pw, const char *term, } else { /* Launch login(1). */ - execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", - "-h", get_remote_name_or_ip(), + execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname, "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, NULL); /* Login couldn't be executed, die. */ @@ -1790,6 +1837,8 @@ session_proctitle(Session *s) void do_authenticated2(void) { + struct passwd *pw; + /* * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for * authentication. @@ -1799,6 +1848,13 @@ do_authenticated2(void) close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = -1; } +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + pw = auth_get_user(); + if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) { + error("unable to get login class"); + return; + } +#endif server_loop2(); if (xauthfile) xauthfile_cleanup_proc(NULL); diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1 index 5fe73a9c..b5dae10d 100644 --- a/ssh-add.1 +++ b/ssh-add.1 @@ -16,14 +16,14 @@ .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-add -.Nd adds RSA identities for the authentication agent +.Nd adds RSA or DSA identities for the authentication agent .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-add .Op Fl lLdD .Op Ar .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm -adds RSA identities to the authentication agent, +adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent, .Xr ssh-agent 1 . When run without arguments, it adds the file .Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity . @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ used to encrypt the private part of this file. This is the default file added by .Nm when no other files have been specified. +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa +Contains the DSA authentication identity of the user. .Pp .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Bl -tag -width Ds diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c index 482229c2..a51f477a 100644 --- a/ssh-add.c +++ b/ssh-add.c @@ -4,18 +4,21 @@ * All rights reserved * Created: Thu Apr 6 00:52:24 1995 ylo * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity. + * + * SSH2 implementation, + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.18 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.19 2000/08/19 21:34:43 markus Exp $"); +#include #include #include #include "rsa.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "xmalloc.h" -#include "fingerprint.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" @@ -37,7 +40,7 @@ delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename) printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno)); return; } - if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, public->rsa)) + if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, public)) fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", filename); @@ -45,11 +48,18 @@ delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename) xfree(comment); } +/* Send a request to remove all identities. */ void delete_all(AuthenticationConnection *ac) { - /* Send a request to remove all identities. */ - if (ssh_remove_all_identities(ac)) + int success = 1; + + if (!ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 1)) + success = 0; + /* ignore error-code for ssh2 */ + ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 2); + + if (success) fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identitities.\n"); @@ -96,6 +106,7 @@ ssh_askpass(char *askpass, char *msg) void add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename) { + struct stat st; Key *public; Key *private; char *saved_comment, *comment, *askpass = NULL; @@ -104,6 +115,10 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename) int interactive = isatty(STDIN_FILENO); int type = KEY_RSA; + if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) { + perror(filename); + exit(1); + } /* * try to load the public key. right now this only works for RSA, * since DSA keys are fully encrypted @@ -154,54 +169,40 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename) strlcpy(msg, "Bad passphrase, try again", sizeof msg); } } - xfree(saved_comment); - - if (ssh_add_identity(ac, private, comment)) - fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); + xfree(comment); + if (ssh_add_identity(ac, private, saved_comment)) + fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, saved_comment); else fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename); key_free(private); - xfree(comment); + xfree(saved_comment); } void list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int fp) { - BIGNUM *e, *n; - int status; + Key *key; char *comment; - int had_identities; + int had_identities = 0; + int version; - e = BN_new(); - n = BN_new(); - had_identities = 0; - for (status = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, e, n, &comment); - status; - status = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, e, n, &comment)) { - unsigned int bits = BN_num_bits(n); - had_identities = 1; - if (fp) { - printf("%d %s %s\n", bits, fingerprint(e, n), comment); - } else { - char *ebuf, *nbuf; - ebuf = BN_bn2dec(e); - if (ebuf == NULL) { - error("list_identities: BN_bn2dec(e) failed."); + for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) { + for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, version); + key != NULL; + key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) { + had_identities = 1; + if (fp) { + printf("%d %s %s\n", + key_size(key), key_fingerprint(key), comment); } else { - nbuf = BN_bn2dec(n); - if (nbuf == NULL) { - error("list_identities: BN_bn2dec(n) failed."); - } else { - printf("%d %s %s %s\n", bits, ebuf, nbuf, comment); - free(nbuf); - } - free(ebuf); + if (!key_write(key, stdout)) + fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed"); + fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", comment); } + key_free(key); + xfree(comment); } - xfree(comment); } - BN_clear_free(e); - BN_clear_free(n); if (!had_identities) printf("The agent has no identities.\n"); } @@ -225,6 +226,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) __progname); exit(1); } + SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + /* At first, get a connection to the authentication agent. */ ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); if (ac == NULL) { diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1 index 47b1e5cc..0aa1ecf4 100644 --- a/ssh-agent.1 +++ b/ssh-agent.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.13 2000/07/06 04:06:56 aaron Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.14 2000/08/19 21:34:43 markus Exp $ .\" .\" -*- nroff -*- .\" @@ -27,14 +27,15 @@ .Oc .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm -is a program to hold private keys used for RSA authentication. +is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication +(RSA, DSA). The idea is that .Nm is started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent program. Through use of environment variables the agent can be located -and automatically used for RSA authentication when logging in to other +and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines using .Xr ssh 1 . .Pp @@ -128,7 +129,9 @@ This file is not used by but is normally added to the agent using .Xr ssh-add 1 at login time. -.It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXX/agent. , +.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa +Contains the DSA authentication identity of the user. +.Pq Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent. , Unix-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by the owner. diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c index e8383b5d..56b81a78 100644 --- a/ssh-agent.c +++ b/ssh-agent.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.32 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.33 2000/08/19 21:34:43 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ * All rights reserved * Created: Wed Mar 29 03:46:59 1995 ylo * The authentication agent program. + * + * SSH2 implementation, + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.32 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.33 2000/08/19 21:34:43 markus Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" @@ -20,11 +23,14 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.32 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $"); #include "getput.h" #include "mpaux.h" +#include #include #include #include #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" +#include "dsa.h" +#include "kex.h" typedef struct { int fd; @@ -39,12 +45,17 @@ unsigned int sockets_alloc = 0; SocketEntry *sockets = NULL; typedef struct { - RSA *key; + Key *key; char *comment; } Identity; -unsigned int num_identities = 0; -Identity *identities = NULL; +typedef struct { + int nentries; + Identity *identities; +} Idtab; + +/* private key table, one per protocol version */ +Idtab idtable[3]; int max_fd = 0; @@ -62,175 +73,243 @@ static const char *__progname = "ssh-agent"; #endif /* HAVE___PROGNAME */ void -process_request_identity(SocketEntry *e) +idtab_init(void) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i <=2; i++){ + idtable[i].identities = NULL; + idtable[i].nentries = 0; + } +} + +/* return private key table for requested protocol version */ +Idtab * +idtab_lookup(int version) +{ + if (version < 1 || version > 2) + fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version); + return &idtable[version]; +} + +/* return matching private key for given public key */ +Key * +lookup_private_key(Key *key, int *idx, int version) +{ + int i; + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); + for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) { + if (key_equal(key, tab->identities[i].key)) { + if (idx != NULL) + *idx = i; + return tab->identities[i].key; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */ +void +process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) { + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Buffer msg; int i; buffer_init(&msg); - buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER); - buffer_put_int(&msg, num_identities); - for (i = 0; i < num_identities; i++) { - buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(identities[i].key->n)); - buffer_put_bignum(&msg, identities[i].key->e); - buffer_put_bignum(&msg, identities[i].key->n); - buffer_put_string(&msg, identities[i].comment, - strlen(identities[i].comment)); + buffer_put_char(&msg, (version == 1) ? + SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER); + buffer_put_int(&msg, tab->nentries); + for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) { + Identity *id = &tab->identities[i]; + if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA) { + buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->n); + } else { + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; + dsa_make_key_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + } + buffer_put_cstring(&msg, id->comment); } buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_free(&msg); } +/* ssh1 only */ void -process_authentication_challenge(SocketEntry *e) +process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e) { - int i, pub_bits, len; - BIGNUM *pub_e, *pub_n, *challenge; + Key *key, *private; + BIGNUM *challenge; + int i, len; Buffer msg; MD5_CTX md; unsigned char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16]; unsigned int response_type; buffer_init(&msg); - pub_e = BN_new(); - pub_n = BN_new(); + key = key_new(KEY_RSA); challenge = BN_new(); - pub_bits = buffer_get_int(&e->input); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, pub_e); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, pub_n); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, challenge); - if (buffer_len(&e->input) == 0) { - /* Compatibility code for old servers. */ - memset(session_id, 0, 16); - response_type = 0; - } else { - /* New code. */ - buffer_get(&e->input, (char *) session_id, 16); - response_type = buffer_get_int(&e->input); - } - for (i = 0; i < num_identities; i++) - if (pub_bits == BN_num_bits(identities[i].key->n) && - BN_cmp(pub_e, identities[i].key->e) == 0 && - BN_cmp(pub_n, identities[i].key->n) == 0) { - /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ - rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, identities[i].key); - - /* Compute the desired response. */ - switch (response_type) { - case 0:/* As of protocol 1.0 */ - /* This response type is no longer supported. */ - log("Compatibility with ssh protocol 1.0 no longer supported."); - buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); - goto send; - - case 1:/* As of protocol 1.1 */ - /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ - len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); - - if (len <= 0 || len > 32) { - fatal("process_authentication_challenge: " - "bad challenge length %d", len); - } - memset(buf, 0, 32); - BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); - MD5_Init(&md); - MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32); - MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16); - MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md); - break; - - default: - fatal("process_authentication_challenge: bad response_type %d", - response_type); - break; - } - /* Send the response. */ - buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) - buffer_put_char(&msg, mdbuf[i]); + buffer_get_int(&e->input); /* ignored */ + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->n); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, challenge); - goto send; + /* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */ + if (buffer_len(&e->input) == 0) + goto failure; + buffer_get(&e->input, (char *) session_id, 16); + response_type = buffer_get_int(&e->input); + if (response_type != 1) + goto failure; + + private = lookup_private_key(key, NULL, 1); + if (private != NULL) { + /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ + rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa); + + /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ + len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); + if (len <= 0 || len > 32) { + log("process_authentication_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len); + goto failure; } - /* Unknown identity. Send failure. */ + memset(buf, 0, 32); + BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); + MD5_Init(&md); + MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32); + MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16); + MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md); + + /* Send the response. */ + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + buffer_put_char(&msg, mdbuf[i]); + goto send; + } + +failure: + /* Unknown identity or protocol error. Send failure. */ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); send: + buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg)); + buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg)); + key_free(key); + BN_clear_free(challenge); + buffer_free(&msg); +} + +/* ssh2 only */ +void +process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) +{ + extern int datafellows; + Key *key, *private; + unsigned char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; + unsigned int blen, dlen, slen = 0; + Buffer msg; + int ok = -1; + + datafellows = 0; + + blob = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &blen); + data = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &dlen); + + key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen); + if (key != NULL) { + private = lookup_private_key(key, NULL, 2); + if (private != NULL) + ok = dsa_sign(private, &signature, &slen, data, dlen); + } + key_free(key); + buffer_init(&msg); + if (ok == 0) { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE); + buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen); + } else { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); + } buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), - buffer_len(&msg)); + buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_free(&msg); - BN_clear_free(pub_e); - BN_clear_free(pub_n); - BN_clear_free(challenge); + xfree(data); + xfree(blob); + if (signature != NULL) + xfree(signature); } +/* shared */ void -process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e) +process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) { + Key *key = NULL, *private; + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; unsigned int bits; - unsigned int i; - BIGNUM *dummy, *n; - - dummy = BN_new(); - n = BN_new(); - - /* Get the key from the packet. */ - bits = buffer_get_int(&e->input); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, dummy); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, n); - - if (bits != BN_num_bits(n)) - log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %d", - BN_num_bits(n), bits); - - /* Check if we have the key. */ - for (i = 0; i < num_identities; i++) - if (BN_cmp(identities[i].key->n, n) == 0) { + int success = 0; + + switch(version){ + case 1: + key = key_new(KEY_RSA); + bits = buffer_get_int(&e->input); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, key->rsa->n); + + if (bits != key_size(key)) + log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %d", + key_size(key), bits); + break; + case 2: + blob = buffer_get_string(&e->input, &blen); + key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + break; + } + if (key != NULL) { + int idx; + private = lookup_private_key(key, &idx, version); + if (private != NULL) { /* * We have this key. Free the old key. Since we * don\'t want to leave empty slots in the middle of * the array, we actually free the key there and copy * data from the last entry. */ - RSA_free(identities[i].key); - xfree(identities[i].comment); - if (i < num_identities - 1) - identities[i] = identities[num_identities - 1]; - num_identities--; - BN_clear_free(dummy); - BN_clear_free(n); - - /* Send success. */ - buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); - buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS); - return; + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); + key_free(tab->identities[idx].key); + xfree(tab->identities[idx].comment); + if (idx != tab->nentries) + tab->identities[idx] = tab->identities[tab->nentries]; + tab->nentries--; + success = 1; } - /* We did not have the key. */ - BN_clear(dummy); - BN_clear(n); - - /* Send failure. */ + key_free(key); + } buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); - buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); + buffer_put_char(&e->output, + success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } -/* - * Removes all identities from the agent. - */ void -process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e) +process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) { unsigned int i; + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */ - for (i = 0; i < num_identities; i++) { - RSA_free(identities[i].key); - xfree(identities[i].comment); + for (i = 0; i < tab->nentries; i++) { + key_free(tab->identities[i].key); + xfree(tab->identities[i].comment); } /* Mark that there are no identities. */ - num_identities = 0; + tab->nentries = 0; /* Send success. */ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); @@ -238,79 +317,108 @@ process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e) return; } -/* - * Adds an identity to the agent. - */ void -process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e) +process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) { - RSA *k; - int i; + Key *k = NULL; + RSA *rsa; BIGNUM *aux; BN_CTX *ctx; + char *type; + char *comment; + int success = 0; + Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); - if (num_identities == 0) - identities = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity)); - else - identities = xrealloc(identities, (num_identities + 1) * sizeof(Identity)); - - identities[num_identities].key = RSA_new(); - k = identities[num_identities].key; - buffer_get_int(&e->input); /* bits */ - k->n = BN_new(); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->n); - k->e = BN_new(); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->e); - k->d = BN_new(); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->d); - k->iqmp = BN_new(); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->iqmp); - /* SSH and SSL have p and q swapped */ - k->q = BN_new(); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->q); /* p */ - k->p = BN_new(); - buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, k->p); /* q */ - - /* Generate additional parameters */ - aux = BN_new(); - ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - - BN_sub(aux, k->q, BN_value_one()); - k->dmq1 = BN_new(); - BN_mod(k->dmq1, k->d, aux, ctx); - - BN_sub(aux, k->p, BN_value_one()); - k->dmp1 = BN_new(); - BN_mod(k->dmp1, k->d, aux, ctx); - - BN_clear_free(aux); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - - identities[num_identities].comment = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL); - - /* Check if we already have the key. */ - for (i = 0; i < num_identities; i++) - if (BN_cmp(identities[i].key->n, k->n) == 0) { - /* - * We already have this key. Clear and free the new - * data and return success. - */ - RSA_free(k); - xfree(identities[num_identities].comment); + switch (version) { + case 1: + k = key_new(KEY_RSA); + rsa = k->rsa; - /* Send success. */ - buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); - buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS); - return; + /* allocate mem for private key */ + /* XXX rsa->n and rsa->e are already allocated */ + rsa->d = BN_new(); + rsa->iqmp = BN_new(); + rsa->q = BN_new(); + rsa->p = BN_new(); + rsa->dmq1 = BN_new(); + rsa->dmp1 = BN_new(); + + buffer_get_int(&e->input); /* ignored */ + + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->n); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->d); + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->iqmp); + + /* SSH and SSL have p and q swapped */ + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->q); /* p */ + buffer_get_bignum(&e->input, rsa->p); /* q */ + + /* Generate additional parameters */ + aux = BN_new(); + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + + BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()); + BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx); + + BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()); + BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx); + + BN_clear_free(aux); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + + break; + case 2: + type = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL); + if (strcmp(type, KEX_DSS)) { + buffer_clear(&e->input); + xfree(type); + goto send; } - /* Increment the number of identities. */ - num_identities++; + xfree(type); - /* Send a success message. */ + k = key_new(KEY_DSA); + + /* allocate mem for private key */ + k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new(); + + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->p); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->q); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->g); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->pub_key); + buffer_get_bignum2(&e->input, k->dsa->priv_key); + + break; + } + + comment = buffer_get_string(&e->input, NULL); + if (k == NULL) { + xfree(comment); + goto send; + } + success = 1; + if (lookup_private_key(k, NULL, version) == NULL) { + if (tab->nentries == 0) + tab->identities = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity)); + else + tab->identities = xrealloc(tab->identities, + (tab->nentries + 1) * sizeof(Identity)); + tab->identities[tab->nentries].key = k; + tab->identities[tab->nentries].comment = comment; + /* Increment the number of identities. */ + tab->nentries++; + } else { + key_free(k); + xfree(comment); + } +send: buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); - buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS); + buffer_put_char(&e->output, + success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } +/* dispatch incoming messages */ + void process_message(SocketEntry *e) { @@ -333,20 +441,37 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e) type = buffer_get_char(&e->input); switch (type) { - case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: - process_request_identity(e); - break; + /* ssh1 */ case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE: - process_authentication_challenge(e); + process_authentication_challenge1(e); + break; + case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: + process_request_identities(e, 1); break; case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY: - process_add_identity(e); + process_add_identity(e, 1); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY: - process_remove_identity(e); + process_remove_identity(e, 1); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES: - process_remove_all_identities(e); + process_remove_all_identities(e, 1); + break; + /* ssh2 */ + case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: + process_sign_request2(e); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: + process_request_identities(e, 2); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY: + process_add_identity(e, 2); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY: + process_remove_identity(e, 2); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES: + process_remove_all_identities(e, 2); break; default: /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ @@ -511,9 +636,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) pid_t pid; char *shell, *format, *pidstr, pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid]; extern int optind; - + init_rng(); - + /* check if RSA support exists */ if (rsa_alive() == 0) { fprintf(stderr, @@ -654,6 +779,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) signal(SIGALRM, check_parent_exists); alarm(10); } + idtab_init(); signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_exit); diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c index 8a03f0d8..83450fe8 100644 --- a/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.29 2000/07/15 04:01:37 djm Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.30 2000/08/19 21:34:43 markus Exp $"); #include #include @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.29 2000/07/15 04:01:37 djm Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "xmalloc.h" -#include "fingerprint.h" #include "key.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "dsa.h" @@ -228,8 +227,9 @@ do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) void do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) { + /* XXX RSA1 only */ + FILE *f; - BIGNUM *e, *n; Key *public; char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024]; int i, skip = 0, num = 1, invalid = 1; @@ -249,13 +249,9 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) key_free(public); exit(0); } - key_free(public); - /* XXX */ f = fopen(identity_file, "r"); if (f != NULL) { - n = BN_new(); - e = BN_new(); while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { i = strlen(line) - 1; if (line[i] != '\n') { @@ -290,18 +286,17 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) *cp++ = '\0'; } ep = cp; - if (auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &ignore, e, n)) { + if (auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &ignore, public->rsa->e, public->rsa->n)) { invalid = 0; comment = *cp ? cp : comment; - printf("%d %s %s\n", BN_num_bits(n), - fingerprint(e, n), + printf("%d %s %s\n", key_size(public), + key_fingerprint(public), comment ? comment : "no comment"); } } - BN_free(e); - BN_free(n); fclose(f); } + key_free(public); if (invalid) { printf("%s is not a valid key file.\n", identity_file); exit(1); diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index 58e4d7bd..39512c5f 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.58 2000/07/16 08:27:22 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.61 2000/08/20 18:42:40 millert Exp $"); #include #include @@ -253,8 +253,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) cp = strrchr(av0, '/') + 1; else cp = av0; - if (strcmp(cp, "rsh") != 0 && strcmp(cp, "ssh") != 0 && - strcmp(cp, "rlogin") != 0 && strcmp(cp, "slogin") != 0) + if (strcmp(cp, "rsh") && strcmp(cp, "ssh") && strcmp(cp, "rlogin") && + strcmp(cp, "slogin") && strcmp(cp, "remsh")) host = cp; for (optind = 1; optind < ac; optind++) { @@ -490,6 +490,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) pwcopy.pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); pwcopy.pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; pwcopy.pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; +#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD + pwcopy.pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); +#endif pwcopy.pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); pwcopy.pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); pw = &pwcopy; @@ -871,7 +874,7 @@ ssh_session(void) } /* Enter the interactive session. */ - return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : -1); + return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : -1, 0); } void @@ -954,9 +957,16 @@ int ssh_session2(void) { int window, packetmax, id; - int in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); - int out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); - int err = dup(STDERR_FILENO); + int in, out, err; + + /* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */ + if (fork_after_authentication_flag) + if (daemon(1, 1) < 0) + fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); + + in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); + err = dup(STDERR_FILENO); if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0) fatal("dump in/out/err failed"); @@ -972,13 +982,13 @@ ssh_session2(void) packetmax = window/2; } +/*XXX MAXPACK */ id = channel_new( "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, xstrdup("client-session")); - channel_open(id); channel_register_callback(id, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, client_init, (void *)0); - return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : -1); + return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : -1, id); } diff --git a/ssh.h b/ssh.h index f3f049fc..f21dee49 100644 --- a/ssh.h +++ b/ssh.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ * */ -/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.48 2000/07/13 22:53:21 provos Exp $"); */ +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.49 2000/08/19 18:48:11 markus Exp $"); */ #ifndef SSH_H #define SSH_H @@ -105,7 +105,11 @@ #endif /* SSH_PROGRAM */ #ifndef LOGIN_PROGRAM -#define LOGIN_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/login" +# ifdef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK +# define LOGIN_PROGRAM LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK +# else +# define LOGIN_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/login" +# endif #endif /* LOGIN_PROGRAM */ #ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM @@ -506,7 +510,7 @@ void server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr); void server_loop2(void); /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */ -int client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char); +int client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char, int id); /* Linked list of custom environment strings (see auth-rsa.c). */ struct envstring { diff --git a/sshconnect1.c b/sshconnect1.c index aaebf17f..7b60d627 100644 --- a/sshconnect1.c +++ b/sshconnect1.c @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.4 2000/07/16 08:27:22 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.5 2000/08/19 21:34:44 markus Exp $"); #include #include @@ -44,27 +44,27 @@ extern char *__progname; int try_agent_authentication() { - int status, type; + int type; char *comment; AuthenticationConnection *auth; unsigned char response[16]; unsigned int i; - BIGNUM *e, *n, *challenge; + int plen, clen; + Key *key; + BIGNUM *challenge; /* Get connection to the agent. */ auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); if (!auth) return 0; - e = BN_new(); - n = BN_new(); challenge = BN_new(); + key = key_new(KEY_RSA); /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */ - for (status = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, e, n, &comment); - status; - status = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, &comment)) { - int plen, clen; + for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, &comment, 1); + key != NULL; + key = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, &comment, 1)) { /* Try this identity. */ debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment); @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ try_agent_authentication() /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); - packet_put_bignum(n); + packet_put_bignum(key->rsa->n); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ try_agent_authentication() does not support RSA authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { debug("Server refused our key."); + key_free(key); continue; } /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */ @@ -97,13 +98,16 @@ try_agent_authentication() debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */ - if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, e, n, challenge, - session_id, 1, response)) { - /* The agent failed to authenticate this identifier although it - advertised it supports this. Just return a wrong value. */ + if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, key, challenge, session_id, 1, response)) { + /* + * The agent failed to authenticate this identifier + * although it advertised it supports this. Just + * return a wrong value. + */ log("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge."); memset(response, 0, sizeof(response)); } + key_free(key); debug("Sending response to RSA challenge."); /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */ @@ -118,10 +122,8 @@ try_agent_authentication() /* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { - debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); - BN_clear_free(e); - BN_clear_free(n); BN_clear_free(challenge); + debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); return 1; } /* Otherwise it should return failure. */ @@ -129,11 +131,7 @@ try_agent_authentication() packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); } - - BN_clear_free(e); - BN_clear_free(n); BN_clear_free(challenge); - debug("RSA authentication using agent refused."); return 0; } diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index 22ad39e7..1f49067a 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.16 2000/07/16 08:27:22 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.17 2000/08/19 21:34:44 markus Exp $"); #include #include @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.16 2000/07/16 08:27:22 markus Exp $"); #include "dsa.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfile.h" +#include "authfd.h" /* import */ extern char *client_version_string; @@ -291,7 +292,7 @@ typedef int sign_fn( unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp, unsigned char *data, int datalen); -void +int ssh2_sign_and_send_pubkey(Key *k, sign_fn *do_sign, const char *server_user, const char *host, const char *service) { @@ -299,6 +300,7 @@ ssh2_sign_and_send_pubkey(Key *k, sign_fn *do_sign, unsigned char *blob, *signature; int bloblen, slen; int skip = 0; + int ret = -1; dsa_make_key_blob(k, &blob, &bloblen); @@ -323,8 +325,12 @@ ssh2_sign_and_send_pubkey(Key *k, sign_fn *do_sign, buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); /* generate signature */ - do_sign(k, &signature, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); - key_free(k); /* XXX */ + ret = do_sign(k, &signature, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); + if (ret == -1) { + xfree(blob); + buffer_free(&b); + return 0; + } #ifdef DEBUG_DSS buffer_dump(&b); #endif @@ -357,6 +363,8 @@ ssh2_sign_and_send_pubkey(Key *k, sign_fn *do_sign, /* send */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); + + return 1; } int @@ -364,6 +372,7 @@ ssh2_try_pubkey(char *filename, const char *server_user, const char *host, const char *service) { Key *k; + int ret = 0; struct stat st; if (stat(filename, &st) != 0) { @@ -389,13 +398,53 @@ ssh2_try_pubkey(char *filename, return 0; } } - ssh2_sign_and_send_pubkey(k, dsa_sign, server_user, host, service); - return 1; + ret = ssh2_sign_and_send_pubkey(k, dsa_sign, server_user, host, service); + key_free(k); + return ret; +} + +int agent_sign( + Key *key, + unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp, + unsigned char *data, int datalen) +{ + int ret = -1; + AuthenticationConnection *ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); + if (ac != NULL) { + ret = ssh_agent_sign(ac, key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); + ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac); + } + return ret; +} + +int +ssh2_try_agent(AuthenticationConnection *ac, + const char *server_user, const char *host, const char *service) +{ + static int called = 0; + char *comment; + Key *k; + int ret; + + if (called == 0) { + k = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); + called ++; + } else { + k = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2); + } + if (k == NULL) + return 0; + debug("trying DSA agent key %s", comment); + xfree(comment); + ret = ssh2_sign_and_send_pubkey(k, agent_sign, server_user, host, service); + key_free(k); + return ret; } void ssh_userauth2(const char *server_user, char *host) { + AuthenticationConnection *ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); int type; int plen; int sent; @@ -450,12 +499,17 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *server_user, char *host) debug("partial success"); if (options.dsa_authentication && strstr(auths, "publickey") != NULL) { - while (i < options.num_identity_files2) { - sent = ssh2_try_pubkey( - options.identity_files2[i++], + if (ac != NULL) + sent = ssh2_try_agent(ac, server_user, host, service); - if (sent) - break; + if (!sent) { + while (i < options.num_identity_files2) { + sent = ssh2_try_pubkey( + options.identity_files2[i++], + server_user, host, service); + if (sent) + break; + } } } if (!sent) { @@ -469,6 +523,8 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *server_user, char *host) fatal("Permission denied (%s).", auths); xfree(auths); } + if (ac != NULL) + ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac); packet_done(); debug("ssh-userauth2 successfull"); } -- 2.45.2