X-Git-Url: http://andersk.mit.edu/gitweb/openssh.git/blobdiff_plain/f095fcc73b54270bf4e7cac5603fb1bb19cb5a4c..8002af617f063c404ae06f0b93eb36557ae3d155:/sshconnect.c diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c index 113887fa..60b16a24 100644 --- a/sshconnect.c +++ b/sshconnect.c @@ -1,1536 +1,790 @@ /* - -sshconnect.c - -Author: Tatu Ylonen - -Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - All rights reserved - -Created: Sat Mar 18 22:15:47 1995 ylo - -Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the -login (authentication) dialog. - -*/ + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the + * login (authentication) dialog. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$Id$"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.104 2001/04/12 19:15:25 markus Exp $"); -#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL #include -#include -#endif -#ifdef HAVE_SSL -#include -#include -#endif +#include "ssh.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "rsa.h" -#include "ssh.h" +#include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" -#include "authfd.h" -#include "cipher.h" -#include "mpaux.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "sshconnect.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "log.h" #include "readconf.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "misc.h" + +char *client_version_string = NULL; +char *server_version_string = NULL; -/* Session id for the current session. */ -unsigned char session_id[16]; +extern Options options; +extern char *__progname; -/* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. */ +/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ +extern int IPv4or6; +/* + * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. + */ int -ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, int port, uid_t original_real_uid, +ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, const char *proxy_command) { - Buffer command; - const char *cp; - char *command_string; - int pin[2], pout[2]; - int pid; - char portstring[100]; - - /* Convert the port number into a string. */ - snprintf(portstring, sizeof portstring, "%d", port); - - /* Build the final command string in the buffer by making the appropriate - substitutions to the given proxy command. */ - buffer_init(&command); - for (cp = proxy_command; *cp; cp++) - { - if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') - { - buffer_append(&command, "%", 1); - cp++; - continue; - } - if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') - { - buffer_append(&command, host, strlen(host)); - cp++; - continue; - } - if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'p') - { - buffer_append(&command, portstring, strlen(portstring)); - cp++; - continue; - } - buffer_append(&command, cp, 1); - } - buffer_append(&command, "\0", 1); - - /* Get the final command string. */ - command_string = buffer_ptr(&command); - - /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ - if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0) - fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", - strerror(errno)); - - debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); - - /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ - if ((pid = fork()) == 0) - { - char *argv[10]; - - /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ - permanently_set_uid(original_real_uid); - - /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ - close(pin[1]); - if (pin[0] != 0) - { - if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) - perror("dup2 stdin"); - close(pin[0]); + Buffer command; + const char *cp; + char *command_string; + int pin[2], pout[2]; + pid_t pid; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + + /* Convert the port number into a string. */ + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port); + + /* Build the final command string in the buffer by making the + appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command. */ + buffer_init(&command); + for (cp = proxy_command; *cp; cp++) { + if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') { + buffer_append(&command, "%", 1); + cp++; + continue; + } + if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') { + buffer_append(&command, host, strlen(host)); + cp++; + continue; + } + if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'p') { + buffer_append(&command, strport, strlen(strport)); + cp++; + continue; + } + buffer_append(&command, cp, 1); } - close(pout[0]); - if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) - perror("dup2 stdout"); - close(pout[1]); /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ - - /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get printed on - the user's terminal. */ - argv[0] = "/bin/sh"; - argv[1] = "-c"; - argv[2] = command_string; - argv[3] = NULL; - - /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any extra - privileges above. */ - execv("/bin/sh", argv); - perror("/bin/sh"); - exit(1); - } - /* Parent. */ - if (pid < 0) - fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - - /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ - close(pin[0]); - close(pout[1]); - - /* Free the command name. */ - buffer_free(&command); - - /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ - packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]); - - return 1; -} + buffer_append(&command, "\0", 1); -/* Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection. */ + /* Get the final command string. */ + command_string = buffer_ptr(&command); -int ssh_create_socket(uid_t original_real_uid, int privileged) -{ - int sock; - - /* If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged port, - bind our own socket to a privileged port. */ - if (privileged) - { - int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1; - - sock = rresvport(&p); - if (sock < 0) - fatal("rresvport: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - debug("Allocated local port %d.", p); - } - else - { - /* Just create an ordinary socket on arbitrary port. We use the - user's uid to create the socket. */ - temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid); - sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - if (sock < 0) - fatal("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - restore_uid(); - } - return sock; -} + /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ + if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0) + fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); -/* Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. If - port is 0, the default port will be used. If anonymous is zero, - a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection. - This requires super-user privileges if anonymous is false. - Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per - second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h - and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact - the daemon. */ - -int ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_in *hostaddr, - int port, int connection_attempts, - int anonymous, uid_t original_real_uid, - const char *proxy_command) -{ - int sock = -1, attempt, i; - int on = 1; - struct servent *sp; - struct hostent *hp; - struct linger linger; - - debug("ssh_connect: getuid %d geteuid %d anon %d", - (int)getuid(), (int)geteuid(), anonymous); - - /* Get default port if port has not been set. */ - if (port == 0) - { - sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); - if (sp) - port = ntohs(sp->s_port); - else - port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; - } - - /* If a proxy command is given, connect using it. */ - if (proxy_command != NULL) - return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, original_real_uid, proxy_command); - - /* No proxy command. */ - - /* No host lookup made yet. */ - hp = NULL; - - /* Try to connect several times. On some machines, the first time will - sometimes fail. In general socket code appears to behave quite - magically on many machines. */ - for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) - { - if (attempt > 0) - debug("Trying again..."); - - /* Try to parse the host name as a numeric inet address. */ - memset(hostaddr, 0, sizeof(hostaddr)); - hostaddr->sin_family = AF_INET; - hostaddr->sin_port = htons(port); - hostaddr->sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(host); - if ((hostaddr->sin_addr.s_addr & 0xffffffff) != 0xffffffff) - { - /* Valid numeric IP address */ - debug("Connecting to %.100s port %d.", - inet_ntoa(hostaddr->sin_addr), port); - - /* Create a socket. */ - sock = ssh_create_socket(original_real_uid, - !anonymous && geteuid() == 0 && - port < IPPORT_RESERVED); - - /* Connect to the host. We use the user's uid in the hope that - it will help with the problems of tcp_wrappers showing the - remote uid as root. */ - temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid); - if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)hostaddr, sizeof(*hostaddr)) - >= 0) - { - /* Successful connect. */ - restore_uid(); - break; - } - debug("connect: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - restore_uid(); - - /* Destroy the failed socket. */ - shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); - close(sock); - } - else - { - /* Not a valid numeric inet address. */ - /* Map host name to an address. */ - if (!hp) - hp = gethostbyname(host); - if (!hp) - fatal("Bad host name: %.100s", host); - if (!hp->h_addr_list[0]) - fatal("Host does not have an IP address: %.100s", host); - - /* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in - sequence until the connection succeeds. */ - for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) - { - /* Set the address to connect to. */ - hostaddr->sin_family = hp->h_addrtype; - memcpy(&hostaddr->sin_addr, hp->h_addr_list[i], - sizeof(hostaddr->sin_addr)); - - debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %d.", - host, inet_ntoa(hostaddr->sin_addr), port); - - /* Create a socket for connecting. */ - sock = ssh_create_socket(original_real_uid, - !anonymous && geteuid() == 0 && - port < IPPORT_RESERVED); - - /* Connect to the host. We use the user's uid in the hope that - it will help with tcp_wrappers showing the remote uid as - root. */ - temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid); - if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)hostaddr, - sizeof(*hostaddr)) >= 0) - { - /* Successful connection. */ - restore_uid(); - break; + debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); + + /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + char *argv[10]; + + /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ + permanently_set_uid(pw); + + /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ + close(pin[1]); + if (pin[0] != 0) { + if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdin"); + close(pin[0]); } - debug("connect: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - restore_uid(); - - /* Close the failed socket; there appear to be some problems - when reusing a socket for which connect() has already - returned an error. */ - shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); - close(sock); - } - if (hp->h_addr_list[i]) - break; /* Successful connection. */ + close(pout[0]); + if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdout"); + /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ + close(pout[1]); + + /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get + printed on the user's terminal. */ + argv[0] = _PATH_BSHELL; + argv[1] = "-c"; + argv[2] = command_string; + argv[3] = NULL; + + /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any + extra privileges above. */ + execv(argv[0], argv); + perror(argv[0]); + exit(1); } + /* Parent. */ + if (pid < 0) + fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ - sleep(1); - } - /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ - if (attempt >= connection_attempts) - return 0; - - debug("Connection established."); + /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ + close(pin[0]); + close(pout[1]); - /* Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear as soon as - it has been closed for whatever reason. */ - /* setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ - setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); - linger.l_onoff = 1; - linger.l_linger = 5; - setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *)&linger, sizeof(linger)); + /* Free the command name. */ + buffer_free(&command); - /* Set the connection. */ - packet_set_connection(sock, sock); + /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ + packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]); - return 1; + return 1; } -/* Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to - authenticate using the agent. */ - +/* + * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection. + */ int -try_agent_authentication() +ssh_create_socket(struct passwd *pw, int privileged, int family) { - int status, type; - char *comment; - AuthenticationConnection *auth; - unsigned char response[16]; - unsigned int i; - BIGNUM *e, *n, *challenge; - - /* Get connection to the agent. */ - auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); - if (!auth) - return 0; - - e = BN_new(); - n = BN_new(); - challenge = BN_new(); - - /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */ - for (status = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, e, n, &comment); - status; - status = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, &comment)) - { - int plen, clen; - - /* Try this identity. */ - debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment); - xfree(comment); - - /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); - packet_put_bignum(n); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Wait for server's response. */ - type = packet_read(&plen); - - /* The server sends failure if it doesn\'t like our key or does not - support RSA authentication. */ - if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - { - debug("Server refused our key."); - continue; + int sock; + + /* + * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged + * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port. + */ + if (privileged) { + int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1; + sock = rresvport_af(&p, family); + if (sock < 0) + error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", family, strerror(errno)); + else + debug("Allocated local port %d.", p); + } else { + /* + * Just create an ordinary socket on arbitrary port. We use + * the user's uid to create the socket. + */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + sock = socket(family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); } - - /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", - type); - - packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen); - - packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type); - - debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); - - /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */ - if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, e, n, challenge, - session_id, 1, response)) - { - /* The agent failed to authenticate this identifier although it - advertised it supports this. Just return a wrong value. */ - log("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge."); - memset(response, 0, sizeof(response)); + return sock; +} + +/* + * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. + * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr. + * If port is 0, the default port will be used. If anonymous is zero, + * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection. + * This requires super-user privileges if anonymous is false. + * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per + * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h + * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact + * the daemon. + */ +int +ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr, + u_short port, int connection_attempts, + int anonymous, struct passwd *pw, + const char *proxy_command) +{ + int gaierr; + int on = 1; + int sock = -1, attempt; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + struct linger linger; + struct servent *sp; + + debug("ssh_connect: getuid %u geteuid %u anon %d", + (u_int) getuid(), (u_int) geteuid(), anonymous); + + /* Get default port if port has not been set. */ + if (port == 0) { + sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); + if (sp) + port = ntohs(sp->s_port); + else + port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; } - - debug("Sending response to RSA challenge."); - - /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) - packet_put_char(response[i]); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Wait for response from the server. */ - type = packet_read(&plen); - - /* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */ - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - { - debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); - BN_clear_free(e); - BN_clear_free(n); - BN_clear_free(challenge); - return 1; + /* If a proxy command is given, connect using it. */ + if (proxy_command != NULL) + return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, pw, proxy_command); + + /* No proxy command. */ + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %.100s: %s", __progname, host, + gai_strerror(gaierr)); + + /* + * Try to connect several times. On some machines, the first time + * will sometimes fail. In general socket code appears to behave + * quite magically on many machines. + */ + for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) { + if (attempt > 0) + debug("Trying again..."); + + /* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in + sequence until the connection succeeds. */ + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, + ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { + error("ssh_connect: getnameinfo failed"); + continue; + } + debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.", + host, ntop, strport); + + /* Create a socket for connecting. */ + sock = ssh_create_socket(pw, +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + !anonymous, +#else + !anonymous && geteuid() == 0, +#endif + ai->ai_family); + if (sock < 0) + continue; + + /* Connect to the host. We use the user's uid in the + * hope that it will help with tcp_wrappers showing + * the remote uid as root. + */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) >= 0) { + /* Successful connection. */ + memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen); + restore_uid(); + break; + } else { + debug("connect: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + /* + * Close the failed socket; there appear to + * be some problems when reusing a socket for + * which connect() has already returned an + * error. + */ + shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); + close(sock); + } + } + if (ai) + break; /* Successful connection. */ + + /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ + sleep(1); } - /* Otherwise it should return failure. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", - type); - } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); - BN_clear_free(e); - BN_clear_free(n); - BN_clear_free(challenge); + /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ + if (attempt >= connection_attempts) + return 0; - debug("RSA authentication using agent refused."); - return 0; -} + debug("Connection established."); -/* Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to - the server. */ + /* + * Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear as soon + * as it has been closed for whatever reason. + */ + /* setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */ + linger.l_onoff = 1; + linger.l_linger = 5; + setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *)&linger, sizeof(linger)); -void -respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM *challenge, RSA *prv) -{ - unsigned char buf[32], response[16]; - MD5_CTX md; - int i, len; - - /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ - rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv); - - /* Compute the response. */ - /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ - len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); - if (len <= 0 || len > sizeof(buf)) - packet_disconnect("respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", - len); - - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len); - MD5_Init(&md); - MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32); - MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16); - MD5_Final(response, &md); - - debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge."); - - /* Send the response back to the server. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) - packet_put_char(response[i]); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - memset(response, 0, sizeof(response)); - memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md)); -} + /* Set keepalives if requested. */ + if (options.keepalives && + setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, + sizeof(on)) < 0) + error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); -/* Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate - the user using it. */ + /* Set the connection. */ + packet_set_connection(sock, sock); -int -try_rsa_authentication(struct passwd *pw, const char *authfile) + return 1; +} + +/* + * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own + * identification string. + */ +void +ssh_exchange_identification(void) { - extern Options options; - BIGNUM *challenge; - RSA *private_key; - RSA *public_key; - char *passphrase, *comment; - int type, i; - int plen, clen; - - /* Try to load identification for the authentication key. */ - public_key = RSA_new(); - if (!load_public_key(authfile, public_key, &comment)) { - RSA_free(public_key); - return 0; /* Could not load it. Fail. */ - } - - debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment); - - /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); - packet_put_bignum(public_key->n); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* We no longer need the public key. */ - RSA_free(public_key); - - /* Wait for server's response. */ - type = packet_read(&plen); - - /* The server responds with failure if it doesn\'t like our key or doesn\'t - support RSA authentication. */ - if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - { - debug("Server refused our key."); - xfree(comment); - return 0; /* Server refuses to authenticate with this key. */ - } - - /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); - - /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ - challenge = BN_new(); - packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen); - - packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type); - - debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); - - private_key = RSA_new(); - /* Load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it fails, - ask for a passphrase. */ - if (!load_private_key(authfile, "", private_key, NULL)) - { - char buf[300]; - /* Request passphrase from the user. We read from /dev/tty to make - this work even if stdin has been redirected. If running in - batch mode, we just use the empty passphrase, which will fail and - return. */ - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, - "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment); - if (!options.batch_mode) - passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0); - else - { - debug("Will not query passphrase for %.100s in batch mode.", - comment); - passphrase = xstrdup(""); + char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */ + int remote_major, remote_minor, i, mismatch; + int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); + int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); + int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; + + /* Read other side\'s version identification. */ + for (;;) { + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { + int len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1); + if (len < 0) + fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (len != 1) + fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host"); + if (buf[i] == '\r') { + buf[i] = '\n'; + buf[i + 1] = 0; + continue; /**XXX wait for \n */ + } + if (buf[i] == '\n') { + buf[i + 1] = 0; + break; + } + } + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; + if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) + break; + debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf); } - - /* Load the authentication file using the pasphrase. */ - if (!load_private_key(authfile, passphrase, private_key, NULL)) - { - memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase)); - xfree(passphrase); - error("Bad passphrase."); - - /* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) - packet_put_char(0); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Expect the server to reject it... */ - packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); - xfree(comment); - return 0; + server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); + + /* + * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept + * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. + */ + if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", + &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) + fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf); + debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", + remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); + + compat_datafellows(remote_version); + mismatch = 0; + + switch(remote_major) { + case 1: + if (remote_minor == 99 && + (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && + !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) { + enable_compat20(); + break; + } + if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { + mismatch = 1; + break; + } + if (remote_minor < 3) { + fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version."); + } else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) { + /* We speak 1.3, too. */ + enable_compat13(); + minor1 = 3; + if (options.forward_agent) { + log("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3"); + options.forward_agent = 0; + } + } + break; + case 2: + if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { + enable_compat20(); + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + mismatch = 1; + break; } - - /* Destroy the passphrase. */ - memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase)); - xfree(passphrase); - } - - /* We no longer need the comment. */ - xfree(comment); - - /* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */ - respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private_key); - - /* Destroy the private key. */ - RSA_free(private_key); - - /* We no longer need the challenge. */ - BN_clear_free(challenge); - - /* Wait for response from the server. */ - type = packet_read(&plen); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - { - debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); - return 1; - } - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); - debug("RSA authentication refused."); - return 0; + if (mismatch) + fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", + (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, + remote_major); + if (compat20) + packet_set_ssh2_format(); + /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", + compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, + compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1, + SSH_VERSION); + if (atomicio(write, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf)) + fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); + chop(client_version_string); + chop(server_version_string); + debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string); } -/* Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv - authentication and RSA host authentication. */ - +/* defaults to 'no' */ int -try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, RSA *host_key) +read_yes_or_no(const char *prompt, int defval) { - int type; - BIGNUM *challenge; - int plen, clen; - - debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication."); - - /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA); - packet_put_string(local_user, strlen(local_user)); - packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->n)); - packet_put_bignum(host_key->e); - packet_put_bignum(host_key->n); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Wait for server's response. */ - type = packet_read(&plen); - - /* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our .rhosts - authentication or doesn't know our host key. */ - if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - { - debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key."); - return 0; /* Server refuses to authenticate us with this method. */ - } - - /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); - - /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ - challenge = BN_new(); - packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen); - - packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type); - - debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server."); - - /* Compute a response to the challenge. */ - respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key); - - /* We no longer need the challenge. */ - BN_clear_free(challenge); - - /* Wait for response from the server. */ - type = packet_read(&plen); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - { - debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server."); - return 1; - } - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); - debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused."); - return 0; -} + char buf[1024]; + FILE *f; + int retval = -1; -#ifdef KRB4 -int try_kerberos_authentication() -{ - KTEXT_ST auth; /* Kerberos data */ - char *reply; - char inst[INST_SZ]; - char *realm; - CREDENTIALS cred; - int r, type, plen; - Key_schedule schedule; - u_long checksum, cksum; - MSG_DAT msg_data; - struct sockaddr_in local, foreign; - struct stat st; - - /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */ - if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0) return 0; - - strncpy(inst, (char *) krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname()), INST_SZ); - - realm = (char *)krb_realmofhost(get_canonical_hostname()); - if (!realm) { - debug("Kerberos V4: no realm for %s", get_canonical_hostname()); - return 0; - } - /* This can really be anything. */ - checksum = (u_long) getpid(); - - r = krb_mk_req(&auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, checksum); - if (r != KSUCCESS) { - debug("Kerberos V4 krb_mk_req failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); - return 0; - } - /* Get session key to decrypt the server's reply with. */ - r = krb_get_cred(KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, &cred); - if (r != KSUCCESS) { - debug("get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); - return 0; - } - des_key_sched((des_cblock *)cred.session, schedule); - - /* Send authentication info to server. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS); - packet_put_string((char *)auth.dat, auth.length); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Zero the buffer. */ - (void) memset(auth.dat, 0, MAX_KTXT_LEN); - - r = sizeof(local); - memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local)); - if (getsockname(packet_get_connection_in(), - (struct sockaddr *) &local, &r) < 0) - debug("getsockname failed: %s", strerror(errno)); - - r = sizeof(foreign); - memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign)); - if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), - (struct sockaddr *)&foreign, &r) < 0) { - debug("getpeername failed: %s", strerror(errno)); - fatal_cleanup(); - } - - /* Get server reply. */ - type = packet_read(&plen); - switch(type) { - - case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE: /* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */ - debug("Kerberos V4 authentication failed."); - return 0; - break; - - case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE: /* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */ - debug("Kerberos V4 authentication accepted."); - - /* Get server's response. */ - reply = packet_get_string((unsigned int *)&auth.length); - memcpy(auth.dat, reply, auth.length); - xfree(reply); - - packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type); - - /* If his response isn't properly encrypted with the session key, - and the decrypted checksum fails to match, he's bogus. Bail out. */ - r = krb_rd_priv(auth.dat, auth.length, schedule, &cred.session, - &foreign, &local, &msg_data); - if (r != KSUCCESS) { - debug("Kerberos V4 krb_rd_priv failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); - packet_disconnect("Kerberos V4 challenge failed!"); - } - /* Fetch the (incremented) checksum that we supplied in the request. */ - (void)memcpy((char *)&cksum, (char *)msg_data.app_data, sizeof(cksum)); - cksum = ntohl(cksum); - - /* If it matches, we're golden. */ - if (cksum == checksum + 1) { - debug("Kerberos V4 challenge successful."); - return 1; - } - else - packet_disconnect("Kerberos V4 challenge failed!"); - break; - - default: - packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos V4 response: %d", type); - } - return 0; -} -#endif /* KRB4 */ + if (options.batch_mode) + return 0; -#ifdef AFS -int send_kerberos_tgt() -{ - CREDENTIALS *creds; - char pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ]; - int r, type, plen; - unsigned char buffer[8192]; - struct stat st; - - /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */ - if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0) return 0; - - creds = xmalloc(sizeof(*creds)); - - if ((r = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, pname, pinst, prealm)) != KSUCCESS) { - debug("Kerberos V4 tf_fullname failed: %s",krb_err_txt[r]); - return 0; - } - if ((r = krb_get_cred("krbtgt", prealm, prealm, creds)) != GC_OK) { - debug("Kerberos V4 get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); - return 0; - } - if (time(0) > krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date, creds->lifetime)) { - debug("Kerberos V4 ticket expired: %s", TKT_FILE); - return 0; - } - - creds_to_radix(creds, buffer); - xfree(creds); - - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT); - packet_put_string((char *)buffer, strlen(buffer)); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - type = packet_read(&plen); - - if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - debug("Kerberos TGT for realm %s rejected.", prealm); - else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos TGT response: %d", type); - - return 1; -} + if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) + f = stdin; + else + f = fopen(_PATH_TTY, "rw"); -void send_afs_tokens(void) -{ - CREDENTIALS creds; - struct ViceIoctl parms; - struct ClearToken ct; - int i, type, len, plen; - char buf[2048], *p, *server_cell; - unsigned char buffer[8192]; - - /* Move over ktc_GetToken, here's something leaner. */ - for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { /* just in case */ - parms.in = (char *)&i; - parms.in_size = sizeof(i); - parms.out = buf; - parms.out_size = sizeof(buf); - if (k_pioctl(0, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) != 0) break; - p = buf; - - /* Get secret token. */ - memcpy(&creds.ticket_st.length, p, sizeof(unsigned int)); - if (creds.ticket_st.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN) break; - p += sizeof(unsigned int); - memcpy(creds.ticket_st.dat, p, creds.ticket_st.length); - p += creds.ticket_st.length; - - /* Get clear token. */ - memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len)); - if (len != sizeof(struct ClearToken)) break; - p += sizeof(len); - memcpy(&ct, p, len); - p += len; - p += sizeof(len); /* primary flag */ - server_cell = p; - - /* Flesh out our credentials. */ - strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service); - creds.instance[0] = '\0'; - strlcpy(creds.realm, server_cell, REALM_SZ); - memcpy(creds.session, ct.HandShakeKey, DES_KEY_SZ); - creds.issue_date = ct.BeginTimestamp; - creds.lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds.issue_date, ct.EndTimestamp); - creds.kvno = ct.AuthHandle; - snprintf(creds.pname, sizeof(creds.pname), "AFS ID %d", ct.ViceId); - creds.pinst[0] = '\0'; - - /* Encode token, ship it off. */ - if (!creds_to_radix(&creds, buffer)) break; - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN); - packet_put_string((char *)buffer, strlen(buffer)); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Roger, Roger. Clearance, Clarence. What's your vector, Victor? */ - type = packet_read(&plen); - - if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - debug("AFS token for cell %s rejected.", server_cell); - else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error on AFS token response: %d", type); - } + if (f == NULL) + return 0; + + fflush(stdout); + + while (1) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s", prompt); + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL) { + /* Print a newline (the prompt probably didn\'t have one). */ + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + strlcpy(buf, "no", sizeof buf); + } + /* Remove newline from response. */ + if (strchr(buf, '\n')) + *strchr(buf, '\n') = 0; + + if (buf[0] == 0) + retval = defval; + if (strcmp(buf, "yes") == 0) + retval = 1; + else if (strcmp(buf, "no") == 0) + retval = 0; + else + fprintf(stderr, "Please type 'yes' or 'no'.\n"); + + if (retval != -1) { + if (f != stdin) + fclose(f); + return retval; + } + } } -#endif /* AFS */ -/* Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own identification - string. */ +/* + * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return only if ok. + */ -void ssh_exchange_identification() +void +check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, + const char *user_hostfile, const char *system_hostfile) { - char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */ - int remote_major, remote_minor, i; - int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); - int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); - extern Options options; - - /* Read other side\'s version identification. */ - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) - { - if (read(connection_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) - fatal("read: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - if (buf[i] == '\r') - { - buf[i] = '\n'; - buf[i + 1] = 0; - break; + Key *file_key; + char *type = key_type(host_key); + char *ip = NULL; + char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp; + HostStatus host_status; + HostStatus ip_status; + int local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0; + int salen; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; + int host_line, ip_line; + const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL; + + /* + * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The + * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple + * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of + * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This + * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however, + * this is probably not a real problem. + */ + /** hostaddr == 0! */ + switch (hostaddr->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + local = (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + break; + case AF_INET6: + local = IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(&(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr)); + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + break; + default: + local = 0; + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); + break; } - if (buf[i] == '\n') - { - buf[i + 1] = 0; - break; + if (local && options.host_key_alias == NULL) { + debug("Forcing accepting of host key for " + "loopback/localhost."); + return; } - } - buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; - - /* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept several - versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ - if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, - remote_version) != 3) - fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf); - debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", - remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); - - /* Check if the remote protocol version is too old. */ - if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor < 3) - fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version."); - - /* We speak 1.3, too. */ - if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 3) { - enable_compat13(); - if (options.forward_agent && strcmp(remote_version, SSH_VERSION) != 0) { - log("Agent forwarding disabled, remote version '%s' is not compatible.", - remote_version); - options.forward_agent = 0; - } - } -#if 0 - /* Removed for now, to permit compatibility with latter versions. The server - will reject our version and disconnect if it doesn't support it. */ - if (remote_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) - fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", - PROTOCOL_MAJOR, remote_major); -#endif - /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", - PROTOCOL_MAJOR, PROTOCOL_MINOR, SSH_VERSION); - if (write(connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf)) - fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); -} + /* + * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections + * using a proxy command + */ + if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { + if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, salen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), + NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) + fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed"); + ip = xstrdup(ntop); + } else { + ip = xstrdup(""); + } + /* + * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy + * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with + */ + if (options.check_host_ip && + (local || strcmp(host, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL)) + options.check_host_ip = 0; + + /* + * Allow the user to record the key under a different name. This is + * useful for ssh tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run + * multiple sshd's on different ports on the same machine. + */ + if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) { + host = options.host_key_alias; + debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", host); + } -int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES; + /* + * Store the host key from the known host file in here so that we can + * compare it with the key for the IP address. + */ + file_key = key_new(host_key->type); + + /* + * Check if the host key is present in the user\'s list of known + * hosts or in the systemwide list. + */ + host_file = user_hostfile; + host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key, file_key, &host_line); + if (host_status == HOST_NEW) { + host_file = system_hostfile; + host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key, file_key, &host_line); + } + /* + * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are + * localhost or the hostname was an ip address to begin with + */ + if (options.check_host_ip) { + Key *ip_key = key_new(host_key->type); + + ip_file = user_hostfile; + ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip, host_key, ip_key, &ip_line); + if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) { + ip_file = system_hostfile; + ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip, host_key, ip_key, &ip_line); + } + if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && + (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || !key_equal(ip_key, file_key))) + host_ip_differ = 1; + + key_free(ip_key); + } else + ip_status = host_status; + + key_free(file_key); + + switch (host_status) { + case HOST_OK: + /* The host is known and the key matches. */ + debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host key.", + host, type); + debug("Found key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line); + if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { + if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, ip, host_key)) + log("Failed to add the %s host key for IP address '%.128s' to the list of known hosts (%.30s).", + type, ip, user_hostfile); + else + log("Warning: Permanently added the %s host key for IP address '%.128s' to the list of known hosts.", + type, ip); + } + break; + case HOST_NEW: + /* The host is new. */ + if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { + /* User has requested strict host key checking. We will not add the host key + automatically. The only alternative left is to abort. */ + fatal("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you have requested strict checking.", type, host); + } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { + /* The default */ + char prompt[1024]; + fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be established.\n" + "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n" + "Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", + host, ip, type, fp); + xfree(fp); + if (!read_yes_or_no(prompt, -1)) + fatal("Aborted by user!"); + } + if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { + snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); + hostp = hostline; + } else + hostp = host; + + /* If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the local known_hosts file. */ + if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, hostp, host_key)) + log("Failed to add the host to the list of known hosts (%.500s).", + user_hostfile); + else + log("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the list of known hosts.", + hostp, type); + break; + case HOST_CHANGED: + if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { + char *msg; + if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) + msg = "is unknown"; + else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) + msg = "is unchanged"; + else + msg = "has a different value"; + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host); + error("and the key for the according IP address %s", ip); + error("%s. This could either mean that", msg); + error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); + error("and its host key have changed at the same time."); + if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) + error("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line); + } + /* The host key has changed. */ + fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); + error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); + error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type); + error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", + type, fp); + error("Please contact your system administrator."); + error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", + user_hostfile); + error("Offending key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line); + xfree(fp); + + /* + * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have + * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. + */ + if (options.strict_host_key_checking) + fatal("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have requested strict checking.", type, host); + + /* + * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow + * the connection but without password authentication or + * agent forwarding. + */ + if (options.password_authentication) { + error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid trojan horses."); + options.password_authentication = 0; + } + if (options.forward_agent) { + error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid trojan horses."); + options.forward_agent = 0; + } + if (options.forward_x11) { + error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid trojan horses."); + options.forward_x11 = 0; + } + if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 || options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { + error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid trojan horses."); + options.num_local_forwards = options.num_remote_forwards = 0; + } + /* + * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. + * This could be done by converting the host key to an + * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself + * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she whishes to + * accept the authentication. + */ + break; + } -int read_yes_or_no(const char *prompt, int defval) -{ - char buf[1024]; - FILE *f; - int retval = -1; - - if (isatty(0)) - f = stdin; - else - f = fopen("/dev/tty", "rw"); - - if (f == NULL) - return 0; - - fflush(stdout); - - while (1) - { - fprintf(stderr, "%s", prompt); - if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL) - { - /* Print a newline (the prompt probably didn\'t have one). */ - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); - strlcpy(buf, "no", sizeof buf); + if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED && + ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) { + log("Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' " + "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'", + type, host, ip); + if (host_status == HOST_OK) + log("Matching host key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line); + log("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line); + if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { + fatal("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); + } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { + if (!read_yes_or_no("Are you sure you want " \ + "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", -1)) + fatal("Aborted by user!"); + } } - /* Remove newline from response. */ - if (strchr(buf, '\n')) - *strchr(buf, '\n') = 0; - - if (buf[0] == 0) - retval = defval; - if (strcmp(buf, "yes") == 0) - retval = 1; - if (strcmp(buf, "no") == 0) - retval = 0; - - if (retval != -1) - { - if (f != stdin) - fclose(f); - return retval; + + xfree(ip); +} + +/* + * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the + * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection + * to the server must already have been established before this is called. + * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. + * This function does not require super-user privileges. + */ +void +ssh_login(Key **keys, int nkeys, const char *orighost, + struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct passwd *pw) +{ + char *host, *cp; + char *server_user, *local_user; + + local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; + + /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ + host = xstrdup(orighost); + for (cp = host; *cp; cp++) + if (isupper(*cp)) + *cp = tolower(*cp); + + /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ + ssh_exchange_identification(); + + /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ + packet_set_nonblocking(); + + /* key exchange */ + /* authenticate user */ + if (compat20) { + ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr); + ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, keys, nkeys); + } else { + ssh_kex(host, hostaddr); + ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, keys, nkeys); } - } } -/* Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the - server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection - to the server must already have been established before this is called. - User is the remote user; if it is NULL, the current local user name will - be used. Anonymous indicates that no rhosts authentication will be used. - If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. - This function does not require super-user privileges. */ - -void ssh_login(int host_key_valid, - RSA *own_host_key, - const char *orighost, - struct sockaddr_in *hostaddr, - uid_t original_real_uid) +void +ssh_put_password(char *password) { - extern Options options; - int i, type; - char *password; - struct passwd *pw; - BIGNUM *key; - RSA *host_key, *file_key; - RSA *public_key; - int bits, rbits; - unsigned char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; - const char *server_user, *local_user; - char *cp, *host, *ip = NULL; - unsigned char check_bytes[8]; - unsigned int supported_ciphers, supported_authentications, protocol_flags; - HostStatus host_status; - HostStatus ip_status; - int host_ip_differ = 0; - int local = (ntohl(hostaddr->sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; - int payload_len, clen, sum_len = 0; - u_int32_t rand = 0; - - if (options.check_host_ip) - ip = xstrdup(inet_ntoa(hostaddr->sin_addr)); - - /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ - host = xstrdup(orighost); - for (cp = host; *cp; cp++) - if (isupper(*cp)) - *cp = tolower(*cp); - - /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ - ssh_exchange_identification(); - - /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ - packet_set_nonblocking(); - - /* Get local user name. Use it as server user if no user name - was given. */ - pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid); - if (!pw) - fatal("User id %d not found from user database.", original_real_uid); - local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); - server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; - - debug("Waiting for server public key."); - - /* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */ - packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); - - /* Get check bytes from the packet. */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) - check_bytes[i] = packet_get_char(); - - /* Get the public key. */ - public_key = RSA_new(); - bits = packet_get_int(); /* bits */ - public_key->e = BN_new(); - packet_get_bignum(public_key->e, &clen); - sum_len += clen; - public_key->n = BN_new(); - packet_get_bignum(public_key->n, &clen); - sum_len += clen; - - rbits = BN_num_bits(public_key->n); - if (bits != rbits) { - log("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: " - "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); - log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); - } - - /* Get the host key. */ - host_key = RSA_new(); - bits = packet_get_int(); /* bits */ - host_key->e = BN_new(); - packet_get_bignum(host_key->e, &clen); - sum_len += clen; - host_key->n = BN_new(); - packet_get_bignum(host_key->n, &clen); - sum_len += clen; - - rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->n); - if (bits != rbits) { - log("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: " - "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); - log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); - } - - /* Store the host key from the known host file in here - * so that we can compare it with the key for the IP - * address. */ - file_key = RSA_new(); - file_key->n = BN_new(); - file_key->e = BN_new(); - - /* Get protocol flags. */ - protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); - packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags); - - /* Get supported cipher types. */ - supported_ciphers = packet_get_int(); - - /* Get supported authentication types. */ - supported_authentications = packet_get_int(); - - debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).", - BN_num_bits(public_key->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->n)); - - packet_integrity_check(payload_len, - 8 + 4 + sum_len + 0 + 4 + 0 + 0 + 4 + 4 + 4, - SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); - - /* Compute the session id. */ - compute_session_id(session_id, check_bytes, host_key->n, public_key->n); - - /* Check if the host key is present in the user\'s list of known hosts - or in the systemwide list. */ - host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, host, - host_key->e, host_key->n, - file_key->e, file_key->n); - if (host_status == HOST_NEW) - host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.system_hostfile, host, - host_key->e, host_key->n, - file_key->e, file_key->n); - /* Force accepting of the host key for localhost and 127.0.0.1. - The problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple - machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of them, - and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This essentially - disables host authentication for localhost; however, this is probably - not a real problem. */ - if (local) { - debug("Forcing accepting of host key for localhost."); - host_status = HOST_OK; - } - - /* Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are - localhost or the hostname was an ip address to begin with */ - if (options.check_host_ip && !local && strcmp(host, ip)) { - RSA *ip_key = RSA_new(); - ip_key->n = BN_new(); - ip_key->e = BN_new(); - ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, ip, - host_key->e, host_key->n, - ip_key->e, ip_key->n); - - if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) - ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.system_hostfile, ip, - host_key->e, host_key->n, - ip_key->e, ip_key->n); - if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && - (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || - (BN_cmp(ip_key->e, file_key->e) || BN_cmp(ip_key->n, file_key->n)))) - host_ip_differ = 1; - - RSA_free(ip_key); - } else - ip_status = host_status; - - RSA_free(file_key); - - switch (host_status) { - case HOST_OK: - /* The host is known and the key matches. */ - debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the host key.", host); - if (options.check_host_ip) { - if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) { - if (!add_host_to_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, ip, - host_key->e, host_key->n)) - log("Failed to add the host key for IP address '%.30s' to the list of known hosts (%.30s).", - ip, options.user_hostfile); - else - log("Warning: Permanently added host key for IP address '%.30s' to the list of known hosts.", - ip); - } else if (ip_status != HOST_OK) - log("Warning: the host key for '%.200s' differs from the key for the IP address '%.30s'", - host, ip); - } - - break; - case HOST_NEW: - { - char hostline[1000], *hostp = hostline; - /* The host is new. */ - if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { - /* User has requested strict host key checking. We will not - add the host key automatically. The only alternative left - is to abort. */ - fatal("No host key is known for %.200s and you have requested strict checking.", host); - } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { /* The default */ - char prompt[1024]; - char *fp = fingerprint(host_key->e, host_key->n); - snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), - "The authenticity of host '%.200s' can't be established.\n" - "Key fingerprint is %d %s.\n" - "Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", - host, BN_num_bits(host_key->n), fp); - if (!read_yes_or_no(prompt, -1)) - fatal("Aborted by user!\n"); - } - - if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW && strcmp(host, ip)) - snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); - else - hostp = host; - - /* If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the local - known_hosts file. */ - if (!add_host_to_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, hostp, - host_key->e, host_key->n)) - log("Failed to add the host to the list of known hosts (%.500s).", - options.user_hostfile); - else - log("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' to the list of known hosts.", - hostp); - break; - } - case HOST_CHANGED: - if (options.check_host_ip) { - if (host_ip_differ) { - char *msg; - if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) - msg = "is unknown"; - else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) - msg = "is unchanged"; - else - msg = "has a different value"; - error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); - error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); - error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); - error("The host key for %s has changed,", host); - error("and the key for the according IP address %s", ip); - error("%s. This could either mean that", msg); - error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); - error("and its host key have changed at the same time"); - } - } - - /* The host key has changed. */ - error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); - error("@ WARNING: HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); - error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); - error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); - error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); - error("It is also possible that the host key has just been changed."); - error("Please contact your system administrator."); - error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", - options.user_hostfile); - - /* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have to edit - the key manually and we can only abort. */ - if (options.strict_host_key_checking) - fatal("Host key for %.200s has changed and you have requested strict checking.", host); - - /* If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow the - connection but without password authentication or - agent forwarding. */ - if (options.password_authentication) { - error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid trojan horses."); - options.password_authentication = 0; - } - if (options.forward_agent) { - error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid trojan horses."); - options.forward_agent = 0; - } - /* XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. This could - be done by converting the host key to an identifying sentence, tell - that the host identifies itself by that sentence, and ask the user - if he/she whishes to accept the authentication. */ - break; - } - - if (options.check_host_ip) - xfree(ip); - - /* Generate a session key. */ - arc4random_stir(); - - /* Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit - random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least significant - 8 bits being the first byte of the key. */ - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - if (i % 4 == 0) - rand = arc4random(); - session_key[i] = rand & 0xff; - rand >>= 8; - } - - /* According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key is - the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with the - first 16 bytes of the session id. */ - key = BN_new(); - BN_set_word(key, 0); - for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) - { - BN_lshift(key, key, 8); - if (i < 16) - BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i]); - else - BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]); - } - - /* Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the server - (key with smaller modulus first). */ - if (BN_cmp(public_key->n, host_key->n) < 0) - { - /* Public key has smaller modulus. */ - if (BN_num_bits(host_key->n) < - BN_num_bits(public_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { - fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < public_key %d + " - "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", - BN_num_bits(host_key->n), - BN_num_bits(public_key->n), - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); - } - - rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key); - rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key); - } - else - { - /* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */ - if (BN_num_bits(public_key->n) < - BN_num_bits(host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { - fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: public_key %d < host_key %d + " - "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", - BN_num_bits(public_key->n), - BN_num_bits(host_key->n), - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); - } - - rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key); - rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key); - } - - if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) { - if (cipher_mask() & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default)) - options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default; - else { - debug("Cipher %d not supported, using %.100s instead.", - cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default), - cipher_name(SSH_FALLBACK_CIPHER)); - options.cipher = SSH_FALLBACK_CIPHER; - } - } - - /* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */ - if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher))) - fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.", - cipher_name(options.cipher)); - - debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher)); - - /* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); - packet_put_char(options.cipher); - - /* Send the check bytes back to the server. */ - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) - packet_put_char(check_bytes[i]); - - /* Send the encrypted encryption key. */ - packet_put_bignum(key); - - /* Send protocol flags. */ - packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); - - /* Send the packet now. */ - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Destroy the session key integer and the public keys since we no longer - need them. */ - BN_clear_free(key); - RSA_free(public_key); - RSA_free(host_key); - - debug("Sent encrypted session key."); - - /* Set the encryption key. */ - packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher); - - /* We will no longer need the session key here. Destroy any extra copies. */ - memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); - - /* Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message will - be received in encrypted form. */ - packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); - - debug("Received encrypted confirmation."); - - /* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER); - packet_put_string(server_user, strlen(server_user)); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* The server should respond with success if no authentication is needed - (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds with - failure. */ - type = packet_read(&payload_len); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - return; /* Connection was accepted without authentication. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", - type); - -#ifdef AFS - /* Try Kerberos tgt passing if the server supports it. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) && - options.kerberos_tgt_passing) - { - if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) - log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!"); - (void)send_kerberos_tgt(); - } - - /* Try AFS token passing if the server supports it. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN)) && - options.afs_token_passing && k_hasafs()) { - if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) - log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Token will be transmitted in the clear!"); - send_afs_tokens(); - } -#endif /* AFS */ - -#ifdef KRB4 - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) && - options.kerberos_authentication) - { - debug("Trying Kerberos authentication."); - if (try_kerberos_authentication()) { - /* The server should respond with success or failure. */ - type = packet_read(&payload_len); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - return; /* Successful connection. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos auth", type); - } - } -#endif /* KRB4 */ - - /* Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and we do not - wish to remain anonymous. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS)) && - options.rhosts_authentication) - { - debug("Trying rhosts authentication."); - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS); - packet_put_string(local_user, strlen(local_user)); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* The server should respond with success or failure. */ - type = packet_read(&payload_len); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - return; /* Successful connection. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to rhosts auth", - type); - } - - /* Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host - authentication. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) && - options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && host_key_valid) - { - if (try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, own_host_key)) - return; /* Successful authentication. */ - } - - /* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) && - options.rsa_authentication) - { - /* Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The agent - is tried first because no passphrase is needed for it, whereas - identity files may require passphrases. */ - if (try_agent_authentication()) - return; /* Successful connection. */ - - /* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */ - for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) - if (try_rsa_authentication(pw, options.identity_files[i])) - return; /* Successful connection. */ - } - - /* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) && - options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) - { - char prompt[80]; - snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.30s's password: ", - server_user, host); - debug("Doing password authentication."); - if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) - log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text."); - for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { - if (i != 0) - error("Permission denied, please try again."); - password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD); - packet_put_string(password, strlen(password)); - memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); - xfree(password); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - type = packet_read(&payload_len); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - return; /* Successful connection. */ - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type); - } - } - - /* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */ - fatal("Permission denied."); - /*NOTREACHED*/ + int size; + char *padded; + + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) { + packet_put_string(password, strlen(password)); + return; + } + size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32); + padded = xmalloc(size); + memset(padded, 0, size); + strlcpy(padded, password, size); + packet_put_string(padded, size); + memset(padded, 0, size); + xfree(padded); }