X-Git-Url: http://andersk.mit.edu/gitweb/openssh.git/blobdiff_plain/983def13fe0569789adc2639e1a917d1b329efce..26d0709572fdbde4fb94bce6b08d3df4fdb140e5:/authfd.c

diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index b3c0d9d8..8976616b 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.42 2001/06/26 04:59:59 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.66 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -53,12 +53,30 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.42 2001/06/26 04:59:59 markus Exp $");
 #include "log.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
 
+static int agent_present = 0;
+
 /* helper */
 int	decode_reply(int type);
 
 /* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
 #define agent_failed(x) \
-    ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE))
+    ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
+    (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
+
+int
+ssh_agent_present(void)
+{
+	int authfd;
+
+	if (agent_present)
+		return 1;
+	if ((authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket()) == -1)
+		return 0;
+	else {
+		ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
+		return 1;
+	}
+}
 
 /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
 
@@ -66,7 +84,7 @@ int
 ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 {
 	const char *authsocket;
-	int sock, len;
+	int sock;
 	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
 
 	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
@@ -75,10 +93,6 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 
 	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-	len = SUN_LEN(&sunaddr)+1;
-#ifdef HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN
-	sunaddr.sun_len = len;
-#endif /* HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN */
 
 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 	if (sock < 0)
@@ -89,17 +103,18 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 		close(sock);
 		return -1;
 	}
-	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, len) < 0) {
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
 		close(sock);
 		return -1;
 	}
+	agent_present = 1;
 	return sock;
 }
 
 static int
 ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
 {
-	int l, len;
+	u_int l, len;
 	char buf[1024];
 
 	/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
@@ -107,8 +122,8 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
 	PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
 
 	/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
-	if (atomicio(write, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
-	    atomicio(write, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+	    atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
 	    buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) {
 		error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
 		return 0;
@@ -117,22 +132,15 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
 	 * Wait for response from the agent.  First read the length of the
 	 * response packet.
 	 */
-	len = 4;
-	while (len > 0) {
-		l = read(auth->fd, buf + 4 - len, len);
-		if (l == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
-			continue;
-		if (l <= 0) {
-			error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
-			return 0;
-		}
-		len -= l;
+	if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4) {
+	    error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
+	    return 0;
 	}
 
 	/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
 	len = GET_32BIT(buf);
 	if (len > 256 * 1024)
-		fatal("Authentication response too long: %d", len);
+		fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
 
 	/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
 	buffer_clear(reply);
@@ -140,14 +148,11 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
 		l = len;
 		if (l > sizeof(buf))
 			l = sizeof(buf);
-		l = read(auth->fd, buf, l);
-		if (l == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
-			continue;
-		if (l <= 0) {
+		if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l) != l) {
 			error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
 			return 0;
 		}
-		buffer_append(reply, (char *) buf, l);
+		buffer_append(reply, buf, l);
 		len -= l;
 	}
 	return 1;
@@ -210,6 +215,26 @@ ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
 	xfree(auth);
 }
 
+/* Lock/unlock agent */
+int
+ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int lock, const char *password)
+{
+	int type;
+	Buffer msg;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, password);
+
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
 /*
  * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
  */
@@ -220,7 +245,7 @@ ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
 	int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
 	Buffer request;
 
-	switch(version){
+	switch (version) {
 	case 1:
 		code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
 		code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
@@ -257,7 +282,7 @@ ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
 
 	/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
 	auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
-	if (auth->howmany > 1024)
+	if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024)
 		fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
 		    auth->howmany);
 
@@ -276,6 +301,7 @@ ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versi
 Key *
 ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
 {
+	int keybits;
 	u_int bits;
 	u_char *blob;
 	u_int blen;
@@ -289,15 +315,16 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
 	 * Get the next entry from the packet.  These will abort with a fatal
 	 * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
 	 */
-	switch(version){
+	switch (version) {
 	case 1:
 		key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
 		bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
 		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
 		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
 		*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
-		if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
-			log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+		keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+		if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
+			logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
 			    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
 		break;
 	case 2:
@@ -338,7 +365,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 	if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
 		return 0;
 	if (response_type == 0) {
-		log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+		logit("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
 		return 0;
 	}
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
@@ -347,7 +374,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
 	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
 	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
-	buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16);
+	buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
 	buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
 
 	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
@@ -357,7 +384,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 	type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
 
 	if (agent_failed(type)) {
-		log("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
+		logit("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
 	} else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
 		fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
 	} else {
@@ -377,8 +404,8 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 int
 ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
     Key *key,
-    u_char **sigp, int *lenp,
-    u_char *data, int datalen)
+    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
 	extern int datafellows;
 	Buffer msg;
@@ -406,7 +433,7 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 	}
 	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
 	if (agent_failed(type)) {
-		log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+		logit("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
 	} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
 		fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
 	} else {
@@ -422,8 +449,6 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 static void
 ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
 {
-	buffer_clear(b);
-	buffer_put_char(b, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY);
 	buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
 	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
 	buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
@@ -438,10 +463,8 @@ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
 static void
 ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
 {
-	buffer_clear(b);
-	buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY);
 	buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
-	switch(key->type){
+	switch (key->type) {
 	case KEY_RSA:
 		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
 		buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
@@ -467,19 +490,28 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
  */
 
 int
-ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
+    const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm)
 {
 	Buffer msg;
-	int type;
+	int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
 
 	buffer_init(&msg);
 
 	switch (key->type) {
 	case KEY_RSA1:
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
 		ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
 		break;
 	case KEY_RSA:
 	case KEY_DSA:
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
 		ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -487,6 +519,14 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
 		return 0;
 		break;
 	}
+	if (constrained) {
+		if (life != 0) {
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+			buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
+		}
+		if (confirm != 0)
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
+	}
 	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
 		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return 0;
@@ -496,6 +536,12 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
 	return decode_reply(type);
 }
 
+int
+ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+{
+	return ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth, key, comment, 0, 0);
+}
+
 /*
  * Removes an identity from the authentication server.  This call is not
  * meant to be used by normal applications.
@@ -535,15 +581,33 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
 }
 
 int
-ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, int reader_id)
+ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add,
+    const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm)
 {
 	Buffer msg;
-	int type;
+	int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
+
+	if (add) {
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+	} else
+		type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
 
 	buffer_init(&msg);
-	buffer_put_char(&msg, add ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY :
-	    SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY);
-	buffer_put_int(&msg, reader_id);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
+	buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
+
+	if (constrained) {
+		if (life != 0) {
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+			buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
+		}
+		if (confirm != 0)
+			buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
+	}
+
 	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
 		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return 0;
@@ -585,7 +649,8 @@ decode_reply(int type)
 	switch (type) {
 	case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
 	case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
-		log("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
+	case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
+		logit("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
 		return 0;
 	case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
 		return 1;