X-Git-Url: http://andersk.mit.edu/gitweb/openssh.git/blobdiff_plain/8b314ec9f522bd6f2e8300f175b73a5ed914d730..79cfe67cb38c7c3b2f3a8024b6b96e7bbb5c5188:/monitor.c diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c index 7b4e53eb..b91cfded 100644 --- a/monitor.c +++ b/monitor.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.8 2002/03/27 17:45:42 mouring Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.30 2002/11/05 19:45:20 markus Exp $"); #include @@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ struct { u_int ivinlen; u_char *ivout; u_int ivoutlen; + u_char *ssh1key; + u_int ssh1keylen; int ssh1cipher; int ssh1protoflags; u_char *input; @@ -96,6 +98,7 @@ struct { int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *); @@ -113,6 +116,17 @@ int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *); +#ifdef USE_PAM +int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *); +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +int mm_answer_krb4(int, Buffer *); +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +int mm_answer_krb5(int, Buffer *); +#endif + static Authctxt *authctxt; static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */ @@ -120,9 +134,11 @@ static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */ static u_char *key_blob = NULL; static u_int key_bloblen = 0; static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; -static u_char *hostbased_cuser = NULL; -static u_char *hostbased_chost = NULL; +static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL; +static char *hostbased_chost = NULL; static char *auth_method = "unknown"; +static int session_id2_len = 0; +static u_char *session_id2 = NULL; struct mon_table { enum monitor_reqtype type; @@ -143,8 +159,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, -#if !defined(USE_PAM) + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, +#ifdef USE_PAM + {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, @@ -172,9 +190,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = { {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey}, {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid}, -#if !defined(USE_PAM) {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, -#endif {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge}, @@ -186,6 +202,15 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = { #ifdef SKEY {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond}, +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + {MONITOR_REQ_KRB4, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTH, mm_answer_krb4}, +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + {MONITOR_REQ_KRB5, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTH, mm_answer_krb5}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; @@ -229,7 +254,7 @@ monitor_permit_authentications(int permit) } Authctxt * -monitor_child_preauth(struct monitor *monitor) +monitor_child_preauth(struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct mon_table *ent; int authenticated = 0; @@ -252,14 +277,18 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct monitor *monitor) /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ while (!authenticated) { - authenticated = monitor_read(monitor, mon_dispatch, &ent); + authenticated = monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent); if (authenticated) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE)) fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d", - __FUNCTION__, ent->type); + __func__, ent->type); if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(auth_method)) authenticated = 0; +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (!do_pam_account(authctxt->pw->pw_name, NULL)) + authenticated = 0; +#endif } if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) { @@ -271,18 +300,18 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct monitor *monitor) } if (!authctxt->valid) - fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__); debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process", - __FUNCTION__, authctxt->user); + __func__, authctxt->user); - mm_get_keystate(monitor); + mm_get_keystate(pmonitor); return (authctxt); } void -monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *monitor) +monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor) { if (compat20) { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20; @@ -302,18 +331,20 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *monitor) } for (;;) - monitor_read(monitor, mon_dispatch, NULL); + monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL); } void -monitor_sync(struct monitor *monitor) +monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor) { - /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */ - mm_share_sync(&monitor->m_zlib, &monitor->m_zback); + if (options.compression) { + /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */ + mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback); + } } int -monitor_read(struct monitor *monitor, struct mon_table *ent, +monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, struct mon_table **pent) { Buffer m; @@ -322,10 +353,10 @@ monitor_read(struct monitor *monitor, struct mon_table *ent, buffer_init(&m); - mm_request_receive(monitor->m_sendfd, &m); + mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); type = buffer_get_char(&m); - debug3("%s: checking request %d", __FUNCTION__, type); + debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type); while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) @@ -335,14 +366,14 @@ monitor_read(struct monitor *monitor, struct mon_table *ent, if (ent->f != NULL) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT)) - fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __FUNCTION__, + fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__, type); - ret = (*ent->f)(monitor->m_sendfd, &m); + ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); buffer_free(&m); /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */ if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) { - debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __FUNCTION__, + debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__, type); ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; } @@ -353,7 +384,7 @@ monitor_read(struct monitor *monitor, struct mon_table *ent, return ret; } - fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __FUNCTION__, type); + fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type); /* NOTREACHED */ return (-1); @@ -398,11 +429,11 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int socket, Buffer *m) max = buffer_get_int(m); debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d", - __FUNCTION__, min, want, max); + __func__, min, want, max); /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */ if (max < min || want < min || max < want) fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d", - __FUNCTION__, min, want, max); + __func__, min, want, max); buffer_clear(m); @@ -431,20 +462,27 @@ mm_answer_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) u_int siglen, datlen; int keyid; - debug3("%s", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s", __func__); keyid = buffer_get_int(m); p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen); if (datlen != 20) - fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __FUNCTION__, datlen); + fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen); + + /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */ + if (session_id2_len == 0) { + session_id2_len = datlen; + session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); + memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len); + } if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __FUNCTION__, keyid); + fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid); if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0) - fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__); - debug3("%s: signature %p(%d)", __FUNCTION__, signature, siglen); + debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen); @@ -469,10 +507,10 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int socket, Buffer *m) struct passwd *pwent; int allowed = 0; - debug3("%s", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s", __func__); if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0) - fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__); login = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); @@ -505,16 +543,36 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int socket, Buffer *m) buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell); out: - debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __FUNCTION__, allowed); + debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed); mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m); /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */ if (!compat20) monitor_permit_authentications(1); - else + else { /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); + } +#ifdef USE_PAM + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1); +#endif + + return (0); +} + +int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int socket, Buffer *m) +{ + char *banner; + + buffer_clear(m); + banner = auth2_read_banner(); + buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : ""); + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); + + if (banner != NULL) + xfree(banner); return (0); } @@ -527,7 +585,7 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int socket, Buffer *m) authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s", - __FUNCTION__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style); + __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style); if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) { xfree(authctxt->style); @@ -537,24 +595,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int socket, Buffer *m) return (0); } -#if !defined(USE_PAM) int mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m) { static int call_count; char *passwd; - int authenticated, plen; + int authenticated; + u_int plen; passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen); /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */ - authenticated = authctxt->valid && auth_password(authctxt, passwd); + authenticated = options.password_authentication && + authctxt->valid && auth_password(authctxt, passwd); memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd)); xfree(passwd); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); - debug3("%s: sending result %d", __FUNCTION__, authenticated); + debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m); call_count++; @@ -566,7 +625,6 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m) /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } -#endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH int @@ -586,7 +644,7 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int socket, Buffer *m) if (res != -1) buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]); - debug3("%s: sending challenge res: %d", __FUNCTION__, res); + debug3("%s: sending challenge res: %d", __func__, res); mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); if (res != -1) { @@ -606,18 +664,19 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int socket, Buffer *m) int authok; if (authctxt->as == 0) - fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__); response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); - authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0); + authok = options.challenge_response_authentication && + auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0); authctxt->as = NULL; - debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __FUNCTION__, response, authok); + debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok); xfree(response); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authok); - debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __FUNCTION__, authok); + debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); auth_method = "bsdauth"; @@ -641,7 +700,7 @@ mm_answer_skeyquery(int socket, Buffer *m) if (res != -1) buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge); - debug3("%s: sending challenge res: %d", __FUNCTION__, res); + debug3("%s: sending challenge res: %d", __func__, res); mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m); return (0); @@ -655,7 +714,8 @@ mm_answer_skeyrespond(int socket, Buffer *m) response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); - authok = (authctxt->valid && + authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication && + authctxt->valid && skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 && skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1); @@ -664,7 +724,7 @@ mm_answer_skeyrespond(int socket, Buffer *m) buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authok); - debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __FUNCTION__, authok); + debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m); auth_method = "skey"; @@ -673,11 +733,27 @@ mm_answer_skeyrespond(int socket, Buffer *m) } #endif +#ifdef USE_PAM +int +mm_answer_pam_start(int socket, Buffer *m) +{ + char *user; + + user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); + + start_pam(user); + + xfree(user); + + return (0); +} +#endif + static void mm_append_debug(Buffer *m) { if (auth_debug_init && buffer_len(&auth_debug)) { - debug3("%s: Appending debug messages for child", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s: Appending debug messages for child", __func__); buffer_append(m, buffer_ptr(&auth_debug), buffer_len(&auth_debug)); buffer_clear(&auth_debug); @@ -688,12 +764,13 @@ int mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m) { Key *key; - u_char *cuser, *chost, *blob; + char *cuser, *chost; + u_char *blob; u_int bloblen; enum mm_keytype type = 0; int allowed = 0; - debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s entering", __func__); type = buffer_get_int(m); cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); @@ -704,26 +781,29 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m) if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) || (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)) - fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__); - debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __FUNCTION__, key); + debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key); if (key != NULL && authctxt->pw != NULL) { switch(type) { case MM_USERKEY: - allowed = user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key); + allowed = options.pubkey_authentication && + user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: - allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, + allowed = options.hostbased_authentication && + hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); break; case MM_RSAHOSTKEY: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */ - allowed = auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, + allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && + auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); break; default: - fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __FUNCTION__, type); + fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type); break; } key_free(key); @@ -742,7 +822,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m) } debug3("%s: key %p is %s", - __FUNCTION__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "disallowed"); + __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "disallowed"); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, allowed); @@ -761,20 +841,28 @@ static int monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer b; - u_char *p; + char *p; u_int len; int fail = 0; - int session_id2_len = 20 /*XXX should get from [net] */; buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, data, datalen); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { + p = buffer_ptr(&b); + len = buffer_len(&b); + if ((session_id2 == NULL) || + (len < session_id2_len) || + (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) + fail++; buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len); } else { - xfree(buffer_get_string(&b, &len)); - if (len != session_id2_len) + p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); + if ((session_id2 == NULL) || + (len != session_id2_len) || + (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; + xfree(p); } if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; @@ -806,21 +894,24 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) } static int -monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, u_char *cuser, - u_char *chost) +monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser, + char *chost) { Buffer b; - u_char *p; + char *p; u_int len; int fail = 0; - int session_id2_len = 20 /*XXX should get from [net] */; buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, data, datalen); - xfree(buffer_get_string(&b, &len)); - if (len != session_id2_len) + p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); + if ((session_id2 == NULL) || + (len != session_id2_len) || + (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; + xfree(p); + if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); @@ -873,11 +964,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int socket, Buffer *m) if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) - fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); if (key == NULL) - fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__); switch (key_blobtype) { case MM_USERKEY: @@ -892,25 +983,25 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int socket, Buffer *m) break; } if (!valid_data) - fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", - __FUNCTION__, key, verified ? "verified" : "unverified"); + __func__, key, verified ? "verified" : "unverified"); key_free(key); xfree(blob); xfree(signature); xfree(data); + auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased"; + monitor_reset_key_state(); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, verified); mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); - auth_method = "publickey"; - return (verified); } @@ -925,8 +1016,8 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw) * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { - fromlen = sizeof(from); if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); @@ -936,15 +1027,15 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw) /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping), - (struct sockaddr *)&from); + (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); } static void mm_session_close(Session *s) { - debug3("%s: session %d pid %d", __FUNCTION__, s->self, s->pid); + debug3("%s: session %d pid %d", __func__, s->self, s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { - debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __FUNCTION__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); + debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup2, (void *)s); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } @@ -954,11 +1045,11 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s) int mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m) { - extern struct monitor *monitor; + extern struct monitor *pmonitor; Session *s; int res, fd0; - debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_clear(m); s = session_new(); @@ -966,7 +1057,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m) goto error; s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; - s->pid = monitor->m_pid; + s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid; res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)); if (res == 0) goto error; @@ -982,7 +1073,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m) /* We need to trick ttyslot */ if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1) - fatal("%s: dup2", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: dup2", __func__); mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw); @@ -991,9 +1082,9 @@ mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m) /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0) - fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno)); + fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (fd0 != 0) - error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __FUNCTION__, fd0); + error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0); /* slave is not needed */ close(s->ttyfd); @@ -1001,7 +1092,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m) /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */ s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd; - debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __FUNCTION__, s->tty, s->ttyfd); + debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd); return (0); @@ -1019,7 +1110,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int socket, Buffer *m) Session *s; char *tty; - debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s entering", __func__); tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) @@ -1039,7 +1130,7 @@ mm_answer_sesskey(int socket, Buffer *m) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1); if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_new", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(m, p); @@ -1064,10 +1155,10 @@ mm_answer_sessid(int socket, Buffer *m) { int i; - debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (buffer_len(m) != 16) - fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m); @@ -1086,11 +1177,11 @@ mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m) u_int blen = 0; int allowed = 0; - debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s entering", __func__); - if (authctxt->valid) { + if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) { if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_new", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n); allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key); BN_clear_free(client_n); @@ -1104,7 +1195,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m) if (allowed && key != NULL) { key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) - fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen); /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ @@ -1130,17 +1221,17 @@ mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int socket, Buffer *m) u_char *blob; u_int blen; - debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!authctxt->valid) - fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen); if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen)) - fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY) - fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: received bad key", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__); if (ssh1_challenge) BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge); @@ -1149,7 +1240,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int socket, Buffer *m) buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge); - debug3("%s sending reply", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s sending reply", __func__); mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1); @@ -1164,23 +1255,23 @@ mm_answer_rsa_response(int socket, Buffer *m) u_int blen, len; int success; - debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!authctxt->valid) - fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__); if (ssh1_challenge == NULL) - fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen); if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen)) - fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY) - fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __FUNCTION__, key_blobtype); + fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: received bad key", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__); response = buffer_get_string(m, &len); if (len != 16) - fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__); success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response); key_free(key); @@ -1200,19 +1291,103 @@ mm_answer_rsa_response(int socket, Buffer *m) return (success); } +#ifdef KRB4 +int +mm_answer_krb4(int socket, Buffer *m) +{ + KTEXT_ST auth, reply; + char *client, *p; + int success; + u_int alen; + + reply.length = auth.length = 0; + + p = buffer_get_string(m, &alen); + if (alen >= MAX_KTXT_LEN) + fatal("%s: auth too large", __func__); + memcpy(auth.dat, p, alen); + auth.length = alen; + memset(p, 0, alen); + xfree(p); + + success = options.kerberos_authentication && + authctxt->valid && + auth_krb4(authctxt, &auth, &client, &reply); + + memset(auth.dat, 0, alen); + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, success); + + if (success) { + buffer_put_cstring(m, client); + buffer_put_string(m, reply.dat, reply.length); + if (client) + xfree(client); + if (reply.length) + memset(reply.dat, 0, reply.length); + } + + debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, success); + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KRB4, m); + + auth_method = "kerberos"; + + /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */ + return (success); +} +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +int +mm_answer_krb5(int socket, Buffer *m) +{ + krb5_data tkt, reply; + char *client_user; + u_int len; + int success; + + /* use temporary var to avoid size issues on 64bit arch */ + tkt.data = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + tkt.length = len; + + success = options.kerberos_authentication && + authctxt->valid && + auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user, &reply); + + if (tkt.length) + xfree(tkt.data); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, success); + + if (success) { + buffer_put_cstring(m, client_user); + buffer_put_string(m, reply.data, reply.length); + if (client_user) + xfree(client_user); + if (reply.length) + xfree(reply.data); + } + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KRB5, m); + + return success; +} +#endif + int mm_answer_term(int socket, Buffer *req) { - extern struct monitor *monitor; + extern struct monitor *pmonitor; int res, status; - debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__); /* The child is terminating */ session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close); - if (waitpid(monitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) - exit(1); + while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) + if (errno != EINTR) + exit(1); res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1; @@ -1221,20 +1396,19 @@ mm_answer_term(int socket, Buffer *req) } void -monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) +monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { if (compat20) { set_newkeys(MODE_IN); set_newkeys(MODE_OUT); } else { - u_char key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; - - memset(key, 'a', sizeof(key)); packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags); - packet_set_encryption_key(key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, - child_state.ssh1cipher); + packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key, + child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher); + xfree(child_state.ssh1key); } + /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */ packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout); xfree(child_state.keyout); packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin); @@ -1253,7 +1427,8 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) sizeof(outgoing_stream)); /* Update with new address */ - mm_init_compression(monitor->m_zlib); + if (options.compression) + mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib); /* Network I/O buffers */ /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */ @@ -1278,6 +1453,10 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex)); memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex)); kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len); + if ((session_id2 == NULL) || + (kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len) || + (memcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) + fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id"); kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m); kex->server = 1; kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); @@ -1303,33 +1482,35 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) /* This function requries careful sanity checking */ void -mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) +mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { Buffer m; u_char *blob, *p; u_int bloblen, plen; - debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); buffer_init(&m); - mm_request_receive_expect(monitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m); if (!compat20) { child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m); child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m); + child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m, + &child_state.ssh1keylen); child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivoutlen); child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen); goto skip; } else { /* Get the Kex for rekeying */ - *monitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m); + *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m); } blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); xfree(blob); - debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); xfree(blob); @@ -1343,22 +1524,22 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen); child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen); - debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__); /* Get compression state */ p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen); if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing)) - fatal("%s: bad request size", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__); memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing)); xfree(p); p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen); if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming)) - fatal("%s: bad request size", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__); memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming)); xfree(p); /* Network I/O buffers */ - debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __FUNCTION__); + debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__); child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen); child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen); @@ -1370,9 +1551,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) void * mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size) { + size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount; void *address; - address = mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount); + if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size) + fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size); + + address = mm_malloc(mm, len); return (address); } @@ -1405,8 +1590,13 @@ mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm) static void monitor_socketpair(int *pair) { +#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) - fatal("%s: socketpair", __FUNCTION__); + fatal("%s: socketpair", __func__); +#else + fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes not supported", + __func__); +#endif FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); } @@ -1427,11 +1617,13 @@ monitor_init(void) mon->m_sendfd = pair[1]; /* Used to share zlib space across processes */ - mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE); - mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE); + if (options.compression) { + mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE); + mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE); - /* Compression needs to share state across borders */ - mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib); + /* Compression needs to share state across borders */ + mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib); + } return mon; }