X-Git-Url: http://andersk.mit.edu/gitweb/openssh.git/blobdiff_plain/09ab32966bde7f08cedb7b029981b6cec2e7307a..cd744742c3efb60d9791f485ce57956223e4aaa0:/sshconnect.c diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c index 8aac221d..dfeddd39 100644 --- a/sshconnect.c +++ b/sshconnect.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.141 2003/05/15 14:55:25 djm Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.156 2004/01/25 03:49:09 djm Exp $"); #include @@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.141 2003/05/15 14:55:25 djm Exp $"); #include "misc.h" #include "readpass.h" -#ifdef DNS #include "dns.h" -#endif char *client_version_string = NULL; char *server_version_string = NULL; +int matching_host_key_dns = 0; + /* import */ extern Options options; extern char *__progname; @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ extern pid_t proxy_command_pid; #endif static int show_other_keys(const char *, Key *); +static void warn_changed_key(Key *); /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. @@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) * Build the final command string in the buffer by making the * appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command. * - * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms + * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms * (e.g. Solaris) */ buffer_init(&command); @@ -225,24 +226,24 @@ timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, fd_set *fdset; struct timeval tv; socklen_t optlen; - int fdsetsz, optval, rc; + int fdsetsz, optval, rc, result = -1; if (timeout <= 0) return (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen)); - if (fcntl(sockfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) - return (-1); - + set_nonblock(sockfd); rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); - if (rc == 0) + if (rc == 0) { + unset_nonblock(sockfd); return (0); + } if (errno != EINPROGRESS) return (-1); fdsetsz = howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz); - memset(fdset, '\0', fdsetsz); + memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz); FD_SET(sockfd, fdset); tv.tv_sec = timeout; tv.tv_usec = 0; @@ -257,30 +258,34 @@ timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, case 0: /* Timed out */ errno = ETIMEDOUT; - return (-1); + break; case -1: /* Select error */ - debug("select: %s", strerror(errno)); - return (-1); + debug("select: %s", strerror(errno)); + break; case 1: /* Completed or failed */ optval = 0; optlen = sizeof(optval); - if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, - &optlen) == -1) - debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno)); - return (-1); + if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, + &optlen) == -1) { + debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno)); + break; + } if (optval != 0) { errno = optval; - return (-1); + break; } + result = 0; + unset_nonblock(sockfd); break; default: /* Should not occur */ fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc); } - return (0); + xfree(fdset); + return (result); } /* @@ -411,8 +416,8 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr, debug("Connection established."); - /* Set keepalives if requested. */ - if (options.keepalives && + /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ + if (options.tcp_keep_alive && setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); @@ -517,7 +522,7 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(void) compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1, SSH_VERSION); - if (atomicio(write, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf)) + if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf)) fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); chop(client_version_string); @@ -559,7 +564,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, int readonly, const char *user_hostfile, const char *system_hostfile) { Key *file_key; - char *type = key_type(host_key); + const char *type = key_type(host_key); char *ip = NULL; char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp; HostStatus host_status; @@ -568,7 +573,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, int salen; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; char msg[1024]; - int len, host_line, ip_line, has_keys; + int len, host_line, ip_line; const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL; /* @@ -712,19 +717,34 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, "have requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { - has_keys = show_other_keys(host, host_key); + char msg1[1024], msg2[1024]; + + if (show_other_keys(host, host_key)) + snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), + "\nbut keys of different type are already" + " known for this host."); + else + snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); /* The default */ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + msg2[0] = '\0'; + if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { + if (matching_host_key_dns) + snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), + "Matching host key fingerprint" + " found in DNS.\n"); + else + snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), + "No matching host key fingerprint" + " found in DNS.\n"); + } snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " "established%s\n" - "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n" + "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n%s" "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " "(yes/no)? ", - host, ip, - has_keys ? ",\nbut keys of different type are already " - "known for this host." : ".", - type, fp); + host, ip, msg1, type, fp, msg2); xfree(fp); if (!confirm(msg)) goto fail; @@ -767,20 +787,10 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, error("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line); } /* The host key has changed. */ - fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); - error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); - error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); - error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); - error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); - error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); - error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type); - error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", - type, fp); - error("Please contact your system administrator."); + warn_changed_key(host_key); error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", user_hostfile); error("Offending key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line); - xfree(fp); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have @@ -794,7 +804,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, /* * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow - * the connection but without password authentication or + * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or * agent forwarding. */ if (options.password_authentication) { @@ -802,6 +812,17 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.password_authentication = 0; } + if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) { + error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled" + " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; + options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; + } + if (options.challenge_response_authentication) { + error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled" + " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; + } if (options.forward_agent) { error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); @@ -846,7 +867,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, host_file, host_line); } if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { - logit(msg); + logit("%s", msg); error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { @@ -855,7 +876,7 @@ check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key, if (!confirm(msg)) goto fail; } else { - logit(msg); + logit("%s", msg); } } @@ -872,22 +893,27 @@ int verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) { struct stat st; + int flags = 0; -#ifdef DNS - if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { - switch(verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key)) { - case DNS_VERIFY_OK: - return 0; - case DNS_VERIFY_FAILED: - return -1; - case DNS_VERIFY_ERROR: - break; - default: - debug3("bad return value from verify_host_key_dns"); - break; + if (options.verify_host_key_dns && + verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) { + + if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { + + if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && + flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && + flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) + return 0; + + if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { + matching_host_key_dns = 1; + } else { + warn_changed_key(host_key); + error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new " + "host key to get rid of this message."); + } } } -#endif /* DNS */ /* return ok if the key can be found in an old keyfile */ if (stat(options.system_hostfile2, &st) == 0 || @@ -1013,3 +1039,24 @@ show_other_keys(const char *host, Key *key) } return (found); } + +static void +warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) +{ + char *fp; + const char *type = key_type(host_key); + + fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); + error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); + error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type); + error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", + type, fp); + error("Please contact your system administrator."); + + xfree(fp); +}