*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.273 2003/07/16 10:34:53 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.279 2003/09/26 08:19:29 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
/* message to be displayed after login */
Buffer loginmsg;
+/* global authentication context */
+Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
+
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
strlen(server_version_string))
!= strlen(server_version_string)) {
logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
- fatal_cleanup();
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
/* Read other sides version identification. */
if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
get_remote_ipaddr());
- fatal_cleanup();
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (buf[i] == '\r') {
buf[i] = 0;
close(sock_out);
logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
- fatal_cleanup();
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) {
logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
- fatal_cleanup();
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
- fatal_cleanup();
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
mismatch = 0;
logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
get_remote_ipaddr(),
server_version_string, client_version_string);
- fatal_cleanup();
+ cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
#endif
}
-static Authctxt *
-privsep_preauth(void)
+static int
+privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- Authctxt *authctxt = NULL;
int status;
pid_t pid;
if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
} else if (pid != 0) {
- fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL);
-
debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
- authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(pmonitor);
+ monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
/* Sync memory */
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
-
- /* Reinstall, since the child has finished */
- fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL);
-
- return (authctxt);
+ return (1);
} else {
/* child */
privsep_preauth_child();
setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
}
- return (NULL);
+ return (0);
}
static void
privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- extern Authctxt *x_authctxt;
-
- /* XXX - Remote port forwarding */
- x_authctxt = authctxt;
-
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
if (1) {
#else
if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
- fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL);
-
debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
int listen_sock, maxfd;
int startup_p[2];
int startups = 0;
- Authctxt *authctxt;
Key *key;
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
int ret, key_used = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
#endif
- __progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
init_rng();
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
- if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
- error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
- close(listen_sock);
- continue;
- }
/*
* Set socket options.
* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
- if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) {
- error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
- close(newsock);
- continue;
- }
if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
close(newsock);
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
key_used == 0) {
/* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
- mysignal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
+ signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
key_used = 1;
}
* mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
* are about to discover the bug.
*/
- mysignal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
+ signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
if (!debug_flag)
alarm(options.login_grace_time);
sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
- /*
- * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
- * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged
- * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
- * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these
- * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
- */
- if (options.rhosts_authentication &&
- (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED ||
- remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2)) {
- debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, "
- "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port);
- options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
- }
-#if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5)
- if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() &&
- options.kerberos_authentication) {
- debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4.");
- options.kerberos_authentication = 0;
- }
-#endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */
-#ifdef AFS
- /* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */
- if (k_hasafs()) {
- k_setpag();
- k_unlog();
- }
-#endif /* AFS */
packet_set_nonblocking();
/* prepare buffers to collect authentication messages */
buffer_init(&loginmsg);
+ /* allocate authentication context */
+ authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
+ memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+
+ /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
+ the_authctxt = authctxt;
+
if (use_privsep)
- if ((authctxt = privsep_preauth()) != NULL)
+ if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
goto authenticated;
/* perform the key exchange */
/* authenticate user and start session */
if (compat20) {
do_ssh2_kex();
- authctxt = do_authentication2();
+ do_authentication2(authctxt);
} else {
do_ssh1_kex();
- authctxt = do_authentication();
+ do_authentication(authctxt);
}
/*
* If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
destroy_sensitive_data();
}
- /* Perform session preparation. */
+ /* Start session. */
do_authenticated(authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
/* Declare supported authentication types. */
auth_mask = 0;
- if (options.rhosts_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS;
if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
if (options.rsa_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
-#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
- if (options.kerberos_authentication)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS;
-#endif
-#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
- if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT;
-#endif
-#ifdef AFS
- if (options.afs_token_passing)
- auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN;
-#endif
if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
if (options.password_authentication)
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
+
+/* server specific fatal cleanup */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+ if (the_authctxt)
+ do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+ _exit(i);
+}