- stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/26 20:35:10
[ssh.1]
sort ChallengeResponseAuthentication; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/28 16:45:27
+ [monitor_mm.c]
+ print strerror(errno) on mmap/munmap error; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/28 17:28:02
+ [uidswap.c]
+ format spec change/casts and some KNF; ok markus@
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/28 21:24:00
+ [uidswap.c]
+ use correct function name in fatal()
+ - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/29 03:06:30
+ [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+ spelling
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/29 11:21:57
+ [sshd.c]
+ don't start if privsep is enabled and SSH_PRIVSEP_USER or
+ _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR are missing; ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/30 08:07:31
+ [cipher.c]
+ use rijndael/aes from libcrypto (openssl >= 0.9.7) instead of
+ our own implementation. allow use of AES hardware via libcrypto,
+ ok deraadt@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 10:30:33
+ [sshconnect2.c]
+ extent ssh-keysign protocol:
+ pass # of socket-fd to ssh-keysign, keysign verfies locally used
+ ip-address using this socket-fd, restricts fake local hostnames
+ to actual local hostnames; ok stevesk@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 11:35:15
+ [auth.h auth2.c]
+ move Authmethod definitons to per-method file.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 13:16:48
+ [key.c]
+ add comment:
+ key_verify returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for an incorrect signature
+ and -1 on error.
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 13:20:50
+ [ssh-rsa.c]
+ pad received signature with leading zeros, because RSA_verify expects
+ a signature of RSA_size. the drafts says the signature is transmitted
+ unpadded (e.g. putty does not pad), reported by anakin@pobox.com
+ - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/03 12:04:07
+ [ssh.h]
+ compatiblity -> compatibility
+ decriptor -> descriptor
+ authentciated -> authenticated
+ transmition -> transmission
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 19:42:35
+ [monitor.c]
+ only allow enabled authentication methods; ok provos@
+ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/04 19:53:40
+ [monitor.c]
+ save the session id (hash) for ssh2 (it will be passed with the
+ initial sign request) and verify that this value is used during
+ authentication; ok provos@
20020604
- (stevesk) [channels.c] bug #164 patch from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki (changed