[buildpkg.sh.in] Last minute fix didn't make it in the .in file. :-(

[openssh.git] / auth-rsa.c

diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
index 92f6277f9a06ed35e1c72bb239cef4572b18c206..8a02b8a8f36cc087dded79a35b56ce681f473bcf 100644 (file)
--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rsa.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.56 2002/06/10 16:53:06 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.59 2004/05/09 01:19:27 djm Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.56 2002/06/10 16:53:06 stevesk Exp $");
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
-#include "mpaux.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
@@ -187,7 +186,7 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
            secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
                xfree(file);
                fclose(f);
-               log("Authentication refused: %s", line);
+               logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
                restore_uid();
                return (0);
        }
@@ -246,7 +245,7 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
 
                /* check the real bits  */
                if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
-                       log("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
+                       logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
                            "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
                            file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
 
@@ -284,13 +283,14 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
  * successful.  This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
  */
 int
-auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
+auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
 {
        Key *key;
        char *fp;
+       struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
 
        /* no user given */
-       if (pw == NULL)
+       if (!authctxt->valid)
                return 0;
 
        if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {