+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.83 2010/01/13 23:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.54 2004/05/23 23:59:53 dtucker Exp $");
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
#include <shadow.h>
#endif
-
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
#include <libgen.h>
#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "misc.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
#include "packet.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int use_privsep;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
/* Debugging messages */
Buffer auth_debug;
{
struct stat st;
const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
- char *shell;
- int i;
+ char *shell, *tmp, *chroot_path;
+ u_int i;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#endif
#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
+ passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (spw != NULL)
- passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+ passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else
- passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
+ passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
#endif
/* check for locked account */
if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
locked = 1;
#endif
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+ free(passwd);
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
if (locked) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
pw->pw_name);
* Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
* legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/
- shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+ shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
+ _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell);
+
+ /*
+ * Amend shell if chroot is requested.
+ */
+ if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
+ pw->pw_uid);
+ chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+ xfree(tmp);
+ xasprintf(&tmp, "%s/%s", chroot_path, shell);
+ xfree(shell);
+ shell = tmp;
+ free(chroot_path);
+ }
/* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
pw->pw_name, shell);
+ xfree(shell);
return 0;
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
(st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
pw->pw_name, shell);
+ xfree(shell);
return 0;
}
+ xfree(shell);
- if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) {
+ if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
+ options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
options.deny_users[i])) {
- logit("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
- pw->pw_name);
+ logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+ "because listed in DenyUsers",
+ pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
break;
/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
- logit("User %.100s not allowed because not listed in AllowUsers",
- pw->pw_name);
+ logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+ "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
- logit("User %.100s not allowed because not in any group",
- pw->pw_name);
+ logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+ "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
options.num_deny_groups)) {
ga_free();
- logit("User %.100s not allowed because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
- pw->pw_name);
+ logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+ "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
+ pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
/*
if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
options.num_allow_groups)) {
ga_free();
- logit("User %.100s not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups",
- pw->pw_name);
+ logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+ "because none of user's groups are listed "
+ "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
ga_free();
}
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
- /*
- * Don't check loginrestrictions() for root account (use
- * PermitRootLogin to control logins via ssh), or if running as
- * non-root user (since loginrestrictions will always fail).
- */
- if ((pw->pw_uid != 0) && (geteuid() == 0)) {
- char *msg;
-
- if (loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &msg) != 0) {
- int loginrestrict_errno = errno;
-
- if (msg && *msg) {
- buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
- aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
- logit("Login restricted for %s: %.100s",
- pw->pw_name, msg);
- }
- /* Don't fail if /etc/nologin set */
- if (!(loginrestrict_errno == EPERM &&
- stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0))
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
+ if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
+ return 0;
+#endif
/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
return 1;
void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
char *authmsg;
+ if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
+ return;
+
/* Raise logging level */
if (authenticated == 1 ||
!authctxt->valid ||
authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
authmsg,
method,
- authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
get_remote_ipaddr(),
get_remote_port(),
info);
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
- if (authenticated == 0 && strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
- record_failed_login(authctxt->user, "ssh");
+ if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
+ (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
+ strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
+ record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
+ get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
+# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+ if (authenticated)
+ sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
+ get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
+ audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
#endif
}
switch (options.permit_root_login) {
case PERMIT_YES:
return 1;
- break;
case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
return 1;
*
* This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
*/
-char *
-expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
+static char *
+expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
{
- Buffer buffer;
- char *file;
- const char *cp;
+ char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
+ int i;
- /*
- * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate
- * substitutions to the given file name.
- */
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) {
- if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
- buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1);
- cp++;
- continue;
- }
- if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
- buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
- cp++;
- continue;
- }
- if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
- buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
- strlen(pw->pw_name));
- cp++;
- continue;
- }
- buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1);
- }
- buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
+ file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
/*
* Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
* compatible and prepend the '%h/'
*/
- file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer);
- if (*cp != '/')
- snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp);
- else
- strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN);
-
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return file;
+ if (*file == '/')
+ return (file);
+
+ i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
+ if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
+ fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
+ xfree(file);
+ return (xstrdup(ret));
}
char *
authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
{
- return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
+ return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
}
char *
authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
{
- return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
+ return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
}
/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
*
* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
-int
+static int
secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
char *err, size_t errlen)
{
return -1;
}
- /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
+ /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
buf);
return 0;
}
+FILE *
+auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+{
+ char line[1024];
+ struct stat st;
+ int fd;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ /*
+ * Open the file containing the authorized keys
+ * Fail quietly if file does not exist
+ */
+ if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
+ if (errno != ENOENT)
+ debug("Could not open keyfile '%s': %s", file,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+ logit("User %s authorized keys %s is not a regular file",
+ pw->pw_name, file);
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ unset_nonblock(fd);
+ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
+ close(fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (options.strict_modes &&
+ secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
+ fclose(f);
+ logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return f;
+}
+
struct passwd *
getpwnamallow(const char *user)
{
#endif
struct passwd *pw;
+ parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
+ get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr());
+
pw = getpwnam(user);
if (pw == NULL) {
- logit("Illegal user %.100s from %.100s",
+ logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
user, get_remote_ipaddr());
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
- record_failed_login(user, "ssh");
+ record_failed_login(user,
+ get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
return (NULL);
}
if (!allowed_user(pw))
fake.pw_passwd =
"$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
- fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1;
- fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1;
+ fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
+ fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
fake.pw_class = "";
#endif
andersk / openssh.git / blobdiff