/*
- *
- * authfd.c
- *
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- *
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
- *
- * Created: Wed Mar 29 01:30:28 1995 ylo
- *
* Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
- *
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id$");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.65 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "ssh.h"
#include "rsa.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "bufaux.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "getput.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+static int agent_present = 0;
+
+/* helper */
+int decode_reply(int type);
+
+/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
+#define agent_failed(x) \
+ ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
+ (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
+
+int
+ssh_agent_present(void)
+{
+ int authfd;
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL
-#include <ssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
+ if (agent_present)
+ return 1;
+ if ((authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket()) == -1)
+ return 0;
+ else {
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
int
-ssh_get_authentication_socket()
+ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
{
const char *authsocket;
int sock;
close(sock);
return -1;
}
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) {
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
close(sock);
return -1;
}
+ agent_present = 1;
return sock;
}
+static int
+ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
+{
+ int l;
+ u_int len;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
+ len = buffer_len(request);
+ PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
+
+ /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+ atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
+ buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) {
+ error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
+ * response packet.
+ */
+ if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4) {
+ error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
+ len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+ if (len > 256 * 1024)
+ fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
+
+ /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
+ buffer_clear(reply);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ l = len;
+ if (l > sizeof(buf))
+ l = sizeof(buf);
+ if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l) != l) {
+ error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buffer_append(reply, buf, l);
+ len -= l;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
* obtained). The argument must have been returned by
* ssh_get_authentication_socket().
*/
-void
+void
ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
{
if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
*/
AuthenticationConnection *
-ssh_get_authentication_connection()
+ssh_get_authentication_connection(void)
{
AuthenticationConnection *auth;
int sock;
auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
auth->fd = sock;
- buffer_init(&auth->packet);
buffer_init(&auth->identities);
auth->howmany = 0;
* memory.
*/
-void
-ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
+void
+ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
{
- buffer_free(&ac->packet);
- buffer_free(&ac->identities);
- close(ac->fd);
- xfree(ac);
+ buffer_free(&auth->identities);
+ close(auth->fd);
+ xfree(auth);
+}
+
+/* Lock/unlock agent */
+int
+ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int lock, const char *password)
+{
+ int type;
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, password);
+
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
}
/*
* Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
- * Returns true if an identity is available, 0 otherwise.
- * The caller must initialize the integers before the call, and free the
- * comment after a successful call (before calling ssh_get_next_identity).
*/
int
-ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
+ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
{
- unsigned char msg[8192];
- int len, l;
-
- /*
- * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
- * identities it can represent.
- */
- msg[0] = 0;
- msg[1] = 0;
- msg[2] = 0;
- msg[3] = 1;
- msg[4] = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
- if (write(auth->fd, msg, 5) != 5) {
- error("write auth->fd: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
+ Buffer request;
+
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+ code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+ code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
+ code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+ break;
+ default:
return 0;
}
- /* Read the length of the response. XXX implement timeouts here. */
- len = 4;
- while (len > 0) {
- l = read(auth->fd, msg + 4 - len, len);
- if (l <= 0) {
- error("read auth->fd: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- return 0;
- }
- len -= l;
- }
/*
- * Extract the length, and check it for sanity. (We cannot trust
- * authentication agents).
+ * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
+ * identities it can represent.
*/
- len = GET_32BIT(msg);
- if (len < 1 || len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("Authentication reply message too long: %d\n", len);
+ buffer_init(&request);
+ buffer_put_char(&request, code1);
- /* Read the packet itself. */
buffer_clear(&auth->identities);
- while (len > 0) {
- l = len;
- if (l > sizeof(msg))
- l = sizeof(msg);
- l = read(auth->fd, msg, l);
- if (l <= 0)
- fatal("Incomplete authentication reply.");
- buffer_append(&auth->identities, (char *) msg, l);
- len -= l;
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&request);
+ return 0;
}
+ buffer_free(&request);
/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
- buffer_get(&auth->identities, (char *) msg, 1);
- if (msg[0] != SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)
- fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", msg[0]);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities);
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (type != code2) {
+ fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type);
+ }
/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
- if (auth->howmany > 1024)
- fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d\n", auth->howmany);
+ if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024)
+ fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
+ auth->howmany);
- /* Return the first entry (if any). */
- return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, comment);
+ return auth->howmany;
}
-/*
- * Returns the next authentication identity for the agent. Other functions
- * can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this
- * function. This returns 0 if there are no more identities. The caller
- * must free comment after a successful return.
- */
+Key *
+ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
+{
+ /* get number of identities and return the first entry (if any). */
+ if (ssh_get_num_identities(auth, version) > 0)
+ return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
+ return NULL;
+}
-int
-ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
+Key *
+ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
{
- unsigned int bits;
+ u_int bits;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ Key *key = NULL;
/* Return failure if no more entries. */
if (auth->howmany <= 0)
- return 0;
+ return NULL;
/*
* Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal
* error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
*/
- bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
- buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, n);
- *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
-
- if (bits != BN_num_bits(n))
- error("Warning: keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
- BN_num_bits(n), bits);
-
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+ key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
+ bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
+ *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+ if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
+ logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+ BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
+ *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ break;
+ }
/* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
auth->howmany--;
-
- return 1;
+ return key;
}
/*
int
ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- BIGNUM* e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge,
- unsigned char session_id[16],
- unsigned int response_type,
- unsigned char response[16])
+ Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
+ u_char session_id[16],
+ u_int response_type,
+ u_char response[16])
{
Buffer buffer;
- unsigned char buf[8192];
- int len, l, i;
-
- /* Response type 0 is no longer supported. */
- if (response_type == 0)
- fatal("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+ int success = 0;
+ int i;
+ int type;
- /* Format a message to the agent. */
- buf[0] = SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE;
+ if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
+ return 0;
+ if (response_type == 0) {
+ logit("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+ return 0;
+ }
buffer_init(&buffer);
- buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) buf, 1);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, n);
+ buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
+ buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
- buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16);
+ buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
- /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
- len = buffer_len(&buffer);
- PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
-
- /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
- if (write(auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
- write(auth->fd, buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer)) !=
- buffer_len(&buffer)) {
- error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
-error_cleanup:
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
buffer_free(&buffer);
return 0;
}
- /*
- * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
- * response packet.
- */
- len = 4;
- while (len > 0) {
- l = read(auth->fd, buf + 4 - len, len);
- if (l <= 0) {
- error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
- goto error_cleanup;
- }
- len -= l;
+ type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ logit("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
+ } else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
+ fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
+ } else {
+ success = 1;
+ /*
+ * Get the response from the packet. This will abort with a
+ * fatal error if the packet is corrupt.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ response[i] = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
}
+ buffer_free(&buffer);
+ return success;
+}
- /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
- len = GET_32BIT(buf);
- if (len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("Authentication response too long: %d", len);
+/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+ Key *key,
+ u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ extern int datafellows;
+ Buffer msg;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ int type, flags = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ return -1;
- /* Read the rest of the response in tothe buffer. */
- buffer_clear(&buffer);
- while (len > 0) {
- l = len;
- if (l > sizeof(buf))
- l = sizeof(buf);
- l = read(auth->fd, buf, l);
- if (l <= 0) {
- error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
- goto error_cleanup;
- }
- buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) buf, l);
- len -= l;
- }
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)
+ flags = SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE;
- /* Get the type of the packet. */
- buffer_get(&buffer, (char *) buf, 1);
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, flags);
+ xfree(blob);
- /* Check for agent failure message. */
- if (buf[0] == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) {
- log("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
- goto error_cleanup;
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return -1;
}
- /* Now it must be an authentication response packet. */
- if (buf[0] != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE)
- fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", buf[0]);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ logit("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+ } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+ fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
+ } else {
+ ret = 0;
+ *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return ret;
+}
- /*
- * Get the response from the packet. This will abort with a fatal
- * error if the packet is corrupt.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- response[i] = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
- /* The buffer containing the packet is no longer needed. */
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+static void
+ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
+{
+ buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->d);
+ /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp); /* ssh key->u */
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q); /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
+ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
+}
- /* Correct answer. */
- return 1;
+static void
+ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
+{
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
}
/*
* be used by normal applications.
*/
-int
-ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- RSA * key, const char *comment)
+int
+ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
+ const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm)
{
- Buffer buffer;
- unsigned char buf[8192];
- int len, l, type;
-
- /* Format a message to the agent. */
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->n);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->d);
- /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->iqmp); /* ssh key->u */
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->q); /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->p); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
- buffer_put_string(&buffer, comment, strlen(comment));
-
- /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
- len = buffer_len(&buffer);
- PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
-
- /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
- if (write(auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
- write(auth->fd, buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer)) !=
- buffer_len(&buffer)) {
- error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
-error_cleanup:
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ Buffer msg;
+ int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ type = constrained ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ type = constrained ?
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment);
+ break;
+ default:
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
+ break;
}
- /* Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
- response packet. */
- len = 4;
- while (len > 0) {
- l = read(auth->fd, buf + 4 - len, len);
- if (l <= 0) {
- error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
- goto error_cleanup;
+ if (constrained) {
+ if (life != 0) {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
}
- len -= l;
+ if (confirm != 0)
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
}
-
- /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
- len = GET_32BIT(buf);
- if (len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("Add identity response too long: %d", len);
-
- /* Read the rest of the response in tothe buffer. */
- buffer_clear(&buffer);
- while (len > 0) {
- l = len;
- if (l > sizeof(buf))
- l = sizeof(buf);
- l = read(auth->fd, buf, l);
- if (l <= 0) {
- error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
- goto error_cleanup;
- }
- buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) buf, l);
- len -= l;
- }
-
- /* Get the type of the packet. */
- type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
- case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return 1;
- default:
- fatal("Bad response to add identity from authentication agent: %d",
- type);
}
- /* NOTREACHED */
- return 0;
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+{
+ return ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth, key, comment, 0, 0);
}
/*
* meant to be used by normal applications.
*/
-int
-ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key)
+int
+ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
{
- Buffer buffer;
- unsigned char buf[8192];
- int len, l, type;
-
- /* Format a message to the agent. */
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->n);
-
- /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
- len = buffer_len(&buffer);
- PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
-
- /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
- if (write(auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
- write(auth->fd, buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer)) !=
- buffer_len(&buffer)) {
- error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
-error_cleanup:
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ Buffer msg;
+ int type;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
+ } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA || key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ } else {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
}
- /*
- * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
- * response packet.
- */
- len = 4;
- while (len > 0) {
- l = read(auth->fd, buf + 4 - len, len);
- if (l <= 0) {
- error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
- goto error_cleanup;
- }
- len -= l;
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
}
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
+}
- /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
- len = GET_32BIT(buf);
- if (len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("Remove identity response too long: %d", len);
-
- /* Read the rest of the response in tothe buffer. */
- buffer_clear(&buffer);
- while (len > 0) {
- l = len;
- if (l > sizeof(buf))
- l = sizeof(buf);
- l = read(auth->fd, buf, l);
- if (l <= 0) {
- error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
- goto error_cleanup;
+int
+ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add,
+ const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
+
+ if (add) {
+ type = constrained ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+ } else
+ type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
+
+ if (constrained) {
+ if (life != 0) {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
}
- buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) buf, l);
- len -= l;
+ if (confirm != 0)
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
}
- /* Get the type of the packet. */
- type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
- case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return 1;
- default:
- fatal("Bad response to remove identity from authentication agent: %d",
- type);
}
- /* NOTREACHED */
- return 0;
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
}
/*
* by normal applications.
*/
-int
-ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
+int
+ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
{
- Buffer buffer;
- unsigned char buf[8192];
- int len, l, type;
+ Buffer msg;
+ int type;
+ int code = (version==1) ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
+ SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
- /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
- PUT_32BIT(buf, 1);
- buf[4] = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
- /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
- if (write(auth->fd, buf, 5) != 5) {
- error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
}
- /*
- * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
- * response packet.
- */
- len = 4;
- while (len > 0) {
- l = read(auth->fd, buf + 4 - len, len);
- if (l <= 0) {
- error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
- return 0;
- }
- len -= l;
- }
-
- /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
- len = GET_32BIT(buf);
- if (len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("Remove identity response too long: %d", len);
-
- /* Read the rest of the response into the buffer. */
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- while (len > 0) {
- l = len;
- if (l > sizeof(buf))
- l = sizeof(buf);
- l = read(auth->fd, buf, l);
- if (l <= 0) {
- error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return 0;
- }
- buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) buf, l);
- len -= l;
- }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
+}
- /* Get the type of the packet. */
- type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+int
+decode_reply(int type)
+{
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
+ case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
+ logit("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
return 0;
case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
- buffer_free(&buffer);
return 1;
default:
- fatal("Bad response to remove identity from authentication agent: %d",
- type);
+ fatal("Bad response from authentication agent: %d", type);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
return 0;