* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
- * Created: Sat Mar 18 16:36:11 1995 ylo
* Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
* The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
* of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
*
- * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> in Canada.
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * in Canada (German citizen).
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id$");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.113 2001/04/12 20:09:37 stevesk Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "key.h"
#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "log.h"
#include "readconf.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "tildexpand.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
extern char *__progname;
-#else /* HAVE___PROGNAME */
-const char *__progname = "ssh";
-#endif /* HAVE___PROGNAME */
+#else
+char *__progname;
+#endif
/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. This can be set on the command line. */
int debug_flag = 0;
+/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be allocated */
int tty_flag = 0;
+int no_tty_flag = 0;
+int force_tty_flag = 0;
+
+/* don't exec a shell */
+int no_shell_flag = 0;
/*
* Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set
*/
volatile int received_window_change_signal = 0;
-/* Value of argv[0] (set in the main program). */
-char *av0;
-
-/* Flag indicating whether we have a valid host private key loaded. */
-int host_private_key_loaded = 0;
-
-/* Host private key. */
-RSA *host_private_key = NULL;
+/* Private host keys. */
+struct {
+ Key **keys;
+ int nkeys;
+} sensitive_data;
/* Original real UID. */
uid_t original_real_uid;
+/* command to be executed */
+Buffer command;
+
+/* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */
+int subsystem_flag = 0;
+
/* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */
void
-usage()
+usage(void)
{
- fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] host [command]\n", av0);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] host [command]\n", __progname);
fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -l user Log in using this user name.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -n Redirect input from /dev/null.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -n Redirect input from " _PATH_DEVNULL ".\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -A Enable authentication agent forwarding.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a Disable authentication agent forwarding.\n");
#ifdef AFS
fprintf(stderr, " -k Disable Kerberos ticket and AFS token forwarding.\n");
#endif /* AFS */
+ fprintf(stderr, " -X Enable X11 connection forwarding.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -x Disable X11 connection forwarding.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -i file Identity for RSA authentication (default: ~/.ssh/identity).\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -i file Identity for public key authentication "
+ "(default: ~/.ssh/identity)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t Tty; allocate a tty even if command is given.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -T Do not allocate a tty.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " Multiple -v increases verbosity.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -V Display version number only.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -P Don't allocate a privileged port.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet; don't display any warning messages.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -e char Set escape character; ``none'' = disable (default: ~).\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -c cipher Select encryption algorithm: "
- "``3des'', "
- "``blowfish''\n");
+ "``3des'', ``blowfish''\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -m macs Specify MAC algorithms for protocol version 2.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p port Connect to this port. Server must be on the same port.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -L listen-port:host:port Forward local port to remote address\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -R listen-port:host:port Forward remote port to local address\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " These cause %s to listen for connections on a port, and\n", av0);
+ fprintf(stderr, " These cause %s to listen for connections on a port, and\n", __progname);
fprintf(stderr, " forward them to the other side by connecting to host:port.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -D port Dynamically forward local port to multiple remote addresses.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " Allows %s to act as an application-layer proxy.\n",
+ __progname);
+ fprintf(stderr, " Protocols supported: SOCKS4, SOCKS5, HTTPS\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -C Enable compression.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -N Do not execute a shell or command.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -g Allow remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -1 Force protocol version 1.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -2 Force protocol version 2.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -o 'option' Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -s Invoke command (mandatory) as SSH2 subsystem.\n");
exit(1);
}
exit(1);
}
+int ssh_session(void);
+int ssh_session2(void);
+void load_public_identity_files(void);
+
/*
* Main program for the ssh client.
*/
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
- int i, opt, optind, type, exit_status, ok, authfd;
+ int i, opt, optind, exit_status, ok;
u_short fwd_port, fwd_host_port;
char *optarg, *cp, buf[256];
- Buffer command;
- struct winsize ws;
struct stat st;
- struct passwd *pw, pwcopy;
- int interactive = 0, dummy;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ int dummy;
uid_t original_effective_uid;
- int plen;
+
+ __progname = get_progname(av[0]);
+ init_rng();
/*
* Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping
original_real_uid = getuid();
original_effective_uid = geteuid();
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
/* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */
if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid) {
struct rlimit rlim;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0)
fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
+#endif
+ /* Get user data. */
+ pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
+ if (!pw) {
+ log("You don't exist, go away!");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
+ pw = pwcopy(pw);
+
/*
* Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of
* option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are
* them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection
* has been made, as we may need to create the port several times).
*/
- temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid);
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
/*
* Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
*/
umask(022);
- /* Save our own name. */
- av0 = av[0];
-
/* Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been set. */
initialize_options(&options);
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
host = NULL;
- /* If program name is not one of the standard names, use it as host name. */
- if (strchr(av0, '/'))
- cp = strrchr(av0, '/') + 1;
- else
- cp = av0;
- if (strcmp(cp, "rsh") != 0 && strcmp(cp, "ssh") != 0 &&
- strcmp(cp, "rlogin") != 0 && strcmp(cp, "slogin") != 0)
- host = cp;
-
for (optind = 1; optind < ac; optind++) {
if (av[optind][0] != '-') {
if (host)
break;
if ((cp = strchr(av[optind], '@'))) {
- if(cp == av[optind])
- usage();
+ if(cp == av[optind])
+ usage();
options.user = av[optind];
*cp = '\0';
host = ++cp;
opt = av[optind][1];
if (!opt)
usage();
- if (strchr("eilcpLRo", opt)) { /* options with arguments */
+ if (strchr("eilcmpLRDo", opt)) { /* options with arguments */
optarg = av[optind] + 2;
if (strcmp(optarg, "") == 0) {
if (optind >= ac - 1)
optarg = NULL;
}
switch (opt) {
+ case '1':
+ options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
+ break;
+ case '2':
+ options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
+ break;
case '4':
IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
break;
-
case '6':
IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
break;
-
case 'n':
stdin_null_flag = 1;
break;
-
case 'f':
fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
stdin_null_flag = 1;
break;
-
case 'x':
options.forward_x11 = 0;
break;
-
case 'X':
options.forward_x11 = 1;
break;
-
case 'g':
options.gateway_ports = 1;
break;
-
case 'P':
options.use_privileged_port = 0;
break;
-
case 'a':
options.forward_agent = 0;
break;
+ case 'A':
+ options.forward_agent = 1;
+ break;
#ifdef AFS
case 'k':
options.kerberos_tgt_passing = 0;
case 'i':
if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s does not exist.\n",
- optarg);
+ optarg);
break;
}
if (options.num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)",
- SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
- options.identity_files[options.num_identity_files++] =
- xstrdup(optarg);
+ SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+ options.identity_files[options.num_identity_files++] = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
-
case 't':
+ if (tty_flag)
+ force_tty_flag = 1;
tty_flag = 1;
break;
-
case 'v':
+ if (0 == debug_flag) {
+ debug_flag = 1;
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
+ options.log_level++;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ fatal("Too high debugging level.");
+ }
+ /* fallthrough */
case 'V':
- fprintf(stderr, "SSH Version %s, protocol version %d.%d.\n",
- SSH_VERSION, PROTOCOL_MAJOR, PROTOCOL_MINOR);
- fprintf(stderr, "Compiled with SSL.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s, SSH protocols %d.%d/%d.%d, OpenSSL 0x%8.8lx\n",
+ SSH_VERSION,
+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, PROTOCOL_MINOR_1,
+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
+ SSLeay());
if (opt == 'V')
exit(0);
- debug_flag = 1;
- options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG;
break;
-
case 'q':
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
-
case 'e':
if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
- (unsigned char) optarg[1] >= 64 && (unsigned char) optarg[1] < 128)
- options.escape_char = (unsigned char) optarg[1] & 31;
+ (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) optarg[1] < 128)
+ options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31;
else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
- options.escape_char = (unsigned char) optarg[0];
+ options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0];
else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
options.escape_char = -2;
else {
exit(1);
}
break;
-
case 'c':
- options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg);
- if (options.cipher == -1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg);
+ if (ciphers_valid(optarg)) {
+ /* SSH2 only */
+ options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg);
+ options.cipher = SSH_CIPHER_ILLEGAL;
+ } else {
+ /* SSH1 only */
+ options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg);
+ if (options.cipher == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES) {
+ options.ciphers = "3des-cbc";
+ } else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH) {
+ options.ciphers = "blowfish-cbc";
+ } else {
+ options.ciphers = (char *)-1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ if (mac_valid(optarg))
+ options.macs = xstrdup(optarg);
+ else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n", optarg);
exit(1);
}
break;
-
case 'p':
- options.port = atoi(optarg);
+ options.port = a2port(optarg);
+ if (options.port == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
break;
-
case 'l':
options.user = optarg;
break;
-
case 'R':
if (sscanf(optarg, "%hu/%255[^/]/%hu", &fwd_port, buf,
&fwd_host_port) != 3 &&
}
add_remote_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf, fwd_host_port);
break;
-
case 'L':
if (sscanf(optarg, "%hu/%255[^/]/%hu", &fwd_port, buf,
&fwd_host_port) != 3 &&
add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf, fwd_host_port);
break;
+ case 'D':
+ fwd_port = a2port(optarg);
+ if (fwd_port == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic port '%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, "socks4", 0);
+ break;
+
case 'C':
options.compression = 1;
break;
-
+ case 'N':
+ no_shell_flag = 1;
+ no_tty_flag = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ no_tty_flag = 1;
+ break;
case 'o':
dummy = 1;
if (process_config_line(&options, host ? host : "", optarg,
"command-line", 0, &dummy) != 0)
exit(1);
break;
-
+ case 's':
+ subsystem_flag = 1;
+ break;
default:
usage();
}
if (!host)
usage();
- /* check if RSA support exists */
- if (rsa_alive() == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "%s: no RSA support in libssl and libcrypto. See ssl(8).\n",
- __progname);
- exit(1);
- }
+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+
/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
buffer_init(&command);
if (optind == ac) {
/* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
tty_flag = 1;
+ if (subsystem_flag) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.");
+ usage();
+ }
} else {
/* A command has been specified. Store it into the
buffer. */
}
/* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0)
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 && !no_shell_flag)
fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command to execute.");
/* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
if (buffer_len(&command) == 0)
tty_flag = 1;
+ /* Force no tty*/
+ if (no_tty_flag)
+ tty_flag = 0;
/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) {
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)) && !force_tty_flag) {
if (tty_flag)
- fprintf(stderr, "Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a terminal.\n");
+ log("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a terminal.");
tty_flag = 0;
}
- /* Get user data. */
- pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
- if (!pw) {
- fprintf(stderr, "You don't exist, go away!\n");
- exit(1);
- }
- /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
- memset(&pwcopy, 0, sizeof(pwcopy));
- pwcopy.pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- pwcopy.pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
- pwcopy.pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
- pwcopy.pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
- pwcopy.pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
- pwcopy.pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
- pw = &pwcopy;
-
- /* Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
- actually goes to the terminal. */
- log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
+ * actually goes to stderr.
+ */
+ log_init(av[0], options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+ SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
/* Read per-user configuration file. */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
read_config_file(buf, host, &options);
/* Read systemwide configuration file. */
- read_config_file(HOST_CONFIG_FILE, host, &options);
+ read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, host, &options);
/* Fill configuration defaults. */
fill_default_options(&options);
/* reinit */
- log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 0);
+ log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+ seed_rng();
if (options.user == NULL)
options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
if (options.hostname != NULL)
host = options.hostname;
- /* Find canonic host name. */
- if (strchr(host, '.') == 0) {
- struct addrinfo hints;
- struct addrinfo *ai = NULL;
- int errgai;
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
- hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- errgai = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai);
- if (errgai == 0) {
- if (ai->ai_canonname != NULL)
- host = xstrdup(ai->ai_canonname);
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- }
- }
/* Disable rhosts authentication if not running as root. */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /* Ignore uid if running under Windows */
+ if (!options.use_privileged_port) {
+#else
if (original_effective_uid != 0 || !options.use_privileged_port) {
+#endif
+ debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, "
+ "originating port will not be trusted.");
options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
- options.rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
}
+
/*
* If using rsh has been selected, exec it now (without trying
* anything else). Note that we must release privileges first.
restore_uid();
/* Switch to the original uid permanently. */
- permanently_set_uid(original_real_uid);
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
/* Execute rsh. */
rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command);
/* Restore our superuser privileges. */
restore_uid();
- /*
- * Open a connection to the remote host. This needs root privileges
- * if rhosts_{rsa_}authentication is enabled.
- */
+ /* Open a connection to the remote host. */
ok = ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
- options.connection_attempts,
- !options.rhosts_authentication &&
- !options.rhosts_rsa_authentication,
- original_real_uid,
- options.proxy_command);
+ options.connection_attempts,
+ original_effective_uid != 0 || !options.use_privileged_port,
+ pw, options.proxy_command);
/*
* If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key
* authentication. This must be done before releasing extra
* privileges, because the file is only readable by root.
*/
- if (ok) {
- host_private_key = RSA_new();
- if (load_private_key(HOST_KEY_FILE, "", host_private_key, NULL))
- host_private_key_loaded = 1;
+ sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
+ sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
+ if (ok && (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
+ options.hostbased_authentication)) {
+ sensitive_data.nkeys = 3;
+ sensitive_data.keys = xmalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys*sizeof(Key));
+ sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
+ _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
}
/*
* Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have. We will no
* process, read the private hostkey and impersonate the host.
* OpenBSD does not allow ptracing of setuid processes.
*/
- permanently_set_uid(original_real_uid);
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
/*
* Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh
* directory if it doesn\'t already exist.
*/
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, SSH_USER_DIR);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
- if (mkdir(buf, 0755) < 0)
+ if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf);
/* Check if the connection failed, and try "rsh" if appropriate. */
}
exit(1);
}
- /* Expand ~ in options.identity_files. */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++)
- options.identity_files[i] =
- tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], original_real_uid);
+ /* load options.identity_files */
+ load_public_identity_files();
/* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
- options.system_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile,
- original_real_uid);
- options.user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile,
- original_real_uid);
+ /* XXX mem-leaks: */
+ options.system_hostfile =
+ tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile, original_real_uid);
+ options.user_hostfile =
+ tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile, original_real_uid);
+ options.system_hostfile2 =
+ tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile2, original_real_uid);
+ options.user_hostfile2 =
+ tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile2, original_real_uid);
/* Log into the remote system. This never returns if the login fails. */
- ssh_login(host_private_key_loaded, host_private_key,
- host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, original_real_uid);
+ ssh_login(sensitive_data.keys, sensitive_data.nkeys,
+ host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, pw);
+
+ /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */
+ if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) {
+ /* Destroys contents safely */
+ debug3("clear hostkey %d", i);
+ key_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ xfree(sensitive_data.keys);
+ }
+
+ exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session();
+ packet_close();
+ return exit_status;
+}
+
+void
+x11_get_proto(char *proto, int proto_len, char *data, int data_len)
+{
+ char line[512];
+ FILE *f;
+ int got_data = 0, i;
+
+ if (options.xauth_location) {
+ /* Try to get Xauthority information for the display. */
+ snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.100s list %.200s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ options.xauth_location, getenv("DISPLAY"));
+ f = popen(line, "r");
+ if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
+ sscanf(line, "%*s %s %s", proto, data) == 2)
+ got_data = 1;
+ if (f)
+ pclose(f);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+ * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
+ * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11
+ * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
+ * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
+ * for the local connection.
+ */
+ if (!got_data) {
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+
+ strlcpy(proto, "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", proto_len);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ snprintf(data + 2 * i, data_len - 2 * i, "%02x", rand & 0xff);
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssh_init_forwarding(void)
+{
+ int success = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ debug("Connections to local port %d forwarded to remote address %.200s:%d",
+ options.local_forwards[i].port,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host_port);
+ success += channel_request_local_forwarding(
+ options.local_forwards[i].port,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host_port,
+ options.gateway_ports);
+ }
+ if (i > 0 && success == 0)
+ error("Could not request local forwarding.");
+
+ /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ debug("Connections to remote port %d forwarded to local address %.200s:%d",
+ options.remote_forwards[i].port,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
+ channel_request_remote_forwarding(
+ options.remote_forwards[i].port,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
+ }
+}
- /* We no longer need the host private key. Clear it now. */
- if (host_private_key_loaded)
- RSA_free(host_private_key); /* Destroys contents safely */
+void
+check_agent_present(void)
+{
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ /* Clear agent forwarding if we don\'t have an agent. */
+ int authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+ if (authfd < 0)
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ else
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
+ }
+}
- /* Close connection cleanly after attack. */
- cipher_attack_detected = packet_disconnect;
+int
+ssh_session(void)
+{
+ int type;
+ int plen;
+ int interactive = 0;
+ int have_tty = 0;
+ struct winsize ws;
+ char *cp;
/* Enable compression if requested. */
if (options.compression) {
/* Read response from the server. */
type = packet_read(&plen);
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
interactive = 1;
- else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ have_tty = 1;
+ } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
log("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to allocate a pseudo tty.");
else
packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty request response.");
}
/* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
if (options.forward_x11 && getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) {
- char line[512], proto[512], data[512];
- FILE *f;
- int forwarded = 0, got_data = 0, i;
-
-#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
- /* Try to get Xauthority information for the display. */
- snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.100s list %.200s 2>/dev/null",
- XAUTH_PATH, getenv("DISPLAY"));
- f = popen(line, "r");
- if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
- sscanf(line, "%*s %s %s", proto, data) == 2)
- got_data = 1;
- if (f)
- pclose(f);
-#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
- /*
- * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
- * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
- * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11
- * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
- * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
- * for the local connection.
- */
- if (!got_data) {
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
-
- strlcpy(proto, "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", sizeof proto);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
- snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x", rand & 0xff);
- rand >>= 8;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Got local authentication reasonable information. Request
- * forwarding with authentication spoofing.
- */
+ char proto[512], data[512];
+ /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+ x11_get_proto(proto, sizeof proto, data, sizeof data);
+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(proto, data);
+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, proto, data);
/* Read response from the server. */
type = packet_read(&plen);
if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- forwarded = 1;
interactive = 1;
- } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
log("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding.");
- else
+ } else {
packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 forwarding");
+ }
}
/* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
- packet_set_interactive(interactive, options.keepalives);
-
- /* Clear agent forwarding if we don\'t have an agent. */
- authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
- if (authfd < 0)
- options.forward_agent = 0;
- else
- ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
+ packet_set_interactive(interactive);
/* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */
+ check_agent_present();
+
if (options.forward_agent) {
debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
auth_request_forwarding();
if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
log("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding.");
}
- /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
- debug("Connections to local port %d forwarded to remote address %.200s:%d",
- options.local_forwards[i].port,
- options.local_forwards[i].host,
- options.local_forwards[i].host_port);
- channel_request_local_forwarding(options.local_forwards[i].port,
- options.local_forwards[i].host,
- options.local_forwards[i].host_port,
- options.gateway_ports);
- }
- /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
- debug("Connections to remote port %d forwarded to local address %.200s:%d",
- options.remote_forwards[i].port,
- options.remote_forwards[i].host,
- options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
- channel_request_remote_forwarding(options.remote_forwards[i].port,
- options.remote_forwards[i].host,
- options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
- }
+ /* Initiate port forwardings. */
+ ssh_init_forwarding();
/* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Enter the interactive session. */
- exit_status = client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : -1);
+ return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : -1, 0);
+}
- /* Close the connection to the remote host. */
- packet_close();
+void
+client_subsystem_reply(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ int id, len;
+
+ id = packet_get_int();
+ len = buffer_len(&command);
+ if (len > 900)
+ len = 900;
+ packet_done();
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)
+ fatal("Request for subsystem '%.*s' failed on channel %d",
+ len, buffer_ptr(&command), id);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_session2_callback(int id, void *arg)
+{
+ int len;
+ int interactive = 0;
+
+ debug("client_init id %d arg %ld", id, (long)arg);
- /* Exit with the status returned by the program on the remote side. */
- exit(exit_status);
+ if (tty_flag) {
+ struct winsize ws;
+ char *cp;
+ cp = getenv("TERM");
+ if (!cp)
+ cp = "";
+ /* Store window size in the packet. */
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+
+ channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 0);
+ packet_put_cstring(cp);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+ packet_put_cstring(""); /* XXX: encode terminal modes */
+ packet_send();
+ interactive = 1;
+ /* XXX wait for reply */
+ }
+ if (options.forward_x11 &&
+ getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) {
+ char proto[512], data[512];
+ /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+ x11_get_proto(proto, sizeof proto, data, sizeof data);
+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, proto, data);
+ interactive = 1;
+ /* XXX wait for reply */
+ }
+
+ check_agent_present();
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+ channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+
+ len = buffer_len(&command);
+ if (len > 0) {
+ if (len > 900)
+ len = 900;
+ if (subsystem_flag) {
+ debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, buffer_ptr(&command));
+ channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", /*want reply*/ 1);
+ /* register callback for reply */
+ /* XXX we asume that client_loop has already been called */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &client_subsystem_reply);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &client_subsystem_reply);
+ } else {
+ debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, buffer_ptr(&command));
+ channel_request_start(id, "exec", 0);
+ }
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
+ packet_send();
+ } else {
+ channel_request(id, "shell", 0);
+ }
+ /* channel_callback(id, SSH2_MSG_OPEN_CONFIGMATION, client_init, 0); */
+
+ /* register different callback, etc. XXX */
+ packet_set_interactive(interactive);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_session2_command(void)
+{
+ int id, window, packetmax;
+ int in, out, err;
+
+ if (stdin_null_flag) {
+ in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
+ } else {
+ in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+ }
+ out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+ err = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
+
+ if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0)
+ fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
+
+ /* enable nonblocking unless tty */
+ if (!isatty(in))
+ set_nonblock(in);
+ if (!isatty(out))
+ set_nonblock(out);
+ if (!isatty(err))
+ set_nonblock(err);
+
+ window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+ packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+ if (!tty_flag) {
+ window *= 2;
+ packetmax *=2;
+ }
+ id = channel_new(
+ "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
+ window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
+ xstrdup("client-session"), /*nonblock*/0);
+
+debug("channel_new: %d", id);
+
+ channel_open(id);
+ channel_register_callback(id, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION,
+ ssh_session2_callback, (void *)0);
+
+ return id;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_session2(void)
+{
+ int id;
+
+ /* XXX should be pre-session */
+ ssh_init_forwarding();
+
+ id = no_shell_flag ? -1 : ssh_session2_command();
+
+ /* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
+ if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
+ fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+ return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : -1, id);
+}
+
+void
+load_public_identity_files(void)
+{
+ char *filename;
+ Key *public;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+ filename = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i],
+ original_real_uid);
+ public = key_load_public(filename, NULL);
+ debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
+ public ? public->type : -1);
+ xfree(options.identity_files[i]);
+ options.identity_files[i] = filename;
+ options.identity_keys[i] = public;
+ }
}
andersk / openssh.git / blobdiff