-Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program to log into another computer over a
-network, to execute commands in a remote machine, and to move files
-from one machine to another. It provides strong authentication and
-secure communications over insecure channels. It is inteded as a
-replacement for rlogin, rsh, rcp, and rdist.
+See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.3 for the release notes.
-See the file INSTALL for installation instructions. See COPYING for
-license terms and other legal issues. See RFC for a description of
-the protocol. There is a WWW page for ssh; see http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh.
+- A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
+- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
+- Thanks to HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org>
-This file has been updated to match ssh-1.2.12.
+This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
+Unices.
+OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
+implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
+external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
+reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
+and Dug Song. It has a homepage at http://www.openssh.com/
-FEATURES
+This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
+support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library
+functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port
+has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X,
+NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris, Unicos, and UnixWare.
- o Strong authentication. Closes several security holes (e.g., IP,
- routing, and DNS spoofing). New authentication methods: .rhosts
- together with RSA based host authentication, and pure RSA
- authentication.
+This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
- o Improved privacy. All communications are automatically and
- transparently encrypted. RSA is used for key exchange, and a
- conventional cipher (normally IDEA, DES, or triple-DES) for
- encrypting the session. Encryption is started before
- authentication, and no passwords or other information is
- transmitted in the clear. Encryption is also used to protect
- against spoofed packets.
+The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
+commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
+all logins, not just when using password authentication.
- o Secure X11 sessions. The program automatically sets DISPLAY on
- the server machine, and forwards any X11 connections over the
- secure channel. Fake Xauthority information is automatically
- generated and forwarded to the remote machine; the local client
- automatically examines incoming X11 connections and replaces the
- fake authorization data with the real data (never telling the
- remote machine the real information).
+OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5].
- o Arbitrary TCP/IP ports can be redirected through the encrypted channel
- in both directions (e.g., for e-cash transactions).
+There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
+refer to http://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
- o No retraining needed for normal users; everything happens
- automatically, and old .rhosts files will work with strong
- authentication if administration installs host key files.
+Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list
+openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by
+unsubscribed users.Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the
+OpenBSD style guidelines[6].
- o Never trusts the network. Minimal trust on the remote side of
- the connection. Minimal trust on domain name servers. Pure RSA
- authentication never trusts anything but the private key.
+Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install
+OpenSSH on your system. There are a number of differences between this
+port of OpenSSH and F-Secure SSH 1.x, please refer to the OpenSSH FAQ[7]
+for details and general tips.
- o Client RSA-authenticates the server machine in the beginning of
- every connection to prevent trojan horses (by routing or DNS
- spoofing) and man-in-the-middle attacks, and the server
- RSA-authenticates the client machine before accepting .rhosts or
- /etc/hosts.equiv authentication (to prevent DNS, routing, or
- IP-spoofing).
+Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- o Host authentication key distribution can be centrally by the
- administration, automatically when the first connection is made
- to a machine (the key obtained on the first connection will be
- recorded and used for authentication in the future), or manually
- by each user for his/her own use. The central and per-user host
- key repositories are both used and complement each other. Host
- keys can be generated centrally or automatically when the software
- is installed. Host authentication keys are typically 1024 bits.
+Miscellania -
- o Any user can create any number of user authentication RSA keys for
- his/her own use. Each user has a file which lists the RSA public
- keys for which proof of possession of the corresponding private
- key is accepted as authentication. User authentication keys are
- typically 1024 bits.
+This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD
+CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample
+implementation released by Tatu Ylonen.
- o The server program has its own server RSA key which is
- automatically regenerated every hour. This key is never saved in
- any file. Exchanged session keys are encrypted using both the
- server key and the server host key. The purpose of the separate
- server key is to make it impossible to decipher a captured session by
- breaking into the server machine at a later time; one hour from
- the connection even the server machine cannot decipher the session
- key. The key regeneration interval is configurable. The server
- key is normally 768 bits.
+References -
- o An authentication agent, running in the user's laptop or local
- workstation, can be used to hold the user's RSA authentication
- keys. Ssh automatically forwards the connection to the
- authentication agent over any connections, and there is no need to
- store the RSA authentication keys on any machine in the network
- (except the user's own local machine). The authentication
- protocols never reveal the keys; they can only be used to verify
- that the user's agent has a certain key. Eventually the agent
- could rely on a smart card to perform all authentication
- computations.
+[0] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
+[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
+[2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html
+[3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
+[4] http://www.openssl.org/
+[5] http://www.openpam.org
+ http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
+ (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11)
+[6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
+[7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
- o The software can be installed and used (with restricted
- functionality) even without root privileges.
-
- o The client is customizable in system-wide and per-user
- configuration files. Most aspects of the client's operation can
- be configured. Different options can be specified on a per-host basis.
-
- o Automatically executes conventional rsh (after displaying a
- warning) if the server machine is not running sshd.
-
- o Optional compression of all data with gzip (including forwarded X11
- and TCP/IP port data), which may result in significant speedups on
- slow connections.
-
- o Complete replacement for rlogin, rsh, and rcp.
-
-
-WHY TO USE SECURE SHELL
-
-Currently, almost all communications in computer networks are done
-without encryption. As a consequence, anyone who has access to any
-machine connected to the network can listen in on any communication.
-This is being done by hackers, curious administrators, employers,
-criminals, industrial spies, and governments. Some networks leak off
-enough electromagnetic radiation that data may be captured even from a
-distance.
-
-When you log in, your password goes in the network in plain
-text. Thus, any listener can then use your account to do any evil he
-likes. Many incidents have been encountered worldwide where crackers
-have started programs on workstations without the owners knowledge
-just to listen to the network and collect passwords. Programs for
-doing this are available on the Internet, or can be built by a
-competent programmer in a few hours.
-
-Any information that you type or is printed on your screen can be
-monitored, recorded, and analyzed. For example, an intruder who has
-penetrated a host connected to a major network can start a program
-that listens to all data flowing in the network, and whenever it
-encounters a 16-digit string, it checks if it is a valid credit card
-number (using the check digit), and saves the number plus any
-surrounding text (to catch expiration date and holder) in a file.
-When the intruder has collected a few thousand credit card numbers, he
-makes smallish mail-order purchases from a few thousand stores around
-the world, and disappears when the goods arrive but before anyone
-suspects anything.
-
-Businesses have trade secrets, patent applications in preparation,
-pricing information, subcontractor information, client data, personnel
-data, financial information, etc. Currently, anyone with access to
-the network (any machine on the network) can listen to anything that
-goes in the network, without any regard to normal access restrictions.
-
-Many companies are not aware that information can so easily be
-recovered from the network. They trust that their data is safe
-since nobody is supposed to know that there is sensitive information
-in the network, or because so much other data is transferred in the
-network. This is not a safe policy.
-
-Individual persons also have confidential information, such as
-diaries, love letters, health care documents, information about their
-personal interests and habits, professional data, job applications,
-tax reports, political documents, unpublished manuscripts, etc.
-
-One should also be aware that economical intelligence and industrial
-espionage has recently become a major priority of the intelligence
-agencies of major governments. President Clinton recently assigned
-economical espionage as the primary task of the CIA, and the French
-have repeatedly been publicly boasting about their achievements on
-this field.
-
-
-There is also another frightening aspect about the poor security of
-communications. Computer storage and analysis capability has
-increased so much that it is feasible for governments, major
-companies, and criminal organizations to automatically analyze,
-identify, classify, and file information about millions of people over
-the years. Because most of the work can be automated, the cost of
-collecting this information is getting very low.
-
-Government agencies may be able to monitor major communication
-systems, telephones, fax, computer networks, etc., and passively
-collect huge amounts of information about all people with any
-significant position in the society. Most of this information is not
-sensitive, and many people would say there is no harm in someone
-getting that information. However, the information starts to get
-sensitive when someone has enough of it. You may not mind someone
-knowing what you bought from the shop one random day, but you might
-not like someone knowing every small thing you have bought in the last
-ten years.
-
-If the government some day starts to move into a more totalitarian
-direction (one should remember that Nazi Germany was created by
-democratic elections), there is considerable danger of an ultimate
-totalitarian state. With enough information (the automatically
-collected records of an individual can be manually analyzed when the
-person becomes interesting), one can form a very detailed picture of
-the individual's interests, opinions, beliefs, habits, friends,
-lovers, weaknesses, etc. This information can be used to 1) locate
-any persons who might oppose the new system 2) use deception to
-disturb any organizations which might rise against the government 3)
-eliminate difficult individuals without anyone understanding what
-happened. Additionally, if the government can monitor communications
-too effectively, it becomes too easy to locate and eliminate any
-persons distributing information contrary to the official truth.
-
-Fighting crime and terrorism are often used as grounds for domestic
-surveillance and restricting encryption. These are good goals, but
-there is considerable danger that the surveillance data starts to get
-used for questionable purposes. I find that it is better to tolerate
-a small amount of crime in the society than to let the society become
-fully controlled. I am in favor of a fairly strong state, but the
-state must never get so strong that people become unable to spread
-contra-offical information and unable to overturn the government if it
-is bad. The danger is that when you notice that the government is
-too powerful, it is too late. Also, the real power may not be where
-the official government is.
-
-For these reasons (privacy, protecting trade secrets, and making it
-more difficult to create a totalitarian state), I think that strong
-cryptography should be integrated to the tools we use every day.
-Using it causes no harm (except for those who wish to monitor
-everything), but not using it can cause huge problems. If the society
-changes in undesirable ways, then it will be to late to start
-encrypting.
-
-Encryption has had a "military" or "classified" flavor to it. There
-are no longer any grounds for this. The military can and will use its
-own encryption; that is no excuse to prevent the civilians from
-protecting their privacy and secrets. Information on strong
-encryption is available in every major bookstore, scientific library,
-and patent office around the world, and strong encryption software is
-available in every country on the Internet.
-
-Some people would like to make it illegal to use encryption, or to
-force people to use encryption that governments can break. This
-approach offers no protection if the government turns bad. Also, the
-"bad guys" will be using true strong encryption anyway. Good
-encryption techniques are too widely known to make them disappear.
-Thus, any "key escrow encryption" or other restrictions will only help
-monitor ordinary people and petty criminals. It does not help against
-powerful criminals, terrorists, or espionage, because they will know
-how to use strong encryption anyway. (One source for internationally
-available encryption software is http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto.)
-
-
-OVERVIEW OF SECURE SHELL
-
-The software consists of a number of programs.
-
- sshd Server program run on the server machine. This
- listens for connections from client machines, and
- whenever it receives a connection, it performs
- authentication and starts serving the client.
-
- ssh This is the client program used to log into another
- machine or to execute commands on the other machine.
- "slogin" is another name for this program.
-
- scp Securely copies files from one machine to another.
-
- ssh-keygen Used to create RSA keys (host keys and user
- authentication keys).
-
- ssh-agent Authentication agent. This can be used to hold RSA
- keys for authentication.
-
- ssh-add Used to register new keys with the agent.
-
- make-ssh-known-hosts
- Used to create the /etc/ssh_known_hosts file.
-
-
-Ssh is the program users normally use. It is started as
-
- ssh host
-
-or
-
- ssh host command
-
-The first form opens a new shell on the remote machine (after
-authentication). The latter form executes the command on the remote
-machine.
-
-When started, the ssh connects sshd on the server machine, verifies
-that the server machine really is the machine it wanted to connect,
-exchanges encryption keys (in a manner which prevents an outside
-listener from getting the keys), performs authentication using .rhosts
-and /etc/hosts.equiv, RSA authentication, or conventional password
-based authentication. The server then (normally) allocates a
-pseudo-terminal and starts an interactive shell or user program.
-
-The TERM environment variable (describing the type of the user's
-terminal) is passed from the client side to the remote side. Also,
-terminal modes will be copied from the client side to the remote side
-to preserve user preferences (e.g., the erase character).
-
-If the DISPLAY variable is set on the client side, the server will
-create a dummy X server and set DISPLAY accordingly. Any connections
-to the dummy X server will be forwarded through the secure channel,
-and will be made to the real X server from the client side. An
-arbitrary number of X programs can be started during the session, and
-starting them does not require anything special from the user. (Note
-that the user must not manually set DISPLAY, because then it would
-connect directly to the real display instead of going through the
-encrypted channel). This behavior can be disabled in the
-configuration file or by giving the -x option to the client.
-
-Arbitrary IP ports can be forwarded over the secure channel. The
-program then creates a port on one side, and whenever a connection is
-opened to this port, it will be passed over the secure channel, and a
-connection will be made from the other side to a specified host:port
-pair. Arbitrary IP forwarding must always be explicitly requested,
-and cannot be used to forward privileged ports (unless the user is
-root). It is possible to specify automatic forwards in a per-user
-configuration file, for example to make electronic cash systems work
-securely.
-
-If there is an authentication agent on the client side, connection to
-it will be automatically forwarded to the server side.
-
-For more infomation, see the manual pages ssh(1), sshd(8), scp(1),
-ssh-keygen(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-add(1), and make-ssh-known-hosts(1)
-included in this distribution.
-
-
-X11 CONNECTION FORWARDING
-
-X11 forwarding serves two purposes: it is a convenience to the user
-because there is no need to set the DISPLAY variable, and it provides
-encrypted X11 connections. I cannot think of any other easy way to
-make X11 connections encrypted; modifying the X server, clients or
-libraries would require special work for each machine, vendor and
-application. Widely used IP-level encryption does not seem likely for
-several years. Thus what we have left is faking an X server on the
-same machine where the clients are run, and forwarding the connections
-to a real X server over the secure channel.
-
-X11 forwarding works as follows. The client extracts Xauthority
-information for the server. It then creates random authorization
-data, and sends the random data to the server. The server allocates
-an X11 display number, and stores the (fake) Xauthority data for this
-display. Whenever an X11 connection is opened, the server forwards
-the connection over the secure channel to the client, and the client
-parses the first packet of the X11 protocol, substitutes real
-authentication data for the fake data (if the fake data matched), and
-forwards the connection to the real X server.
-
-If the display does not have Xauthority data, the server will create a
-unix domain socket in /tmp/.X11-unix, and use the unix domain socket
-as the display. No authentication information is forwarded in this
-case. X11 connections are again forwarded over the secure channel.
-To the X server the connections appear to come from the client
-machine, and the server must have connections allowed from the local
-machine. Using authentication data is always recommended because not
-using it makes the display insecure. If XDM is used, it automatically
-generates the authentication data.
-
-One should be careful not to use "xin" or "xstart" or other similar
-scripts that explicitly set DISPLAY to start X sessions in a remote
-machine, because the connection will then not go over the secure
-channel. The recommended way to start a shell in a remote machine is
-
- xterm -e ssh host &
-
-and the recommended way to execute an X11 application in a remote
-machine is
-
- ssh -n host emacs &
-
-If you need to type a password/passphrase for the remote machine,
-
- ssh -f host emacs
-
-may be useful.
-
-
-
-RSA AUTHENTICATION
-
-RSA authentication is based on public key cryptograpy. The idea is
-that there are two encryption keys, one for encryption and another for
-decryption. It is not possible (on human timescale) to derive the
-decryption key from the encryption key. The encryption key is called
-the public key, because it can be given to anyone and it is not
-secret. The decryption key, on the other hand, is secret, and is
-called the private key.
-
-RSA authentication is based on the impossibility of deriving the
-private key from the public key. The public key is stored on the
-server machine in the user's $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys file. The
-private key is only kept on the user's local machine, laptop, or other
-secure storage. Then the user tries to log in, the client tells the
-server the public key that the user wishes to use for authentication.
-The server then checks if this public key is admissible. If so, it
-generates a 256 bit random number, encrypts it with the public key,
-and sends the value to the client. The client then decrypts the
-number with its private key, computes a 128 bit MD5 checksum from the
-resulting data, and sends the checksum back to the server. (Only a
-checksum is sent to prevent chosen-plaintext attacks against RSA.)
-The server checks computes a checksum from the correct data,
-and compares the checksums. Authentication is accepted if the
-checksums match. (Theoretically this indicates that the client
-only probably knows the correct key, but for all practical purposes
-there is no doubt.)
-
-The RSA private key can be protected with a passphrase. The
-passphrase can be any string; it is hashed with MD5 to produce an
-encryption key for IDEA, which is used to encrypt the private part of
-the key file. With passphrase, authorization requires access to the key
-file and the passphrase. Without passphrase, authorization only
-depends on possession of the key file.
-
-RSA authentication is the most secure form of authentication supported
-by this software. It does not rely on the network, routers, domain
-name servers, or the client machine. The only thing that matters is
-access to the private key.
-
-All this, of course, depends on the security of the RSA algorithm
-itself. RSA has been widely known since about 1978, and no effective
-methods for breaking it are known if it is used properly. Care has
-been taken to avoid the well-known pitfalls. Breaking RSA is widely
-believed to be equivalent to factoring, which is a very hard
-mathematical problem that has received considerable public research.
-So far, no effective methods are known for numbers bigger than about
-512 bits. However, as computer speeds and factoring methods are
-increasing, 512 bits can no longer be considered secure. The
-factoring work is exponential, and 768 or 1024 bits are widely
-considered to be secure in the near future.
-
-
-RHOSTS AUTHENTICATION
-
-Conventional .rhosts and hosts.equiv based authentication mechanisms
-are fundamentally insecure due to IP, DNS (domain name server) and
-routing spoofing attacks. Additionally this authentication method
-relies on the integrity of the client machine. These weaknesses is
-tolerable, and been known and exploited for a long time.
-
-Ssh provides an improved version of these types of authentication,
-because they are very convenient for the user (and allow easy
-transition from rsh and rlogin). It permits these types of
-authentication, but additionally requires that the client host be
-authenticated using RSA.
-
-The server has a list of host keys stored in /etc/ssh_known_host, and
-additionally each user has host keys in $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts. Ssh
-uses the name servers to obtain the canonical name of the client host,
-looks for its public key in its known host files, and requires the
-client to prove that it knows the private host key. This prevents IP
-and routing spoofing attacks (as long as the client machine private
-host key has not been compromized), but is still vulnerable to DNS
-attacks (to a limited extent), and relies on the integrity of the
-client machine as to who is requesting to log in. This prevents
-outsiders from attacking, but does not protect against very powerful
-attackers. If maximal security is desired, only RSA authentication
-should be used.
-
-It is possible to enable conventional .rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv
-authentication (without host authentication) at compile time by giving
-the option --with-rhosts to configure. However, this is not
-recommended, and is not done by default.
-
-These weaknesses are present in rsh and rlogin. No improvement in
-security will be obtained unless rlogin and rsh are completely
-disabled (commented out in /etc/inetd.conf). This is highly
-recommended.
-
-
-WEAKEST LINKS IN SECURITY
-
-One should understand that while this software may provide
-cryptographically secure communications, it may be easy to
-monitor the communications at their endpoints.
-
-Basically, anyone with root access on the local machine on which you
-are running the software may be able to do anything. Anyone with root
-access on the server machine may be able to monitor your
-communications, and a very talented root user might even be able to
-send his/her own requests to your authentication agent.
-
-One should also be aware that computers send out electromagnetic
-radition that can sometimes be picked up hundreds of meters away.
-Your keyboard is particularly easy to listen to. The image on your
-monitor might also be seen on another monitor in a van parked behind
-your house.
-
-Beware that unwanted visitors might come to your home or office and
-use your machine while you are away. They might also make
-modifications or install bugs in your hardware or software.
-
-Beware that the most effective way for someone to decrypt your data
-may be with a rubber hose.
-
-
-LEGAL ISSUES
-
-As far as I am concerned, anyone is permitted to use this software
-freely. However, see the file COPYING for detailed copying,
-licensing, and distribution information.
-
-In some countries, particularly France, Russia, Iraq, and Pakistan,
-it may be illegal to use any encryption at all without a special
-permit, and the rumor has it that you cannot get a permit for any
-strong encryption.
-
-This software may be freely imported into the United States; however,
-the United States Government may consider re-exporting it a criminal
-offence.
-
-Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this
-software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major
-bookstore, scientific library, or patent office worldwide.
-
-THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THIS PROGRAM. Please consult the file
-COPYING for more information.
-
-
-MAILING LISTS AND OTHER INFORMATION
-
-There is a mailing list for ossh. It is ossh@sics.se. If you would
-like to join, send a message to majordomo@sics.se with "subscribe
-ssh" in body.
-
-The WWW home page for ssh is http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh. It contains an
-archive of the mailing list, and detailed information about new
-releases, mailing lists, and other relevant issues.
-
-Bug reports should be sent to ossh-bugs@sics.se.
-
-
-ABOUT THE AUTHOR
-
-This software was written by Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>. I work as a
-researcher at Helsinki University of Technology, Finland. For more
-information, see http://www.cs.hut.fi/~ylo/. My PGP public key is
-available via finger from ylo@cs.hut.fi and from the key servers. I
-prefer PGP encrypted mail.
-
-The author can be contacted via ordinary mail at
- Tatu Ylonen
- Helsinki University of Technology
- Otakaari 1
- FIN-02150 ESPOO
- Finland
-
- Fax. +358-0-4513293
-
-
-ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
-
-I thank Tero Kivinen, Timo Rinne, Janne Snabb, and Heikki Suonsivu for
-their help and comments in the design, implementation and porting of
-this software. I also thank numerous contributors, including but not
-limited to Walker Aumann, Jurgen Botz, Hans-Werner Braun, Stephane
-Bortzmeyer, Adrian Colley, Michael Cooper, David Dombek, Jerome
-Etienne, Bill Fithen, Mark Fullmer, Bert Gijsbers, Andreas Gustafsson,
-Michael Henits, Steve Johnson, Thomas Koenig, Felix Leitner, Gunnar
-Lindberg, Andrew Macpherson, Marc Martinec, Paul Mauvais, Donald
-McKillican, Leon Mlakar, Robert Muchsel, Mark Treacy, Bryan
-O'Sullivan, Mikael Suokas, Ollivier Robert, Jakob Schlyter, Tomasz
-Surmacz, Alvar Vinacua, Petri Virkkula, Michael Warfield, and
-Cristophe Wolfhugel.
-
-Thanks also go to Philip Zimmermann, whose PGP software and the
-associated legal battle provided inspiration, motivation, and many
-useful techniques, and to Bruce Schneier whose book Applied
-Cryptography has done a great service in widely distributing knowledge
-about cryptographic methods.
-
-
-Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen, Espoo, Finland.
+$Id$
andersk / openssh.git / blobdiff