* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
- * Created: Sat Mar 18 22:15:47 1995 ylo
* Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
* login (authentication) dialog.
*
- * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.61 2000/04/04 21:37:27 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.153 2003/11/12 16:39:58 jakob Exp $");
-#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL
-#include <ssl/bn.h>
-#include <ssl/rsa.h>
-#include <ssl/dsa.h>
-#include <ssl/md5.h>
-#endif
+#include "ssh.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "packet.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
-#include "mpaux.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
-#include "readconf.h"
-
-#include "bufaux.h"
-
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "myproposal.h"
#include "key.h"
-#include "dsa.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readpass.h"
-/* Session id for the current session. */
-unsigned char session_id[16];
+#include "dns.h"
-/* authentications supported by server */
-unsigned int supported_authentications;
+char *client_version_string = NULL;
+char *server_version_string = NULL;
-static char *client_version_string = NULL;
-static char *server_version_string = NULL;
+int matching_host_key_dns = 0;
+/* import */
extern Options options;
extern char *__progname;
+extern uid_t original_real_uid;
+extern uid_t original_effective_uid;
+extern pid_t proxy_command_pid;
+
+#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */
+#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
+#endif
+
+static int show_other_keys(const char *, Key *);
+static void warn_changed_key(Key *);
/*
* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
*/
-int
-ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, uid_t original_real_uid,
- const char *proxy_command)
+static int
+ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
{
Buffer command;
const char *cp;
char *command_string;
int pin[2], pout[2];
- int pid;
+ pid_t pid;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
/* Convert the port number into a string. */
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port);
- /* Build the final command string in the buffer by making the
- appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command. */
+ /*
+ * Build the final command string in the buffer by making the
+ * appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command.
+ *
+ * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms
+ * (e.g. Solaris)
+ */
buffer_init(&command);
+ buffer_append(&command, "exec ", 5);
+
for (cp = proxy_command; *cp; cp++) {
if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
buffer_append(&command, "%", 1);
/* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0)
fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s",
- strerror(errno));
+ strerror(errno));
debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string);
char *argv[10];
/* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
- permanently_set_uid(original_real_uid);
+ seteuid(original_real_uid);
+ setuid(original_real_uid);
/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
close(pin[1]);
/* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
printed on the user's terminal. */
- argv[0] = "/bin/sh";
+ argv[0] = _PATH_BSHELL;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = command_string;
argv[3] = NULL;
/* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
extra privileges above. */
- execv("/bin/sh", argv);
- perror("/bin/sh");
+ execv(argv[0], argv);
+ perror(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
if (pid < 0)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ else
+ proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */
/* Close child side of the descriptors. */
close(pin[0]);
/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]);
- return 1;
+ /* Indicate OK return */
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection.
*/
-int
-ssh_create_socket(uid_t original_real_uid, int privileged, int family)
+static int
+ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
{
- int sock;
+ int sock, gaierr;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res;
/*
* If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged
*/
if (privileged) {
int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1;
- sock = rresvport_af(&p, family);
+ PRIV_START;
+ sock = rresvport_af(&p, ai->ai_family);
+ PRIV_END;
if (sock < 0)
- error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", family, strerror(errno));
+ error("rresvport: af=%d %.100s", ai->ai_family,
+ strerror(errno));
else
debug("Allocated local port %d.", p);
- } else {
- /*
- * Just create an ordinary socket on arbitrary port. We use
- * the user's uid to create the socket.
- */
- temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid);
- sock = socket(family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sock < 0)
- error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- restore_uid();
+ return sock;
+ }
+ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
+ if (options.bind_address == NULL)
+ return sock;
+
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
+ hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+ gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, "0", &hints, &res);
+ if (gaierr) {
+ error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
+ gai_strerror(gaierr));
+ close(sock);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ error("bind: %s: %s", options.bind_address, strerror(errno));
+ close(sock);
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ return -1;
}
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
return sock;
}
+static int
+timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
+ socklen_t addrlen, int timeout)
+{
+ fd_set *fdset;
+ struct timeval tv;
+ socklen_t optlen;
+ int fdsetsz, optval, rc, result = -1;
+
+ if (timeout <= 0)
+ return (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen));
+
+ if (fcntl(sockfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ return (0);
+ if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
+ return (-1);
+
+ fdsetsz = howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
+
+ memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
+ FD_SET(sockfd, fdset);
+ tv.tv_sec = timeout;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+
+ for(;;) {
+ rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv);
+ if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch(rc) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Timed out */
+ errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ /* Select error */
+ debug("select: %s", strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ /* Completed or failed */
+ optval = 0;
+ optlen = sizeof(optval);
+ if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval,
+ &optlen) == -1) {
+ debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
+ if (optval != 0) {
+ errno = optval;
+ break;
+ }
+ result = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Should not occur */
+ fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc);
+ }
+
+ xfree(fdset);
+ return (result);
+}
+
/*
* Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
* The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
- * If port is 0, the default port will be used. If anonymous is zero,
+ * If port is 0, the default port will be used. If needpriv is true,
* a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection.
- * This requires super-user privileges if anonymous is false.
+ * This requires super-user privileges if needpriv is true.
* Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
* second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
* and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
* the daemon.
+ * Return values:
+ * 0 for OK
+ * ECONNREFUSED if we got a "Connection Refused" by the peer on any address
+ * ECONNABORTED if we failed without a "Connection refused"
+ * Suitable error messages for the connection failure will already have been
+ * printed.
*/
int
ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
- u_short port, int connection_attempts,
- int anonymous, uid_t original_real_uid,
- const char *proxy_command)
+ u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts,
+ int needpriv, const char *proxy_command)
{
+ int gaierr;
+ int on = 1;
int sock = -1, attempt;
- struct servent *sp;
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
- int gaierr;
- struct linger linger;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ struct servent *sp;
+ /*
+ * Did we get only other errors than "Connection refused" (which
+ * should block fallback to rsh and similar), or did we get at least
+ * one "Connection refused"?
+ */
+ int full_failure = 1;
- debug("ssh_connect: getuid %d geteuid %d anon %d",
- (int) getuid(), (int) geteuid(), anonymous);
+ debug2("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv);
/* Get default port if port has not been set. */
if (port == 0) {
}
/* If a proxy command is given, connect using it. */
if (proxy_command != NULL)
- return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, original_real_uid, proxy_command);
+ return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, proxy_command);
/* No proxy command. */
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+ hints.ai_family = family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+ snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %.100s: %s", __progname, host,
gai_strerror(gaierr));
* Try to connect several times. On some machines, the first time
* will sometimes fail. In general socket code appears to behave
* quite magically on many machines.
- */
- for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
+ */
+ for (attempt = 0; ;) {
if (attempt > 0)
debug("Trying again...");
/* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
- sequence until the connection succeeds. */
+ sequence until the connection succeeds. */
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
host, ntop, strport);
/* Create a socket for connecting. */
- sock = ssh_create_socket(original_real_uid,
- !anonymous && geteuid() == 0 && port < IPPORT_RESERVED,
- ai->ai_family);
+ sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai);
if (sock < 0)
+ /* Any error is already output */
continue;
- /* Connect to the host. We use the user's uid in the
- * hope that it will help with tcp_wrappers showing
- * the remote uid as root.
- */
- temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid);
- if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) >= 0) {
+ if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ options.connection_timeout) >= 0) {
/* Successful connection. */
- memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, sizeof(*(ai->ai_addr)));
- restore_uid();
+ memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
break;
} else {
- debug("connect: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- restore_uid();
+ if (errno == ECONNREFUSED)
+ full_failure = 0;
+ debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
+ ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
/*
* Close the failed socket; there appear to
* be some problems when reusing a socket for
* which connect() has already returned an
* error.
*/
- shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
close(sock);
}
}
if (ai)
break; /* Successful connection. */
+ attempt++;
+ if (attempt >= connection_attempts)
+ break;
/* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
sleep(1);
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
- if (attempt >= connection_attempts)
- return 0;
+ if (attempt >= connection_attempts) {
+ logit("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
+ host, strport, strerror(errno));
+ return full_failure ? ECONNABORTED : ECONNREFUSED;
+ }
debug("Connection established.");
- /*
- * Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear as soon
- * as it has been closed for whatever reason.
- */
- /* setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */
- linger.l_onoff = 1;
- linger.l_linger = 5;
- setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger));
+ /* Set keepalives if requested. */
+ if (options.keepalives &&
+ setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
+ sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/* Set the connection. */
packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to
- * authenticate using the agent.
- */
-int
-try_agent_authentication()
-{
- int status, type;
- char *comment;
- AuthenticationConnection *auth;
- unsigned char response[16];
- unsigned int i;
- BIGNUM *e, *n, *challenge;
-
- /* Get connection to the agent. */
- auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
- if (!auth)
- return 0;
-
- e = BN_new();
- n = BN_new();
- challenge = BN_new();
-
- /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */
- for (status = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, e, n, &comment);
- status;
- status = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, &comment)) {
- int plen, clen;
-
- /* Try this identity. */
- debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment);
- xfree(comment);
-
- /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
- packet_put_bignum(n);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Wait for server's response. */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
-
- /* The server sends failure if it doesn\'t like our key or
- does not support RSA authentication. */
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- debug("Server refused our key.");
- continue;
- }
- /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d",
- type);
-
- packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen);
-
- packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type);
-
- debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
-
- /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */
- if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, e, n, challenge,
- session_id, 1, response)) {
- /* The agent failed to authenticate this identifier although it
- advertised it supports this. Just return a wrong value. */
- log("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge.");
- memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
- }
- debug("Sending response to RSA challenge.");
-
- /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- packet_put_char(response[i]);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Wait for response from the server. */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
-
- /* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
- BN_clear_free(e);
- BN_clear_free(n);
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
- return 1;
- }
- /* Otherwise it should return failure. */
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d",
- type);
- }
-
- BN_clear_free(e);
- BN_clear_free(n);
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
-
- debug("RSA authentication using agent refused.");
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to
- * the server.
- */
-void
-respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv)
-{
- unsigned char buf[32], response[16];
- MD5_CTX md;
- int i, len;
-
- /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */
- rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv);
-
- /* Compute the response. */
- /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
- len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
- if (len <= 0 || len > sizeof(buf))
- packet_disconnect("respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d",
- len);
-
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len);
- MD5_Init(&md);
- MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
- MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
- MD5_Final(response, &md);
-
- debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge.");
-
- /* Send the response back to the server. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- packet_put_char(response[i]);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- memset(response, 0, sizeof(response));
- memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate
- * the user using it.
- */
-int
-try_rsa_authentication(const char *authfile)
-{
- BIGNUM *challenge;
- RSA *private_key;
- RSA *public_key;
- char *passphrase, *comment;
- int type, i;
- int plen, clen;
-
- /* Try to load identification for the authentication key. */
- public_key = RSA_new();
- if (!load_public_key(authfile, public_key, &comment)) {
- RSA_free(public_key);
- /* Could not load it. Fail. */
- return 0;
- }
- debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment);
-
- /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA);
- packet_put_bignum(public_key->n);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* We no longer need the public key. */
- RSA_free(public_key);
-
- /* Wait for server's response. */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
-
- /*
- * The server responds with failure if it doesn\'t like our key or
- * doesn\'t support RSA authentication.
- */
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- debug("Server refused our key.");
- xfree(comment);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
-
- /* Get the challenge from the packet. */
- challenge = BN_new();
- packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen);
-
- packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type);
-
- debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
-
- private_key = RSA_new();
- /*
- * Load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it
- * fails, ask for a passphrase.
- */
- if (!load_private_key(authfile, "", private_key, NULL)) {
- char buf[300];
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ",
- comment);
- if (!options.batch_mode)
- passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
- else {
- debug("Will not query passphrase for %.100s in batch mode.",
- comment);
- passphrase = xstrdup("");
- }
-
- /* Load the authentication file using the pasphrase. */
- if (!load_private_key(authfile, passphrase, private_key, NULL)) {
- memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
- xfree(passphrase);
- error("Bad passphrase.");
-
- /* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- packet_put_char(0);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Expect the server to reject it... */
- packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
- xfree(comment);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Destroy the passphrase. */
- memset(passphrase, 0, strlen(passphrase));
- xfree(passphrase);
- }
- /* We no longer need the comment. */
- xfree(comment);
-
- /* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */
- respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private_key);
-
- /* Destroy the private key. */
- RSA_free(private_key);
-
- /* We no longer need the challenge. */
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
-
- /* Wait for response from the server. */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- debug("RSA authentication accepted by server.");
- return 1;
- }
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
- debug("RSA authentication refused.");
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
- * authentication and RSA host authentication.
- */
-int
-try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, RSA * host_key)
-{
- int type;
- BIGNUM *challenge;
- int plen, clen;
-
- debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication.");
-
- /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA);
- packet_put_string(local_user, strlen(local_user));
- packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->n));
- packet_put_bignum(host_key->e);
- packet_put_bignum(host_key->n);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Wait for server's response. */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
-
- /* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our
- .rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
- debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key.");
- return 0;
- }
- /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type);
-
- /* Get the challenge from the packet. */
- challenge = BN_new();
- packet_get_bignum(challenge, &clen);
-
- packet_integrity_check(plen, clen, type);
-
- debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server.");
-
- /* Compute a response to the challenge. */
- respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key);
-
- /* We no longer need the challenge. */
- BN_clear_free(challenge);
-
- /* Wait for response from the server. */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
- debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server.");
- return 1;
- }
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type);
- debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused.");
- return 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef KRB4
-int
-try_kerberos_authentication()
-{
- KTEXT_ST auth; /* Kerberos data */
- char *reply;
- char inst[INST_SZ];
- char *realm;
- CREDENTIALS cred;
- int r, type, plen;
- socklen_t slen;
- Key_schedule schedule;
- u_long checksum, cksum;
- MSG_DAT msg_data;
- struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
- struct stat st;
-
- /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
- if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
- return 0;
-
- strncpy(inst, (char *) krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname()), INST_SZ);
-
- realm = (char *) krb_realmofhost(get_canonical_hostname());
- if (!realm) {
- debug("Kerberos V4: no realm for %s", get_canonical_hostname());
- return 0;
- }
- /* This can really be anything. */
- checksum = (u_long) getpid();
-
- r = krb_mk_req(&auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, checksum);
- if (r != KSUCCESS) {
- debug("Kerberos V4 krb_mk_req failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Get session key to decrypt the server's reply with. */
- r = krb_get_cred(KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, &cred);
- if (r != KSUCCESS) {
- debug("get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
- return 0;
- }
- des_key_sched((des_cblock *) cred.session, schedule);
-
- /* Send authentication info to server. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS);
- packet_put_string((char *) auth.dat, auth.length);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Zero the buffer. */
- (void) memset(auth.dat, 0, MAX_KTXT_LEN);
-
- slen = sizeof(local);
- memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
- if (getsockname(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
- debug("getsockname failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-
- slen = sizeof(foreign);
- memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
- if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) {
- debug("getpeername failed: %s", strerror(errno));
- fatal_cleanup();
- }
- /* Get server reply. */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE:
- /* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */
- debug("Kerberos V4 authentication failed.");
- return 0;
- break;
-
- case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE:
- /* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */
- debug("Kerberos V4 authentication accepted.");
-
- /* Get server's response. */
- reply = packet_get_string((unsigned int *) &auth.length);
- memcpy(auth.dat, reply, auth.length);
- xfree(reply);
-
- packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type);
-
- /*
- * If his response isn't properly encrypted with the session
- * key, and the decrypted checksum fails to match, he's
- * bogus. Bail out.
- */
- r = krb_rd_priv(auth.dat, auth.length, schedule, &cred.session,
- &foreign, &local, &msg_data);
- if (r != KSUCCESS) {
- debug("Kerberos V4 krb_rd_priv failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
- packet_disconnect("Kerberos V4 challenge failed!");
- }
- /* Fetch the (incremented) checksum that we supplied in the request. */
- (void) memcpy((char *) &cksum, (char *) msg_data.app_data, sizeof(cksum));
- cksum = ntohl(cksum);
-
- /* If it matches, we're golden. */
- if (cksum == checksum + 1) {
- debug("Kerberos V4 challenge successful.");
- return 1;
- } else
- packet_disconnect("Kerberos V4 challenge failed!");
- break;
-
- default:
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos V4 response: %d", type);
- }
return 0;
}
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
-#ifdef AFS
-int
-send_kerberos_tgt()
-{
- CREDENTIALS *creds;
- char pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ];
- int r, type, plen;
- char buffer[8192];
- struct stat st;
-
- /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */
- if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0)
- return 0;
-
- creds = xmalloc(sizeof(*creds));
-
- if ((r = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, pname, pinst, prealm)) != KSUCCESS) {
- debug("Kerberos V4 tf_fullname failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((r = krb_get_cred("krbtgt", prealm, prealm, creds)) != GC_OK) {
- debug("Kerberos V4 get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]);
- return 0;
- }
- if (time(0) > krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date, creds->lifetime)) {
- debug("Kerberos V4 ticket expired: %s", TKT_FILE);
- return 0;
- }
- creds_to_radix(creds, (unsigned char *)buffer);
- xfree(creds);
-
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT);
- packet_put_string(buffer, strlen(buffer));
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- type = packet_read(&plen);
-
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- debug("Kerberos TGT for realm %s rejected.", prealm);
- else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos TGT response: %d", type);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-void
-send_afs_tokens(void)
-{
- CREDENTIALS creds;
- struct ViceIoctl parms;
- struct ClearToken ct;
- int i, type, len, plen;
- char buf[2048], *p, *server_cell;
- char buffer[8192];
-
- /* Move over ktc_GetToken, here's something leaner. */
- for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { /* just in case */
- parms.in = (char *) &i;
- parms.in_size = sizeof(i);
- parms.out = buf;
- parms.out_size = sizeof(buf);
- if (k_pioctl(0, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) != 0)
- break;
- p = buf;
-
- /* Get secret token. */
- memcpy(&creds.ticket_st.length, p, sizeof(unsigned int));
- if (creds.ticket_st.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN)
- break;
- p += sizeof(unsigned int);
- memcpy(creds.ticket_st.dat, p, creds.ticket_st.length);
- p += creds.ticket_st.length;
-
- /* Get clear token. */
- memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
- if (len != sizeof(struct ClearToken))
- break;
- p += sizeof(len);
- memcpy(&ct, p, len);
- p += len;
- p += sizeof(len); /* primary flag */
- server_cell = p;
-
- /* Flesh out our credentials. */
- strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
- creds.instance[0] = '\0';
- strlcpy(creds.realm, server_cell, REALM_SZ);
- memcpy(creds.session, ct.HandShakeKey, DES_KEY_SZ);
- creds.issue_date = ct.BeginTimestamp;
- creds.lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds.issue_date, ct.EndTimestamp);
- creds.kvno = ct.AuthHandle;
- snprintf(creds.pname, sizeof(creds.pname), "AFS ID %d", ct.ViceId);
- creds.pinst[0] = '\0';
-
- /* Encode token, ship it off. */
- if (!creds_to_radix(&creds, (unsigned char*) buffer))
- break;
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN);
- packet_put_string(buffer, strlen(buffer));
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Roger, Roger. Clearance, Clarence. What's your vector,
- Victor? */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
-
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- debug("AFS token for cell %s rejected.", server_cell);
- else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error on AFS token response: %d", type);
- }
-}
-
-#endif /* AFS */
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system.
- * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS.
- */
-int
-try_skey_authentication()
-{
- int type, i;
- int payload_len;
- unsigned int clen;
- char *challenge, *response;
-
- debug("Doing skey authentication.");
-
- /* request a challenge */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- type = packet_read(&payload_len);
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE &&
- type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
- "to skey-auth", type);
- }
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) {
- debug("No challenge for skey authentication.");
- return 0;
- }
- challenge = packet_get_string(&clen);
- packet_integrity_check(payload_len, (4 + clen), type);
- if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
- log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! "
- "Reponse will be transmitted in clear text.");
- fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", challenge);
- xfree(challenge);
- fflush(stderr);
- for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
- if (i != 0)
- error("Permission denied, please try again.");
- response = read_passphrase("Response: ", 0);
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
- packet_put_string(response, strlen(response));
- memset(response, 0, strlen(response));
- xfree(response);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- type = packet_read(&payload_len);
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- return 1;
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response "
- "to skey-auth-reponse", type);
- }
- /* failure */
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication.
- */
-int
-try_password_authentication(char *prompt)
-{
- int type, i, payload_len;
- char *password;
-
- debug("Doing password authentication.");
- if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
- log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text.");
- for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
- if (i != 0)
- error("Permission denied, please try again.");
- password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
- packet_put_string(password, strlen(password));
- memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
- xfree(password);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- type = packet_read(&payload_len);
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- return 1;
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type);
- }
- /* failure */
- return 0;
-}
-
-char *
-chop(char *s)
-{
- char *t = s;
- while (*t) {
- if(*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') {
- *t = '\0';
- return s;
- }
- t++;
- }
- return s;
-
-}
-
/*
* Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own
* identification string.
*/
-void
-ssh_exchange_identification()
+static void
+ssh_exchange_identification(void)
{
char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */
- int remote_major, remote_minor, i;
+ int remote_major, remote_minor, i, mismatch;
int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
+ int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
/* Read other side\'s version identification. */
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
- int len = read(connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
- if (len < 0)
- fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (len != 1)
- fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host");
- if (buf[i] == '\r') {
- buf[i] = '\n';
- buf[i + 1] = 0;
- continue; /**XXX wait for \n */
+ for (;;) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+ int len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
+ if (len < 0)
+ fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (len != 1)
+ fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host");
+ if (buf[i] == '\r') {
+ buf[i] = '\n';
+ buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ continue; /**XXX wait for \n */
+ }
+ if (buf[i] == '\n') {
+ buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ break;
+ }
}
- if (buf[i] == '\n') {
- buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
+ if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
- }
+ debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf);
}
- buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
/*
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3)
fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf);
debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
- remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+ remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
-/*** XXX option for disabling 2.0 or 1.5 */
compat_datafellows(remote_version);
-
- /* Check if the remote protocol version is too old. */
- if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor < 3)
- fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version.");
-
- /* We speak 1.3, too. */
- if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 3) {
- enable_compat13();
- if (options.forward_agent) {
- log("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3");
- options.forward_agent = 0;
+ mismatch = 0;
+
+ switch (remote_major) {
+ case 1:
+ if (remote_minor == 99 &&
+ (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) &&
+ !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) {
+ enable_compat20();
+ break;
}
+ if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (remote_minor < 3) {
+ fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version.");
+ } else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) {
+ /* We speak 1.3, too. */
+ enable_compat13();
+ minor1 = 3;
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ logit("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3");
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
+ enable_compat20();
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ mismatch = 1;
+ break;
}
- if ((remote_major == 2 && remote_minor == 0) ||
- (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99)) {
- enable_compat20();
- }
-#if 0
- /*
- * Removed for now, to permit compatibility with latter versions. The
- * server will reject our version and disconnect if it doesn't
- * support it.
- */
- if (remote_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
+ if (mismatch)
fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
- PROTOCOL_MAJOR, remote_major);
-#endif
+ (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
+ remote_major);
/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
- compat20 ? 2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR,
- compat20 ? 0 : PROTOCOL_MINOR,
+ compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
+ compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1,
SSH_VERSION);
- if (atomicio(write, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
chop(client_version_string);
debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string);
}
-int
-read_yes_or_no(const char *prompt, int defval)
+/* defaults to 'no' */
+static int
+confirm(const char *prompt)
{
- char buf[1024];
- FILE *f;
- int retval = -1;
+ const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': ";
+ char *p;
+ int ret = -1;
- if (isatty(0))
- f = stdin;
- else
- f = fopen("/dev/tty", "rw");
-
- if (f == NULL)
+ if (options.batch_mode)
return 0;
-
- fflush(stdout);
-
- while (1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s", prompt);
- if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL) {
- /* Print a newline (the prompt probably didn\'t have one). */
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- strlcpy(buf, "no", sizeof buf);
- }
- /* Remove newline from response. */
- if (strchr(buf, '\n'))
- *strchr(buf, '\n') = 0;
-
- if (buf[0] == 0)
- retval = defval;
- if (strcmp(buf, "yes") == 0)
- retval = 1;
- if (strcmp(buf, "no") == 0)
- retval = 0;
-
- if (retval != -1) {
- if (f != stdin)
- fclose(f);
- return retval;
- }
+ for (msg = prompt;;msg = again) {
+ p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
+ if (p == NULL ||
+ (p[0] == '\0') || (p[0] == '\n') ||
+ strncasecmp(p, "no", 2) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ if (p && strncasecmp(p, "yes", 3) == 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ if (p)
+ xfree(p);
+ if (ret != -1)
+ return ret;
}
}
/*
- * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return only if ok.
+ * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
+ * is not valid. the user_hostfile will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
*/
-
-void
-check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
+static int
+check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
+ int readonly, const char *user_hostfile, const char *system_hostfile)
{
Key *file_key;
+ const char *type = key_type(host_key);
char *ip = NULL;
- char hostline[1000], *hostp;
+ char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp;
HostStatus host_status;
HostStatus ip_status;
int local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0;
int salen;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+ char msg[1024];
+ int len, host_line, ip_line;
+ const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL;
/*
* Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
* essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
* this is probably not a real problem.
*/
+ /** hostaddr == 0! */
switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
- local = (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
+ local = (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
+ sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
break;
case AF_INET6:
- local = IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(&(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
+ local = IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
+ &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
break;
default:
salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
break;
}
- if (local) {
- debug("Forcing accepting of host key for loopback/localhost.");
- return;
+ if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
+ options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
+ debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
+ "loopback/localhost.");
+ return 0;
}
/*
- * Turn off check_host_ip for proxy connects, since
- * we don't have the remote ip-address
+ * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
+ * using a proxy command
*/
- if (options.proxy_command != NULL && options.check_host_ip)
- options.check_host_ip = 0;
-
- if (options.check_host_ip) {
+ if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, salen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed");
ip = xstrdup(ntop);
+ } else {
+ ip = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy command>");
+ }
+ /*
+ * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
+ * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
+ */
+ if (options.check_host_ip &&
+ (local || strcmp(host, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
+ options.check_host_ip = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Allow the user to record the key under a different name. This is
+ * useful for ssh tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run
+ * multiple sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
+ */
+ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
+ host = options.host_key_alias;
+ debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", host);
}
/*
* Check if the host key is present in the user\'s list of known
* hosts or in the systemwide list.
*/
- host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, host, host_key, file_key);
- if (host_status == HOST_NEW)
- host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.system_hostfile, host, host_key, file_key);
+ host_file = user_hostfile;
+ host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key,
+ file_key, &host_line);
+ if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
+ host_file = system_hostfile;
+ host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(host_file, host, host_key,
+ file_key, &host_line);
+ }
/*
* Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
* localhost or the hostname was an ip address to begin with
*/
- if (options.check_host_ip && !local && strcmp(host, ip)) {
+ if (options.check_host_ip) {
Key *ip_key = key_new(host_key->type);
- ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, ip, host_key, ip_key);
- if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
- ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.system_hostfile, ip, host_key, ip_key);
+ ip_file = user_hostfile;
+ ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip, host_key,
+ ip_key, &ip_line);
+ if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+ ip_file = system_hostfile;
+ ip_status = check_host_in_hostfile(ip_file, ip,
+ host_key, ip_key, &ip_line);
+ }
if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
(ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || !key_equal(ip_key, file_key)))
host_ip_differ = 1;
switch (host_status) {
case HOST_OK:
/* The host is known and the key matches. */
- debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the host key.", host);
- if (options.check_host_ip) {
- if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
- if (!add_host_to_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, ip, host_key))
- log("Failed to add the host key for IP address '%.30s' to the list of known hosts (%.30s).",
- ip, options.user_hostfile);
- else
- log("Warning: Permanently added host key for IP address '%.30s' to the list of known hosts.",
- ip);
- } else if (ip_status != HOST_OK)
- log("Warning: the host key for '%.200s' differs from the key for the IP address '%.30s'",
- host, ip);
+ debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host key.",
+ host, type);
+ debug("Found key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line);
+ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+ if (readonly)
+ logit("%s host key for IP address "
+ "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
+ type, ip);
+ else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, ip,
+ host_key))
+ logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
+ "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
+ "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip, user_hostfile);
+ else
+ logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
+ "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
+ "of known hosts.", type, ip);
}
break;
case HOST_NEW:
+ if (readonly)
+ goto fail;
/* The host is new. */
if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
- /* User has requested strict host key checking. We will not add the host key
- automatically. The only alternative left is to abort. */
- fatal("No host key is known for %.200s and you have requested strict checking.", host);
+ /*
+ * User has requested strict host key checking. We
+ * will not add the host key automatically. The only
+ * alternative left is to abort.
+ */
+ error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you "
+ "have requested strict checking.", type, host);
+ goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
+ char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
+
+ if (show_other_keys(host, host_key))
+ snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
+ "\nbut keys of different type are already"
+ " known for this host.");
+ else
+ snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
/* The default */
- char prompt[1024];
- char *fp = key_fingerprint(host_key);
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
- "The authenticity of host '%.200s' can't be established.\n"
- "Key fingerprint is %s.\n"
- "Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? ",
- host, fp);
- if (!read_yes_or_no(prompt, -1))
- fatal("Aborted by user!\n");
+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ msg2[0] = '\0';
+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+ if (matching_host_key_dns)
+ snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+ "Matching host key fingerprint"
+ " found in DNS.\n");
+ else
+ snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+ "No matching host key fingerprint"
+ " found in DNS.\n");
+ }
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
+ "established%s\n"
+ "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n%s"
+ "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+ "(yes/no)? ",
+ host, ip, msg1, type, fp, msg2);
+ xfree(fp);
+ if (!confirm(msg))
+ goto fail;
}
- if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW && strcmp(host, ip)) {
+ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
hostp = hostline;
} else
hostp = host;
- /* If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the local known_hosts file. */
- if (!add_host_to_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, hostp, host_key))
- log("Failed to add the host to the list of known hosts (%.500s).",
- options.user_hostfile);
+ /*
+ * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the
+ * local known_hosts file.
+ */
+ if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfile, hostp, host_key))
+ logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
+ "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfile);
else
- log("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' to the list of known hosts.",
- hostp);
+ logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
+ "list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
break;
case HOST_CHANGED:
if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("The host key for %s has changed,", host);
+ error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
error("and the key for the according IP address %s", ip);
error("%s. This could either mean that", msg);
error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
- error("and its host key have changed at the same time");
+ error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
+ if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
+ error("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line);
}
/* The host key has changed. */
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
- error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
- error("It is also possible that the host key has just been changed.");
- error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+ warn_changed_key(host_key);
error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
- options.user_hostfile);
+ user_hostfile);
+ error("Offending key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line);
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
- if (options.strict_host_key_checking)
- fatal("Host key for %.200s has changed and you have requested strict checking.", host);
+ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) {
+ error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
+ "requested strict checking.", type, host);
+ goto fail;
+ }
/*
* If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
- * the connection but without password authentication or
+ * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
* agent forwarding.
*/
if (options.password_authentication) {
- error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid trojan horses.");
+ error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.password_authentication = 0;
}
+ if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
+ error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
+ " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+ options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+ }
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
+ error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
+ " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+ }
if (options.forward_agent) {
- error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid trojan horses.");
+ error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.forward_agent = 0;
}
+ if (options.forward_x11) {
+ error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.forward_x11 = 0;
+ }
+ if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
+ options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+ error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+ "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.num_local_forwards =
+ options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
+ }
/*
* XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
* This could be done by converting the host key to an
* accept the authentication.
*/
break;
- }
- if (options.check_host_ip)
- xfree(ip);
-}
-void
-check_rsa_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, RSA *host_key)
-{
- Key k;
- k.type = KEY_RSA;
- k.rsa = host_key;
- check_host_key(host, hostaddr, &k);
-}
-
-/*
- * SSH2 key exchange
- */
-void
-ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
-{
- Kex *kex;
- char *cprop[PROPOSAL_MAX];
- char *sprop[PROPOSAL_MAX];
- Buffer *client_kexinit;
- Buffer *server_kexinit;
- int payload_len, dlen;
- unsigned int klen, kout;
- char *ptr;
- char *signature = NULL;
- unsigned int slen;
- char *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
- Key *server_host_key;
- unsigned int sbloblen;
- DH *dh;
- BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = 0;
- BIGNUM *shared_secret = 0;
- int i;
- unsigned char *kbuf;
- unsigned char *hash;
-
-/* KEXINIT */
-
- debug("Sending KEX init.");
- if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_ARCFOUR ||
- options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES_CBC ||
- options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_CAST128_CBC ||
- options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = cipher_name(options.cipher);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = cipher_name(options.cipher);
- }
- if (options.compression) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = "zlib";
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib";
- } else {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
- }
- for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
- cprop[i] = xstrdup(myproposal[i]);
-
- client_kexinit = kex_init(cprop);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
- packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(client_kexinit), buffer_len(client_kexinit));
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- debug("done");
-
- packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
-
- /* save payload for session_id */
- server_kexinit = xmalloc(sizeof(*server_kexinit));
- buffer_init(server_kexinit);
- ptr = packet_get_raw(&payload_len);
- buffer_append(server_kexinit, ptr, payload_len);
-
- /* skip cookie */
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- (void) packet_get_char();
- /* kex init proposal strings */
- for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
- sprop[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
- debug("got kexinit string: %s", sprop[i]);
- }
- i = (int) packet_get_char();
- debug("first kex follow == %d", i);
- i = packet_get_int();
- debug("reserved == %d", i);
-
- debug("done read kexinit");
- kex = kex_choose_conf(cprop, sprop, 0);
-
-/* KEXDH */
-
- debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT.");
-
- /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
- dh = new_dh_group1();
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "\np= ");
- bignum_print(dh->p);
- fprintf(stderr, "\ng= ");
- bignum_print(dh->g);
- fprintf(stderr, "\npub= ");
- bignum_print(dh->pub_key);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
-#endif
-
- debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY.");
-
- packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
-
- debug("Got SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY.");
-
- /* key, cert */
- server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
- server_host_key = dsa_serverkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- if (server_host_key == NULL)
- fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
-
- check_host_key(host, hostaddr, server_host_key);
-
- /* DH paramter f, server public DH key */
- dh_server_pub = BN_new();
- if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
- fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
- packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub, &dlen);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "\ndh_server_pub= ");
- bignum_print(dh_server_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub));
-#endif
-
- /* signed H */
- signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
-
- klen = DH_size(dh);
- kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
- kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- debug("shared secret: len %d/%d", klen, kout);
- fprintf(stderr, "shared secret == ");
- for (i = 0; i< kout; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (kbuf[i])&0xff);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- shared_secret = BN_new();
-
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
- memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
- xfree(kbuf);
-
- /* calc and verify H */
- hash = kex_hash(
- client_version_string,
- server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(client_kexinit), buffer_len(client_kexinit),
- buffer_ptr(server_kexinit), buffer_len(server_kexinit),
- server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- dh->pub_key,
- dh_server_pub,
- shared_secret
- );
- buffer_free(client_kexinit);
- buffer_free(server_kexinit);
- xfree(client_kexinit);
- xfree(server_kexinit);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "hash == ");
- for (i = 0; i< 20; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (hash[i])&0xff);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- dsa_verify(server_host_key, (unsigned char *)signature, slen, hash, 20);
- key_free(server_host_key);
-
- kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
- packet_set_kex(kex);
-
- /* have keys, free DH */
- DH_free(dh);
-
- debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
- packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- debug("GOT SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
-
- debug("send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- debug("done: send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
-
- /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
- packet_put_cstring("markus");
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- debug("done: KEX2.");
-}
-/*
- * Authenticate user
- */
-void
-ssh_userauth2(int host_key_valid, RSA *own_host_key,
- uid_t original_real_uid, char *host)
-{
- int type;
- int plen;
- unsigned int dlen;
- int partial;
- struct passwd *pw;
- char *server_user, *local_user;
- char *auths;
- char *password;
- char *service = "ssh-connection"; // service name
-
- debug("send SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth");
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- type = packet_read(&plen);
- if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) {
- fatal("denied SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT: %d", type);
- }
- /* payload empty for ssh-2.0.13 ?? */
- /* reply = packet_get_string(&payload_len); */
- debug("got SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT");
-
- /*XX COMMONCODE: */
- /* Get local user name. Use it as server user if no user name was given. */
- pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
- if (!pw)
- fatal("User id %d not found from user database.", original_real_uid);
- local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
-
- /* INITIAL request for auth */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(server_user);
- packet_put_cstring(service);
- packet_put_cstring("none");
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- for (;;) {
- type = packet_read(&plen);
- if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS)
- break;
- if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)
- fatal("access denied: %d", type);
- /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE means: try again */
- auths = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- debug("authentications that can continue: %s", auths);
- partial = packet_get_char();
- if (partial)
- debug("partial success");
- if (strstr(auths, "password") == NULL)
- fatal("passwd auth not supported: %s", auths);
- xfree(auths);
- /* try passwd */
- password = read_passphrase("password: ", 0);
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
- packet_put_cstring(server_user);
- packet_put_cstring(service);
- packet_put_cstring("password");
- packet_put_char(0);
- packet_put_cstring(password);
- memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
- xfree(password);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
- debug("ssh-userauth2 successfull");
-}
-
-/*
- * SSH1 key exchange
- */
-void
-ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
-{
- int i;
- BIGNUM *key;
- RSA *host_key;
- RSA *public_key;
- int bits, rbits;
- int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES;
- unsigned char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char cookie[8];
- unsigned int supported_ciphers;
- unsigned int server_flags, client_flags;
- int payload_len, clen, sum_len = 0;
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
-
- debug("Waiting for server public key.");
-
- /* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */
- packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
-
- /* Get cookie from the packet. */
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- cookie[i] = packet_get_char();
-
- /* Get the public key. */
- public_key = RSA_new();
- bits = packet_get_int();/* bits */
- public_key->e = BN_new();
- packet_get_bignum(public_key->e, &clen);
- sum_len += clen;
- public_key->n = BN_new();
- packet_get_bignum(public_key->n, &clen);
- sum_len += clen;
-
- rbits = BN_num_bits(public_key->n);
- if (bits != rbits) {
- log("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: "
- "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
- log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
- }
- /* Get the host key. */
- host_key = RSA_new();
- bits = packet_get_int();/* bits */
- host_key->e = BN_new();
- packet_get_bignum(host_key->e, &clen);
- sum_len += clen;
- host_key->n = BN_new();
- packet_get_bignum(host_key->n, &clen);
- sum_len += clen;
-
- rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->n);
- if (bits != rbits) {
- log("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: "
- "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits);
- log("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
- }
-
- /* Get protocol flags. */
- server_flags = packet_get_int();
- packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags);
-
- supported_ciphers = packet_get_int();
- supported_authentications = packet_get_int();
-
- debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).",
- BN_num_bits(public_key->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->n));
-
- packet_integrity_check(payload_len,
- 8 + 4 + sum_len + 0 + 4 + 0 + 0 + 4 + 4 + 4,
- SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
-
- check_rsa_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key);
-
- client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN;
-
- compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, host_key->n, public_key->n);
-
- /* Generate a session key. */
- arc4random_stir();
-
- /*
- * Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit
- * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least
- * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
- session_key[i] = rand & 0xff;
- rand >>= 8;
- }
-
- /*
- * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key
- * is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with
- * the first 16 bytes of the session id.
- */
- key = BN_new();
- BN_set_word(key, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
- BN_lshift(key, key, 8);
- if (i < 16)
- BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i]);
- else
- BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]);
+ case HOST_FOUND:
+ fatal("internal error");
+ break;
}
- /*
- * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
- * server (key with smaller modulus first).
- */
- if (BN_cmp(public_key->n, host_key->n) < 0) {
- /* Public key has smaller modulus. */
- if (BN_num_bits(host_key->n) <
- BN_num_bits(public_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < public_key %d + "
- "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
- BN_num_bits(public_key->n),
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
- }
- rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key);
- rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key);
- } else {
- /* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */
- if (BN_num_bits(public_key->n) <
- BN_num_bits(host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: public_key %d < host_key %d + "
- "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- BN_num_bits(public_key->n),
- BN_num_bits(host_key->n),
- SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+ if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
+ ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) {
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
+ "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'"
+ "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%d",
+ type, host, ip, ip_file, ip_line);
+ if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
+ len = strlen(msg);
+ snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
+ "\nMatching host key in %s:%d",
+ host_file, host_line);
}
- rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key);
- rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, public_key);
- }
-
- /* Destroy the public keys since we no longer need them. */
- RSA_free(public_key);
- RSA_free(host_key);
-
- if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) {
- if (cipher_mask1() & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default))
- options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default;
- else {
- debug("Cipher %s not supported, using %.100s instead.",
- cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default),
- cipher_name(SSH_FALLBACK_CIPHER));
- options.cipher = SSH_FALLBACK_CIPHER;
+ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
+ logit("%s", msg);
+ error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
+ goto fail;
+ } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
+ strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want "
+ "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg));
+ if (!confirm(msg))
+ goto fail;
+ } else {
+ logit("%s", msg);
}
}
- /* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */
- if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher)))
- fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.",
- cipher_name(options.cipher));
-
- debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher));
-
- /* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
- packet_put_char(options.cipher);
-
- /* Send the cookie back to the server. */
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
-
- /* Send and destroy the encrypted encryption key integer. */
- packet_put_bignum(key);
- BN_clear_free(key);
-
- /* Send protocol flags. */
- packet_put_int(client_flags);
-
- /* Send the packet now. */
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- debug("Sent encrypted session key.");
-
- /* Set the encryption key. */
- packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher);
-
- /* We will no longer need the session key here. Destroy any extra copies. */
- memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
-
- /*
- * Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message
- * will be received in encrypted form.
- */
- packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
+ xfree(ip);
+ return 0;
- debug("Received encrypted confirmation.");
+fail:
+ xfree(ip);
+ return -1;
}
-/*
- * Authenticate user
- */
-void
-ssh_userauth(int host_key_valid, RSA *own_host_key,
- uid_t original_real_uid, char *host)
+/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
+int
+verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
{
- int i, type;
- int payload_len;
- struct passwd *pw;
- const char *server_user, *local_user;
-
- /* Get local user name. Use it as server user if no user name was given. */
- pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
- if (!pw)
- fatal("User id %d not found from user database.", original_real_uid);
- local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
+ struct stat st;
+ int flags = 0;
- /* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER);
- packet_put_string(server_user, strlen(server_user));
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns &&
+ verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
- /*
- * The server should respond with success if no authentication is
- * needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds
- * with failure.
- */
- type = packet_read(&payload_len);
+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
- /* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- return;
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER",
- type);
-
-#ifdef AFS
- /* Try Kerberos tgt passing if the server supports it. */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) &&
- options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
- if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
- log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!");
- (void) send_kerberos_tgt();
- }
- /* Try AFS token passing if the server supports it. */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN)) &&
- options.afs_token_passing && k_hasafs()) {
- if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE)
- log("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Token will be transmitted in the clear!");
- send_afs_tokens();
- }
-#endif /* AFS */
-
-#ifdef KRB4
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) &&
- options.kerberos_authentication) {
- debug("Trying Kerberos authentication.");
- if (try_kerberos_authentication()) {
- /* The server should respond with success or failure. */
- type = packet_read(&payload_len);
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- return;
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos auth", type);
- }
- }
-#endif /* KRB4 */
+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE)
+ return 0;
- /*
- * Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and we
- * do not wish to remain anonymous.
- */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS)) &&
- options.rhosts_authentication) {
- debug("Trying rhosts authentication.");
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS);
- packet_put_string(local_user, strlen(local_user));
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* The server should respond with success or failure. */
- type = packet_read(&payload_len);
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- return;
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to rhosts auth",
- type);
- }
- /*
- * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host
- * authentication.
- */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) &&
- options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && host_key_valid) {
- if (try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, own_host_key))
- return;
+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
+ matching_host_key_dns = 1;
+ } else {
+ warn_changed_key(host_key);
+ error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new "
+ "host key to get rid of this message.");
+ }
+ }
}
- /* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) &&
- options.rsa_authentication) {
- /*
- * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The
- * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for
- * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases.
- */
- if (try_agent_authentication())
- return;
- /* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++)
- if (try_rsa_authentication(options.identity_files[i]))
- return;
- }
- /* Try skey authentication if the server supports it. */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) &&
- options.skey_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
- if (try_skey_authentication())
- return;
- }
- /* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */
- if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) &&
- options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) {
- char prompt[80];
-
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.40s's password: ",
- server_user, host);
- if (try_password_authentication(prompt))
- return;
+ /* return ok if the key can be found in an old keyfile */
+ if (stat(options.system_hostfile2, &st) == 0 ||
+ stat(options.user_hostfile2, &st) == 0) {
+ if (check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key, /*readonly*/ 1,
+ options.user_hostfile2, options.system_hostfile2) == 0)
+ return 0;
}
- /* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */
- fatal("Permission denied.");
- /* NOTREACHED */
+ return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key, /*readonly*/ 0,
+ options.user_hostfile, options.system_hostfile);
}
+
/*
* Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the
* server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection
* This function does not require super-user privileges.
*/
void
-ssh_login(int host_key_valid, RSA *own_host_key, const char *orighost,
- struct sockaddr *hostaddr, uid_t original_real_uid)
+ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
+ struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct passwd *pw)
{
char *host, *cp;
+ char *server_user, *local_user;
+
+ local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
host = xstrdup(orighost);
/* authenticate user */
if (compat20) {
ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr);
- ssh_userauth2(host_key_valid, own_host_key, original_real_uid, host);
+ ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
} else {
- supported_authentications = 0;
ssh_kex(host, hostaddr);
- if (supported_authentications == 0)
- fatal("supported_authentications == 0.");
- ssh_userauth(host_key_valid, own_host_key, original_real_uid, host);
+ ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssh_put_password(char *password)
+{
+ int size;
+ char *padded;
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) {
+ packet_put_cstring(password);
+ return;
+ }
+ size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32);
+ padded = xmalloc(size);
+ memset(padded, 0, size);
+ strlcpy(padded, password, size);
+ packet_put_string(padded, size);
+ memset(padded, 0, size);
+ xfree(padded);
+}
+
+static int
+show_key_from_file(const char *file, const char *host, int keytype)
+{
+ Key *found;
+ char *fp;
+ int line, ret;
+
+ found = key_new(keytype);
+ if ((ret = lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(file, host,
+ keytype, found, &line))) {
+ fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+ "in %s:%d\n"
+ "%s key fingerprint %s.",
+ key_type(found), host, file, line,
+ key_type(found), fp);
+ xfree(fp);
}
+ key_free(found);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */
+static int
+show_other_keys(const char *host, Key *key)
+{
+ int type[] = { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, -1};
+ int i, found = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
+ if (type[i] == key->type)
+ continue;
+ if (type[i] != KEY_RSA1 &&
+ show_key_from_file(options.user_hostfile2, host, type[i])) {
+ found = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (type[i] != KEY_RSA1 &&
+ show_key_from_file(options.system_hostfile2, host, type[i])) {
+ found = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (show_key_from_file(options.user_hostfile, host, type[i])) {
+ found = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (show_key_from_file(options.system_hostfile, host, type[i])) {
+ found = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ debug2("no key of type %d for host %s", type[i], host);
+ }
+ return (found);
+}
+
+static void
+warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+{
+ char *fp;
+ const char *type = key_type(host_key);
+
+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
+ error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
+ error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type);
+ error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+ type, fp);
+ error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+
+ xfree(fp);
}