*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.309 2005/04/06 09:43:59 djm Exp $");
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
static void
sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
{
- int i, mismatch;
+ u_int i;
+ int mismatch;
int remote_major, remote_minor;
int major, minor;
char *s;
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
#endif
/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
- monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
use_privsep = 0;
- return;
- }
-
- /* Authentication complete */
- alarm(0);
- if (startup_pipe != -1) {
- close(startup_pipe);
- startup_pipe = -1;
+ goto skip;
}
/* New socket pair */
/* Drop privileges */
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+ skip:
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+ /*
+ * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
+ * this information is not part of the key state.
+ */
+ packet_set_authenticated();
}
static char *
* bignum iqmp "
* bignum p "
* bignum q "
+ * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
*/
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf));
} else
buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ rexec_send_rng_seed(&m);
+#endif
+
if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
sensitive_data.server_key->rsa);
}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m);
+#endif
+
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
initialize_server_options(&options);
/*
* Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
* root's environment
- */
+ */
if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
drop_cray_privs();
#endif
- seed_rng();
-
sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
if (!rexec_flag)
buffer_free(&cfg);
+ seed_rng();
+
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
num_listen_socks++;
/* Start listening on the port. */
- logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
- fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
+ fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
+ ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+ logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
}
freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
* not have a key.
*/
packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
+ packet_set_server();
/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- remote_port = get_remote_port();
- remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
+ debug("get_remote_port failed");
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of
+ * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked.
+ */
+ remote_ip = get_canonical_hostname(0);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
/*
- * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
* successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
* cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
- * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
+ * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
* mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
* are about to discover the bug.
*/
}
authenticated:
+ /*
+ * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ alarm(0);
+ signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+ close(startup_pipe);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
+ }
+
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
#endif
if (!rsafail) {
BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
- if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
+ if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
"session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
}
- if (!options.compression) {
+ if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
}
+
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
/* start key exchange */
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
kex->server = 1;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
andersk / openssh.git / blobdiff