- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/01/10 07:15:56

[openssh.git] / ssh.1

diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index 445e2f5d27b5112797524fdf2b7b8a4947837b0f..c0d149de60657228c3a7fb2ae88e42d84f24f133 100644 (file)
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.285 2009/10/22 12:35:53 sobrado Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.289 2010/01/09 23:04:13 dtucker Exp $
 .Dd $Mdocdate$
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
@@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
 Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
 Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
 (for the agent's
-.Ux
-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
 An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
 however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
 authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.