- espie@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/21 11:20:59

[openssh.git] / ChangeLog

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f3ee4990bf3e7c284930ac6861e7b7dfefa98903..08db139d2255e6deebe592b7056b84b4d141651d 100644 (file)
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,89 @@
+20020903
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/12 10:46:35
+     [ssh-agent.c]
+     make ssh-agent setgid, disallow ptrace.
+   - espie@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/21 11:20:59
+     [sshd.8]
+     `RSA' updated to refer to `public key', where it matters.
+     okay markus@
+
+20020820
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/02 14:43:15
+     [monitor.c monitor_mm.c]
+     Change mm_zalloc() sanity checks to be more in line with what
+     we do in calloc() and add a check to monitor_mm.c.
+     OK provos@ and markus@
+   - marc@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/02 16:00:07
+     [ssh.1 sshd.8]
+     note that .ssh/environment is only read when
+     allowed (PermitUserEnvironment in sshd_config).
+     OK markus@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/02 21:23:41
+     [ssh-rsa.c]
+     diff is u_int (2x); ok deraadt/provos
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/02 22:20:30
+     [ssh-rsa.c]
+     replace RSA_verify with our own version and avoid the OpenSSL ASN.1 parser
+     for authentication; ok deraadt/djm
+   - aaron@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/08 13:50:23
+     [sshconnect1.c]
+     Use & to test if bits are set, not &&; markus@ ok.
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/08 23:54:52
+     [auth.c]
+     typo in comment
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/09 17:21:42
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     use Op for mdoc conformance; from esr@golux.thyrsus.com
+     ok aaron@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/09 17:41:12
+     [sshd_config.5]
+     proxy vs. fake display
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/12 17:30:35
+     [ssh.1 sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
+     more PermitUserEnvironment; ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/17 23:07:14
+     [ssh.1]
+     ForwardAgent has defaulted to no for over 2 years; be more clear here.
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/17 23:55:01
+     [ssh_config.5]
+     ordered list here
+ - (bal) [defines.h] Some platforms don't have SIZE_T_MAX.  So assign 
+   it to ULONG_MAX.
+
+20020813
+ - (tim) [configure.ac] Display OpenSSL header/library version.
+   Patch by dtucker@zip.com.au
+
+20020731
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/24 16:11:18
+     [hostfile.c hostfile.h sshconnect.c]
+     print out all known keys for a host if we get a unknown host key,
+     see discussion at http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=101069210100016&r=1&w=4
+
+     the ssharp mitm tool attacks users in a similar way, so i'd like to
+     pointed out again:
+        A MITM attack is always possible if the ssh client prints:
+        The authenticity of host 'bla' can't be established.
+     (protocol version 2 with pubkey authentication allows you to detect
+     MITM attacks)
+   - mouring@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/25 01:16:59
+     [sftp.c]
+     FallBackToRsh does not exist anywhere else.  Remove it from here.
+     OK deraadt.
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/29 18:57:30
+     [sshconnect.c]
+     print file:line
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/30 17:03:55
+     [auth-options.c servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd_config sshd_config.5]
+     add PermitUserEnvironment (off by default!); from dot@dotat.at;
+     ok provos, deraadt
+
+20020730
+ - (bal) [uidswap.c] SCO compile correction by gert@greenie.muc.de
+
 20020728
  - (stevesk) [auth-pam.c] should use PAM_MSG_MEMBER(); from solar
  - (stevesk) [CREDITS] solar