]> andersk Git - openssh.git/blobdiff - auth-krb4.c
- (djm) Bug #573 - Remove unneeded Krb headers and compat goop. Patch from
[openssh.git] / auth-krb4.c
index fc26a70847e7bb51abce1fef8043c267426bccb9..9e1c800bee95815dbe9c4c0c227f9ab4332896e8 100644 (file)
 /*
-
-   auth-kerberos.c
-
-   Dug Song <dugsong@UMICH.EDU>
-
-   Kerberos v4 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
-
-   $Id$
-*/
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-krb4.c,v 1.30 2003/04/08 20:21:28 itojun Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef AFS
+#include "radix.h"
+#endif
 
 #ifdef KRB4
-char *ticket = NULL;
+extern ServerOptions options;
 
-void
-krb4_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
+static int
+krb4_init(void *context)
 {
-  debug("krb4_cleanup_proc called");
-  
-  if (ticket) {
-    (void) dest_tkt();
-    xfree(ticket);
-    ticket = NULL;
-  }
-}
+       static int cleanup_registered = 0;
+       Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
+       const char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
+       struct stat st;
+       int fd;
 
-int krb4_init(uid_t uid)
-{
-  static int cleanup_registered = 0;
-  char *tkt_root = TKT_ROOT;
-  struct stat st;
-  int fd;
-
-  if (!ticket) {
-    /* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
-    ticket = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+       if (!authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
+               /* Set unique ticket string manually since we're still root. */
+               authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
 #ifdef AFS
-    if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
-      tkt_root = "/ticket/";
+               if (lstat("/ticket", &st) != -1)
+                       tkt_root = "/ticket/";
 #endif /* AFS */
-    snprintf(ticket, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%d_%d", tkt_root, uid, getpid());
-    (void) krb_set_tkt_string(ticket);
-  }
-  /* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
-  if (!cleanup_registered) {
-    fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, NULL);
-    cleanup_registered = 1;
-  }
-  /* Try to create our ticket file. */
-  if ((fd = mkstemp(ticket)) != -1) {
-    close(fd);
-    return 1;
-  }
-  /* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */
-  if (lstat(ticket, &st) != -1) {
-    if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR) && st.st_uid == uid)
-      return 1;
-  }
-  /* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving bad ticket for inspection. */
-  log("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", ticket);
-  fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, NULL);
-  cleanup_registered = 0;
-  xfree(ticket);
-  ticket = NULL;
-  
-  return 0;
+               snprintf(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s%u_%ld",
+                   tkt_root, authctxt->pw->pw_uid, (long)getpid());
+               krb_set_tkt_string(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+       }
+       /* Register ticket cleanup in case of fatal error. */
+       if (!cleanup_registered) {
+               fatal_add_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
+               cleanup_registered = 1;
+       }
+       /* Try to create our ticket file. */
+       if ((fd = mkstemp(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file)) != -1) {
+               close(fd);
+               return (1);
+       }
+       /* Ticket file exists - make sure user owns it (just passed ticket). */
+       if (lstat(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file, &st) != -1) {
+               if (st.st_mode == (S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) &&
+                   st.st_uid == authctxt->pw->pw_uid)
+                       return (1);
+       }
+       /* Failure - cancel cleanup function, leaving ticket for inspection. */
+       logit("WARNING: bad ticket file %s", authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+
+       fatal_remove_cleanup(krb4_cleanup_proc, authctxt);
+       cleanup_registered = 0;
+
+       xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+       authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
+
+       return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * try krb4 authentication,
+ * return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available
+ */
+int
+auth_krb4_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+       AUTH_DAT adata;
+       KTEXT_ST tkt;
+       struct hostent *hp;
+       struct passwd *pw;
+       char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN], phost[INST_SZ], realm[REALM_SZ];
+       u_int32_t faddr;
+       int r;
+
+       if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
+               return (0);
+
+       /*
+        * Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
+        * users and only if Kerberos is installed.
+        */
+       if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) {
+               /* Set up our ticket file. */
+               if (!krb4_init(authctxt)) {
+                       logit("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!",
+                           pw->pw_name);
+                       goto failure;
+               }
+               /* Try to get TGT using our password. */
+               r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "", realm,
+                   "krbtgt", realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *)password);
+               if (r != INTK_OK) {
+                       debug("Kerberos v4 password authentication for %s "
+                           "failed: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+                       goto failure;
+               }
+               /* Successful authentication. */
+               chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
+
+               /*
+                * Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
+                * "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
+                * to a bogus Kerberos server.
+                */
+               gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
+               strlcpy(phost, (char *)krb_get_phost(localhost),
+                   sizeof(phost));
+               r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
+
+               if (r == KSUCCESS) {
+                       if ((hp = gethostbyname(localhost)) == NULL) {
+                               logit("Couldn't get local host address!");
+                               goto failure;
+                       }
+                       memmove((void *)&faddr, (void *)hp->h_addr,
+                           sizeof(faddr));
+
+                       /* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
+                       r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
+                           faddr, &adata, "");
+                       if (r == RD_AP_UNDEC) {
+                               /*
+                                * Probably didn't have a srvtab on
+                                * localhost. Disallow login.
+                                */
+                               logit("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
+                                   "no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s",
+                                   pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+                               goto failure;
+                       } else if (r != KSUCCESS) {
+                               logit("Kerberos v4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
+                                   KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]);
+                               goto failure;
+                       }
+               } else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) {
+                       /*
+                        * Disallow login if no rcmd service exists, and
+                        * log the error.
+                        */
+                       logit("Kerberos v4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
+                           "not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name,
+                           krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
+                       goto failure;
+               } else {
+                       /*
+                        * TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed!
+                        */
+                       debug("WARNING: Kerberos v4 TGT possibly spoofed "
+                           "for %s: %s", pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+                       goto failure;
+               }
+               /* Authentication succeeded. */
+               return (1);
+       } else
+               /* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
+               debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
+
+ failure:
+       krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+
+       if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
+               return (0);
+
+       /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+       return (-1);
 }
 
-int auth_krb4(const char *server_user, KTEXT auth, char **client)
+void
+krb4_cleanup_proc(void *context)
+{
+       Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
+       debug("krb4_cleanup_proc called");
+       if (authctxt->krb4_ticket_file) {
+               (void) dest_tkt();
+               xfree(authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+               authctxt->krb4_ticket_file = NULL;
+       }
+}
+
+int
+auth_krb4(Authctxt *authctxt, KTEXT auth, char **client, KTEXT reply)
 {
-  AUTH_DAT adat   = { 0 };
-  KTEXT_ST reply;
-  char instance[INST_SZ];
-  int r, s;
-  u_int cksum;
-  Key_schedule schedule;
-  struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
-  
-  s = packet_get_connection_in();
-  
-  r = sizeof(local);
-  memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
-  if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) &local, &r) < 0)
-    debug("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-  r = sizeof(foreign);
-  memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
-  if (getpeername(s, (struct sockaddr *)&foreign, &r) < 0)
-    debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-  
-  instance[0] = '*'; instance[1] = 0;
-  
-  /* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */
-  if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance, 0, &adat, ""))) {
-    packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  des_key_sched((des_cblock *)adat.session, schedule);
-  
-  *client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ);
-  (void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname,
-                  *adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm);
-
-  /* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */
-  if (kuserok(&adat, (char *)server_user) != KSUCCESS) {
-    packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 .klogin authorization failed!");
-    log("Kerberos V4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to account %s",
-       *client, server_user);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  /* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the session key. */
-  cksum = adat.checksum + 1;
-  cksum = htonl(cksum);
-  
-  /* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an empty
-     message, admitting our failure. */
-  if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *)&cksum, reply.dat, sizeof(cksum)+1,
-                      schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) {
-    packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
-    reply.dat[0] = 0;
-    reply.length = 0;
-  }
-  else reply.length = r;
-  
-  /* Clear session key. */
-  memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(&adat.session));
-  
-  packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE);
-  packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length);
-  packet_send();
-  packet_write_wait();
-  return 1;
+       AUTH_DAT adat = {0};
+       Key_schedule schedule;
+       struct sockaddr_in local, foreign;
+       char instance[INST_SZ];
+       socklen_t slen;
+       u_int cksum;
+       int r, s;
+
+       s = packet_get_connection_in();
+
+       slen = sizeof(local);
+       memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local));
+       if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *) & local, &slen) < 0)
+               debug("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+       slen = sizeof(foreign);
+       memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign));
+       if (getpeername(s, (struct sockaddr *) & foreign, &slen) < 0) {
+               debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+               fatal_cleanup();
+       }
+       instance[0] = '*';
+       instance[1] = 0;
+
+       /* Get the encrypted request, challenge, and session key. */
+       if ((r = krb_rd_req(auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, instance,
+           0, &adat, ""))) {
+               debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_req: %.100s", krb_err_txt[r]);
+               return (0);
+       }
+       des_key_sched((des_cblock *) adat.session, schedule);
+
+       *client = xmalloc(MAX_K_NAME_SZ);
+       (void) snprintf(*client, MAX_K_NAME_SZ, "%s%s%s@%s", adat.pname,
+           *adat.pinst ? "." : "", adat.pinst, adat.prealm);
+
+       /* Check ~/.klogin authorization now. */
+       if (kuserok(&adat, authctxt->user) != KSUCCESS) {
+               logit("Kerberos v4 .klogin authorization failed for %s to "
+                   "account %s", *client, authctxt->user);
+               xfree(*client);
+               *client = NULL;
+               return (0);
+       }
+       /* Increment the checksum, and return it encrypted with the
+          session key. */
+       cksum = adat.checksum + 1;
+       cksum = htonl(cksum);
+
+       /* If we can't successfully encrypt the checksum, we send back an
+          empty message, admitting our failure. */
+       if ((r = krb_mk_priv((u_char *) & cksum, reply->dat, sizeof(cksum) + 1,
+           schedule, &adat.session, &local, &foreign)) < 0) {
+               debug("Kerberos v4 mk_priv: (%d) %s", r, krb_err_txt[r]);
+               reply->dat[0] = 0;
+               reply->length = 0;
+       } else
+               reply->length = r;
+
+       /* Clear session key. */
+       memset(&adat.session, 0, sizeof(adat.session));
+       return (1);
 }
 #endif /* KRB4 */
 
 #ifdef AFS
-int auth_kerberos_tgt(struct passwd *pw, const char *string)
+int
+auth_krb4_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *string)
 {
-  CREDENTIALS creds;
-  
-  if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) {
-    log("Protocol error decoding Kerberos V4 tgt");
-    packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding Kerberos V4 tgt");
-    goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
-  }
-  if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
-    strlcpy(creds.service, "krbtgt", sizeof creds.service);
-  
-  if (strcmp(creds.service, "krbtgt")) {
-    log("Kerberos V4 tgt (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname,
-       creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
-    packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s",
-                     creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst,
-                     creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
-    goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
-  }
-  if (!krb4_init(pw->pw_uid))
-    goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
-
-  if (in_tkt(creds.pname, creds.pinst) != KSUCCESS)
-    goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
-  
-  if (save_credentials(creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm,
-                      creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno,
-                      &creds.ticket_st, creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) {
-    packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt refused: couldn't save credentials");
-    goto auth_kerberos_tgt_failure;
-  }
-  /* Successful authentication, passed all checks. */
-  chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
-  
-  packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 tgt accepted (%s.%s@%s, %s%s%s@%s)",
-                   creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm, creds.pname,
-                   creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm);
-  memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-  packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
-  packet_send();
-  packet_write_wait();
-  return 1;
-  
- auth_kerberos_tgt_failure:
-  krb4_cleanup_proc(NULL);
-  memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-  packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-  packet_send();
-  packet_write_wait();
-  return 0;
+       CREDENTIALS creds;
+       struct passwd *pw;
+
+       if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
+               goto failure;
+
+       temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+       if (!radix_to_creds(string, &creds)) {
+               logit("Protocol error decoding Kerberos v4 TGT");
+               goto failure;
+       }
+       if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
+               strlcpy(creds.service, "krbtgt", sizeof creds.service);
+
+       if (strcmp(creds.service, "krbtgt")) {
+               logit("Kerberos v4 TGT (%s%s%s@%s) rejected for %s",
+                   creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst,
+                   creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
+               goto failure;
+       }
+       if (!krb4_init(authctxt))
+               goto failure;
+
+       if (in_tkt(creds.pname, creds.pinst) != KSUCCESS)
+               goto failure;
+
+       if (save_credentials(creds.service, creds.instance, creds.realm,
+           creds.session, creds.lifetime, creds.kvno, &creds.ticket_st,
+           creds.issue_date) != KSUCCESS) {
+               debug("Kerberos v4 TGT refused: couldn't save credentials");
+               goto failure;
+       }
+       /* Successful authentication, passed all checks. */
+       chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
+
+       debug("Kerberos v4 TGT accepted (%s%s%s@%s)",
+           creds.pname, creds.pinst[0] ? "." : "", creds.pinst, creds.realm);
+       memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+
+       restore_uid();
+
+       return (1);
+
+ failure:
+       krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+       memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+       restore_uid();
+
+       return (0);
 }
 
-int auth_afs_token(struct passwd *pw, const char *token_string)
+int
+auth_afs_token(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *token_string)
 {
-  CREDENTIALS creds;
-  uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
-
-  if (!radix_to_creds(token_string, &creds)) {
-    log("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
-    packet_send_debug("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
-    packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-    packet_send();
-    packet_write_wait();
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
-    strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
-  
-  if (strncmp(creds.pname, "AFS ID ", 7) == 0)
-    uid = atoi(creds.pname + 7);
-  
-  if (kafs_settoken(creds.realm, uid, &creds)) {
-    log("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname, creds.realm,
-       pw->pw_name);
-    packet_send_debug("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s", creds.pname,
-                     creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
-    memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-    packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
-    packet_send();
-    packet_write_wait();
-    return 0;
-  }
-  packet_send_debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s, %s@%s)", creds.service,
-                   creds.realm, creds.pname, creds.realm);
-  memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
-  packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
-  packet_send();
-  packet_write_wait();
-  return 1;
+       CREDENTIALS creds;
+       struct passwd *pw;
+       uid_t uid;
+
+       if ((pw = authctxt->pw) == NULL)
+               return (0);
+
+       if (!radix_to_creds(token_string, &creds)) {
+               logit("Protocol error decoding AFS token");
+               return (0);
+       }
+       if (strncmp(creds.service, "", 1) == 0) /* backward compatibility */
+               strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof creds.service);
+
+       if (strncmp(creds.pname, "AFS ID ", 7) == 0)
+               uid = atoi(creds.pname + 7);
+       else
+               uid = pw->pw_uid;
+
+       if (kafs_settoken(creds.realm, uid, &creds)) {
+               logit("AFS token (%s@%s) rejected for %s",
+                   creds.pname, creds.realm, pw->pw_name);
+               memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+               return (0);
+       }
+       debug("AFS token accepted (%s@%s)", creds.pname, creds.realm);
+       memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+
+       return (1);
 }
 #endif /* AFS */
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