* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.63 2001/03/20 19:21:21 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.106 2001/10/09 21:59:41 markus Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
-#include "nchan.h"
#include "bufaux.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
struct Session {
int used;
int self;
- int extended;
- struct passwd *pw;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
pid_t pid;
/* tty */
char *term;
int single_connection;
/* proto 2 */
int chanid;
+ int is_subsystem;
};
/* func */
Session *session_new(void);
-void session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr);
-void session_pty_cleanup(Session *s);
-void session_proctitle(Session *s);
-void do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command);
-void do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command);
-void do_login(Session *s, const char *command);
-void do_child(Session *s, const char *command);
+void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int);
+static void session_pty_cleanup(void *);
+void session_proctitle(Session *);
+int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *);
+void do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *);
+void do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *);
+void do_exec(Session *, const char *);
+void do_login(Session *, const char *);
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+static void do_pre_login(Session *s);
+#endif
+void do_child(Session *, const char *);
+void do_motd(void);
+int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
+
+static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
+static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
+
+static void session_close(Session *);
+static int session_pty_req(Session *);
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern int log_stderr;
extern int debug_flag;
extern u_int utmp_len;
-
extern int startup_pipe;
-
-/* Local Xauthority file. */
-static char *xauthfile;
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
/* original command from peer. */
-char *original_command = NULL;
+const char *original_command = NULL;
/* data */
#define MAX_SESSIONS 10
static login_cap_t *lc;
#endif
-/*
- * Remove local Xauthority file.
- */
void
-xauthfile_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
+do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- debug("xauthfile_cleanup_proc called");
-
- if (xauthfile != NULL) {
- char *p;
- unlink(xauthfile);
- p = strrchr(xauthfile, '/');
- if (p != NULL) {
- *p = '\0';
- rmdir(xauthfile);
- }
- xfree(xauthfile);
- xauthfile = NULL;
+ /*
+ * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ alarm(0);
+ if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+ close(startup_pipe);
+ startup_pipe = -1;
}
-}
-
-/*
- * Function to perform cleanup if we get aborted abnormally (e.g., due to a
- * dropped connection).
- */
-void
-pty_cleanup_proc(void *session)
-{
- Session *s=session;
- if (s == NULL)
- fatal("pty_cleanup_proc: no session");
- debug("pty_cleanup_proc: %s", s->tty);
-
- if (s->pid != 0) {
- /* Record that the user has logged out. */
- record_logout(s->pid, s->tty);
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD)
+ if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
+ error("unable to get login class");
+ return;
+ }
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ if (auth_approval(NULL, lc, authctxt->pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
+ packet_disconnect("Approval failure for %s",
+ authctxt->pw->pw_name);
}
+#endif
+#endif
+ /* setup the channel layer */
+ if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
+ channel_permit_all_opens();
- /* Release the pseudo-tty. */
- pty_release(s->tty);
+ if (compat20)
+ do_authenticated2(authctxt);
+ else
+ do_authenticated1(authctxt);
+
+ /* remove agent socket */
+ if (auth_get_socket_name())
+ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
+#ifdef KRB4
+ if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
+ krb4_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+#endif
}
/*
* terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings
* are requested, etc.
*/
-void
-do_authenticated(struct passwd * pw)
+static void
+do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Session *s;
- int type, fd;
- int compression_level = 0, enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
- int have_pty = 0;
char *command;
- int n_bytes;
- int plen;
+ int success, type, plen, screen_flag;
+ int compression_level = 0, enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen;
- int screen_flag;
-
- /*
- * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
- * authentication.
- */
- alarm(0);
- if (startup_pipe != -1) {
- close(startup_pipe);
- startup_pipe = -1;
- }
-
- if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
- channel_permit_all_opens();
s = session_new();
- s->pw = pw;
-
-#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD)
- if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
- error("unable to get login class");
- return;
- }
-#endif
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
/*
* We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
* or a command.
*/
for (;;) {
- int success = 0;
+ success = 0;
/* Get a packet from the client. */
type = packet_read(&plen);
break;
case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY:
- if (no_pty_flag) {
- debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication.");
- break;
- }
- if (have_pty)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
-
- debug("Allocating pty.");
-
- /* Allocate a pty and open it. */
- if (!pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
- sizeof(s->tty))) {
- error("Failed to allocate pty.");
- break;
- }
- fatal_add_cleanup(pty_cleanup_proc, (void *)s);
- pty_setowner(pw, s->tty);
-
- /* Get TERM from the packet. Note that the value may be of arbitrary length. */
- s->term = packet_get_string(&dlen);
- packet_integrity_check(dlen, strlen(s->term), type);
- /* packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen + 4*4 + n_bytes, type); */
- /* Remaining bytes */
- n_bytes = plen - (4 + dlen + 4 * 4);
-
- if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
- xfree(s->term);
- s->term = NULL;
- }
- /* Get window size from the packet. */
- s->row = packet_get_int();
- s->col = packet_get_int();
- s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
- s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
- pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
-
- /* Get tty modes from the packet. */
- tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
- packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen + 4 * 4 + n_bytes, type);
-
- session_proctitle(s);
-
- /* Indicate that we now have a pty. */
- success = 1;
- have_pty = 1;
+ success = session_pty_req(s);
break;
case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
- if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
- packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
- break;
- }
- if (!options.xauth_location) {
- packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
- break;
- }
- if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
- packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding not permitted for this authentication.");
- break;
- }
- debug("Received request for X11 forwarding with auth spoofing.");
- if (s->display != NULL)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: X11 display already set.");
-
s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len);
s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len);
if (!screen_flag)
debug2("Buggy client: "
"X11 screen flag missing");
- packet_integrity_check(plen,
- 4 + proto_len + 4 + data_len + 4, type);
s->screen = packet_get_int();
} else {
- packet_integrity_check(plen,
- 4 + proto_len + 4 + data_len, type);
s->screen = 0;
}
- s->display = x11_create_display_inet(s->screen, options.x11_display_offset);
-
- if (s->display == NULL)
- break;
-
- /* Setup to always have a local .Xauthority. */
- xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- strlcpy(xauthfile, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
- temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
- if (mkdtemp(xauthfile) == NULL) {
- restore_uid();
- error("private X11 dir: mkdtemp %s failed: %s",
- xauthfile, strerror(errno));
- xfree(xauthfile);
- xauthfile = NULL;
- /* XXXX remove listening channels */
- break;
+ packet_done();
+ success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
+ if (!success) {
+ xfree(s->auth_proto);
+ xfree(s->auth_data);
+ s->auth_proto = NULL;
+ s->auth_data = NULL;
}
- strlcat(xauthfile, "/cookies", MAXPATHLEN);
- fd = open(xauthfile, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600);
- if (fd >= 0)
- close(fd);
- restore_uid();
- fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, NULL);
- success = 1;
break;
case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING:
break;
}
debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request.");
- success = auth_input_request_forwarding(pw);
+ success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw);
break;
case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST:
break;
}
debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request.");
- channel_input_port_forward_request(pw->pw_uid == 0, options.gateway_ports);
+ channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0, options.gateway_ports);
success = 1;
break;
if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0)
success = 1;
break;
+
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
+ case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
+ if (!options.kerberos_tgt_passing) {
+ verbose("Kerberos TGT passing disabled.");
+ } else {
+ char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+
+ /* XXX - 0x41, see creds_to_radix version */
+ if (kdata[0] != 0x41) {
+#ifdef KRB5
+ krb5_data tgt;
+ tgt.data = kdata;
+ tgt.length = dlen;
+
+ if (auth_krb5_tgt(s->authctxt, &tgt))
+ success = 1;
+ else
+ verbose("Kerberos v5 TGT refused for %.100s", s->authctxt->user);
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+ } else {
+#ifdef AFS
+ if (auth_krb4_tgt(s->authctxt, kdata))
+ success = 1;
+ else
+ verbose("Kerberos v4 TGT refused for %.100s", s->authctxt->user);
+#endif /* AFS */
+ }
+ xfree(kdata);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* AFS || KRB5 */
+
+#ifdef AFS
+ case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
+ if (!options.afs_token_passing || !k_hasafs()) {
+ verbose("AFS token passing disabled.");
+ } else {
+ /* Accept AFS token. */
+ char *token = packet_get_string(&dlen);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+
+ if (auth_afs_token(s->authctxt, token))
+ success = 1;
+ else
+ verbose("AFS token refused for %.100s",
+ s->authctxt->user);
+ xfree(token);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* AFS */
case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL:
case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD:
if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) {
command = packet_get_string(&dlen);
debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command);
- packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
+ do_exec(s, command);
+ xfree(command);
} else {
- command = NULL;
- packet_integrity_check(plen, 0, type);
+ do_exec(s, NULL);
}
- if (forced_command != NULL) {
- original_command = command;
- command = forced_command;
- debug("Forced command '%.500s'", forced_command);
- }
- if (have_pty)
- do_exec_pty(s, command);
- else
- do_exec_no_pty(s, command);
-
- if (command != NULL)
- xfree(command);
- /* Cleanup user's local Xauthority file. */
- if (xauthfile)
- xauthfile_cleanup_proc(NULL);
+ packet_done();
+ session_close(s);
return;
default:
session_proctitle(s);
#if defined(USE_PAM)
- do_pam_setcred();
+ do_pam_session(s->pw->pw_name, NULL);
+ do_pam_setcred(1);
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/* Fork the child. */
/* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
-
/*
* Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
* setlogin() affects the entire process group.
close(perr[1]);
if (compat20) {
- session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], s->extended ? perr[0] : -1);
+ session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], s->is_subsystem ? -1 : perr[0]);
} else {
/* Enter the interactive session. */
server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]);
- /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[1], and perr[1]. */
+ /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */
}
#else /* USE_PIPES */
/* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
* handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
*/
if (compat20) {
- session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], s->extended ? err[1] : -1);
+ session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], s->is_subsystem ? -1 : err[1]);
} else {
server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]);
/* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */
ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
#if defined(USE_PAM)
- do_pam_session(pw->pw_name, s->tty);
- do_pam_setcred();
+ do_pam_session(s->pw->pw_name, s->tty);
+ do_pam_setcred(1);
#endif
/* Fork the child. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+
/* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
-
/* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ptyfd);
/* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
- /* Redirect stdin from the pseudo tty. */
- if (dup2(ttyfd, fileno(stdin)) < 0)
- error("dup2 stdin failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Redirect stdout to the pseudo tty. */
- if (dup2(ttyfd, fileno(stdout)) < 0)
- error("dup2 stdin failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
- /* Redirect stderr to the pseudo tty. */
- if (dup2(ttyfd, fileno(stderr)) < 0)
- error("dup2 stdin failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0)
+ error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0)
+ error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0)
+ error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
do_login(s, command);
+# ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+ else
+ do_pre_login(s);
+# endif
+#endif
/* Do common processing for the child, such as execing the command. */
do_child(s, command);
} else {
server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
/* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */
- session_pty_cleanup(s);
}
}
-const char *
-get_remote_name_or_ip(void)
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+static void
+do_pre_login(Session *s)
{
- static const char *remote = "";
- if (utmp_len > 0)
- remote = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check);
- if (utmp_len == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_len)
- remote = get_remote_ipaddr();
- return remote;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+ * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ }
+
+ record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name,
+ get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.reverse_mapping_check),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is
+ * to be forced, execute that instead.
+ */
+void
+do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ if (forced_command) {
+ original_command = command;
+ command = forced_command;
+ debug("Forced command '%.900s'", command);
+ }
+
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ do_exec_pty(s, command);
+ else
+ do_exec_no_pty(s, command);
+
+ original_command = NULL;
}
/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
void
do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
{
- FILE *f;
char *time_string;
- char buf[256];
char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
- struct stat st;
time_t last_login_time;
struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
pid_t pid = getpid();
}
/* Get the time and hostname when the user last logged in. */
- hostname[0] = '\0';
- last_login_time = get_last_login_time(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name,
- hostname, sizeof(hostname));
+ if (options.print_lastlog) {
+ hostname[0] = '\0';
+ last_login_time = get_last_login_time(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name,
+ hostname, sizeof(hostname));
+ }
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
- get_remote_name_or_ip(), (struct sockaddr *)&from);
+ get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.reverse_mapping_check),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from);
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
}
#endif
- /* Done if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
- if (command != NULL)
- return;
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
-#else
- if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
-#endif
+ if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
return;
#ifdef USE_PAM
printf("%s\n", aixloginmsg);
#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
- if (last_login_time != 0) {
+ if (options.print_lastlog && last_login_time != 0) {
time_string = ctime(&last_login_time);
if (strchr(time_string, '\n'))
*strchr(time_string, '\n') = 0;
else
printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, hostname);
}
+
+ do_motd();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Display the message of the day.
+ */
+void
+do_motd(void)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char buf[256];
+
if (options.print_motd) {
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
}
}
+
+/*
+ * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
+ */
+int
+check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
+ if (command != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+ return 1;
+#else
+ if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable
* already exists, its value is overriden.
*/
-void
+static void
child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
const char *value)
{
* Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
* and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed.
*/
-void
+static void
read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
const char *filename)
{
/*
* Sets any environment variables which have been specified by PAM
*/
-void do_pam_environment(char ***env, int *envsize)
+void do_pam_environment(char ***env, u_int *envsize)
{
char *equals, var_name[512], var_val[512];
char **pam_env;
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
-void copy_environment(char ***env, int *envsize)
+void copy_environment(char ***env, u_int *envsize)
{
char *equals, var_name[512], var_val[512];
int i;
do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
{
const char *shell, *hostname = NULL, *cp = NULL;
- struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
+ struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
char buf[256];
char cmd[1024];
FILE *f = NULL;
extern char **environ;
struct stat st;
char *argv[10];
- int do_xauth = s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
+ int do_xauth;
#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
prid_t projid;
#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
#endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */
#endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */
+ do_xauth =
+ s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
+
+ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+ destroy_sensitive_data();
+
/* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */
if (options.use_login && command != NULL)
options.use_login = 0;
-#ifndef USE_PAM /* pam_nologin handles this */
+#if !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
if (!options.use_login) {
# ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (!login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) && pw->pw_uid)
exit(254);
}
}
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
/* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
if (!options.use_login) {
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
session_setup_sia(pw->pw_name, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
+ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+ do_motd();
#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (is_winnt) {
perror("unable to set user context");
exit(1);
}
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- if (auth_approval(NULL, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
- error("approval failure for %s", pw->pw_name);
- fprintf(stderr, "Approval failure");
- exit(1);
- }
-#endif
# else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
#if defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID)
/* Sets login uid for accounting */
exit(1);
}
endgrent();
+# ifdef USE_PAM
+ /*
+ * PAM credentials may take the form of
+ * supplementary groups. These will have been
+ * wiped by the above initgroups() call.
+ * Reestablish them here.
+ */
+ do_pam_setcred(0);
+# endif /* USE_PAM */
# ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
jid = jlimit_startjob(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, "interactive");
if (jid == -1) {
#endif
/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
- permanently_set_uid(pw->pw_uid);
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
# endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
}
#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
#endif
-#ifdef AFS
- /* Try to get AFS tokens for the local cell. */
- if (k_hasafs()) {
- char cell[64];
-
- if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
- krb_afslog(cell, 0);
-
- krb_afslog(0, 0);
- }
-#endif /* AFS */
-
/* Initialize the environment. */
envsize = 100;
env = xmalloc(envsize * sizeof(char *));
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
#endif
-
#ifdef KRB4
- {
- extern char *ticket;
-
- if (ticket)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRBTKFILE", ticket);
- }
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
+ if (s->authctxt->krb4_ticket_file)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRBTKFILE",
+ s->authctxt->krb4_ticket_file);
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if (s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+ s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* Pull in any environment variables that may have been set by PAM. */
do_pam_environment(&env, &envsize);
#endif /* USE_PAM */
- if (xauthfile)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "XAUTHORITY", xauthfile);
if (auth_get_socket_name() != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
auth_get_socket_name());
}
/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
if (options.use_login)
- hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip();
+ hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
+ options.reverse_mapping_check);
/*
* Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
* the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
for (i = 3; i < 64; i++)
close(i);
+ /*
+ * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc and
+ * xauth are run in the proper environment.
+ */
+ environ = env;
+
+#ifdef AFS
+ /* Try to get AFS tokens for the local cell. */
+ if (k_hasafs()) {
+ char cell[64];
+
+ if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
+ krb_afslog(cell, 0);
+
+ krb_afslog(0, 0);
+ }
+#endif /* AFS */
+
/* Change current directory to the user\'s home directory. */
if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home directory %s: %s\n",
- pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno));
+ pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno));
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0))
exit(1);
#endif
}
- /*
- * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc and
- * xauth are run in the proper environment.
- */
- environ = env;
-
/*
* Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found first
* in this order).
*/
if (!options.use_login) {
- if (stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
+ /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems */
+ if (!s->is_subsystem && (stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0)) {
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
+ shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
if (debug_flag)
- fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
- _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
- f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_USER_RC, "w");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
+ f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
if (do_xauth)
fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else
- fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
_PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
} else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
if (debug_flag)
fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
-
f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
if (f) {
if (do_xauth)
else
cp = shell;
}
+
+ /* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+
/*
* If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell
* name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
if (!options.use_login) {
char buf[256];
- /*
- * Check for mail if we have a tty and it was enabled
- * in server options.
- */
- if (s->ttyfd != -1 && options.check_mail) {
- char *mailbox;
- struct stat mailstat;
-
- mailbox = getenv("MAIL");
- if (mailbox != NULL) {
- if (stat(mailbox, &mailstat) != 0 ||
- mailstat.st_size == 0)
- printf("No mail.\n");
- else if (mailstat.st_mtime < mailstat.st_atime)
- printf("You have mail.\n");
- else
- printf("You have new mail.\n");
- }
- }
/* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */
buf[0] = '-';
strncpy(buf + 1, cp, sizeof(buf) - 1);
/* Launch login(1). */
execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname,
- "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, NULL);
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM
+ s->term? s->term : "unknown",
+#endif
+ "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
/* Login couldn't be executed, die. */
debug("session_new: init");
for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
sessions[i].used = 0;
- sessions[i].self = i;
}
did_init = 1;
}
for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (! s->used) {
- s->pid = 0;
- s->extended = 0;
+ memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
s->chanid = -1;
s->ptyfd = -1;
s->ttyfd = -1;
- s->term = NULL;
- s->pw = NULL;
- s->display = NULL;
- s->screen = 0;
- s->auth_data = NULL;
- s->auth_proto = NULL;
s->used = 1;
- s->pw = NULL;
+ s->self = i;
debug("session_new: session %d", i);
return s;
}
return NULL;
}
-void
+static void
session_dump(void)
{
int i;
}
int
-session_open(int chanid)
+session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
{
Session *s = session_new();
debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
error("no more sessions");
return 0;
}
- s->pw = auth_get_user();
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
if (s->pw == NULL)
fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
return 1;
}
-Session *
+static Session *
session_by_channel(int id)
{
int i;
return NULL;
}
-Session *
+static Session *
session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
{
int i;
return NULL;
}
-int
+static int
session_window_change_req(Session *s)
{
s->col = packet_get_int();
return 1;
}
-int
+static int
session_pty_req(Session *s)
{
u_int len;
- char *term_modes; /* encoded terminal modes */
+ int n_bytes;
- if (no_pty_flag)
+ if (no_pty_flag) {
+ debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication.");
return 0;
- if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ }
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
return 0;
+ }
+
s->term = packet_get_string(&len);
- s->col = packet_get_int();
- s->row = packet_get_int();
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ s->col = packet_get_int();
+ s->row = packet_get_int();
+ } else {
+ s->row = packet_get_int();
+ s->col = packet_get_int();
+ }
s->xpixel = packet_get_int();
s->ypixel = packet_get_int();
- term_modes = packet_get_string(&len);
- packet_done();
if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
xfree(s->term);
s->term = NULL;
}
+
/* Allocate a pty and open it. */
+ debug("Allocating pty.");
if (!pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty))) {
- xfree(s->term);
+ if (s->term)
+ xfree(s->term);
s->term = NULL;
s->ptyfd = -1;
s->ttyfd = -1;
error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
- xfree(term_modes);
return 0;
}
debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+ /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */
+ if (!compat20)
+ n_bytes = packet_remaining();
+ tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
+
/*
* Add a cleanup function to clear the utmp entry and record logout
* time in case we call fatal() (e.g., the connection gets closed).
*/
- fatal_add_cleanup(pty_cleanup_proc, (void *)s);
+ fatal_add_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s);
pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
- /* Get window size from the packet. */
+
+ /* Set window size from the packet. */
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+ packet_done();
session_proctitle(s);
-
- /* XXX parse and set terminal modes */
- xfree(term_modes);
return 1;
}
-int
+static int
session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
{
+ struct stat st;
u_int len;
int success = 0;
- char *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
+ char *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len);
int i;
packet_done();
log("subsystem request for %s", subsys);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
- if(strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
- debug("subsystem: exec() %s", options.subsystem_command[i]);
- do_exec_no_pty(s, options.subsystem_command[i]);
+ if (strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
+ cmd = options.subsystem_command[i];
+ if (stat(cmd, &st) < 0) {
+ error("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", cmd,
+ strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
+ debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
+ s->is_subsystem = 1;
+ do_exec(s, cmd);
success = 1;
}
}
if (!success)
- log("subsystem request for %s failed, subsystem not found", subsys);
+ log("subsystem request for %s failed, subsystem not found",
+ subsys);
xfree(subsys);
return success;
}
-int
+static int
session_x11_req(Session *s)
{
- int fd;
- if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
- debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
- return 0;
- }
- if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
- debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
- return 0;
- }
- if (xauthfile != NULL) {
- debug("X11 fwd already started.");
- return 0;
- }
-
- debug("Received request for X11 forwarding with auth spoofing.");
- if (s->display != NULL)
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error: X11 display already set.");
+ int success;
s->single_connection = packet_get_char();
s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL);
s->screen = packet_get_int();
packet_done();
- s->display = x11_create_display_inet(s->screen, options.x11_display_offset);
- if (s->display == NULL) {
+ success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
+ if (!success) {
xfree(s->auth_proto);
xfree(s->auth_data);
- return 0;
+ s->auth_proto = NULL;
+ s->auth_data = NULL;
}
- xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- strlcpy(xauthfile, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN);
- temporarily_use_uid(s->pw->pw_uid);
- if (mkdtemp(xauthfile) == NULL) {
- restore_uid();
- error("private X11 dir: mkdtemp %s failed: %s",
- xauthfile, strerror(errno));
- xfree(xauthfile);
- xauthfile = NULL;
- xfree(s->auth_proto);
- xfree(s->auth_data);
- /* XXXX remove listening channels */
- return 0;
- }
- strlcat(xauthfile, "/cookies", MAXPATHLEN);
- fd = open(xauthfile, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600);
- if (fd >= 0)
- close(fd);
- restore_uid();
- fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, s);
- return 1;
+ return success;
}
-int
+static int
session_shell_req(Session *s)
{
- /* if forced_command == NULL, the shell is execed */
- char *shell = forced_command;
packet_done();
- s->extended = 1;
- if (s->ttyfd == -1)
- do_exec_no_pty(s, shell);
- else
- do_exec_pty(s, shell);
+ do_exec(s, NULL);
return 1;
}
-int
+static int
session_exec_req(Session *s)
{
u_int len;
char *command = packet_get_string(&len);
packet_done();
- if (forced_command) {
- original_command = command;
- command = forced_command;
- debug("Forced command '%.500s'", forced_command);
- }
- s->extended = 1;
- if (s->ttyfd == -1)
- do_exec_no_pty(s, command);
- else
- do_exec_pty(s, command);
- if (forced_command == NULL)
- xfree(command);
+ do_exec(s, command);
+ xfree(command);
return 1;
}
-int
+static int
session_auth_agent_req(Session *s)
{
static int called = 0;
s->self, id, rtype, reply);
/*
- * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell
- * or programm is executed
+ * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
+ * or a subsystem is executed
*/
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
1);
}
-void
-session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
+/*
+ * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
+ * (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
+ */
+static void
+session_pty_cleanup(void *session)
{
- if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd == -1)
+ Session *s = session;
+
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ error("session_pty_cleanup: no session");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (s->ttyfd == -1)
return;
debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty);
- /* Cancel the cleanup function. */
- fatal_remove_cleanup(pty_cleanup_proc, (void *)s);
-
/* Record that the user has logged out. */
- record_logout(s->pid, s->tty);
+ if (s->pid != 0)
+ record_logout(s->pid, s->tty);
/* Release the pseudo-tty. */
pty_release(s->tty);
error("close(s->ptymaster): %s", strerror(errno));
}
-void
+static void
session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
{
Channel *c;
fatal("session_close: no session");
c = channel_lookup(s->chanid);
if (c == NULL)
- fatal("session_close: session %d: no channel %d",
+ fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d",
s->self, s->chanid);
debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %d",
s->self, s->chanid, s->pid);
s->chanid = -1;
}
-void
-session_free(Session *s)
+static void
+session_close(Session *s)
{
- debug("session_free: session %d pid %d", s->self, s->pid);
+ debug("session_close: session %d pid %d", s->self, s->pid);
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s);
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ }
if (s->term)
xfree(s->term);
if (s->display)
if (s->auth_proto)
xfree(s->auth_proto);
s->used = 0;
-}
-
-void
-session_close(Session *s)
-{
- session_pty_cleanup(s);
- session_free(s);
session_proctitle(s);
}
{
Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
if (s == NULL) {
- debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %d", s->pid);
+ debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %d", pid);
return;
}
if (s->chanid != -1)
s->chanid = -1;
debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d kill %d", id, s->pid);
- if (s->pid == 0) {
- /* close session immediately */
- session_close(s);
- } else {
- /* notify child, delay session cleanup */
- if (kill(s->pid, (s->ttyfd == -1) ? SIGTERM : SIGHUP) < 0)
+ if (s->pid != 0) {
+ /* notify child */
+ if (kill(s->pid, SIGHUP) < 0)
error("session_close_by_channel: kill %d: %s",
s->pid, strerror(errno));
}
+ session_close(s);
+}
+
+void
+session_close_all(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ for(i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used) {
+ if (s->chanid != -1) {
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid);
+ s->chanid = -1;
+ }
+ session_close(s);
+ }
+ }
}
-char *
+static char *
session_tty_list(void)
{
static char buf[1024];
setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
}
-void
-do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+int
+session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
{
- /*
- * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
- * authentication.
- */
- alarm(0);
- if (startup_pipe != -1) {
- close(startup_pipe);
- startup_pipe = -1;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
+ packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
+ return 0;
}
- if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding)
- channel_permit_all_opens();
-#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD)
- if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
- error("unable to get login class");
- return;
+ if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
+ debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
- server_loop2();
- if (xauthfile)
- xauthfile_cleanup_proc(NULL);
+ if (!options.xauth_location ||
+ (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
+ packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options.use_login) {
+ packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; "
+ "not compatible with UseLogin=yes.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->display != NULL) {
+ debug("X11 display already set.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->display = x11_create_display_inet(s->screen, options.x11_display_offset);
+ if (s->display == NULL) {
+ debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ server_loop2(authctxt);
}
andersk / openssh.git / blobdiff