/*
-
-ssh.c
-
-Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-
-Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- All rights reserved
-
-Created: Sat Mar 18 16:36:11 1995 ylo
-
-Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
-The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
-of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
-
-Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> in Canada.
-
-*/
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ * Created: Sat Mar 18 16:36:11 1995 ylo
+ * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
+ * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
+ * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
+ *
+ * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> in Canada.
+ */
#include "includes.h"
RCSID("$Id$");
#include "readconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
-/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. This can be set on the
- command line. */
-int debug_flag = 0;
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+extern char *__progname;
+#else /* HAVE___PROGNAME */
+const char *__progname = "ssh";
+#endif /* HAVE___PROGNAME */
-/* Flag indicating whether quiet mode is on. */
-int quiet_flag = 0;
+/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. This can be set on the command line. */
+int debug_flag = 0;
-/* Flag indicating whether to allocate a pseudo tty. This can be set on the
- command line, and is automatically set if no command is given on the command
- line. */
int tty_flag = 0;
-/* Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set
- on the command line. */
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set
+ * on the command line.
+ */
int stdin_null_flag = 0;
-/* Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
- so that the pasphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
- background. */
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
+ * so that the pasphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
+ * background.
+ */
int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
-/* General data structure for command line options and options configurable
- in configuration files. See readconf.h. */
+/*
+ * General data structure for command line options and options configurable
+ * in configuration files. See readconf.h.
+ */
Options options;
-/* Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
- command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name
- in a configuration file. */
+/*
+ * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
+ * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * configuration file.
+ */
char *host;
/* socket address the host resolves to */
struct sockaddr_in hostaddr;
-/* Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
- not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new
- window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile
- because this is updated in a signal handler. */
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
+ * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new
+ * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile
+ * because this is updated in a signal handler.
+ */
volatile int received_window_change_signal = 0;
/* Value of argv[0] (set in the main program). */
void
usage()
{
- fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] host [command]\n", av0);
- fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -l user Log in using this user name.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -n Redirect input from /dev/null.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -a Disable authentication agent forwarding.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] host [command]\n", av0);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -l user Log in using this user name.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -n Redirect input from /dev/null.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -a Disable authentication agent forwarding.\n");
#ifdef AFS
- fprintf(stderr, " -k Disable Kerberos ticket and AFS token forwarding.\n");
-#endif /* AFS */
- fprintf(stderr, " -x Disable X11 connection forwarding.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -i file Identity for RSA authentication (default: ~/.ssh/identity).\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -t Tty; allocate a tty even if command is given.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -V Display version number only.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -P Don't allocate a privileged port.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet; don't display any warning messages.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -f Fork into background after authentication.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -e char Set escape character; ``none'' = disable (default: ~).\n");
-
- fprintf(stderr, " -c cipher Select encryption algorithm: "
- "``3des'', "
- "``blowfish''\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -p port Connect to this port. Server must be on the same port.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -L listen-port:host:port Forward local port to remote address\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -R listen-port:host:port Forward remote port to local address\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " These cause %s to listen for connections on a port, and\n", av0);
- fprintf(stderr, " forward them to the other side by connecting to host:port.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -C Enable compression.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -g Allow remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -o 'option' Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.\n");
- exit(1);
+ fprintf(stderr, " -k Disable Kerberos ticket and AFS token forwarding.\n");
+#endif /* AFS */
+ fprintf(stderr, " -x Disable X11 connection forwarding.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -i file Identity for RSA authentication (default: ~/.ssh/identity).\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -t Tty; allocate a tty even if command is given.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -V Display version number only.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -P Don't allocate a privileged port.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet; don't display any warning messages.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -f Fork into background after authentication.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -e char Set escape character; ``none'' = disable (default: ~).\n");
+
+ fprintf(stderr, " -c cipher Select encryption algorithm: "
+ "``3des'', "
+ "``blowfish''\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -p port Connect to this port. Server must be on the same port.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -L listen-port:host:port Forward local port to remote address\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -R listen-port:host:port Forward remote port to local address\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " These cause %s to listen for connections on a port, and\n", av0);
+ fprintf(stderr, " forward them to the other side by connecting to host:port.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -C Enable compression.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -g Allow remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -o 'option' Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.\n");
+ exit(1);
}
-/* Connects to the given host using rsh (or prints an error message and exits
- if rsh is not available). This function never returns. */
-
+/*
+ * Connects to the given host using rsh (or prints an error message and exits
+ * if rsh is not available). This function never returns.
+ */
void
-rsh_connect(char *host, char *user, Buffer *command)
+rsh_connect(char *host, char *user, Buffer * command)
{
- char *args[10];
- int i;
-
- log("Using rsh. WARNING: Connection will not be encrypted.");
- /* Build argument list for rsh. */
- i = 0;
- args[i++] = _PATH_RSH;
- args[i++] = host; /* may have to come after user on some systems */
- if (user)
- {
- args[i++] = "-l";
- args[i++] = user;
- }
- if (buffer_len(command) > 0)
- {
- buffer_append(command, "\0", 1);
- args[i++] = buffer_ptr(command);
- }
- args[i++] = NULL;
- if (debug_flag)
- {
- for (i = 0; args[i]; i++)
- {
- if (i != 0)
- fprintf(stderr, " ");
- fprintf(stderr, "%s", args[i]);
+ char *args[10];
+ int i;
+
+ log("Using rsh. WARNING: Connection will not be encrypted.");
+ /* Build argument list for rsh. */
+ i = 0;
+ args[i++] = _PATH_RSH;
+ /* host may have to come after user on some systems */
+ args[i++] = host;
+ if (user) {
+ args[i++] = "-l";
+ args[i++] = user;
+ }
+ if (buffer_len(command) > 0) {
+ buffer_append(command, "\0", 1);
+ args[i++] = buffer_ptr(command);
+ }
+ args[i++] = NULL;
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ for (i = 0; args[i]; i++) {
+ if (i != 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, " ");
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s", args[i]);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
- execv(_PATH_RSH, args);
- perror(_PATH_RSH);
- exit(1);
+ execv(_PATH_RSH, args);
+ perror(_PATH_RSH);
+ exit(1);
}
-/* Main program for the ssh client. */
-
+/*
+ * Main program for the ssh client.
+ */
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
- int i, opt, optind, type, exit_status, ok, fwd_port, fwd_host_port, authfd;
- char *optarg, *cp, buf[256];
- Buffer command;
- struct winsize ws;
- struct stat st;
- struct passwd *pw, pwcopy;
- int interactive = 0, dummy;
- uid_t original_effective_uid;
- int plen;
-
- /* Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping may
- clobber the real uid). */
- original_real_uid = getuid();
- original_effective_uid = geteuid();
-
- /* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */
- if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid)
- {
- struct rlimit rlim;
- rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
- if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0)
- fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- }
-
- /* Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of option
- processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are ready to
- create the privileged port, and will permanently drop them when the
- port has been created (actually, when the connection has been made, as
- we may need to create the port several times). */
- temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid);
-
- /* Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created with
- the default umask. This will make them world-readable but writable
- only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we don't set
- the modes explicitly. */
- umask(022);
-
- /* Save our own name. */
- av0 = av[0];
-
- /* Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been set. */
- initialize_options(&options);
-
- /* Parse command-line arguments. */
- host = NULL;
-
- /* If program name is not one of the standard names, use it as host name. */
- if (strchr(av0, '/'))
- cp = strrchr(av0, '/') + 1;
- else
- cp = av0;
- if (strcmp(cp, "rsh") != 0 && strcmp(cp, "ssh") != 0 &&
- strcmp(cp, "openssh") != 0 && strcmp(cp, "openlogin") != 0 &&
- strcmp(cp, "rlogin") != 0 && strcmp(cp, "slogin") != 0)
- host = cp;
-
- for (optind = 1; optind < ac; optind++)
- {
- if (av[optind][0] != '-')
- {
- if (host)
- break;
- if ((cp = strchr(av[optind], '@'))) {
- options.user = av[optind];
- *cp = '\0';
- host = ++cp;
- }
- else
- host = av[optind];
- continue;
+ int i, opt, optind, type, exit_status, ok, fwd_port, fwd_host_port,
+ authfd;
+ char *optarg, *cp, buf[256];
+ Buffer command;
+ struct winsize ws;
+ struct stat st;
+ struct passwd *pw, pwcopy;
+ int interactive = 0, dummy;
+ uid_t original_effective_uid;
+ int plen;
+
+ /*
+ * Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping
+ * may clobber the real uid).
+ */
+ original_real_uid = getuid();
+ original_effective_uid = geteuid();
+
+ /* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */
+ if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid) {
+ struct rlimit rlim;
+ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0)
+ fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
- opt = av[optind][1];
- if (!opt)
- usage();
- if (strchr("eilcpLRo", opt)) /* options with arguments */
- {
- optarg = av[optind] + 2;
- if (strcmp(optarg, "") == 0)
- {
- if (optind >= ac - 1)
+ /*
+ * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of
+ * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are
+ * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop
+ * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection
+ * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times).
+ */
+ temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid);
+
+ /*
+ * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
+ * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but
+ * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we
+ * don't set the modes explicitly.
+ */
+ umask(022);
+
+ /* Save our own name. */
+ av0 = av[0];
+
+ /* Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been set. */
+ initialize_options(&options);
+
+ /* Parse command-line arguments. */
+ host = NULL;
+
+ /* If program name is not one of the standard names, use it as host name. */
+ if (strchr(av0, '/'))
+ cp = strrchr(av0, '/') + 1;
+ else
+ cp = av0;
+ if (strcmp(cp, "rsh") != 0 && strcmp(cp, "ssh") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(cp, "rlogin") != 0 && strcmp(cp, "slogin") != 0)
+ host = cp;
+
+ for (optind = 1; optind < ac; optind++) {
+ if (av[optind][0] != '-') {
+ if (host)
+ break;
+ if ((cp = strchr(av[optind], '@'))) {
+ options.user = av[optind];
+ *cp = '\0';
+ host = ++cp;
+ } else
+ host = av[optind];
+ continue;
+ }
+ opt = av[optind][1];
+ if (!opt)
+ usage();
+ if (strchr("eilcpLRo", opt)) { /* options with arguments */
+ optarg = av[optind] + 2;
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "") == 0) {
+ if (optind >= ac - 1)
+ usage();
+ optarg = av[++optind];
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (av[optind][2])
+ usage();
+ optarg = NULL;
+ }
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'n':
+ stdin_null_flag = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'f':
+ fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
+ stdin_null_flag = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'x':
+ options.forward_x11 = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case 'X':
+ options.forward_x11 = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'g':
+ options.gateway_ports = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'P':
+ options.use_privileged_port = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case 'a':
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ break;
+#ifdef AFS
+ case 'k':
+ options.kerberos_tgt_passing = 0;
+ options.afs_token_passing = 0;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case 'i':
+ if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s does not exist.\n",
+ optarg);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (options.num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+ fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)",
+ SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+ options.identity_files[options.num_identity_files++] =
+ xstrdup(optarg);
+ break;
+
+ case 't':
+ tty_flag = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'v':
+ case 'V':
+ fprintf(stderr, "SSH Version %s, protocol version %d.%d.\n",
+ SSH_VERSION, PROTOCOL_MAJOR, PROTOCOL_MINOR);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Compiled with SSL.\n");
+ if (opt == 'V')
+ exit(0);
+ debug_flag = 1;
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG;
+ break;
+
+ case 'q':
+ options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+ break;
+
+ case 'e':
+ if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
+ (unsigned char) optarg[1] >= 64 && (unsigned char) optarg[1] < 128)
+ options.escape_char = (unsigned char) optarg[1] & 31;
+ else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
+ options.escape_char = (unsigned char) optarg[0];
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
+ options.escape_char = -2;
+ else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n", optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 'c':
+ options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg);
+ if (options.cipher == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 'p':
+ options.port = atoi(optarg);
+ if (options.port < 1 || options.port > 65535) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port %s.\n", optarg);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 'l':
+ options.user = optarg;
+ break;
+
+ case 'R':
+ if (sscanf(optarg, "%d:%255[^:]:%d", &fwd_port, buf,
+ &fwd_host_port) != 3) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad forwarding specification '%s'.\n", optarg);
+ usage();
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ add_remote_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf, fwd_host_port);
+ break;
+
+ case 'L':
+ if (sscanf(optarg, "%d:%255[^:]:%d", &fwd_port, buf,
+ &fwd_host_port) != 3) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad forwarding specification '%s'.\n", optarg);
+ usage();
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf, fwd_host_port);
+ break;
+
+ case 'C':
+ options.compression = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'o':
+ dummy = 1;
+ if (process_config_line(&options, host ? host : "", optarg,
+ "command-line", 0, &dummy) != 0)
+ exit(1);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that we got a host name. */
+ if (!host)
usage();
- optarg = av[++optind];
- }
+
+ /* check if RSA support exists */
+ if (rsa_alive() == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s: no RSA support in libssl and libcrypto. See ssl(8).\n",
+ __progname);
+ exit(1);
}
- else
- {
- if (av[optind][2])
- usage();
- optarg = NULL;
+ /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
+ buffer_init(&command);
+
+ /*
+ * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There
+ * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum
+ * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command.
+ */
+ if (optind == ac) {
+ /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
+ tty_flag = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* A command has been specified. Store it into the
+ buffer. */
+ for (i = optind; i < ac; i++) {
+ if (i > optind)
+ buffer_append(&command, " ", 1);
+ buffer_append(&command, av[i], strlen(av[i]));
+ }
}
- switch (opt)
- {
- case 'n':
- stdin_null_flag = 1;
- break;
-
- case 'f':
- fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
- stdin_null_flag = 1;
- break;
-
- case 'x':
- options.forward_x11 = 0;
- break;
-
- case 'X':
- options.forward_x11 = 1;
- break;
-
- case 'g':
- options.gateway_ports = 1;
- break;
-
- case 'P':
- options.use_privileged_port = 0;
- break;
-
- case 'a':
- options.forward_agent = 0;
- break;
-#ifdef AFS
- case 'k':
- options.kerberos_tgt_passing = 0;
- options.afs_token_passing = 0;
- break;
-#endif
- case 'i':
- if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s does not exist.\n",
- optarg);
- break;
- }
- if (options.num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
- fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)",
- SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
- options.identity_files[options.num_identity_files++] =
- xstrdup(optarg);
- break;
-
- case 't':
- tty_flag = 1;
- break;
-
- case 'v':
- case 'V':
- debug_flag = 1;
- fprintf(stderr, "SSH Version %s, protocol version %d.%d.\n",
- SSH_VERSION, PROTOCOL_MAJOR, PROTOCOL_MINOR);
- fprintf(stderr, "Compiled with SSL.\n");
- if (opt == 'V')
- exit(0);
- break;
-
- case 'q':
- quiet_flag = 1;
- break;
-
- case 'e':
- if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
- (unsigned char)optarg[1] >= 64 && (unsigned char)optarg[1] < 128)
- options.escape_char = (unsigned char)optarg[1] & 31;
- else
- if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
- options.escape_char = (unsigned char)optarg[0];
- else
- if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
- options.escape_char = -2;
- else
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n", optarg);
- exit(1);
+
+ /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0)
+ fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command to execute.");
+
+ /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
+ if (buffer_len(&command) == 0)
+ tty_flag = 1;
+
+ /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
+ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) {
+ if (tty_flag)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a terminal.\n");
+ tty_flag = 0;
+ }
+ /* Get user data. */
+ pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
+ if (!pw) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "You don't exist, go away!\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
+ memset(&pwcopy, 0, sizeof(pwcopy));
+ pwcopy.pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ pwcopy.pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
+ pwcopy.pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ pwcopy.pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+ pwcopy.pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+ pwcopy.pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
+ pw = &pwcopy;
+
+ /* Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
+ actually goes to the terminal. */
+ log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 0);
+
+ /* Read per-user configuration file. */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
+ read_config_file(buf, host, &options);
+
+ /* Read systemwide configuration file. */
+ read_config_file(HOST_CONFIG_FILE, host, &options);
+
+ /* Fill configuration defaults. */
+ fill_default_options(&options);
+
+ /* reinit */
+ log_init(av[0], options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 0);
+
+ if (options.user == NULL)
+ options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
+ if (options.hostname != NULL)
+ host = options.hostname;
+
+ /* Find canonic host name. */
+ if (strchr(host, '.') == 0) {
+ struct hostent *hp = gethostbyname(host);
+ if (hp != 0) {
+ if (strchr(hp->h_name, '.') != 0)
+ host = xstrdup(hp->h_name);
+ else if (hp->h_aliases != 0
+ && hp->h_aliases[0] != 0
+ && strchr(hp->h_aliases[0], '.') != 0)
+ host = xstrdup(hp->h_aliases[0]);
}
- break;
-
- case 'c':
- options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg);
- if (options.cipher == -1)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg);
- exit(1);
- }
- break;
-
- case 'p':
- options.port = atoi(optarg);
- if (options.port < 1 || options.port > 65535)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad port %s.\n", optarg);
- exit(1);
- }
- break;
-
- case 'l':
- options.user = optarg;
- break;
-
- case 'R':
- if (sscanf(optarg, "%d:%255[^:]:%d", &fwd_port, buf,
- &fwd_host_port) != 3)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad forwarding specification '%s'.\n", optarg);
- usage();
- /*NOTREACHED*/
- }
- add_remote_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf, fwd_host_port);
- break;
-
- case 'L':
- if (sscanf(optarg, "%d:%255[^:]:%d", &fwd_port, buf,
- &fwd_host_port) != 3)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "Bad forwarding specification '%s'.\n", optarg);
- usage();
- /*NOTREACHED*/
- }
- add_local_forward(&options, fwd_port, buf, fwd_host_port);
- break;
-
- case 'C':
- options.compression = 1;
- break;
-
- case 'o':
- dummy = 1;
- process_config_line(&options, host ? host : "", optarg,
- "command-line", 0, &dummy);
- break;
-
- default:
- usage();
}
- }
-
- /* Check that we got a host name. */
- if (!host)
- usage();
-
- /* check if RSA support exists */
- if (rsa_alive() == 0) {
- extern char *__progname;
-
- fprintf(stderr,
- "%s: no RSA support in libssl and libcrypto. See ssl(8).\n",
- __progname);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
- buffer_init(&command);
-
- /* Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There is
- no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum packet
- size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command. */
- if (optind == ac)
- {
- /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
- tty_flag = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */
- for (i = optind; i < ac; i++)
- {
- if (i > optind)
- buffer_append(&command, " ", 1);
- buffer_append(&command, av[i], strlen(av[i]));
+ /* Disable rhosts authentication if not running as root. */
+ if (original_effective_uid != 0 || !options.use_privileged_port) {
+ options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
+ options.rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
}
- }
-
- /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0)
- fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command to execute.");
-
- /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
- if (buffer_len(&command) == 0)
- tty_flag = 1;
-
- /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
- if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
- {
- if (tty_flag)
- fprintf(stderr, "Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a terminal.\n");
- tty_flag = 0;
- }
-
- /* Get user data. */
- pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid);
- if (!pw)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "You don't exist, go away!\n");
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
- memset(&pwcopy, 0, sizeof(pwcopy));
- pwcopy.pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
- pwcopy.pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
- pwcopy.pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
- pwcopy.pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
- pwcopy.pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
- pwcopy.pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
- pw = &pwcopy;
-
- /* Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output actually
- goes to the terminal. */
- log_init(av[0], 1, debug_flag, quiet_flag, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER);
-
- /* Read per-user configuration file. */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
- read_config_file(buf, host, &options);
-
- /* Read systemwide configuration file. */
- read_config_file(HOST_CONFIG_FILE, host, &options);
-
- /* Fill configuration defaults. */
- fill_default_options(&options);
- if (options.user == NULL)
- options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
-
- if (options.hostname != NULL)
- host = options.hostname;
-
- /* Find canonic host name. */
- if (strchr(host, '.') == 0)
- {
- struct hostent *hp = gethostbyname(host);
- if (hp != 0)
- {
- if (strchr(hp->h_name, '.') != 0)
- host = xstrdup(hp->h_name);
- else if (hp->h_aliases != 0
- && hp->h_aliases[0] != 0
- && strchr(hp->h_aliases[0], '.') != 0)
- host = xstrdup(hp->h_aliases[0]);
+ /*
+ * If using rsh has been selected, exec it now (without trying
+ * anything else). Note that we must release privileges first.
+ */
+ if (options.use_rsh) {
+ /*
+ * Restore our superuser privileges. This must be done
+ * before permanently setting the uid.
+ */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /* Switch to the original uid permanently. */
+ permanently_set_uid(original_real_uid);
+
+ /* Execute rsh. */
+ rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command);
+ fatal("rsh_connect returned");
}
- }
-
- /* Disable rhosts authentication if not running as root. */
- if (original_effective_uid != 0)
- {
- options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
- options.rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
- }
-
- /* If using rsh has been selected, exec it now (without trying anything
- else). Note that we must release privileges first. */
- if (options.use_rsh)
- {
- /* Restore our superuser privileges. This must be done before
- permanently setting the uid. */
- restore_uid();
-
- /* Switch to the original uid permanently. */
- permanently_set_uid(original_real_uid);
-
- /* Execute rsh. */
- rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command);
- fatal("rsh_connect returned");
- }
-
- /* Restore our superuser privileges. */
- restore_uid();
-
- /* Open a connection to the remote host. This needs root privileges if
- rhosts_{rsa_}authentication is true. */
-
- if (!options.use_privileged_port)
- {
- options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
- options.rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
- }
-
- ok = ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port, options.connection_attempts,
- !options.rhosts_authentication &&
- !options.rhosts_rsa_authentication,
- original_real_uid, options.proxy_command);
-
- /* If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key in
- case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts authentication.
- This must be done before releasing extra privileges, because the file
- is only readable by root. */
- if (ok)
- {
- host_private_key = RSA_new();
- if (load_private_key(HOST_KEY_FILE, "", host_private_key, NULL))
- host_private_key_loaded = 1;
- }
-
- /* Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have. We will no longer need
- them. Also, extra privileges could make it very hard to read identity
- files and other non-world-readable files from the user's home directory
- if it happens to be on a NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody. */
- permanently_set_uid(original_real_uid);
-
- /* Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh directory
- if it doesn\'t already exist. */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, SSH_USER_DIR);
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
- if (mkdir(buf, 0755) < 0)
- error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf);
-
- /* Check if the connection failed, and try "rsh" if appropriate. */
- if (!ok)
- {
- if (options.port != 0)
- log("Secure connection to %.100s on port %d refused%.100s.",
- host, options.port,
- options.fallback_to_rsh ? "; reverting to insecure method" : "");
- else
- log("Secure connection to %.100s refused%.100s.", host,
- options.fallback_to_rsh ? "; reverting to insecure method" : "");
-
- if (options.fallback_to_rsh)
- {
- rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command);
- fatal("rsh_connect returned");
+ /* Restore our superuser privileges. */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /*
+ * Open a connection to the remote host. This needs root privileges
+ * if rhosts_{rsa_}authentication is enabled.
+ */
+
+ ok = ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
+ options.connection_attempts,
+ !options.rhosts_authentication &&
+ !options.rhosts_rsa_authentication,
+ original_real_uid,
+ options.proxy_command);
+
+ /*
+ * If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key
+ * in case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts
+ * authentication. This must be done before releasing extra
+ * privileges, because the file is only readable by root.
+ */
+ if (ok) {
+ host_private_key = RSA_new();
+ if (load_private_key(HOST_KEY_FILE, "", host_private_key, NULL))
+ host_private_key_loaded = 1;
}
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* Expand ~ in options.identity_files. */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++)
- options.identity_files[i] =
- tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], original_real_uid);
-
- /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
- options.system_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile,
- original_real_uid);
- options.user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile,
- original_real_uid);
-
- /* Log into the remote system. This never returns if the login fails. */
- ssh_login(host_private_key_loaded, host_private_key,
- host, &hostaddr, &options, original_real_uid);
-
- /* We no longer need the host private key. Clear it now. */
- if (host_private_key_loaded)
- RSA_free(host_private_key); /* Destroys contents safely */
-
- /* Close connection cleanly after attack. */
- cipher_attack_detected = packet_disconnect;
-
- /* If requested, fork and let ssh continue in the background. */
- if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
- {
- int ret = fork();
- if (ret == -1)
- fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if (ret != 0)
- exit(0);
- setsid();
- }
-
- /* Enable compression if requested. */
- if (options.compression)
- {
- debug("Requesting compression at level %d.", options.compression_level);
-
- if (options.compression_level < 1 || options.compression_level > 9)
- fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best).");
-
- /* Send the request. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
- packet_put_int(options.compression_level);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- type = packet_read(&plen);
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- packet_start_compression(options.compression_level);
- else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- log("Warning: Remote host refused compression.");
- else
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for compression response.");
- }
-
- /* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */
- if (tty_flag)
- {
- debug("Requesting pty.");
-
- /* Start the packet. */
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
-
- /* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the length of the
- string. */
- cp = getenv("TERM");
- if (!cp)
- cp = "";
- packet_put_string(cp, strlen(cp));
-
- /* Store window size in the packet. */
- if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
- memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
- packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
-
- /* Store tty modes in the packet. */
- tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin));
-
- /* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Read response from the server. */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- interactive = 1;
- else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- log("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to allocate a pseudo tty.");
- else
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty request response.");
- }
-
- /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
- if (options.forward_x11 && getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL)
- {
- char line[512], proto[512], data[512];
- FILE *f;
- int forwarded = 0, got_data = 0, i;
+ /*
+ * Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have. We will no
+ * longer need them. Also, extra privileges could make it very hard
+ * to read identity files and other non-world-readable files from the
+ * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where
+ * root is mapped to nobody.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Note that some legacy systems need to postpone the following call
+ * to permanently_set_uid() until the private hostkey is destroyed
+ * with RSA_free(). Otherwise the calling user could ptrace() the
+ * process, read the private hostkey and impersonate the host.
+ * OpenBSD does not allow ptracing of setuid processes.
+ */
+ permanently_set_uid(original_real_uid);
+
+ /*
+ * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh
+ * directory if it doesn\'t already exist.
+ */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, SSH_USER_DIR);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ if (mkdir(buf, 0755) < 0)
+ error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf);
+
+ /* Check if the connection failed, and try "rsh" if appropriate. */
+ if (!ok) {
+ if (options.port != 0)
+ log("Secure connection to %.100s on port %d refused%.100s.",
+ host, options.port,
+ options.fallback_to_rsh ? "; reverting to insecure method" : "");
+ else
+ log("Secure connection to %.100s refused%.100s.", host,
+ options.fallback_to_rsh ? "; reverting to insecure method" : "");
+
+ if (options.fallback_to_rsh) {
+ rsh_connect(host, options.user, &command);
+ fatal("rsh_connect returned");
+ }
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Expand ~ in options.identity_files. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++)
+ options.identity_files[i] =
+ tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], original_real_uid);
+
+ /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
+ options.system_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(options.system_hostfile,
+ original_real_uid);
+ options.user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfile,
+ original_real_uid);
+
+ /* Log into the remote system. This never returns if the login fails. */
+ ssh_login(host_private_key_loaded, host_private_key,
+ host, &hostaddr, original_real_uid);
+
+ /* We no longer need the host private key. Clear it now. */
+ if (host_private_key_loaded)
+ RSA_free(host_private_key); /* Destroys contents safely */
+
+ /* Close connection cleanly after attack. */
+ cipher_attack_detected = packet_disconnect;
+
+ /* Enable compression if requested. */
+ if (options.compression) {
+ debug("Requesting compression at level %d.", options.compression_level);
+
+ if (options.compression_level < 1 || options.compression_level > 9)
+ fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best).");
+
+ /* Send the request. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION);
+ packet_put_int(options.compression_level);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ packet_start_compression(options.compression_level);
+ else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ log("Warning: Remote host refused compression.");
+ else
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for compression response.");
+ }
+ /* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */
+ if (tty_flag) {
+ debug("Requesting pty.");
+
+ /* Start the packet. */
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY);
+
+ /* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the
+ length of the string. */
+ cp = getenv("TERM");
+ if (!cp)
+ cp = "";
+ packet_put_string(cp, strlen(cp));
+
+ /* Store window size in the packet. */
+ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
+ memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_row);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_col);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_xpixel);
+ packet_put_int(ws.ws_ypixel);
+
+ /* Store tty modes in the packet. */
+ tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin));
+
+ /* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ /* Read response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ interactive = 1;
+ else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ log("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to allocate a pseudo tty.");
+ else
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty request response.");
+ }
+ /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
+ if (options.forward_x11 && getenv("DISPLAY") != NULL) {
+ char line[512], proto[512], data[512];
+ FILE *f;
+ int forwarded = 0, got_data = 0, i;
#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
- /* Try to get Xauthority information for the display. */
- snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.100s list %.200s 2>/dev/null",
- XAUTH_PATH, getenv("DISPLAY"));
- f = popen(line, "r");
- if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
- sscanf(line, "%*s %s %s", proto, data) == 2)
- got_data = 1;
- if (f)
- pclose(f);
+ /* Try to get Xauthority information for the display. */
+ snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.100s list %.200s 2>/dev/null",
+ XAUTH_PATH, getenv("DISPLAY"));
+ f = popen(line, "r");
+ if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
+ sscanf(line, "%*s %s %s", proto, data) == 2)
+ got_data = 1;
+ if (f)
+ pclose(f);
#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
- /* If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some data. The
- forwarding code will check the validity of the response anyway, and
- substitute this data. The X11 server, however, will ignore this
- fake data and use whatever authentication mechanisms it was using
- otherwise for the local connection. */
- if (!got_data)
- {
- u_int32_t rand = 0;
-
- strlcpy(proto, "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", sizeof proto);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rand = arc4random();
- snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x", rand & 0xff);
- rand >>= 8;
- }
+ /*
+ * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+ * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
+ * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11
+ * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
+ * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
+ * for the local connection.
+ */
+ if (!got_data) {
+ u_int32_t rand = 0;
+
+ strlcpy(proto, "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1", sizeof proto);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rand = arc4random();
+ snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x", rand & 0xff);
+ rand >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Got local authentication reasonable information. Request
+ * forwarding with authentication spoofing.
+ */
+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(proto, data);
+
+ /* Read response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) {
+ forwarded = 1;
+ interactive = 1;
+ } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
+ log("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding.");
+ else
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 forwarding");
+ }
+ /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
+ packet_set_interactive(interactive, options.keepalives);
+
+ /* Clear agent forwarding if we don\'t have an agent. */
+ authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
+ if (authfd < 0)
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ else
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
+
+ /* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */
+ if (options.forward_agent) {
+ debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+ auth_request_forwarding();
+
+ /* Read response from the server. */
+ type = packet_read(&plen);
+ packet_integrity_check(plen, 0, type);
+ if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
+ log("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding.");
+ }
+ /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+ debug("Connections to local port %d forwarded to remote address %.200s:%d",
+ options.local_forwards[i].port,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host_port);
+ channel_request_local_forwarding(options.local_forwards[i].port,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host,
+ options.local_forwards[i].host_port);
+ }
+
+ /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+ debug("Connections to remote port %d forwarded to local address %.200s:%d",
+ options.remote_forwards[i].port,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
+ channel_request_remote_forwarding(options.remote_forwards[i].port,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host,
+ options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
}
- /* Got local authentication reasonable information. Request forwarding
- with authentication spoofing. */
- debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(proto, data);
-
- /* Read response from the server. */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
- if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- {
- forwarded = 1;
- interactive = 1;
+ /* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */
+ if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
+ if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
+ fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /*
+ * If a command was specified on the command line, execute the
+ * command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell.
+ */
+ if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) {
+ int len = buffer_len(&command);
+ if (len > 900)
+ len = 900;
+ debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, buffer_ptr(&command));
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
+ packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ } else {
+ debug("Requesting shell.");
+ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
}
- else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE)
- log("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding.");
- else
- packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 forwarding");
- }
-
- /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
- packet_set_interactive(interactive, options.keepalives);
-
- /* Clear agent forwarding if we don\'t have an agent. */
- authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket();
- if (authfd < 0)
- options.forward_agent = 0;
- else
- ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
-
- /* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */
- if (options.forward_agent)
- {
- debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
- auth_request_forwarding();
-
- /* Read response from the server. */
- type = packet_read(&plen);
- packet_integrity_check(plen, 0, type);
- if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS)
- log("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding.");
- }
-
- /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++)
- {
- debug("Connections to local port %d forwarded to remote address %.200s:%d",
- options.local_forwards[i].port, options.local_forwards[i].host,
- options.local_forwards[i].host_port);
- channel_request_local_forwarding(options.local_forwards[i].port,
- options.local_forwards[i].host,
- options.local_forwards[i].host_port);
- }
-
- /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++)
- {
- debug("Connections to remote port %d forwarded to local address %.200s:%d",
- options.remote_forwards[i].port, options.remote_forwards[i].host,
- options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
- channel_request_remote_forwarding(options.remote_forwards[i].port,
- options.remote_forwards[i].host,
- options.remote_forwards[i].host_port);
- }
-
- /* If a command was specified on the command line, execute the command now.
- Otherwise request the server to start a shell. */
- if (buffer_len(&command) > 0)
- {
- int len = buffer_len(&command);
- if (len > 900)
- len = 900;
- debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, buffer_ptr(&command));
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD);
- packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command));
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
- else
- {
- debug("Requesting shell.");
- packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
-
- /* Enter the interactive session. */
- exit_status = client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : -1);
-
- /* Close the connection to the remote host. */
- packet_close();
-
- /* Exit with the status returned by the program on the remote side. */
- exit(exit_status);
+
+ /* Enter the interactive session. */
+ exit_status = client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : -1);
+
+ /* Close the connection to the remote host. */
+ packet_close();
+
+ /* Exit with the status returned by the program on the remote side. */
+ exit(exit_status);
}
andersk / openssh.git / blobdiff