*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.241 2002/05/13 15:53:19 millert Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.249 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
int startup_pipe; /* in child */
/* variables used for privilege separation */
-extern struct monitor *monitor;
+extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
extern int use_privsep;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
if (client_version_string == NULL) {
/* Send our protocol version identification. */
- if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string))
+ if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string,
+ strlen(server_version_string))
!= strlen(server_version_string)) {
log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
fatal_cleanup();
}
- /* Read other side's version identification. */
+ /* Read other sides version identification. */
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
}
}
-
/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
void
destroy_sensitive_data(void)
pid_t pid;
/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
- monitor = monitor_init();
+ pmonitor = monitor_init();
/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
- monitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
+ pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
} else if (pid != 0) {
- debug2("Network child is on pid %d", pid);
+ debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
- close(monitor->m_recvfd);
- authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(monitor);
- close(monitor->m_sendfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(pmonitor);
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
/* Sync memory */
- monitor_sync(monitor);
+ monitor_sync(pmonitor);
/* Wait for the child's exit status */
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
} else {
/* child */
- close(monitor->m_sendfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
/* Demote the child */
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
- monitor_apply_keystate(monitor);
+ monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
use_privsep = 0;
return;
}
}
/* New socket pair */
- monitor_reinit(monitor);
+ monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
- monitor->m_pid = fork();
- if (monitor->m_pid == -1)
+ pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- else if (monitor->m_pid != 0) {
- debug2("User child is on pid %d", monitor->m_pid);
- close(monitor->m_recvfd);
- monitor_child_postauth(monitor);
+ else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+ debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
exit(0);
}
- close(monitor->m_sendfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
- monitor_apply_keystate(monitor);
+ monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
}
static char *
}
}
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+ if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
+ (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
+ fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
+ _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
+ fatal("Bad owner or mode for %s",
+ _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+ }
+
/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
if (test_flag)
exit(0);
*/
f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
if (f) {
- fprintf(f, "%u\n", (u_int) getpid());
+ fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
fclose(f);
}
}
if (pid < 0)
error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
- debug("Forked child %d.", pid);
+ debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
close(startup_p[1]);
* setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
* want the child to be able to affect the parent.
*/
- if (setsid() < 0)
+#if 0
+ /* XXX: this breaks Solaris */
+ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
/*
* Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
/*
* Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
- * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged
+ * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged
* programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
* machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these
* authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
* the current keystate and exits
*/
if (use_privsep) {
- mm_send_keystate(monitor);
+ mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
exit(0);
}
debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
- /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
+ /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
}
+ if (!options.compression) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ }
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
/* start key exchange */
andersk / openssh.git / blobdiff