*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.238 2002/03/23 20:57:26 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.250 2002/06/23 10:29:52 deraadt Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+#include <sys/security.h>
+#include <prot.h>
+#endif
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
int startup_pipe; /* in child */
/* variables used for privilege separation */
-extern struct monitor *monitor;
+extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
extern int use_privsep;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
close_listen_socks(void)
{
int i;
+
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
close(listen_socks[i]);
num_listen_socks = -1;
close_startup_pipes(void)
{
int i;
+
if (startup_pipes)
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
close_listen_socks();
close_startup_pipes();
execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
- log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno));
+ log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
+ strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
+ pid_t pid;
int status;
- while (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG) > 0)
+ while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+ (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
;
signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
+
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
errno = save_errno;
key_do_regen = 1;
if (client_version_string == NULL) {
/* Send our protocol version identification. */
- if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string))
+ if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string,
+ strlen(server_version_string))
!= strlen(server_version_string)) {
log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
fatal_cleanup();
}
- /* Read other side's version identification. */
+ /* Read other sides version identification. */
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
}
}
-
/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
void
destroy_sensitive_data(void)
privsep_preauth_child(void)
{
u_int32_t rand[256];
- int i;
struct passwd *pw;
+ int i;
/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
privsep_challenge_enable();
demote_sensitive_data();
if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no user", SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+ fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
endpwent();
pid_t pid;
/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
- monitor = monitor_init();
+ pmonitor = monitor_init();
/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
- monitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
+ pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
} else if (pid != 0) {
- debug2("Network child is on pid %d", pid);
+ debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
- close(monitor->m_recvfd);
- authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(monitor);
- close(monitor->m_sendfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(pmonitor);
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
/* Sync memory */
- monitor_sync(monitor);
+ monitor_sync(pmonitor);
/* Wait for the child's exit status */
- waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
-
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ break;
return (authctxt);
} else {
/* child */
- close(monitor->m_sendfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
/* Demote the child */
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
- monitor_apply_keystate(monitor);
+ monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
use_privsep = 0;
return;
}
}
/* New socket pair */
- monitor_reinit(monitor);
+ monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
- monitor->m_pid = fork();
- if (monitor->m_pid == -1)
+ pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- else if (monitor->m_pid != 0) {
- debug2("User child is on pid %d", monitor->m_pid);
- close(monitor->m_recvfd);
- monitor_child_postauth(monitor);
+ else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+ debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
exit(0);
}
- close(monitor->m_sendfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
- monitor_apply_keystate(monitor);
+ monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
}
static char *
get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
{
int i;
+
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
{
int i;
+
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
return (i);
Key *key;
int ret, key_used = 0;
+#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+ (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+#endif
__progname = get_progname(av[0]);
init_rng();
* hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
*/
if (options.server_key_bits >
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED &&
- options.server_key_bits <
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
options.server_key_bits =
- BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
+ BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
options.server_key_bits);
}
}
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+ if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
+ (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
+ fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
+ _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
+ fatal("Bad owner or mode for %s",
+ _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+ }
+
/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
if (test_flag)
exit(0);
-#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW
- (void) set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
-#endif
+ /*
+ * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
+ * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
+ * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
+ * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
+ * module which might be used).
+ */
+ if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
+ debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
*/
f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
if (f) {
- fprintf(f, "%u\n", (u_int) getpid());
+ fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
fclose(f);
}
}
if (pid < 0)
error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
- debug("Forked child %d.", pid);
+ debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
close(startup_p[1]);
/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
+ /*
+ * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+ * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
+ * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
+ */
+#if 0
+ /* XXX: this breaks Solaris */
+ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
+ error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
/*
* Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
* key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
/*
* Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
- * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged
+ * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged
* programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
* machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these
* authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
* the current keystate and exits
*/
if (use_privsep) {
- mm_send_keystate(monitor);
+ mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
exit(0);
}
debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
- /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
+ /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
}
+ if (!options.compression) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ }
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
/* start key exchange */