- (djm) [auth-pam.c auth.c bufaux.h entropy.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.c]

[openssh.git] / auth.c

diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index fca373b8075b3f564a13e9f12ce854a00169eede..f2aee8fdb084dcdb58a421cb5bb970775c87c178 100644 (file)
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.75 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -23,44 +24,52 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.62 2006/02/20 17:19:53 stevesk Exp $");
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
 
+#include <errno.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
 # include <paths.h>
 #endif
+#include <pwd.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
 #include <login.h>
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
 #include <shadow.h>
 #endif
-
 #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
 #include <libgen.h>
 #endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "groupaccess.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "loginrec.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int use_privsep;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
 
 /* Debugging messages */
@@ -237,6 +246,9 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
        void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
        char *authmsg;
 
+       if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
+               return;
+
        /* Raise logging level */
        if (authenticated == 1 ||
            !authctxt->valid ||
@@ -267,42 +279,8 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
                    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
 #endif
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-       if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
-               ssh_audit_event_t event;
-
-               debug3("audit failed auth attempt, method %s euid %d",
-                   method, (int)geteuid());
-               /*
-                * Because the auth loop is used in both monitor and slave,
-                * we must be careful to send each event only once and with
-                * enough privs to write the event.
-                */
-               event = audit_classify_auth(method);
-               switch(event) {
-               case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
-               case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
-               case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
-                       if (geteuid() == 0)
-                               audit_event(event);
-                       break;
-               case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
-               case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
-               case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
-                       /*
-                        * This is required to handle the case where privsep
-                        * is enabled but it's root logging in, since
-                        * use_privsep won't be cleared until after a
-                        * successful login.
-                        */
-                       if (geteuid() == 0)
-                               audit_event(event);
-                       else
-                               PRIVSEP(audit_event(event));
-                       break;
-               default:
-                       error("unknown authentication audit event %d", event);
-               }
-       }
+       if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
+               audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -315,7 +293,6 @@ auth_root_allowed(char *method)
        switch (options.permit_root_login) {
        case PERMIT_YES:
                return 1;
-               break;
        case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
                if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
                        return 1;
@@ -342,7 +319,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(char *method)
 static char *
 expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
 {
-       char *file, *ret;
+       char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
+       int i;
 
        file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
            "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
@@ -354,14 +332,11 @@ expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
        if (*file == '/')
                return (file);
 
-       ret = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-       if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
-           strlcat(ret, "/", MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
-           strlcat(ret, file, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN)
+       i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
+       if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
                fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
-
        xfree(file);
-       return (ret);
+       return (xstrdup(ret));
 }
 
 char *
@@ -498,6 +473,9 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 #endif
        struct passwd *pw;
 
+       parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
+           get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr());
+
        pw = getpwnam(user);
        if (pw == NULL) {
                logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",