*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.175 2001/03/18 23:30:55 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.208 2001/11/09 19:08:35 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "canohost.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "channels.h"
#ifdef LIBWRAP
#include <tcpd.h>
*/
int debug_flag = 0;
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
+int test_flag = 0;
+
/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
int inetd_flag = 0;
char *client_version_string = NULL;
char *server_version_string = NULL;
+/* for rekeying XXX fixme */
+Kex *xxx_kex;
+
/*
* Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
* structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
*/
int key_do_regen = 0;
-/* This is set to true when SIGHUP is received. */
+/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
int received_sighup = 0;
+int received_sigterm = 0;
/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
u_char session_id[16];
u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
-void do_ssh1_kex(void);
-void do_ssh2_kex(void);
+void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-void ssh_dh1_server(Kex *, Buffer *_kexinit, Buffer *);
-void ssh_dhgex_server(Kex *, Buffer *_kexinit, Buffer *);
+static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
+static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
/*
* Close all listening sockets
*/
-void
+static void
close_listen_socks(void)
{
int i;
* the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
* the server key).
*/
-void
+static void
sighup_handler(int sig)
{
received_sighup = 1;
* Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
* Restarts the server.
*/
-void
+static void
sighup_restart(void)
{
log("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
/*
* Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
- * These close the listen socket; not closing it seems to cause "Address
- * already in use" problems on some machines, which is inconvenient.
*/
-void
+static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
- log("Received signal %d; terminating.", sig);
- close_listen_socks();
- unlink(options.pid_file);
- exit(255);
+ received_sigterm = sig;
}
/*
* SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
- * reap any zombies left by exited c.
+ * reap any zombies left by exited children.
*/
-void
+static void
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
/*
* Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
*/
-void
+static void
grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
{
+ /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
+
/* Close the connection. */
packet_close();
* Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
* problems.
*/
-void
+static void
generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
{
u_int32_t rand = 0;
int i;
- log("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "",
- options.server_key_bits);
+ verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
+ sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1, options.server_key_bits);
- log("RSA key generation complete.");
+ sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
+ options.server_key_bits);
+ verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
arc4random_stir();
}
-void
+static void
key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
key_do_regen = 1;
}
-void
+static void
sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
{
int i, mismatch;
/* Send our protocol version identification. */
if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string))
!= strlen(server_version_string)) {
- log("Could not write ident string to %s.", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
fatal_cleanup();
}
/* Read other side's version identification. */
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
- log("Did not receive identification string from %s.",
+ log("Did not receive identification string from %s",
get_remote_ipaddr());
fatal_cleanup();
}
if (buf[i] == '\r') {
- buf[i] = '\n';
- buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ buf[i] = 0;
/* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
if (i == 12 &&
strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
continue;
}
if (buf[i] == '\n') {
- /* buf[i] == '\n' */
- buf[i + 1] = 0;
+ buf[i] = 0;
break;
}
}
break;
}
chop(server_version_string);
- chop(client_version_string);
debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
if (mismatch) {
server_version_string, client_version_string);
fatal_cleanup();
}
- if (compat20)
- packet_set_ssh2_format();
}
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
}
-Key *
-load_private_key_autodetect(const char *filename)
-{
- struct stat st;
- int type;
- Key *public, *private;
-
- if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
- perror(filename);
- return NULL;
- }
- /*
- * try to load the public key. right now this only works for RSA1,
- * since SSH2 keys are fully encrypted
- */
- type = KEY_RSA1;
- public = key_new(type);
- if (!load_public_key(filename, public, NULL)) {
- /* ok, so we will assume this is 'some' key */
- type = KEY_UNSPEC;
- }
- key_free(public);
-
- /* Ok, try key with empty passphrase */
- private = key_new(type);
- if (load_private_key(filename, "", private, NULL)) {
- debug("load_private_key_autodetect: type %d %s",
- private->type, key_type(private));
- return private;
- }
- key_free(private);
- return NULL;
-}
-char *
+static char *
list_hostkey_types(void)
{
static char buf[1024];
return buf;
}
-Key *
+static Key *
get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
{
int i;
* of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
* all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
*/
-int
+static int
drop_connection(int startups)
{
double p, r;
int listen_sock, maxfd;
int startup_p[2];
int startups = 0;
+ Key *key;
int ret, key_used = 0;
__progname = get_progname(av[0]);
initialize_server_options(&options);
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
- while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:dDiqQ46")) != -1) {
+ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '4':
IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
case 'D':
no_daemon_flag = 1;
break;
+ case 'e':
+ log_stderr = 1;
+ break;
case 'i':
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
exit(1);
}
- options.ports[options.num_ports++] = atoi(optarg);
+ options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
+ if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
break;
case 'g':
- options.login_grace_time = atoi(optarg);
+ if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
break;
case 'k':
- options.key_regeneration_time = atoi(optarg);
+ if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
break;
case 'h':
if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
/* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
+ case 't':
+ test_flag = 1;
+ break;
case 'u':
utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
break;
fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -D Do not fork into daemon mode\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -t Only test configuration file and keys\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n");
exit(1);
}
}
+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+ channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
/*
* Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
options.log_facility == -1 ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
!inetd_flag);
+#ifdef _CRAY
+ /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now!
+ * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
+ */
+ drop_cray_privs();
+#endif
+
seed_rng();
/* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
for(i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- Key *key = load_private_key_autodetect(options.host_key_files[i]);
+ key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
if (key == NULL) {
- error("Could not load host key: %.200s: %.100s",
- options.host_key_files[i], strerror(errno));
+ error("Could not load host key: %s",
+ options.host_key_files[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
switch(key->type){
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
break;
}
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
+ debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
+ key_type(key));
}
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
}
}
+ /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
+ if (test_flag)
+ exit(0);
+
#ifdef HAVE_SCO_PROTECTED_PW
(void) set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
#endif
/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
unmounted if desired. */
chdir("/");
+
+ /* ignore SIGPIPE */
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
/* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
if (inetd_flag) {
- int s1, s2;
+ int s1;
s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */
- s2 = dup(s1);
+ dup(s1);
sock_in = dup(0);
sock_out = dup(1);
startup_pipe = -1;
if (!num_listen_socks)
fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
+ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+ generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+
+ /*
+ * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs
+ * listen_sock.
+ */
+ signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+
+ signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+
+ /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
+ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+
+ /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
if (!debug_flag) {
/*
* Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
fclose(f);
}
}
- if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
- generate_ephemeral_server_key();
-
- /* Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs listen_sock. */
- signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
-
- signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
-
- /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
- signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
/* setup fd set for listen */
fdset = NULL;
ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (received_sigterm) {
+ log("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ received_sigterm);
+ close_listen_socks();
+ unlink(options.pid_file);
+ exit(255);
+ }
if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
generate_ephemeral_server_key();
key_used = 0;
{
struct request_info req;
- request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, NULL);
+ request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
fromhost(&req);
if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
+ refuse(&req);
close(sock_in);
close(sock_out);
- refuse(&req);
}
/*XXX IPv6 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", eval_client(&req), remote_port); */
}
if (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED ||
remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2) {
debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, "
- "originating port not trusted.");
+ "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port);
options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
}
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5)
if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() &&
options.kerberos_authentication) {
debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4.");
options.kerberos_authentication = 0;
}
-#endif /* KRB4 */
+#endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */
#ifdef AFS
/* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */
if (k_hasafs()) {
do_ssh1_kex();
do_authentication();
}
-
-#ifdef KRB4
- /* Cleanup user's ticket cache file. */
- if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
- (void) dest_tkt();
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
/* The connection has been terminated. */
verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
/*
* SSH1 key exchange
*/
-void
+static void
do_ssh1_kex(void)
{
int i, len;
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
if (options.rsa_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
if (options.kerberos_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS;
#endif
-#ifdef AFS
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
if (options.afs_token_passing)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN;
#endif
- if (options.challenge_reponse_authentication == 1)
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
if (options.password_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
/*
* SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
*/
-void
+static void
do_ssh2_kex(void)
{
- Buffer *server_kexinit;
- Buffer *client_kexinit;
- int payload_len;
- int i;
Kex *kex;
- char *cprop[PROPOSAL_MAX];
-
-/* KEXINIT */
if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
}
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
+ compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
+
if (options.macs != NULL) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
}
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
- server_kexinit = kex_init(myproposal);
- client_kexinit = xmalloc(sizeof(*client_kexinit));
- buffer_init(client_kexinit);
-
- /* algorithm negotiation */
- kex_exchange_kexinit(server_kexinit, client_kexinit, cprop);
- kex = kex_choose_conf(cprop, myproposal, 1);
- for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
- xfree(cprop[i]);
+ /* start key exchange */
+ kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
- switch (kex->kex_type) {
- case DH_GRP1_SHA1:
- ssh_dh1_server(kex, client_kexinit, server_kexinit);
- break;
- case DH_GEX_SHA1:
- ssh_dhgex_server(kex, client_kexinit, server_kexinit);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type);
- }
+ xxx_kex = kex;
- debug("send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- debug("done: send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
- debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
- packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
- debug("GOT SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
+ session_id2 = kex->session_id;
+ session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
-
- debug("done: KEX2.");
-}
-
-/*
- * SSH2 key exchange
- */
-
-/* diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 */
-
-void
-ssh_dh1_server(Kex *kex, Buffer *client_kexinit, Buffer *server_kexinit)
-{
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- int i;
-#endif
- int payload_len, dlen;
- int slen;
- u_char *signature = NULL;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
- u_int sbloblen;
- u_int klen, kout;
- u_char *kbuf;
- u_char *hash;
- BIGNUM *shared_secret = 0;
- DH *dh;
- BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = 0;
- Key *hostkey;
-
- hostkey = get_hostkey_by_type(kex->hostkey_type);
- if (hostkey == NULL)
- fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
-
-/* KEXDH */
- /* generate DH key */
- dh = dh_new_group1(); /* XXX depends on 'kex' */
- dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-
- debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT.");
- packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
-
- /* key, cert */
- dh_client_pub = BN_new();
- if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
- fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
- packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub, &dlen);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "\ndh_client_pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "\np= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->p);
- fprintf(stderr, "\ng= ");
- bn_print(dh->g);
- fprintf(stderr, "\npub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
-#endif
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
- packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-
- klen = DH_size(dh);
- kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
- kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- debug("shared secret: len %d/%d", klen, kout);
- fprintf(stderr, "shared secret == ");
- for (i = 0; i< kout; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (kbuf[i])&0xff);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- shared_secret = BN_new();
-
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
- memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
- xfree(kbuf);
-
- /* XXX precompute? */
- key_to_blob(hostkey, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
-
- /* calc H */ /* XXX depends on 'kex' */
- hash = kex_hash(
- client_version_string,
- server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(client_kexinit), buffer_len(client_kexinit),
- buffer_ptr(server_kexinit), buffer_len(server_kexinit),
- (char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- dh_client_pub,
- dh->pub_key,
- shared_secret
- );
- buffer_free(client_kexinit);
- buffer_free(server_kexinit);
- xfree(client_kexinit);
- xfree(server_kexinit);
- BN_free(dh_client_pub);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "hash == ");
- for (i = 0; i< 20; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (hash[i])&0xff);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- /* save session id := H */
- /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
- session_id2_len = 20;
- session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
- memcpy(session_id2, hash, session_id2_len);
-
- /* sign H */
- /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
- key_sign(hostkey, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
-
- destroy_sensitive_data();
-
- /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
- packet_put_string((char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); /* f */
- packet_put_string((char *)signature, slen);
- packet_send();
- xfree(signature);
- xfree(server_host_key_blob);
- packet_write_wait();
-
- kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- packet_set_kex(kex);
-
- /* have keys, free DH */
- DH_free(dh);
-}
-
-/* diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 */
-
-void
-ssh_dhgex_server(Kex *kex, Buffer *client_kexinit, Buffer *server_kexinit)
-{
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- int i;
-#endif
- int payload_len, dlen;
- int slen, nbits;
- u_char *signature = NULL;
- u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
- u_int sbloblen;
- u_int klen, kout;
- u_char *kbuf;
- u_char *hash;
- BIGNUM *shared_secret = 0;
- DH *dh;
- BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = 0;
- Key *hostkey;
-
- hostkey = get_hostkey_by_type(kex->hostkey_type);
- if (hostkey == NULL)
- fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
-
-/* KEXDHGEX */
- debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST.");
- packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
- nbits = packet_get_int();
- dh = choose_dh(nbits);
-
- debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP.");
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
-
- /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
-
- dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-
- debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT.");
- packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
-
- /* key, cert */
- dh_client_pub = BN_new();
- if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
- fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
- packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub, &dlen);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "\ndh_client_pub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "\np= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->p);
- fprintf(stderr, "\ng= ");
- bn_print(dh->g);
- fprintf(stderr, "\npub= ");
- BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
-#endif
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
- packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-
- klen = DH_size(dh);
- kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
- kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- debug("shared secret: len %d/%d", klen, kout);
- fprintf(stderr, "shared secret == ");
- for (i = 0; i< kout; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (kbuf[i])&0xff);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- shared_secret = BN_new();
-
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
- memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
- xfree(kbuf);
-
- /* XXX precompute? */
- key_to_blob(hostkey, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
-
- /* calc H */ /* XXX depends on 'kex' */
- hash = kex_hash_gex(
- client_version_string,
- server_version_string,
- buffer_ptr(client_kexinit), buffer_len(client_kexinit),
- buffer_ptr(server_kexinit), buffer_len(server_kexinit),
- (char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
- nbits, dh->p, dh->g,
- dh_client_pub,
- dh->pub_key,
- shared_secret
- );
- buffer_free(client_kexinit);
- buffer_free(server_kexinit);
- xfree(client_kexinit);
- xfree(server_kexinit);
- BN_free(dh_client_pub);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- fprintf(stderr, "hash == ");
- for (i = 0; i< 20; i++)
- fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (hash[i])&0xff);
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
- /* save session id := H */
- /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
- session_id2_len = 20;
- session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
- memcpy(session_id2, hash, session_id2_len);
-
- /* sign H */
- /* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
- key_sign(hostkey, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
-
- destroy_sensitive_data();
-
- /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
- packet_put_string((char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
- packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); /* f */
- packet_put_string((char *)signature, slen);
- packet_send();
- xfree(signature);
- xfree(server_host_key_blob);
- packet_write_wait();
-
- kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- packet_set_kex(kex);
-
- /* have keys, free DH */
- DH_free(dh);
+ debug("KEX done");
}
andersk / openssh.git / blobdiff