*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.295 2004/06/25 01:16:09 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.314 2005/09/19 11:47:09 djm Exp $");
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#define O_NOCTTY 0
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+/* Re-exec fds */
+#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
+#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
+
extern char *__progname;
-#else
-char *__progname;
-#endif
/* Server configuration options. */
ServerOptions options;
/* Name of the server configuration file. */
char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
-/*
- * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
- * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6.
- */
-int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
-
/*
* Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
* mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
int use_privsep;
struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
-/* message to be displayed after login */
-Buffer loginmsg;
-
/* global authentication context */
Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
+/* message to be displayed after login */
+Buffer loginmsg;
+
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
static void
sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
{
- int i, mismatch;
+ u_int i;
+ int mismatch;
int remote_major, remote_minor;
int major, minor;
char *s;
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
#endif
/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
- monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
use_privsep = 0;
- return;
+ goto out;
}
/* Authentication complete */
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
/* Drop privileges */
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+ out:
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+ /*
+ * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
+ * this information is not part of the key state.
+ */
+ packet_set_authenticated();
}
static char *
static int
drop_connection(int startups)
{
- double p, r;
+ int p, r;
if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
return 0;
p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
- p /= (double) (options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin);
+ p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p += options.max_startups_rate;
- p /= 100.0;
- r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX;
+ r = arc4random() % 100;
- debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r);
+ debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
}
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
- SSH_VERSION, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+ SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
" [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
* bignum iqmp "
* bignum p "
* bignum q "
+ * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
*/
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf));
- if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
buffer_put_int(&m, 1);
buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
} else
buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ rexec_send_rng_seed(&m);
+#endif
+
if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
sensitive_data.server_key->rsa);
}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m);
+#endif
+
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
{
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
- int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
+ int opt, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
+ int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
pid_t pid;
socklen_t fromlen;
fd_set *fdset;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
char *line;
int listen_sock, maxfd;
- int startup_p[2], config_s[2];
+ int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
int startups = 0;
Key *key;
Authctxt *authctxt;
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
+ rexec_argc = ac;
saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1));
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
initialize_server_options(&options);
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqrtQR46")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '4':
- IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+ options.address_family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
- IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+ options.address_family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'f':
config_file_name = optarg;
if (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))
fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
if (rexeced_flag)
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 3);
+ closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
+ else
+ closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
- channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
/*
* Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
-#ifdef _AIX
/*
* Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
* root's environment
- */
- unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
-#endif /* _AIX */
+ */
+ if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
+ unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
+
#ifdef _UNICOS
/* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
* Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
drop_cray_privs();
#endif
- seed_rng();
-
sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
/* Fetch our configuration */
buffer_init(&cfg);
if (rexeced_flag)
- recv_rexec_state(STDERR_FILENO + 2, &cfg);
+ recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg);
else
load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
if (!rexec_flag)
buffer_free(&cfg);
+ seed_rng();
+
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
+ /* set default channel AF */
+ channel_set_af(options.address_family);
+
/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
if (optind < ac) {
fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
exit(1);
}
- debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION);
+ debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
/* load private host keys */
sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
}
/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
- if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
+ if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
log_stderr = 1;
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
startup_pipe = -1;
if (rexeced_flag) {
- close(STDERR_FILENO + 2);
+ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
sock_in = sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
if (!debug_flag) {
- startup_pipe = dup(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- close(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+ close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
}
} else {
sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
"Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
- NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
- error("getnameinfo failed");
+ NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+ error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+ (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
+ strerror(errno));
continue;
}
/* Create socket for listening. */
sock_in = newsock;
sock_out = newsock;
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ if (rexec_flag)
+ close(config_s[0]);
break;
}
}
/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
+ /*
+ * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+ * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
+ * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
+ */
+#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
+ /*
+ * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
+ * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
+ * controlling tty" errors.
+ */
+ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
+ error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
if (rexec_flag) {
int fd;
- debug("rexec newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", newsock,
- startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
+ debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
+ sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (startup_pipe == -1)
- close(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
else
- dup2(startup_pipe, STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
- dup2(config_s[1], STDERR_FILENO + 2);
+ dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
close(config_s[1]);
+ if (startup_pipe != -1)
+ close(startup_pipe);
+
execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
/* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
- recv_rexec_state(STDERR_FILENO + 2, NULL);
+ recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Clean up fds */
+ startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
close(config_s[1]);
- close(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- close(STDERR_FILENO + 2);
+ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+ newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
close(fd);
}
+ debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
+ sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
}
- /*
- * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
- * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
- * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
- */
-#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
- /*
- * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
- * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
- * controlling tty" errors.
- */
- if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
- error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-#endif
-
/*
* Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
* key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
- /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
- if (options.tcp_keep_alive &&
- setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on,
- sizeof(on)) < 0)
- error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-
/*
* Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
* not have a key.
*/
packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
+ packet_set_server();
+
+ /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
+ setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+ error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- remote_port = get_remote_port();
+ if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
+ debug("get_remote_port failed");
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+#endif
#ifdef LIBWRAP
/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
packet_set_nonblocking();
- /* prepare buffers to collect authentication messages */
- buffer_init(&loginmsg);
-
/* allocate authentication context */
authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
+
/* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
the_authctxt = authctxt;
+ /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
+ buffer_init(&loginmsg);
+
if (use_privsep)
if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
goto authenticated;
}
authenticated:
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+
/*
* In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
* file descriptor passing.
finish_pam();
#endif /* USE_PAM */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#endif
+
packet_close();
if (use_privsep)
if (!rsafail) {
BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
- if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
+ if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
"session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
derive_ssh1_session_id(
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
+ sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
cookie, session_id);
/*
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
}
- if (!options.compression) {
+ if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
}
+
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
/* start key exchange */
{
if (the_authctxt)
do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+#endif
_exit(i);
}