/*
- *
- * authfd.c
- *
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- *
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
- *
- * Created: Wed Mar 29 01:30:28 1995 ylo
- *
* Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
*
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
* SSH2 implementation,
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.25 2000/08/19 21:34:42 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.65 2005/05/24 17:32:43 avsm Exp $");
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "ssh.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "bufaux.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "getput.h"
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "key.h"
#include "authfd.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
-#include "dsa.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+static int agent_present = 0;
/* helper */
int decode_reply(int type);
+/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
+#define agent_failed(x) \
+ ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
+ (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
+
+int
+ssh_agent_present(void)
+{
+ int authfd;
+
+ if (agent_present)
+ return 1;
+ if ((authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket()) == -1)
+ return 0;
+ else {
+ ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
int
-ssh_get_authentication_socket()
+ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
{
const char *authsocket;
- int sock, len;
+ int sock;
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-#ifdef HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN
- sunaddr.sun_len = len = SUN_LEN(&sunaddr)+1;
-#else /* HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN */
- len = SUN_LEN(&sunaddr)+1;
-#endif /* HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN */
sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock < 0)
close(sock);
return -1;
}
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, len) < 0) {
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
close(sock);
return -1;
}
+ agent_present = 1;
return sock;
}
-int
+static int
ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
{
- int l, len;
+ int l;
+ u_int len;
char buf[1024];
/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
- if (atomicio(write, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
- atomicio(write, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+ atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) {
error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
return 0;
* Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
* response packet.
*/
- len = 4;
- while (len > 0) {
- l = read(auth->fd, buf + 4 - len, len);
- if (l <= 0) {
- error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
- return 0;
- }
- len -= l;
+ if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4) {
+ error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
+ return 0;
}
/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
len = GET_32BIT(buf);
if (len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("Authentication response too long: %d", len);
+ fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
buffer_clear(reply);
l = len;
if (l > sizeof(buf))
l = sizeof(buf);
- l = read(auth->fd, buf, l);
- if (l <= 0) {
+ if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l) != l) {
error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
return 0;
}
- buffer_append(reply, (char *) buf, l);
+ buffer_append(reply, buf, l);
len -= l;
}
return 1;
*/
AuthenticationConnection *
-ssh_get_authentication_connection()
+ssh_get_authentication_connection(void)
{
AuthenticationConnection *auth;
int sock;
xfree(auth);
}
+/* Lock/unlock agent */
+int
+ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int lock, const char *password)
+{
+ int type;
+ Buffer msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, password);
+
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
/*
* Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
*/
-Key *
-ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
+int
+ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
{
int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
Buffer request;
- switch(version){
+ switch (version) {
case 1:
code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
break;
default:
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
/*
buffer_clear(&auth->identities);
if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) {
buffer_free(&request);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
buffer_free(&request);
/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities);
- if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) {
- return NULL;
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ return 0;
} else if (type != code2) {
fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type);
}
/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
- if (auth->howmany > 1024)
- fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d\n",
+ if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024)
+ fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
auth->howmany);
- /* Return the first entry (if any). */
- return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
+ return auth->howmany;
+}
+
+Key *
+ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
+{
+ /* get number of identities and return the first entry (if any). */
+ if (ssh_get_num_identities(auth, version) > 0)
+ return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
+ return NULL;
}
Key *
ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
{
- unsigned int bits;
- unsigned char *blob;
- unsigned int blen;
+ u_int bits;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
Key *key = NULL;
/* Return failure if no more entries. */
* Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal
* error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
*/
- switch(version){
+ switch (version) {
case 1:
- key = key_new(KEY_RSA);
+ key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
- log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+ logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
break;
case 2:
blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
- key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
xfree(blob);
break;
default:
int
ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
- unsigned char session_id[16],
- unsigned int response_type,
- unsigned char response[16])
+ u_char session_id[16],
+ u_int response_type,
+ u_char response[16])
{
Buffer buffer;
int success = 0;
int i;
int type;
- if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
+ if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
return 0;
if (response_type == 0) {
- log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+ logit("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
return 0;
}
buffer_init(&buffer);
buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
- buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16);
+ buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
}
type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
- if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) {
- log("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ logit("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
} else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
} else {
int
ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
Key *key,
- unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp,
- unsigned char *data, int datalen)
+ u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
+ extern int datafellows;
Buffer msg;
- unsigned char *blob;
- unsigned int blen;
- int type;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+ int type, flags = 0;
int ret = -1;
- if (dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
return -1;
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB)
+ flags = SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE;
+
buffer_init(&msg);
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, flags);
xfree(blob);
if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
return -1;
}
type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
- if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) {
- log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+ if (agent_failed(type)) {
+ logit("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
} else {
/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
-void
-ssh_encode_identity_rsa(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
+static void
+ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
{
- buffer_clear(b);
- buffer_put_char(b, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY);
buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp); /* ssh key->u */
buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q); /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
- buffer_put_string(b, comment, strlen(comment));
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
}
-void
-ssh_encode_identity_dsa(Buffer *b, DSA *key, const char *comment)
+static void
+ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
{
- buffer_clear(b);
- buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY);
- buffer_put_cstring(b, KEX_DSS);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->p);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->q);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->g);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->pub_key);
- buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->priv_key);
- buffer_put_string(b, comment, strlen(comment));
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
}
/*
*/
int
-ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
+ const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm)
{
Buffer msg;
- int type;
+ int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
buffer_init(&msg);
switch (key->type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
- ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ type = constrained ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
- ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&msg, key->dsa, comment);
+ type = constrained ?
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment);
break;
default:
buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
break;
}
+ if (constrained) {
+ if (life != 0) {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
+ }
+ if (confirm != 0)
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
+ }
if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
return decode_reply(type);
}
+int
+ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+{
+ return ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth, key, comment, 0, 0);
+}
+
/*
* Removes an identity from the authentication server. This call is not
* meant to be used by normal applications.
{
Buffer msg;
int type;
- unsigned char *blob;
- unsigned int blen;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
buffer_init(&msg);
- if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
- } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA) {
- dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
+ } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA || key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
xfree(blob);
return decode_reply(type);
}
+int
+ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add,
+ const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
+
+ if (add) {
+ type = constrained ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+ } else
+ type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
+
+ if (constrained) {
+ if (life != 0) {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
+ }
+ if (confirm != 0)
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
+ }
+
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
/*
* Removes all identities from the agent. This call is not meant to be used
* by normal applications.
return decode_reply(type);
}
-int
+int
decode_reply(int type)
{
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
- log("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
+ case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
+ case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
+ logit("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
return 0;
case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
return 1;