]> andersk Git - openssh.git/blobdiff - authfd.c
- (stevesk) [auth1.c] fix password auth for protocol 1 when
[openssh.git] / authfd.c
index d98f1184e3da33448ae0930e838a85d4138c5d2f..f3050d64db29e9bbed21f2d5c67fb258d09594eb 100644 (file)
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.33 2001/01/21 19:05:44 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.49 2002/03/21 22:44:05 rees Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -52,14 +52,14 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.33 2001/01/21 19:05:44 markus Exp $");
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
-#include "authfd.h"
 
 /* helper */
 int    decode_reply(int type);
 
 /* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
 #define agent_failed(x) \
-    ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE))
+    ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
+     (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
 
 /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
 
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int
 ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 {
        const char *authsocket;
-       int sock, len;
+       int sock;
        struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
 
        authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
@@ -76,11 +76,6 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 
        sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
        strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-#ifdef HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN
-       sunaddr.sun_len = len = SUN_LEN(&sunaddr)+1;
-#else /* HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN */
-       len = SUN_LEN(&sunaddr)+1;
-#endif /* HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN */
 
        sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
        if (sock < 0)
@@ -91,14 +86,14 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
                close(sock);
                return -1;
        }
-       if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, len) < 0) {
+       if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
                close(sock);
                return -1;
        }
        return sock;
 }
 
-int
+static int
 ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
 {
        int l, len;
@@ -122,6 +117,8 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
        len = 4;
        while (len > 0) {
                l = read(auth->fd, buf + 4 - len, len);
+               if (l == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+                       continue;
                if (l <= 0) {
                        error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
                        return 0;
@@ -141,6 +138,8 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
                if (l > sizeof(buf))
                        l = sizeof(buf);
                l = read(auth->fd, buf, l);
+               if (l == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+                       continue;
                if (l <= 0) {
                        error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
                        return 0;
@@ -218,7 +217,7 @@ ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
        int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
        Buffer request;
 
-       switch(version){
+       switch (version) {
        case 1:
                code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
                code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
@@ -256,7 +255,7 @@ ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
        /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
        auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
        if (auth->howmany > 1024)
-               fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d\n",
+               fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
                    auth->howmany);
 
        return auth->howmany;
@@ -287,7 +286,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
         * Get the next entry from the packet.  These will abort with a fatal
         * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
         */
-       switch(version){
+       switch (version) {
        case 1:
                key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
                bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
@@ -345,7 +344,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
-       buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16);
+       buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
        buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
 
        if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
@@ -375,8 +374,8 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 int
 ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
     Key *key,
-    u_char **sigp, int *lenp,
-    u_char *data, int datalen)
+    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
        extern int datafellows;
        Buffer msg;
@@ -417,7 +416,7 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 
 /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
 
-void
+static void
 ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
 {
        buffer_clear(b);
@@ -430,16 +429,16 @@ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
        buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp);        /* ssh key->u */
        buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q);   /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
        buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p);   /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
-       buffer_put_string(b, comment, strlen(comment));
+       buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
 }
 
-void
+static void
 ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
 {
        buffer_clear(b);
        buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY);
        buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
-       switch(key->type){
+       switch (key->type) {
        case KEY_RSA:
                buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
                buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
@@ -532,6 +531,26 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
        return decode_reply(type);
 }
 
+int
+ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin)
+{
+       Buffer msg;
+       int type;
+
+       buffer_init(&msg);
+       buffer_put_char(&msg, add ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY :
+           SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY);
+       buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
+       buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
+       if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+               buffer_free(&msg);
+               return 0;
+       }
+       type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+       buffer_free(&msg);
+       return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
 /*
  * Removes all identities from the agent.  This call is not meant to be used
  * by normal applications.
@@ -564,6 +583,7 @@ decode_reply(int type)
        switch (type) {
        case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
        case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
+       case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
                log("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
                return 0;
        case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
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