*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.140 2003/05/14 18:16:21 jakob Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.159 2005/01/05 08:51:32 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "readconf.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
-#include "readpass.h"
-#ifdef DNS
#include "dns.h"
-#endif
char *client_version_string = NULL;
char *server_version_string = NULL;
+int matching_host_key_dns = 0;
+
/* import */
extern Options options;
extern char *__progname;
#endif
static int show_other_keys(const char *, Key *);
+static void warn_changed_key(Key *);
/*
* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
* Build the final command string in the buffer by making the
* appropriate substitutions to the given proxy command.
*
- * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms
+ * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms
* (e.g. Solaris)
*/
buffer_init(&command);
return sock;
}
+static int
+timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
+ socklen_t addrlen, int timeout)
+{
+ fd_set *fdset;
+ struct timeval tv;
+ socklen_t optlen;
+ int fdsetsz, optval, rc, result = -1;
+
+ if (timeout <= 0)
+ return (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen));
+
+ set_nonblock(sockfd);
+ rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
+ return (-1);
+
+ fdsetsz = howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+ fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
+
+ memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
+ FD_SET(sockfd, fdset);
+ tv.tv_sec = timeout;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+
+ for(;;) {
+ rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv);
+ if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch(rc) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Timed out */
+ errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ /* Select error */
+ debug("select: %s", strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ /* Completed or failed */
+ optval = 0;
+ optlen = sizeof(optval);
+ if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval,
+ &optlen) == -1) {
+ debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
+ if (optval != 0) {
+ errno = optval;
+ break;
+ }
+ result = 0;
+ unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Should not occur */
+ fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc);
+ }
+
+ xfree(fdset);
+ return (result);
+}
+
/*
* Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
* The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
* second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
* and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
* the daemon.
- * Return values:
- * 0 for OK
- * ECONNREFUSED if we got a "Connection Refused" by the peer on any address
- * ECONNABORTED if we failed without a "Connection refused"
- * Suitable error messages for the connection failure will already have been
- * printed.
*/
int
ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
struct servent *sp;
- /*
- * Did we get only other errors than "Connection refused" (which
- * should block fallback to rsh and similar), or did we get at least
- * one "Connection refused"?
- */
- int full_failure = 1;
debug2("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv);
/* Any error is already output */
continue;
- if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) >= 0) {
+ if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ options.connection_timeout) >= 0) {
/* Successful connection. */
memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
break;
} else {
- if (errno == ECONNREFUSED)
- full_failure = 0;
debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
/*
/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
if (attempt >= connection_attempts) {
- logit("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
+ error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
host, strport, strerror(errno));
- return full_failure ? ECONNABORTED : ECONNREFUSED;
+ return (-1);
}
debug("Connection established.");
- /* Set keepalives if requested. */
- if (options.keepalives &&
+ /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+ if (options.tcp_keep_alive &&
setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
sizeof(on)) < 0)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1,
SSH_VERSION);
- if (atomicio(write, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
chop(client_version_string);
int readonly, const char *user_hostfile, const char *system_hostfile)
{
Key *file_key;
- char *type = key_type(host_key);
+ const char *type = key_type(host_key);
char *ip = NULL;
char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp;
HostStatus host_status;
int salen;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
char msg[1024];
- int len, host_line, ip_line, has_keys;
+ int len, host_line, ip_line;
const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL;
/*
"have requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
- has_keys = show_other_keys(host, host_key);
+ char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
+
+ if (show_other_keys(host, host_key))
+ snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
+ "\nbut keys of different type are already"
+ " known for this host.");
+ else
+ snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
/* The default */
fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ msg2[0] = '\0';
+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+ if (matching_host_key_dns)
+ snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+ "Matching host key fingerprint"
+ " found in DNS.\n");
+ else
+ snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
+ "No matching host key fingerprint"
+ " found in DNS.\n");
+ }
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
"established%s\n"
- "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n"
+ "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n%s"
"Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
"(yes/no)? ",
- host, ip,
- has_keys ? ",\nbut keys of different type are already "
- "known for this host." : ".",
- type, fp);
+ host, ip, msg1, type, fp, msg2);
xfree(fp);
if (!confirm(msg))
goto fail;
break;
case HOST_CHANGED:
if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
- char *msg;
+ char *key_msg;
if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
- msg = "is unknown";
+ key_msg = "is unknown";
else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
- msg = "is unchanged";
+ key_msg = "is unchanged";
else
- msg = "has a different value";
+ key_msg = "has a different value";
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
error("and the key for the according IP address %s", ip);
- error("%s. This could either mean that", msg);
+ error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
error("Offending key for IP in %s:%d", ip_file, ip_line);
}
/* The host key has changed. */
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
- error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
- error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type);
- error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
- type, fp);
- error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+ warn_changed_key(host_key);
error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
user_hostfile);
error("Offending key in %s:%d", host_file, host_line);
- xfree(fp);
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
/*
* If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
- * the connection but without password authentication or
+ * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
* agent forwarding.
*/
if (options.password_authentication) {
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.password_authentication = 0;
}
+ if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
+ error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
+ " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+ options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+ }
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
+ error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
+ " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+ options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+ }
if (options.forward_agent) {
error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
host_file, host_line);
}
if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) {
- logit(msg);
+ logit("%s", msg);
error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) {
if (!confirm(msg))
goto fail;
} else {
- logit(msg);
+ logit("%s", msg);
}
}
verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
{
struct stat st;
+ int flags = 0;
-#ifdef DNS
- if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
- switch(verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key)) {
- case DNS_VERIFY_OK:
- return 0;
- case DNS_VERIFY_FAILED:
- return -1;
- case DNS_VERIFY_ERROR:
- break;
- default:
- debug3("bad return value from verify_host_key_dns");
- break;
+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns &&
+ verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
+
+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
+
+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
+ matching_host_key_dns = 1;
+ } else {
+ warn_changed_key(host_key);
+ error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new "
+ "host key to get rid of this message.");
+ }
}
}
-#endif /* DNS */
/* return ok if the key can be found in an old keyfile */
if (stat(options.system_hostfile2, &st) == 0 ||
}
return (found);
}
+
+static void
+warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+{
+ char *fp;
+ const char *type = key_type(host_key);
+
+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
+ error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+ error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
+ error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
+ error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type);
+ error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+ type, fp);
+ error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+
+ xfree(fp);
+}
andersk / openssh.git / blobdiff