]> andersk Git - openssh.git/blobdiff - authfd.c
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/01/30 02:54:53
[openssh.git] / authfd.c
index e2456e39eee3f0a794569983c5cd1b0e0684a104..78a53c7a621d858d3ec3bb44db16b562fb822108 100644 (file)
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.81 2009/08/27 17:44:52 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.32 2000/12/20 19:37:21 markus Exp $");
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "getput.h"
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include "key.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+static int agent_present = 0;
 
 /* helper */
 int    decode_reply(int type);
 
 /* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
 #define agent_failed(x) \
-    ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE))
+    ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
+    (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
+
+int
+ssh_agent_present(void)
+{
+       int authfd;
+
+       if (agent_present)
+               return 1;
+       if ((authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket()) == -1)
+               return 0;
+       else {
+               ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd);
+               return 1;
+       }
+}
 
 /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
 
@@ -65,7 +95,7 @@ int
 ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 {
        const char *authsocket;
-       int sock, len;
+       int sock;
        struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
 
        authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
@@ -74,11 +104,6 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
 
        sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
        strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-#ifdef HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN
-       sunaddr.sun_len = len = SUN_LEN(&sunaddr)+1;
-#else /* HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN */
-       len = SUN_LEN(&sunaddr)+1;
-#endif /* HAVE_SUN_LEN_IN_SOCKADDR_UN */
 
        sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
        if (sock < 0)
@@ -89,26 +114,27 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket(void)
                close(sock);
                return -1;
        }
-       if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, len) < 0) {
+       if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
                close(sock);
                return -1;
        }
+       agent_present = 1;
        return sock;
 }
 
-int
+static int
 ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
 {
-       int l, len;
+       u_int l, len;
        char buf[1024];
 
        /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
        len = buffer_len(request);
-       PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
+       put_u32(buf, len);
 
        /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
-       if (atomicio(write, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
-           atomicio(write, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
+       if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+           atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request),
            buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) {
                error("Error writing to authentication socket.");
                return 0;
@@ -117,20 +143,15 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
         * Wait for response from the agent.  First read the length of the
         * response packet.
         */
-       len = 4;
-       while (len > 0) {
-               l = read(auth->fd, buf + 4 - len, len);
-               if (l <= 0) {
-                       error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
-                       return 0;
-               }
-               len -= l;
+       if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4) {
+           error("Error reading response length from authentication socket.");
+           return 0;
        }
 
        /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
-       len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+       len = get_u32(buf);
        if (len > 256 * 1024)
-               fatal("Authentication response too long: %d", len);
+               fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
 
        /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
        buffer_clear(reply);
@@ -138,12 +159,11 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
                l = len;
                if (l > sizeof(buf))
                        l = sizeof(buf);
-               l = read(auth->fd, buf, l);
-               if (l <= 0) {
+               if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l) != l) {
                        error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
                        return 0;
                }
-               buffer_append(reply, (char *) buf, l);
+               buffer_append(reply, buf, l);
                len -= l;
        }
        return 1;
@@ -206,6 +226,26 @@ ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
        xfree(auth);
 }
 
+/* Lock/unlock agent */
+int
+ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int lock, const char *password)
+{
+       int type;
+       Buffer msg;
+
+       buffer_init(&msg);
+       buffer_put_char(&msg, lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK);
+       buffer_put_cstring(&msg, password);
+
+       if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+               buffer_free(&msg);
+               return 0;
+       }
+       type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+       buffer_free(&msg);
+       return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
 /*
  * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
  */
@@ -216,7 +256,7 @@ ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
        int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
        Buffer request;
 
-       switch(version){
+       switch (version) {
        case 1:
                code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
                code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
@@ -253,8 +293,8 @@ ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
 
        /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
        auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
-       if (auth->howmany > 1024)
-               fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d\n",
+       if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024)
+               fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
                    auth->howmany);
 
        return auth->howmany;
@@ -272,6 +312,7 @@ ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versi
 Key *
 ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
 {
+       int keybits;
        u_int bits;
        u_char *blob;
        u_int blen;
@@ -285,15 +326,16 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
         * Get the next entry from the packet.  These will abort with a fatal
         * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
         */
-       switch(version){
+       switch (version) {
        case 1:
                key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
                bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
                buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
                buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
                *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
-               if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
-                       log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+               keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
+               if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
+                       logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
                            BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
                break;
        case 2:
@@ -304,7 +346,6 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
                break;
        default:
                return NULL;
-               break;
        }
        /* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
        auth->howmany--;
@@ -334,7 +375,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
        if (key->type != KEY_RSA1)
                return 0;
        if (response_type == 0) {
-               log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+               logit("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
                return 0;
        }
        buffer_init(&buffer);
@@ -343,7 +384,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
        buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
-       buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16);
+       buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
        buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
 
        if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
@@ -353,7 +394,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
        type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
 
        if (agent_failed(type)) {
-               log("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
+               logit("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key.");
        } else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) {
                fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
        } else {
@@ -363,7 +404,7 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
                 * fatal error if the packet is corrupt.
                 */
                for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-                       response[i] = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
+                       response[i] = (u_char)buffer_get_char(&buffer);
        }
        buffer_free(&buffer);
        return success;
@@ -373,8 +414,8 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 int
 ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
     Key *key,
-    u_char **sigp, int *lenp,
-    u_char *data, int datalen)
+    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
        extern int datafellows;
        Buffer msg;
@@ -402,7 +443,7 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
        }
        type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
        if (agent_failed(type)) {
-               log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+               logit("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
        } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
                fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
        } else {
@@ -415,11 +456,9 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 
 /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
 
-void
+static void
 ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
 {
-       buffer_clear(b);
-       buffer_put_char(b, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY);
        buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
        buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
        buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
@@ -428,16 +467,14 @@ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
        buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp);        /* ssh key->u */
        buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q);   /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
        buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p);   /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
-       buffer_put_string(b, comment, strlen(comment));
+       buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
 }
 
-void
+static void
 ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
 {
-       buffer_clear(b);
-       buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY);
        buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
-       switch(key->type){
+       switch (key->type) {
        case KEY_RSA:
                buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
                buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
@@ -463,25 +500,41 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
  */
 
 int
-ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
+ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
+    const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm)
 {
        Buffer msg;
-       int type;
+       int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
 
        buffer_init(&msg);
 
        switch (key->type) {
        case KEY_RSA1:
+               type = constrained ?
+                   SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+                   SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY;
+               buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
                ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
                break;
        case KEY_RSA:
        case KEY_DSA:
+               type = constrained ?
+                   SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+                   SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
+               buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
                ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment);
                break;
        default:
                buffer_free(&msg);
                return 0;
-               break;
+       }
+       if (constrained) {
+               if (life != 0) {
+                       buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+                       buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
+               }
+               if (confirm != 0)
+                       buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
        }
        if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
                buffer_free(&msg);
@@ -530,6 +583,43 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
        return decode_reply(type);
 }
 
+int
+ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add,
+    const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm)
+{
+       Buffer msg;
+       int type, constrained = (life || confirm);
+
+       if (add) {
+               type = constrained ?
+                   SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
+                   SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+       } else
+               type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+
+       buffer_init(&msg);
+       buffer_put_char(&msg, type);
+       buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id);
+       buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin);
+
+       if (constrained) {
+               if (life != 0) {
+                       buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME);
+                       buffer_put_int(&msg, life);
+               }
+               if (confirm != 0)
+                       buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM);
+       }
+
+       if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+               buffer_free(&msg);
+               return 0;
+       }
+       type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+       buffer_free(&msg);
+       return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
 /*
  * Removes all identities from the agent.  This call is not meant to be used
  * by normal applications.
@@ -556,13 +646,14 @@ ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
        return decode_reply(type);
 }
 
-int 
+int
 decode_reply(int type)
 {
        switch (type) {
        case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
        case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE:
-               log("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
+       case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE:
+               logit("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE");
                return 0;
        case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS:
                return 1;
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