]> andersk Git - openssh.git/blame_incremental - auth.c
- dugsong@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 01:30:10
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1/*
2 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
5 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
6 * are met:
7 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
8 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
9 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
11 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
12 *
13 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
14 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
15 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
16 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
17 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
18 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
19 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
20 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
21 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
22 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
23 */
24
25#include "includes.h"
26RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.37 2002/03/17 20:25:56 provos Exp $");
27
28#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
29#include <login.h>
30#endif
31#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
32#include <shadow.h>
33#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
34
35#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
36#include <libgen.h>
37#endif
38
39#include "xmalloc.h"
40#include "match.h"
41#include "groupaccess.h"
42#include "log.h"
43#include "servconf.h"
44#include "auth.h"
45#include "auth-options.h"
46#include "canohost.h"
47#include "buffer.h"
48#include "bufaux.h"
49#include "uidswap.h"
50#include "tildexpand.h"
51
52/* import */
53extern ServerOptions options;
54
55/*
56 * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
57 * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
58 * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
59 * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
60 * listed there, false will be returned.
61 * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
62 * Otherwise true is returned.
63 */
64int
65allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
66{
67 struct stat st;
68 const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
69 char *shell;
70 int i;
71#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
72 char *loginmsg;
73#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
74#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
75 !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
76 struct spwd *spw;
77
78 /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
79 if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
80 return 0;
81
82 spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
83 if (spw != NULL) {
84 int days = time(NULL) / 86400;
85
86 /* Check account expiry */
87 if ((spw->sp_expire >= 0) && (days > spw->sp_expire))
88 return 0;
89
90 /* Check password expiry */
91 if ((spw->sp_lstchg >= 0) && (spw->sp_max >= 0) &&
92 (days > (spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max)))
93 return 0;
94 }
95#else
96 /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
97 if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
98 return 0;
99#endif
100
101 /*
102 * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
103 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
104 */
105 shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
106
107 /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
108 if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
109 log("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
110 pw->pw_name, shell);
111 return 0;
112 }
113 if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
114 (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
115 log("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
116 pw->pw_name, shell);
117 return 0;
118 }
119
120 if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) {
121 hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping);
122 ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
123 }
124
125 /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
126 if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
127 for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
128 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
129 options.deny_users[i])) {
130 log("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
131 pw->pw_name);
132 return 0;
133 }
134 }
135 /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
136 if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
137 for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
138 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
139 options.allow_users[i]))
140 break;
141 /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
142 if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
143 log("User %.100s not allowed because not listed in AllowUsers",
144 pw->pw_name);
145 return 0;
146 }
147 }
148 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
149 /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
150 if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
151 log("User %.100s not allowed because not in any group",
152 pw->pw_name);
153 return 0;
154 }
155
156 /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
157 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
158 if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
159 options.num_deny_groups)) {
160 ga_free();
161 log("User %.100s not allowed because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
162 pw->pw_name);
163 return 0;
164 }
165 /*
166 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
167 * isn't listed there
168 */
169 if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
170 if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
171 options.num_allow_groups)) {
172 ga_free();
173 log("User %.100s not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups",
174 pw->pw_name);
175 return 0;
176 }
177 ga_free();
178 }
179
180#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
181 if (loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &loginmsg) != 0) {
182 if (loginmsg && *loginmsg) {
183 /* Remove embedded newlines (if any) */
184 char *p;
185 for (p = loginmsg; *p; p++) {
186 if (*p == '\n')
187 *p = ' ';
188 }
189 /* Remove trailing newline */
190 *--p = '\0';
191 log("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, loginmsg);
192 }
193 return 0;
194 }
195#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
196
197 /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
198 return 1;
199}
200
201Authctxt *
202authctxt_new(void)
203{
204 Authctxt *authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
205 memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
206 return authctxt;
207}
208
209void
210auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
211{
212 void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
213 char *authmsg;
214
215 /* Raise logging level */
216 if (authenticated == 1 ||
217 !authctxt->valid ||
218 authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG ||
219 strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
220 authlog = log;
221
222 if (authctxt->postponed)
223 authmsg = "Postponed";
224 else
225 authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
226
227 authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
228 authmsg,
229 method,
230 authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
231 authctxt->user,
232 get_remote_ipaddr(),
233 get_remote_port(),
234 info);
235}
236
237/*
238 * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
239 */
240int
241auth_root_allowed(char *method)
242{
243 switch (options.permit_root_login) {
244 case PERMIT_YES:
245 return 1;
246 break;
247 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
248 if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
249 return 1;
250 break;
251 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
252 if (forced_command) {
253 log("Root login accepted for forced command.");
254 return 1;
255 }
256 break;
257 }
258 log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
259 return 0;
260}
261
262
263/*
264 * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
265 * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
266 * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
267 *
268 * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
269 */
270char *
271expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
272{
273 Buffer buffer;
274 char *file;
275 const char *cp;
276
277 /*
278 * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate
279 * substitutions to the given file name.
280 */
281 buffer_init(&buffer);
282 for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) {
283 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
284 buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1);
285 cp++;
286 continue;
287 }
288 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
289 buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
290 cp++;
291 continue;
292 }
293 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
294 buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
295 strlen(pw->pw_name));
296 cp++;
297 continue;
298 }
299 buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1);
300 }
301 buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
302
303 /*
304 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
305 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
306 */
307 file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
308 cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer);
309 if (*cp != '/')
310 snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp);
311 else
312 strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN);
313
314 buffer_free(&buffer);
315 return file;
316}
317
318char *
319authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
320{
321 return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
322}
323
324char *
325authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
326{
327 return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
328}
329
330/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
331HostStatus
332check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
333 const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
334{
335 Key *found;
336 char *user_hostfile;
337 struct stat st;
338 HostStatus host_status;
339
340 /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
341 found = key_new(key->type);
342 host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
343
344 if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
345 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
346 if (options.strict_modes &&
347 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
348 ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
349 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
350 log("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
351 "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
352 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
353 } else {
354 temporarily_use_uid(pw);
355 host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
356 host, key, found, NULL);
357 restore_uid();
358 }
359 xfree(user_hostfile);
360 }
361 key_free(found);
362
363 debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
364 "ok" : "not found", host);
365 return host_status;
366}
367
368
369/*
370 * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
371 * of the path to the file must either be owned by either the owner of
372 * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
373 *
374 * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
375 *
376 * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
377 * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
378 *
379 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
380 */
381int
382secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
383 char *err, size_t errlen)
384{
385 uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
386 char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
387 char *cp;
388 struct stat st;
389
390 if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
391 snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
392 strerror(errno));
393 return -1;
394 }
395 if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) == NULL) {
396 snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", pw->pw_dir,
397 strerror(errno));
398 return -1;
399 }
400
401 /* check the open file to avoid races */
402 if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
403 (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
404 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
405 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
406 buf);
407 return -1;
408 }
409
410 /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
411 for (;;) {
412 if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
413 snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
414 return -1;
415 }
416 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
417
418 debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
419 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
420 (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
421 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
422 snprintf(err, errlen,
423 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
424 return -1;
425 }
426
427 /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
428 if (strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
429 debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
430 buf);
431 break;
432 }
433 /*
434 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
435 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
436 */
437 if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
438 break;
439 }
440 return 0;
441}
442
443struct passwd *
444getpwnamallow(const char *user)
445{
446 struct passwd *pw;
447
448 pw = getpwnam(user);
449 if (pw != NULL && !allowed_user(pw))
450 pw = NULL;
451
452 return (pw);
453}
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