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1/*
2 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
3 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
4 * All rights reserved
5 * Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit
6 * the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes
7 * /etc/hosts.equiv.
8 *
9 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
10 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
11 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
12 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
13 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
14 */
15
16#include "includes.h"
17RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.32 2003/11/04 08:54:09 djm Exp $");
18
19#include "packet.h"
20#include "uidswap.h"
21#include "pathnames.h"
22#include "log.h"
23#include "servconf.h"
24#include "canohost.h"
25#include "auth.h"
26
27/* import */
28extern ServerOptions options;
29extern int use_privsep;
30
31/*
32 * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
33 * /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted
34 * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise.
35 */
36
37static int
38check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
39 const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user,
40 const char *server_user)
41{
42 FILE *f;
43 char buf[1024]; /* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
44
45 /* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */
46 f = fopen(filename, "r");
47 if (!f)
48 return 0;
49
50 while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
51 /* All three must be at least as big as buf to avoid overflows. */
52 char hostbuf[1024], userbuf[1024], dummy[1024], *host, *user, *cp;
53 int negated;
54
55 for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
56 ;
57 if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp)
58 continue;
59
60 /*
61 * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we
62 * don't ever support the plus syntax).
63 */
64 if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0)
65 continue;
66
67 /*
68 * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the
69 * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten.
70 */
71 switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf,
72 dummy)) {
73 case 0:
74 auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename);
75 continue;
76 case 1:
77 /* Host name only. */
78 strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf));
79 break;
80 case 2:
81 /* Got both host and user name. */
82 break;
83 case 3:
84 auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename);
85 continue;
86 default:
87 /* Weird... */
88 continue;
89 }
90
91 host = hostbuf;
92 user = userbuf;
93 negated = 0;
94
95 /* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */
96 if (host[0] == '-') {
97 negated = 1;
98 host++;
99 } else if (host[0] == '+')
100 host++;
101
102 if (user[0] == '-') {
103 negated = 1;
104 user++;
105 } else if (user[0] == '+')
106 user++;
107
108 /* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
109 if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
110 /* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
111 auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names in %.100s.",
112 filename);
113 continue;
114 }
115 /* Verify that host name matches. */
116 if (host[0] == '@') {
117 if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
118 !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
119 continue;
120 } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
121 continue; /* Different hostname. */
122
123 /* Verify that user name matches. */
124 if (user[0] == '@') {
125 if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL))
126 continue;
127 } else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0)
128 continue; /* Different username. */
129
130 /* Found the user and host. */
131 fclose(f);
132
133 /* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
134 if (negated) {
135 auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
136 filename);
137 return 0;
138 }
139 /* Accept authentication. */
140 return 1;
141 }
142
143 /* Authentication using this file denied. */
144 fclose(f);
145 return 0;
146}
147
148/*
149 * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns
150 * true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only
151 * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
152 */
153
154int
155auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user)
156{
157 const char *hostname, *ipaddr;
158
159 hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
160 ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
161 return auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
162}
163
164static int
165auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
166 const char *ipaddr)
167{
168 char buf[1024];
169 struct stat st;
170 static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL};
171 u_int rhosts_file_index;
172
173 debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s",
174 client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
175
176 /* Switch to the user's uid. */
177 temporarily_use_uid(pw);
178 /*
179 * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files, return
180 * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
181 * servers.
182 */
183 for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
184 rhosts_file_index++) {
185 /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
186 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
187 pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
188 if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
189 break;
190 }
191 /* Switch back to privileged uid. */
192 restore_uid();
193
194 /* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there are no system-wide files. */
195 if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
196 stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
197 stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0)
198 return 0;
199
200 /* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */
201 if (pw->pw_uid != 0) {
202 if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
203 client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
204 auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.",
205 hostname, ipaddr);
206 return 1;
207 }
208 if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
209 client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
210 auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.",
211 hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
212 return 1;
213 }
214 }
215 /*
216 * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
217 * not group or world writable.
218 */
219 if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) {
220 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
221 "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
222 auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
223 "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
224 return 0;
225 }
226 if (options.strict_modes &&
227 ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
228 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
229 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
230 "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
231 auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
232 "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
233 return 0;
234 }
235 /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
236 temporarily_use_uid(pw);
237
238 /* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
239 for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
240 rhosts_file_index++) {
241 /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
242 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
243 pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
244 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
245 continue;
246
247 /*
248 * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by
249 * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the
250 * owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally
251 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
252 */
253 if (options.strict_modes &&
254 ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
255 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
256 logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
257 pw->pw_name, buf);
258 auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
259 continue;
260 }
261 /* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts and .shosts files. */
262 if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
263 auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to ignore %.100s.",
264 rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
265 continue;
266 }
267 /* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
268 if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
269 auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.",
270 rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
271 /* Restore the privileged uid. */
272 restore_uid();
273 auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user %s server_user %s",
274 hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name);
275 return 1;
276 }
277 }
278
279 /* Restore the privileged uid. */
280 restore_uid();
281 return 0;
282}
283
284int
285auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
286 const char *ipaddr)
287{
288 int ret;
289
290 auth_debug_reset();
291 ret = auth_rhosts2_raw(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
292 if (!use_privsep)
293 auth_debug_send();
294 return ret;
295}
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