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- otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/01/21 08:32:02
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1/*
2 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
5 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
6 * are met:
7 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
8 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
9 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
11 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
12 *
13 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
14 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
15 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
16 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
17 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
18 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
19 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
20 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
21 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
22 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
23 */
24
25#include "includes.h"
26RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.56 2004/07/28 09:40:29 markus Exp $");
27
28#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
29#include <login.h>
30#endif
31#ifdef USE_SHADOW
32#include <shadow.h>
33#endif
34
35#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
36#include <libgen.h>
37#endif
38
39#include "xmalloc.h"
40#include "match.h"
41#include "groupaccess.h"
42#include "log.h"
43#include "servconf.h"
44#include "auth.h"
45#include "auth-options.h"
46#include "canohost.h"
47#include "buffer.h"
48#include "bufaux.h"
49#include "uidswap.h"
50#include "misc.h"
51#include "bufaux.h"
52#include "packet.h"
53
54/* import */
55extern ServerOptions options;
56extern Buffer loginmsg;
57
58/* Debugging messages */
59Buffer auth_debug;
60int auth_debug_init;
61
62/*
63 * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
64 * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
65 * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
66 * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
67 * listed there, false will be returned.
68 * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
69 * Otherwise true is returned.
70 */
71int
72allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
73{
74 struct stat st;
75 const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
76 char *shell;
77 int i;
78#ifdef USE_SHADOW
79 struct spwd *spw = NULL;
80#endif
81
82 /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
83 if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
84 return 0;
85
86#ifdef USE_SHADOW
87 if (!options.use_pam)
88 spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
89#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
90 if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
91 return 0;
92#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
93#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
94
95 /* grab passwd field for locked account check */
96#ifdef USE_SHADOW
97 if (spw != NULL)
98 passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
99#else
100 passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
101#endif
102
103 /* check for locked account */
104 if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
105 int locked = 0;
106
107#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
108 if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
109 locked = 1;
110#endif
111#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
112 if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
113 strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
114 locked = 1;
115#endif
116#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
117 if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
118 locked = 1;
119#endif
120 if (locked) {
121 logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
122 pw->pw_name);
123 return 0;
124 }
125 }
126
127 /*
128 * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
129 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
130 */
131 shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
132
133 /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
134 if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
135 logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
136 pw->pw_name, shell);
137 return 0;
138 }
139 if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
140 (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
141 logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
142 pw->pw_name, shell);
143 return 0;
144 }
145
146 if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) {
147 hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
148 ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
149 }
150
151 /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
152 if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
153 for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
154 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
155 options.deny_users[i])) {
156 logit("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
157 pw->pw_name);
158 return 0;
159 }
160 }
161 /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
162 if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
163 for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
164 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
165 options.allow_users[i]))
166 break;
167 /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
168 if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
169 logit("User %.100s not allowed because not listed in AllowUsers",
170 pw->pw_name);
171 return 0;
172 }
173 }
174 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
175 /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
176 if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
177 logit("User %.100s not allowed because not in any group",
178 pw->pw_name);
179 return 0;
180 }
181
182 /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
183 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
184 if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
185 options.num_deny_groups)) {
186 ga_free();
187 logit("User %.100s not allowed because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
188 pw->pw_name);
189 return 0;
190 }
191 /*
192 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
193 * isn't listed there
194 */
195 if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
196 if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
197 options.num_allow_groups)) {
198 ga_free();
199 logit("User %.100s not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups",
200 pw->pw_name);
201 return 0;
202 }
203 ga_free();
204 }
205
206#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
207 if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw))
208 return 0;
209#endif
210
211 /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
212 return 1;
213}
214
215void
216auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
217{
218 void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
219 char *authmsg;
220
221 /* Raise logging level */
222 if (authenticated == 1 ||
223 !authctxt->valid ||
224 authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
225 strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
226 authlog = logit;
227
228 if (authctxt->postponed)
229 authmsg = "Postponed";
230 else
231 authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
232
233 authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
234 authmsg,
235 method,
236 authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
237 authctxt->user,
238 get_remote_ipaddr(),
239 get_remote_port(),
240 info);
241
242#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
243 if (authenticated == 0 && strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
244 record_failed_login(authctxt->user, "ssh");
245#endif
246}
247
248/*
249 * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
250 */
251int
252auth_root_allowed(char *method)
253{
254 switch (options.permit_root_login) {
255 case PERMIT_YES:
256 return 1;
257 break;
258 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
259 if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
260 return 1;
261 break;
262 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
263 if (forced_command) {
264 logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
265 return 1;
266 }
267 break;
268 }
269 logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
270 return 0;
271}
272
273
274/*
275 * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
276 * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
277 * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
278 *
279 * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
280 */
281char *
282expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
283{
284 Buffer buffer;
285 char *file;
286 const char *cp;
287
288 /*
289 * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate
290 * substitutions to the given file name.
291 */
292 buffer_init(&buffer);
293 for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) {
294 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
295 buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1);
296 cp++;
297 continue;
298 }
299 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
300 buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
301 cp++;
302 continue;
303 }
304 if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
305 buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
306 strlen(pw->pw_name));
307 cp++;
308 continue;
309 }
310 buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1);
311 }
312 buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
313
314 /*
315 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
316 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
317 */
318 file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
319 cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer);
320 if (*cp != '/')
321 snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp);
322 else
323 strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN);
324
325 buffer_free(&buffer);
326 return file;
327}
328
329char *
330authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
331{
332 return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
333}
334
335char *
336authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
337{
338 return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
339}
340
341/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
342HostStatus
343check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
344 const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
345{
346 Key *found;
347 char *user_hostfile;
348 struct stat st;
349 HostStatus host_status;
350
351 /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
352 found = key_new(key->type);
353 host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
354
355 if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
356 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
357 if (options.strict_modes &&
358 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
359 ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
360 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
361 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
362 "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
363 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
364 } else {
365 temporarily_use_uid(pw);
366 host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
367 host, key, found, NULL);
368 restore_uid();
369 }
370 xfree(user_hostfile);
371 }
372 key_free(found);
373
374 debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
375 "ok" : "not found", host);
376 return host_status;
377}
378
379
380/*
381 * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
382 * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
383 * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
384 *
385 * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
386 *
387 * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
388 * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
389 *
390 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
391 */
392int
393secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
394 char *err, size_t errlen)
395{
396 uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
397 char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
398 char *cp;
399 int comparehome = 0;
400 struct stat st;
401
402 if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
403 snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
404 strerror(errno));
405 return -1;
406 }
407 if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
408 comparehome = 1;
409
410 /* check the open file to avoid races */
411 if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
412 (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
413 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
414 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
415 buf);
416 return -1;
417 }
418
419 /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
420 for (;;) {
421 if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
422 snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
423 return -1;
424 }
425 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
426
427 debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
428 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
429 (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
430 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
431 snprintf(err, errlen,
432 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
433 return -1;
434 }
435
436 /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
437 if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
438 debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
439 buf);
440 break;
441 }
442 /*
443 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
444 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
445 */
446 if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
447 break;
448 }
449 return 0;
450}
451
452struct passwd *
453getpwnamallow(const char *user)
454{
455#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
456 extern login_cap_t *lc;
457#ifdef BSD_AUTH
458 auth_session_t *as;
459#endif
460#endif
461 struct passwd *pw;
462
463 pw = getpwnam(user);
464 if (pw == NULL) {
465 logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
466 user, get_remote_ipaddr());
467#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
468 record_failed_login(user, "ssh");
469#endif
470 return (NULL);
471 }
472 if (!allowed_user(pw))
473 return (NULL);
474#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
475 if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
476 debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
477 return (NULL);
478 }
479#ifdef BSD_AUTH
480 if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
481 auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
482 debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
483 pw = NULL;
484 }
485 if (as != NULL)
486 auth_close(as);
487#endif
488#endif
489 if (pw != NULL)
490 return (pwcopy(pw));
491 return (NULL);
492}
493
494void
495auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
496{
497 char buf[1024];
498 va_list args;
499
500 if (!auth_debug_init)
501 return;
502
503 va_start(args, fmt);
504 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
505 va_end(args);
506 buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
507}
508
509void
510auth_debug_send(void)
511{
512 char *msg;
513
514 if (!auth_debug_init)
515 return;
516 while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
517 msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
518 packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
519 xfree(msg);
520 }
521}
522
523void
524auth_debug_reset(void)
525{
526 if (auth_debug_init)
527 buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
528 else {
529 buffer_init(&auth_debug);
530 auth_debug_init = 1;
531 }
532}
533
534struct passwd *
535fakepw(void)
536{
537 static struct passwd fake;
538
539 memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
540 fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
541 fake.pw_passwd =
542 "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
543 fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
544 fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1;
545 fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1;
546#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
547 fake.pw_class = "";
548#endif
549 fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
550 fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
551
552 return (&fake);
553}
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